Neopatrimonialism and the Production of Poverty in Cameroon: The ...

Neopatrimonialism and the Production of Poverty in Cameroon: The State at
the Crossroads of Poverty and Politics in the 21 st Century
Abstract
By
Martin Sango Ndeh (Ph.D)
Department of History
Faculty of Arts
University of Buea
Cameroon
E‐mail: masango_2001@yahoo.co.uk
Phone No. +237 77169810
The shrinkage of state wealth through neopatrimonial logic is a serious cause
for poverty in Cameroon. The two regimes that have ruled Cameroon since
independence used neopatrimonial mechanisms to win grass root support and
to win loyalty from the different regions of the country. This process
exacerbated poverty because those who were co‐opted into the neo‐
patrimonial regime considered the wealth and revenue of the state as theirs
and the masses were abandoned to languish in poverty. Since independence
this system has unconsciously presented the plight of the masses or dominated
groups as passive and overestimates or exaggerates the integrationist’s virtues
of regimes based on the values of clientelism. This constitutes the basis of
neglect of the masses resulting in poverty. This study thus analyses the
different political relationships that have been established between the rulers
and the ruled under neopatrimonialism and how this have contributed in the
production of poverty in the state. There may be several different causes of
poverty in Cameroon like lack of jobs, declining incomes and inadequate road
infrastructure but the neopatrimonial regimen under Amadou Ahidjo and Biya
have grossly contributed to these inadequacies thus leading to poverty.
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Introduction
Contextual definition of Neopatrimonialism
Neopatrimonial rule can be defined as a political system whose apex is
controlled by personal mechanisms of control. The chief executive in this
system maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than through
ideology and law. As classic patrimonialism shows, the right to rule is ascribed
to a person rather than an office (Bratton, 1994:458). Following this system,
political leaders occupy offices to acquire personal wealth and status rather
than performing public functions and this can be described as kleptocracy. To
so many scholars loyalty and dependence intertwine to construct a formal
political and administrative system. It is important to mention that
neopatrimonialism is practised by different governments in Africa but the
outcome cannot be the same because of the different magnitudes and
intensities in the different proponents of this concept implement their ideas.
Therefore inside the neo‐patrimonial regimen the level of state capacity or
political institutionalization is low and any distinction between private and
public ambits is blurred. This paper attempts to demonstrate that the
neopatrimonial system established in Cameroon in the past fifty years has in no
small way contributed to the depletion of state resources leading to the
poverty of the masses.
Cameroon is a state located in the Central African sub‐ region with a
population of about nineteen million according to the 2006 census statistics. Of
this population, seventeen percent lives on less than one dollar a day, fifty‐one
percent on less than two dollars a day and access to basic facilities like health
services, water and electricity is still a major problem in the rural settings.
There is no region in the country that is untouched by poverty. (Encyclopedia of
Nations). The causes of poverty range from a high level of unemployment to
declining incomes, inadequate road infrastructure and problems of access to
land. Cameroon is often described as Africa in miniature because of its diverse
socio‐cultural, geographical varieties and broad‐based economic potentials.
This alludes to the state potentials to fight poverty and improve on the welfare
of the citizens. Unfortunately this is not the case because Cameroon falls
deeply below the poverty margin according to World Bank statistics.
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(Encyclopedia of Nations). The state of Cameroon has moved from the status of
a poor country as assessed by the French in 1946 to the status of a heavily
indebted poor country as described by the Breton Woods‐ IMF and World Bank
in their recent assessment of the country’s economy. While acknowledging the
absence of a real nation in Cameroon due to ethnic, religious and linguistic
particularities, those who have constituted the national bureaucrat since
independence have not exploited this diversity to enhance uniform
development. The ethnic groups that have been lucky to grab the control of
state machinery (Ahidjo’s ethnic group in the North and Biya’s Beti Clan) have
concentrated development and empowerment around their ethnic groups
even then with specific clans and selected clients enjoying the bulk of the
wealth.
The Cameroon body politic, which is a serious determinant of
economic survival and progress, thrives on political and economic gluttony.
Joining the national bureaucrat is based on irrational criteria. Those who
constitute the neopatrimonial club in Cameroon develop with the backing of
the state machinery and these people collaborate in the pillage of state
resources with impunity. For example there are several former ministers and
some directors of parastatals like Policap Ababah (former minister of finance),
Atanagana Mebara (former minister of higher education) and Zacheaus
Fornjindam (former boss of Cameroon Ship Yard) that have been arrested
under Biya today, accused of embezzling several billions of CFA Franc. This is
evidence of state workers depleting state resources. It is common place to find
politicians who belong to the national bureaucrat with huge bank accounts
abroad while a section of the population cannot afford three square meals in a
day. Such thoughtless depletion of resources and a commitment to annihilate
those who raise dissenting voices has contributed tremendously to the
shrinkage of state resources and poverty production. This culture of
neopatrimonialism breeds haughtiness and exchaustion by the appointed with
no sense of right or wrong. This kind of pillage culture has drained the state of
resources and Cameroon must energetically fight against it if they must
alleviate poverty.
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This paper is written based on empirical observation of the concept
of neopatrimonialism in the Cameroon political culture since independence. If
there is any similarity between Ahidjo and Biya then their belief in political
clientelism was a converging point. This philosophy has strived in the
Cameroon political landscape since independence. In reading through the
plethora of political literature that exists on Cameroon, this researcher was
able to identify neopatrimonialism as a system which survived on the grand
patron (Head of state) building cleavages that fragmented the society into
distinct categories of poor and rich. And within this framework, the poor have
remained poor with their numbers increasing while the rich continue to
accumulate wealth. Neopatrimonialism is one of Cameroon’s political cultures
that determines its values and shape its economic destiny. Jean Francois Bayart
(1993:19) paints a clear scenario of how the Cameroon national bureaucrats
have always concentrated on grabbing for themselves food, money and other
money generating resources without bothering about the plight of the masses.
Fighting poverty of the masses is always the least among their considerations.
This position held by Bayart was described by Chinua Achebe (1983:27) as
institutional robbery of the commoners of Nigeria by public servants when he
alluded to the greed, corruption and depletion of Nigerian resources by the
public servants.
Frame of Analysis
The theoretical framework of analysis in this paper is drawn from Bayart and
Fanon. Bayart in his philosophy of the state in Africa sees the national
bureaucrats as grabbers and people who cannot propel the state away from
ridicule, poverty and underdevelopment. While Fanon describes them as local
malleable collaborators in the enterprise of the European dehumanization and
expropriation of African resources or simply as conduits of the European
enterprise in Africa. In Cameroon, this is evidence in the close ties that existed
between Ahidjo and the French government, a policy that has continued under
Biya. Inspiration was therefore drawn from the ideas of Bayart and Fanon. I was
equally inspired by regular formal and informal discussions with academic
mentors and other non‐academic seniors (on the subject of state management
of resources and poverty), some of whom actively participated or keenly
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observed the unfolding political terrain in the country and the negative
influence of neopatrimonialism on the economy. Stepping into the shoes of
Bayart and Fanon, this researcher identifies neopatrimonialism as a subtle but
injurious political culture that has left a stranglehold on the economy of the
country. It has become so engrained in the political culture of the state that
those who constitute the cream of the poor in society have developed the
feeling that the only way to fight poverty is to join the band wagon of the
national bureaucrats.
Background to the Study
The Socio‐political and Economic Landscape as Context of Neopatrimonialism
and Poverty in Cameroon
Politics, economy and social welfare are all interwoven in all human societies
and Cameroon is no exception. Hence political systems are superstructures
built on economic foundations. It is these political systems that take major
decisions on resource allocation, distribution and welfare of the community.
These decisions will either prevent or alleviate poverty or enhances it. It is
therefore important to look at the socio‐political and economic landscape of
Cameroon and to establish a link between socio‐political and socio‐economic
platforms of the country and our subject of discussion on poverty. This is
important because resource management which is strictly determined by
governance has a direct implication on welfare and poverty.
Politically, before becoming independent, Cameroon had gone
through a tortuous colonial experience under the Germans and later the British
and the French. The state was first colonized in 1884 by Germany and in 1914
when Germany was defeated in the World War 1; the territory became a
League of Nations Mandate handed over to Britain and France for
administration. This complicated political past has influenced the political set
up of the country in so many ways. In terms of political cultures, the country
today experiences two different political systems, that is the French Styled
administration and the British system. This has not worked for the interest of
the country because one of the cultures is dominant (French culture) leading to
marginalization of the English speaking culture. The bicultural nature of the
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country has further complicated the concept of neopatrimonialism because this
plays an important role so far as control of state wealth is concerned. For
example the president in building his client patronage takes the
Anglophone\Francophone dichotomy into consideration. It is therefore not
surprising that there are certain key ministries like Finance, Armed Forces and
Territorial Administration that have never been headed by an Anglophone.
Since the independence of Cameroon in 1960\1, the country has been ruled by
Francophones that is the late Amadou Ahidjo (from the Northern Region) and
Paul Biya (from Beti country in the South). Late Amadou Ahidjo ruled the
country from 1961 to 1982 when he constitutionally handed over power to
Paul Biya who is still in power. Under the two regimes, political clientelism,
regionalism and corruption have seriously affected government business with
consequences on efforts at alleviating poverty and the judicious use of
resources for growth. This is evident in the wide gap that exists between those
who constitute the national bureaucrat and the masses.
These two regimes shared a common value because the leaders
either repressed or co‐opted their political opponents. It will be difficult to
understand poverty in Africa as a whole and Cameroon in particular as long as
we look at it only from the point of failing economies. Cameroon is
experiencing a serious political crisis that has very serious economic
repercussions. This political crisis can be attributed to the fact that a selected
group have hijacked the state and taken control of the resources and the
masses not given a fair share of control. This kind of patrimonial styled
leadership has made the national bureaucrats to think only about their
personal aggrandizement and this has overshadowed development goals and
the fight against poverty. In terms of the political system, it should be
established that since 1972, Cameroon has been under a centralized system
with a lot of powers concentrated in the hands of the president. The judiciary
and legislatures only play subordinate roles to the executive. This kind of
system where powers are concentrated in the hands of a single individual
without checks and balances allows for patrimonial establishments.
When Ahidjo took over the reins of power from the colonialists in
1960, he established a domineering ruling class consisted of mostly his close
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aides that were selected from his ethnic group and other regions of the
country. Using his powers, he empowered these selected individuals through
wealth accumulation and strategic positions in government. This
empowerment of his close aides continued throughout his reign. When power
shifted from Ahidjo to Biya, from the North to the South, the Betis, Ewondos
and other co‐opted individuals from other ethnic groups that were deemed
powerful became the power brokers of the country and ensured that they
controlled a greater share of the national cake. The implication of this kind of
neopatrimonial system is that the wealth of the state has been directed into a
few hands that will power and the masses are allowed to languish in poverty.
Those who belong to the ruling class evade taxes and use other corrupt means
to amass wealth for themselves which drains the resources of the state. For
example there are familiar cases where important contracts geared at fighting
poverty have been given to politically significant figures who are unable to
execute them successfully or who sell them to other contractors in
circumstances which defeat the purpose for the fight against poverty and
national interest. For example it is on paper that the Bamenda Ring Road had
long been constructed but this is not the case because the contractors who
took the contract never executed the job. (Ni John Fru Ndi:2007). Sometimes
well‐paid positions are created just to give jobs to people whose political
support is considered important. To support this claim it is important to
mention that the state embarks on new projects to create jobs and fight
poverty very often but for these projects to run bankrupt is also very easy. For
example the Menchum Area Development Authority (WADA) that was created
to enhance development in Menchum Division and fight poverty lasted only for
a few years. It was the same thing with Upper Noun Valley Development
Authority (UNVDA), was to promote the cultivation of rice in Ndop area.
In terms of the nature of the economy, important to mention that
Cameroon is endowed with natural resources like crude oil, rubber, coffee, tea,
bananas, and groundnuts which would have mitigated any effects of poverty.
Yet the country with these diverse potentials is among the countries with the
lowest per capita income in the World. The country belongs to the highly
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indebted poor countries of the World. For example in 1999 the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) ranked Cameroon 134 th out of 174 countries on
its human development index. This index is a social and economic indicator
which ranks poverty on the basis of statistics for life expectancy, access to clean
water, adequate food, health care and other public services. (Encyclopedia of
Nations). With the low level of income there were and still are no large
reserves of private capital or saving except for the national bureaucrats. As a
result of the more or less subsistence and agricultural nature of the economy,
there is little industry and only about half of the population is in wage
employment. The government is then the major source of funding for all types
of development projects. This clearly indicates that when the government fails,
then the ripple efforts on the population can be enormous. Due to the extreme
centralization of the government structures and processes, Yaounde and
particularly the office of the president became the sole determinant in the
distribution of the scarce state resources to individuals, communities and
regions. Central to the problems of state building and poverty in Cameroon are
issues such as a powerful ruling class. This ruling class is composed of a narrow‐
based elite class that had acquired political and economic power by virtue of
their inheritance of the state apparatus. This neopatrimonial leadership has
laid the foundation for the misuse of manpower resources, inefficiency and
corruption leading to poverty.
Looking at the socio‐cultural background of the state, it is made up
of about two hundred and fifty different ethnic groups that are grouped under
the Bantu, Semi‐ Bantu, Chambas and the moslems. (Ngoh:1987:9). These
different ethnic groups have different languages and culture. This ethnic
diversity brings in the the ethnic factor in politics which is a common
phenomenon with African countries. This composition breeds favouritism and
unbalanced development because it is difficult to satisfy all the ethnic groups. It
is against this backdrop that neopatrimonialism has been established and
institutionalized into the state apparatus. Following this system, some of the
ethnic groups and regions are dominant over others. As earlier mentioned,
ethnic groups that are lucky to have their sons and daughters occupy key
positions in government do benefit from the client network.
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AhIdjo, Neopatrimonialism and the Production of Poverty in Cameroon
When Cameroon achieved independence in 1960\61 under
President Amadou Ahidjo, the economy of the new state was not yet out of the
doldrums and it was yet to acquire the capacity for independent and durable
growth.( source). This could be justified by the fact that during the early days of
independence, the state relied much on external aid and loans. This trend has
continued even five decades after independence because poverty has made
nonsense of what life should be in Cameroon. In Cameroon, poverty can be
attributed to a crisis of institutions. That is institutions are built not on the
principles of equality, justice and equity but are built on elements of nepotism,
ethnicity, regionalism and neopatrimonialism. When Ahidjo took over control
of the state, he established, Clientelism, a kind of Tammany Hall Style
patronage based on personal, family and ethnic networks of local interest. He
did this through co‐opting people he trust in into the public service. His close
aides and appointees were empowered economically and administratively. All
strategic positions in government were handed to Ahidjo,s close aides who
were mostly selected individuals from different parts of the country but with
northerners dominant. Ahidjo was a big patron with a set of clients, each of
whom was in a turn a patron to another set of clients. (Delancey: 1989:59).
This was very possible because centralization gave the president tremendous
authority over most aspects of politics and economic determinism. For instance
under Article 8 of the unitary constitution, the president had the sole authority
to appoint and terminate his ministers and vice‐ministers without the approval
of the legislature. ( Takougang and Krieger, 1998:51). He did not need to seek
legislative approval for his appointments. He appointed his ministers, his
governors, his judges alone, and they in turn were entirely dependent upon
him and his favour if they were to remain in office. The National Assembly had
no role to play and could not exert any pressure on him. He therefore had the
constitutional backing to establish his neo‐patrimonial kind of leadership.
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The close aides of Ahidjo that were empowered economically and
co‐opted into the state machinery by Ahidjo could be described as verandah
boys who were greedy for the spoils of the state but in actual fact they did not
deserve any spoils. They were not better than crooks and conmen. They were
favoured recipients almost to the last days of Ahidjo in power. A typical
example of these verandah boys was Egbe Tabi who was appointed minister of
Post and Telecommunication for many years. Within his period of clientship,
Tabi was able to establish a patron‐ client network among Anglophones
especially those from his area (Mamfe) by providing them jobs in his ministry
and awarding them non‐refundable loans.( Takougang and Krieger:2008:52)
Other individuals that created spheres of control around Ahidjo included Sadou
Daoudou who served as minister of defense for two decades. This kind of
governance structure that was instituted by Ahidjo was indicative of the fact
that only a privileged few were benefiting from the transfer of political power
from the colonialists to Cameroonnians. It must be noted that under President
Ahidjo, the 1960s and 70s in Cameroon were considered years of excitement
and discovery because of the newly achieved independence and this period
promised real social and political developments that could lead to poverty
reduction and improved economic stability. But this optimism began to seem
naïve because the masses were poverty stricken while a few individuals
controlled the wealth of the state. Hope and optimism was replaced with
disillusionment and despair because poverty later set in to be a major obstacle
to development.
To ensure that the status quo he had created was maintained,
Ahidjo established special units that were to check any opposition and
dissenting voices, guarantee his stay in power and eliminate enemies of the
regime. Among the special units was the political police that was responsible
for spying on potential enemies of the regime. The BMM (Brigades Mixtes
Mobiles) maintained sites of torture where physical punishment was used to
extract confessions from suspects. (Takougang and Krieger, 1998:54). Agents of
these units alongside the entire military were highly rewarded through
frequent promotions and financial remunerations for uncovering ‘’subversive’’
elements and maintaining the status quo. For example Jean Forcheve was
promoted to rank of Delegate General for National Security because services he
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endered the Head of State. He was equally made the head of Ahidjo’s secret
police service. Unfortunately this system often led to false accusations by
overzealous agents who wanted more promotions and more benefits from the
regime. This is to show how repressive the regime was and the commoners had
to dance to the dictats of those who had been entrusted authority. Whether
the economic policies that were put in place benefitted the masses or not it
was difficult for these commoners to make their voices heard. Some of the
close aides of Ahidjo like Charles Assale, former prime minister of East
Cameroon, compared Cameroon under Ahidjo to the Soviet Union under Stalin.
This detailed description by a correspondent for the weekly magazine West
Africa best describes the repressive nature of the state under Ahidjo.
(Nfamewih, 2006:67).
It is not just looking at this clienteles network that is important but
establishing a link between this kind of system and the poverty of the masses
remains the main focus. Those who received important positions under Ahidjo
were not only able to exploit those positions for their personal gains, but were
also able to build client patronages for themselves and for the president
through employment opportunities and by providing other economic and social
benefits for the clients. State resources were therefore in the control of the
clients and if one was not to fall within this category, then he\she was
consciously or unconsciously denied access to state resources. It is remarkable
to note that only a very tiny proportion of the population of Cameroon falls
within the category of clients. The masses do not have real access to the
control of wealth, employment and other economic instruments to fight
poverty. It is based on this that the poverty margin continues to increase while
capital and state resources are manned and controlled by the national
bourgeoisie. This unequal pattern of distribution built into the state structure in
Cameroon and the opportunism of those directing state resources established
through a kind of neopatrimonial system constitutes a major factor for poverty
in the state.
When Ahidjo took over power there was the zeal to develop the
socio‐economic infrastructure of the state so as to fight poverty. This was
noted in the increased medical facilities that were put up in different parts of
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the territory. There was an increase in the number of hospitals and clinic.
Hospital beds increased from 10.000 beds in 1962 to 24.541 beds in 1980.
(Nfamewih, 2006:68). Ahidjo,s investments in the health sector were intended
to fight poverty and to pilot the state towards development. He also devoted
some interest in the development of educational infrastructure. So many
schools were created in the country and the student population kept on
increasing. For example in 1966\67 there were about 42,774 students in post
primary institutions and this number increased to 462,225 in 1980\81. The
student enrollment in the newly created University of Yaounde more than
doubled from 2572 in 1970\71 to 6000 in 1973\74. The Gross National Product
had increased from 300 billion Francs in 1970 to 2000 billion in 1982 and the
economy of the country during this period experienced a growth rate of 6
percent, which was quite encouraging for a newly independent state.
(Takougang and Krieger:1998:) Cameroon’s economy at this time was rated
among Africa’s most credit worthy economies. Cameroon was described by
some as ‘’the paradigm for Africa’s development’’ and an agricultural success
story. This success in agriculture was recorded because of government’s
agricultural policy that was carried on alongside the exploitation of oil. The
discovery of oil in the state in the early 1970s was seen as progress towards
development and the fight against poverty.
These social indicators showed signs of little poverty but in reality,
this was not the case because the distribution and management of these
endowments remained a factor for poverty. In the course of distribution some
selected individuals were favoured and empowered while the masses felt the
pinch of poverty. This view can be supported by the fact that the Ahidjo regime
was confronted with signs of opposition in the 1970s, these unrests that
affected the nation’s capital and economic capital all centered on poverty and
economic failures. For example in 1976, thousands of antigovernment leaflets
were strewed around the capital city of Yaounde and Douala, the nation’s
economic capital in January in 1977. Most of these unrests were provoked by
economic discontents resulting from the increasing financial disparity between
most Cameroonians and the small but privileged group of national bureaucrats
and politicians.(Takougang and Krieger:2008). The corruption of the national
bureaucrat and capital flight remained major sources of leakages in the
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economic system. It is estimated that during Ahidjo’s twenty‐two years of
leadership, Cameroon lost a total of CFA 965 billion Francs in bad investment,
embezzlement and other forms of fraud. (Kah, forthcoming). These were signs
that even though the state was rich in terms of natural resources, poverty was
still very prevalent because of poor management and the kind of patrimonial
structure put in place. This kind of system that was enshrined under president
Ahidjo continued under Paul Biya and the situation under Biya was even worse
because of the economic decline that confronted most African states in the
1980s and 1990s. This economic crisis that set in, in the 1980s as result of the
drop in prices of primary products in the world market had a serious impact on
Cameroon because it led to a drop in agricultural production, salary cuts and a
general economic decline leading to increasing poverty.
Biya, Neopatrimonialism and the stranglehold of Poverty in Cameroon
Biya came to power with his philosophy of communal liberalism,
which was seen as the dawn of a new era. Following this policy, he said the
economy of the state was to operate based on free enterprise, though the
state was to play a significant guiding role. (Biya: 1984). The policy further
explained that the benefits of economic growth were to be distributed equally
and each Cameroonian was to have access to home ownership. This clearly
spelt out how the new head of state intended to fight poverty but
unfortunately what was written and propagated in communal liberalism is not
what is implemented under the Biya,s regime. This expected change could
hardly come because Biya simply stepped into one pair of Ahidjo’s shoes. The
authoritarian political institutions and practices built by Ahidjo remained intact.
The coalition of regional and local leaders constructed through Ahidjo’s skillful
use of patronage was unaltered. Paul Biya,s first goal upon assuming the
presidency had been to gather unto himself all the powers and responsibilities
that accrued to the office under Ahidjo. (Delancey, 1989:73). It is therefore
certain that Biya like his predecessor continued with the same clienteles policy
which constituted a major cause of inequitable distribution of resources and
poverty in the state. Hence it can be observed that Cameroon’s problems of
poverty are caused by sit‐tight leaders who do not want to empower their
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citizens by giving them the responsibility to fully take part in the process of
economic development.
In same light there is increased poverty under Biya because he has
refused to empower the middle class by not granting them access to control of
state resources rather he is interested in co‐opting close aides and empowering
them economically at the expense of the larger state enterprise. During the
early days of his leadership, he maintained the client patronage that had been
put in place by Ahidjo for some time but this was not for so long because
authority was gradually shifted from the old client patronage to a new one
composed of Biya,s Beti folks and other trusted individuals from other regions.
Pressure was gradually mounting from Biya,s own kin and kiths for him to push
aside the northerners and grant them powers.
Biya and the Shift of power and state resource management from the old
Client System to a new team
When Biya took over power, the Betis immediately developed the
feeling that it was their time to benefit from the state machinery since their
brother was in charge. Ahidjo, although giving up the presidency of the
country, did not give up all of his powers, and there were clear indications that
he expected to remain firmly in control of the state. This explains why it was
difficult for Biya to completely root off the system that had been put in place by
him. Ahidjo believed that haven groomed Biya for leadership, Biya was going to
dance to his tune and play the role of a puppet while he continues to
determine the functioning of state machinery. This was not the case because
Biya was not a puppet as perceived by Ahidjo. The period of trust and
cooperation among them was short‐lived because soon after Biya became
familiar with the presidency and acquainted himself with the powers of the
president, he began to establish independent grounds of leadership. Biya used
the constitution to funnel authority to himself and he started the process of
reconstructing new cleavages aimed at shifting authority from Ahidjo’s selected
team to a new center (the Betis and Biya’s favoured appointees). Biya’s power
of nomination and appointments, unfettered by any sort of checks from other
political institutions gave him the opportunity to deconstruct the clienteles
system that had been set up by his predecessor and of course a new hegemony
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was on the way, which was the Beti hegemony. The northern moslems who
were close associates to Ahidjo and who had been strategically placed were not
happy with Ahidjo’s choice of Biya. Some of the northern moslems like Moussa
Yaya were openly critical of Biya’s selection as president. (Takougang and
Krieger, 1998:67). This open criticism from the north made Biya to be
suspicious of the northerners and this speeded the process of him dismantling
what had been put in place by Ahidjo. Considering the fact that Biya owes his
political fortunes to Ahidjo, he struggled to maintain a smooth working relation
with him for some time. This explains why even though suspicious of the close
aides of Ahidjo, Biya still maintained them for some time and the process of
seizing power from the them and systematically empowering his Beti associates
was slow.
When Biya took charge of the state, he maintained the cabinet that
was put in place by Ahidjo (dominated by northerners and his close aides) and
continued to seek advice from his predecessor in case of changes in
government. This lasted up till the period when a rift developed between Biya
and Ahidjo. Ahidjo’s attempt to take over power from Biya through a coup in
1984 only further dampened their relations and Biya at this time decided to
take over full control of the state machinery. Taking over full control implied he
was to destroy the old client patronage created by Ahidjo and to establish a
new one that would guarantee loyalty to him. Therefore the first step in trying
to establish himself was for Biya to replace all the northerners who held
strategic positions in the military with people loyal to him. The military
authority system was restructured, placed under a single command headed by
General Pierre Semengue (a Beti from the president’s ethnic group).
(Takougang and Krieger, 1998:71).
To achieve his ambitions of setting up his own client patronage,
Biya on the 18 th of June 1983 reshuffled the cabinet without Ahidjo,s consent.
In the process, he started the destruction of the old order set up Ahidjo by
dropping members suspected of continued allegiance and loyalty to the former
head of state. Ahidjo’s key collaborators who could act as spies under the Biya’s
regime like Sadou Daoudou were all dropped from government. The president
was at this moment coming up with a new team of national bureaucrats who
15

were to continue the process of depletion of state resources. The cabinet
reshuffle and the subsequent departure of Ahidjo from Cameroon on self‐
imposed exile gave Biya the free hand to continue the process of dismantling
Ahidjo’s power structure, purging his loyalists and establishing for himself a
new order. He was therefore strategically positioning those he had trust in and
this was all to ensure that he was in charge.
By the same stretch of imagination, Biya’s system of governance
and management of the economy was not very different from that of Ahidjo.
Just like his predecessor, Biya used state resources to build a set of economic
relations tying his supporters to himself and creating a kind of centralized
authority that determined the political and economic survival of the state. In
fact it can be said that the client patronage system that was created by Ahidjo
became an institutionalized system of governance which has gone a long way
to deprive the masses of the abundance of state resources. This plunder of
state resources by a selected few has a ripple effect on poverty. The
centralization of power which is a doctrine Biya inherited from his predecessor
left the state at the center of economic management. This retarded the
development of private enterprise as a means to fight poverty and joining the
national bureaucrats in effect became a means of private advancement. This
kind of bureaucratic red tape gave the president powers that he could use state
resources to drive through his political ambitions at the expense of the rural
masses. This could be justified by the fact that it is difficult to separate the
financial resources of the ruling party and that of the state. Like the client
patronage that existed under Ahidjo, ministerial appointments for example
provide a major opportunity for Biya to reward influential people in society.
This system of rewarding close aides with ministerial positions has a very
negative impact on the economy because when somebody is newly appointed
into office, he\she and his chronies set up a vast machinery of depletion.
Enormous pressure from kith and kin is brought to bear on the one appointed
to deplete the resources of the state for their individual advancements. They
buttress this by stating that now is their own time to eat and have a feel that
they are in charge of the state.(Kah:forthcoming). The Client patronage system
and the culture of appointments in Cameroon have a very negative impact on
the economy leading to poverty. This is corroborated by Nantang Jua who has
16

documented both the enormous amount of money used to sustain the
bureaucracy and middle and high ranking bureaucrat’s connivance with
business to siphon hundreds of millions of CFA Francs from the government. A
common practice involved over billing the cost of a particular item or items,
then sharing the extra money between the bureaucrat and the businessman.
(Takougang and Krieger:1998:99).
Since there are no enough ministries to satisfy the entire national
bureaucrats, Biya has made frequent cabinet reshuffles a tradition and this has
provoked inertia and increased the rate of depletion. This is because somebody
newly appointed into office is not sure of staying there for long and this pushes
him to swindle state resources as fast as possible before the next cabinet
reshuffle. In some instances the government frequently creates new ministries
or breaks up old ones into other ministries so as to satisfy political associates.
A typical example is the ministry of Technical Education that was created in
2007 and dissolved one year after. A small country like Cameroon has three
ministries of education‐ the Ministry of Basic Education, the Ministry of
Secondary Education and there is a Ministry of Higher Education. These many
ministries are not intended to address the needs of the population but some
are created to satisfy certain personalities and regions. The many ministries
with duplicated functions provide avenues for depletion of state resources
because the various ministerial positions go with so much personal benefits for
the minister. This contributes enormously to the process of depletion.
This clienteles system and the lack of commitment to public interest
goes contrary to the views of Fanon who says that government is a trust and
therefore, government depends for its justification on a shared morality
between those who rule and those who are being ruled. The existence of this
shared morality also implies a mutuality of obligations between governors and
the governed. (Fanon: 1980:89). In the case of Cameroon, this mutuality
between the state and the masses in terms of resource management and
allocation is greatly strained because of the clienteles system that has been
enshrined by the government. This system naturally sows chaos because a few
co‐opted individuals are granted the privilege to enjoy state resources whether
through legitimate means or by crockery while the masses are abandoned to
17

themselves. Under the Biya regime, issues of governance especially favouritism
based on client patronage and poverty were further intensified by the
economic crisis that confronted Cameroon a few years after he took over
power. The declining economy intensified the corruption of the national
bureaucrat and increased poverty because with economic hardship the state
employees derived new survival strategies and these strategies mostly involved
corrupt practises.
Biya,s Neopatrimonialism, the economic crisis and increasing poverty
When Biya assumed office in1982, some considered him a savior
who would take the masses away from the darkness of poverty caused by poor
governance to the brightness of economic prosperity. But this optimism began
to fade away and hope was replaced with disappointment or disillusionment
because a few years after he took control of the state, he announced that the
state was gradually moving into a deep economic crisis and that Cameroonians
should by ready to make sacrifices. The declining economy was attributed to a
global drop in the prices of agricultural products in the world market and a
drop in the price of a barrel of crude oil from US 29 Dollars in 1984 to US 10
Dollars in 1986. But to a larger extent the crisis could be attributed to poor
management of the reserves that were left by president Ahidjo and the high
incidence of corruption and misuse of state resources under Biya. It must be
noted that under Biya’s leadership, corruption that is a major means of
depletion in most African countries is officially frowned upon, by the
government but very limited anticorruption efforts are carried out.
The corruption of the Cameroon bourgeoisie particularly the
political office holders and public functionaries has been amply documented.
(Nfamewih: 2006:81). The findings of these public commissions like the
operation antelope have generally pointed to the abuse of public trust by public
officials but no appropriate action have been taken to curb the situation. For
example the civil service registry code‐named Operation Antelope in 1986
revealed the names of about 20.000 ghost workers (state workers who had
either died, retired, or were studying overseas) whose combined monthly
salaries were costing the state billions of CFA Francs. This was failure on the
part of the government to ensure accountability.(Takougang and Krieger,
18

1998:98). The reluctance of the government to fight corruption can be
attributed to the fact that it provides a major avenue for the president to allow
his supporters to receive rewards. In some instances the government instead
encourages corruption by awarding loans without interest or any expectations
of repayment to close presidential associates to compensate them. (Delancey:
1989:59). This explains why with widespread corruption, Biya uses selective
enforcement against anyone suspected of anything that is not in favour of the
president’s political game plans. For example there is anti‐corruption campaign
going on in the country today which is referred to as operation sparrow hawk.
Following this operation some former ministers and directors that were close
aides to Biya have been arrested on charges of corruption. But some sources
and media reports indicate that these people even though have embezzled
were not arrested for that rather they were arrested because the posed a
threat to the president. This to an extent could be true because there are many
other ministers and public functionaries who have embezzled with ample
evidence who have not been arrested because they are still in the good books
of the president. This shows the discriminatory execution of the anti‐corruption
drive based on the client system.
The economic crisis under Biya increased the corrupt practices of
public servants because the impact of the crisis fell directly on this category of
workers. The government reacted to the declining economic situation by
embarking on salary cuts. The president ordered for three salary cuts within a
very short period of say one year and this reduced the salaries of state workers
by fifty percent. The salaries that were at first not the best were now slashed
down to nothing. The public servants could no longer meet up with their
demands because of increasing poverty. These public functionaries resorted to
bribery and corruption, increasing depletion of state resources and other
crocket activities as a means to make extra money and increase their living
standards. This had a tripled ripple effect on the masses because poverty
increased tremendously. First corruption deprived the masses of the scarce
state resources and the multiplier effect of slashed salaries on the population
was remarkable. The low incomes earned affected the purchasing power of the
said public servants and this had a direct impact on private endeavours to fight
poverty.
19

Amidst the crisis, it was even difficult for the government to pay the
meager salaries of the state workers and this explains why the government had
to from time to time run to the IMF and World Bank for loans to run the
economy. But running to these Breton Woods was not the solution because the
government had not put in place measures to check depletion, fraud and
misuse of state resources. In this instance, the loans collected were again
invested in wild elephant projects that were not meant to fight poverty. For
example part of the loans was used to buy heavy duty vehicles for ministers
and chief of services and these vehicles had to be maintained and fueled. In
effect the common man did not even feel the impact of the loans or even if
they were to feel it, it was very minimal because of mismanagement and the
culture of depletion that has eaten deep into the fabrics of the society. Another
ugly side of the IMF and World Bank loans was that it increased hardship and
poverty in the sense that there were preconditions before these loans were
granted (loans with strings). These preconditions included a reduction of the
size of the public services and the privatization of state owned corporations.
Reducing the size of the public service increased unemployment and
joblessness because so many workers were retrenched from the public service
with no retrenchment benefits. (Stiglitz:nd) This instead increased the level of
poverty because the number of dependents in the country increased
tremendously.
Privatization of state corporations as a remedy to economic failures
was itself faulty because of the way it was handled. The government was still
used privatization to compensate close aides. The privatization of these state
corporations was not based on ability to sustain the management of these
corporations and to improve on the plight of the workers but the corporations
were handed to close aides of the government. For example the Tole Tea
Estate was handed to Alhadji Baba Ahmadou Danpullo who was empowered by
Ahidjo and has remained close to the presidency till date. (Ndeh: 2009:8). It
was hoped that the conditions laid down by the IMF and World Bank were to
salvage the collapsing economies of the African countries but unfortunately
there was little success story in most of the states that went through the
structural adjustment programme. In the opinion of this researcher, the
implementation of the SAP project in Cameroon was more detrimental to the
20

economy than beneficial. This was partly due the conditions that were put in
place and partly due to poor management of the project.
The increase leakages under the Biya administration accounted for
a high level of poverty of the commoners. For example within four years from
1982 to 1986, the New Deal government of Biya had lost to the tune of CFA 650
billion through fraudulent activities. In the custom’s department alone, the
leakages during this period were estimated at about 500million Franc. (Kah:
Fourth Coming). Some of the sources consulted indicated that much of the
blame for fraud and other depletion activities can be attributed to the
members of the president’s ethnic group and his close aides. The declining
economic situation under Biya had negative repercussions. There was a serious
drop in foreign investment and a massive exodus of many foreign businesses
and financial institutions. For example Manhattan and Bosten Banks closed
their doors in the country. By the 1990s turning 2000 the domestic institutions
both private and public had started failing. The Cameroon Bank and Banque
Camerounaise de Development owned entirely by the Cameroon government
crumbled because of financial mismanagement. The collapse of Banks like
Societe Camerounaise de Banque (SCB) and Paribas‐ Cameroun could partly be
attributed to the extravagance of the presidential couple who used resources
from these Banks for their private development and the empowerment of their
close aides. This wasteful spending by the presidential couple of Cameroon can
only be likened to the extravagance of Loius xvi and Marie Antoinette of the
French Republic in the pre‐revolutionary days. The bankruptcy of most of these
companies both private and public aggravated unemployment and further
increased poverty. The economy of the country became so fragile that other
external shocks only further complicated matters. Unemployment of youths
and poverty was estimated at about seventy percent with the common man
not being able to purchase the basic commodities for survival. This was clearly
manifested in the February 2008 strikes that affected a cross section of the
country.
21

The 2008 Anti‐government protest and the Manifestation of Poverty in
Cameroon
In February 2008, the Cameroon government under Biya witnessed
one of the most serious and bloodiest anti‐government demonstrations that
affected five of the ten Regions of the country. The nation’s capital, Yaounde
was affected and the economic capital, Douala alongside the Western Region,
the South West Region and the North West Region. During this period of
turbulence there were accusations and counter‐accusations from the
government and the opposition parties attributing the riots to political
manouevers from the government and the opposition. The violent
demonstrations of February 2008 were as result of poverty and the inability of
the masses to meet up with their day to day basics.(Suifon:2008:7) Even though
some political grievances were attributed to the strike like Biya’s constitutional
revision to extend his stay in power, it was strictly a manifestation against
economic failures and poverty. The massive demonstration that ended in
looting and destruction started as a result of the Driver’s Syndicate declaring a
seat down strike because of a consistent increase in the price of fuel and
generally poor working conditions. The drivers in their memorandum calling for
a strike included other issues like police harassment and the extortion of
money from drivers by council officials for wrong parking. This protest that was
started by the driver had a spillover effect on the other sectors that were also
poverty stricken. For instance the general saw it as an opportunity to express
their dismay against increasing poverty, generally high cost of living,
unbearable unemployment and a general collapse of the economy. The prices
of basic commodities like rice, cooking gas, cooking oil, fish, fuel and other
basic commodities kept on increasing before the strike. These price hikes had a
direct repercussion on the survival of the common man because it became
difficult for families to afford some of the basic commodities.
The unemployed youths seized opportunity of the strike to express
their frustrations and this explains why it took a violent dimension. Large
groups of youths took to the streets in the major cities of Douala, Yaounde,
Limbe, Buea, Bamenda and Bafoussam looting and destroying privately owned
shops and government property in anger. This manifested poverty on the part
22

of the demonstrators and other Cameroonians who are not the least
comfortable with the economic imbalances. Statistics provided by the
government place damages to property at tens of billions of CFA Franc. It was
estimated that property was destroyed to the tune of 15.2 million Euros or 23.4
million Dollars. (Kah, Forthcoming). The government in trying institute control
and to avoid destruction of state property decided to send troops to crack
down on the unrest. This resulted to the death of some of the rioters and
troops alike. The government pronounced the number of deaths to be 40, a
figure which greatly contradicted what was presented by human right groups.
The human rights groups placed the death toll at about 100 persons.
(Suifon:2008:1). Government sources indicated that about 1600 people
including government officials were arrested for eventual trial and persecution.
But this figure was again contested by human right groups that claimed that
about 2000 person were arrested in Douala alone. The trial of these persons
were said to be very swift severe and secretive. This was done by the
government in order avoid further confrontations from the public.
In reaction to the strike, president Biya acknowledge the poverty
stricken nature of the masses and instituted measures that were to fight
poverty and improve on the living conditions of the masses. These measures
included the reduction in the cost of fuel, a minimal increase in the salaries of
state workers, reduced duties paid on cement and other basic commodities like
cooking oil, fish and rice. It must be noted that even though these measures
were to fight poverty they only came as a result of pressure mounted by the
masses not from the good will of the government to fight poverty. These
temporal measures have very minimal impact on the masses because
unemployment, low living standards and other indicators of poverty are still
very prevalent in the society. Much still has to be done by the government to
curb depletion, embezzlement and other fraudulent activities that constitute
the root causes of poverty.
23

Conclusion
From the above discussion, this paper has attempted to establish a link
between neopatrimonialism and poverty in Cameroon. The paper analyses how
class political behavior in Cameroon has contributed to underdevelopment and
poverty in the country. While this is not peculiar to Cameroon, it has come to
affect every day life of the commoners. The faults associated with
neopatrimonialism are quite sufficient explanations of poverty when dealing
with fragile and developing economies like that of Cameroon. This theory of
neopatrimonialism had led to serious retrogression that is harmful to the
economy and the masses. There may be several other causes of poverty in
Cameroon but the negative values that accompany neopatrimonialism remains
a major factor for poverty. The institutionalization of this philosophy by Ahidjo
and Biya laid the foundation for the depletion and shrinkage of state resources
which have continued right up till date. This culture of depletion has made the
fight against poverty in the country to be frustrating because even when
money is invested into projects to fight poverty, the money ends up in the
pockets of private individuals (national bureaucrats). Therefore to fight
poverty, the government must rid the state of Cameroon of the culture of
clientelism and depletion and ensure that the economic resources trickle down
to the middle class of the society. Empowering the middle class is going to
stimulate economic development because it is this class in every society that
constitutes the development force. The declining economy of Cameroon and
increasing poverty is because the middle class is not granted full access to state
resources and the national bourgeoisie that constitutes the depletion
machinery is not engaged in production and the generation of wealth. This
class is completely canalized into activities of fraud, embezzlement and
thoughtless use of state resources.
24

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