Narcissism and stock market investing: Correlates and ... - Knopers.net
Narcissism and stock market investing: Correlates and ... - Knopers.net
Narcissism and stock market investing: Correlates and ... - Knopers.net
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
<strong>Narcissism</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> <strong>investing</strong>: <strong>Correlates</strong> <strong>and</strong> consequences<br />
of cocksure <strong>investing</strong><br />
Joshua D. Foster a,⇑ , Dennis E. Reidy b , Tiffany A. Misra a , Joshua S. Goff a<br />
a Psychology Department, University of South Alabama, Mobile, AL 36688, United States<br />
b Psychology Department, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, United States<br />
article info<br />
Article history:<br />
Received 5 November 2010<br />
Received in revised form 20 December 2010<br />
Accepted 8 January 2011<br />
Available online 2 February 2011<br />
Keywords:<br />
<strong>Narcissism</strong><br />
Motivation<br />
Risk-taking<br />
Decision-making<br />
Approach motivation<br />
Avoidance motivation<br />
Economics<br />
1. Introduction<br />
abstract<br />
The global economy is in the midst of its worst decline since the<br />
Great Depression. The causes of this financial calamity are varied<br />
<strong>and</strong> complex, although many commentators speculate that cocksure<br />
investors <strong>and</strong> corporate leaders played a significant role by<br />
making risky <strong>and</strong> often foolhardy financial decisions (e.g., Cohan,<br />
2009; Gladwell, 2009). What fueled this cocksureness? During<br />
the 1990s <strong>and</strong> early 2000s, the economy experienced one of the<br />
most prominent bull <strong>market</strong>s in history. Investors were positive<br />
about the future <strong>and</strong> confident that their investments would pay<br />
off. For instance, when surveyed in October 2007, more than<br />
three-quarters of individual <strong>and</strong> institutional investors predicted<br />
that the US <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> would rise during the next year (Shiller,<br />
2000, 2009). These investors were clearly overconfident because<br />
the <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> ultimately plunged by nearly 40%.<br />
Economic climate played an important role in investor exuberance<br />
<strong>and</strong> overconfidence. However, the level of risk that investors<br />
bore is probably not fully explained by situational factors alone.<br />
Consider that during even the historic bull <strong>market</strong>s of the 1990s<br />
<strong>and</strong> early 2000s, most investors did not utilize risky financial<br />
instruments, such as derivatives. Most families purchased homes<br />
within their means. Most corporations’ investments were not<br />
⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Department of Psychology, University of South<br />
Alabama, Mobile, AL 36688, United States. Tel.: +1 251 460 6548.<br />
E-mail address: foster@usouthal.edu (J.D. Foster).<br />
0191-8869/$ - see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.<br />
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2011.01.002<br />
Personality <strong>and</strong> Individual Differences 50 (2011) 816–821<br />
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect<br />
Personality <strong>and</strong> Individual Differences<br />
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid<br />
Two studies tested whether narcissists are prone to making risky <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> investments. In Study 1,<br />
narcissistic participants reported being more inclined to invest in <strong>stock</strong>s that exhibited high volatility<br />
(i.e., large price fluctuations). In study 2, participants created hypothetical investment portfolios using<br />
a selection of real <strong>stock</strong>s whose values were tracked for a five-week period. Narcissists selected more<br />
highly volatile <strong>stock</strong>s for their portfolios <strong>and</strong> this tendency was explained by narcissists’ heightened<br />
approach motivation. Narcissists also lost significantly more money during the tracking period—the <strong>stock</strong><br />
<strong>market</strong> as a whole declined by approximately 30% during the tracking period—<strong>and</strong> this was fully<br />
explained by the heightened volatility of their investments. Cumulatively, these results suggest that narcissistic<br />
personality is linked to risky <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> <strong>investing</strong>, which is especially maladaptive during periods<br />
of economic decline.<br />
Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.<br />
leveraged to the point that even a small fraction of losses would<br />
be ruinous. The economic situation was not so powerful that<br />
everyone simply got swept up by a tsunami of financial risk-taking.<br />
Flagrant financial risk-taking was prevalent during this time period,<br />
but it was limited to a proportion of investors. The purpose<br />
of the present research was to examine one characteristic, narcissistic<br />
personality, that we think might distinguish these risky<br />
investors from the general investor population.<br />
<strong>Narcissism</strong> is particularly relevant to the current economic crisis.<br />
Narcissists 1 are more likely than others to rise to leadership<br />
positions (Brunell et al., 2008). Thus, the financial decisions that narcissists<br />
make affect greater numbers of individuals (e.g., employees,<br />
investors, tax-payers). Although we cannot say for certain how many<br />
corporate leadership positions were/are occupied by narcissists,<br />
anecdotal evidence suggests that narcissists are overrepresented in<br />
this population. To the extent that corporate leaders of the recent<br />
past were more narcissistic than the general population, <strong>and</strong> if narcissism<br />
is indeed linked to financial risk-taking, then narcissism<br />
might have played a role in the economic meltdown.<br />
1 We use the term ‘‘narcissist’’ as a matter of convenience to refer to individuals<br />
who score above the mean on measures of narcissistic personality. In actuality, most<br />
narcissism measures, such as the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI), do not<br />
capture a specific group of ‘‘narcissists’’ (Foster & Campbell, 2007). Furthermore, the<br />
NPI—the measure used in the present studies—is not a measure of clinical narcissism<br />
<strong>and</strong> thus ‘‘narcissists’’ in this context should not be confused with individuals with<br />
Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Why would narcissists be expected to make risky financial decisions?<br />
Financial decisions are often preceded by an assessment of<br />
risk (i.e., potential financial losses) <strong>and</strong> reward (i.e., potential financial<br />
gains). Individuals who are more strongly motivated by reward<br />
(i.e., highly approach motivated) than punishment (i.e., weakly<br />
avoidance motivated) tend to make riskier financial decisions<br />
(e.g., Hamilton & Biehal, 2005; Zhou, Pham, Mick, Iacobucci, & Huber,<br />
2004). Recent research suggests that narcissism is characterized<br />
by strong approach motivation <strong>and</strong> weak avoidance<br />
motivation (Foster, Misra, & Reidy, 2010; Foster, Shenesey, & Goff,<br />
2010; Foster & Trimm, 2008). That is, narcissists are more strongly<br />
motivated by reward acquisition than punishment avoidance.<br />
Thus, narcissists should be expected to make riskier financial decisions.<br />
Evidence supporting this hypothesis comes from studies<br />
showing that narcissists engage more frequently in risky financial<br />
activities, such as gambling (Lakey, Rose, Campbell, & Goodie,<br />
2008). More directly, Foster, Misra et al. (2010) showed that narcissists<br />
are more likely to endorse financial investment strategies that<br />
couple high risk with high reward potential (e.g., <strong>investing</strong> in<br />
<strong>stock</strong>s rather than bonds).<br />
The purpose of the present study was to test whether narcissism<br />
predicts financial risk-taking within the specific context of <strong>stock</strong><br />
<strong>market</strong> <strong>investing</strong>. We hypothesized that narcissism would predict<br />
a tendency to invest in riskier <strong>stock</strong>s, with ‘‘risky’’ being defined in<br />
terms of a <strong>stock</strong>’s volatility. Stock volatility—i.e., how much a <strong>stock</strong>’s<br />
value (i.e., price per share) fluctuates relative to other <strong>stock</strong>s—is a<br />
useful metric of <strong>stock</strong> riskiness for a couple of reasons. Practically<br />
speaking, there exist well-established measures of <strong>stock</strong> volatility.<br />
One of these measures is the economic indicator b (used in Study<br />
2), which indicates how much a single <strong>stock</strong>’s value fluctuates relative<br />
to a <strong>market</strong> indicator, such as the S&P 500 or FTSE. In terms of<br />
validity, highly volatile <strong>stock</strong>s are indeed risky investments. Put<br />
simply, highly volatile <strong>stock</strong>s are riskier than average <strong>stock</strong>s because<br />
their price valleys are deeper. However, they are also more potentially<br />
rewarding because their price peaks are higher.<br />
Because narcissists are more strongly motivated by reward than<br />
punishment, they should make investment decisions that maximize<br />
reward potential even at the cost of heightened risk exposure.<br />
In other words, highly volatile <strong>stock</strong>s should be particularly attractive<br />
to narcissists. If our hypothesis is correct, then narcissism<br />
should be an adaptive personality trait during economic bull <strong>market</strong>s<br />
<strong>and</strong> a maladaptive trait during economic bear <strong>market</strong>s. This is<br />
because volatility correlates positively with price during bull <strong>market</strong>s<br />
(i.e., when most <strong>stock</strong>s’ values are rising) <strong>and</strong> negatively with<br />
price during bear <strong>market</strong>s (i.e., when most <strong>stock</strong>s’ values are falling).<br />
Therefore, <strong>investing</strong> in more volatile <strong>stock</strong>s will generally result<br />
in greater profits during bull <strong>market</strong>s <strong>and</strong> greater losses during<br />
bear <strong>market</strong>s.<br />
In this article, we present findings from two studies that test the<br />
link between narcissism <strong>and</strong> risky <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> <strong>investing</strong>. In Study<br />
1, participants were asked to select which <strong>stock</strong> they would rather<br />
invest money into from amongst four hypothetical <strong>stock</strong>s depicted<br />
by plots showing varying degrees of volatility. In Study 2, participants<br />
created hypothetical investment portfolios using actual<br />
<strong>stock</strong>s <strong>and</strong> performance indicators, including b. In both studies,<br />
narcissistic participants were expected to be attracted to highly<br />
volatile <strong>stock</strong>s. Specifically, narcissistic participants were expected<br />
to select <strong>stock</strong>s depicted in plots showing high volatility (Study 1)<br />
<strong>and</strong> create investment portfolios more heavily populated with<br />
highly volatile <strong>stock</strong>s (Study 2). Finally, the investment portfolios<br />
created in Study 2 were tracked for five weeks to determine<br />
whether narcissism predicts investment performance. By chance,<br />
the US <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> experienced a historic collapse during this<br />
tracking period, which allowed us to examine how investments<br />
by narcissists perform during strong economic declines (i.e., a bear<br />
<strong>market</strong>).<br />
J.D. Foster et al. / Personality <strong>and</strong> Individual Differences 50 (2011) 816–821 817<br />
2. Study 1<br />
In this study, we conducted an initial test of the link between<br />
narcissism <strong>and</strong> risky <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> <strong>investing</strong>. We hypothesized that<br />
narcissists would be prone to making hypothetical investments<br />
into <strong>stock</strong>s that displayed higher levels of volatility (i.e., <strong>stock</strong>s<br />
with more severe price fluctuations).<br />
2.1. Method<br />
2.1.1. Participants <strong>and</strong> procedure<br />
A sample of 237 University of South Alabama undergraduates<br />
(M age = 20.93; 56% female) completed measures of narcissism<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>stock</strong> volatility preference.<br />
2.1.1.1. <strong>Narcissism</strong>. <strong>Narcissism</strong> was measured with the 40-item<br />
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988). NPI<br />
scores for the present sample ranged from one to 39 (M = 17.74,<br />
SD = 7.54, a = .87) with higher scores indicating higher levels of<br />
narcissistic personality.<br />
2.1.1.2. Stock volatility preference. Participants were presented with<br />
four hypothetical <strong>stock</strong>s that differed in terms of volatility <strong>and</strong><br />
asked to select the one that they would most want to invest their<br />
money. Volatility was depicted graphically as the amount each<br />
<strong>stock</strong>’s price fluctuated during the previous 1000 <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong><br />
closings (see Appendix A for actual plots used in study). To create<br />
these plots, times series data for 1000 time points were simulated<br />
such that the value for each successive time point differed from<br />
that of the previous time point by a r<strong>and</strong>om integer between 3<br />
<strong>and</strong> +3. Time point #1 was designated as the present time <strong>and</strong><br />
was set at 100 (i.e., the price of the <strong>stock</strong> at the most recent close<br />
of the <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> was set at $100). Therefore the price for time<br />
point #2 could range from 97 to 103, the price for time point #3<br />
could range from 94 to 106 (the actual price depended, of course,<br />
on what the price for time point #2 was), <strong>and</strong> so forth all of the<br />
way to time point #1000. These prices were then plotted with<br />
the Y-axis designated as the <strong>stock</strong>’s closing price <strong>and</strong> the X-axis<br />
designated as time. Time points were reversed before plotting so<br />
that time point #1 appeared at the far right end of the X-axis. This<br />
ensured that the most recent closing price of the <strong>stock</strong> was fixed at<br />
$100. This simulation was repeated until a plot with adequate visual<br />
appeal (e.g., appeared to show relatively consistent price fluctuations<br />
across the time series) emerged. We term this plot <strong>and</strong><br />
data set the st<strong>and</strong>ard time series.<br />
Next, to create the four plots used in the study, a plot representing<br />
very low volatility was created by multiplying by 0.5 the range<br />
with which the prices for each time point in the st<strong>and</strong>ard time series<br />
were allowed to differ (i.e., the range was changed from ±3 to<br />
±1.5). In other words, we created a new time series plot that displayed<br />
one-half the daily fluctuation displayed in the st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />
time series plot. To create the second, third, <strong>and</strong> fourth plots, we<br />
used multipliers of 2.0, 3.5, <strong>and</strong> 5.0, respectively. In sum, we created<br />
four time series plots that displayed between one-half <strong>and</strong><br />
five times the volatility displayed in the st<strong>and</strong>ard time series plot.<br />
For quantitative purposes, we use the numbers 1–4 to represent<br />
these plots with higher numbers representing plots reflecting higher<br />
volatility. Participants were asked to select from amongst these<br />
four plots (M = 2.39, SD = .99).<br />
3. Results <strong>and</strong> discussion<br />
As hypothesized, narcissism positively predicted the selection<br />
of <strong>stock</strong>s represented by plots depicting greater price volatility,<br />
r = .13, p < .05, R 2 = .02. Put differently, participants who selected
818 J.D. Foster et al. / Personality <strong>and</strong> Individual Differences 50 (2011) 816–821<br />
the two lower volatility <strong>stock</strong>s (n = 137) reported an average NPI<br />
score of 16.91 (SD = 7.38), whereas participants who selected the<br />
two higher volatility <strong>stock</strong>s (n = 100) reported an average NPI score<br />
of 18.89 (SD = 7.65), d = .26. In short, this represents a relatively<br />
small, but statistically significant effect suggesting that narcissists<br />
are prone to making investments in riskier (i.e., more volatile)<br />
<strong>stock</strong>s.<br />
Gender was also analyzed as a potential confounding <strong>and</strong> moderating<br />
variable in this study <strong>and</strong> in Study 2. Although men scored<br />
higher in narcissism <strong>and</strong> made somewhat riskier investment selections<br />
than did women, controlling for gender or including it as a<br />
moderating variable did not significantly change any of the results<br />
reported in this paper. In short, narcissism’s link to risky <strong>investing</strong><br />
was not contingent upon gender. Gender is therefore not discussed<br />
further.<br />
4. Study 2<br />
The next study sought to more conclusively test the link between<br />
narcissism <strong>and</strong> risky <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> <strong>investing</strong> by having a<br />
sample of college undergraduates create hypothetical investment<br />
portfolios (i.e., collection of investments) using real <strong>stock</strong>s, the values<br />
of which were tracked for an approximate five-week period.<br />
Serendipitously, the tracking period of this study overlapped the<br />
historic collapse of the US <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> that occurred during September<br />
<strong>and</strong> October, 2008. We were thus able to observe how narcissists’<br />
investments perform during a strong economic downturn<br />
<strong>and</strong> test whether narcissism is financially maladaptive during bear<br />
<strong>market</strong> conditions. Additionally, we included a measure of approach-avoidance<br />
motivation in this study to examine whether<br />
narcissists’ <strong>investing</strong> tendencies are explained by their strong approach<br />
motivation <strong>and</strong>/or weak avoidance motivation.<br />
4.1. Method<br />
4.1.1. Participants<br />
Seventy-one University of South Alabama undergraduates (M<br />
age = 21.20, 58% women) participated in this study in exchange<br />
for credit toward their research participation requirement. Due to<br />
the complexity of the study (e.g., participants were taught about<br />
economic concepts, such as b) individuals who reported little or<br />
no familiarity with the <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> <strong>and</strong>/or a prior diagnosis of a<br />
learning disability were excluded from the study.<br />
4.1.2. Materials <strong>and</strong> procedure<br />
Participants completed individual difference measures of narcissistic<br />
personality <strong>and</strong> approach-avoidance motivation as part<br />
of a subject pool registration session conducted at the beginning<br />
of the semester. <strong>Narcissism</strong> was again measured with the 40-item<br />
NPI (Raskin & Terry, 1988). NPI scores for the present sample ranged<br />
from six to 37 (M = 18.07, SD = 7.09, a = .85). Approach-avoidance<br />
motivation was measured with the 35-item Sensitivity to<br />
Reward <strong>and</strong> Punishment Scale (O’Connor, Colder, & Hawk, 2004;<br />
Torrubia, Avila, Molto, & Caseras, 2001). Approach motivation<br />
(i.e., sensitivity to reward) scores ranged from one to 17<br />
(M = 8.39, SD = 3.63, a = .76) <strong>and</strong> avoidance motivation (i.e., sensitivity<br />
to punishment) scores also ranged from one to 17<br />
(M = 8.15, SD = 4.54, a = .83) with higher scores indicating higher<br />
levels of approach <strong>and</strong> avoidance motivation, respectively.<br />
Upon arrival to the study, participants were informed that they<br />
would be creating <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> investment portfolios based on actual<br />
<strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> data <strong>and</strong> that their portfolios would be tracked<br />
for approximately five weeks. They were further informed that<br />
participants whose portfolios were most profitable at the end of<br />
the tracking period would receive cash prizes ranging from $100<br />
for first place to $20 for fifth place. Multiple prizes were awarded<br />
to discourage participants from employing extremely risky (‘‘Hail<br />
Mary’’) investment strategies in an attempt to claim a single gr<strong>and</strong><br />
prize. This appeared to work because participants’ investments<br />
ended up on average being only moderately risky.<br />
Before creating portfolios, participants listened to an approximately<br />
30-min long didactic about several fundamental concepts<br />
of the <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> (e.g., what a share of <strong>stock</strong> is). Most importantly,<br />
participants learned about the economic indicator b, which<br />
measures a <strong>stock</strong>’s volatility. b is the unst<strong>and</strong>ardized regression<br />
coefficient that results from regressing a broad indicator of <strong>market</strong><br />
performance (e.g., S&P 500, FTSE) onto the performance of a single<br />
<strong>stock</strong> over a given length of time. For example, a <strong>stock</strong> with b = 2.0<br />
correlates positively with the performance of the <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong>, but<br />
tends to fluctuate in price at about twice the rate of the <strong>market</strong>. A<br />
<strong>stock</strong> with b = 0.5 is about half as volatile as the <strong>market</strong>. In short,<br />
<strong>stock</strong>s with high b tend to experience more pronounced price fluctuations<br />
resulting in enhanced risk exposure <strong>and</strong> reward potential<br />
(to make this point salient, we generally referred to b using the<br />
acronym RR, which stood for Risk/Reward). Whether investors<br />
actually profit or lose money is often best predicted by the performance<br />
of the <strong>market</strong>. When the <strong>market</strong> rises, <strong>stock</strong>s with high b<br />
tend to experience extreme profits; when the <strong>market</strong> falls, high b<br />
<strong>stock</strong>s tend to suffer extreme losses (this assumes that b is positive,<br />
which is true for the vast majority of <strong>stock</strong>s).<br />
Following this presentation, participants were given a list containing<br />
the 30 companies that collectively made up the Dow Jones<br />
Industrial Average (e.g., Walmart, Microsoft). 2 Listed beside each<br />
company was its b (b values were multiplied by 100 to make them<br />
whole numbers), current price-per-share, <strong>and</strong> 52-week high <strong>and</strong><br />
low prices. All values were taken from the close of the New York<br />
Stock Exchange (NYSE) the day before the study began (September<br />
2, 2008) <strong>and</strong> all participants were run within three weeks of this<br />
date. The dates that participants participated in the study were<br />
uncorrelated with their <strong>stock</strong> selections or any other variables reported<br />
in this study.<br />
Participants were next given an imaginary sum of $10,000 with<br />
which to invest into one or more of the 30 <strong>stock</strong>s. Participants were<br />
permitted to assign their investments to any single company or<br />
combination of companies they desired. The only requirements<br />
were that (i) they had to invest all $10,000 <strong>and</strong> (ii) they had to limit<br />
their investments to the 30 listed companies.<br />
4.1.2.1. Portfolio volatility. We computed how volatile participants’<br />
portfolios were by averaging the b values for the 10 investments<br />
that made up their portfolios. Portfolio volatilities ranged from<br />
58.10 to 168.80 (M = 111.60, SD = 25.33). Higher scores reflected<br />
higher portfolio volatility.<br />
4.1.2.2. Portfolio value. At the end of the tracking period (i.e., the<br />
close of the NYSE on October 10, 2008), portfolios values were assessed<br />
(all portfolios began the study with a $10,000 value). The<br />
Dow Jones Industrial Average lost approximately 27% of its value<br />
during the tracking period. Not surprisingly, all participants’ portfolios<br />
also lost value (M portfolio value = $6605, SD = $932,<br />
range = $3909–$8130); the average portfolio lost 34% of its initial<br />
$10,000 value.<br />
5. Results <strong>and</strong> discussion<br />
As hypothesized, narcissism predicted the creation of more volatile<br />
<strong>stock</strong> portfolios, r = .36, p < .01. Also consistent with prior research<br />
(Foster & Trimm, 2008), narcissism predicted high approach<br />
2 One of the companies, AIG, has since been removed from the Dow-30.
motivation, r = .49, p < .001, <strong>and</strong> low avoidance motivation,<br />
r = .38, p < .01. Furthermore, approach motivation predicted more<br />
volatile portfolios, r = .34, p < .01, <strong>and</strong> avoidance motivation predicted<br />
less volatile portfolios, r = .26, p < .05. To summarize, narcissists<br />
<strong>and</strong> individuals high in approach motivation selected<br />
riskier <strong>stock</strong>s for their portfolios; individuals high in avoidance<br />
motivation selected safer <strong>stock</strong>s for their portfolios.<br />
We next tested whether approach-avoidance motivation mediated<br />
the link between narcissism <strong>and</strong> portfolio volatility using the<br />
steps outlined by Baron <strong>and</strong> Kenny (1986). When portfolio volatility<br />
was regressed onto narcissism, approach motivation, <strong>and</strong> avoidance<br />
motivation simultaneously, the direct association between narcissism<br />
<strong>and</strong> portfolio volatility fell to non-significant, b = .16, p = .25.<br />
Likewise, the link between avoidance motivation <strong>and</strong> portfolio volatility<br />
also fell to non-significant, b = .19, p = .12. In contrast, the<br />
link between approach motivation <strong>and</strong> portfolio volatility remained<br />
statistically significant, b = .26, p < .05. This indicates that the narcissism-portfolio<br />
volatility link was mediated primarily by approach<br />
motivation. Preacher <strong>and</strong> Hayes’ (2004) bootstrapping procedure<br />
confirmed that the indirect effect of narcissism on portfolio volatility<br />
carried through approach motivation was significant; that is, the<br />
95% confidence intervals of the indirect effect did not cross zero, 95%<br />
CI = .08 <strong>and</strong> 1.10, whereas the indirect effect carried through avoidance<br />
motivation was non-significant, 95% CI = .07 <strong>and</strong> .81. Narcissists’<br />
risky <strong>stock</strong> selections in this study were best explained by their<br />
heightened level of approach motivation.<br />
We also tested whether the <strong>stock</strong>s that narcissists picked for<br />
their portfolios performed better or worse than average during<br />
the tracking period. Not surprisingly, highly volatile portfolios lost<br />
significantly more money than did less volatile portfolios, r = .84,<br />
p < .001. Likewise, narcissism, which was positively correlated with<br />
portfolio volatility, also predicted greater losses, r = .26, p < .05. In<br />
short, narcissists, who created more volatile <strong>stock</strong> portfolios, lost<br />
significantly more money than did their less narcissistic<br />
counterparts.<br />
Next, we tested whether the link between narcissism <strong>and</strong> poor<br />
portfolio performance was explained by portfolio volatility. Consistent<br />
with mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986), when we controlled for<br />
portfolio volatility, the association between narcissism <strong>and</strong> portfolio<br />
performance fell to non-significant, b = .06, p = .43, whereas the<br />
association between portfolio volatility <strong>and</strong> portfolio performance<br />
remained strong, b = .86, p < .001. Confirming the significance of<br />
the mediation, 95% confidence intervals representing the indirect<br />
effect of narcissism on portfolio performance carried through portfolio<br />
volatility did not cross zero, 95% CI = 65.19 <strong>and</strong> 16.85.<br />
Finally, to put all of these results together, we constructed a<br />
structural equation model that reflected our theoretical contention<br />
that the poor performance of narcissists in this study was caused<br />
by the fact that they made risky (i.e., highly volatile) investments,<br />
which was ultimately caused by their strong approach orientations.<br />
This model is shown in Fig. 1. We created latent variables<br />
for narcissism, approach motivation, <strong>and</strong> portfolio volatility by<br />
splitting the measures into two or three parcels that contained<br />
the summed scores for a selection of items. Specifically, we created<br />
narcissism<br />
J.D. Foster et al. / Personality <strong>and</strong> Individual Differences 50 (2011) 816–821 819<br />
three parcels for narcissism by summing NPI items 1, 4, 7, 10...<br />
into parcel 1, items 2, 5, 8, 11... into parcel 2, <strong>and</strong> items 3, 6, 9,<br />
12... into parcel 3. We created two parcels for approach motivation<br />
that contained either odd or even numbered items of the Sensitivity<br />
to Reward Scale. We created two parcels for portfolio<br />
volatility that contained either odd or even numbered b values (recall<br />
that participants made 10 separate investments, so each parcel<br />
contained five bs). Of course, we could not create a latent variable<br />
for portfolio performance since it was simply a dollar amount, so it<br />
was modeled as a manifest variable.<br />
We tested our hypothesized model using Amos Ò v6.0 SEM software<br />
<strong>and</strong> found that it fit the data nearly perfectly (v 2 [18 df]=<br />
15.53, p = .63; CFI = 1.00, GFI = .95, SRMR = .06, RMSEA = .00). We<br />
also tested alternative models that contained either (i) a direct<br />
path from narcissism to portfolio volatility, (ii) a direct path from<br />
narcissism to portfolio performance, or (iii) a direct path from approach<br />
motivation to portfolio performance. None of these alternative<br />
models significantly improved model fit relative to our<br />
hypothesized model (Dv 2 [1 df] values were .64, 3.12, <strong>and</strong> 3.53,<br />
respectively; ps were .42, .08, <strong>and</strong> .06, respectively). In sum, our<br />
hypothesized model fit the data exceptionally well <strong>and</strong> as well as<br />
any of the less parsimonious alternative models tested. We believe<br />
that our hypothesized model best reflects reality in terms of how<br />
narcissism operates within the context of <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> <strong>investing</strong>.<br />
6. General discussion<br />
nar1 nar2 nar3 app1 app2 beta1 beta2<br />
.74 .76 .91 .80 .72 .72 .86<br />
The results of these studies suggest that narcissists are prone to<br />
<strong>investing</strong> in risky <strong>stock</strong>s. This tendency appears to stem primarily<br />
from narcissists’ hypersensitivity to reward (i.e., high approach<br />
motivation). Researchers have suggested that the motivational disposition<br />
of narcissists (i.e., high approach/low avoidance motivation)<br />
is likely to be adaptive in some circumstances <strong>and</strong><br />
maladaptive in others (e.g., Foster & Trimm, 2008). Investing in<br />
highly volatile <strong>stock</strong>s exposes investors to greater potential gains<br />
<strong>and</strong> losses depending upon <strong>market</strong> conditions (e.g., whether the<br />
<strong>market</strong> is in ascent or decline). Accordingly, narcissistic personality<br />
should be financially disadvantageous during periods of economic<br />
decline. This was clearly evident in Study 2, where narcissists lost<br />
significantly more money from their investments than did their less<br />
narcissistic counterparts, which was entirely explained by the risky<br />
investments that narcissists made. Of course, it should be noted<br />
here that had the <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> risen rather than fallen during Study<br />
2, narcissists would most likely have performed better than other<br />
participants in the study. In short, these results further demonstrate<br />
what Paulhus (1998) labeled the ‘‘mixed-blessing’’ of narcissism,<br />
that is, narcissism presents its host with a range of advantages<br />
<strong>and</strong> disadvantages that are situationally dependent.<br />
The results of these studies are also in line with prior research<br />
that has linked narcissism with risky decision-making in other<br />
domains. For example, Lakey <strong>and</strong> colleagues (2008) demonstrated<br />
that narcissism is linked to pathological gambling. These authors<br />
suggest that the link between narcissism <strong>and</strong> pathological<br />
gambling is explained in part by what they refer to as narcissists’<br />
.65 approach .39 portfolio -.94<br />
motivation<br />
volatility<br />
portfolio<br />
performance<br />
Fig. 1. Structural equation model depicting narcissism <strong>and</strong> <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> <strong>investing</strong>. Latent variables are represented by ovals; manifest variables are represented by<br />
rectangles. The numbers above the paths connecting the latent variables (<strong>and</strong> portfolio performance) are st<strong>and</strong>ardized regression weights. The numbers beside the paths<br />
connecting the latent variables to their manifest indicators are estimated factor loadings.
820 J.D. Foster et al. / Personality <strong>and</strong> Individual Differences 50 (2011) 816–821<br />
‘‘myopic focus on reward’’ (p. 131), which leads them to make high<br />
risk wagers that ultimately result in more substantial losses. In a<br />
similar vein, narcissists in Study 2 incurred greater financial losses<br />
compared to less narcissistic participants because the <strong>stock</strong>s they<br />
invested in were, on average, more volatile. This tendency appeared<br />
to be fueled by approach motivation. It is interesting that<br />
approach motivation, but not avoidance motivation best accounted<br />
for the risky <strong>investing</strong> by narcissists. This finding is consistent with<br />
recent research showing that narcissists engage in more general<br />
risk-taking because of the benefits they think they will derive from<br />
taking risks <strong>and</strong> not because they underestimate the level of risk<br />
associated with risky behavior (Foster, Shenesey et al., 2010).<br />
Cumulatively, these findings suggest that strong approach motivation<br />
rather than weak avoidance motivation might be the driving<br />
force behind narcissistic risk-taking.<br />
Finally, the present studies’ results are also consistent with<br />
Campbell, Goodie, <strong>and</strong> Foster’s (2004) research showing that narcissists<br />
display overconfidence in their decision-making. For example,<br />
narcissists faced with objective evidence that they will not<br />
succeed at a task (e.g., poor performance in prior similar tasks)<br />
tend to remain confident that they will succeed no<strong>net</strong>heless. These<br />
findings have been interpreted as reflecting a level of dysfunctional<br />
overconfidence associated with narcissism. Although not directly<br />
tested in their study, Campbell et al. (2004) suggested that narcissistic<br />
overconfidence may be fueled by a strong approach orientation<br />
whereby one focuses exclusively on potential positive<br />
outcomes (i.e., task success). Study 2’s results support this<br />
perspective.<br />
In conclusion, the results of this research suggest that the motivational<br />
disposition of narcissists makes them susceptible to problems<br />
stemming from exuberant financial risk-taking, including<br />
<strong>investing</strong> in highly volatile <strong>stock</strong>s. Future research will need to<br />
examine how well these laboratory studies using college students<br />
generalize to real-world <strong>investing</strong>. Future research should also<br />
examine more thoroughly the process that underlies risky <strong>investing</strong><br />
by narcissists. Sub-goal scaffolding theory (Corr, 2008), for<br />
example, in part suggests that approach motivated behavior often<br />
involves restraint <strong>and</strong> planning (i.e., it is strategic), which distinguishes<br />
it from purely impulsive behavior. Although we are inclined<br />
to view risky <strong>investing</strong> by narcissists as approach<br />
motivated behavior, we admittedly cannot rule out the possibility<br />
that narcissists make risky investments out of sheer impulse. Future<br />
research may address this by examining narcissists’ investment<br />
decisions over longer periods of time <strong>and</strong> following<br />
performance feedback. If narcissists’ risky investments consistently<br />
perform poorly, more cautious future <strong>investing</strong> might indicate<br />
planning <strong>and</strong> restraint characteristic of approach motivation.<br />
Failure to modify their investment scheme, on the other h<strong>and</strong>,<br />
might indicate impulsivity. Finally, we want to reiterate that we<br />
do not think that narcissism is a purely maladaptive trait with regard<br />
to investment decisions. Again, had the <strong>market</strong> performed<br />
well during Study 2’s tracking period, narcissists would most likely<br />
have outperformed their less narcissistic counterparts. Nevertheless,<br />
during economic downturns it is probably best not to leave<br />
investments in the h<strong>and</strong>s of narcissists.<br />
Appendix A. Plots used in <strong>stock</strong> picking exercise from Study 1<br />
Stock. picking exercise<br />
Below are the prices of four <strong>stock</strong>s during the past several years.<br />
In general, all four <strong>stock</strong>s performed about the same, though some
obviously went up <strong>and</strong> down in price more than others. Currently,<br />
they are each worth exactly $100 per share. Imagine that you have<br />
saved up a significant amount of money <strong>and</strong> that you want to invest<br />
it into one of these four <strong>stock</strong>s. Place a check mark next to<br />
the <strong>stock</strong> that you would you buy?<br />
References<br />
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable distinction in<br />
social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, <strong>and</strong> statistical<br />
considerations. Journal of Personality <strong>and</strong> Social Psychology, 51, 1173–1182.<br />
Brunell, A. B., Gentry, W. A., Campbell, W. K., Kuhnert, K. W., DeMarree, K. G., &<br />
Hoffman, B. J. (2008). Leader emergence: The case of the narcissistic leader.<br />
Personality <strong>and</strong> Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 1663–1676.<br />
Campbell, W. K., Goodie, A. S., & Foster, J. D. (2004). <strong>Narcissism</strong>, confidence, <strong>and</strong> risk<br />
attitude. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 17, 297–311.<br />
Cohan, W. D. (2009). House of cards: A tale of hubris <strong>and</strong> wretched excess on Wall<br />
Street. New York: Doubleday.<br />
Corr, P. J. (2008). Reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST): Introduction. In P. J. Corr<br />
(Ed.), The reinforcement theory of personality. New York: Cambridge University<br />
Press.<br />
Foster, J. D., & Campbell, W. K. (2007). Are there such things as ‘Narcissists’ in social<br />
psychology? A taxometric analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory.<br />
Personality <strong>and</strong> Individual Differences, 43, 1321–1332.<br />
Foster, J. D., Misra, T. A., & Reidy, D. E. (2010). Narcissists are approach-oriented<br />
toward their money <strong>and</strong> their friends. Journal of Research in Personality, 43,<br />
764–769.<br />
Foster, J. D., Shenesey, J. W., & Goff, J. (2010). Why do narcissists take more risks?<br />
Testing the roles of perceived risks <strong>and</strong> benefits on risky behaviors. Personality<br />
<strong>and</strong> Individual Differences, 47, 885–889.<br />
J.D. Foster et al. / Personality <strong>and</strong> Individual Differences 50 (2011) 816–821 821<br />
Foster, J. D., & Trimm, R. F. IV., (2008). On being eager <strong>and</strong> uninhibited: <strong>Narcissism</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> approach-avoidance motivation. Personality <strong>and</strong> Social Psychology Bulletin,<br />
34, 1004–1017.<br />
Gladwell, M. (2009). Cocksure: Banks, battles, <strong>and</strong> the psychology of<br />
overconfidence. The New Yorker.<br />
Hamilton, R. W., & Biehal, G. J. (2005). Achieving Your Goals or Protecting Their<br />
Future? The Effects of Self-View on Goals <strong>and</strong> Choices. Journal of Consumer<br />
Research, 32, 277–283.<br />
Lakey, C. E., Rose, P., Campbell, W. K., & Goodie, A. S. (2008). Probing the link<br />
between narcissism <strong>and</strong> gambling: The mediating role of judgment <strong>and</strong><br />
decision-making biases. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 21, 113–137.<br />
O’Connor, R. M., Colder, C. R., & Hawk, L. W. Jr., (2004). Confirmatory factor analysis<br />
of the Sensitivity to Punishment <strong>and</strong> Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire.<br />
Personality <strong>and</strong> Individual Differences, 37, 985–1002.<br />
Paulhus, D. L. (1998). Interpersonal <strong>and</strong> intrapsychic adaptiveness of trait selfenhancement:<br />
A mixed blessing? Journal of Personality <strong>and</strong> Social Psychology, 74,<br />
1197–1208.<br />
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS <strong>and</strong> SAS procedures for estimating indirect<br />
effects in simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments &<br />
Computers, 36, 717–731.<br />
Raskin, R., & Terry, H. (1988). A principal-components analysis of the Narcissistic<br />
Personality Inventory <strong>and</strong> further evidence of its construct validity. Journal of<br />
Personality <strong>and</strong> Social Psychology, 54, 890–902.<br />
Shiller, R. J. (2000). Irrational exuberance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.<br />
Shiller, R. J. (2009). Yale school of management <strong>stock</strong> <strong>market</strong> confidence indexes.<br />
Retrieved July 21, 2009, from http://icf.som.yale.edu/confidence.index/<br />
YearIndex.shtml.<br />
Torrubia, R., Avila, C., Molto, J., & Caseras, X. (2001). The Sensitivity to Punishment<br />
<strong>and</strong> Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire (SPSRQ) as a measure of Gray’s anxiety<br />
<strong>and</strong> impulsivity dimensions. Personality <strong>and</strong> Individual Differences, 31, 837–862.<br />
Zhou, R., Pham, M. T., Mick, D. G., Iacobucci, D., & Huber, J. (2004). Promotion <strong>and</strong><br />
prevention across mental accounts: When financial products dictate<br />
consumers’ investment goals. Journal of Consumer Research, 31, 125–135.