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The Rule Against Perpetuities : Its Applicability to ... - 경희법학연구소

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> * :<br />

<strong>Its</strong> <strong>Applicability</strong> <strong>to</strong> An Option <strong>to</strong> Purchase<br />

미국법상 영대재산권 무효의 원칙의 환매특약에 대한 적용 연구<br />

< CONTENTS ><br />

Ⅰ. Introduction<br />

Ⅱ. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong><br />

Ⅲ. Case Analysis: <strong>The</strong> Symphony Space, Inc., v. Pergola Properties, Inc.<br />

Ⅳ. Discussion: Exemption of Option From <strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong><br />

Ⅴ. Conclusion<br />

Pak, Wan-Q **<br />

(박완규)<br />

Key Words: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, Option <strong>to</strong> Purchase, Commercial Transaction, Uniform<br />

Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, Feudal System, Exemption, Preemptive Right.<br />

영대재산권무효의 원칙, 환매특약, 보통법, 환매기간, 부동산거래.<br />

I. Introduction<br />

<strong>The</strong> legal concept of a perpetuity refers <strong>to</strong> “any condition extending the inalienability<br />

of property beyond the time of a life or lives in being plus twenty one years.” 1) <strong>The</strong><br />

* 영대 재산권 무효의 원칙은 영미법상의 ‘<strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>’를 지칭하는 것으로 그<br />

의미를 번역하면 “미래 부동산 지배권 양도 당시 생존한 자의 생애기간에 21년을 더한 기간<br />

안에 그 지배권이 현실화되어 누군가에 귀속되지 않으면 그 지배권은 무효이다.”라고 할 수<br />

있다. 박완규, “미국법상 영대 재산권 무효의 원칙에 관한 연구”,


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common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> was created <strong>to</strong> prohibit the creation of perpetuities.<br />

In seventeen-century England, land owners desired <strong>to</strong> control their interests in land for<br />

unlimited durations beyond their own death. <strong>The</strong>y wanted their own consanguine<br />

descendants <strong>to</strong> perpetually own the property as every man's wish is the long term prosperity<br />

of their children or offspring. Landowners wanted <strong>to</strong> make special landholding arrangements<br />

among family members <strong>to</strong> implement their wish for a perpetuity. 2)<br />

<strong>Perpetuities</strong> restrain the alienability of interests in real property. English Judges attempted<br />

<strong>to</strong> prevent the inalienability of land. Inalienability of land was against public policy, and<br />

it is still so <strong>to</strong>day. An English judge stated this notion, “the principle was that restraints<br />

of trade are contrary <strong>to</strong> public policy.” 3) <strong>The</strong> judges believed that if land were not traded<br />

in commerce, it would be unproductive, and the national wealth would be decreased. 4)<br />

On the other hand, alienability would help developing land and prevent concentration of<br />

wealth on a few people or family. 5)<br />

<strong>The</strong> common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> began <strong>to</strong> take a form in 17th century in<br />

England, and it was completed in <strong>to</strong>day’s form in the early 20th century. 6) After about<br />

150 years of struggle with landowners in determining the perpetuity period within which<br />

land must vest or fail, the courts fixed it as “lives in being plus 21 years thereafter.” 7)<br />

John Chipman Gray8) came up with a concise formulation as follows: “No interest is good<br />

unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at<br />

the creation of the interest.” 9)<br />

1) Black’s Law Dictionary 1141 (6th ed. 1995).<br />

2) <strong>The</strong> rule against perpetuities originated <strong>to</strong> address familial landholding arrangements in 17th century.<br />

See Wildenstein & Co., Inc. v. Wallis 595 N.E.2d 828, 832 (N.Y. 1992).<br />

3) In re Hollis’ Hospital, [1899] 2 Ch. 540, 553.<br />

4) John A. Borron, Jr. & Lewis Mallalieu Simes, 3 Simes and Smith, <strong>The</strong> Law of Future Interests,<br />

§ 1117, available at LFUTINT § 1117 (Westlaw).<br />

5) See also case cited supra note 4.<br />

6) See Jesse Dukeminier ET AL., Property, 244-45 (6th ed. 2006) (1981).<br />

7) Id.<br />

8) John Chipman Gray was a law professor at Harvard Law School from 1869 <strong>to</strong> 1913. Id. at 245.<br />

9) Dukeminnier, supra note 8, at 245(citing JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES<br />

§ 201 (4th ed. 1943)).


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>: <strong>Its</strong> <strong>Applicability</strong> <strong>to</strong> An Option <strong>to</strong> Purchase | Pak, Wan-Q<br />

<strong>The</strong> common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> holds that society is better off when the<br />

living members control the property than when dead ones do. 10) Also, the common law<br />

<strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> balances the desires of the present generation <strong>to</strong> tie up their property<br />

and those of the future generation: <strong>The</strong> common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> limits<br />

nonvesting of future interest <strong>to</strong> a period of life in being plus 21 years. 11) In sum, the<br />

gist of the rationale for the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> are twofold; first, the<br />

promotion of the productivity of land, and second, the spread of wealth among people. 12)<br />

However, when it is applied <strong>to</strong> a commercial option13), such as, an option <strong>to</strong> purchase,<br />

the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> become problematic. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> will cause legal<br />

inconsistency and confusion as well as inefficiency, which will be later discussed in detail<br />

in Part IV. An option is different from a landholding arrangement among family members.<br />

It is commercial in nature not familial. <strong>The</strong> optionee’s right is a contractual interest rather<br />

than a property interest. <strong>The</strong> common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> is commonly<br />

applicable, without much doubt, <strong>to</strong> some future interest including contingent remainders14), execu<strong>to</strong>ry interests15), and class gifts16). All of these involve property rights in family<br />

settings. But the majority courts apply the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> <strong>to</strong> an<br />

option <strong>to</strong> purchase as well, disregarding its commercial and contractual nature. We should<br />

rethink the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>’s applicability <strong>to</strong> options.<br />

This paper aims <strong>to</strong> discuss and argue for exemption of an option <strong>to</strong> purchase from the<br />

common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>.<br />

In part II, some his<strong>to</strong>rical background and explanation of the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong><br />

<strong>Perpetuities</strong> will be presented. In part III, an analysis of a case with general implications<br />

10) Borron, supra note 6, at § 1117.<br />

11) Id.<br />

12) Id.<br />

13) ‘A commercial option’ here includes a preemptive right, an option appurtenant, and an option<br />

<strong>to</strong> purchase. See Ferrero Constr. Co v. Dennis Rourke Corp, 311 Md. 560, 567 (1985).<br />

14) A contingent remainder is a future interest in a grantee that is subject <strong>to</strong> a condition precedent<br />

or that is given <strong>to</strong> an unascertained person.<br />

15) An execu<strong>to</strong>ry interest is a future interest in a grantee that divests another grantee's interest or<br />

the gran<strong>to</strong>r’s interest.<br />

16) A class gift is a remainder created in a class of persons.<br />

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on applicability of the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> <strong>to</strong> an option <strong>to</strong> purchase<br />

will be made, in part IV, the reasons for the exemption of an option <strong>to</strong> purchase from<br />

the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> will be discussed, and finally, part V will<br />

conclude this paper.<br />

II. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong><br />

1. Some His<strong>to</strong>rical Background: <strong>The</strong> English Feudal System and<br />

American Land Law<br />

1) <strong>The</strong> English Feudal System<br />

<strong>The</strong> English feudal system dates back <strong>to</strong> the Norman conquest of England in 1066.<br />

William the Conqueror became the King of the England, subordinating all the resistant<br />

Anglo-Saxons, forfeiting their lands, and distributing them among his supporters. Those<br />

supporters were called tenants in chief. <strong>The</strong>y did not “own” the land in modern sense<br />

but had “the right <strong>to</strong> use, possess, and enjoy the land,” on the king’ behalf. 17) Tenants<br />

in common and their subordinates also made similar landholding arrangements with their<br />

own vassals, through a process called subinfeudation.<br />

Subinfeudation generated lessor tenants such as mesne lords and tenants in demesne,<br />

in the feudal hierarchy. Mesne lords refers <strong>to</strong> a middle or intermediate lords, and tenants<br />

in demesne refers the person who had possessory use of the land. <strong>The</strong> lords above him<br />

(the King, tenants in common, mesne lords) had the rights <strong>to</strong> services. <strong>The</strong> subinfeudation<br />

down the road by lower tenants produced the complex English feudal pyramid that<br />

developed in<strong>to</strong> <strong>to</strong>day's Anglo-American law of estates in land. 18)<br />

While tenants were given the right <strong>to</strong> land, they provided services and incidents <strong>to</strong> the<br />

17) John G. Sprankling, Understanding Property Law, 91 (2nd. ed 2007).<br />

18) Id. at 93.


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king or their lord. <strong>The</strong>re were four types of services: Knight service, which required tenants<br />

in common who held their lands in knight service <strong>to</strong> provide the king with certain number<br />

of knights for military service each year; socage, which required tenants <strong>to</strong> provide their<br />

lord with some fixed amount of money or a particular agricultural product, or specified<br />

labor; frankalmoign, which required tenants <strong>to</strong> provide their lord with the service of praying<br />

for his salvation; and serjeanty, which required tenants <strong>to</strong> provide ceremonial or personal<br />

services <strong>to</strong> the king. 19)<br />

In addition <strong>to</strong> services, tenants owed their lord incidents. <strong>The</strong> feudal incidents include:<br />

homage and fealty, a ceremony by which military tenants gave their allegiance <strong>to</strong> the<br />

king and became vassals; aids, tenants’ duty <strong>to</strong> financially support the lord in a case of<br />

financial difficulties; forfeiture, the lord’s right <strong>to</strong> take the land back if a tenant fails <strong>to</strong><br />

perform feudal services or duties under his oath of loyalty; wardship and marriage, the<br />

lord's right <strong>to</strong> possession of the tenant’s land if the tenant died leaving an heir under 21,<br />

and <strong>to</strong> sell the heir in marriage. 20)<br />

Feudal services gradually changed in<strong>to</strong> money rents, and it lost its value with inflation,<br />

while feudal incidents maintained their value because they gave the lords the right <strong>to</strong><br />

possess the land. 21) Wardship, for example, was not affected by inflation. However, tenants<br />

could circumvent incidents by subinfeudation. 22) Wardship, an incident, for example, could<br />

be avoided if a tenant subinfeudated the land <strong>to</strong> someone else. 23) By doing so, the land<br />

would not be escheated <strong>to</strong> his lord even if he died without an heir. 24)<br />

As a result, the Statute Quia Emp<strong>to</strong>res was enacted in 1290 <strong>to</strong> prohibit the subinfeudation<br />

and <strong>to</strong> guard the feudal system. 25) However, the Statute marked the beginning of the end<br />

of the feudal system. 26) In exchange for prohibiting subinfeudation, the greater lords<br />

permitted their tenants <strong>to</strong> alienate the land without their consent, which established the<br />

19) Id. at 92.<br />

20) Dukemenier, supra note 8, at 178.<br />

21) Id. at 177-78.<br />

22) Id. at 179.<br />

23) Id.<br />

24) Id.<br />

25) Id.<br />

26) Id. at 179-180.<br />

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principle of alienability of land. 27) Also, the Statute resulted in direct holdings of the land<br />

from the crown, removing all the mesne lords in the hierarchy as it worked with forfeiture<br />

and escheat overtime. 28) In 1660, the Statute of Tenures was enacted effectively ending<br />

the feudal system. 29) This Statute abolished the feudal incidents including aids, homage,<br />

marriage, and wardship, and commuted all the remaining knight service tenures in<strong>to</strong> socage<br />

tenures. 30)<br />

2) <strong>The</strong> Influence of English Land Law <strong>to</strong> America<br />

American states adopted English principles of governing estates in land and future<br />

interests, but in parcel with the rejection of English royal system also rejected the “feudal<br />

relic of tenure”, 31) and severed all ties between American landowners and the king. 32) In<br />

America, the fee simple absolute33) are dominant over the complex English estate in land. 34)<br />

<strong>The</strong> mode of landholdings in America has become much more simple than the landholding<br />

arrangements of the feudal system.<br />

American legisla<strong>to</strong>rs and courts prefer the fee simple ownership <strong>to</strong> other estates, future<br />

interests in particular, because they tend <strong>to</strong> limit the alienability of land, which is viewed<br />

as commodity, and they may be used as means for “dead hand control” affecting the good<br />

faith present owners’ expectations of the land. 35) However, the remnants of the Feudal<br />

tradition in law cause confusion among judges, lawyers, and law students. 36) <strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong><br />

<strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> is one of them.<br />

27) Id.<br />

28) Id. at 180.<br />

29) Sprankling, supra note 19 at 96.<br />

30) Id.<br />

31) Id. at 98.<br />

32) Id.<br />

33) It is the most basic form of estate, equivalent <strong>to</strong> a complete ownership of land.<br />

34) Sprankling, supra note 19 at 98.<br />

35) Id. at 100.<br />

36) Id.


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>: <strong>Its</strong> <strong>Applicability</strong> <strong>to</strong> An Option <strong>to</strong> Purchase | Pak, Wan-Q<br />

2. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>: <strong>Its</strong> Origin and the <strong>Rule</strong> Explanation<br />

1) <strong>The</strong> Origin of the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong><br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> is known <strong>to</strong> have its roots in the Duke of Norfolk's Case<br />

22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1681) 37) <strong>The</strong> Duke of Norfolk had several sons, and three of them<br />

were involved with the issue of the case: Thomas, the eldest and insane; Henry, the<br />

second-eldest; and Charles, the third-eldest. <strong>The</strong> Duke wanted <strong>to</strong> “guard against the<br />

consequences of Thomas’ insanity.” 38) <strong>The</strong> Duke hired a lawyer <strong>to</strong> craft his desire in<br />

documents, and the lawyer sought <strong>to</strong> avoid the prohibited perpetuity in drafting the<br />

documents. 39) <strong>The</strong> lawyer created a trust under the term of which Henry was <strong>to</strong> enjoy<br />

certain property during the life of Thomas; but if Thomas should die childless, and Henry<br />

should become the Earl by inheritance, then Charles should enjoy that property. 40)<br />

Later, Henry received the property as his father intended, but refused <strong>to</strong> return the<br />

property according <strong>to</strong> the term of the trust, arguing that the devise <strong>to</strong> Charles under the<br />

trust was void because it was involved a perpetuity. 41) Charles brought a suit in Chancery<br />

<strong>to</strong> demand his right as the conditions for his taking had been met. 42) <strong>The</strong> issue was what<br />

were perpetuities, and more specifically, whether there was a perpetuity in this case. 43)Lord<br />

Chancellor Nottingham decided that the devise <strong>to</strong> Charles was not a perpetuity and was<br />

thus valid. 44) <strong>The</strong> Chancellor held that the property had <strong>to</strong> vest at some point, but he<br />

37) Herbert Barry, <strong>The</strong> Duke of Norfolk’s Case, 23 Va. L. Rev. 557, 538 (1937). (“Lord Nottingham’s<br />

decision established as a principle that in an equitable estate a future interest <strong>to</strong> take effect upon<br />

a contingency that cannot occur beyond the expiration of one or more lives in being is not void<br />

by reason of remoteness ... later cases ... resulted in giving it a quality and scope that may have<br />

been beyond its original purpose.”).<br />

38) George L. Haskins, Extending <strong>The</strong> Grasp of <strong>The</strong> Dead Hand Reflections on <strong>The</strong> Origins of <strong>The</strong><br />

<strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 19, 36 (1977-1978). (citing the Duke of Norfolk’s<br />

Case 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1681)).<br />

39) Herbert Barry, supra note 39, at 552.<br />

40) Id.<br />

41) Peter Appel, <strong>The</strong> Embarrasing <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, 54 J. Legal Educ. 264, 268 (2004).<br />

42) Haskins, supra note 40, at 37.<br />

43) Id.<br />

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refused <strong>to</strong> determine how long a period the property could be tied up. 45)<br />

Later courts attempted <strong>to</strong> determine the perpetuity period. 46)<br />

2) Explaining <strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong><br />

<strong>The</strong> common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> basically invalidates certain types of future<br />

interests that might not vest or fail within the perpetuity period. <strong>The</strong> perpetuity period<br />

refers <strong>to</strong> the duration between the creation of the interest and the death of a person related<br />

<strong>to</strong> that interest plus 21 years. “It must vest” means that it should be certain that the interest<br />

will vest or fail. “Life in being” means someone who is related <strong>to</strong> the interest and alive<br />

at the time when the interest is created. Often the life tenant becomes the “life in being”<br />

in the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> cases. <strong>The</strong> common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong><br />

<strong>Perpetuities</strong> is a rule of proof. 47) <strong>The</strong> grantee of the interest has <strong>to</strong> prove that his interest<br />

will vest or fail after creation of that interest within the perpetuities period. <strong>The</strong> grantee<br />

must find the person whose life can be used <strong>to</strong> prove the validity of the interest under<br />

the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. 48) If the interest will vest or fail within the<br />

life of that person plus 21 years, then it is valid. 49) If there is any possibility that the<br />

interest will remain contingent after the perpetuities period ends, the future interest is void. 50)<br />

44) Appel, supra note 43, at 268.<br />

45) Barry, supra note 39, at 553.<br />

46) See Id.<br />

47) Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide To <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1867, 1870 (1986).<br />

48) Id.<br />

49) See supra note 8, at 246. For example, if O transfers his interest “<strong>to</strong> A for his life, then <strong>to</strong> A's<br />

first child <strong>to</strong> reach 21”, A has a life estate and A's first child has a contingent remainder. <strong>The</strong><br />

remainder is valid because it is certain that within 21 years after A’s death, whether the<br />

remainder will vest or fail. A’s life is called the validating life because it can be used <strong>to</strong> prove<br />

the validity of the interest. Id.<br />

50) Dukemenier, supra note 49, at 1870.


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>: <strong>Its</strong> <strong>Applicability</strong> <strong>to</strong> An Option <strong>to</strong> Purchase | Pak, Wan-Q<br />

III. Case Analysis:<br />

<strong>The</strong> Symphony Space, Inc., v. Pergola Properties, Inc. 51)<br />

1. An option <strong>to</strong> purchase in common law courts and under <strong>The</strong> Uniform<br />

Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong><br />

An option <strong>to</strong> purchase is defined as an offer by the seller of realty open for the buyer<br />

<strong>to</strong> accept such offer at a specified time in the future. 52) An option <strong>to</strong> purchase gives the<br />

optionee a right <strong>to</strong> purchase property within a specified time. 53) To be legally binding,<br />

an option must be supported by consideration. 54)<br />

<strong>The</strong> majority rule, in England as well as in America dictates that options are subject<br />

<strong>to</strong> the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. 55) Accordingly, a court held that an option<br />

<strong>to</strong> purchase realty without a time limitation constitutes a perpetuity and thus was invalid. 56)<br />

However, some judicial attempts and legislative efforts have been made <strong>to</strong> deviate from<br />

the strict and mechanical application of the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> <strong>to</strong><br />

options. <strong>The</strong> minority courts have elaborated three options exempted from the common<br />

law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>: a lessee’s option <strong>to</strong> renew a lease; a lessee’s option <strong>to</strong><br />

purchase all or part of the leased premises; a usufructury’s option <strong>to</strong> extend the scope<br />

of an easement or profit. 57)<br />

In addition, some courts hold that rights of first refusal are not subject <strong>to</strong> the common<br />

law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. A preemptive right or right of first refusal is the right held<br />

by the optionee who has priority <strong>to</strong> buy the land if the landowner ever decides <strong>to</strong> sell<br />

it. In Metro. Auth. v. Brunken Realty Corp. 58), the court held the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong><br />

51) <strong>The</strong> Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Properties, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799 (1996).<br />

52) 60 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 255 § 2. (2001), available at 60 AMJUR POF 3d255 (Westlaw).<br />

53) Id. at § 4.<br />

54) Proof of Facts, supra note 54, at § 2.<br />

55) See case cited supra note 15, at 565.<br />

56) Proof of Facts, supra note 54, at § 7.<br />

57) Supra note 15, at 568.<br />

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<strong>Perpetuities</strong> inapplicable <strong>to</strong> preemptive rights or rights of first refusal in commercial and<br />

governmental transactions. 59) <strong>The</strong> court held that “application of the common law <strong>Rule</strong><br />

<strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> would defeat the policies underlying the rule because it would<br />

invalidate an agreement which promoted the use and development of the property while,<br />

at the same time, imposing only a minor impediment <strong>to</strong> free transferability.” 60)<br />

Legisla<strong>to</strong>rs also have attempted <strong>to</strong> relax the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. <strong>The</strong><br />

common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> has been criticized because it invalidates a future<br />

interest on the grounds of what might happen disregarding what actually happens. 61) <strong>The</strong><br />

Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> was prepared <strong>to</strong> make up for shortcomings<br />

in the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. 62) As of 2011, the <strong>The</strong> Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry<br />

<strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> has been adopted by 30 states. 63)<br />

<strong>The</strong> Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> still maintains the common law <strong>Rule</strong><br />

<strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. 64) If the interest violates the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>,<br />

then the court will wait and see what actually happens for 90 years. 65) If the interest fails<br />

<strong>to</strong> vest within 90 years, the court will reform the disposition <strong>to</strong> conform closely <strong>to</strong> the<br />

transferor’s intentions yet complies with the 90 years rule. 66)<br />

Moreover, options, as non-donative transfers, are exempted with some exceptions67) 58) Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Brunken Realty Corp., 492 N.E.2d 379 (1986).<br />

59) Id. at 385. <strong>The</strong> court reasoned, “Although preemptive rights unlimited in duration violate the rule<br />

against remote vesting they do so only marginally ... This is so particularly in commercial and<br />

governmental activities ... the need <strong>to</strong> insure free alienability is served more effectively if the<br />

validity of the preemptive right is assessed by applying the common-law rule prohibiting<br />

unreasonable restraints.” Id.<br />

60) Id.<br />

61) John D. Moore, <strong>The</strong> Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>: Taming <strong>The</strong> “Technically-Ridden<br />

Legal Nightmare,” 95 W. Va. L. Rev. 193, 194 (1992).<br />

62) See Id.<br />

63) <strong>The</strong> Uniform Law Commission, Legislative Fact Sheet - Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>,<br />

http://www.nccusl.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Statu<strong>to</strong>ry%20<strong>Rule</strong>%20<strong>Against</strong>%20<strong>Perpetuities</strong><br />

(Last visited Oct. 31, 2011).<br />

64) See supra note 63, at 200-05.<br />

65) See Id.<br />

66) See Id.


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>: <strong>Its</strong> <strong>Applicability</strong> <strong>to</strong> An Option <strong>to</strong> Purchase | Pak, Wan-Q<br />

under the Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. 68)<br />

An option <strong>to</strong> purchase in <strong>to</strong>day’s commercial and business transactions should be<br />

exempted from the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. <strong>The</strong> analysis of the Symphony<br />

case and discussions thereafter will show the reasons for exemption of an option <strong>to</strong> purchase<br />

from the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> as well as some flaws in the court’s ruling.<br />

2. <strong>The</strong> Symphony Space, Inc, v. Pergola Properties<br />

This is a New York State case. However, it provides general implications concerning<br />

applicability of the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> <strong>to</strong> commercial options, an option<br />

<strong>to</strong> purchase in particular. <strong>The</strong> main issue of this case was whether an option <strong>to</strong> purchase<br />

is exempted from the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. <strong>The</strong> court held it is not<br />

exempted. <strong>The</strong> court, in so holding, discussed other critical issues as well, such as the<br />

distinction between options exempted from the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> and<br />

an option <strong>to</strong> purchase, and the adoptability of ‘wait and see approach.’ 69)<br />

Broadwest Realty Corporation owned a two-s<strong>to</strong>ry building, which housed theaterical and<br />

commercial space, in New York City. 70) On December in 1978, Broadwest sold the<br />

building <strong>to</strong> Symphony, a non-profit entity, for the below-market price of $10,010. 71)<br />

Broadwest paid $10 in consideration for an option <strong>to</strong> repurchase the building. 72) According<br />

<strong>to</strong> the option agreement, Broadwest could exercise its option <strong>to</strong> purchase the building “at<br />

any time after July 1, 1979, so long as the Notice of Election specifies that the closing<br />

is <strong>to</strong> occur during any of the calendar years 1987, 1993, 1998, and 2003....” 73) In 1981,<br />

67) Unif. Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> § 4 (Amended 1990), 8B U.L.A 321 (1993 & Supp.<br />

2000), available at Unif.Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> § 4 (Westlaw). Nondonative interests<br />

not exempted include, for example, a premarital or postmarital agreement, a separation or divorce<br />

settlement. Id.<br />

68) Id.<br />

69) See case cited supra note 53, at 808.<br />

70) Id. at 800.<br />

71) Id.<br />

72) Id.<br />

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Broadwest sold and assigned its interest under the option agreement as well as its ownership<br />

interest in the adjacent buildings <strong>to</strong> defendants Pergola, Bradford, Casandium, and Darenth<br />

as tenants in common. 74) In 1988, the appraisal valued the property at $27 million given<br />

the enforceability of the option, whereas without the option it was valued at $5.5 million. 75)<br />

Pergola, on behalf of all the defendants, notified Symphony that it would purchase the<br />

property under the option on January 5, 1987. Symphony then filed a declara<strong>to</strong>ry judgment<br />

action against the defendants, claiming that the option agreement violated the New York’s<br />

statute76) that embraces the feature of the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> issue was whether an option <strong>to</strong> purchase commercial property is exempted from<br />

New York’s statute. 77)78) <strong>The</strong> court held it is not. 79) <strong>The</strong> court concluded that new<br />

commercial options80) are not exempted from New York statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>,<br />

stating,<br />

“Inasmuch as the common law prohibition against remote vesting applies <strong>to</strong> both commercial and<br />

noncommercial options, it likewise follows that the Legislature intended EPTL 9-1.1(b) <strong>to</strong> apply <strong>to</strong><br />

commercial purchase options as well ... creation of general exception ... for all purchase options<br />

that are commercial in nature ... would remove an entire class of contingent future interests ...” 81)<br />

73) Id. at 801.<br />

74) Id.<br />

75) Id.<br />

76) Id. at 802.<br />

77) N.Y. [EPTL] § 9-1.1[b] (McKinney 2002), available at McKinney’s EPTL § 9-1.1. <strong>The</strong> statute<br />

provides, “No estate in property shall be valid unless it must vest, if at all, not later than<br />

twenty-one years after one or more lives in being at the creation of the estate and any period<br />

of gestation involved.” Id.<br />

78) See case cited supra note 53, at 800.<br />

79) Id.<br />

80) Here, the court refers commercial options <strong>to</strong> an option <strong>to</strong> purchase.<br />

81) See case cited supra note 53, at 804-05.


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<strong>The</strong> court distinguished the option <strong>to</strong> purchase in this case from the preemptive right<br />

in Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v. Brunken Realty Corp., which was also commercial in<br />

nature but held <strong>to</strong> be exempted from EPTL 9-1.1(b). 82) <strong>The</strong> court stated,<br />

“... unlike options, preemptive rights (or rights of first refusal) only marginally affect<br />

transferability: encourage the holder <strong>to</strong> develop the property by insuring an opportunity <strong>to</strong> benefit<br />

from the improvement and <strong>to</strong> recapture any investment, ... promote the purposes underlying the<br />

common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, ... underscoring that preemptive rights impede alienability<br />

only minimally whereas purchase options vest substantial control over the transferability of property<br />

in the option holder, ... the option agreement creates precisely the sort of control over future<br />

disposition... EPTL seeks <strong>to</strong> prevent.” 83)<br />

<strong>The</strong> court also determined that the perpetuities period in this case was 21 years84) because the parties were corporations, and no measuring lives were stated in the instrument,<br />

which invalidated the option as it could be exercised 24 years after the creation of the<br />

interest. 85)<br />

<strong>The</strong> court refused <strong>to</strong> adopt the “wait and see” approach <strong>to</strong> the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>:<br />

the defendants argued that the option was actually exercised by 1987, well within the<br />

21-year limitation, and thus not in violation of the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. <strong>The</strong> court<br />

stated that it is well settled that the court will look <strong>to</strong> what might happen rather than <strong>to</strong><br />

what has actually happened in determining the validity of the interest. 86) Moreover, the<br />

court added, the very language in the statute precludes the court from determining the<br />

validity of the interest based on what actually happens. 87)<br />

82) See case cited supra note 60, at 384.<br />

83) See case cited Supra note 53, at 805.<br />

84) Id. at 806.<br />

85) Had the court construed the parties' agreement as creating several options instead a single option,<br />

only the last option of 2003 would have been invalidated, which made <strong>to</strong>tally different outcome<br />

of the case. See John A. Humbach, Shifting Paradigms Of Lawyer Honesty, 76 Tenn. L. Rev.<br />

993, 1029 (2009).<br />

86) See case cited supra note 53, at 808.<br />

87) Id.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> Symphony case well represents the majority courts’ posture, except where <strong>The</strong><br />

Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> has been adopted88), that supports application<br />

of the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> <strong>to</strong> an option <strong>to</strong> purchase. <strong>The</strong> court could,<br />

if it wanted, hold an option <strong>to</strong> purchase exempted from the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong><br />

<strong>Perpetuities</strong> given that a preemptive right, a type of option, is held <strong>to</strong> be exempted. 89)<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is no reason for which one type of option is exempted and another is not under<br />

the same statute<br />

IV. Discussion: Exemption of An Option <strong>to</strong> Purchase<br />

From <strong>The</strong> common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong><br />

Subjecting options <strong>to</strong> the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> has raised sharp<br />

criticism. 90) An option <strong>to</strong> purchase should be exempted from the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong><br />

<strong>Perpetuities</strong>: First, the optionee's right in the option is a contractual interest rather than<br />

a property interest; Second, an option is a commercial transaction not a familial<br />

arrangement. 91)<br />

1. An Option Creates a Contract Right<br />

It can be argued that an option creates a contractual right and thus it should be exempted<br />

88) See sources cited supra note 65. California, Colorado, and Connecticut are among those states<br />

that adopted the Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. Some other states do not apply<br />

the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> at all but have their own time frame. For example, there is no<br />

limit in Idaho, and 360 years in Florida. Robert A. Esperti ET AL., Irrevocable Trusts: Analysis<br />

with Forms, § 15.02[3] available at ITAF WGL 15.02 (Westlaw).<br />

89) See case cited supra note 60.<br />

90) See Dukeminier, supra note 49, at 1909.<br />

91) See Haskins, supra note 40.


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from the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. Did the option in Symphony create a<br />

contract right or a property right? <strong>The</strong> Symphony court must have found that the option<br />

created a property interest. <strong>The</strong> court characterized the optionee's right as a contingent<br />

‘future interest’ that is a property interest subject <strong>to</strong> the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. 92)<br />

Because “it is well settled that the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> has no application <strong>to</strong> contract<br />

that do not create future interest in property,” 93) the court would not apply the common<br />

law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> <strong>to</strong> the option had it found that option created a mere<br />

contractual right.<br />

‘Contingent remainders’, ‘execu<strong>to</strong>ry interests’, and ‘vested remainders subject <strong>to</strong> open’<br />

(class gifts), create property rights subject <strong>to</strong> the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. <strong>The</strong>se are all<br />

matters in property rights. However, the right created by an option is a contractual right.<br />

An option is an contract between the optionor promising his offer open for a certain period<br />

time for acceptance <strong>to</strong> the optionee, who in turn pays some value <strong>to</strong> the optionor in<br />

consideration of his promise. <strong>The</strong> optionee has the right <strong>to</strong> purchase the land, if it is<br />

involved a land sale contract, within the specified time period. An optionee does not have<br />

an equitable right until he exercises his right <strong>to</strong> accept the offer <strong>to</strong> purchase the land.<br />

He is not bound by any duty or obligations until then. 94) Thus his right is contractual.<br />

And thus, the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> should not be applicable <strong>to</strong> an option. Doing so<br />

would cause legal inconsistency and confusion. It will undermine the principle that the<br />

common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> is not applicable <strong>to</strong> a contract.<br />

2. An Option is a Commercial Transaction<br />

An option is commercial in nature, therefore is not subject <strong>to</strong> the common law <strong>Rule</strong><br />

<strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> which was originated <strong>to</strong> prohibit a perpetuity within familial settings. 95)<br />

92) See case cited supra note 53, at 805.<br />

93) William Berg, Jr., I. Long-Term Options and the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 1,<br />

33 (1948-1949).<br />

94) <strong>The</strong> optionee has a right <strong>to</strong> purchase within a limited time but has no obligation <strong>to</strong> purchase.<br />

95) Young v. Cass, 255 Ga. 508, 510 (1986).<br />

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Technical and mechanical application of the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> causes confusions<br />

and often causes disregard for the parties’ intentions and fails <strong>to</strong> reflect commercial and<br />

business activities. Because of its commercial nature an option should be exempted from<br />

the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. An option is a useful <strong>to</strong>ol in modern commercial transactions. 96)<br />

It facilitates land transactions and development as a preemptive right does. 97) It may<br />

restrain transactions <strong>to</strong> some degree as a preemptive right does, but its advantages outweigh<br />

its disadvantages. 98)<br />

<strong>The</strong> Symphony court found that a preemptive right restrains less than an option does.<br />

However, it is not necessarily true. It depends on the option price, for example. If the<br />

option price is fixed at lower than the market value, there is no reason for the optionee<br />

not <strong>to</strong> exercise his option. 99) On the other hand, a preemptive right may restrain alienation<br />

unreasonably if the price is fixed at lower than the market value, because the landowner<br />

will lose money if it is sold <strong>to</strong> the holder of the preemptive right.<br />

<strong>The</strong>refore, it depends on conditions, the option price in particular, not the label, whether<br />

it is a preemptive right or an option <strong>to</strong> purchase, for exercise of the right involved, that<br />

determines the duration of restraint on alienation of land. Thus it can be argued that whether<br />

it is an option <strong>to</strong> purchase or a preemptive right, as they are both commercially useful<br />

means <strong>to</strong> promote transactions and development of land, as long as the benefits they bring<br />

<strong>to</strong> society outweighs the harm, they should be exempted from the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>.<br />

Also, in Symphony as well as in some other transactions, optionors claim a <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong><br />

<strong>Perpetuities</strong> violation <strong>to</strong> avoid their otherwise legitimate duties <strong>to</strong> which once they agreed<br />

under the option agreement. 100) Upholding their claims will promote inequitable resolution.<br />

In addition, statistics show that optionees in commercial transactions exercise their rights<br />

well within the perpetuity period under the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. 101) Thus, there is<br />

96) William Berg, Jr., III. Long-Term Options and the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, 37 Cal. L. Rev.<br />

419, 447 (1948-1949).<br />

97) See Id.<br />

98) See Id.<br />

99) See William Berg, Jr., II. Long-Term Options and the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, 37 Cal. L. Rev.<br />

245 (1948-1949).<br />

100) See Dukeminier, supra note 49, at 1909.<br />

101) See Frederick R. Schneider, A <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> For <strong>The</strong> Twenty-First Century, 41 Real


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no reason <strong>to</strong> adhere <strong>to</strong> such confusing centuries old rule in the era of modern transactions<br />

because the majority of options will be exercised within the required non-perpetuity period<br />

under the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>.<br />

3. Alternatives <strong>to</strong> Exemption<br />

<strong>The</strong>re may be still some concerns for restraint of alienation that the exemption might<br />

bring about. Adoption of the Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> might be an<br />

alternative <strong>to</strong> the <strong>to</strong>tal exemption. Enacting separate statues, independent from statu<strong>to</strong>ry<br />

the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, that specifically limits the time period for<br />

exercise of commercial options might be another alternative.<br />

1) <strong>The</strong> Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong><br />

<strong>The</strong> Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> was created <strong>to</strong> change the common<br />

law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> by “installing a workable ‘wait and see’ element.” 102) Under<br />

the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, the validity is determined based on what might<br />

happen not on what actually happens. As a result, even if the interest in question actually<br />

vest within the perpetuity period, it is still invalid if the interest does not pass the ‘what<br />

might happen test.’ By adopting ‘wait and see approach’ <strong>The</strong> Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong><br />

<strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> makes it possible <strong>to</strong> avoid the harsh results of invalidating interests<br />

because of what might happen, without compromising the policy goal of prohibiting<br />

perpetuities. 103) <strong>The</strong> Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> cures some of the<br />

shortcomings of the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> by deferring the test of<br />

perfection till a later date. Thus, <strong>The</strong> Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> might<br />

be an alternative <strong>to</strong> <strong>to</strong>tal exemption from the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>.<br />

Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 743, 785 (2007).<br />

102) See Refs & Annos, supra note 69.<br />

103) Id.<br />

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2) Legislation of Separate Statutes of <strong>Perpetuities</strong> designed for Commercial<br />

Options.<br />

A statute of perpetuities for commercial options might be enacted as an alternative. 104)<br />

<strong>The</strong> statutes may specifically provide for time limit within which the option must be<br />

exercised. By doing so, confusion and inconsistency may be eliminated. 105) In this regard,<br />

Korean law provides some insights. For example, under Korean Civil Code 561106), the<br />

optionee must exercise his option <strong>to</strong> purchase the land within 5 years after execution of<br />

the option agreement. This is a very clear and simple rule. <strong>The</strong> common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong><br />

<strong>Perpetuities</strong> is very complicated. Due <strong>to</strong> its complexity, it is very difficult and time<br />

consuming for at<strong>to</strong>rneys <strong>to</strong> draft instruments <strong>to</strong> avoid the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong><br />

<strong>Perpetuities</strong> violation. Compliance with the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> costs<br />

a lot of unnecessary money <strong>to</strong> the parties in commercial transactions. This is inefficient<br />

for society as well as for the parties. Thus it is suggested that legislation be developed<br />

<strong>to</strong> provide simple and clear time limits for the exercise of commercial options.<br />

104) More states now exempt commercial options from the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> whether it is<br />

a preemptive right or an option <strong>to</strong> purchase. States may adopt the Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong><br />

against <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, abolish the <strong>Rule</strong>, or develop a new rule applicable <strong>to</strong> options. For example,<br />

Massachusettes’ statute requires an option <strong>to</strong> be exercised within 30 years. Patricia Y. Reyhan,<br />

<strong>Perpetuities</strong> Perpetuated: Symphony Spac, Inc. v. Pergola Properties, Inc., 60 Alb. L. Rev.<br />

1259, 1270 (1996-1997).<br />

105) A judge noted that he would not apply the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> but develop<br />

different doctrine for commercial options or wait for legislative action. See case cited supra note<br />

97, at 510.<br />

106) Korean Civil Code art. 591① (Kr. 2011).


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>: <strong>Its</strong> <strong>Applicability</strong> <strong>to</strong> An Option <strong>to</strong> Purchase | Pak, Wan-Q<br />

V. Conclusion<br />

His<strong>to</strong>rical public policy supported the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> <strong>to</strong> prohibit<br />

gran<strong>to</strong>rs from disallowing the inalienation of land. <strong>The</strong> common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong><br />

<strong>Perpetuities</strong> brings us many advantages. However, the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong><br />

<strong>Perpetuities</strong> also brings side effects along with its benefits, particularly when the <strong>Rule</strong> is<br />

applied <strong>to</strong> commercial options. An option creates a contractual right in the optionee. <strong>The</strong><br />

well-settled principle is that the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> has no application<br />

<strong>to</strong> a contract. Application of the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> <strong>to</strong> an option causes<br />

legal inconsistency and confusion. Also, an option is a commercial transaction. It is very<br />

useful instrument in commercial transactions. <strong>The</strong> advantages from commercial options<br />

might outweigh the disadvantage of restraint on alienation that they may cause. <strong>The</strong><br />

common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> will discourage use of options. Finally, statistics<br />

show that commercial options are usually exercised well within the perpetuity period under<br />

the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>. If that is so, there is no reason <strong>to</strong> maintain<br />

the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> for commercial options. With the foregoing<br />

reasons, any commercial options, whether it is an option <strong>to</strong> purchase or a preemptive right,<br />

should be exempted from the common law <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>.<br />

Alternatively, <strong>The</strong> Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> might be adopted as it<br />

seems more realistic and practical means <strong>to</strong> prohibit perpetuities. Also, making a separate<br />

statu<strong>to</strong>ry law for commercial options might be an alternative as well. <strong>The</strong> statu<strong>to</strong>ry law<br />

might clearly and specifically provide for time limit in years within which the option should<br />

be exercised <strong>to</strong> be valid. This will save time and money arising from the common law<br />

<strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> application <strong>to</strong> commercial activities, and thus will promote<br />

efficiency in society.<br />

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References<br />

1) 60 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 255 § 2. (2001), available at 60 AMJUR POF 3d255<br />

(Westlaw).<br />

2) Black’s Law Dictionary 1141 (6th ed. 1995).<br />

3) <strong>The</strong> Duke of Norfolk’s Case 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1681).<br />

4) Ferrero Constr. Co v. Dennis Rourke Corp, 311 Md. 560, 567 (1985).<br />

5) George L. Haskins, Extending <strong>The</strong> Grasp of <strong>The</strong> Dead Hand Reflections on <strong>The</strong> Origins<br />

of <strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 19, 36 (1977-1978).<br />

6) Frederick R. Schneider, A <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> For <strong>The</strong> Twenty-First Century,<br />

41 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 743, 785 (2007).<br />

7) Wildenstein & Co., Inc. v. Wallis 595 N.E.2d 828, 832 (N.Y. 1992).<br />

8) Herbert Barry, <strong>The</strong> Duke of Norfolk’s Case, 23 Va. L. Rev. 557, 538 (1937).<br />

9) In re Hollis’ Hospital, [1899] 2 Ch. 540, 553.<br />

10) John A. Borron, Jr. & Lewis Mallalieu Simes, 3 Simes and Smith, <strong>The</strong> Law of Future<br />

Interests, § 1117, available at LFUTINT § 1117 (Westlaw).<br />

11) John A. Humbach, Shifting Paradigms Of Lawyer Honesty, 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 993,<br />

1029 (2009).<br />

12) John C. Gray, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, § 201 (4th ed. 1943).<br />

13) Jesse Dukeminier ET AL., Property, 244-45 (6th ed. 2006) (1981).<br />

14) Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide To <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1867, 1870 (1986).<br />

15 John D. Moore, <strong>The</strong> Uniform Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>: Taming <strong>The</strong><br />

“Technically-Ridden Legal Nightmare,” 95 W. Va. L. Rev. 193, 194 (1992).<br />

16) John G. Sprankling, Understanding Property Law, 91 (2nd. ed 2007).<br />

17) Korean Civil Code art. 591① (Kr. 2011).<br />

18) Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Brunken Realty Corp., 492 N.E.2d 379 (1986).<br />

19) N.Y. [EPTL] § 9-1.1[b] (McKinney 2002), available at McKinney's EPTL § 9-1.1.<br />

20) Peter Appel, <strong>The</strong> Embarrasing <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, 54 J. Legal Educ. 264, 268<br />

(2004).<br />

21) Robert A. Esperti ET AL., Irrevocable Trusts: Analysis with Forms, § 15.02[3]<br />

available at ITAF WGL 15.02 (Westlaw).


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>: <strong>Its</strong> <strong>Applicability</strong> <strong>to</strong> An Option <strong>to</strong> Purchase | Pak, Wan-Q<br />

22) <strong>The</strong> Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Properties, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799 (1996).<br />

23) <strong>The</strong> Uniform Law Commission, Legislative Fact Sheet - Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong><br />

<strong>Perpetuities</strong>,<br />

http://www.nccusl.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Statu<strong>to</strong>ry%20<strong>Rule</strong>%20<strong>Against</strong>%<br />

20<strong>Perpetuities</strong> (Last visited Oct. 31, 2011).<br />

24) Unif. Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> (Amended 1990), 8B U.L.A 321 (1993 &<br />

Supp. 2000), available at Unif.Statu<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong> (Westlaw).<br />

25) William Berg, Jr., I. Long-Term Options and the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, 37 Cal.<br />

L. Rev. 1, 33 (1948-1949).<br />

26) William Berg, Jr., II. Long-Term Options and the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, 37 Cal.<br />

L. Rev. 245 (1948-1949).<br />

27) William Berg, Jr., III. Long-Term Options and the <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>, 37 Cal.<br />

L. Rev. 419, 447 (1948-1949).<br />

28) Young v. Cass, 255 Ga. 508, 510 (1986).<br />

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* 숭실대학교 법과대학 부교수.<br />

미국법상 영대재산권 무효의 원칙의<br />

환매특약에 대한 적용 연구<br />

박 완 규 *<br />

본고는 미국 재산법상의 원칙인 ‘영대재산권 무효의 원칙’을 다루고 있다. 이 원칙<br />

은 중세 영국의 봉건시대부터 뿌리를 두고 오늘의 형태로 발전해 왔다. 이 원칙은<br />

로스쿨을 과정에서 가장 이해하기 힘들다 할 정도로 대부분의 법학도는 물론 기존<br />

법률가들에게 무척 어려운 개념으로 이해된다(본고의 목적이 영대재산권 무효의 원<br />

칙을 설명하기 위한 것이 아니고 환매특약에의 적용문제를 다루기 위한 것임을 밝혀<br />

두고자 한다. ‘영대재산권 무효의 원칙에 대한 자세한 설명은 우리말로 작성된 필자<br />

의 논문(박완규, “미국법상 영대 재산권 무효의 원칙에 관한 연구”,


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Rule</strong> <strong>Against</strong> <strong>Perpetuities</strong>: <strong>Its</strong> <strong>Applicability</strong> <strong>to</strong> An Option <strong>to</strong> Purchase | Pak, Wan-Q<br />

하고 계속 적용된다는 점, 둘째, 영대재산 무효의 원칙은 가족 간의 재산 분배에서<br />

비롯되었으므로 상업적 거래에는 적절하지 않다는 점이 지적되었다. 이런 불합리한<br />

점을 해결하기 위한 대안으로는 상업적 환매특약에 영대재산권 무효의 원칙을 적용<br />

배제 시키는 방법, ‘통일 영대재산권 무효의 원칙’을 채택하는 방법, 환매특약에 관한<br />

별도의 규정을 마련하는 방법이 있을 것이다. 특히 우리나라와 같이 환매기간을 5년<br />

을 명확히 제한하는 것은 상대적으로 법적 안정성과 효율성을 제공한다는 점에서<br />

미국 법에서 참고할 만 할 것이다. 끝으로 본고를 통해서 우리 나라법상 환매기간<br />

제한에 대한 관심과 향후 방향성에 대해서 생각해 보는 계기가 되기를 희망한다.<br />

435

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