1 DRAFT MINUTES of the Annual General Meeting ... - SBM Offshore

States of America. In terms of the dismissal of employees (second remark), Mr Gugen answered that when
it comes to the Board of Management level, if performance is not happening, dismissal would happen.
There was a history of change in the past, but he indicated that he could assure that monitoring
performance of the Company and of the senior managers who are responsible for it, is something that the
Remuneration Committee takes extremely serious. Finally, in terms of taking risky decisions (third remark),
he replied that it could happen and that his thoughts are that if one doesn’t structure the remuneration policy
correctly one could get people going for the quick buck and moving on. By weighting more towards the LTI
than the STI SBM has gone longer, because it is three years plus two years it has to be held. If the numbers
are actually worked out and if people are on target and once they have been in the Company for a while, on
average, they would have seven times their base salary held in shares. Mr Gugen argued that that brings
them quite a lot in alignment with the shareholders rather than going for the quick buck just in one year. He
hoped that gave Mr Heineman some feeling that SBM is conscious of the issues he raised and has tried to
structure the RP 2011 such that it doesn’t fall into the trap of short termism.
Mr Heineman noted that the bonus system did not exist 30 or 40 years ago. If you performed well, you
were promoted and eventually you might even end up on the Board of Management. Nowadays there is a
base salary which is on the high side and almost seems like an attendance fee. He noted that he was
aware that SBM was not the only company that paid bonuses, but he wondered whether bonuses were
necessary and why they should not be awarded at the end of someone’s career. He asked if everyone who
enjoyed working and performing for SBM only looked at the money. Didn’t people also look at their
prospects, as they did 30 or 40 years ago? The Chairman noted that this was a discussion about the
principles of an ideal remuneration policy. At the end of the 1980s and early 1990s - when remuneration
was usually limited to base salary - every company was expected to introduce performance rewards. In the
meantime people had learned more about the risks of performance remuneration. The Chairman noted that
the proposed policy took account of these risks and that the Supervisory Board’s proposal had struck a fair
balance between the different factors that must be incorporated into the development of a remuneration
policy. Looking at the development of SBM’s remuneration policy, he concluded that it had become much
more detailed since 2005. The 2011 remuneration policy had also sought to remove some of the
shortcomings of the 2008 policy. The Chairman unfortunately had to note that the policy would probably
have to be amended once more in two years’ time. SBM aligned its policy to the expected developments in
our society. As stated earlier by Ms Lindeman, there were many expectations surrounding remuneration. He
noted that the tabled proposal was a reasonable reflection of what can be expected. Mr Heineman asked
whether the lower echelons immediately below the Management Board also receive a fairly high bonus.
The Chairman replied that this is the case, they do also get a bonus, but that this subject was not part of
this meeting. An attempt has been made, however, to integrate the remuneration policy throughout the
entire Company.
Mr Jorna (VEB) said he agreed that matching shares should be linked to performance objectives (first
remark). In his opinion it could not be the case that if someone remained employed for just three years he
or she would receive matching shares as a kind of stay-on premium. Those matching shares also have a
fairly aggressive form of one-on-one conversion. Mr Gugen had explained that this was actually a way of
shifting cash now to shares in the future. Mr Jorna said he would prefer it if these shares, once acquired,
were also linked to performance criteria. They would then have a more long-term character, which was what
was envisaged. After all, there was an attempt to shift from the short term to the long term. He said he had a
second point, which he did not require answering, about the multiplier. Mr Mace had indicated in his
introduction that it was linked to qualitative and quantitative elements. He asked whether the multiplier was
for example linked to a particular ranking in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, thus enabling it to be
measured objectively at least to a modest extent, or whether they were other company specific items. He
said he wanted to keep a distance from the Shell scenario, where when going down in the index the policy
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