DS556.57 7th (12/9/65) - After Action Report, Battle of ... - Fort Benning

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I fool that the fact that we .had first B Company, then it Company, off
the lding zone moving against the PIN, then C Company in a good blocking
posItiton took the initiative. away from him°. From then on, • for three
days and two nights, he was reacting to our presence.
(2) At night, units must form tight perimeters,, use Claywrs
mines, trip flares and dig in.. The use. of outposts .and listening posts
depends largely on the terrain and the enemy situation, In this operation,
it would have been suigidal as the cover and onooalmant afforded'the
enemy too bman opportunities to take the outguards by stealth. Camouf
laged foxholes with cleared fields offire are -roooumended.
sometimes hard to execute-under fire.
Normal, but
-(3) In a perimeter defense, it is necessary to chock the
front with small rocon -parties at first light and periodically tbiough
the (lay for 100-200 meters to .clear out infiltrators, police the battlefield,
and to insure that the enemy is not massing for an attaeko This
aotiOn should be preOeded by having all troops on the perimntc:- spray the
trees, grass, and anthills to their front and overhead at a sxsitied
time for two-three minutes. When the reoon elements screen ',o O
front, it should be preoeded by artillery and reoon by fire.. Ate Cav
deouts overhead can assist by observation. Units should rx . in
the attack with fire and movement. all men must give th oene;y the
capability of being to the front and overhead as infiltrators, isdpers,
or massing for an attack.
(4) The battalion command group must oar y a 292 antenna
in on the assault and set it up as soon as possible. D Company, wr'
alternate' P, arried one in on the assault -set it.up, and it
was invaluable.
Z.•fY ~ SRIE a
()The0 miniu amouttof gear should be caxri'je ito
an assault. This should be one meal, a poncho, two canteenn of water,
salt tablots, and plenty of ammunition.
(2) Casualties-are a oritioal problem. When fIre is
pinning down .individuals, one casualty will ..co t one or .tw-mor man
attempting. to get o him. ileavy cover fire mut" be employeO, to try
.and over the; attempt to reoover the wounded men and got him out of
the daneor arQ, Leaders at .al levls in oontaot under, fire ; ; aot.
cawtbtuly ± getting oasualties out. lest ml.eaders .il,,e, and
wounded. whileae:overiW g-boavu.ti1ss,,Weux4oQ m-St be Julld back to
some type o.f co.0veOd, po.ittio an th en .eated,. Troo-ps must not get so
ooncerned With. Oasualtt s that. .they o-get the enemy and their miss ion*
httempting . to; carry- a rfa out :equ s up tb four men as bearers whioh
can hurt a uni at a critical time.
(3). Evacua~tion-of cas.ualties .from. the. areas of contact
in this, action was a problem. TU&E litter bearers would hav.e been a
big help. As it turned out, Lghting strength had to be .used to
caorry out a woundod man (3 -4 men requir~ed) or to assist many. walking
woun ded. .(one. man. at least required in many oases).
(4) When a .won is wounded or killed, his weapon and somj.
of his. equipment get separated from him in many oases. An 5-4 represent-
atire- officer or NCO with assistants, must be present at least-i.
the battalion forward aid station and at the collecting company at
Forward Support. Some of our equipment was, evacuated with men all
the way to gui lhon. Also we had many SD-16's shot up and had to
have replacements in the area. Therefore we kept a lot of weapons
in the battle aroa for re-issue. When we were pulled out we brougtht.
all -excess Weapons and equipment with us. lav e±emy weapons which
were oalured and sent out with friendly KLa and WIA were never sen