Journal of European Integration History – Revue d - Centre d'études ...

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN 

INTEGRATION HISTORY 

REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE 

L'INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE 

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER 

EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION 

edited by the 

Groupe de liaison des professeurs d'histoire contemporaine 

auprès de la Commission européenne 

2007, Volume 13, Number 2 

NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft 

Baden-Baden







Editors 

Published twice a year by the 

Groupe de liaison des professeurs d'histoire 

contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne. 

This publication is part of the Network of Excellence 

EU-CONSENT. 

It is financed by the Ministère d'Etat, Présidence du 

gouvernement of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 

Editorial Board 

LOTH. Wilfried (chairman) 

Universität Essen 

Jean Monnet Chair 

BITSCH. Marie-Thérèse 

Université de Strasbourg III Robert Schuman 


BOSSUAT. Gérard 

Université de Cergy-Pontoise, 


DEIGHTON, Anne 

Wolfson College. Oxford 


DUMOULIN, Michel 

Université catholique de Louvain 


GEHLER. Michael 

Universität Hildesheim 


GUIRAO. Fernando 

Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Barcelona 


LAURSEN. Johnny 

University of Aarhus 

LUDLOW. N. Piers 

London School of Economics 

MILWARD. Alan S. 

European University Institute, Florence 

SCHWABE, Klaus 

Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen 


TRAUSCH. Gilbert 

Centre Robert Schuman. Université de Liège 

VAN der HARST, Jan 

University of Groningen 


VARSORI. Antonio 

Università di Padova 


Editorial Secretariat 

Charles Barthel, director 

Centre d'études et de recherches européennes 

Robert Schuman 

4 Rue Jules Wilhelm 

L-2728 Luxembourg 

Tel.: (352)4782290, Fax.: (352) 4227 97

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY 

REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE 

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION 

edited by the 

Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine 

auprès de la Commission européenne 

2007, Volume 13, Number 2

The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important international 

symposium that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg to launch historical research on European 

integration. The committee is composed of historians of the European Union member countries 

who work on contemporary history. 

The Liaison Committee: 

– gathers and conveys information about work on European history after the Second World War; 

– advises the European Union on research projects concerning contemporary European history. 

Thus, the Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the 

Community institutions; 

– enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources; 

– promotes research meetings to get an update of work in progress and to stimulate new research: 

seven research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published. 

The Journal of European Integration History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für 

Geschichte der europäischen Integration is in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Committee. Being 

the first history journal to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration, the Journal offers the 

increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporary Europe, a permanent forum. 

The Liaison Committee works completely independently and according to historians’ critical method. 

❋ 

Le Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission des 

Communautés européennes s’est constitué en 1982 à la suite d’un grand colloque que la Commission 

avait organisé à Luxembourg pour lancer la recherche historique sur la construction 

européenne. Il regroupe des professeurs d’université des pays membres de l’Union européenne, spécialistes 

d’histoire contemporaine. 

Le Groupe de liaison a pour mission: 

– de diffuser l’information sur les travaux portant sur l’histoire de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerre 

mondiale; 

– de conseiller l’Union européenne sur les actions scientifiques à entreprendre avec son appui; ainsi 

le Groupe de liaison a assuré une mission concernant la mise à la disposition du public des archives 

des institutions communautaires; 

– d’aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposition 

(archives, sources orales...); 

– d’encourager des rencontres scientifiques afin de faire le point sur les connaissances acquises et 

de susciter de nouvelles recherches: sept grands colloques ont été organisés et leurs actes publiés. 

L’édition du Journal of European Integration History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne 

– Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration se situe dans le droit fil des préoccupations 

du Groupe de liaison. Première revue d’histoire à se consacrer exclusivement à l’histoire de la 

construction européenne, le Journal se propose de fournir un forum permanent au nombre croissant 

de jeunes historiens vouant leurs recherches à l’Europe contemporaine. 

Le Groupe de liaison organise ses colloques et publications en toute indépendance et conformément 

à la méthode critique qui est celle des historiens.





Anne Deighton, coordinator 

Foreword ................................................................................................................. 5 

Linda RISSO 

Introduction............................................................................................................. 7 

Against Rearmament or Against Integration? The PCI and PCF’s 

Opposition to the European Defence Community and the Western 

European Union, 1950–1955 ............................................................................... 11 

Maud BRACKE 

From the Atlantic to the Urals? 

Italian and French communism and the question of Europe, 1956–1973............. 33 

Muriel BLAIVE 

Internationalism, Patriotism, Dictatorship and Demcracy: 

The Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Exercise of Power, 1945–1968 .... 55 

Dagmara JAJEŚNIAK-QUAST 

Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in 

Ostmitteleuropa: Die Tschechoslowakei und Polen von den fünfziger bis 

zu den siebziger Jahren ........................................................................................ 69 

Thomas FETZER 

Turning Eurosceptic: British trade unions and European integration 

(1961–1975).......................................................................................................... 85 

Gabriele D’OTTAVIO 

The Treaties of Rome: Continuity and Discontinuity in SPD’s 

European Policy ................................................................................................. 103 

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen ................................... 115 

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen .................................................... 133 

Contributors – Auteurs – Autoren ...................................................................... 141 

Editorial notice





Anne Deighton, coordinator 

Articles for inclusion in this journal may be submitted at any time. The editorial board will then 

arrange for the article to be refereed. Articles should not be longer than 6000 words, footnotes 

included. They may be in English, French or German. 

Articles submitted to the Journal should be original contributions and not be submitted to any 

other publication at the same time as to the Journal of European Integration History. Authors 

should retain a copy of their article. The publisher and editors cannot accept responsibility for 

loss of or damage to authors’ typescripts or disks. 

The accuracy of, and views expressed in articles and reviews are the sole responsibility of the 

authors. 

Authors should ensure that typescripts conform with the journal style. Prospective contributors 

should obtain further guidelines from the Editorial Secretariat. 

Articles, reviews, communications relating to articles and books for review should be sent to the 

Editorial Secretariat. 

Citation 

The Journal of European Integration History may be cited as follows: 

JEIH, (Year)/(Number), (Page). 

ISSN 0947-9511 

© 2007 NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden and the Groupe de liaison des professeurs 

d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne. Printed in Germany. 

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or 

transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, 

without prior permission of the publishers.

Foreword 

Anne DEIGHTON 

There is as yet little archivally based research on the reaction of Communists to the 

attempts to develop institutions of integration and consolidation in Western Europe 

in the early decades after World War Two. Volume 10, Number 2 of the Journal of 

European Integration History did start to examine some of these issues with regard 

to attitudes in Poland and Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic towards the European 

Community in the later periods of the Cold War and then post-Cold War years. 

However, the earlier period holds considerable promise as archival sources become 

more easily accessible across time, as well as within a greater number of Eastern 

European countries. 

The attitudes, policies and plans of Communist parties in Europe were 

necessarily predicated upon a delicate triangulation of each country’s specific 

national context, its relations with the Soviet Union, and the philosophical aspects 

of reactions to the recovery of Western capitalism and the growth of 

supranationalism, as well as integrated Western security and defence projects. 

This number of the Journal of European Integration History therefore takes 

forward the exploration of reactions of Communist parties to the uneven integration 

and security building process in the western part of the continent. Most of the 

articles in this number derive from papers presented at a conference Quelle 

Europe? Les partis communistes entre internationalisme et patriotisme, 

1945-2005, organised at the Institut d’Etudes Européennes in Brussels on 5 May 

2006. They have been gathered together and edited by Dr Linda Risso, a young 

Italian scholar based at the University of Reading in the UK. 

The articles that follow are in most cases based upon sets of archives that have 

been barely used before, or indeed which are still closed to the general researcher 

who cannot gain special permission to access them. The picture that emerges is still 

a fragmented one. We see how different the responses were, and also that there was 

not a monolithic and unchanging perception of what was happening in the western 

part of the continent. 

The bulk of the content of this Journal number is concerned with Communist 

parties. However, the articles by Thomas Fetzer and Gabriele d’Ottavio have a 

different focus. Fetzer deals with trade unions in the United Kingdom, and he 

considers their shifting responses to European integration. He deploys new archival 

sources effectively, to reveal the different sets of attitudes and ideas that drove the 

negative British union responses to changes on the continent. D’Ottavio considers 

the significance of the ratification of the Rome Treaties for the development of the 

German Social Democratic Party’s European policy. 

5

6 

Anne DEIGHTON

Which Europe? 

Communist parties between nationalism and internationalism 

1945-1975 

Linda RISSO 

The contribution of European Communist parties to the struggle for national 

liberation during the Second World War seemed to signal the final reconciliation of 

Communism with patriotism, after three decades of swaying back and forth 

between the primacy of the international revolutionary discourse and the need to 

“build socialism in one country”. The fight against fascism provided a strong and 

ideologically legitimised course for broadening the recruitment base of Communist 

militancy. The Yugoslavian and Italian Resistance movements offer two good 

examples of how the antifascist fight, combined with the strong charisma of their 

leaders, could transform small Communist groups into mass parties, attracting 

unprecedented support reaching far beyond the working class. On the model of the 

Soviet “great patriotic war”, Communist parties everywhere in Europe combined 

the need to defend their country with the hope of bringing about permanent and 

radical social change at the end of the conflict. In order to do so, they took a first 

step towards greater instrumental collaborations with other political parties, thus 

ending their political isolation. 

With the beginning of the Cold War, such developments were rapidly effaced. If 

nationalism, internationalism and the geopolitical interests of the USSR were 

compatible at an international level, they stood in antithesis at a national level. With 

the division of the world into two blocs, the Communists found themselves in the 

uncomfortable position of having to defend patriotic interests while simultaneously 

opposing all policies that might jeopardise Soviet geopolitical interests. The 

rejection of the Marshall Plan and the subsequent opposition to the European Coal 

and Steel Community, the European Defence Community and the Treaty of Rome 

seemingly left the Communist parties with no other strategy for the reconstruction 

of Europe but the repli national, thus becoming defenders of national sovereignty. 

The creation of a new supranational political order for some West European 

countries, the establishment of a strong transatlantic political and economic 

collaboration and the need to find a solution to the Trieste question are further 

examples that demonstrate the extent to which the Communists were torn between 

their traditional adherence to internationalism and the obligation to safeguard 

Moscow’s interests. 

Historians have already widely shown that the Communist parties widely 

rejected the early stages of the European integration process. The integration 

process was criticised by the Communists as an imperialist and clerical project 

conceived to strengthen US control over Western Europe’s economic development 

and political affairs in preparation for an aggressive war against the Soviet Union. 

Yet, if historical researchers have often examined the reasons behind Communist 

7

8 

Linda RISSO 

opposition, they have rarely focused on a number of alternative projects proposed 

by the Communists and the question how internal dissent among national parties 

developed over time. Even less is known about internal opposition within Eastern 

European parties. Apart from enquiries into direct international exchanges between 

party militants, pacifist manifestations and the involvement of intellectuals on both 

sides of the Iron Curtain, little research has been undertaken in this area. The 

solidity and consistent development of Communist criticism have often been 

overemphasised. Communist opposition has been seen as a monolithic rejection of 

any proposal put forward by Western European and American policy-makers. 

However, closer inspection reveals that Communist opposition changed over time 

and that there were national differences. Both national and international contexts 

had a deep impact on the parties’ respective positions concerning the integration 

process, and by the early 1960s their views differed greatly. 

Instead of merely resulting in a catalogue of misconceptions, an analysis of 

critical discourses around the European integration process should also provide a 

true account of various alternative sources of legitimacy and take into consideration 

the section of public opinion that rejected integration. To what extent were the 

Communist parties able to offer a viable alternative to European integration beyond 

a mere rejection? Is it possible to identify the development of a cultural 

environment that could give rise to a vision of a united Europe as an intermediate 

stage between the world revolution and the parties’ national interests? What was 

the actual significance of the transnational and cross-Curtain contacts? New 

sources available in Moscow and in many Western and Eastern European countries 

offer invaluable new material to examine these issues. At the same time, the 

passage of time itself allows us to re-examine previously studied cases, such as the 

French and Italian Communist parties, under a new light. 

The articles gathered here look at various national cases, often by taking a 

comparative approach and trying to identify a series of national characteristics and 

changes over time. They are a selection of papers presented at the conference 

Quelle Europe? Les partis communistes entre internationalisme et patriotisme, 

1945-2005 organised at the Institut d’études européennes in Brussels on 5th May 

2006. 

The question of how Communist parties on both sides of the Iron Curtain dealt 

with the problem of balancing nationalism (as a major propaganda tool to oppose 

the integration process) with their traditional adherence to internationalism is a 

thorny issue rarely addressed by historians. 1 The merit of the contributions 

gathered together in this issue is to focus precisely on this point through the study 

of national examples on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Linda Risso and Maud 

Bracke examine the situation in France and Italy from 1950 to 1975; Muriel Blaive 

focuses on both the Czechoslovak Communist Party around the end of WWII as 

1. The most notable exception is the work by Marc Lazar and particularly his article “The French 

Communist Party between Nation and Internationalism”, in: T. SAARELA, K. RENTOLA (eds.), 

Communism: National & International, SHS, Helsinki, 1998, pp.41-59.

Introduction 9 

well as the Prague Spring and Dagmara Jajesniak-Quast offers a comparative 

analysis of Polish and Czechoslovakian policies to further integration between the 

1950s and the 1970s. 

These articles make extensive use of archival material and unpublished sources 

including parties’ internal documents, private correspondence as well as various 

articles published in the parties’ newspapers and magazines. Risso and Bracke base 

their research on documents from the Archivio del PCI (APCI) of the Fondazione 

Istituto Gramsci in Rome and several articles taken from L’Unità. Bracke also uses 

material from the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) in Berlin and the Archives du Parti 

Communiste Français (APCF) in Paris, which are currently closed to the public. 

Jajesniak-Quast uses the hitherto largely unexplored Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN) 

in Warsaw and makes ample use of files from the Ministerstwo Przemysu i Handlu 

II (MPiH II) (ministry of Industry and Trade), the Gabinet Ministra (minister’s 

Cabinet), the Centralny Zarzd Przemysu Metalowego (central administration of 

metalworking industry) and the Uzasadnienia ogólne do 3-letniego planu 

gospodarczego (general reasons to the three-year economic plan) files. Muriel 

Blaive’s article offers a sharp analysis of the writings by numerous 

Czechoslovakian party members, which have not yet been translated into English. 

In her article, Linda Risso takes a comparative approach to Communist 

opposition to German rearmament in France and Italy. She demonstrates how 

Communist opposition evolved from a total rejection of the project between 

October 1950 and March 1953 towards a more balanced strategy in the following 

years. The study of archival material along with a detailed analysis of the parties’ 

newspapers and congress decisions reveals that after the death of Stalin and the end 

of the Korean War, outright rejection of the integration process gave way to more 

differentiated criticism in the following years. The aim was to delay the ratification 

process in the hope that the governing coalitions in France and Italy would divide 

over the issue and that the public would grow weary of the debate. This article also 

deals with the reasons behind the Communists’ alleged “silence” during the debate 

concerning the Western European Union and demonstrates that although in 1953 

the French and Italian Communists accepted a controlled form of German 

rearmament, they still opposed the political unification of Western Europe. 

Maud Bracke also focuses on the French and Italian Communist parties but 

turns her attention to the period that followed the rejection of the European Army 

project. She takes a wider perspective which includes the two parties’ respective 

positions on the idea of a unified Europe in general, and the EEC in particular. 

According to Bracke, in addition to the Soviet-lead rejection of the EEC as a 

product of American dominance over Western Europe, the anti-EEC stance of the 

PCI and PCF was based on specific social arguments including the claim that 

European integration was an imperialist and capitalist project and an instrument to 

curtail national sovereignty. Bracke demonstrates that despite some common 

ground, the two parties developed different political strategies. The PCI gradually 

shifted towards a more positive view of the EEC and by the early 1970s, the party 

came to see the EEC as a potential vehicle for social and political change.

10 

Linda RISSO 

Conversely, the PCF persisted in its opposition and only in the early 1970s did the 

French Communists timidly accept European integration. 

Muriel Blaive’s article deals with the chasm between internationalism and 

patriotism within the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ) through the analysis 

of the writings and correspondence of leading Czechoslovak politicians and 

intellectuals. Whereas the “international” aspirations of the KSČ have frequently 

been said to conform to Moscow’s official stance (which often symbolizes the 

gloomiest aspects of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia), the “patriotic” side, has 

been made to embody national democratic traditions and the positive side of 

Communist achievements. According to Blaive, this black-and-white picture fails 

to address a number of crucial issues concerning Communist domination of 

Czechoslovakia even though it has so far not been challenged. 

Dagmara Jajesniak-Quast examines the Polish and Czechoslovakian cases 

between the 1950s and the 1970s and demonstrates how, contrary to common 

assumptions, after the turning point of 1947, Eastern European states did remain 

interested in maintaining economic relations with the West. Although the Eastern 

European Communist parties officially rejected the European integration process, 

the Polish and Czechoslovakian governments undertook a number of steps towards 

greater economic collaboration with the West. It follows that their attitude towards 

the economic integration of Western Europe differs substantially from their formal 

opposition to the political unification process. Thus, Poland and Czechoslovakia 

along with other Eastern European countries found ways to “permeate” the Iron 

Curtain by approaching the neutral states – Austria, Sweden, Finland and 

Switzerland – that seemed to have been willing to enter negotiations in view of 

trading raw materials and organizing know-how transfers as well as capital 

movements. Similarly, the increase in Eastern European exports to Western Europe 

and the promotion of national productivity in view of achieving a positive balance 

of payments offered additional incentives to develop more intricate economic 

relations with the EEC countries. International organizations, such as the Economic 

Commission for Europe and GATT, offered additional channels through which 

relations with the West could be improved. 

I would like to thank Prof. Pieter Lagrou, Dr Irene Di Jorio and Nicolas Naif for 

their help in organizing the conference. Financial support from the History Section 

of the Institut d’Etudes Européennes at the Université Libre de Bruxelles and from 

the Wiener-Anspach Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

Against Rearmament or Against Integration? 

The PCI and PCF’s Opposition to the European Defence 

Community and the Western European Union, 1950-55 

Linda RISSO 

Historians have often presented Communist opposition to the European Defence 

Community as a monolithic block. However, closer inspection reveals that 

Communist criticism passed from total opposition between October 1950 and 

March 1953 to a more differentiated criticism in the following years. This 

development was due to both the changes that occurred in the international arena 

after the death of Stalin, as well as to the political events that took place at the 

national level. 1 

In order to explain how the different elements influenced the Communist 

position regarding this dimension of the integration process, this article follows the 

chronological development of Communist criticism between 1950 and 1955, 

focusing first on the initial reaction of the French and Italian Communists to the 

launch of the project and then on the reasons behind the fall of the European army 

project. This will allow a comparison between Communist opposition to the 

integrated army and to the Western European Union, assessing the reasons behind 

the alleged “silence” of the Communists in the latter case. 

The launch of the integrated army project (1950-52) 

Between 1949 and 1950, the foundation of NATO and the outbreak of the Korean 

War put the rearmament of Western Europe on the front burner. The NATO Council 

meetings of September 1950 led to the American decision to rearm West Germany 

and, in the following months, this materialised in the form of the Spofford plan, 

which foresaw full German rearmament under the control of NATO. 2 In order to 

prevent the re-establishment of the German military staff, in October 1950 the 

French government proposed the creation of a European integrated army. This 

project envisaged that the participating governments would merge their troops in a 

common army which would be under the control of a supranational authority and 

of a European Defence minister. Unable to find a compromise between the 

1. This article is based on the chapter “Communist opposition to the European army” in: L. RISSO, 

Divided we stand: The French and Italian political parties and the rearmament of West Germany, 

1949-1955, Cambridge Scholars Press, Newcastle-upon-Tyne (forthcoming, end of 2007), 

pp.166-181. 

2. A summary of the Spofford report is available in “Integrated forces and European Army” [no date], 

in: Historical Archives of the European Communities (henceforward HAEC), JMDS/82. 

11

12 

Linda RISSO 

Spofford plan and the French government's proposal, the NATO Council allowed 

the running of two parallel sets of talks at Petersberg and Paris. 3 

Talks at Petersberg reached an early stalemate on the degree of integration and 

the conference was forced to close prematurely. After several months of discussion, 

the Paris Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) was signed 

on 27 May 1952. 4 The European army entailed the creation of a supranational 

authority that would represent its members on the international stage and, if the 

approval of the EDC Council of ministers had been secured, it would have had the 

right to enter defensive agreements and to join international organisations on behalf 

of its members. 

Since its outset, numerous political parties, intellectuals and pressure groups 

criticised the notion of an integrated army because it entailed the permanent curbing 

of national sovereignty and made it impracticable for its members to have fully 

independent foreign policies. Many also argued that national governments would lose 

control over national troops, which would be put at the service of the Community. 5 

Precisely because of its supranational features, the project was enthusiastically 

supported by the federalists and the Christian Democrats, who, at the time, were 

leading most of the governments of the countries involved in the project. They 

believed that the creation of a supranational institution would offer a permanent 

solution to the economic problems of Europe, facilitate the reconstruction of the 

continent and normalise diplomatic relations between its members. Because the EDC 

project put into question the definition of the nation-state and entailed the creation of 

a new international system, it awoke strong feelings. It would not be an exaggeration 

to state that the EDC produced one of the fiercest debates in post-war Europe. 

In the fifties, the Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party, PCI) was 

the largest and possibly the best organised political group among the philo-Soviet 

parties in Western Europe. It has been estimated that its membership ranged from 

1,371,000 in 1945 to 2,145,000 in 1954, with an efficient network of party cells and 

collateral organisations. 6 

3. Documents on American Foreign Policy, vol.XII, 1950, p.215. 

4. The EDC Conference took place in Paris between February 1951 and May 1952. Copies of the 

EDC Treaty and minutes of the debates are available in several European archives as well as at the 

HAEC. The EDC members were France, Italy, West Germany and the Benelux countries. For the 

history of the EDC, see E. FURSDON, The European Defence Community: A History, Macmillan, 

London, 1980; A. CLESSE, Le projet de C.E.D. du Plan Pleven au “crime” du 30 août: Histoire 

d'un malentendu européen, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1989; M. DUMOULIN (ed.), The European 

Defence Community: Lessons for the future?, Euroclio, Brussels, 2000; D. PREDA, Storia di una 

speranza: La battaglia per la CED e la Federazione Europea nelle carte della delegazione italiana, 

1950-1952, Jaca Book, Milan, 1990. 

5. However, each member state retained the right of veto in the Council of ministers and Community 

policies could be implemented only once the Council had unanimously approved of them. Each 

member could therefore block any decision that risked undermining national interests. The actual 

power of the Community was therefore much more limited than it was perceived at the time. 

6. P. SPRIANO, Storia del Partito Comunista Italiano, Einaudi, Turin, 1967-1975, vol.5; G. GALLI, 

Storia del PCI, Kaos, Milan, 1993.

Against Rearmament or Against Integration? 13 

The PCI was strengthened by its close collaboration with the Partito Socialista 

Italiano (Italian Socialist Party, PSI). The two parties were bound together by the 

“Common Action Pact”, which had been drafted in 1934 to coordinate their 

anti-fascist fight. The Pact was renewed in October 1946 and extended to a number of 

political issues in both domestic and foreign affairs. 7 The PSI was, however, more a 

follower of its political ally than an equal partner and, more often than not, it 

unquestioningly complied with the directives of the PCI’s leadership. 8 Consequently, 

because it would be impossible to make a distinction between the two parties in their 

fight against the EDC and because internal debate was virtually absent, the position 

of the PCI and PSI is here analysed as that of one political actor. 9 

Their French counterpart, the Parti Communiste Français (French Communist 

Party, PCF), was slightly smaller in terms of membership but was nevertheless the 

strongest opponent of the Troisième Force governments in the Fourth Republic. The 

PCF suffered from total political isolation as both the Socialists and Radicals 

rejected an alliance with the Communists. Despite this, the PCF regularly won a 

quarter of the French votes in the Fourth Republic and earned a major place in the 

French political milieu. 10 

The different degree of isolation of the two parties in the early post-war period 

partially arose from their historical development between the early 1920s and the end 

of World War II. It has been argued that one of the fundamental explanations for this 

discrepancy is that the more democratic structures of the Third Republic allowed the 

PCF to grow and set down roots in the country, whereas the PCI had no sooner 

emerged in 1921 than it was forced underground by Fascism. 11 If the immediate 

result was that the PCI became a more conspiratorial group, in the long run the PCI’s 

absence from Italian politics for nearly twenty years saved it from being blamed for 

the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. By the time the PCI re-appeared with the Resistance, 

the Red Army was successfully allied with the US and was winning in the East. 

Initially, the PCI and the PCF paid little attention to the integrated army project 

and simply described it as an “ugly little monster”. 12 The Western Communist 

7. Gli otto punti del nuovo patto, in: Avanti!, 27.10.1946. In the 1948 elections, the Italian Communists 

and the Socialists gained 31% of the votes and the PCI’s political weight grew even bigger in 

1953, when it received 22.6% of votes on its own. 

8. The relationship between the two parties reflected the Leninist concept of the Communist Party as 

the “vanguard party” according to which in order to advance the cause of Socialism the Communist 

parties – which were by definition the holders of “socialist truth” – had to be entrusted with the 

leadership of any alliance with other socialist - or social democratic - parties. 

9. Only after the Hungarian crisis (October 1956) and the XX congress of the Communist party of the 

Soviet Union, was the “Common Action Pact” replaced by the looser “Mutual Consultation Pact”. 

10. The PCF obtained 28.6% of the votes in 1946, 26.7% in 1951, and 25.9% in 1956. A. KRIEGEL, 

Les Communistes Français dans leur premier demi-siècle. 1920-1970, Ed. du Seuil, Paris, 1985. 

11. D.L.M. BLACKMER, S. TARROW (eds.), Communism in Italy and France, Princeton University 

Press, Princeton, 1975, pp.581-582. 

12. See for example Assomiglia al ‘pool’ dell’acciaio il progetto Pleven sulla Germania, in: Avanti!, 

25.10.1950. S. GALANTE, Il Partito Comunista Italiano e l’integrazione europea: Il decennio del 

rifiuto, 1947-1957, Liviana editrice, Padova, 1988.

14 

Linda RISSO 

parties’ attention was monopolised by the Korean War and the foundation of 

NATO, and at the same time they believed the integration process to be too 

nebulous and ambitious to become reality. Thus, both Robert Schuman’s 

declaration concerning the coal and steel pool (May 1950) and René Pleven’s 

proposal about the creation of an integrated army (October 1950) received little 

attention, a delay later regretted by the party leaderships. 13 In the period 1949-50, 

the western European Communist parties identified Europeanism with Atlanticism 

and saw all initiatives aimed at creating a federal Europe as steps in bringing 

Europe under the control of Washington and as the preparation for an imperialistic 

war of aggression against the USSR. 14 

According to the PCI’s archives, the EDC was first discussed during a plenary 

session of the Central Committee only in late 1953. 15 The initial poor attention 

does not mean that the Communists ignored the issue altogether but rather that the 

party believed its collateral organisations – such as the ex-partisans' groups, the 

women's associations and the party newspapers - provided the most appropriate 

means of fighting the EDC. When the EDC Conference opened in Paris in February 

1951, the Communists expressed their criticism through parliamentary opposition, 

street demonstrations, conferences and newspapers articles. The opening ceremony 

itself was disrupted by a protest organised by the PCF, with the support of the 

ex-partisans and the concentration camp survivors. They attempted to prevent the 

German delegation from entering the building. The object of their protest was the 

military advisor general Hans Spiedel, who had been Erwin Rommel’s chief of 

staff. 16 This was only the beginning. 

The study of the private papers of Emilio Sereni, who was the leader of the 

Italian section of the Peace Partisans, demonstrates that the Communist collateral 

organisations did indeed carry out an anti-EDC campaign since the early 1952. 17 

After the summer of 1951, with the failure of the Petersberg talks and the 

renewed US support for the EDC, the Communists became progressively more 

determined to oppose the creation of an integrated army in all forms. The soviet 

diplomatic note sent to the French government on 11 September 1951 marks the 

beginning of a new phase in the opposition of the PCF and PCI to the EDC. The 

Western Communist parties rejected any further step towards the economic and 

political integration of Europe, which they deemed to be against the interests of the 

workers; they criticised the integration process for deepening the rift between the 

13. Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Archivio del Partito Comunista, Rome (henceforward FIG-APCI), 

MF131, “Campagna contro la bomba H e la CED”. Riunione del 29 aprile 1954. Verbali della Direzione. 

14. See for example the comments of Antonio Pesenti in his column Nostro Paese, in: Critica, 2(1950) 

and 4(1950). 

15. Catalogues of the Verbali della Segreteria and Verbali della Direzione, 1950-1955, FIG-APCI. 

16. Les déportés manifestent ce soir à 18h 30 à l’Opéra, in: L’Humanité, 15.02.1951. 

17. Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Fondo Emilio Sereni: Scritti e Discorsi (henceforward FIG-ES), folders 

12 and 13.


East and the West and believed it to be in preparation for a war of aggression 

against the USSR. 18 

In the period between September 1951 and the summer of 1953, the Western 

Communist parties fiercely opposed the project both inside and outside their 

parliaments. Their opposition was organised around three central themes: 

widespread anti-German feeling, fear of excessive influence of the US on European 

affairs and the need to protect national sovereignty. These three issues had great 

resonance among the European public. 

Anti-German and anti-American feelings 

As has already been demonstrated elsewhere, the opponents of the EDC project 

belonged to different political backgrounds and opposed it for different reasons. 19 

However, they all shared a deep distrust of Germany and were determined to 

prevent its rearmament or at least to secure sufficient guarantees against the 

resurgence of German militarism. The Nazi occupation had left deep scars in the 

memory of the populations of the potential EDC members and debates on 

amnesties and trials against war criminals kept alive such memories. 20 

In addition to the memories of the Nazi occupation, large sectors of the public 

feared that because West Germany had an experienced high command, its officers 

would soon occupy the highest ranks in the future army and be able to threaten 

their neighbours again. 21 The French Socialist Jules Moch remembered that: 

“At the time, I had the tendency to consider all Germans as Hitler’s collaborators. 

Every time I met one I could not avoid wondering ‘what crimes did he commit?’. It 

took years before I could get rid of these feelings”. 22 

Public and politicians alike demanded clear guarantees that ex-Nazi marshals 

and generals would be excluded from all involvement in the defence of Western 

Europe, pointing out that the international agreements of Potsdam and Yalta 

forbade all rearmament of Germany. 

In the eyes of many, premature West German rearmament would also mean 

Germany’s premature political rehabilitation, only five years after the end of the 

war. The ghost of the “new Wehrmacht” was thus indissolubly bound to the EDC 

from its inception and the Communists skilfully turned this into a powerful 

18. S. GALANTE, op.cit., pp.84-85. 

19. M. DUMOULIN, op.cit. 

20. P. LAGROU, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western 

Europe, 1945-1965, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. 

21. See for example La CED significa l’europeizzazione della volontà di rivincita del nazismo, in: 

Avanti!, 20.02.1953. M. GEHLER, Ein wiedervereinigtes und blockfreies Deutschland mit Nationalarmee 

und die französischen Kommunisten im Jahre 1952, in: Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 

2(1988), pp.75-104. 

22. J. MOCH, Histoire du réarmement allemand depuis 1950, Laffont, Paris, 1965, p.268.

16 

Linda RISSO 

propaganda weapon. In fact, although such concerns pervaded the Western 

European public and lay behind the various political parties’ criticism of the 

European Army, it was the Communists who more effectively focused their 

anti-EDC campaign on the spectre of the “new Wehrmacht”. They turned the 

commemoration of the most well known massacres, such as Oradour-sur-Glane 

and Marzabotto, into occasions to oppose the rearmament and political 

rehabilitation of West Germany. 23 

The French and Italian Communists presented their opposition to the EDC as a 

logical consequence of their fight against the Atlantic Pact, the rearmament policies 

implemented by their governments and the H bomb. The PCI and PCF criticised 

the submission to the US which such policies implied, and proposed instead the 

creation of a neutral and disarmed Europe. 24 Since the autumn of 1950, the PCF 

and the PCI had joined their Western European counterparts in a declaration of 

opposition to German rearmament either under NATO or in any other form. The 

reasons for their opposition were twofold: first, they argued that there was no need 

for rearmament as the USSR and its satellites were peaceful countries; second, they 

claimed that US propaganda was criminalising the People’s Democracies in order 

to justify its own imperialist greed. 25 Reflecting Moscow’s opposition to 

Washington’s interference in European affairs, the Communist criticism found 

fertile ground in the widespread anti-Americanism in parts of Europe at the time. 

Although after World War II Western Europeans recognised that Europe needed 

American economic support, there was nevertheless resentment of American 

hegemony, which was often seen as cultural colonisation and infringement of 

national sovereignty. 26 The Communist parties skilfully exploited such feelings and 

denounced American political and economic interference. 

Opposition started with graffiti (“Ami go home”) expressing hostility to the 

American troops still stationed in Europe and soon took the form of violent 

demonstrations every time American officials visited Western European capitals. In 

France, anti-Americanism reached worrying proportions: on 28 May 1952, the 

Communists organised massive protests against the visit of general Matthew 

23. 40.000 personnes ont participé à la manifestation à la mémoire des victimes du massacre, in: Le 

Monde, 05.02.1953; 111 français et une fillette de 9 ans étaient assassinés, in: L’Humanité, 

27.10.1950; La CED significa l’europeizzazione della volontà di rivincita del nazismo, in: Avanti!, 

20.02.1953. 

24. FIG-APCI, MF 131, “Campagna contro la bomba H e la CED. Relatore: E. Sereni”, Verbali della 

Direzione, Riunione del 29 aprile 1954. P. TOGLIATTI, Discorsi Parlamentari, 1946-1964, 2 

vols., Ufficio Stampa della Camera dei Deputati, Rome, 1984, pp.405-441; D.L.M. BLACKMER, 

S. TARROW, op.cit. 

25. See for example Contre la ratification des traités de guerre contre les peuples d’Allemagne et de 

France, in: Cahiers du Communisme, 2(1953), pp.168-169; and L’Unione Sovietica é per la pace, 

in: Avanti!, 27.09.1950. 

26. This opinion was shared by several political parties in Western Europe, particularly in France, 

where the government repeatedly rejected the US attempts to guide their foreign and economic policies. 

In Italy, the fact that the Social-Communists were excluded from the government upon De 

Gasperi’s return from Washington with a cheque for 50 million dollars led to the claim that the exclusion 

of the PCI-PSI was the price imposed by the US for its help.


Ridgway (nicknamed Ridgway la peste). The demonstration was broken up by 

anti-riot police, resulting in one dead, more than two hundred injured on both sides 

and seven hundred arrests. 27 Similar demonstrations had been organised by the 

Communists against general Dwight D. Eisenhower both in Paris and Rome. 28 

Along with their criticism of the United States, the Communists orchestrated 

campaigns against those policy-makers who had bound their names to the Atlantic 

and European policies, accusing them of “shameful servility” to the US, their 

“Imperialist Employer”. The Italian Communist press, for example, identified in 

Alcide De Gasperi the channel through which the philo-fascist Vatican policy tried 

to shape Italian politics. They predicted the creation of a clerical Italy on the 

Salazarian model, which would be the first step towards a crypto-fascist Europe, 

servant of the US. 29 

In April 1953, during a ceremony to honour the victims of World War I at the 

Arc de Triomphe, Gaullist protesters faced Prime minister Joseph Laniel and the 

minister of Defence René Pleven shouting “Vive l’Armée”. The Communist 

activists scattered among the crowd seized upon this first sign of protest and started 

a violent demonstration at the cry “CED nazie” and “À bas les revanches 

allemandes”, and the demonstration rapidly escalated into physical confrontation. 30 

The episode received a great deal of attention from all the major newspapers in 

France and calls for tougher legislation against the Communists resounded in and 

outside of parliament. The PCI expressed similar criticism of their government’s 

submission to the US, their demonstrations were usually crushed by the Celere, the 

anti-riot police of Mario Scelba, the Christian Democratic minister for Home 

Affairs. 

The Communists’ defence of national sovereignty: A paradox? 

In addition to the memories of the Nazi occupation and the widespread 

anti-Americanism, the Communists had another weapon in their hands: the need to 

defend national sovereignty. 

27. Les ‘commandos’ communistes ont provoqué des bagarres, in: Le Figaro, 29.05.1952. 

28. The PCI Central Committee recommended the demonstrations to be widespread and involve all the 

parties’ organisations. FIG-APCI, MF266, Verbali della Segreteria. Sessione del 15 gennaio 1951 

“Manifestazioni per la venuta di Eisenhower”. Cf.. also Pourquoi les chefs communistes veulent 

une démonstration de masse contre le général Eisenhower, in: Le Figaro, 23.01.1951. 

29. Il più americano della classe, in: L’Unità, 12.12.1951; De Gasperi quinta colonna degli USA per 

superare l’opposizione al riarmo tedesco, in: L’Unità, 20.02.1953. 

30. MM. Laniel et Pleven sont malmenés par des manifestants, in: Le Monde, 06.04.1954; Comment 

le PCF cherche à exploiter l’opposition du Maréchal Juin, in: Le Figaro, 03.04.1954. For the position 

of Le Monde and Le Figaro in the EDC debate, see M. KÖNIG, Die Wiederbewaffnung der 

Bundesrepublik im Le Monde und Le Figaro, 1950-1955, in: M. KÖNIG, M. SCHULZ (eds.), Die 

Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die europäische Einigung, 1949-2000, Franz Steiner Verlag, 

2004, pp.401-422.

18 

Linda RISSO 

In order to ratify the EDC Treaty, the member governments had to approve 

substantial amendments to their own constitutions. The six members had to 

renounce some of their prerogatives, which would be transferred to the new 

supranational organisation. The EDC Treaty also established the precedence of 

Community law over national law, thus forcing the member governments to 

implement the supranational organisation’s directives, another important clause 

that needed to be added to the national constitutions. On the other hand, the EDC 

opponents – Communists and non-Communists alike – stressed the economic 

consequences of the treaty’s ratification. Not only did the treaty establish an 

integrated procurement policy, but it also foresaw a joint research project designed 

to lead to a more integrated armament industry, which meant that the supranational 

army would formulate plans for the harmonisation of national economies. Thus it 

was not just a matter of loss of control of the amount of money to be used for 

military purposes, but also of loss of sovereignty over the nation's budget. 

According to many EDC opponents, including the Communists, the economic and 

social situation of post-war Europe meant that the six governments were in no 

position to divert money to anything other than reconstruction. In an interview to 

Avanti!, Francesco Saverio Nitti, a liberal Prime minister of the pre-fascist era, 

declared that a “country with more than two million unemployed that commits 

itself to a policy of rearmament is a country of crazy people”. 31 

Thus, during the EDC ratification debate the Communists became the fiercest 

defenders of national sovereignty. As Pietro Nenni, the PSI leader, declared: “We 

want a foreign policy of firm defence of our national interests particularly over 

Istria and Trieste”. 32 Paolo Emilio Taviani, the Christian Democratic leader of the 

Italian delegation to the EDC, remembers that: 

“There was no doubt that the Communists were going to engage the European 

Defence Community in an even fiercer battle than the one they had orchestrated 

against the Atlantic Pact a few years earlier. They had become the defenders of the 

Italian heritage [Italianité]”. 33 

In defiance of the traditional Socialist vision of the unity of the working class 

across national borders, the new Communist strategy was based on the awareness 

that the defence of the nation-state had a larger appeal to the public and could raise 

more support than the sheer class struggle approach would have ever done. The 

Communists denounced the “double threat” to the sovereignty of the nation-state: 

on the one hand, there was the American attempt to buy out the European 

31. See E’ necessario che gli Italiani sappiano ciò che significa la ratifica della CED, in: Avanti!, 

20.03.1954. See also I 250 miliardi stanziati per il riarmo siano usati per la ricostruzione del Polesine, 

in: L’Unità, 27.11.1951. 

32. P. NENNI, Dal Patto Atlantico alla politica di distensione: Pace e guerra nel parlamento italiano. 

Scritti e discorsi di Pietro Nenni, Parenti, Bologna, 1953, p.480. 

33. HAEC-INT/10, “Interview avec Paolo Emilio Taviani. Participation au séminaire du Prof. Richard 

T. Griffiths à l’IUE (14-15 May 1989)”. In the same interview, Taviani remembers when in 1954 

he went with Giovanni Gronchi to Ravenna to confer the medal for resistance to the city and was 

faced by a crowd of communist protesters who shouted “Viva l’armata nazionale” and “Viva l’esercito 

italiano”.


governments with loans and skilfully designed procurement policies, which 

increased Western Europe’s economic dependence on the US and, on the other, 

there were the European policy-makers who supported such policies in order to 

gain a personal advantage. This political strategy was approved of – and to a certain 

degree inspired by – the Soviet Union, who since the “great patriotic war” of 

1941-45 had recognised the appeal that nationalism could exert on the public. 

Since the end of WWII, Moscow had identified nationalism as an “anticoagulant 

against the new internationalism pushed forward by the US”. 34 

The defence of the constitution and of national sovereignty was of course also a 

concern of the French and Italian right-wing parties. However, this produced 

different results in the two countries. While the PCF worked for an instrumental 

alliance with the Gaullists to fight the EDC and even made public appeals in favour 

of such an alliance, their Italian counterparts refused to have any contact with the 

Right. On 23 October 1953, Jacques Duclos launched an open invitation to the 

Gaullists when he declared that: 

“Always aware of the need to act rapidly everywhere in the country to prevent the 

ratification of the treaty that establishes the European army, we declare that we, the 

Communists, are ready to fight with all the French, whoever they are – we repeat, 

whoever they are – and who like us do not want a new Wehrmacht, to take part in all 

political actions that can and should be organised as part of a conscious campaign 

everywhere in France”. 35 

Although the French Communists and the Gaullists never formed an official 

alliance, they united informally to defeat the EDC and eventually caused its 

collapse on 30 August 1954, when their combined vote struck a mortal blow to the 

project. Clearly, the relations that the PCF and PCI maintained with the Gaullists 

and the Italian Social Movement respectively were determined by the different 

natures and histories of the Italian and French right-wing parties. The Gaullist party 

members were among the most well known members of the European Resistance. 36 

The Italian Right, on the other hand, was made up of ex-Fascists who had managed 

to continue their political careers after the end of the war. 37 

34. Pravda, 29 September 1951, as quoted in A. CLESSE, op.cit., pp.316-317. In the Italian case in 

particular, the PCI had opted for the defence of national sovereignty as a tool to enhance the possibility 

of establishing alliances with other political parties since April 1944, with the so-called 

svolta di Salerno (Salerno turning point). 

35. FIG-ES, Folder 12, “Estratto da una dichiarazione di Jacques Duclos, Segretario del PCF”. See also 

a similar declaration of a few months earlier in J. DUCLOS, Mémoires, Fayard, Paris, 1952, 

pp.126-127. S. BERSTEIN, Le Parti communiste français et de Gaulle sous la IV e République: 

Confrontations et convergences, in: S. COURTOIS, M. LAZAR (eds.), 50 ans d’une passion 

française: De Gaulle et les communistes, Balland, Paris, 1991, pp.79-95. 

36. Besides de Gaulle himself, generals Koenig and Juin, Gaston Palewski and Jacques Soustelle were 

among the most outstanding French resistants. 

37. Giorgio Almirante, the MSI secretary from 1946 to 1951, had been a member of minister Mezzasoma’s 

cabinet and in 1944 took part in several anti-partisan operations.

20 

Linda RISSO 

Finally, the Communists argued that the lack of democratic control within the 

EDC would jeopardise the political stability of Europe and of West Germany in 

particular: 

“[The EDC] is the worst solution that could be conceived: a German national army 

would be at least under the control of the German public opinion. [...] The German 

section of the European army, instead, would be exclusively under the command of 

the American army, thus escaping the control of the German public opinion”. 38 

A more specific criticism of the Italian Communists was the link between the 

fight against the EDC and their opposition to the Christian Democratic 

government: the PCI claimed in fact that by touting the need to comply with the 

EDC requirements, the Christian Democrats were in fact trying to undermine 

parliamentary powers and pave the way for an authoritarian regime. In their eyes 

the EDC was merely an excuse to reshape Italian democracy according to the 

Salazarian model, which would turn Italy into a philo-Fascist and philo-American 

theocracy. The opposition to the EDC was therefore intentionally linked to their 

fight against the new electoral law, the so called legge truffa, and the new 

legislation approved by the DC government in the early fifties, which they regarded 

as being all part of the Christian Democrats’ plan to establish an authoritarian 

regime. 39 

The report by Emilio Sereni clearly summarises the ideas around which the 

Communist campaigns were organised: 

“It is clear that the limitation – or liquidation – of the parliamentary prerogatives in 

our country is one of the crucial objectives of the promoters of the EDC […]. We 

need to defend our country and our constitution […] Along with these democratic 

issues, other issues can be used more than in the past to open the way to new initiatives 

at the local and national level: the theme of national independence and the 

threat of German rearmament: which are at the same time issues of national independence 

and of peace. […] We need to demonstrate that the EDC, in which German 

militarism would be virtually uncontrolled, means for Italy – now more than in 1940 

– the risk to be pulled into a world conflict at the service of German greed for 

revenge and aggression. We need to show that the ratification of the EDC will be the 

greatest obstacle to any policy of international appeasement. […] This will open an 

extremely vast and heterogeneous field of political and propagandist actions”. 40 

A further peculiarity of the Italian case was the problem of Trieste, whose 

contended position created frictions between Rome and Belgrade and which was 

widely exploited in the EDC debate by both the Communists and the right-wing 

parties. The Yugoslavian occupation of Trieste, which had the support of Moscow, 

38. P. NENNI, Dal Patto Atlantico …, op.cit., p.355. 

39. IFG MF116, Verbali della Segreteria del 30 dicembre 1954, “Provvedimenti del CdM del 4 dicembre 

1954”. See also E’ necessario che gli Italiani sappiano ciò che significa la ratifica della CED, 

in: Avanti!, 20.03.1954. L. LOTTI, Crisi del centrismo e legge elettorale maggioritaria, in: A. 

TURBANTI, Movimento di Unità Popolare e crisi del centrismo: Atti della giornata di studi organizzata 

dalla Fondazione Bianciardi. Grosseto, 12 marzo 1994, Giunti, Florence, 1995. 

40. IFG-ES, Folder 12, Emilio Sereni, I compiti dei partigiani della pace nella lotta contro la CED e 

contro il riarmo tedesco. 15 dicembre 1953. Draft article for Il Quaderno dell’Attivista.


reinforced anti-Communism at home and put the PCI in an uncomfortable position 

as the party was accused of being a pawn of the Soviet and Yugoslavian greed. 41 

The expulsion of Josip Tito from the Cominform in June 1948 allowed the PCI to 

criticise him and support the government’s demand for full control over the town 

without upsetting Moscow. Trieste became therefore yet another propaganda 

weapon in the hands of the Communists who used it to show, once again, that the 

Western Allies were sacrificing Italian national interests at their advantage. 

Between 1953 and 1954, the fear that Trieste might become the reward for 

Tito’s collaboration created alarm in Italy. Thus, the right-wing parties’ support for 

the ratification of the EDC became increasingly linked to the solution to the 

problem of Trieste. According to the monarchists, Italy had to take advantage of the 

fact that the US wanted the EDC Treaty to be ratified and bargain with the Western 

Allies, “claiming its dignity and territorial integrity like a respected nation, as it 

deserved”. 42 As the US ambassador to Rome, Clare Boothe Luce, commented, 

“ratification is the only carrot Italy has”, and it was one they were determined to 

use. 43 Officially, Italian authorities denied the link between Trieste and the EDC. In 

his diaries, Paolo Emilio Taviani wrote that the Italian government never thought of 

linking the ratification of the treaty to the solution to Trieste mainly because such 

blackmail would upset those in London and Paris who were against a positive 

solution for Italy, but other surces suggest otherwise. 44 Pietro Nennni remembers in 

his diaries, for example, that during an informal conversation over dinner Prime 

minister Pella told him that “About Trieste he does not see a solution. He will go to 

Paris and to the Hague to remind the others that they cannot ask him to support the 

EDC if they do not give him Trieste”. 45 The behaviour of his successor, Prime 

minister Mario Scelba, remained similarly ambiguous, thus raising further 

suspicion among the other EDC members. 46 

41. L. GIBJANSKIJ, Mosca, il PCI e la questione di Trieste, 1943-1948, in: F. GORI, S. PONS (eds.), 

Dagli archivi di Mosca: L’URSS, il Cominform e il PCI (1943-1951), Carocci, Rome, 1998, 

pp.85-133; S. PONS, Stalin, Togliatti and the origins of the Cold War in Europe, in: Journal of 

Cold War Studies, 3/2(2001), pp.3-27. 

42. Il problema del TLT e la CED, in: Il Popolo di Roma, 12.05.1954; La definizione della frontiera 

orientale presupposto alla ratifica della CED, in: Idid., 08.04.1954. 

43. Foreign Relations of the United States (henceforward FRUS), 1952-54, VI, pp.1671-1675. For the 

PNM’s decision to link Trieste to the EDC ratification, see Trieste e la CED, in: Il Popolo di Roma, 

03.03.1954. 

44. P.E. TAVIANI, Politica a memoria d’uomo, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2002, p.193. 

45. P. NENNI, Tempo di guerra fredda: Diari, 1943-1956, Sugar&Co, Milan, 1981, p.594. 

46. A. CANAVERO, La politica estera di un Ministro degli Interni: Scelba, Piccioni e Martino e la 

politica estera italiana, in: Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, 1(1990), pp.63-97.

22 

Linda RISSO 

Mobilising all the forces against the EDC 

The PCI and PCF mobilised their MPs, newspapers and collateral organisations in 

what became one of their fiercest opposition campaigns of the post-war period. 

Party newspapers were the most obvious way of presenting the Communist 

criticism. The PCI, in collaboration with the PSI, relied on two widely read 

newspapers, L’Unità and Avanti!. In the early fifties, L’Unità, the PCI’s newspaper, 

sold more than half a million copies a day and a million on Sundays and special 

occasions like the 1st of May. 47 The Socialist Avanti! added a further two hundred 

thousand copies to the Italian left-wing press. In France, the PCF published 

L’Humanité, which reached 170,000 copies. Compared with the Italian Communist 

press, the circulation of L’Humanité might appear limited, however the PCF 

allowed the publication of different sections of the party's newspapers. Between 

1950 and 1954, it is possible to find not only more than eight different editions of 

L’Humanité itself, but also fourteen other newspapers which were published under 

the PCF’s umbrella. 48 

The parties and their newspapers did not shape their campaign against the EDC 

around the class struggle theme, but chose instead to concentrate exclusively on the 

dangers of German rearmament: namely, the return of Nazism and the beginning of 

a new world conflict (often interchanging the prospects of German aggression with 

the imminent East-West conflict). The public was extremely sensitive about these 

two issues. Thus, the ghost of the “new Wehrmacht” became omnipresent in the 

Communist press. The party newspapers skilfully placed reports on the 

concentration camps and interviews with survivors on the same page as anti-EDC 

articles, in order to remind readers of the Nazi horrors and to reinforce their 

anti-EDC position and they published articles on the massacre of Korean civilians 

by US troops to encourage anti-Americanism. 49 

It is also interesting to note that in their parliamentary speeches as well as in 

their articles, the Communists often used the terms ‘rearmament’ and 

‘remilitarisation’ as synonyms. 50 The misleading use of the term ‘remilitarisation’ 

evoked the re-creation of the German army and indirectly implied that the 

premature creation of an army in a country that had not yet been de-nazified would 

lead to a new authoritarian regime and eventually to military aggression against its 

neighbours. 

If through the newspapers the Communist parties reached their own followers, 

they recognised the importance of engaging other groups whose political 

allegiances were close – but not exactly within – the Communist sphere and they 

47. Data taken from Intervento di Ingrao alla riunione della Segreteria del Cominform. Novembre 

1950, quoted in F. GORI, S. PONS (eds.), op.cit., pp.399-414. 

48. A. KRIEGEL, op.cit., p.39. 

49. Several examples are available in L’Unità, Avanti! and L’Humanité in the period 1951-53. 

50. See for example: La CED significa l’europeizzazione della volontà di rivincita del nazismo, in: 

Avanti!, 20.02.1953; and I partigiani contrari all’esercito europeo tendente a ridurre in schiavitù 

il paese, in: Ibid., 01.03.1953.


therefore resorted to the collateral organisations they had created for this purpose. 

The Italian Communists could rely on a huge variety of groups and associations. 

One of the most influential was the Associazione Nazionale Partigiani Italiani 

(National Association of Italian Partisans, ANPI). Since the beginning of the Cold 

War, the partisans had opposed rearmament and denounced the risk of an 

irreversible shift of the Italian Republic which would put it under the control of the 

US. 

It was only in February 1953, however, that the ANPI addressed the EDC 

problem: at their congress in Florence, their president, Arrigo Boldrini, warned that 

it was impossible for those who had fought against Nazism and Fascism to support 

the creation of the “new Wehrmacht” and called for the general mobilisation of all 

“democratic citizens”. 51 Thereafter the ANPI took an active part in the anti-EDC 

campaign organised by the party. The Association Nationale des Anciens 

Combattants de la Résistance (National Association of the Ex-Combatants of the 

Resistance, ANARC), the ANPI’s French counterpart, included the protagonists of 

the French resistance who, unlike what had happened in Italy, belonged to different 

political groups, which meant the PCF exerted little or no influence over them. 

Only the smaller Fédération Nationale des Déportés et Internés Résistants et 

Patriotes (National Federation of the Deported and Interned Resistants and 

Patriots, FNDIRP) was close to the PCF, and it offered its unconditional support in 

the fight against German rearmament. 

There were other collateral organisations the Communists could rely on. In July 

1951, the Dockers Union organised a congress in Genoa under the motto “The 

Mediterranean: a peaceful sea”, at which they declared their refusal to load or 

unload any military items in the name of the peaceful coexistence of all nations. 

The Italian dockers sent an invitation to follow their programme to all the cities 

facing the Mediterranean Sea, and the French dockers were the first to answer the 

call. 52 Finally, the Union des Femmes Françaises (French Women’s Union, UdFF) 

and the Unione delle Donne Italiane (Italian Women’s Union, UDI) tried to reach 

the female population, especially housewives, who were deeply influenced by the 

Church and the Christian Democratic parties. 

The foundation of the Kominform in 1947 had produced a new transnational 

opposition in the form of international organisations or, as the Western security 

agencies called them, “front” organisations. Since the 1920s, the USSR had 

understood that organisations that were believed to be independent could be more 

useful to the cause of international Communism than those that were openly 

pro-Communist. Precisely because their programmes were ones with which 

non-Communists could sympathise – peaceful coexistence, disarmament, 

economic and cultural exchange – they attracted wider support. The great asset of 

such organisations was their spurious international appeal to both Communists and 

non-Communists, and their ability to demonstrate that they enjoyed support that 

51. Manifestazioni in tutta Italia contro il Trattato della CED, in: Avanti!, 22.02.1953. 

52. Nei porti del Mediterraneo soltanto traffici di pace, in: Avanti!, 31.07.1951.

24 

Linda RISSO 

transcended the limits of the Party as well as national boundaries. Consequently, 

the USSR invested massively in these organisations: in 1951 the CIA estimated that 

the USSR spent $ 2,500,000,000 a year on the front organisations. 53 

The World Peace Congress (WPC) was one of the most effective of these 

groups. From the very beginning, the Peace Partisans – as the WPC members called 

themselves – were an instrument in the hands of the USSR and therefore were 

under the control of each country’s Communist party. It is not surprising, that the 

movement had its strongest branches in France and Italy, whereas it remained a 

marginal phenomenon in Britain and in the Scandinavian countries. 54 According to 

the PCI’s archives, the Italian section of the Partisans received 1.2 million lira a 

year from the party and an additional 375,000 lira from the PSI and the CGIL, the 

Communist trade union. 55 

Along with the Communist parties, the Peace Partisans initially focused their 

actions on issues such as disarmament, peaceful coexistence, the Korean War and 

NATO. Accordingly, at the end of 1950, the Partisans launched a campaign against 

rearmament and collected ten million signatures in nine months, a sign of the 

extent of the public’s fear of a new conflict and a clear demonstration of the 

effectiveness of the Communist propaganda campaign. 56 In February 1950, the 

Italian section of the movement presented a motion to the Italian parliament asking 

for an immediate stop to the rearmament process, the prohibition of the atomic 

bomb and the drawing up of a “peace treaty” between the Western Allies and the 

USSR. 57 

It was only at the end of 1951 that the Peace Partisans addressed the European 

Army question. 58 Not surprisingly, the decision to address the question followed 

the Soviet note to the French government in September in which the USSR 

criticised the integrated army and the rearmament of the Federal Republic. 59 The 

movement organised a series of international meetings to gather together the 

anti-EDC opponents and to reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful solution to the 

German problem through diplomatic agreements between the Four Powers. The 

WPC built on their previous campaigns against the atomic bomb and disarmament 

and presented their opposition to the EDC as a logical consequence of their 

53. J. KOTEK, Youth Organisations as a Battlefield in the Cold War, in: Intelligence and National Security 

18/2(2003), p.181. 

54. D. DESANTI, Les Staliniens, 1944-1956: Une expérience politique, Fayard, Paris, 1975; R. GI- 

ACOMINI, I Partigiani della Pace, Vangelista, Milan, 1984. 

55. FIG-APCI, MF189, Verbali della Segreteria del 19 giugno 1952; FIG-APCI, Verbali della Segreteria 

del 17 settembre, MF 165, “Lettera di G. Pajetta alla Segreteria. 18 luglio 1953”. 

56. According to the report by Emilio Sereni, the partisans had gathered 13,500,000 signatures. “Campagna 

per la raccolta di firme”. FIG-APCI, MF191, Verbali della Direzione. Riunione del 26 settembre 

1951. 

57. Oggi presentata in Parlamento la mozione dei Partigiani della Pace, in: Avanti!, 28.02.1950. 

58. See the speech of Pietro Nenni, the movement secretary, denouncing the EDC in L’Assemblea Nazionale 

per il disarmo e la pace, in: La Pace, 4-5(December 1951), special supplement. 

59. L. BRUNORI, I Partigiani della Pace e la CED: Il caso italiano (1950-1954), in: Storia delle 

Relazioni Internazionali, 2(1992), pp.299-332.


commitment to international dialogue and détente. 60 According to the Peace 

Partisans, therefore: 

“The campaign against the EDC – along with the general campaigns against German 

rearmament, in favour of national independence and in support for peace – needs to 

become a decisive campaign of all the democratic forces. It will require a concrete 

and direct commitment of the party similar to that against the atomic bomb”. 61 

New strategy: Delaying the ratification process (1953-54) 

Nineteen fifty-three marked a turning point in the history of the European Army or, 

as Edward Fursdon has put it, the beginning of the end of the EDC. 62 Key 

international events that took place in 1953 reshaped East-West diplomatic 

relations and had far-reaching effects on Italian domestic affairs. Such changes 

were triggered by the death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953 and the end of the 

Korean War in July. It marked the beginning of a period of relaxation in East-West 

relations, in which peaceful coexistence was the order of the day. In this changed 

atmosphere, the need for the EDC as a precautionary defence scheme against a 

Soviet attack lost its urgency. 

It was the Berlin Conference (January-February 1954) which marked a 

volte-face in Moscow’s approach to the German problem. Rather than rejecting the 

military integration of Western Europe tout court, the USSR proposed through its 

Foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, a Pan-European Security Pact whereby 

thirty-two nations from the Atlantic to the Urals would merge into a common 

supranational organisation, while the USSR and the US would act as external 

observers. 63 James Richter has suggested that, although his proposal was rejected 

by the Western Allies, Molotov did achieve his goal: to divide the Western Allies 

and to widen the internal rift within several political parties, particularly the West 

German Social Democrats and the French Socialists. 64 In fact, for the first time the 

words of a Soviet leader seemed to strike a chord in groups other than the 

Communists, including members of the French centre. Édouard Herriot and Jules 

Moch, for example, praised Molotov’s words and asked for new talks with Moscow 

before proceeding with the EDC ratification debate. 65 

60. FIG-APCI, MF 116, Verbali della Segreteria dell’11 November 1954, “Dichiarazione dell’Esecutivo 

del Consiglio Mondiale della Pace”. Vienna, 15 Settembre 1954. 

61. FIG-APCI, MF165, Verbali della Segreteria del 29 dicembre 1953, “Campagna contro la CED. Conclusioni 

della riunione del 21 dicembre u.s. sulla CED da sottoporre all’esame della Segreteria”. 

62. E. FURSDON, op.cit., p.229. 

63. FRUS, 1952-54, VII, pp.1122-1123. V.M. ZUBOK, K. PLESHAKOV, Inside the Kremlin Cold 

War: From Stalin to Khrushchev, Harvard University Press, Cambridge-Mass, 1993. 

64. J. RICHTER, Re-examining Soviet policy towards Germany in 1953, in: Europe-Asia Studies, 45/ 

4(1993), pp.671-691. 

65. M. Edouard Herriot: On vous demande de commettre une terrible imprudence, in: Le Monde, 

16.03.1954.

26 

Linda RISSO 

Molotov’s speech opened the way to a new form of criticism, which focused on 

the use of the adjective “European” itself. The Communist parties claimed that it 

was inappropriate to use the term European for the EDC since it only included six 

countries, while others (such as Spain, Portugal, Britain, the German Democratic 

Republic and the Scandinavian countries) were excluded. Rather than a “Small 

Europe”, the Communists endorsed the “Pan-European Pact”, which included all 

the countries between the Atlantic Ocean, the Urals and the Mediterranean Sea, 

with mutual recognition of the two blocs, and normalisation of international 

relations. 66 

Following the developments that had occurred in Moscow, Communist criticism 

of the European integration process underwent significant changes and outright 

rejection of the EDC gave way to a more articulated strategy, aimed at delaying the 

ratification process. The new Communist approach was based on the conviction 

that international détente was working against the EDC and that support for the 

European Army was decreasing by the day. The more time passed, the more likely 

it was that it would be defeated. 67 For this reason, it was vital to keep the Western 

Allies, as well as the national parties, divided and to show that there were viable 

alternatives to the rearmament of West Germany. Consequently, it was necessary 

for the USSR to prove – or, as their opponents would say, pretend – that they were 

willing to co-operate on issues such as the German and Austrian peace treaties, the 

war in Indochina and disarmament. The proposal for a Pan-European Security Pact 

should therefore be contextualised as part of the new Soviet leadership’s attempt to 

change the world perception of its foreign policy. Disarmament and co-operation 

were the new weapons in the Communist propaganda armoury. 

Because of their political weight and their position within the National 

Assembly’s spectrum, the solid vote of the French Socialists and Radicals in favour 

of the EDC was vital for the ratification. For this reason, Guy Mollet, the Socialist 

leader, asked for a “disciplined vote” arguing that because of the virtually equal 

division of the National Assembly over the EDC, it was necessary for the Socialists 

to vote solidly together to ensure the treaty’s ratification. 68 In spite of party 

66. FIG-APCI, MF 165, Verbali della Segreteria del 4 marzo, “Riunione a Parigi contro la CED dei 

rappresentanti dei 6 Paesi della ‘Piccola Europa’”, Lettera di G. Pajetta alla Segreteria, 27 febbraio 

1954. See also Gli amici dell’Europa (i veri e i falsi), in: Avanti!, 27.09.1952. 

67. FIG-APCI, MF165, Verbali della Segreteria del 29 dicembre 1953, “Campagna contro la CED (Sereni, 

Giuliano Pajetta, Robotti). Conclusioni della riunione del 21 dicembre u.s. sulla CED da sottoporre 

all’esame della Segreteria”. See also the report sent by the Italian Ambassador to Moscow, 

according to which, the death of Stalin notwithstanding, the Soviet administration remained determined 

to have the Treaty rejected. HAEC-IML/16, “Telespresso dal MAE alla Delegazione Italiana 

CED; Subj.: URSS e CED”, 27 April 1954. 

68. A disciplined vote would impose to all party members to vote according to the directives of the 

party leadership, with any disobedience being punished by “disciplinary measures” ranging from 

suspension to expulsion from the party. Party discipline was imposed at the special congress of Puteaux 

by 2,414 votes to 972. Le congrès national extraordinaire de la SFIO se prononce en faveur 

de la ratification de la CED, in: Le Populaire, 31 May 1954; for the full text of the Mollet motion, 

La motion de la CED, in: Le Populaire, 31 May 1954; for the disciplined vote, Motion sur la discipline, 

in: Le Populaire, 6 July 1954.


discipline, however, the Socialists remained deeply divided and split into two 

almost perfect halves at the final vote of 30 August 1954: 53 deputies supported the 

ratification, whereas 50 opposed it. 69 The Radical Party was deeply divided too and 

many of its members suggested postponing the EDC ratification debate until new 

relations with Moscow had been established. 70 

Thus, the new Soviet tactic produced the envisaged results: it widened the 

internal rifts within the French Socialist and Radical parties, while the 

Communists’ obstructionism contributed to the rejection of the EDC. 

Believing that the Italian ratification would weaken the French opposition 

within the National Assembly, the PCI delayed the parliamentary discussion on the 

EDC through parliamentary obstruction, claiming that the ratification debate could 

take place only after new relations with Moscow had been initiated. 71 As a result of 

this action, the Italian Communists found they had an unexpected ally in the 

government. Since the parliamentary debate appeared highly problematic, with 

both the Left and the Right embracing obstructionism, the Italian government 

decided to postpone the ratification debate until after the elections, which were 

scheduled for the summer of 1953. Aware of the increasing difficulties within the 

National Assembly, the Italian government believed that it would be pointless to 

initiate a long fight in parliament if the treaty were then to be rejected by the 

National Assembly. Italy preferred to wait for the French results. 72 

It is worth remembering that before the elections of 1953 the Italian government 

still enjoyed a comfortable majority that would have ensured the ratification of the 

EDC Treaty, whereas the prospects of the election results were increasingly 

uncertain and it was unlikely the new government would have been in a position to 

ratify the Treaty. 73 By postponing the ratification debate, the Christian Democrats 

prevented a sensitive issue from jeopardising the already difficult electoral 

campaign and thus they consciously sacrificed the EDC, to the great distress of the 

US. 

69. Journal Officiel la République Française, Assemblée Nationale, 30 August 1954, pp.4473-4474. 

70. On 30 August 1954, 29 Radicals voted in favour of the Herriot motion, which signalled the end of 

the EDC, whereas 31 of them supported EDC by voting against the motion. Journal Officiel, 30 

August 1954, pp.4473-4474. Among them there were Jean-Paul David, Bernard Lafay, Léon Martinaud-Dèplat, 

and René Mayer. The fall of the EDC did not mean a return to the unanimity that 

had been seen at the time of the Coal and Steel Community vote and the WEU produced a similar 

internal divisions. 

71. FIG-APCI, MF 165, Verbali della Segreteria, “Campagna contro la CED (Sereni, Giuliano Pajetta, 

Robotti). Conclusioni della riunione del 21 dicembre u.s. sulla CED da sottoporre all’esame della 

Segreteria”. See also FIG-APCI, MF 165, Verbali della Segreteria del 2 aprile 1954, about the decision 

to postpone the ratification process and to revise the propaganda campaign. Non si deve ratificare 

la CED prima della Francia e della Germania, in: Avanti!, 13.02.1953. 

72. P.E. TAVIANI, op.cit., pp.196, 200 and 209. 

73. Before the 1953 elections, the governing coalition could count on 61.9% of the votes in parliament, 

P. GINSBORG, A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988, Penguin, London, 

1990, p.442. Yet, the municipal elections of 1951 had shown a decrease in the consensus of 

the governing coalition and it seemed unlikely they could repeat the success of 1948.

28 

Linda RISSO 

Contrary to the opinion of the Italian government, several American officials 

believed that Italian ratification would pave the way for French ratification. At the 

end of March 1953, De Gasperi informed the US secretary of State, John Foster 

Dulles, that there was not enough time to discuss the EDC Treaty, because the 

parliamentary debate regarding the new electoral law had stretched into the 

Spring. 74 This caused great disappointment in Washington and it was only thanks to 

the mediation of David Bruce, the US observer to the Interim Committee of the 

EDC, that Foster Dulles did not release another of his threatening statements. 75 

The Italian decision to postpone ratification until after the French vote has 

generated an intense historiographical discussion: Sergio Pistone, for example, 

maintains that Italian ratification would have encouraged the French to do the 

same. 76 However, with the benefit of hindsight, it is unlikely that the Italian vote 

would have influenced the French parliament. The French ratification was 

hampered by widespread opposition not only among the Gaullists and the 

Communists, but also among governmental parties such as the Socialists and the 

Radicals. Therefore, it seems improbable that Italian ratification would have 

exerted any influence on the French vote. At the time, Taviani too believed that the 

French parliament would not be influenced by the Italian vote77 and Pietro Quaroni, 

the Italian ambassador to France – whose opinion was highly regarded at the 

Foreign ministry – thought that ratifying the treaty before the French would be a 

strategic mistake: the Assembly would see Italian ratification as a betrayal and this 

would strengthen the anti-EDC front: 

“Many believe that if the EDC Treaty were ratified by all members, the French parliament 

would not dare reject it. But the French parliament […] would dare! […] 

From time to time, the French parliament still suffers from a form of ‘National Convention’ 

reflex”. 78 

Against rearmament or against integration? 

The changes that occurred at the international level after the death of Stalin, 

combined with the continuous delays in the ratification process, reinforced the 

anti-EDC opposition and led to its rejection by the French parliament in August 

1954 – thanks to the combined vote of the Gaullists and the Communists. After 

four years of thorny diplomatic meetings and parliamentary debates, the rejection 

of the EDC did not come as a sudden blow. However, if European policy-makers 

74. P. PASTORELLI, La politica estera italiana del dopoguerra, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1987, p.198. 

75. HAEC-JMAS(Bruce)/149, Bruce’s diary at the entry of 16 March 1953. 

76. S. PISTONE (ed.), I movimenti per l’unità europea dal 1945 al 1954: Atti del convegno internazionale, 

Pavia 19-21 ottobre 1989, Jaca Book, Milan, 1992, pp.46-47. 

77. P.E. TAVIANI, op.cit., p.200. 

78. HAEC-IML/15, “Lettera di Quaroni al Ministro. Parigi, 23 ottobre 1952, Subj.: Integrazione Europea”.


had expected the negative vote of the National Assembly, they remained uncertain 

about what would happen next. 

The failure of the EDC did not change the core problem it had tried to solve: 

providing military security for Western Europe. This was eventually achieved 

through the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) at the end of 1954. 

There is no room to recall here the debate that led to the creation of this new 

organisation, suffice it to say that the WEU was a military alliance of a traditional 

kind and it created neither unified high commands nor integrated headquarters, and 

it allowed its members to follow independent foreign policies under the NATO 

umbrella. For West Germany the WEU meant the end of the occupation statute and 

the opportunity to become a member of NATO, which it joined in May 1955. 

It is interesting to compare the Communists’ opposition to the WEU with their 

opposition to the EDC. In his conclusion, Raymond Aron has pointed out that 

neither the USSR nor the Communist parties opposed the WEU as strongly as they 

had opposed the EDC. 79 Aron argues that the “silence” of the Communists was due 

to the fact that between 1950 and 1954 they were actually opposing the European 

integration process rather than German rearmament. According to Aron, in the 

fifties the USSR, while being aware that they could not prevent the rearmament of 

Western Germany, were nevertheless determined to prevent European integration 

and the creation of a strong power aligned with the US. 80 Interesting questions that 

are still waiting to be answered. 

First of all, it is important to assess whether Communist opposition to the WEU 

was indeed different from the opposition organised against the EDC, and to explain 

the reasons behind such behaviour. A comparison between the parliamentary 

debates of August and December 1954, as well as a quick look at the Communist 

press during those months, shows a quite remarkable change. The number of 

front-page articles on European defence fell after 30 August. This might partially 

be due to the fact that some scandals were taking place at that time. In September 

and October, the Italian press was obsessed by the Montesi Affair and its political 

implications, as well as by the love drama of the cyclist Fausto Coppi and his White 

Lady. 81 In France, a case of espionage involving some PCF members and 

Emmanuel D’Astier, the editor of Libération, polarised the public and the media, 

leaving little room for anything else. The very fact that the Communist press 

allowed such topics to take over the front page is evidence that their commitment to 

79. R. ARON, D. LERNER (eds.), La querelle de la CED: Essais d’analyse sociologique, in: Cahiers 

de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 80(1956), p.201. 

80. R. ARON, op.cit., pp.201-202. 

81. In April 1954, Wilma Montesi was found dead on a beach near Rome and a four-week investigation 

concluded that the death had been accidental. Six months later, the case was reopened due to the 

intervention of Amintore Fanfani, the Interior minister. It is widely believed that Fanfani exploited 

the Montesi scandal to get rid of Attilio Piccioni, his rival to the party’s leadership; G. GALLI, 

Mezzo secolo di DC, Rizzoli, Milan, 1993, pp.121-123. Still in 1954, the cyclist Fausto Coppi had 

a love affair with a married woman, known as the “White Lady”. At a time when divorce was still 

a long way off, the couple was prosecuted for indecency and the White Lady had to spend a short 

time in prison, where she started a hunger strike.

30 

Linda RISSO 

the fight against the WEU was not as great as it had been to the anti-EDC 

campaign. In fact, in 1952 and 1953, Italy and France had witnessed several 

scandals, but they had been reported in small articles that would not distract the 

reader from the important issue of the EDC. Hence, there must have been a 

conscious decision on the part of the editorial committees to grant D’Astier and 

Montesi the honour of the front page. 82 

The parliamentary debates offer another excellent perspective from which to 

analyse the same issue. The French and Italian Communists used their seats in 

parliament to criticise the WEU, but if they tried to delay its ratification, they did 

not attack it with the same strength as they had attacked the EDC. They repeated 

some of the criticism they had used against the EDC: namely, the rearmament of 

West Germany would make the reunification of Germany impossible, it would 

entail the re-formation of German militarism, it would hamper relations with 

Moscow, and so forth. The direct dependence of the WEU on NATO was a further 

point of criticism because it would increase the military dependence of Western 

Europe on the US. 

During a meeting of the Central Committee, Arturo Colombi, responsible for 

the PCI Propaganda Commission, confirmed that regrettably “there has not been a 

large mobilisation throughout the country” against the WEU. 83 Similarly, the 

Foreign affairs section of the party pointed out that “even our leadership is scarcely 

informed about the development of current events” and claimed that there was “a 

dangerous discrepancy between the extent of our duties and our actual 

manpower”. 84 

At the same time, after 1953, the Peace Partisans seemed unable to adjust to the 

new strategy suggested by Moscow. Initiating new relations with the Western bloc 

required diplomatic and conciliatory skills, which the movement clearly lacked. 

Consequently, the Peace Partisans proved to be incapable of adapting to the new 

Soviet strategy. It is not surprising, then, that in the last months of 1954 the 

Partisans’ voice grew weaker and that they decreased their activity even further 

during the WEU negotiations. 85 The twentieth congress of the Communist Party of 

the Soviet Union (1956) inflicted the final blow on the already dying movement, 

which disappeared a few months later. 86 

The reasons for the French and Italian Communists’ attitude towards the WEU 

must be traced back to Soviet foreign policy, rather than being restricted to the 

national political context. As has been shown, the new leadership in Moscow had 

82. Giorgio Galli has already examined how the PCI used the Montesi affair to discredit the Christian 

Democrats, thus the relevance given to the case must be contextualised as part of the Italian internal 

political debate. G. GALLI, op.cit., pp.121-123. 

83. FIG-APCI, MF 116, Verbali della Direzione, Riunione del 29 dicembre 1954, “Giudizio sulla situazione 

internazionale e azione del partito contro la ratifica dell’UEO”. 

84. FIG-APCI, MF 194, Verbali della Segreteria del 10 May 1955, “Piano di lavoro della sezione esteri, 

23 marzo 1955”. 

85. L. BRUNORI, op.cit., p.331. 

86. D. DESANTI, op.cit.


understood that it was vital to keep the Western Allies divided on the issue of 

German rearmament and that in order to do so it was imperative to show a clear 

commitment to peaceful international co-operation. For this reason, Moscow had 

announced the Pan-European Pact and the national Communist parties had not 

rejected the integration process per se but had proposed the creation of a larger and 

neutral Europe. The problem of Germany might also have influenced Moscow’s 

position. As Aron has pointed out, in 1954 the division of Germany seemed likely 

to be long term and possibly permanent. Thus, the rearmament of West Germany 

under the WEU would have indirectly implied official recognition of East 

Germany. Instead of offering something new, the WEU stabilised the European 

post-war settlement and recognised Soviet control over the Eastern zone. 87 

However, although Aron’s opinions are worthy of consideration, it should not be 

forgotten that the Western European Union created neither unified high commands 

nor integrated headquarters; it was a traditional military alliance and allowed its 

members to follow independent foreign policies, albeit within a common 

framework. In the Cold War context, a divided Europe was more likely to appeal to 

Moscow than a militarily united one under the NATO umbrella. As Nenni 

confirmed: “The Paris Agreements are far less threatening for us than the EDC, 

except for the everlasting problem of German rearmament”. 88 Therefore, while the 

USSR had good reasons to criticise the foundation of a new military alliance, it was 

quite plausible for Moscow to regard the WEU as likely to be far less threatening 

than the EDC would have been. 

87. R. ARON, op.cit., p.202. 

88. P. NENNI, Tempo di guerra fredda …, op.cit., p.636.

32 

Linda RISSO


Italian and French communism and the question of Europe, 

1956-1973 

Maud BRACKE 

The decade of the “long 1960s” was crucial in shaping and changing the attitudes 

of the Italian and French Left with regard to European integration. This article 

deals with the positions taken by the Italian and to a lesser extent the French 

communist party (Partito comunista italiano, PCI, and Parti communiste français, 

PCF) vis-à-vis the EEC and the idea of a unified Europe. A striking contrast 

distinguishes the two cases in this regard. The two parties had since the start of the 

Cold War taken on strongly negative positions vis-à-vis the EEC and its 

institutions, on the basis largely of the Soviet analysis of and Soviet propaganda on 

the nature of European integration. In this analysis, the EEC was understood as a 

product of the Cold War and of American dominance over Western Europe, 

intended to provide the economic and political framework for the re-armament of 

West Germany, as well as to undermine the Soviet Union and the communist 

governments in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the anti-EEC stance of PCI and PCF 

was based on a social argument – European integration was seen as an expression 

of the concentration of capital – and, in the case of the PCF especially, an argument 

relating to the loss of national sovereignty. 

During the 1960s the PCI gradually shifted towards a more positive stance on 

the EEC, an evolution hallmarked by the entry of a PCI delegation in the European 

parliament in 1969. By the early 1970s, the party came to see the EEC as a 

potential vehicle for social and political change in Europe. The PCF, by contrast, 

continued throughout the 1960s to oppose any form of West European integration. 

It was only in the early 1970s, in the context of its continued domestic alliance with 

the socialist party, continued problematic relations with the Soviet communist 

party, and under the influence of the PCI, that the French communists came to 

accept, although never welcome, West European integration. The PCF’s gradual 

acceptance of the EEC was always more tactical than it was in the case of the PCI, 

and signified a far less fundamental change in its international outlook and strategy. 

In this article I set out to demonstrate how the two parties’ positions with regard 

to Europe can be understood as resulting from the specific impacts of European 

détente on domestic politics in the two countries. Doing so, I aim to contribute to 

the existing literature, not only by using primary document from the PCI, PCF and 

SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) archives, but also by refining our 

understanding of the impact of 1960s European détente on West European 

communism. 1 The ambivalent impact of European détente on West European 

communism has not sufficiently been understood in the mass of literature on 

Eurocommunism in the 1960s-1970s. Much of this literature has in an 

unproblematic way assumed the positive impact of détente on West European 

33

34 

Maud BRACKE 

communism and specifically the PCI, and has, accordingly, failed to note the 

contradictions in the PCI’s views on Europe and détente in this period. 2 

The only recent, archive-based monograph on the PCI and the question of 

Europe in the 1960s, L’Europa degli altri by Mauro Maggiorani, usefully 

emphasises the centrality of détente, as well as offering the first comprehensive 

account of the PCI’s shifting positions. 3 However, when the PCI case is not 

compared to another one such as the PCF, the specificity of the Italian situation, 

both in terms of the domestic political situation and in terms of the country’s 

position in the Cold War, cannot come out clearly. It will become clear here 

through the comparison that the parting of the PCI’s and PCF’s European ways in 

the 1960s reflects more than anything else the different positions held by Italy and 

France in European and global Cold War politics, as well as the ambivalent impacts 

of détente on domestic politics in Western Europe. 

Détente in Europe and Italy 

There was in the early 1960s a remarkable symmetry between the rise of détente on 

the global and European level, and developments in Italian domestic politics which 

allowed the PCI to partially escape its political isolation of the 1950s. It is this set 

of circumstances that convinced a generation of PCI leaders that European 

integration had the potential of providing a context for the kind of European 

détente which would allow for the PCI’s move towards governmental power. In this 

perspective, European integration and European détente would create the 

circumstances in which Italy and other West European states would become more 

1. I have used the following archive collections: Archivio del PCI (APCI), Istituto Gramsci, Rome; 

Funds: Direzione (full minutes of the meetings of the Direzione), Comitato centrale (“CC”, full 

minutes of the Central Committee meetings), and Fondo Berlinguer, which includes the personal 

papers of Enrico Berlinguer (study documents, reports of meetings, correspondance); Archives 

Parti communiste francais (APCF), Paris; collection accessible at the time of my consultation in 

2001/02 (but meanwhile closed): Bureau politique (“BP”, agendas and conclusions of the meetings), 

Comité central (“CC”, agendas and conclusions of the meetings), Secrétariat (agendas and 

conclusions of the meetings), Fonds Waldeck Rochet – Provenance Secrétariat Marchais (personal 

papers, transferred to Marchais’ office after 1968, including some reports of meetings and conferences, 

preparations of letters and speeches, correspondences); Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten 

(MfAA), Berlin: Politisches Archiv; Zentrales Parteiarchiv SED (ZPA-SED), 

Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), 

Berlin: Buro W. Ulbricht, Buro H. Axen. 

2. See for example H. TIMMERMANN, Democratic socialists, Eurocommunists and the West, in: 

W. GRIFFITH (ed.), The European Left: Italy, France and Spain, Lexington Books, Lexington, 

1979. A still very valuable attempt at developing a more sophisticated view on détente and Eurocommunism 

is presented in the various contributions to R. TOKES (ed.), Eurocommunism and 

détente, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1978, which, however, are not based on unpublished primary 

sources. 

3. M. MAGGIORANI, L’Europa degli altri. Comunisti italiani e integrazione europea 1957-1969. 

Carocci, Rome, 1998.

Italien and French communism and the question of Europe, 1956-1973 35 

autonomous from the United States, a process through which, ultimately, the Cold 

War division of the continent would be “overcome” and West European countries 

would be free to choose socialism. 

The Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 led to the first 

onset of détente between the superpowers. In Europe, these crises on the short term 

gave way to the establishment of what Marc Trachtenberg has referred to as the 

European political Cold War system. 4 The system was based on respect for the 

status quo (including the so-called territorial status quo, the 1945 frontiers, as well 

as the informal superpower division of spheres of influence), West Germany’s 

non-access to nuclear weapons, and continued intense US presence in the country. 

In Western Europe, there was in the early 1960s a shift in public opinion with 

regard to Cold War matters: as superpower acceptance of the status quo in Europe 

had become evident, public opinion started to feel less directly threatened by the 

Soviet Union. 5 This led to a crisis in anti-communist politics which had served as a 

source of legitimation and public support for governments since the start of the 

Cold War in countries like Italy. It was in this sense that that early superpower 

détente, while stabilising relations between the superpowers, acutely destabilised 

relations within the blocks as well as the social and political order within states, 

based since 1948 on the Cold War consensus. 6 Within NATO, the major challenge 

came from French president Charles de Gaulle’s policy of rapprochement to the 

East European and Soviet regimes. Also early Ostpolitik between 1966 and 1968, 

although in a less acute way, destabilised the balance of power within the Western 

alliance. This coincided with a severe crisis of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, 

provoked notably by Nicolae Ceaucescu in Romania, and relating to a number of 

disagreements over military and strategy and nuclear proliferation as well as 

economic integration. 7 

The crisis of the Cold War consensus and the de-legitimation of anti-communist 

politics were translated in the Italian political context into a crisis in the 

Democrazia cristiana (DC), the dominant government party since 1948. Having 

lost its majority in 1953, around 1960 the DC found it increasingly difficult to build 

a coalition government without the socialist party PSI (Partito socialista italiano). 

The PSI became not only unavoidable, it also became acceptable as a government 

partner, especially given its break with its earlier neutralism in the Cold War and its 

distancing from the Soviet Union and the PCI starting in 1956. Despite strong 

opposition within the DC against a coalition with the socialists, Aldo Moro’s 

4. M. TRACHTENBERG, A constructed peace. The making of the European settlement, 1945-1963, 

Princeton UP, Princeton, 1999. 

5. A similar point in E. CONZE, “Cold War crises and Public Opinion”. West European public opinion 

and the Berlin Wall”, in: W. LOTH (ed.), Europe, Cold War and Coexistence 1955-1965, 

Frank Cass, London, 2004, pp.90-91. 

6. J. SURI, Power and Protest. Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente, Harvard University Press, 

Harvard, 2003, pp.41-43. 

7. H. CARRERE D’ENCAUSSE, Le grand frère. L’Union soviétique et l’Europe soviétique, Fayard, 

Paris, 1983, chapter 4.

36 

Maud BRACKE 

strategy of “opening to the Left” became dominant in the DC in the early 1960s. In 

1963, the PSI entered into the first Moro government, and centre-left coalitions 

were to govern Italy up to 1969. 8 

It was early détente that made the “opening to the Left” possible, in that it took 

away the main ideological argument against socialist government participation. 9 

Also in terms of its policy contents, the centre-left’s reformist strategy was 

quintessentially one of 1960s détente, and its contradictions can be seen as 

reflecting the ambivalent nature of 1960s détente. The contradictions of the 

centro-sinistra were to do on one level with its anti-communist nature, and the 

question whether the centre-left was aimed at isolating the PCI. Another 

contradiction was to do with the fact that the centro-sinistra was based on a shaky 

coalition between, on the one hand, those in the PSI and on the left of the DC who 

aimed at profound economic and social reform as well as a reconfiguration of the 

political landscape and, on the other hand, the majority in the DC which aimed at 

preventing fundamental social and economic reform and wished to maintain the 

DC’s political supremacy. Such avoidance of structural social and economic reform 

was indeed possible between 1963 and 1966, through the – extensive rather than 

intensive – economic growth created by Italy’s “economic miracle”. 10 The coming 

of the centre-left, thus, presented the PCI with a contradictory challenge, not unlike 

the challenge posed to it by European détente. This is why the issue of the 

centre-left and how to respond to it provoked intense debate in the PCI, notably 

between the so-called right, headed by Giorgio Amendola and Giorgio Napolitano, 

who were in favour of a classic communist-socialist rapprochement as a way to 

avoid PCI isolation, and the so-called left, headed by Pietro Ingrao, who started to 

think in terms of a social rather than a political alliance aimed at shaking up Italy’s 

party system. 11 

8. On the coming of the centre-left government see: P.L. BALLINI, S. GUERRIERI, A. VARSORI 

(eds.), Le istituzioni repubblicane dal centrismo al centro-sinistra 1953-1968, Carocci, Rome, 

2006; S. COLARIZI, Storia politica della repubblica 1943-2006, Laterza, Rome-Bari, 2007, chapter 

3; R. GUALTIERI, L’Italia dal 1943 al 1992. PCI e DC nella storia della Repubblica, Carocci, 

Rome, 2006, pp.143-151. 

9. R. GUALTIERI, op.cit., pp.145-146. In addition, the centro-sinistra had crucially become possible 

because in 1963 the Kennedy administration turned to support it. One reason for this was the expectation 

that the PSI in government would oppose an Italian nuclear programme. L. NUTI, Gli 

Stati uniti e l’apertura a sinistra. Importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia, Laterza, 

Rome-Bari, 1999, pp.500-517. 

10. R. GUALTIERI, op.cit., pp.153-154. 

11. On the centro-sinistra debate in the PCI see P. GINSBORG, Storia d’Italia dal dopoguerra a oggi. 

Societá politica 1943-1988, Einaudi, Turin, 1989, pp.397-398.


The PCI’s détente, the PCI’s Europe 

An important strand of opinion in the PCI leadership, mostly of the right 

current, started to emphasise the potential benefits of European détente to the PCI 

and its domestic strategy and political position. Already in 1962, the PCI had 

devoted much of its 10 th national congress to issues of peaceful coexistence and 

European détente. 12 The choice to place peaceful coexistence at the centre of 

attention was still a sign of obedience to the Soviet Union, motivated by the need to 

demonstrate support to Moscow in its dispute with Maoist China over peaceful 

coexistence. Yet, if strictly speaking the 1962 Congress texts did not depart from 

the Soviet line, the points that were emphasised gave proof of a growing awareness 

of the PCI’s own, specific interests in peaceful coexistence and détente, grounded 

in its domestic political experience and increasingly disconnected from Soviet 

foreign policy interests. The party’s view on peaceful coexistence and détente was 

one in which improved East-West relations would be accompanied by the 

loosening of cohesiveness and hierarchies within the two blocks. This was evident 

from the emphasised call for the “withdrawal of all foreign bases across the 

European continent”. 13 Such a statement was in contradiction with Washington’s 

détente policies but it also went counter to Soviet interests in détente. Also the 

party’s new insistence here on “the positive view on the role played by non-aligned 

states such as Yugoslavia” illustrated its own particular view on what détente in 

Europe should be: a way to break through the division of the continent and end 

superpower domination over it. 

There was a close and crucial connection between the PCI’s emerging European 

strategy, and the development of its ideas on détente and peaceful coexistence. 14 

While the thesis of the EEC in its origins being a product of the Cold War was 

maintained, the belief grew that Europe had qualitatively changed, and that a “third 

force” Europe, increasingly autonomous from the United States, could be turned 

into an instrument of détente as well as domestic social and political change. 

Europe, in its continental scope, would be able to contribute to “the overcoming of 

the blocks” globally. A strategy similar to the party’s domestic “long march 

through the institutions” was to be developed on the EEC level: a broad 

mobilisation behind, in a first instance, “general-democratic and anti-monopolistic 

objectives”. This meant combating the influence of monopoly capitalism and 

democratising the EEC’s institutions. 15 

12. The resolutions of the 10 th national congress: COMITATO CENTRALE DEL PCI, Documenti politici 

dal X al XI Congresso, Editori riuniti, Rome, 1963, pp.122-156. 

13. D. SASSOON, The Strategy of the Italian Communist Party. From the Resistance to the Historic 

Compromise, Pinter, London, 1981, pp.209-211 (emphasis added – MB). 

14. For a similar view see M. MAGGIORANI, op.cit., passim. 

15. The theme of democratisation was linked to the question of the PCI’s inclusion in the Italian delegation 

to the Strasbourg parliament, and the PCI leaders were to some extent supported by the PSI. 

M. MAGGIORANI, op.cit., pp.232-239.

38 

Maud BRACKE 

Within the party leadership a number of individuals developed revised 

interpretations on the political significance of European integration, and more 

optimistic views on the potential for social change in (Western) Europe. Important 

here were especially Amendola and Napolitano. They were influenced by two 

organisations linked to the PCI: the left-wing trade union Confederazione generale 

italiana del lavoro (CGIL), and the research centre Istituto Gramsci. At the 

(Soviet-dominated) World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) meetings of 1961 

in Moscow and 1962 in Budapest, the CGIL defended its new, more positive 

positions regarding Europe, arguing that the EEC had become an “objective 

necessity”, which could lead to the improvement of the living conditions of the 

Italian workers. The Gramsci Institute convened in 1965 an international 

conference on “Tendencies of European capitalism”, which marked a 

break-through in terms of economic analysis of the EEC. CGIL leader Bruno 

Trentin argued that European economic integration had led to an increase of the 

real wages of Italian workers; an affirmation which clearly went counter to the 

heavily biased opinions expressed on this occasion by the Soviet delegation. In 

1965 the CGIL established with the French communist trade union CGT a 

permanent “liaison office” in Brussels, and in 1969 it sent a representation to the 

EEC’s Social and Economic Committee. Influenced by the discussions in the CGIL 

and the Istituto Gramsci, the PCI in March 1966 established a “Study Centre for 

Economic Policy” (CESPE), which equally developed more positive analyses of 

European economic developments. 16 

This “Europeanism” of part of the PCI leadership was, and would always 

remain, linked to their focus on a parliamentary strategy, based on domestic and 

international alliances with social-democratic and socialist parties. 17 The 

pro-European position would indeed on the longer term prove to be part and parcel 

of the social-democratisation of the party. The deep contradictions inherent in this 

line, notably the party's, and specifically Amendola's continued adherence to and 

limited criticism of the Soviet-dominated communist world, were not debated in 

any fundamental way until the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. 

It was in the context of the crisis of the EEC in 1963-1965 that majority opinion 

within the PCI leadership shifted in favour of European integration. The crisis of 

the EEC and the Gaullist challenge were seen as proof of the collapse of the 

Atlanticist consensus and the erosion of American hegemony in the Western world. 

The PCI was particularly attracted to the Gaullist concepts of Europe “from the 

Atlantic to the Urals” and l’Europe des Patries, with the potential of countering 

16. Ibid., pp.251-252. 

17. See in particular Napolitano’s memoirs, which present a longer-term interpretation of the PCI's development 

towards a social-democratic party, and the importance in this regard of its European 

contacts (with, for example, the German SPD and the French socialists). G. NAPOLITANO, Dal 

PCI al socialismo europeo. Un'autobiografia politica, Laterza, Rome-Bari, 2005. A similar interpretation 

is presented in the memoirs by Luciano Barca: L. BARCA, Cronache dall'interno del 

vertice del Pci, vol.1-3, Rubbettino, Catenzaro, 2005.


superpower dominance. 18 The PCI in 1963 supported de Gaulle’s veto against UK 

entry into the EEC for reasons of fear of increasing US influence. It welcomed his 

verbal assault on the Bretton Woods system in 1965 as a sign of the deepening 

inner contradictions of capitalism. Further, it interpreted de Gaulle’s withdrawal of 

French troops from NATO’s integrated military command in the following year as 

closely connected to this vision of a new, strong Europe “between the blocks”. 19 

The PCI perceived the défi francais as not just a French matter, but as the most 

radical expression of the crisis of the Cold War consensus. It was in this sense 

enthusiastic also about by the new foreign policy activism displayed by the Italian 

government around 1965-67. The centre-left government showed interest in 

improving its (economic, cultural, political) relations with the communist regimes. 

In 1966 Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko visited Rome and met with 

Foreign minister Amintore Fanfani, and the following year Chairman of the 

Supreme Soviet Nikolai Podgorny did the same. Podgorny’s visit marked the high 

point in this evolution, as the two Foreign ministers signed a document calling for 

the need for a European conference on security. Fanfani increasingly put emphasis 

on the issue of pan-European co-operation and security. 20 Party leader Luigi Longo 

saw Italy now as “a protagonist of a new vision for Europe” and attempted to push 

the centre-left’s foreign policy even further Eastward. 21 

At the 1966 national Congress held in Rome, the party’s new European policy 

was laid out in the following way: (1) the establishment of a denuclearised zone in 

central Europe, (2) the acceptance of the 1945 frontiers, and thus the acceptance of 

the sovereignty of the GDR, (3) no West German re-armament, and (4) the signing 

of a pact of non-aggression between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. 

PCI texts in this period stressed that integration should not be limited to the “small 

Europe” of the six, but rather should encompass the entire continent. The 

expectation was that European integration could have positive effects on the 

domestic political situations in Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Greece), as well 

as on the East European communist regimes. The strong sense of the 

interdependence of Eastern and Western Europe was probably the most innovative 

and significant element of the PCI’s new views on Europe and gave proof of the 

fact that a supranational political vision came to be widespread in Italian politics. 

Yet it was at the same time in its approach to Eastern Europe that the 

contradictions of the PCI’s new vision on Europe were most pronounced. The 

“overcoming of the blocks” in theory implied the undermining of Soviet 

dominance over the Eastern part of the continent. The PCI did, around the 

mid-1960s, advocate the autonomy of the communist parties in the East. However, 

18. This in contrast to the PSI, which critiqued the PCI’s blunt ideological agnosticism in its support 

for the conservative French president. M. MAGGIORANI, op.cit., p.211. 

19. More detail on the French challenge to the EEC and NATO in 1963-1965 in N.P. LUDLOW, The 

European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negotiating the Gaullist challenge, Routledge, 

London, 2006. 

20. M. MAGGIORANI, op.cit., p.248. 

21. Ibid., p.244.

40 

Maud BRACKE 

it never went as far as to unambiguously argue for the end of Soviet domination in 

Eastern Europe and much remained unclear on this point. 22 It was furthermore 

never specified how this Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals” would relate to the 

Soviet Union – which gave the PCI’s European vision the same limitations as the 

Gaullist one. Ironically, it were those in the leadership, like Amendola, who put 

forward this vision of Europe which left the Soviet question unanswered for, who 

were at the same time most in favour of maintaining friendly relations with the 

Soviet Union, as was to become clear during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. 

Moscow’s own positions on the EEC in the mid-1960s were ambivalent. Some 

in the Kremlin abandoned the harsh anti-EEC positions of the 1950s and took on an 

“instrumentalist” position with regard to Europe, arguing on the one hand that the 

crisis of both the EEC and NATO allowed for demilitarisation, and on the other 

hand that this new Europe was not inherently expansionist like the Atlantic alliance 

in the 1950s had been. Others, however, including probably Leonid Brezhnev, did 

see the EEC as a direct threat to Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and argued for 

increased military spending in this context. A “compromise” in 1966 left the issue 

largely unresolved, although Brezhnev decided that the EEC needed to be met with 

both political overtures and militarism. 23 

Well-aware of the widening gap with the Soviet-dominated communist world 

over the question of Europe, the PCI attempted to have an impact on the 

discussions in the communist world. It did so at the conference of European 

communist parties held at Karlovy Vary (Czechoslovakia) in 1967 and during the 

intense debates preceding it in 1966-1967. The debates at this Conference on 

European strategy were, to communist standards, exceptionally open and 

confrontational. During the pre-Conference debates in the party, discussions were 

focussed, inevitably, on the question of how this new policy would relate to the 

party’s membership of the Soviet-dominated communist world, and how to assess 

the Soviet concept of détente. Criticism by the radical left within the PCI 

leadership on Soviet policies with regard to Europe came to the surface. In reaction 

to the draft resolutions to the Conference, Pietro Ingrao wrote an alternative 

version, in which he strongly advocated the need for European autonomy in the 

East-West conflict, and criticised the way peaceful coexistence was carried out by 

the socialist states. 24 The call for a system of collective security was linked to the 

need for unity of an autonomous Europe in its continental scope, which should 

assume a new role in the global order. In line with Warsaw Pact policies, Ingrao 

emphasized the need for the recognition of the post–World War Two borders and of 

22. Ibid., pp.303-304. 

23. J.M. NEWTON, Russia, France and the Idea of Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003, 

pp.69-77. 

24. It is not clear what the reactions to this report in the wider PCI leadership were; according to Carlo 

Galluzzi, there was no time to propose this alternative version to the Conference, but the amendments 

proposed by the PCI to the resolutions (see above) were based on this text. APCI, “Berlinguer”, 

35.3, Nota per la conferenza sulla sicurezza europea. Commenti Pietro Ingrao sul progetto, 

18.07.1967.


the GDR, but it was stressed that this is not a status quo policy. Criticism on the 

Soviet conception of détente was explicit: “the struggle for peaceful coexistence 

has in recent years not had the necessary development and impulse, also because it 

has been understood by part of our forces [i.e. the Soviet-aligned communist 

world] as a struggle to be carried out essentially by the socialist countries through 

state and economic initiatives”. 25 

French communism and French détente 

The PCF’s objections against the EEC were based on a double argument: a social 

argument (“Europe of capital”) and an argument relating to national sovereignty. 

The issue of French national sovereignty had been a central source of domestic 

political legitimation employed by the PCF. 26 The PCF had since 1945 promoted 

itself as the liberator of the French people – a term here understood in its double 

meaning, national and social. 27 It had been able to do so in the context of the early 

Cold War in spite of the evident fact that the party itself was highly dependant on 

the Soviet Union, because until de Gaulle’s return to power in 1958 it was able to 

present itself as the sole political party in France fighting against US domination. 

Because the question of sovereignty was so central in the party’s identity structure, 

it was extremely difficult for the party to not see the EEC as a (US-sponsored) 

vehicle for the undermining of the French nation. 

By contrast, to the PCI and to the Italian Left more generally the issue of 

national sovereignty became less significant as of the 1960s. This was to do with 

the Left’s reactions to the Cold War and international developments more generally. 

While the matter of national sovereignty was an important one to the Italian Left in 

the immediate aftermath of the war because it was related to the liberation from 

Fascism, it bore much less significance as of the 1960s. By then, the Italian Left 

had come to understand that Italy was not a major actor in international affairs and 

that its domestic politics had since 1945 been greatly dependant on global Cold 

War developments. Acknowledging this was politically useful to the Italian Left, as 

it helped to explain its exclusion from power. In addition, the PCI in the 1960s and 

1970s took a rapidly growing interest in developments outside Europe: the “Third 

World”, anti-imperialism, decolonisation. The party started to develop a broader 

line of thought on imperialism, and on the structural dependency on the United 

25. APCI, “Berlinguer”, 35.3, Nota per la conferenza sulla sicurezza europea. Commenti Pietro Ingrao 

sul progetto, 18.07.1967 (my translation - MB). 

26. For the use of the concept of sources of legitimation here I refer to De Felice’s work on the PCI 

after World War Two. F. DE FELICE, Doppia lealtá e doppio stato, in: Studi storici, 3(1998), 

pp.493-563. For my application of this notion to the PCF and its view on sovereignty, see M 

BRACKE, Which socialism, Whose détente? West European Communism and the Czechoslovak 

crisis of 1968. CEU Press, Budapest, New York, 2007, pp.21-25. 

27. A similar view in M. LAZAR, Le communisme, une passion française. Perrin, Paris, 2005(2 nd ed.), 

pp.74-77.

42 

Maud BRACKE 

States of not only Third World countries but also countries like Italy. Sovereignty, 

in this world-view, was not an important political idea because it was not 

considered a realistic one. 

Next to the matter of sovereignty, the PCF’s greater reluctance in accepting 

European integration resulted from the fact that European détente impacted very 

differently on French domestic politics than it did in Italy. European détente in the 

mid-1960s, and Gaullist détente specifically, challenged the PCF on the most 

fundamental level, in terms of its domestic sources of legitimation, its political 

identity, and its actual domestic strategy. The PCF’s objections against any form of 

détente or peaceful coexistence can be traced back to 1956, when the PCF 

leadership expressed strong initial disagreement with the Soviet policy of peaceful 

coexistence with the West. 28 One indication of the fact that the Thorez leadership 

was particularly weary of peaceful coexistence was the fact that Pierre Hervé, party 

journalist, former resistance member and private secretary to Jacques Duclos, was 

expelled from the party for pointing at the un-revolutionary implications of 

peaceful coexistence. Hervé had developed an argument on the tension between 

peaceful coexistence and revolution. It was precisely because Hervé identified the 

essence of the problem that peaceful coexistence posed to the “orthodox” view on 

the global class struggle, that his views needed to be tabooed. 29 

While there never was a public debate on this tricky matter, the question 

whether peaceful coexistence could be beneficial to revolution in the West was a 

central one in the discussions of the Bureau politique between 1956 and 1961. 30 A 

majority in the PCF leadership had a basic, almost intuitive sense of the 

un-revolutionary character of peaceful coexistence. The issue went to the heart of 

the strategic gap between the Soviet and French communists with regard to the 

Cold War after 1956: to the SU, the Cold War was to be ended because it damaged 

the communist regimes and hindered the expansion of socialism, especially to the 

Third world. To the PCF – and other communists in the West – ending the Cold War 

was primarily about ending American dominance in the West. The PCF officially 

accepted Moscow’s new line on relations with the West, but purely as a matter of 

discipline - never out of conviction. Its vision on global politics was always to 

remain an essentially bipolar one, which equated the global class struggle with 

Cold War antagonism. 

The question of détente became a particularly urgent one to the PCF when 

around 1965 it felt the actual negative implications of Gaullist détente on its 

domestic strategies as well as its international alliances. De Gaulle’s vision of 

European integration and of “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals” defined the 

terms of the debate on Europe in France in the 1960s. It focused the debate on two 

questions: American domination over Western Europe and national sovereignty. On 

28. F. FEJTO, The French communist party and the Crisis of International Communism, MIT Press, 

Cambridge, Mass., London, 1967, pp.54-69. 

29. F. FEJTO, op.cit., pp. 44-45. 

30. F. HINCKER, Le Parti communiste au carrefour. Essai sur 15 ans de son histoire 1965-1981, Albin 

Michel, Paris, 1982, p.51.


both issues, de Gaulle succeeded in outbidding the PCF. By obtaining friendly 

relations with the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the USSR, and by 

forcefully re-asserting national sovereignty vis-à-vis the Western alliance, de 

Gaulle was able to undermine the PCF’s main sources of domestic legitimation. In 

addition, the increasingly friendly relations between Brezhnev and de Gaulle made 

it clear to the PCF leadership that a fundamental divergence of strategic interests on 

the European continent had occurred between the CPSU leadership and 

themselves. This happened on occasion of the French presidential elections of 

1965, when the Soviets openly preferred de Gaulle to the Left alliance between the 

PCF and the newly founded Fédération de la gauche démocratique et socialiste 

(FGDS). The two parties engaged in an electoral alliance that was based not yet on 

a common programme but on a joint candidate for the second round of the 

presidential elections, the socialist François Mitterrand. The latter was considered 

in Moscow (and by many in the PCF) as pro-Atlantic, and did indeed stand for a 

foreign policy of close relations with the Atlantic world and the United States. 

Despite the fact that the Union de la gauche lacked broad support from the 

apparatuses of either party, it obtained a surprising success at the 1965 presidential 

elections. 31 In the midst of the election campaign, Moscow intervened in a manner 

that was explicitly aimed at undermining the Left alliance. The Pravda published a 

series of articles in support of de Gaulle’s European and détente policy, in 

meaningful omission of any reference to the Union de la gauche. Equally 

significantly, the PCF leadership responded in L'Humanité by referring to “the 

interpretation of domestic French problems by a foreign agency”. 32 The harshness 

of reactions both in Paris and Moscow demonstrates that what was at stake was 

nothing less than the question of a revolutionary strategy in Europe. 

Moscow’s strategic interests in Europe went totally counter to those of the 

FGDS, and this placed the PCF in an impossible position. In other East European 

capitals, however, there was more interest in discussing matters of European 

détente with the socialist-communist alliance in France. Notably the Czechoslovak 

communist party (CPCS) engaged around 1966 in talks with both the French 

socialists and communists on a “European” solution for Germany, that is to say, a 

process of improving FRG-GDR relations, initiated and supervised by the 

European powers, with the aim of evacuating Bonn from US influence. Even the 

Moscow-loyal East German communist party SED demonstrated at this stage a 

careful interest in the French Left alliance and, specifically, its views on the 

German question. Following a number of meetings in 1966-67 between the SED 

31. Mitterrand lost to de Gaulle in the second round, but only just, obtaining 45%. More details on the 

coming of the Union de la gauche in J. VIGREUX, Waldeck Rochet, une biographie politique, La 

Dispute, Paris, 2000, pp.234-236; J. KERGOAT, Histoire du Parti socialiste, La Découverte/ 

Repères, Paris, 1997, pp.144-151. 

32. F. FEJTO, op.cit., p.200 (emphasis added – MB). The gravity of the PCF-CPSU fall-out, although 

it unravelled largely behind the scenes, is evident from the fact, very unusual in the PCF’s history, 

that its political bureau discussed the possibility of protesting against Moscow’s intervention in a 

more direct manner (although it was rejected at this point). Agenda of the BP meeting of APCF, 

Waldeck Rochet, box 9, file 2.

44 

Maud BRACKE 

and the FGDS, an SED report noted positively that Mitterrand was “personally in 

favour” of French diplomatic recognition of the GDR (although this was not his 

party’s official position). 33 These talks were kept secret and therefore had little 

direct impact. Nonetheless, the fact that they were held does show how the question 

of European détente provoked cracks in the both the American- and 

Soviet-dominated alliances and created possibilities for new alliances across the 

Iron Curtain. 

It was only this grave conflict of interests with Moscow that lead the PCF 

around 1965 to seek alternative alliances in Europe – although this was done 

carefully and within limits. It was a constant characteristic of the PCF’s 

international politics that it only engaged in alternative international alliances when 

its relations with the Soviet communist party were under severe pressure. To a 

significant extent, its more positive perspective on Europe and its rapprochement to 

the PCI were no more than tactical tools in its stand-off with Moscow over 

Gaullism and détente. Nonetheless, the PCF did start to revise its positions on the 

EEC, hereby pressurised by both the FGDS and the PCI. In the mid-1960s relations 

between the two largest West European communist parties improved significantly, 

and the PCI leadership succeeded in influencing its French counterpart on a 

number of issues. A series of meetings took place between the PCI and PCF 

leadership between 1965 and 1967, some of which took place in the context of the 

West European “pressure group” that was forming itself in the communist world. 

The PCI had since 1956 actively sought to establish such a grouping of Western 

communist parties, as an expression of what it referred to as Polycentrism in the 

communist world. The aim was double: on the one hand, creating autonomy 

vis-à-vis Moscow and having, as a group, some impact on discussions in the wider 

communist world, and on the other hand, providing a forum for the discussion of 

issues relevant specifically to the West European context and developing practical 

ways to cooperate. 34 

Despite the PCF’s strong initial objections to any type of Polycentrism, the PCI 

succeeded by 1965 in establishing an informal network of West European 

communist leaders. The West European communist “cluster” became around 1965 

important as a forum in which new ideas on a European strategy for socialism 

emerged. From discussions on practical co-operation on a European level, the 

debate shifted to a more substantive one on European integration and the crisis in 

the EEC. This included discussions of socialist strategy in “late capitalism”, 

reflections on socialism and democracy, broader left alliances, issues of European 

security, the Cold War and détente, and European integration. At the 1965 Geneva 

meeting between the two new party leaders Luigi Longo and Waldeck Rochet, the 

former spoke clearly about prioritising a debate on a “system of collective 

European security”. 35 The conference of West European communist parties held in 

33. MfAA, B24, Bd 606, Die FGDS and die Deutschlandfrage. For more details on these talks, see K. 

BARTOSEK, Les aveux des archives. Prague-Paris-Prague, 1948-1968, Le Seuil, Paris, 1996, 

pp.177-180. 

34. On Polycentrism see D. SASSOON, op.cit., pp.98-109.


Brussels in the same year committed to favouring the dissolution of both the 

Warsaw pact and NATO. One year later, the meeting of Warsaw pact countries in 

Bucharest adopted the same statement. At the Vienna meeting of 1966 the PCI 

leadership convinced Rochet, at least in theory, to agreeing to adopt the strategy of 

“struggle from within” strategy with regard to the EEC. 36 

Nonetheless, the delegations discovered that many disagreements existed on 

important matters of domestic programme, European and global strategy, and the 

organisation of the world communist movement. The Italians failed to gather 

support for a joint statement on the EEC and European integration. 37 The West 

European communist grouping was based on a PCI-PCF alliance that was weak 

because of the two parties’ very different perspectives on the domestic and 

European struggles for socialism and how détente related to this. These two major 

shortcomings that characterised the West European communist cluster, were also 

characteristic of Eurocommunism in the 1970. In this sense, the episode discussed 

here prefigures Eurocommunism but highlights its limits rather than its strengths. 38 

The Karlovy Vary Conference mentioned above brought to the fore the 

fundamental disagreements that existed between the PCI and PCF – and the 

disparate effects that European détente was having on the Left in Europe. On the 

German question, the central and most contentious issue on the agenda, cleavages 

were complex and, significantly, cut across the East-West division. While Brezhnev 

in his speech suggested the possibility of a positive response to Ostpolitik, the 

delegations of East Germany and Poland fiercely rejected this. Among the Western 

parties, the PCI strongly argued in favour of a positive response to Bonn, which 

would go beyond rhetoric and would consist of actual co-operation. Other parties 

such as the PCE and the KPÖ advocated a positive response to Bonn. The PCF, by 

contrast, remained wary of any positive re-evaluation of West German politics. 39 

The impossibility for West European communists to agree upon détente, Gaullism 

and Ostpolitik was at the essence of the impossibility to bring about a truly 

effective West European communist pressure group within the communist world. 

35. APCF, “Waldeck Rochet”, box 27, folder 4, Notes CC d’avril: points de désaccord avec Longo, 

(probably Waldeck Rochet), early 1966. It was noted here that there were “positive and negative 

aspects” to the PCI’s policies. With regard to foreign policy “they [the Italian communists – MB] 

pose fewer questions [than we do – MB] on NATO and other difficult matters”. 

36. According to what PCF BP member J. Denis told SED leader H. Axen in January 1967. SAPMDB, 

ZPA-SED, DY/30/IV A 2/20, 457, Vermerk über ein Gesprach des Gen. Hermann Axen mit Gen. 

Jacques Denis am 30.Januar 1967, p.3. 

37. H. TIMMERMAN, Moskau und die Westkommunisten: von Breshnew zu Gorbatschow, in: 

Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 3(1989). 

38. Some of the literature on Eurocommunism has over-estimated the autonomous character of the 

West European communist cluster in the world communist movement in this phase. (For example 

K. DEVLIN, The Role of the Non-ruling Communist Parties in Transforming Internationalism, in: 

L.L. WHETTEN (ed.), The Present State of Communist Internationalism, Lexington, 1983, 

pp.21-74). 

39. APCF, BP, 06.04.1967.

46 

Maud BRACKE 

1968-73: European détente controlled 

The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 demonstrated that what 

the PCI understood by “dynamic détente” or “détente from below”, that is to say 

the improvement of East-West relations through the loosening of block 

cohesiveness and the limiting of superpower supremacy, was an illusion. The 

outcome of the Czechoslovak crisis made it clear that détente would be 

superpower-led and based on the consolidation of the spheres of influence on the 

European continent, rather than that it would undermine these. This was the only 

realistic conclusion that could be drawn from the combined facts of, first, the 

Soviet need to re-assert control over its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe after 

a period of challenges to its supremacy, and second, Washington’s and NATO’s 

unwillingness to consider the invasion as anything different from an internal 

Warsaw Pact affair. 40 

The year 1969 marked the start of the era of “controlled détente”, in which the 

superpowers and their European allies aimed at securing and consolidating the 

benefits of détente in terms of the further stabilisation of the European Cold War 

system and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, whilst avoiding this process 

to lead to the questioning of Cold War alliances or further destabilisation within the 

blocks. 41 This meant putting an end to the instability that early détente had 

provoked in Europe: challenges to the superpowers’ supremacy by their allies, and 

the questioning of the legitimacy of Cold War ideology and politics in public 

opinion. The changed meaning of détente involved, firstly, the end of Gaullism. De 

Gaulle’s replacement as president of the French Republic by Georges Pompidou in 

1969 signified the end of the urgent challenge to US hegemony in the Western 

alliance. Although the Pompidou presidency aimed at preserving aspects of the 

spirit of Gaullist détente and continued to strive towards a unified and politically 

strong Europe to counterbalance the US, the threat that Gaullist has posed to the 

US and its role on the old continent had vanished. Despite diplomatic friction 

between France and the US around 1973, France continued to move towards a 

more pro-Atlanticist outlook under the subsequent Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 

presidency. Pan-European détente now included the US – even in French eyes. 42 

Secondly, the consolidation of superpower détente as of 1969 implied a subtle shift 

in the political meaning of West German Ostpolitik. After 1968, Ostpolitik was 

carried out by the Willy Brandt government in consultation with the US, and the 

latter in turn no longer felt it interfered negatively with its own designs for dealing 

with the Soviet Union and the communist world. 43 

40. On NATO country responses: J. MCGINN, The Politics of Collective Inaction: NATO’s response 

to the Prague Spring, in: Journal of Cold War Studies, 1.3(1999), pp.119-127. 

41. See J. SURI, op.cit., for a similar argument on post-1968 détente as a superpower strategy to limit 

the destabilising effects of early détente on intra-block relations and within societies. R. GUAL- 

TIERI, op.cit., pp.165-166, has analysed post-1968 European détente as part the US’ “containment 

through dialogue” strategy. 

42. More details in J.M. NEWTON, op.cit., pp.84-88.


This is, however, not to argue that there were no elements whatsoever of change 

“from below” in European détente after 1968. Many have argued that European 

détente continued to feature, up to at least the late 1970s and arguably later, a 

dimension of bottom-up change, involving non-state rather than state actors, which 

helped bringing about the end of the Cold War by undermining block cohesion in 

the East. 44 In Western Europe, however, there were after 1968 no similar signs of 

decreased US influence. Atlantic unity was significantly greater in the years 

following 1969 than it had been in 1962-1968, and it was restored on the basis of 

US re-assertion vis-à-vis its allies. 45 US interference in domestic politics in 

countries like Italy continued to be a reality in the 1970s, although through 

somewhat different means. 46 Tragically, from the perspective of West European 

communism, the crisis of 1968 meant the end of the possibility of radical social and 

political change in Western Europe through détente. 

Similarly, the Soviet vision of détente shifted after 1968. Having forcedly 

re-asserted its domination over Eastern Europe through the invasion of 

Czechoslovakia and the subsequent phase of “normalisation” of the People’s 

Democracies, the Brezhnev leadership felt it could engage with the Western powers 

from a position of relative power. Moscow was fairly successful in the early 1970s 

in combining its strategic priorities: stability on the European continent and access 

to West European economies, socialist cohesiveness under its dominance, and 

controlled political and military détente with the United States. 47 However, 

European integration continued to be potentially problematic to Moscow, in as far 

as it implied an expansionist agenda (vis-à-vis Eastern Europe) and threatened to 

upset on the status quo on the old continent. 48 

The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia caused the PCI, the PCF and most West 

European communist parties to for the first time in their history explicitly 

disassociate themselves from Soviet policies. The PCI and PCF did so, however, on 

the basis of to some extent different arguments, and also the importance of the 

crisis to the parties’ strategies and world-view differed. Most of the PCI leaders 

interpreted the Prague Spring as an example of a democratic form of socialism, 

similar to its vision for socialism in Italy and other Western countries. 

Optimistically, they recognised in the Prague Spring signs of the future of 

socialism on the European continent. They understood it, in terms of socialist 

43. J.W. YOUNG, Cold War Europe 1945-1991, A Political History, Edward Arnold, New York, London, 

1996 (2 nd ed.), p.86. 

44. J.M. HAHNIMAKI, Ironies and turning points: détente in perspective, in: O.A. WESTAD (ed.), 

Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, interpretations, theory, Frank Cass, London, 2000, 

pp.326-433. 

45. As Pons has noted, the perception of US weakness in the 1970s was, while widespread in Europe 

at the time, a false one. S. PONS, Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo, Einaudi, Turin, 2006, p.3. 

46. More details in O. NJOLSTAD, The Carter Administration and Italy: Keeping the Communists out 

of Power without Interfering, in: Journal of Cold War Studies, 4.3(2002), pp.56-94. 

47. J.M. NEWTON, op.cit., pp.82-84. 

48. V. ZUBOK, The Soviet Union and European Integration from Stalin to Gorbachev, in: Journal of 

European Integration History, 2(1996), pp.85-98, here pp.92-93.

48 

Maud BRACKE 

doctrine, as announcing an era of varied and new forms of democratic socialism. In 

terms of international relations, they understood it as the result of dynamic détente: 

the decline of anti-communist politics and American domination in the West, and 

greater autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow in the East. The invasion, then, shattered all 

these hopes. 

The discussions in the PCI’s Direzione in September-October 1968 demonstrate 

that the party leadership was well aware of the implications of the invasion to the 

nature of détente in Europe. Publicly, the centrality of détente in the Czechoslovak 

crisis was acknowledged in the Central Committee statement that was issued a 

week after the invasion. The party leadership here invoked as motives for its 

decision to disagree with the invasion the need to “overcome the blocks” and to 

“liberate Italy from Atlanticism”, as well as the need to create a “system of 

collective security in Europe”. 49 At the first Direzione meeting following the 

invasion, Achille Occhetto made it clear that “the Soviets confuse internationalism 

with block politics”, while Emanuele Macaluso accused the Soviets of seeking 

détente on the basis of block consolidation and stated that “the current strategy is 

objectively working against us”. 50 Yet, it was clear from the outset that the 

understanding regarding the ambiguous character of détente and the Soviets’ 

different interpretation of it, would not affect the party’s aim to work towards a 

bottom-up type of détente, based on a strong integrated Europe. Amendola in 

particular made this clear in the days following the invasion, by leading the debate 

towards focusing on a “dynamic” concept of détente and on the EEC as a means for 

achieving it. In an October 1968 article in Critica marxista, the party’s theoretical 

journal, he defined the struggle for peaceful coexistence in Europe as “a struggle 

against the politics of intervention in military, political and economic terms”. 51 

It was, crucially, Enrico Berlinguer who formulated a response to the invasion 

of Czechoslovakia and related it to the party’s European and détente policies. 

Berlinguer, vice-secretary at the time and to become the new general secretary in 

1972, constructed a new international policy for the party which, while built on 

deep contradictions particularly in relation to détente, did succeed in introducing a 

number of changes while avoiding the party’s falling apart. His aims included 

reinforcing the party’s understanding of and support for European integration as a 

strategy for the overcoming of the blocks and of the Cold War. The goal remained 

dynamic détente, now more explicitly than before defined in contrast to static or 

top-down détente. The party’s engagement in the EEC was significantly reinforced, 

albeit still critical on issues such as democracy in the EEC institutions. 

However, the problem at the heart of Berlinguer’s new line lie in the fact that 

dynamic détente had been compromised by the invasion, to the point that it had 

become an unrealistic perspective. This was wilfully ignored by the leadership, and 

49. CC statement, 29.08.1968, in: COMITATO CENTRALE DEL PCI (ed.), Documenti politici dal 

XI al XII Congresso, Editori riuniti, Rome, 1969. 

50. APCI, Direzione, 020.0926, 23.08.1968. 

51. G. AMENDOLA, 25 anni dopo l’internazionale comunista, i: Critica marxista, 4-5(VI), pp 63-87, 

here p.84.


a debate on it among the rank and file was discouraged. The precise reasons why 

the PCI needed to support the EEC and how European integration would create 

dynamic détente, were after September 1968 not communicated to the rank and 

file. At the Central Committee meeting of May 1969, Napolitano reiterated the 

well-known arguments on both the need and the possibility for the West European 

Left to co-operate and actively work towards a “third way” Europe, independent of 

the United States and having the potential of weakening Atlanticism. 52 These, 

however, had become mere slogans, out of touch with the much cruder realities of 

international politics in the era of static détente. The leadership’s unwillingness to 

debate its European choice in a more fundamental way was sharply evidenced by 

the so-called Manifesto affair in the fall of 1969, when a number of leaders of the 

left within the party were excluded following the publication of an article in the 

Manifesto paper entitled “Prague is alone”. The article strongly denounced the 

Soviets’ static conception of détente and criticised the Berlinguer consensus for its 

unwillingness to draw the necessary conclusions from this regarding the real rather 

than desired nature of European détente. 53 

In 1969 the first PCI delegation, headed by Amendola, entered the European 

parliament. In 1971 Amendola proposed the Eastward enlargement of the EEC. 

Increasingly, and especially from the early 1970s onwards, “Europe” became one 

of the core points of reference of the PCI’s international outlook and strategy, and a 

standard element in its rhetoric and political discourses. The shift towards Europe 

was not only a matter of pragmatism and accepting existing situations, there now 

was also a teleological, and arguably a utopian dimension in the PCI’s European 

policy. By working inside the European institutional framework, the perspective 

was, the PCI would contribute to making Western Europe socialist. Concretely, 

however, the “alternative development of democracy” as a strategy for Europe 

remained vague. At this point only the immediate, “democratic phase” of the 

strategy was more or less clear: it focused on the democratisation of the European 

institutions, for example through the direct election of the European parliament. 54 

Deep tensions existed, and persisted up to the mid-1970s and beyond, between 

the PCI’s pro-European choice and its belonging to the Soviet-dominated 

communist world. After a phase of open conflict with the USSR in the aftermath of 

the 1968 invasion, a gradual improvement of relations between the CPSU and the 

PCI occurred. A new modus vivendi between the two parties came about. To the 

PCI, a break was impossible for reasons to do with the party’s identity, history and 

unity, but also because it was impossible to claim having an internationalist 

strategy without belonging to a global movement, however fraught with 

contradictions. To the Soviets, a break with the PCI was undesirable because the 

party was after all the most powerful CP in the West, increasingly successful 

domestically, and increasingly influential ideologically in the global 

52. APCI, Fund Berlinguer, “Comitato centrale maggio 1969”, Unitá, 29.05.1969. 

53. On the Manifesto affair, see G. AMYOT, The Italian Communist Party. The Crisis of the Popular 

Front Strategy, Croon Helm, London, 1981, chapter 6. 

54. M. MAGGIORANI, op.cit., pp.212-233.

50 

Maud BRACKE 

anti-imperialist movement. Soviet funding to the PCI was resumed in 1970, and so 

were the regular bilateral meetings, although the illusion of unproblematic 

solidarity had forever been lost. 55 

Yet the PCI’s vision of an expanding Europe very clearly went counter to Soviet 

interests; strategically, because it suggested taking Eastern Europe out of the Soviet 

sphere of influence, and ideologically because it suggested the building of a 

different, better socialism for this enlarged Europe. Also Berlinguer’s abandonment 

of the two camp theory, which was linked to its pro-European choice, evidently 

went counter to Soviet interests. 56 Nonetheless, the Berlinguer leadership 

succeeded at this stage in avoiding an open clash with Moscow. At a meeting 

between the CPSU and PCI leaderships in 1973, Berlinguer attempted to make the 

PCI’s European positions acceptable to Moscow, emphasising on the one hand that 

the PCI still advocated a radically different EEC, which implied the need to revise 

the treaties, and on the other hand the fact that the EEC no longer merely served US 

and Atlantic interests. 57 This was not only a matter of avoiding an open clash with 

Moscow, it was also an attempt to influence the positions of the communist world. 

This naive optimism regarding the PCI’s own influence characterised also the 

party’s tactics during the Eurocommunist phase of the mid-1970s. 58 

Berlinguer in the 1970s highlighted the neutralist dimension and the vision of 

Europe “between the blocks” (“A Europe neither anti-American nor 

anti-Soviet”). 59 At this stage, the PCI’s pro-European stance was still an 

anti-Atlantic position. In fact, following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and in the 

context of left-wing criticism at the Berlinguer line in 1969, the party hardened its 

stance on NATO. 60 The slogan “Italy out of NATO, NATO out of Italy” became in 

the early 1970s once more an important one in PCI propaganda, while it had been 

downplayed in the years preceding 1968. 61 However, in the context of improved 

relations between the European powers and the US in the Atlantic alliance after 

1968, there was a clear tension between the party’s pro-EEC and anti-NATO 

stances. This tension, it has been argued, came to be “resolved” between 1973 and 

1976, when the party line gradually moved towards accepting US military and 

political influence in Western Europe and Italy. Berlinguer’s explicit acceptance of 

NATO’s presence in Italy in 1976 was welcomed by mainstream political opinion 

in Italy as the party’s belated recognition of the country’s security interests. 62 This 

55. See a similar argument on the PCI’s inability to break its ties with Moscow over the 1968 crisis, 

see S. PONS, op.cit., pp.8-11, 51-52, 256. 

56. Ibid., p.21. 

57. Ibid., pp.26-30. 

58. See Urban’s comments on the PCI’s “evangelical face”, in J.B. URBAN, The four faces of Eurocommunism, 

in: C.F. ELLIOT, C.A LINDEN (eds.), Marxism in the Contemporary West, Westview 

Press, Boulder, 1980, pp.36-59. 

59. S. PONS, op.cit., p.23. 

60. G. AMYOT, op.cit., p.179. 

61. M. BRACKE, op.cit., pp.279-287. 

62. For a discussion of the connections between Berlinguer's pro-European stance and his acceptance 

of NATO, see: S. PONS, op.cit., pp.257-258.


move was, however, also the party’s final surrendering of any kind of revolutionary 

vision on a Europe capable of upsetting the Cold War order and superpower 

hegemony. Moreover, rather than resolved, the tensions within the party's 

international line were in fact aggravated, as the party still failed to unambiguously 

reject Soviet-style communism. 

In the case of the PCF, the invasion of Czechoslovakia provoked less of a shift 

in international positions than it did in the case of the Italian communists. The PCF 

found itself in an impasse, between lack of Soviet support for détente “from below” 

or even for its domestic strategy of Left unity, and its own inability to move away 

from its internationalist tradition and identity centred around loyalty to what the 

Soviet Union represented historically and symbolically. The PCF leadership’s 

post-1968 self-realignment on Soviet positions was nearly complete. While since 

1956 sentiments regarding the un-revolutionary character of peaceful coexistence 

and détente had been widespread in the party, the official line was now one that 

fully supported the superpower-based vision on European détente, including the 

Soviets’ domination over Eastern Europe. At the Moscow conference in June 1969, 

the French delegation stated: “As long as there will not be a system of collective 

security in place, the socialist states have the duty to reinforce their defence and 

unity”. 63 However, this was not understood in the same way the Soviet leaders 

understood their own security interests in the early 1970s and did not include the 

acceptance of friendly relations between East and West. Significantly, the PCF 

came close to ignoring the Moscow treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the 

Federal Republic of Germany in 1970, thus implying its lack of enthusiasm for the 

new European détente. 64 

The party in the 1970s fell back into interpreting the EEC as an expression of 

American domination in Western Europe – and therefore as a rather insignificant 

actor in international politics. Admittedly, there were important and visible changes 

in its attitude vis-à-vis the EEC in this phase, including the sending of its first 

delegation to the Strasbourg parliament in 1973, and its first participation in the 

European elections of 1977. Its approach to the EEC was, however, at all times 

instrumental. The party started to display remarkable pragmatism with regard to the 

EEC and its institutions. 65 The argument relating to national sovereignty gained in 

importance, despite the fact that Brezhnev’s doctrine on limited sovereignty of 

1968, which the PCF had not explicitly denounced, made it very hard to make 

strong claims regarding the need for national sovereignty on the European 

continent. In the context of the Union de la gauche, which in the mid-1970s 

developed from an electoral to a political alliance based on a common programme, 

the party’s new leader George Marchais and his foreign policy advisor Jacques 

63. APCI, “Berlinguer”, 81.2, Conferenza PC di Mosca 5-17 giugno 1969. Discussioni, note. 

64. The Bureau politique in a very brief statement noted that the treaty “should be considered important”. 

APCF, BP, 13.08.1970. 

65. See also A. KRIEGEL, French communism in the Fifth Republic, in: D. BLACKMER, S. TAR- 

ROW (eds.), Communism in Italy and France, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976, 

pp.69-86, here p.82.

52 

Maud BRACKE 

Kanapa favoured an independent French nuclear force, the force de frappe. This 

was a suitable way of bridging the gap with the socialists over foreign policy, but 

did bring the party once more in conflict with Moscow. 66 This foreign policy was 

however severely hampered by the fact that it did not allow for a meaningful 

analysis of the EEC or of Europe as an actor in the Cold War. The PCF indeed spent 

most of the 1970s ignoring the fact that France’s sovereignty was already limited 

through its membership of the EEC and NATO. 

These different approaches to Europe became clear at a PCI-PCF meeting held 

in June 1970 in Rome. The PCI’s position of “change from within” was reinforced: 

Amendola argued that it was genuinely possible through geographic and political 

“enlargement” to alter the ideological and political character of the EEC. Jacques 

Denis of the PCF sharply countered that there was “no objective basis for a 

[European – MB] third force”. The PCF delegation did nonetheless declare itself in 

favour of an “active presence” in and continued pressure on the EEC institutions, to 

make them “more democratic and anti-monopolistic”. 67 The differences continued 

to be pronounced at a conference of West European communist parties held in 

Brussels in 1974 on the theme of “Europe”. The PCI delegation upheld its 

ambitious yet vague vision of a democratic Europe “which was to realise its role of 

peace and progress in the world”. This contrasted sharply to Marchais’ nihilism: 

“Europe can be the best and the worst”. Much of the debate dealt with the 

practicalities of support among the West European CP’s in political and trade union 

action, and there was little or no substantial discussion on issues related to 

European integration and the Cold War. 68 

Concluding remarks 

Communist parties such as the French continued up to the end of the Cold War to 

perceive the global class struggle in terms of the classic East-West confrontation. 

Relaxation of this confrontation towards the United States or West Germany 

appeared to them as a retreat from the global class struggle. A Europe “between the 

blocks” was in this vision unrealistic, if not undesirable. To the PCI, by contrast, 

the revision of its European policies signified a true, if partial and problematic, 

transfer of allegiances. The main contradictions inherent to it were to do with the 

party’s continued links with the Soviet Union, and the latter’s relation to Europe. 

The European debates in the two parties during the long 1960s bear longer-term 

significance. Firstly, the 1960s episode announces the main limitations and 

contradictions of 1970s Eurocommunism: the very different views held by the PCI 

and PCF on “Europe” and its relation to the Cold War, and the PCF’s purely 

66. G. STREIFF, Jean Kanapa, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2001, pp.547-557. 

67. APCI, “Berlinguer”, 89, Incontro con delegazione PCF Roma, 25-26.06.70. 

68. M. STEINKUHLER, Eurokommunismus in Widerspruch. Analyse und Dokumente, Verlag Wissenschaft 

und Politik, Köln, 1977, pp.37-48.


instrumental approach to a European strategy. Furthermore, a direct historical line 

can be drawn from the PCI’s choice to accept and then embrace the EEC in the 

1960s-70s, to the policy of quasi-unconditional support for the EU of much of the 

Italian Left today. This is rooted historically the fact that the impasse of Italian 

domestic politics in the 1960s was indeed unlocked by the dynamic of early 

European détente. The Italian Left as a whole has since the 1960s maintained the 

assumption that European integration would always affect Italian politics 

positively. Similarly, the PCF’s legacy is unmistakable in the European policy of 

most of the French radical Left today, critical of the EU for reasons to do with both 

class politics and national sovereignty. While the issue of national sovereignty is 

today, it can be argued, largely overcome by the facts, the social nature of the EU 

continues to be a highly pertinent issue.

54 

Maud BRACKE

Internationalism, Patriotism, Dictatorship and Democracy: 

The Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Exercise of Power, 

1945-1968 

Muriel BLAIVE 

Seldom has the presumed tension between internationalism and patriotism been 

given so much academic coverage as in the Czechoslovak case. From its very birth 

in 1921 until the crushing of the Prague Spring by the Warsaw Pact tanks in 1968, 

from the expulsion of the Social Democratic opponents in the 1920s to the 

«Czechoslovak path to socialism» between 1945 and 1948, from the 

«bolshevization» in 1929 to the alleged «cruellest terror of all popular democracies 

put together» in the beginning of the 1950s, from the absence of 1956 to the 

brilliance of the Prague Spring, the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ) has 

been considered special, indeed very special. The Czechoslovak case is described 

as being unique in communist Eastern Europe. 

What is the crux of this specificity? The KSČ is said to have suffered from a 

particular kind of disease called the «democratic spirit», which impregnated Czech 

society so thoroughly from 1918 onwards that it supposedly didn’t spare the 

Czechoslovak section of the Internationale. 

A communist party impregnated by a democratic spirit? This paper will first of 

all carefully review this argument in its different chronological versions, ranging 

from the interwar to 1968; it will then argue that the «democratic argument» has 

much rather served to avoid questioning the local responsibilities in the terror 

regime of the 1950s; and finally, to emphasize this point, it will concentrate on the 

KSČ’s policy in several concrete cases during the 1950s and argue that facts simply 

don’t match with this «democratic theory». 

As will come out in the course of this article, the internationalism/patriotism 

dichotomy reflects the fate of the European integration process only in a very 

twisted way. The European integration in the West can be seen as a successful 

internationalist project, slowly attempting to overcome patriotic – actually, more 

often than not, chauvinistic – traits. In the East, the idea of internal cohesion 

promoted by the communist elites was negatively perceived by the population as it 

mostly served to disguise exploitation by the Soviet Union; the concept of 

European integration as it was thought of in the West was largely repressed. The 

Cold War reinforced the East-West divide and it is only when it came to an end that 

a redefinition of the European project including both the «East» and the «West» – 

the famous «return to Europe» – could begin. 1 

This article points to the fact that the Eastern «cohesion» which preceded it was 

rather questionable, not because Czechoslovakia was democratic and the other 

1. See H. ARMBRUSTER, C. ROLLO, U.H. MEINHOF, Imagining Europe Everyday Narratives in 

European Border Communities, in: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 5(2003). 

55

56 

Muriel BLAIVE 

countries were not – what «Czech» historiography was so intent on proving – but 

on the contrary because Czechoslovakia embraced communism with a degree of 

sincerity unequalled elsewhere, with the possible exception of the former GDR. It 

also shows between the lines that almost anything is possible if the populations can 

be mobilized for a project whose values they share – both in the case of 

Czechoslovakia in 1945 and of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2004. 

Introduction to the «democratic spirit» of the Czech nation 

In the Czechoslovak historiography, or rather in the Czech one, 2 the tension 

between internationalism and patriotism has been largely equated with the 

antinomy dictatorship/democracy. The dichotomy East/West was never very far 

from most of the authors’ mind either. Contrary to the claimed «uniqueness» of the 

Czech case, this issue is in fact common in the wider context as practically each 

Central European country is convinced to have been the last bastion of civilization 

before the «barbarian» East. After 1948, «East» became synonymous for the end of 

Europe, lack of civilization, dictatorship, Moscow’s orders and therefore of 

internationalism; «West» represented culture, development, democracy, in other 

words patriotism. 3 

This vision fitted in a framework where Czechoslovakia had largely celebrated 

itself for being the only democracy in Central Europe – later referred to as the 

«East bloc.» Indeed, in contrast to interwar Poland and Hungary, or to Yugoslavia, 

Romania and Bulgaria, not to mention Germany and Austria, a true democracy was 

established between 1918 and 1938 under the patronage of president Tomáš 

Garrigue Masaryk and of his successor Edvard Beneš. Free elections were 

guaranteed, as were freedoms of speech, of the press, of meeting, of movement, 

etc. A significant measure of minority rights was granted. 4 

The problem is that this Czechoslovak democratic spirit has been generally 

over-interpreted, both in the interwar period and after the Second World War, 5 

especially in contrast to Poland and Hungary. It is true that the latter did not enjoy 

the same degree of freedom in the interwar period, for instance, but the intellectual 

life was nevertheless flourishing in those two countries, a fact easily forgotten on 

the Czech side. Instead, a vast historiographical current – which might seem 

2. Unfortunately Slovakia didn’t have much of a word to say concerning the running of the country, 

neither in the 1920s and 1930s – which led to the well-known Slovak fascist state during the Second 

World War –, nor in the 1950s and 1960s. Czechoslovakia was turned into a federation only 

on 1 st January 1969. The vast majority of academic works dealing with «Czechoslovakia» actually 

deal almost exclusively with the Czech lands. 

3. For an elaborate and elegant version of this trend, see for instance M. KUNDERA, Un Occident 

kidnappé ou la tragédie de l’Europe centrale, in: Le Débat, November 1983, pp.3-21. 

4. It was a kind of paternalistic democracy which would also describe the French third- or even fourth 

Republic, where criticism of De Gaulle was tolerated but where the state would keep a significant 

amount of control on national broadcasting medias.

The Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Exercise of Power, 1945-1968 57 

incredibly outdated today but which is practically the only one existing to date as it 

has hardly been renewed since the 1980s –, has devoted itself to the study of the 

famed Bohemian democratic heritage and of its legacy onto the Communist party 

of Czechoslovakia and onto its militants. We will review the different chronological 

stages of this argument, ranging from the First Republic to the 1945-1948 period, 

to the 1950s in general, 1956 in particular, and of course to the Prague Spring. 

The «democratic spirit» of the KSČ from the interwar period to 1968 

To avoid confusion, we will first of all review the dominant «democratic narrative» 

of the Czech nation and of Czech communism in twelve different variations, and 

then we will go back to the arguments one at a time. 6 

At the origin of Czech democracy, thus, was the First Republic. For numerous 

political scientists and historians, mainly American, Canadian and Czech, 7 the 

KSČ’s history placed it in cantilever between the democratic atmosphere in which 

it had been born and its allegiance to Moscow. It was said to have found itself in an 

ambiguous position after 1948 since it was both a dictatorial party in power and the 

heir of the First Republic democratic institutions, in which it had taken part. 8 In 

other words, it would have been submitted to an internal conflict between its own 

democratic tendencies, nourished by Masaryk’s regime, and its authoritarian 

tendencies, which eventually led it to seize power through force in 1948. 

In the relevant literature, the KSČ has been understood to work on a different 

basis than the other Komintern members already before World War II. In the 1930s, 

the Czech militants were allegedly reluctant not only to sacrifice their life for 

revolution’s sake but also their spare evenings. 9 Apart from a few muscled speeches 

5. And even, one might add, after 1989: the general notion that the Czechs are the «best pupils of the 

class» led to an optimistic (if not outright arrogant) self-analysis of the Czech elites concerning 

their country’s ability to step into the EU – specifically to be the first Central European country to 

do so. See J. KARLAS, P. KRATOCHVÍL, Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic and European Integration: 

During and After the Cold War, in: Journal of European Integration History, 2(2004), 

p.37. 

6. To underline this narrative’s predominance in the Czechoslovak literature, we will refer to as many 

authors as possible in this short article. These references already abundantly show the very diverse 

ideological and chronological provenience of these concordant arguments; however, for a more detailed 

review and a hopefully convincing demonstration of this narrative’s almost unanimous character, 

please refer to M. BLAIVE, Une déstalinisation manquée, Tchécoslovaquie 1956, Complexe, 

Bruxelles, 2005. 

7. For a study of Czech intellectuals’ influence on American politics and, by extension, on 

North-American academia on Czechoslovakia, see J. FAURE, L’ami américain. La Tchécoslovaquie, 

enjeu de la diplomatie américaine 1943-1968, Tallandier, Paris, 2004. 

8. B.W. JANCAR, Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power, Praeger, New-York, 1971, 

p. 50. 

9. E. TABORSKY, Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948-1960, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 

1961, p.7.

58 

Muriel BLAIVE 

on Klement Gottwald’s part, we are told that the KSČ did not threaten the 

democratic institutions and was well integrated. In sum, it had lost its revolutionary 

character, at least among the rank-and-file. 10 

Is that to say that Czechoslovak communism, which had deep roots into the 

working class, suffered more than others from the conflict between its national 

traditions and the policy imposed by the Soviets? This would be all the easier to 

believe that the Komintern leaders themselves pointed their finger at the KSČ 

members with this 1928 open letter: «It is precisely because the KSČ suffers from a 

significant social-democratic heritage and has not forged itself in revolutionary 

fights that it must find its own Bolshevik line», it said. 11 

In 1945, on the other hand, the KSČ was in a good position to convince the 

population that a «specific Czechoslovak path to socialism» could succeed. Its 

popularity portended that the new type of Communist regime it was promising was 

achievable. Yet, as soon as it found itself in charge of the state in 1948, what 

Barbara Wolfe Jancar has named a «logic of absolute monopoly», centred in the 

USSR, allegedly forced it to adopt the «same position» as Gottwald in the 1930s, 

i.e. to Stalinize the party (and now the country). 12 Supposedly, it was not easy. 

Gottwald is said to have resisted a long time before surrendering and accepting a 

total sovietization of the political institutions, a resistance which was understood to 

be the consequence of the «links, partly conscious and partly subconscious, with 

Western traditions which have left an indelible mark on Czechoslovak 

communism». 13 In other words, the communists had to put aside the 

«Czechoslovak experience» of democratic socialism and to rely on Moscow to be 

able to remain in power. 

This situation is said to have resulted in the disaster of repression: «Rigidity and 

an orthodoxy more conservative than that of the Soviet party was Gottwald's 

response to the KSČ's new power position». 14 In fact, the Czechoslovak 

Communist party members allegedly suffered from a «split personality», torn as 

they were between their loyalty for Moscow and for their own country. 15 In the 

concrete case of 1956, for example, the Czechoslovak delay in destalinizing is 

explained in literature by the «idiosyncratic framework of Czechoslovak political 

10. Idem., p. 7. 

11. J. RUPNIK, Histoire du parti communiste tchécoslovaque, Presses de la FNSP, Paris, 1981, p.73. 

12. B.W. JANCAR, op.cit., p.55. The fact that Western historians based themselves on (or, in Taborsky 

and Duchacek’s case, even preceded) reform communist historians or witnesses, such as Karel 

Kaplan, Evžen Löbl or Artur London without ever questioning their ideological background shows 

(1) how political the history of popular democracies during the Cold War was, (2) what legitimacy 

Prague Spring intellectuals had attained in the West, (3) how pregnant the thesis of the «Czech 

democratic spirit» was, since it bound together practically all historiographical currents, however 

diverse they may have been. For a study of the importance of this «democratic argument». See M. 

BLAIVE, La démocratie pour les Tchèques: une légitimité politique et une composante identitaire, 

in: Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest, 1(2003), pp.59-82. 

13. E. TABORSKY, op.cit., p.603. 

14. B.W. JANCAR, op.cit., p.55. 

15. Ibid., p.52.


culture», which accounts for the leaders’ «apprehensions about the possible 

consequences of a major policy revision.» In other words, «Among the parties in 

control, only the KSČ was aware of the power of public opinion». 16 The democratic 

traditions, we read, also refrained people from expressing their discontentment. 

The «sophisticated sobriety of the opponents, reared in the tradition of democracy 

and its non-violent methods of action» allegedly accounts for the lack of resistance 

of the Czechoslovak population. 17 Face to face with an anti-democratic regime, 

democratically raised citizens, deprived of their only weapon, the right to vote, felt 

powerless. 

As for the party members, they are said to have felt equally democratic. The 

news of Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech caused «a new and surprisingly 

vigorous inner-party democracy». 18 The party was supposedly upside-down. The 

Central Committee was said to be flooded with demands for an extraordinary party 

congress. 19 Even though such a party congress actually never took place, some of 

the authors’ enthusiasm was revived by the 1968 events. The rehabilitation law 

passed in that year, for instance, was welcomed: 

«The passage of the law on rehabilitation was a humane step, rare in history, and 

unique in the communist world, to restore justice to the victims of illegalities of an 

entire historical period and to supplement the limited and inadequate measures of 

correction taken in the sixties. It was the first occasion in a communist country in 

which an action of such vast scope, embracing even discrimination and persecution 

by administrative agencies, was to be undertaken in accordance with strictly legal 

procedures». 20 

Finally, nowhere more than in the gloomy area of the numbers of victims to the 

Communist terror regime the «democratic argument» is more emphasized. A vast 

majority of authors consider that Czechoslovakia suffered an unprecedented level 

of terror, in fact «higher than in all the other popular democracies put together». 21 

Why? Precisely, so the argument goes, because Czechoslovakia had strong 

democratic traditions, in and outside of its communist party: to destroy them, one 

needed a much higher level of terror than elsewhere. Hence the «especially ruthless 

character of Stalinism in the 1950s [which] was, in a sense, proportional to the 

16. Z. SUDA, Zealots and Rebels. A History of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, The Hoover 

Institution Press, Stanford, 1980, p.258. 

17. Ivo DUCHACEK, «A ‘Loyal’ Satellite: The Case of Czechoslovakia», in Henry L. Roberts (ed), 

The Satellites in Eastern Europe, Philadelphia, AAPPS, 1958, p.115. 

18. E. TABORSKY, op.cit., p.77. 

19. J. PELIKÁN, S’ils me tuent …, Grasset, Paris, 1975, p.112. 

20. G. SKILLING, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 

1976, p.409. 

21. K. KAPLAN, Zamyšlení nad politickými procesy, in: Nová mysl, 7(1968), p.915. This argument 

was taken over by nearly ever author every writing on Czechoslovakia in the 1950s. See for instance 

J. RUPNIK, op.cit., p.15 and p.229; A. KRATOCHVIL, Žaluji I. Stalinská justice v Československu 

(I Accuse), Dolmen, Prague, 1990, p.5; O. ULČ, Politics in Czechoslovakia, San 

Fransisco; G. FEIWEL, New Economic Patterns in Czechoslovakia, Praeger, New-York, 1968, 

p.139; J. PELIKÁN, op.cit., p.82; B.W. JANCAR, op.cit., p.100, Z. HEJZLAR, Praha ve stínu Stalina 

a Brežněva (Prague in Stalin’s and Brejnev’s Shadow), Práce, Prague, 1991, p.34; etc.

60 

Muriel BLAIVE 

democratic traditions it had to destroy». 22 In other words, both the Western 

historians, the Czech democrats in exile and the former reform communists agreed 

after 1968 that the Czechoslovak terror had been much higher than in other 

countries because the democratic traditions had to be destroyed (for the democrats, 

inside society, for the reform communists, inside the communist party). 

Let us now go back and re-examine each argument in turn. 

A dispassionate look at Czechoslovak communist history 

These arguments are all marked by an understandable, but often unreasonable, 

sympathy for Czechoslovakia’s fate. Time and the ideological appeasement of the 

post-Cold War period now permit a more dispassionate approach. In fact, simple 

logic suffices to put most of the arguments back into perspective. Why, for instance, 

would the KSČ «suffer» once it had attained power? It was striving to do so and it 

did; this friendly presentation of the KSČ is simply naïve. Let us for instance call 

back to memory the testimony of a direct witness, Ota Hromádko, who describes, 

as an early Communist militant, his activities under the First Republic; reading 

through his account, one will be convinced not only that he dedicated more than a 

spare evening to the Revolution, 23 but also that he and his comrades had no qualms 

about fulfilling their goal: reaching power. 

More importantly, a revolutionary wave of violence inspired by the Marxist left 

swept Czechoslovakia in 1919-1921, notably with a general strike in December, 

1920 and an insurrectional situation in Kladno and Most. 24 The middle-class 

thought a coup was under way and the strike was bloodily crushed. At least 13 

people were killed. 25 In Slovakia, a Republic of Councils was established (July 

1919) and constituted the first attempt to export the Bolshevik revolution out of 

Russia. 26 The troubles started again after the 1929 crisis and were again stirred by 

the Communist party. 27 And the presentation of the KSČ as a «good child of the 

Republic» is gravely undermined by these few sentences pronounced by Gottwald 

after he was elected to Parliament in 1929: 

22. See G. SKILLING, op.cit., p.825. See as well F. EIDLIN, The Two Faces of Czechoslovak Communism, 

in: East-Central Europe, (1-2)1983, p.189; F. AUGUST, D. REES, Red Star Over 

Prague, Sherwood Press, London, 1984, p.XVII; Z. HEJZLAR, op.cit., p.34; J. PELIKÁN, op.cit., 

pp.82-83. 

23. O. HROMÁDKO, Jak se kalila voda (How the Water Got Troubled), Index, Cologne, 1982, 

pp.9-95. 

24. J. RUPNIK, op.cit., p.49. 

25. V.S. MAMATEY, Le développement de la démocratie tchécoslovaque, in: V. MAMATEY, R. 

LUŽA (eds), La république tchécoslovaque 1918-1948, Librairie du regard, Paris, 1987, pp.96-97. 

26. J. RUPNIK, op.cit., pp.44-45. 

27. V.S. MAMATEY, op.cit., p.131.


«We are the party of the Czechoslovak proletariat and our general staff is in Moscow. 

We go to Moscow to learn from the Russian Bolsheviks how to twist your necks. 

And as you know, the Russian Bolsheviks are masters at that». 28 

As for the lack of Czechoslovak destalinization, the alleged blindness of the 

Polish and Hungarian Communists to the power of public opinion between 1953 

and 1956 also has to be contended. The existing interviews, for instance that of 

Edward Ochab’s, 29 show, on the contrary, that the leaders were very much aware of 

the risks incumbent to destalinization. They did it not because they were fools, but 

because there was a strong public demand for it which they did not feel politically 

able to stand up to. 

The KSČ was all the less the only party aware of the power of public opinion as 

the Hungarian and Polish party's ground was not as secure. The Communist parties’ 

policy is always more fluctuating when the public’s pressure is mounting, as is 

shown by the detailed chronology of the period 1953-1956. 30 All concessions on 

the leadership’s part in Poland and Hungary (apart perhaps from the very first one, 

the nomination of Imre Nagy, in which the Soviets apparently played a major role) 

were the result of popular pressure. The fact that the KSČ didn’t make any 

concessions, or very little, is a proof not of its dogmatism but of the fact that there 

was no significant demand for such concessions. It should lead to wonder how 

come there was so little discontentment, not to reflect on the alleged «Stalinian 

wisdom» of the Czechoslovak leadership. 

The Czechoslovak democratic tradition must not be disregarded but neither can 

it help to explain why people did nothing in 1956. Incidentally, those who did 

oppose the regime and ended up in jail or were killed are better reminders of the 

democratic traditions than those who remained almost or totally passive. That the 

population was aspiring to freedom and democracy is certainly true but it is not 

necessarily incompatible with a partial satisfaction on the socio-economic, and 

even patriotic, level. If the Czechoslovak population was not pro-communist, it 

didn’t show any strong sign of anti-communism either, neither at that time nor 

later. 31 

This is true as well of the Communist party members: as we have seen above, 

the party was said to be upside-down and flooded with demands for an 

extraordinary party congress in 1956. In reality, only 0,5% of the party local 

organisations called for such a congress to take place. 32 

28. J. RUPNIK, op.cit., p.78. 

29. See the chapter «Edward Ochab» in: T. TORAŃSKA, Oni. Stalin’s Polish Puppets, Collins, London, 

1987, p.48. 

30. See this chronology in M. BLAIVE, Une déstalinisation manquée …, op.cit., pp.224-253. 

31. This could have been deduced already before 1989 but is becoming increasingly clear since the archives 

are being opened. See for instance this analysis of the State Security reports on the people’s 

mood during the 1956 Hungarian revolution in M. BLAIVE, La police politique communiste en 

action: les Tchécoslovaques et la révolution hongroise de 1956, in: Revue d’histoire moderne et 

contemporaine, 2(April-June 2002), pp.176-202. There was little of a «revolutionary mood» 

among the Czechoslovaks.

62 

Muriel BLAIVE 

As far as the special role of Czechoslovakia in the terror policy is concerned, 

finally, it can be contested on two fronts. First of all, it is simply wrong. Since the 

opening of the archives in 1989, we know, even if only roughly, that Czechoslovak 

terror was not greater than in any other popular democracy and certainly not greater 

than in all the other countries put together 33 (at least in statistical terms, one might 

argue that such a gruesome simplification doesn’t leave any space to the victims’ 

feelings, which are yet legitimate and commanding respect – in Czechoslovakia, 

too, but not only in Czechoslovakia). But even if we leave statistics aside, it would 

have been only logical to invoke the real level of support for the communist party 

inside a given country to explain a particular level of terror. If we take for instance 

Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the difference lies not in the presence or absence of 

democratic traditions but in the fact that the KSČ pulled 38% of the votes in 

Czechoslovakia in 1946, becoming the leading political party of the country, 34 

whereas the Hungarian Communist party had pulled a few months earlier only 17% 

of the votes, which put it far behind the Smallholders’ party which had gained a 

stunning 60%. The Hungarian people, by clearly rejecting the communist option, 

obviously risked a lot more to be persecuted by a Communist party in power. 

The Polish and the Hungarian examples – not even to mention Romania or 

Bulgaria – suffice to show that it is not the presence of democratic traditions which 

accounts for the depth of the repression. And if the Czechoslovak 1968 

rehabilitation law was «unique», it is so only in its 14-year delay: the Hungarians 

and the Poles had proceeded to extensive rehabilitations already between 1954 and 

1956. László Rajk and Wladysław Gomułka were both fully rehabilitated in 1956, 

whereas Rudolf Slánský never was reinstated in the KSČ, not even in 1968. 

But let us now concentrate in greater detail around some of the above 

mentioned arguments, i.e. around the central question of internationalism vs. 

patriotism. 

32. See A. NOVOTNÝ, Současná situace a úkoly strany (The current situation and the party’s tasks), 

Nová mysl, Celostátní konference KSČ, June 1956, p.25. 

33. See M. BLAIVE, Une déstalinisation manquéé …, op.cit., pp.93-101. 

34. And secured the absolute majority (55,75%) in the Czech lands together with its Social-Democratically. 

Counting the Socialist-National party, the socialist coalition reached an astonishing 

79,41% of the Czech vote.


The KSČ policy 

1920s and 1930s 

What is important to keep in mind is that in the 1920s and 1930s, division was in 

the very nature of the Communist parties, insofar as it reflected the power struggle 

which took place in Moscow. In this respect, the KSČ is not specific in the least. 

Let us remember the history of the Hungarian Communist party at the turn of the 

1930s with the confrontation between Gyorgy Lukács’ «Blum Theses», Béla 

Szántó’s «Robert Theses» and Gyula Alpári’s theses taken over by József Révai. 

Just like in the KSČ’s case, the Komintern sent an open letter to the Hungarian PC 

members. 35 

The history of the French Communist party at that time was very similar: some 

denounced the leadership’s sectarism, were excluded, created a dissident party, 

while the said leadership was torn between the men in place, the trade-unionists 

and the Communist youth leadership. In an open letter sent on 7 December 1930 by 

the Komintern to all PCs, the French Communist party was denounced as one of 

the most faulty sections. In other words, the PCF was said to be «the worst pupil of 

the communist class». 36 

The title of «worst pupil of the communist class» would actually fit many of the 

Central European Communist parties by the end of the 1920s, insofar as the 

Komintern’s grip on the parties’ organisation and tactics was never easy to accept. 

But those who found it the hardest were undoubtedly those whose life was 

endangered by Moscow’s dogmatism, because they already had to live in 

clandestinity under a right-wing dictatorship: from the beginning the Polish, 

Hungarian and Yugoslav parties, later on the German and Austrian ones. The first 

three were particularly attacked by the Komintern. 37 The first two were even 

dissolved: the Hungarian apparently in 1936, 38 the Polish in 1938. 39 The third one 

was able to make it only thanks to Josip Tito’s personality but at the price of a 

zealed purge of its own ranks (the «split personality» issue undoubtedly applying 

35. See A. KRIEGEL, S. COURTOIS, Eugen Fried, Le Seuil, Paris, 1997, p.97. See also M. MOL- 

NÁR, De Béla Kun à János Kádár, Presses de la FNSP, Paris, 1987, pp.67-79. 

36. Idem., pp.119-120. 

37. See B. LAZITCH, Les partis communistes d’Europe 1919-1955, Les îles d’or, Paris, 1956, p.87. 

38. See M. MOLNÁR, op.cit., p.82 and p.87. 

39. See M.K. DZIEWANOWSKI, The Communist Party of Poland, Cambridge, Harvard University 

Press, 1976, p.150.

64 

Muriel BLAIVE 

here in full force). 40 In all three cases, their Central Committee members exiled in 

Moscow were exterminated. 41 

Yet one can not speak of an authentic «democratic heritage» when referring to 

Poland, Hungary or Yugoslavia. The divisions inside their Communist parties 

nevertheless existed and were even more exacerbated than in the Czech case. All of 

them had at least two antagonistic wings, which reflected the opposition between 

internationalism and patriotism. 

1945-1948 

Doubts on Gottwald’s will to plan and implement the monopoly of power in his 

country also have to be lifted. Gottwald had been politically educated in Moscow. 

He had ruthlessly stalinized the Czechoslovak Communist party in 1929 and earlier 

(see the Bubník case in 1925). 42 He had been one of the main organizers of the 

Komintern’s VII th Congress in 1935, spending one and a half years in Moscow for 

this purpose. He had been elected on the Komintern’s political bureau along with 

personalities such as Georgi Dimitrov, Otto Pieck and Palmiro Togliatti. He had 

attended the trial of the «Trotskyist criminals» in 1937. 43 He had also spent the war 

in Moscow. There can be little doubt that he purposely drafted the after-war 

political institutions in the ambivalent spirit which would allow him to take power 

sooner or later – as was dictated by Stalin. 44 

What is certainly true, on the other hand, is that numerous European communist 

militants, at the bottom and even at the top, had faith, after the war, in the 

communist discourse; however, as Miklós Molnár remarks, this doesn’t mean that 

one can speak of an authentic «democratic current» inside the Communist 

parties. 45 The 1948 tactical change was dictated by Stalin, just like the conciliatory 

policy of 1945-1948 had been, and Gottwald followed suit, just like Mátyás Rákosi 

and Bolesław Bierut. 

40. See A.B. ULAM, Titoism and the Cominform, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1952, p.20. 

For an eye-witness account, see M. DJILAS, Tito, mon ami, mon ennemi, Fayard, Paris, 1980, p.44. 

41. See for instance B. LAZITCH, Stalin’s Massacre of the Foreign Communist Leaders, in: M. 

DRACHKOVITCH, B. LAZITCH, The Comintern: Historical Highlights, Praeger, New-York, 

1966, pp.139-174 and B. SOUVARINE, Comments on the Massacre, in: ibid., pp.175-183. 

42. See J. RUPNIK, op.cit. 

43. See F. NEČÁSEK, O Klementu Gottwaldovi. Náčrt životopisu (On Klement Gottwald. Sketch of 

a biography), SNPL, Prague, 1954, pp.37-41. 

44. In the 1945 institutions, the decision making was taken away from experts and administrations and 

given to sole politicians. The unity of the state was replaced by the unity of the political will. From 

1945 onwards, a criticism of the means through which the goal would be achieved was still possible; 

but a criticism of the goal itself was already rendered impossible. See V. CHALUPA, Rise and 

Development of a Totalitarian State, H.E. Steinfert Kneese N.V., Leiden, 1959, pp.80-81. 

45. M. MOLNÁR, op.cit., p.195.


The 1950s 

It is too easy an explanation, on historian Karel Kaplan’s model followed by most 

other historians, to blame solely the Soviets for everything which ever went wrong 

with Czechoslovak communism: Gottwald was allegedly a «good guy», the 

inventor of the genuine «Czechoslovak path to socialism», 46 who was distracted 

from his «noble» task only by Stalin’s blood thirst, a fact which caused him a great 

deal of pain and explains why he surrendered to alcoholism before and during the 

political trials. As for the trials, the reasoning was simplified in the following way: 

«The domestic causes of the trials, according to Kaplan, lay in the political process 

itself […] This political order, contrary to Czechoslovak tradition, was a product of 

Bolshevik experience and was imported into Czechoslovakia as an essential feature 

of the policy of modelling all aspects of life on the Soviet pattern». 47 

But this narrative does not account for the strong domestic support for such a 

terror policy, including on Gottwald’s part. If only the Soviets are guilty, it does not 

really help to understand why Antonín Novotný, KSČ’s first secretary after 1953, 

did so little to implement a real destalinization in 1956, both as a successor to the 

Stalinian leader Gottwald and as Moscow’s follower after the XXth Congress. 

Accordingly, the year 1956 in Czechoslovakia – which didn’t bring any substantial 

implementation of the destalinization process, contrary to what happened in Poland 

and Hungary –, and more generally the whole period 1953-1965, is conveniently 

left out in most books dealing with post WWII Czechoslovak history. The terror 

level and the democratic traditions vaguely serve to mask the incongruency of a 

supposedly democratic-minded population and of a Communist party who both 

completely failed to take part in the liberalization campaign in 1956. Alexander 

Dubček then pops out of history seemingly out of nowhere in the second half of the 

1960s and is said to have revived the national, patriotic, side of Czechoslovak 

communism, before being forced again by the «evil» Soviets (the 

«internationalists») to give up. 

Yet again, Dubček’s gradual surrender, the fact that he himself undid most of 

what he had done while he was still in power and that he remained in spite of 

everything a dedicated communist48 is rather left out, just like the astonishing 

isolation of the valorous dissidents in the 1970s and 1980s. Rather than wondering 

why the latter were at best a couple of thousand in Czechoslovakia as opposed to 

some 30,000 in Poland and Hungary, academic literature abroad has concentrated 

46. «After 1945, the Czechoslovak Communists sought new ways of passing from the national and democractic 

revolution of the immediate post-war period to the socialist revolution. They envisaged 

the transition as peaceful and democratic, and in this they were absolutely serious. For a time it 

seemed that they even had Stalin’s support; one recalls, for instance, an interview with British Labour 

MPs in which he mentioned the possibility of a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism». 

See J. PELIKÁN (ed.), The Czechoslovak Political Trials, Macdonald, London, 1971, 

pp.15-16. 

47. G. SKILLING, op.cit., pp.389-390. 

48. For instance, he dutifully came back to Czechoslovakia after he was revoked from his ambassador’s 

post in Turkey in 1970 even though he was certain to be demoted, if not sent outright to jail.

66 

Muriel BLAIVE 

on an in-depth analysis of their samizdat and tamizdat texts – indeed very inspiring 

on the intellectual level but enjoying a remarkably limited support among the 

population. 

Pressure from «under» and concessions from «above» 

It should be reminded that it was not Gottwald who invented the theory of the 

«national path to socialism», but Stalin. It was indeed during the visit of Labour 

MPs to Moscow in the summer of 1946 that the Soviet leader formulated it for the 

first time and it was only then that the Czechoslovak communists began to refer to 

it (see Gottwald’s first speech on this theme dated 4 October 1946: «On our 

Czechoslovak road to socialism»). 49 Jiří Pelikán gives the impression that 

Czechoslovak communism was a pioneer in this matter, but this is only due to the 

fact that he remains silent about the rest of the world communist movement: yet 

Gomułka, 50 Rákosi 51 and Maurice Thorez, 52 or even Togliatti and Dimitrov, made 

similar references to a national specific path to socialism. Success of the said path 

in Czechoslovakia as opposed to Poland and Hungary is not the consequence of the 

Czech communists’ democratic mind but of the inclination of the Czechoslovak 

population towards an egalitarian, strongly socialist, regime. The national 

consensus can hardly be better illustrated than by the fact that the communists 

49. K. GOTTWALD, O naši československé cestě k socialismu, in: Spisy (Collected Works), XI- 

II(1946-47), SNPL, Prague, 1957, pp.230-231. 

50. W. GOMUŁKA, Przemówienie sekretarza generalnego KC PPR Tow. Wl. Gomułki, in: W. GO- 

MUŁKA, J. CYRANKIEWICZ, Jednošcia silni – zwycieżymy. Przemówienia wyglosone na zebraniu 

aktywu warszawskiego PPR I PPS w dniu 30 listopadu 1946 (By Uniting Our Forces – We 

Will Win), Warsaw, 1946, p.25. In the chapter «We follow a Polish road, the road to popular democracy», 

Gomulka explains: «We have chosen our own path, a socialist path of development, 

which we have named the path of the Popular Democracy. Along this road and in our conditions, 

the dictatorship of the proletariat or even less of a party is neither an aim itself, nor a means to 

achieve it». 

51. See M. RÁKOSI, A magyar demokráciáért (For the Hungarian Democracy), Szinka, Budapest, 

1948, p.376. In the chapter «Forward to a popular democracy!», Rákosi explains: «The Communist 

parties have learned in the course of the last quarter of the century that there is no unique path leading 

to socialism but that there are as many paths as there are countries which build them through 

their own experiences». 

52. See M. THOREZ, Déclaration au journal anglais ‘The Times’, in: Œuvres de Maurice Thorez, 

Livre cinquième, t.23 (Novembre 1946-Juin 1947), Ed. sociales, Paris, 1965, pp.14-15. In the 

chapter «One can envisage on the path to socialism other roads than the one followed by the Russian 

communists», Thorez claims: «The progress of democracy throughout the world, inspite of a 

few exceptions which confirm the rule, allow us to envisage on the path to socialism other roads 

than the one followed by the Russian communists. In any case, the road is necessarily different for 

every country. We have always thought and said that the French people, rich of a glorious tradition, 

would find its own path towards more democracy, progress and social justice».


mainly propagated a «democratic socialism» between 1945 and 1948, while the 

democrats were advocating a «socialist democracy». 53 

Its failure in Poland and Hungary is not the consequence of a lack of democratic 

spirit on the communists’ side but of the fierce opposition of the (essentially 

agricultural) population to anything resembling socialism. Communism gained a 

strong base in Czechoslovakia because the party succeeded in presenting itself as 

the embodiment of patriotism. It failed in Poland and Hungary at that time because 

it was perceived on the contrary as the symbol of something imposed from the 

outside, while other political forces better represented the patriotic feelings. And it 

finally regained partial success in those countries, for example with Gomułka in 

1956, when the communists were somehow able to re-establish a connection 

between patriotism and communism. 

The domestic soldiers of repression 

It is not Stalin who signed Rudolf Slánský’s and Milada Horáková’s death sentences 

but Gottwald. As of today, the KSČ and its successor the KSČM have refused to 

condemn or even to express regrets over Horáková’s fate (respected political leader 

of the First Republic and dedicated Democrat, also persecuted by the Nazis, she 

was hanged along with three other defendants after a Stalinist trial in 1950 for 

alleged anti-state activities). On 27 June 2005, on the occasion of the 55 th 

anniversary of her execution, KSČM’s vice-president, Václav Exner, expressed the 

view on Czech Radio that Horáková had been indeed guilty of anti-state activities 

after 1948, activities which even today would be considered as collusion with a 

foreign state. 54 Yet it is not Stalin anymore who puts these words into Comrade 

Exner’s mouth. 

It was certainly not Khrushchev who stopped Novotný from destalinizing, as it 

was him who had launched the destalinization and encouraged the other communist 

parties to follow suit. Even though Leonid Brejnev’s guilt in crushing the Prague 

Spring is overwhelming, it is again Dubček who chose to do what he did: he did 

refuse to consider the Prague Spring a «counter-revolution», but out of a genuine 

and unshakable communist faith, not out of a democratic spirit; and it didn’t stop 

him in his report to the November, 1968 plenum of the KSČ from defending the 

53. Cf. these words by Hubert Ripka, the democratic minister for Trade in the post-war government: 

«We want to create a new social order, which means radical changes in the economic structure according 

to socialist principles. We are entertaining the constructive energy and the creative spirit 

of our people because we thus offer them the real hope that our political democracy, which has 

overall proven its worth during the First Republic, will be supported and strengthened by the economic 

and social democracy. […] I am convinced that we will manage in a few years to build an 

efficient socialist democracy in Central Europe». Quoted in G. BEUER, New Czechoslovakia and 

her Historical Background, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1947, p.41. Beuer made this interview 

of Ripka in 1945 or 1946. 

54. See A. DRDA, P. DUDEK, Kdo ve stínu čeká na moc. Čeští komunisté po listopadu 1989 (Look Who’s 

Hiding in the Dark. The Czech Communists after November, 1989), Paseka, Prague, 2006, p.11.

68 

Muriel BLAIVE 

necessity of «normalization» and criticizing the «negative features» of the 

post-January 1968 policy and the «anti-socialist forces» currently active. 55 And 

finally the Czechoslovak communists were among the most reluctant to follow 

Mikhail Gorbachov; if it had been up to them, 1989 would never have occurred. 

Conclusion 

The antinomy between internationalism and patriotism has been instrumentalized 

in the Czechoslovak case to present a vision of good, patriotic local communists 

against bad, international (Soviet) communists and to exonerate the Czechoslovak 

communists of the worst of their mistakes. 

A re-evaluation of Gottwald’s historical role could be a first step. Unfortunately, 

Czech historians do not seem in a hurry to embark on this hazardous journey and 

the existing biographical notes remain at the level of a «personal drama» on 

Gottwald’s part. 56 They do not seem in a hurry either to re-evaluate in writing the 

fundamental myth of the Czechoslovak communist regime, e.g. that the level of 

terror was higher than in all the other democracies put together; therefore it keeps 

permeating most Western works on this period. 57 

And finally, they do not seem in a hurry to reinstate society, rather than political 

institutions and specifically the KSČ, at the heart of their analysis. The existing 

Czech historiography still favours the big events (1948, 1968, 1989) or riskless 

topics like repression and opposition rather than questioning the involvement of 

Czech society in the communist regime. 58 Yet it is not a coincidence if the Czech 

communists have still been polling 20% of the popular vote 15 years after the 

Velvet Revolution; it testifies to the long-term support basis for the communist 

regime built over the years. To gain a plausible explanation of this phenomenon, 

one will undoubtedly have to plunge into the historical depth of Czechoslovak 

communism. Until this comes into being, the dealing with the memory of 

communism under post-communism will remain rather abstract. 

55. G. SKILLING, op.cit., p.815. 

56. See for instance Českoslovenští a čeští prezidenti (Czech and Czechoslovak Presidents), CEP, 

Prague, 2003; J. PERNES, Takoví nám vládli (Those Who Ruled Us), Brána, Prague, 2003; V. KA- 

DLEC, Podivné konce naších prezidentů (The Strange End of Our Presidents), Kruh, Prague, 

1991; K. KAPLAN, Gottwaldovi muži (Gottwald’s Men), Paseka, Prague, 2004, etc. 

57. See for instance a mild version in H. AGNEW, The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, 

Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 2004. See also A. MARÈS, Histoire des Tchèques et des 

Slovaques, Perrin, Paris, 2005. 

58. As often in similar cases, young, foreign historians are lending a hand in opening the debate on 

controversial topics: see for instance, on two very different chapters of Czech postwar history, B. 

FROMMER, National Cleansing. Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia, 

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 and P. BREN, Opposing the Opposition: Rethinking 

Fear and Apathy in Late Communist Czechoslovakia, presentation at the international 

workshop Authority and Expectations: A Social History of the Socialist Dictatorships in Central 

Europe, Charles University, Prague, June 21-22, 2007.

Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in 

Ostmitteleuropa: Die Tschechoslowakei und Polen von den 

fünfziger bis zu den siebziger Jahren 

Dagmara JAJEŚNIAK-QUAST 

1. Einführende Fragestellung 

Der vorliegende Beitrag über die Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration 

in Ostmitteleuropa am Beispiel Polens und der Tschechoslowakei fragt, 

wie die westeuropäischen Integrationsprozesse in Ostmitteleuropa wahrgenommen 

wurden und welche Effekte sich durch diesen Prozess für die Handelsbeziehungen 

Polens und der Tschechoslowakei zu den westeuropäischen Ländern vom Beginn 

der fünfziger bis zum Zeitpunkt der ersten Erweiterung der Gemeinschaft im Jahre 

1973 ergaben. 1 

Dabei beschränkt sich diese Untersuchung allerdings nicht auf die Länder der 

Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG), sondern versteht die Integrationsprozesse 

Westeuropas in einem breiten historischen Kontext. Unter „Integration“ 

wird die schrittweise Abschaffung ökonomischer Schranken zwischen unabhängigen 

Staaten und die zunehmende Verflechtung von deren Volkswirtschaften, sowie 

das Zusammenwachsen der Güter- und Faktormärkte verstanden. 2 Dieser Prozess 

vollzog sich nicht nur in der Zollunion im Rahmen der EWG, sondern auch in der 

Freihandelszone im Rahmen der European Free Trade Association (EFTA) sowie 

im Fall der Nordeuropäischen Länder im Rahmen des NORDEK. Diese alternativen 

Integrationsmodelle entstanden zum Teil als Reaktion auf die Entstehung der 

EWG und wirkten in gegenseitiger Konkurrenz. Gerade diese Vielfalt – so eine 

These – versuchten die ostmitteleuropäischen Länder für die Durchsetzung eigener 

Interessen zu nutzen. 

Schon jetzt kann man sagen, dass der Eiserne Vorhang nicht immer so undurchlässig 

war wie ursprünglich angenommen. Besonders ab den 1970er Jahren flossen 

verstärkt westliches Kapital und Technologien in Form von Krediten und Patentlizenzen 

nach Ostmitteleuropa. Zum Beispiel erwarb Polen drei Viertel aller westlichen 

Lizenzen seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges in der Zeit von 1971-1979. 

Ab Mitte der achtziger Jahre kamen zu den Portfolioinvestitionen auch einzelne 

Joint-Ventures, also ausländische Direktinvestitionen aus den EWG-Ländern in der 

Region. 3 Vor diesem Hintergrund gilt es die These kritisch zu hinterfragen, wonach 

1. Für zahlreiche Hinweise zu diesem Text danke ich Herrn Prof. André Steiner, Frau Prof. Helga 

Schultz und Herrn Dr. Uwe Müller. 

2. Vgl. dazu: H.-J. WAGENER, T. EGER, H. FRITZ, Europäische Integration. Recht und Ökonomie, 

Geschichte und Politik, Verlag Franz Vahlen, München, 2006, S.35 ff. 

69

70 

Dagmara Jajeśniak-Quast 

die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen den RGW [Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe]- 

und westeuropäischen Ländern seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg vollständig 

abgebrochen waren. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass es ein Spannungsfeld 

zwischen der politisch motivierten Ablehnung der westeuropäischen Integration in 

den sozialistischen Staaten und dem wirtschaftlich bedingten Bestreben einiger 

Staaten gab, mit den EWG- und EFTA-Mitgliedsländern Handelskontakte zu unterhalten. 

Trotz der Nationalisierung des Bankwesens nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 

wurden sowohl in Polen als auch in der Tschechoslowakei zwei Banken nicht vollständig 

verstaatlicht, die den Außenhandel mit westlichen Ländern abwickeln sollten. 

Bis 1989 bleibt die Bank Handlowy [Handelsbank] in Polen - neben dem 

polnischen Staat als größtem Gesellschafter - auch teilweise in ausländischer, vorwiegend 

westeuropäischer Hand. Die ausländischen Beteiligungen erleichterten 

den Finanzverkehr insbesondere mit Unternehmen aus Westeuropa und den USA. 

Die westlichen Unternehmen, die weiterhin mit Polen Kontakte pflegten, vertrauten 

diesen Banken mehr als den rein staatlichen Finanzinstitutionen. Eine ähnliche 

Situation war in der Tschechoslowakei festzustellen. Dort übernahm die Gewerbebank 

[Živnostenská banka] in der gesamten sozialistischen Periode eine Vermittlerrolle 

im Zahlungsverkehr mit dem westlichen Ausland. 4 An dieser Bank gab es 

auch eine Minderheitsbeteiligung von ausländischem Kapital. 

2. Forschungsstand und Methoden 

Die wirtschaftspolitischen Reaktionen in den ostmitteleuropäischen Ländern auf 

die wirtschaftliche Integration des westlichen Teils des Kontinents und die daraus 

folgenden realwirtschaftlichen Konsequenzen in Ostmitteleuropa sind bis heute 

nicht ausreichend erforscht. Die zeitgenössische Literatur zum Thema der wirtschaftlichen 

Integration Westeuropas fällt in Polen und der Tschechoslowakei 

(ČSSR) eher spärlich aus. Der wichtigste Grund dafür ist, dass dieser Prozess in 

beiden Ländern in der sozialistischen Periode offiziell abgelehnt und verurteilt 

wurde. Jan Kułakowski – der erste Unterhändler Polens in den Assoziierungsverhandlungen 

mit der Europäischen Union – erinnert sich, dass in den 1950er Jahren 

ein Engagement für die pro-europäische Bewegung nicht möglich war und schon 

das Interesse an den entstehenden europäischen Strukturen Kritik hervorrief. 5 Bis 

in die 1970er Jahre hinein und damit bis zu der neuen auf Entspannung und Verständigung 

ausgerichteten Ostpolitik der meisten EWG-Länder, sahen die Ent- 

3. Siehe dazu: Á. TÖRÖK, Á. GYÖRFFY, Ungarn in der Vorreiterrolle, in: J. GÜNTHER, D. JA- 

JEŚNIAK-QUAST (Hrsg.), Willkommene Investoren oder nationaler Ausverkauf? Ausländische 

Direktinvestitionen in Ostmitteleuropa im 20. Jahrhundert, Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, Berlin, 

2006, S.253-274. 

4. JIRÁSEK, Zdeněk/MAŁKIEWICZ, Andrzej (2005): Polska i Czechosłowacja w dobie stalinizmu 

(1948-1956) [Polen und die Tschechoslowakei in der Zeit des Stalinismus (1948-1956)], Warszawa: 

Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, S. 182 und 184 .

Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa 71 

scheidungsträger der Volksrepublik (VR) Polen und der ČSSR den Integrationsprozess 

des Westens als eine Konzentration des Kapitalismus an, die maßgeblich durch 

die USA inspiriert sei. Spätestens seit Anfang der 1950er Jahre, also mit dem 

Beginn des westlichen Wirtschaftsembargos gegenüber Ostmitteleuropa, wurde 

daher dieser Prozess offiziell abgelehnt. In beiden Ländern wurden derartige Kontakte 

zum westlichen Teil des Kontinents in den 1950er Jahren auch als Landesverrat 

angesehen. In der Tschechoslowakei wurden besonders viele Wirtschaftsexperten 

während der politischen Schauprozesse der 1950er Jahre zum Tode verurteilt. 6 

Eine erste Monographie über die Tendenzen und Perspektiven des Handels zwischen 

Polen und den Ländern der EWG erschien in Polen erst im Jahre 1974. 7 Mit 

dem Außenhandel und den wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen den beiden 

Blöcken befasste sich die Forschung systematisch erst Ende der achtziger Jahre. 8 

Anders sieht es in den zahlreichen wirtschaftlichen Fachperiodika aus, die für die 

zu untersuchende Zeitperiode allein in Polen mit ca. 218 Titeln beziffert werden 

können. In Polen diskutierte man die Auswirkungen der westlichen Integration auf 

den polnischen Außenhandel und die Binnenwirtschaft für den hier betrachteten 

Zeitabschnitt in unregelmäßigen Abständen in „Ekonomista“ [„Ökonom“] (Warszawa 

1947-2000), „Handel Zagraniczny“ [Außenhandel] (Warszawa: 1955-1984) 

und Życie gospodarcze“ [Wirtschaftsleben] (Katowice: 1945-1949, Warszawa 

1949-1988). Für die Tschechoslowakei sind in diesem Kontext die zahlreichen Veröffentlichungen 

in den zeitgenössischen Periodika wie „Plánované hospodárství“ 

[„Planwirtschaft“] oder „Hospodářské noviny“ [„Wirtschaftsnachrichten“] sowie 

„Zahraniční obchod“[Außenhandel] vor allem in der Zeit des Prager Frühlings von 

großem Interesse. 9 Bis heute sind allerdings Untersuchungen zu diesem Thema, 

mit Ausnahme von wenigen ersten Ansätzen, rar geblieben. 10 

5. KUŁAKOWSKI, Jan: Polityka Polski wobec Unii Europejskiej [Politik Polen bzgl. der Europäischen 

Union], in: Sprawy Międzynarodowe rocznik 1997 [Jahrgang 1997], unter: http:// 

www.sprawymiedzynarodowe.pl/rocznik/1997/ 

jan_kulakowski_polityka_polski_wobec_unii_europejskiej.html 

6. Vgl. K. KAPLAN, Komunistický rezim a politické procesy v Československu [Das kommunistische 

Regime und die politischen Prozesse in der Tschechoslowakei], Barrister & Principal, Brno 

2001; Id., Nekrvavá revoluce [Die unblutige Revolution], Mladá fronta, Praha, 1993; Id., Die politischen 

Prozesse in der Tschechoslowakei 1948-1954, Oldenbourg, München, 1986. 

7. Vgl.: A WIECZORKIEWICZ, Tendencje i perspektywy handlu między Polską a krajami EWG 

[Tendenzen und Perspektiven des Handels zwischen Polen und den Ländern der EWG], Państwowe 

Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warschau, 1974. 

8. Vgl.: M. HAENDCKE-HOPPE (Hrsg.), Außenwirtschaftssysteme und Außenwirtschaftsreformen 

sozialistischer Länder. Ein intrasystemarer Vergleich, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1988. 

9. J. PLEVA, Konference o plánování zahraničního obchodu [Die Konferenz über die Planung des 

Außenhandels], in: Plánované hospodářství, 2(1968); Z. ŠEDIVÝ, Ke koncepci rozvoje vnăjších 

ekonomických vztahů [Zur Konzeption der Entwicklung der Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen], in: 

Plánované hospodářství, 7(1968); K. PODLAHA, Struktura vnăjších hospodářských vztahů a 

ekonomická rovnováha [Die Struktur der Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen und das wirtschaftliche 

Gleichgewicht], in: Plánované hospodáøství, 4(1969); J. KUBÁLEK, Konkretizace hospodářské 

politiky v oblasti vnìjších ekonomických vztahů [Die Konkretisierung der Wirtschaftspolitik im 

Bereich der Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen], in: Hospodářské noviny, 09.08.1968.

72 


Die Erforschung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen den westeuropäischenund 

einzelnen RGW-Ländern im Kalten Krieg bleibt also nach wie vor eine 

anspruchsvolle Aufgabe. Derartige Untersuchungen wurden parallel von Forschergruppen 

initiiert, die von Alice Teichová, Dieter Stiefel und Gertrude Enderle-Burcel 

in Wien, Luciano Segreto in Florenz sowie André Steiner in Potsdam geleitet 

werden. Darüber hinaus gibt es einzelne neuere Veröffentlichungen zu diesem 

Thema. 11 Für die Tschechoslowakei sind vor allem Beiträge von Jaroslav Kučera, 12 

Christoph Buchheim, 13 Bohumír Brom 14 und Lenka Málková 15 zu nennen. 

Die Auswertung der Primärquellen in den Nationalarchiven ist auf Grund des 

geschilderten Forschungsstandes unumgänglich. Außerdem werden die Statistiken 

des Außenhandels herangezogen. Meine Recherchen basieren vor allem auf den 

Quellen aus den Zentralen Archiven in Warschau und Prag: Prager Staatsarchiv 

(Státní ústřední Archiv, SÚA), Warschauer Archiv der Neuen Akten (Archiwum 

Akt Nowych) sowie Archiv des Außenministeriums (Archiwum MSZ). Für das 

Thema sind in Prag insbesondere die Akten des Außenhandelsministeriums (Ministerstvo 

zahraničního obchodu) sowie die Akten der Wirtschaftskommission (Ekonomická 

komise) und die Bestände der Staatlichen Planbehörde (Statní úřad 

plánování, SÚP) von großer Bedeutung. Für die polnische Seite erfasste ich vor 

allem die Bestände der Plankommission (Państwowa Komisja Planowania 

Gospodarczego PKPG bzw. Komisja Planowania przy Radzie Ministrów), des 

Ministeriums für Industrie und Handel (Ministerstwo Przemysłu i Handlu, MpiH), 

10. Die ersten Ansätze dieses Themas findet man auch in dieser Zeitschrift. Siehe für Polen: A. 

KROK-PASZKOWSKA, J. ZIELONKA, Poland´s Road to the European Union, in: Journal of 

European Integration History, 2(2004), S.7-24, hier: 11-13 und für die Tschechoslowakei: J. 

KARALAS, P. KRATOCHVÍL, Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republik and European Integration: 

During and After the Cold War, in: idem., S.25-42, hier: 26-32; sowie: J. SCHEVARDO, Der Westen 

im Osten. Reaktion auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa, [unveröffentlichtes 

Manuskript], Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam, 2005. 

11. J. ELORANTA, J. OJALA (eds), East-West Trade and the Cold War, Jyväskylä Studies in Humanities, 

Jyväskylä, 2005. 

12. J. KUČERA, Reformdynamik und wirtschaftspolitischer Alltag. Der Außenhandel in Theorie und 

Praxis der tschechoslowakischen Wirtschaftsreform der sechziger Jahre, in: Ch. BOYER (Hrsg.), 

Sozialistische Wirtschaftsreformen. Tschechoslowakei und DDR im Vergleich, Klostermann, 

Frankfurt am Main, 2006, S.311-355. 

13. Ch. BUCHHEIM, Die Integration der Tschechoslowakei in den RGW. In: Bohemia, in: Zeitschrift 

für die Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder, 1(2001), S.1–10. 

14. B. BROM, Dokumenty z českých archívů k historii mezinárodných hospodářských vztahů 

v období studené války: studie o pramenech [Dokumente aus den Tschechischen Archiven für die 

Geschichte der internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zur Zeit des Kalten Krieges: Eine Studie 

über die Archivquellen], Karolinum, Prag, 2002; ders.: Československo a západoevropská integrace 

(základní rysy vzájemných hospodárských, zejména obchodních vztahů od konce 2. svătové války 

do počatku 90. let) [Die Tschechoslowakei und die westeuropäische Integration (Grundrisse der 

gegenseitigen Handelsbeziehungen seit dem Ende des 2. Weltkrieges bis Anfang der 1990er Jahre], 

[unveröffentlichtes Manuskript], Staatliches Zentralarchiv, Prag, 2000. 

15. L. MÁLKOVÁ, Vývoj spolupráce mezi Evropskými společenstvími a Československem do roku 

1992 [Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Europäischen Union und der Tschechoslowakei 

bis 1992], unveröffentlichte Magisterarbeit, Wirtschaftshochschule Prag, 1999.


des Außenhandelsministeriums (Ministerstwo Handlu Zagranicznego) und des 

Zentralkomitees der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei (Komitet Centralny 

PZPR). 

3. Phasen der Wahrnehmung der westeuropäischen Integration in 

Ostmitteleuropa 

Die Wahrnehmung und Bewertung der westeuropäischen Wirtschaftsintegration in 

Polen und der Tschechoslowakei war – ähnlich wie die tatsächlichen Handelsbeziehungen 

– nicht statisch, sondern unterlag verschiedenen historischen Einflüssen. 

Ich beschränke mich zunächst auf eine Periodisierung des Hauptdiskurses, ohne 

dabei auf die spezifischen Unterschiede zwischen Polen und der Tschechoslowakei 

einzugehen. In der Wahrnehmung der Integrationsprozesse wird vor allem der 

Unterschied zwischen den einzelnen Jahrzehnten deutlich. Die Reaktion auf die 

westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa ist trotz der offiziellen 

Ablehnung dieses Prozesses durch die kommunistischen Parteien sehr vielschichtig. 

Das Beispiel der Tschechoslowakei und Polens in der Zeit von den fünfziger 

bis zu den siebziger Jahren zeigt, dass diese Reaktionen von der völligen Abschottung, 

von Autarkiebestrebungen, über die eigene Integration im Rahmen des RGW 

bis hin zu gezielten Bemühungen um den Dialog mit den Integrationsbündnissen 

der westeuropäischen Länder reichen. 

Es wäre eine Binsenwahrheit zu sagen, dass die sozialistischen Länder der Entwicklung 

der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen mit den Ländern Westeuropas, darunter 

mit den Staaten der EWG, eine immer größere Bedeutung beimaßen. Aus der 

zeitgenössischen polnischen Sicht sprachen für diese Beziehungen eine große Konvergenz 

der Struktur der Importnachfrage der sozialistischen Länder (vor allem 

Investitionsgüter) mit der Struktur des Exportangebots der EWG-Länder, die große 

Aufnahmefähigkeit des EWG-Marktes, die historisch bedingte Tradition des 

gemeinsamen Handels, die geographische Nähe, woraus relativ niedrige Transportkosten 

resultierten, und schließlich das wachsende Interesse der EWG-Länder an 

der Erweiterung der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen mit den sozialistischen Staaten. 

16 

Die historische Tradition des gemeinsamen Handels wird durch den Anteil der 

westlichen Staaten und den USA im Außenhandel mit Polen und der Tschechoslowakei 

vor dem Krieg deutlich. Dieser Anteil verringerte sich von durchschnittlich 

85% bzw. 90% vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und entsprechend 60% bzw. 68% noch 

im Jahre 1948 auf durchschnittlich 33% bzw. 30% im Jahre 1952 (siehe Abbildung 

1). 

16. Vgl. dazu: Z. KAMECKI, Integracja gospodarcza w Europie Zachodniej a handel 

Wschód-Zachód [Die Wirtschaftsintegration in Westeuropa und der Ost-West Handel], Sprawy 

Międzynarodowe, Warszawa, 10-11(1970), S.30-43, hier: 30.

74 


(1) Anteil der westeuropäischen Staaten und der USA im Außenhandel Polens 

und der Tschechoslowakei vor und nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (in Prozent) 

Quelle: S. BIALER, O międzynarodowych stosunkach ekonomicznych nowego typu 

[Über die internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen des neuen Typs], in: Ekonomista, 

III(1953), S.56. 

3.1. Die späten 1940er und 1950er Jahre 

Direkt nach dem Krieg waren die ostmitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftswissenschafter 

noch unsicher, ob es sich bei der westeuropäischen Wirtschaftsintegration um einen 

dauerhaften Trend handelt. Die Zusammenschlüsse zur Zoll- und Wirtschaftsunion 

wurden als eine Mode bezeichnet. Schon bald standen die ostmitteleuropäischen 

Wirtschaftsexperten diesen Prozessen allerdings sehr skeptisch gegenüber. Das 

Hauptargument gegen die Zoll- und Wirtschaftsunion war, dass die damit verbundenen 

Integrationsprozesse nur den Wirtschaften weniger westeuropäischer Kernländern 

Vorteile bringen. 17 Eine Zollunion lehnte man im Osten des Kontinents 

kategorisch ab, denn eine Zollunion (wie die EWG) reduziert bzw. hebt im Unterschied 

zur Freihandelszone (wie die EFTA) nicht nur die Zollgrenzen innerhalb der 

Gemeinschaft auf, sondern erhebt auch einen gemeinsamen Außenzoll. Ein 

gemeinsamer Außenzoll würde demnach die ostmitteleuropäischen Länder, die traditionell 

mit Westeuropa Handel betrieben, sehr stark benachteiligen. 

Nach der Unterzeichnung der Römischen Verträge im März 1957 wurde die 

Zollunion von sechs westeuropäischen Ländern schrittweise zur Realität und damit 

erfuhren auch die ostmitteleuropäischen Vorbehalte eine Bestätigung. Im Angesicht 

des Kalten Krieges wurden die gesamteuropäischen Wirtschafts- und Handelsbeziehungen, 

sowohl im Osten als auch im Westen Europas, immer mehr durch den 

Austausch in jeweils regionalen wirtschaftlichen Gruppierungen (RGW vs. EWG/ 

EFTA) ersetzt. Diese Integrationsorganismen in Ost und West entwickelten sich vor 

17. Włosko-francuska unia celna [Die italienisch-französische Zollunion], in: Życie Gospodarcze, 

3(1948), S.118-119, hier: 119.


allem in den 1950er Jahren in einer völligen gegenseitigen Isolation. Unter diesen 

Bedingungen führten die europäischen Integrationsprozesse - trotz der Wachstumsstimuli 

für die integrierten Länder - in der Perspektive der gesamteuropäischen 

Arbeitsteilung zu eindeutig negativen Ergebnissen. 

Ursprünglich sahen die ostmitteleuropäischen Ökonomen den Handel zwischen 

Ost- und Westeuropa als eine Notwendigkeit für beide Seiten an. Bereits kurz nach 

dem Zweiten Weltkrieg schrieben polnische Wirtschaftswissenschaftler darüber, 

dass die Okkupationszonen in Westdeutschland, vor allem die Bi-Zone, nicht das 

ursprüngliche ökonomische Potenzial erreichen könne, wenn sie weiterhin von der 

sowjetischen Besatzungszone (SBZ) und den Ländern Osteuropas abgekoppelt 

blieben. 18 

Der „amerikanische Imperialismus“ war in den Augen der osteuropäischen 

Experten dafür verantwortlich, dass die westeuropäischen Länder die Möglichkeit 

des Bezugs von Lebensmitteln aus den alten Herkunftsländern Ostmitteleuropas 

einbüßten. 19 Hier wurden vor allem der „Battle Act“ und andere Begrenzungen im 

Rahmen des Marshall-Plans genannt. So gelten die Restriktionen der Mutual Security 

Agency (MSA) oder die Arbeit der Consultive Group Cooperation Committee 

(CGCOCOM) als Beispiele in dieser Hinsicht. 20 Die Rolle der USA bei der Zerstörung 

der traditionellen Ost-West-Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und ihr Einfluss im Integrationsprozess 

Westeuropas wurde aber nicht nur von den ostmitteleuropäischen 

Wissenschaftlern und Politikern betont, sondern auch im Westen thematisiert. So 

wählte der Schwede Gunnar Adler-Karlsson in seiner bekannten „Abrechnung“ mit 

den Ost-West-Wirtschaftsbeziehungen bewusst eine ähnliche Argumentation, als er 

feststellte, dass der amerikanische Kongress den Handel zwischen Ost- und Westeuropa 

unterbinden wollte, um damit die innere Wirtschaftskraft der Sowjetunion 

ernsthaft zu schädigen. 21 

Die Schuld für das Abbrechen der Handelskontakte zwischen Ost- und Westeuropa 

gaben die ostmitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftspolitiker eindeutig der Politik der 

USA und dem fortschreitenden Integrationsprozess Westeuropas, mit dessen einzelnen 

Schritten wie der Gründung der Organisation für europäische Wirtschaftszusammenarbeit 

(Organisation for European Economic Cooperation – OEEC, 

1948), der Europäischen Zahlungsunion (1950), der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 

für Kohle und Stahl (1951) bis hin zu den Römischen Verträgen im Jahre 1957. 22 

Der Integrationsprozess wurde wiederum als entscheidend für die Reaktivierung 

18. F. WILIŃSKI, Bizonia [Die Bizone], in: Życie Gospodarcze, 5(1948), S.194-197, hier: 197. 

19. Siehe dazu: A. PAWLIKIEWICZ, Destrukcyjne skutki planu Marshalla [Die destruktiven Folgen 

des Marshallplans], in: Życie Gospodarcze, 5(1950), S.235-238, hier vor allem: 238. 

20. Im Jahre 1951 beschloss der Kongress der USA das Battle Act, das mit dem Rückzug der wirtschaftlichen 

Hilfe der USA für die westeuropäischen Länder drohte, die weiterhin Handelsbeziehungen, 

vor allem den Handel mit den Embargowaren, mit sozialistischen Ländern unterhalten. 

Die MSA wurde im Jahre 1952 ins Leben gerufen und kontrollierte die Marshallplanländer. Ebenfalls 

im Jahre 1952 wurde das C.G. CO. COM mit Sitz in Paris zum Zweck der Kontrolle des Handels 

mit Osteuropa gegründet. 

21. G. ADLER-KARLSSON, Der Fehlschlag. 20 Jahre Wirtschaftskrieg zwischen Ost und West, Europa 

Verlag, Wien, 1971, S.123.

76 


des „deutschen Imperialismus“ und die Exportexpansion der Bundesrepublik von 

den ostmitteleuropäischen Politikern und Wirtschaftsexperten angesehen und 

gefürchtet. 23 Vor allem wurde der so genannte Schuman-Plan scharf verurteilt, 

denn in ihm sahen die ostmitteleuropäischen Experten eine wesentliche Unterstützung 

für westdeutsche Eisen- und Stahlunternehmen. Daher wurde der Schuman-Plan 

als ein Werkzeug der Aggressionspolitik der großen Stahlmonopole der 

USA und der westdeutschen „Magnaten aus dem Ruhrgebiet“ 24 angesehen und als 

eine „Party der amerikanischen Monopolisten unter dem Namen Schumanplan“ 25 

bezeichnet. Die Aufhebung der alliierten Kontrolle über die Produktion von Kohle 

und Stahl, die Reaktivierung der Vorkriegskartelle und die Steigerung der 

Rüstungsproduktion in Westdeutschland sah man in Ostmitteleuropa als eine 

direkte Folge des „atlantischen Integrationsprozesses“ 26 Westeuropas. 

Die steigende Exportkraft Westdeutschlands befand sich vor allem mit der auf 

Export orientierten tschechoslowakischen Wirtschaftspolitik auf Kollisionskurs. 

Schon unmittelbar nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg hoffte unter anderem Präsident 

Edvard Beneš, dass nach der Kriegsniederlage Deutschlands die Tschechoslowakei 

als eines der am meisten industrialisierten Länder Ostmitteleuropas die einstige 

Rolle Deutschlands als Lieferant von industriellen Produkten für den europäischen 

Markt, vor allem von Erzeugnissen der Schwerindustrie, übernehmen könnte. 27 

22. K. PIOTROWSKA-HOCHFELDOWA, Europejska Wspólnota Gospodarcza [Die Europäische 

Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft], in: Ekonomista, 1(1958), S.165-188. 

23. Vgl.: M. TOMALA, Odradzanie się ekspansji ekonomicznej monopoli zachodnio-niemieckich 

[Das Erneuern der wirtschaftlichen Expansion der westdeutschen Monopole], in: Ekonomista, 

1(1955), S.134-142 und ders: Besprechung des Buches von K. H. Domdey: Die deutschen Monopole 

auf den äußeren Märkten [Verlag Die Wirtschaft, Berlin, 1959], in: Ekonomista, 4-5(1959), 

S.1095-1099, hier: 1098. Noch stärker wurde das Problem des „amerikanischen Programms der 

Wirtschaftsintegration Westeuropas“ und der Verknüpfung der Zoll- und Wirtschaftspolitik Westdeutschlands 

mit der USA-Politik in der DDR-Literatur diskutiert, was die polnische Fachliteratur 

rezipierte: J. RUTKOWSKI, Besprechung des Sammelbandes: Zur Finanzpolitik der Deutschen 

Bundesrepublik. I. Anton Borgmeier: Preispolitik, II. Rolf Lohse: Die Zollpolitik [Berlin: Verlag 

die Wirtschaft, 1958], in: Ekonomista, 1(1959), S. 1105-1110, hier: 1109 f. 

24. A. FILIPIAK, Z obrad VI Sesji Europejskiej Komisji Gospodarczej ONZ [Aus den Verhandlungen 

der VI. Tagung der Europäischen Wirtschaftskommission der VN], in: Życie Gospodarcze, 

15(1951), S.868-870, hier: 868. 

25. L. SIENNICKI, Plan Schumana – narzędziem polityki agresji [Der Schumanplan – Werkzeug der 

Politik der Aggression], in: Życie Gospodarcze, 8(1951), S.470-473, hier: 473; S. BIELAK, Przed 

realizacją planu Schumana [Vor der Realisierung des Schuman-Plans], in: Idem., 23(1951), 

S.1294-1296, hier: 1294, sowie: Przemysł stalowy Francji i Europejskie Zjednoczenie Węgla i Stali 

[Die Stahlindustrie Frankreichs und die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl], in: 

Idem., 1(1954), S.38-39; sowie: Czy Anglia przystąpi do Europejskiego Zjednoczenia Węgla i Stali 

[Wird England der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl beitreten?], in: Idem., 8(1954), 

S.318-320, hier: 318. 

26. Co dało Francji „Europejskie Zjednoczenie Węgla i Stalii” [Was hat Frankreich der „Europäischen 

Vereinigung für Kohle und Stahl” gebracht], in: Życie Gospodarcze, 18(1954), S.715-717, 

hier: 717; Handlarze broni zapowiadają nowy boom [Die Waffenhändler kündigen einen neuen 

Boom an], in: Idem., 21(1954), S.839; W imię zapewnienia pokoju w Europie trzeba uniemoźliwić 

wskrzeszenie militaryzmu niemieckiego [Im Namen der Sicherung des Friedens in Europa muss 

man die Wiederbelebung des deutschen Militarismus verhindern], in: Idem., 24(1954), S.921-922.


Dieses Ziel verfolgten allmählich auch die anderen ostmitteleuropäischen Länder. 

So wurde die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit der ostmitteleuropäischen Länder 

als Kompensation zum Wiedererstarken des wirtschaftlichen Potenzials Deutschlands 

interpretiert. Der spätere Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe sollte das Erbe 

des deutschen wirtschaftlichen Einflusses im Osten des Kontinents antreten. 28 

3.2. Die 1960er Jahre 

Seit Beginn der 1960er Jahre schauten die ostmitteleuropäischen Länder verstärkt 

über den eigenen Tellerrand und suchten nach Wegen der Nutzung der Integration 

zu ihrem eigenen Vorteil. Angestoßen von polnischen Wirtschaftswissenschaftlern 

(Włodzimierz Brus, Oskar Lange), bald gefolgt von tschechoslowakischen Ökonomen 

(Otta Šik) setzte eine Diskussion über die positiven Effekte wirtschaftlicher 

Integration ein. 29 So beriefen in Polen im Jahr 1968 der Außenminister und der 

Minister für Außenhandel gleichzeitig eine Kommission für die Untersuchung der 

Möglichkeiten der Nutzung der Integrationsprozesse im Westen Europas für die 

polnische Volkswirtschaft ein. 30 

Offiziell wurden vor allem seitens der Partei die wirtschaftlichen Integrationsprozesse 

Westeuropas in ihren Zielen und Aufgaben weiterhin als gegen das sozialistische 

System gerichteter Prozess wahrgenommen. 31 In den wissenschaftlichen 

Publikationen, die seit dem Ende der 1960er Jahre verstärkt zu dem Thema der 

wirtschaftlichen Integration Westeuropas in Polen publiziert wurden, sah man 

27. A. ZAUBERMAN, Industrial progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany 1937-1962, 

Oxford University Press, London, u.a., 1964, S.272. 

28. W. KONDERSKI, Zagadnienie współpracy gospodarczej państw południowo-wschodniej Europy 

[Das Problem der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit der Länder im süd-östlichen Europa], in: Życie 

Gospodarcze, 6(1948), S.246-249, hier: 246 f. 

29. Vgl. J. SCHEVARDO, op.cit., S.7; D. JAJEŚNIAK-QUAST, Die ersten Versuche der Dezentralisierung 

der sozialistischen Planwirtschaft in Polen. Höhepunkte der Debatten über die Wirtschaftsreformen 

(1956-1968), in: H.-G. HAUPT, J. REQUATE, M. KÖHLER-BAUR (Hrsg.), Aufbruch 

in die Zukunft. Die 1960er zwischen Planungseuphorie und kulturellem Wandel. DDR, CSSR und 

Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Vergleich, Velbrück Wissenschaft, Weilerswist, 2004, S.89-106. 

30. Verordnung Nr.3 des Ministers für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten vom 20.03.1962 für die Berufung 

einer internen Arbeitsgruppe im Außenministerium für die Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Integration 

und: Verordnung Nr.62 des Ministers für Außenhandel vom 13.09.1962 für die Berufung 

einer Arbeitsgruppe für die Bearbeitung der Folgen für den polnischen Außenhandel aufgrund des 

Fortschrittes der Integrationsprozesse in Westeuropa, in: A. KOCHAŃSKI, Polska 1944-1991, Informator 

historyczny, Tom 2, Ważniejsze akty prawne decyzje i enuncjacje państwowe (1957-1970) 

[Polen 1944-1991, Ein historischer Leitfaden, Band 2, Die wichtigsten Rechtsakten, Entscheidungen 

und Staatlichen Beschlüsse], Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa, 2000, S.301 und 322. 

31. Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warschawie [Archiv der Neuen Akten in Warschau; weiter: AAN], Komitet 

Centralny Polskiej Zjednoczenej Partii Robotniczej [Zentralkomitee der Polnischen Vereinigten 

Arbeiterpartei; weiter KC PZPR], 1354/V/101, Protokół z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego 

z dnia 14.03.1972 [Protokoll aus der Sitzung des Politbüros vom 14.03.1972], S.133.

78 


neben den ökonomischen Motiven den Integrationsprozess auch als einen politisch, 

ideologisch und sogar militärisch bedingten Vorgang an. 32 

In den Expertengremien der beiden Länder herrschte allerdings in den 1960er 

Jahren bereits die Meinung vor, dass die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft den 

„point of no return“ erreicht hat und „zum Erfolg verurteilt“ sei. 33 Angesichts des 

Faktes, dass die EWG in den 1960er Jahren der größte Handelsblock der Welt war 

und mit 185 Millionen Konsumenten den ersten Platz auf der Liste der Weltexporteure 

von Industriewaren einnahm, gleichzeitig auch zu den größten Importeuren 

von landwirtschaftlichen Produkten gehörte, war eine weitere Abnabelung der beiden 

Länder gegenüber dieser Gemeinschaft nicht mehr möglich. 

3.3. Die 1970er Jahre 

In den 1970er Jahren zeigte die Entspannungspolitik im Rahmen der Vorbereitung 

für die Konferenz für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE) auch die 

Änderung in den wirtschaftlichen Verhältnissen zwischen den beiden Ländern und 

vorwiegend den EWG-Ländern. 34 Im Rahmen der Vorbereitung dieser Konferenz 

und während des Treffens der Außenminister der Staaten des Warschauer Paktes in 

Budapest im Juni 1970 war dies ein Thema. Polen und andere sozialistische Länder 

formulierten in einem Memorandum den Vorschlag im Rahmen der KSZE auch die 

Probleme der Erweiterung der gesamteuropäischen Wirtschafts- und Handelsbeziehungen 

zu berücksichtigen. 35 Dabei hatten gemeinsame Infrastrukturprojekte Priorität, 

wie die Schaffung eines europäischen Energiesystems, der Ausbau des Straßennetzes 

und die Verbesserung des Eisenbahntransportes in Europa. 

Auf der anderen Seite wurde der ostmitteleuropäische Markt immer interessanter 

für die Länder aus den westeuropäischen Integrationsbündnissen. Vor allem 

nach dem Ölschock der 1970er Jahre zeigte sich die Enge des EWG-Markts und 

eine gewisse Sättigung. In Osteuropa (inklusive der UdSSR) bestanden dagegen 

große Reserven sowohl an Rohstoffen als auch an den qualifizierten Arbeitskräften. 

Darüber hinaus stellte Ostmitteleuropa einen großen und in keiner Weise gesättigten 

Konsumentenmarkt mit fast 350 Millionen Einwohnern und einem relativ großen 

Wachstum dar. 36 Den polnischen Wirtschaftsexperten war dieser Umstand 

32. Vgl. u.a.: T. GRABOWSKI, Z. NOWAK (Hrsg.), Integracja ekonomiczna Europy Zachodniej i jej 

aspekty polityczno-militarne [Die wirtschaftliche Integration Westeuropas und ihre politisch-militärischen 

Aspekte], Instytut Zachodni, Poznań, 1969; Z.M. KLEPACKI, Zachodnioeuropejskie 

organizacje międzynarodowe [Die internationalen Organisationen Westeuropas], Ksiąźka i Wiedza, 

Warszawa, 1969. 

33. M. ŁYTKO, EWG – czy tylko unia celna? [EWG – nur eine Zollunion?], in: Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 

12(1968), S.48-68, hier: 56 und 64. 

34. Vgl. dazu: Z. LUDWICZAK, Aktualne problemy związane z Europejską Konferencją Bezpieczeństwa 

i Współpracy [Die aktuellen Probleme, die die Konferenz für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit 

in Europa betreffen], in: Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 9(1970), S.23-34. 

35. W. GRABSKA, Ogólnoeuropejska współpraca gospodarcza [Die gesamteuropäische wirtschaftliche 

Zusammenarbeit], in: Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 9(1970), S.35-49, hier: 48.


bewusst. Während der vielen Treffen im Zentralkomitee der Polnischen Vereinigten 

Arbeiterpartei am Anfang der 1970er Jahre diskutierte man daher immer öfter die 

Stellung Polens bezüglich der Beziehungen zwischen den RGW-Ländern und der 

EWG. Man stellte fest, dass die Konsolidierungsprozesse innerhalb der EWG 

immer weiter voranschreiten werden. Aus der Sicht der sozialistischen Länder 

sollte die gemeinsame Handelspolitik der Gemeinschaft gegenüber den RGW-Ländern 

eine große Rolle spielen. Dabei zählte man in Polen vor allem auf die Verstärkung 

der industriellen Kooperation und auf westliche Kredite. 37 

4. Auswirkungen der Integrationsprozesse auf den Außenhandel und 

Reaktionen darauf 

Eine weitere These dieses Beitrags lautet, dass gerade im Bereich des Außenhandels 

mit Westeuropa der Einfluss des RGW nicht sehr stark war und die Länder 

weitgehend eigene Interessen verfolgten. Dies lag zum einen an der institutionellen 

Schwäche des Rates, zum anderen daran, dass der Außenhandel im System der 

sozialistischen Planwirtschaft an sich einen eher niedrigen Status eingeräumt 

bekam. 38 Diese institutionelle Schwäche des RGW führte dazu, dass sowohl Polen 

als auch die Tschechoslowakei immer wieder versuchten, mit westeuropäischen 

Ländern Handelskontakte zu unterhalten und die starren Grenzen des RGW zu 

überwinden. Diese Wege zu den Ländern der westeuropäischen Integrationsgemeinschaften 

waren sehr verschieden. Allgemein erfolgte eine Reaktion beider 

Länder auf die westeuropäischen Wirtschaftsintegrationsprozesse in folgenden 

Bereichen: 

– Diskussion und Einflussnahme im Rahmen der internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisation, 

z.B.: der Europäischen Wirtschaftskommission (ECE) oder des Allgemeinen 

Zoll- und Handelsabkommens (GATT); 

– Neuausrichtung der Handelbeziehungen in andere westeuropäische Märkte, vor 

allem im Rahmen der EFTA und NORDEK; 

– „Handel“ mit den EWG-Ländern über die neutralen Staaten; 

36. In den Jahren 1950-1967 war das Wachstum sowohl des Volkseinkommens als auch der Industrieproduktion 

der RGW-Länder höher als der EWG-Länder. Grund dafür war das niedrige Ausgangsniveau. 

Bei einem Ausgang der Industrieproduktion von 1950 (= 100) betrug die Steigerung der 

Produktion im Jahre 1967 für die RGW-Länder 176 und für die EWG entsprechend 136. Siehe dazu: 

W. GRABSKA, Ogólnoeuropejska współpraca …, op.cit., S 40. 

37. AAN, KC PZPR, 1354/V/101, Protokół z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia 14.03.1972 [Protokoll 

aus der Sitzung des Politbüros vom 14.03.1972], S. 12 und 133. 

38. Vgl. W. SEIFFERT, Das staatliche Außenhandelmonopol – Entstehungsgeschichte und Ausgestaltung 

bis zur Reformperiode der 1960er Jahre, in: M. HAENDCKE-HOPPE (Hrsg.), Außenwirtschaftssysteme 

und Außenwirtschaftsreformen sozialistischer Länder. Ein intrasystemarer 

Vergleich, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1988, S.11-17.

80 


– Nutzung der Kontakte zu den kommunistischen Parteien in Westeuropa und 

deren Wirtschaftsbereiche; 

– Eigene Integration im Rahmen des RGW. 

In diesem Beitrag wird zunächst die Neuausrichtung der Handelbeziehungen in 

andere westeuropäische Märkte, vor allem im Rahmen der EFTA und NORDEK 

und der „Handel“ mit den EWG-Ländern über die neutralen Staaten vorgestellt. 

4.1. Umlenkung der Warenströme 

Eine Möglichkeit, den Handel mit Westeuropa aufrecht zu erhalten bildeten u.a. die 

Umlenkungsstrategien der Warenströme. So kann auch die Steigerung der Handelsströme 

in die EFTA-Länder aus Polen als eine direkte Auswirkung des gemeinsamen 

Marktes des „kleinen Europas“ gesehen werden. Im Gegensatz zur Tschechoslowakei 

spielte in Polen der Außenhandel mit den späteren EFTA-Ländern schon 

vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg eine große Rolle und war mit 668 Millionen Złoty Handelsvolumen 

im Jahre 1936 sogar höher als mit den späteren EWG-Ländern, wo 

diese Summe entsprechend 624 Millionen Złoty betrug. Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 

stieg das Handelsvolumen mit den EFTA-Ländern weiter, während der 

Außenhandel mit den späteren EWG-Ländern bis zum Zeitpunkt der Römischen 

Verträge im Jahre 1957 stagnierte bzw. sank. Danach nahmen das Handelsvolumen 

mit beiden Integrationsblöcken zu, aber erst im Jahre 1968 übertraf der Außenhandel 

Polens mit den EWG-Ländern den Handel mit der EFTA. 

Aus der Statistik wird ersichtlich, dass die Zollunion der EWG vor allem für die 

Tschechoslowakei eine große Rolle spielte, denn für sie waren die späteren 

EWG-Länder traditionell die wichtigsten Handelspartner. Im Fall der Tschechoslowakei, 

das neben der DDR am meisten industrialisierte und exportorientierte Land 

des RGW, brach der Handel mit diesen Ländern nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg am 

stärksten ein und konnte sich von diesem radikalen Bruch erst Mitte der 1960er 

Jahre langsam erholen. 

Auch die sich verstärkenden Handelsvolumina mit den neutralen Ländern können 

als eine Folge des Integrationsprozesses in Westeuropa angesehen werden. 

Nach der Gründung der OEEC wurden die anderen Länder Westeuropas immer 

interessanter für den polnischen und tschechoslowakischen Außenhandel. Skandinavien 

spielte dabei schon aus politischen Gründen wegen der Neutralität von 

Finnland und Schweden eine entscheidende Rolle. Für den finnischen Außenhandel 

sind Polen und die Tschechoslowakei nicht zu unterschätzende Handelspartner, 

denn beide Länder standen im Jahre 1955 auf dem 8. und 9. Platz des finnischen 

Exports und entsprechend auf dem 6. und 9. Platz bezüglich des finnischen Imports 

(siehe Tabelle).


Tabelle 1: Die Haupthandelspartner Finnlands im Jahre 1955 

(in Milliarden Finn Mark) 

Export Ranking 

bzgl. 

Exports 

Import Ranking 

bzgl. 

Imports 

Großbritannien 43,5 1. 35,9 1. 

UdSSR 31,7 2. 26,0 2. 

BRD 16,5 3. 15,9 3. 

USA 10,4 4. 9,3 5. 

Frankreich 8,4 5. 10,5 4. 

Niederlande 8,0 6. 6,4 7. 

Belgien/Luxemburg 6,3 7. 5,3 8. 

Polen 3,6 8. 8,6 6. 

Tschechoslowakei 1,9 9. 4,8 9. 

Quelle: Handel zagraniczny Finlandii [Der Außenhandel Finnlands], Życie 

Gospodarcze, 8(1956), S.321. 

Polen und die Tschechoslowakei beobachteten bereits seit 1952 die Integrationsbestrebungen 

der skandinavischen Länder im Rahmen des Nordischen Rates 

sehr genau. Ostmitteleuropa reagierte mit Enttäuschung auf den Beschluss der 

Kopenhagener Konferenz im April 1968, im Rahmen der EFTA eine nordische 

Gemeinschaft mit dem Ziel einer Zollunion zu gründen. Ein Jahr später – im Juli 

1969 – wurde das Projekt der Nordischen Zollunion – NORDEK von den Regierungen 

von Dänemark, Norwegen, Schweden und Finnland umgesetzt. 39 Damit 

entstand eine neue europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, die zwar mit ca. 22 Millionen 

Konsumenten und 40 Milliarden US-Dollar der gesamten Summe der BIPs 

viel kleiner als die EWG war (hier waren die Daten zu dem Zeitpunkt entsprechend 

180 Millionen Konsumenten und 300 Milliarden US-Dollar), aber für Polen und 

die Tschechoslowakei bedeutete dies neue Handelsbarrieren in Europa. Immerhin 

betrugen die Handelsvolumina der NORDEK-Länder ca. ein Drittel des Umsatzes 

mit allen EFTA Ländern und entsprachen einem Fünftel des Außenhandels mit der 

EWG. 40 Die sozialistischen Länder befürchteten darüber hinaus mit Recht, dass 

das langfristige Ziel der nordischen Länder darin bestehen könnte, ihre Position in 

39. A. GROCHULSKI, NORDEK – nowy etap integracji krajów skandynawskich [NORDEK – die 

neue Etappe der Integration der skandinavischen Länder], in: Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 3(1970), 

S.106-116, hier: 107 und 109. 

40. Ibid., S.111.

82 


den Verhandlungen mit der EWG zu stärken, um schließlich eine Integration in die 

EWG zu erreichen. Ein Hinweis für dieses mögliche Ziel waren unter anderen die 

Pläne für eine Festlegung der Zollsätze aller vier skandinavischen Länder auf die 

Höhe der EWG-Zölle. 

Die Mitgliedschaft von Schweden und Finnland in der NORDEK-Gemeinschaft 

rief in beiden sozialistischen Länder weiterhin Sorgen hervor, dass die Neutralität 

der beiden Länder aufgegeben würde und sie unter die Vorherrschaft der NATO 

geraten könnten. Wirtschaftlich fürchteten Polen und die Tschechoslowakei die 

Entstehung eines weiteren abgeschotteten Wirtschaftsblocks im Norden Europas. 

Damit würde die bis jetzt relativ liberale Handelspolitik der nordischen Länder 

gegenüber den ostmitteleuropäischen Staaten aufgegeben. Für Polen hätte das den 

Verlust eines relativ großen wirtschaftlichen Partners bedeutet, denn der Anteil der 

skandinavischen Länder am polnischen Außenhandel betrug ca. 15%. Daher 

schaute man mit großer Hoffnung in Richtung Finnland, wo es große Bedenken 

gegenüber dem NORDEK-Verbund gab. 41 Gegen die Aufgabe der Neutralität, vor 

allem Finnlands, protestierte auch die Sowjetunion stark. 

In den beiden Ländern versuchte man aber weiterhin eigene Interessen unabhängig 

von der Sowjetunion zu verfolgen. Bereits Mitte der 1960er Jahre herrschte 

unter den Wirtschaftspolitikern Polens die Meinung vor, dass die Weiterentwicklung 

der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen mit den kapitalistischen Ländern eine wichtige 

Aufgabe sei. Sogar Piotr Jaroszewicz, der ständige Vertreter Polens im RGW, 

stellte fest, dass trotz der guten wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsperspektiven Polens 

innerhalb des RGW, ein Teil der wirtschaftlichen Aufgaben besser erfüllt werden 

könnten, wenn man die Kooperation mit anderen westeuropäischen Ländern ausbauen 

würde. 42 

Die statistischen Daten bestätigen, dass sich die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen 

den sozialistischen und westeuropäischen Ländern seit dem Anfang der 1960er 

Jahre langsam normalisierten. Die Bedeutung der neutralen Staaten ist schon in der 

1950er Jahren rückläufig und die der EWG-Länder steigt. Vor allem war der Zollabbau 

der EWG im Prozess der Normalisierung wichtig. Während der Handel 

Polens mit anderen Integrationsgruppen stagnierte oder sogar sank, stieg der Anteil 

der EWG-Länder am Außenhandel, im Export mit Polen bereits Mitte der 1950er 

Jahre von ca. 6% im Jahre 1955 auf über 12% im Jahre 1970. Der Anteil der 

EWG-Länder am polnischen Import stagnierte dagegen fast über den gesamten 

Untersuchungszeitraum bei einem Umfang von ca. 10% (siehe Abbildung 2). 

Im Fall der Tschechoslowakei setzte das Wachstum sogar früher ein. Im Gegensatz 

zu Polen nahm der Anteil der EWG-Länder sowohl im Fall des Exports als 

auch des Imports bereits seit 1953 kontinuierlich zu, von ca. 5% im Jahre 1953 auf 

über 10% im Jahre 1970. (siehe Abbildung 3). 

41. Ibid., S.114. 

42. P. JAROSZEWICZ, Polska, RWPG i gospodarka światowa [Polen, RGW und Weltwirtschaft], in: 

Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 7-8(1967), S.16-29, hier: 19 f.


(2) Anteil des polnischen Im- und Exports aus und in die westeuropäischen 

Länder nach Integrationsgruppen (in Prozent) 

Quelle: Mały Rocznik Statystyczny 1937, S.153; Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu 1970, 

S.24 f.; Rocznik Statystyczny 1970, S.359 f.; Rocznik Statystyczny 1980, S.313 f. 

(3) Anteil des tschechoslowakischen Im- und Exports aus und in die 

westeuropäischen Länder nach Integrationsgruppen (in Prozent) 

Quelle: Statistická Ročenka Republiky Československé 1938, S. 138-139; Statistická 

Ročenka Československé Socialistické Republiky 1960, S.361-362 und 

1965, S.385 und 1968, S.421 so wie 1971, S.423 und 425-427. 

5. Zusammenfassung 

Die Wahrnehmung der westeuropäischen Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa 

war trotz der offiziellen Ablehnung dieses Prozesses durch die kommunistischen

84 


Parteien nicht einseitig. Er unterlag im übrigen auch Wandlungen. Die Reaktionen 

auf die Integrationsprozesse im Westen des Kontinents reichten von der völligen 

Abschottung, über Autarkietendenzen, verstärkte Integration im Rahmen des RGW 

bis hin zum Dialog mit den Integrationsbündnissen der westeuropäischen Länder. 

Die statistischen Daten bestätigen, dass seit dem Anfang der 1960er Jahre langsam 

eine Ausweitung der Handelsbeziehungen zwischen den sozialistischen und westeuropäischen 

Ländern zu registrieren ist. Der Zollabbau der EWG spielte in diesem 

Prozess eine große Rolle. In den 1970er Jahren zeigte dagegen die Entspannungspolitik 

im Rahmen der Vorbereitung für die Konferenz für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit 

in Europa (KSZE) auch eine Änderung des wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisses 

der Tschechoslowakei und Polen insbesondere zur EWG. 

Grundsätzlich ist festzustellen, dass die ostmitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftsexperten 

den Handel zwischen Ost- und Westeuropa als eine Notwendigkeit für beide 

Seiten ansahen. Dabei wurde die Rolle der USA in der zeitgenössischen Diskussion 

in ihrem Einfluss im Integrationsprozess im Westen des Kontinents und in der 

Zerstörung der traditionellen Ost-West-Wirtschaftsbeziehungen betont. So sprach 

man im Osten über einen „atlantischen Integrationsprozess“ Westeuropas. Hier 

stimmen die Meinungen der ostmitteleuropäischen Wissenschaftler und Politiker 

mit derjenigen einiger westeuropäischer Kollegen überein. 

Darüber hinaus wurde der Integrationsprozess des Westens von den ostmitteleuropäischen 

Politikern und Wirtschaftsexperten gefürchtet, weil er eine Reaktivierung 

des „deutschen Imperialismus“ und die Expansion westdeutschen Ausfuhren 

mit sich bringen könnte. Diese Sorge gründete natürlich in den historischen Erfahrungen 

Ostmitteleuropas mit dem deutschen Expansionismus. 

Trotz der ideologischen Vorbehalte gegenüber den Wirtschaftskontakten mit westeuropäischen 

Ländern suchte die Wirtschaftspolitik Polens und der Tschechoslowakei 

nach Wegen, um den Kontakt zu den traditionellen Handelspartnern, den EFTA- und 

EWG-Ländern, aufrecht zu erhalten und damit auch einen Einfluss auf die westliche 

Integration auszuüben. Hier spielten die Diskussion und Einflussnahme im Rahmen 

der internationalen Wirtschaftsorganisation, wie der Europäischen Wirtschaftskommission 

(ECE) oder des Allgemeinen Zoll- und Handelsabkommens (GATT) eine 

große Rolle, denn das war die letzte Plattform, wo Mitglieder der beiden unterschiedlichen 

Integrationslager sich noch treffen konnten. Hier wurden insbesondere die negativen 

Folgen der Zollunion, die gemeinsame Agrarpolitik oder die Einfuhrkontingente 

für Ostmitteleuropa mit den westeuropäischen Ländern diskutiert. 

Zeitlich variieren die Bemühungen sehr, aber bereits in den 1960er Jahren 

herrschte die Meinung in den Expertengremien beider Länder, dass die Europäische 

Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft den „point of no return“ erreicht hat und „zum 

Erfolg verurteilt“ sei. Angesicht der steigenden Bedeutung der EWG auf dem Weltmarkt, 

war eine weitere Abkopplung der beiden Länder gegenüber dieser Gemeinschaft 

nicht mehr möglich. Zusätzlich führte die systembedingte Schwäche des 

RGW auch dazu, dass sowohl Polen als auch die Tschechoslowakei immer wieder 

versuchten, mit den westeuropäischen Ländern Handelskontakte zu unterhalten 

und nach Auswegen aus den starren RGW-Grenzen zu suchen.

Turning Eurosceptic: British trade unions 

and European integration (1961-1975) 

Thomas FETZER 

For a long time European integration historiography has been dominated by 

state-centred approaches either in the classic realist variant, or in the form of liberal 

intergovernmentalism. 1 On the other hand, with the major exception of the federalist 

European movements, 2 less attention has been paid to non-state actors. In the early 

post-war period neo-functionalist scholars had still contended that “interest groups” 

were crucial in bringing about “spill-over” effects that supposedly moved integration 

forward, 3 yet given that this general assumption proved to be of little value for 

historians their interest in European non-governmental organisations remained 

limited. Only recently, spurred by the more general turn towards transnational 

history and the revival of concepts such as “civil society” historians of European 

integration have shown a greater propensity to engage with the extensive political 

science literature dealing with non-state groups and networks at European level. 4 

So far, and rather obviously, the choice fell mostly on groups that actively 

attempted to influence European policy – from business and agricultural lobbies, 5 

pro-European party federations like the Christian Democrats, 6 to “epistemic communities” 

of experts 7 and those networks shaping what Keith Middlemas has called 

the “informal politics” of European integration. 8 Largely absent are studies on currents 

within civil society that, for whatever motives, opposed the European project 

consistently or for a temporary period. However, not least the recent failure of the 

constitution 9 has demonstrated that such currents can at times have an extraordi- 

1. W. LOTH, Beiträge der Geschichtswissenschaft zur Deutung der europäischen Integration, in: W. 

LOTH, W. WESSELS (eds.), Theorien europäischer Integration, Leske+Budrich, Opladen, 2001, 

pp.87-106. 

2. See for example A. LANDUYT, D. PREDA (eds.), I Movimenti per l’Unità Europea 1970-1986, 

Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000. 

3. See E. HAAS, The uniting of Europe: political, social, and economic forces 1950-1957, Stevens, 

London, 1958. 

4. See for example W. KAISER, P. STARIE (eds.), Transnational European Union. Towards a common 

political space, Routledge, London/New York, 2005; for an overview of the political science 

literature see J. GREENWOOD, Interest Representation in the European Union, 2 nd edition, Palgrave, 

Basingstoke, 2007. 

5. See for example E. BUSSIERE, M. DUMOULIN, Milieux économiques et intégration européenne 

en Europe occidentale au XXe siècle, Artois, Arras 1998. 

6. See W. KAISER, Transnational Christian Democracy and the Making of Contemporary Europe, 

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007. 

7. See B. LEUCHT, Netzwerke als Träger grenzüberschreitenden Kulturtransfers. Transatlantische 

Politiknetzwerke bei der Schuman-Plan-Konferenz 1950/51, in: comparativ, 4(2006), pp.200-218. 

8. K. Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe. The Informal Politics of European Union, 1973-1995, Fontana, 

London, 1995. 

9. The “Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe” (TCE) was adopted by EU member states in 

2004 but its ratification failed due to rejection in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005. 

85

86 

Thomas FETZER 

nary impact - simply by blocking important integration initiatives. Against the 

backdrop of growing signs of disenchantment with European integration political 

scientists have recently developed a keen interest in “Eurosceptic” movements – 

yet their studies, apart from few exceptions, usually lack a historical dimension. 10 

In the specific case of the United Kingdom Euroscepticism has to some extent 

always been taken into consideration by historians as part of the more general paradigm 

depicting Britain as the “awkward partner” in the EC because of the country’s 

ambiguous long-term relationship to the continent. 11 However, as Anthony Forster 

has pointed out, few studies focused directly on Eurosceptic groups themselves, 

and on the historical dynamics of their changing policy agendas. 12 

This article is a contribution to overcome this research deficit. It is concerned 

with a case study of British trade union attitudes towards the European Community 

(EC) 13 between 1961, the year of the first UK application to join the EC, and the 

referendum that confirmed British membership in 1975. During this time period 

British trade unions changed from being a cautiously pro-European to a staunchly 

anti-European movement. This transformation has so far received little scholarly 

attention – in contrast to the numerous accounts by political scientists of the celebrated 

“European turn” of British trade unionism since the late 1980s. 14 The main 

available work is Paul Teague’s unpublished Ph. D. thesis on the European policy 

of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), which, however, is an overview of the entire 

post-war period up to the early 1980s. 15 On the other hand, Clemens Wurms’ more 

10. See for example P. TAGGART, A. SZCZERBIAK (eds.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative 

Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008 (forthcoming). 

11. See for example P. LUDLOW, Us or Them? The Meanings of ‘Europe’ in British Political Discourse, 

in: M. af MALMBORG, B. STRATH (eds.), The Meaning of Europe. Variety and Contention 

within and among Nations, Berg, Oxford/New York, 2002, pp.101-124. 

12. A. FORSTER, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics. Opposition to Europe in the British 

Conservative and Labour Parties since 1945, Routledge, London/New York, 2002, p.5. Forster 

himself confines his analysis to political parties. 

13. The term “European Community” (EC) is used throughout the article. Direct quotations of trade 

union documents at times refer to “Common Market” and “European Economic Community” 

(EEC) as frequently used contemporary terms. 

14. See for example: D. MACSHANE, Trade unions and Europe, in: Political Quarterly, 62(1991), 

pp.351-364; B. ROSAMOND, National labour organisations and European integration: British 

unions and ‘1992’, in: Political Studies, 41(1993), pp.420-434. For British union attitudes to European 

integration in the early post-war period see M.E. GUASCONI, Il Labour Party, il Trade 

Union Congress e il processo di integrazione europea dal 1945 al 1957, in: A. CIAMPANI (ed.), 

L’altra via per l’Europa: Forze sociali e organizzazione di interessi nell’integrazione europea 

(1947-1957), Franco Angeli, Milano, 1995, pp.112-126. 

15. P. TEAGUE, Labour and Europe: The response of British trade unions to membership of the European 

Communities, Unpublished Ph. D., London School of Economics, 1984; see also his short 

summary The British TUC and the European Community, in: Millenium, 18(1989), pp.29-46. The 

TUC is the national federation of all major trade unions in the United Kingdom created in 1868. 

While being little involved in collective bargaining processes the main function of the TUC has 

been to represent the movement in the political arena. Therefore, the annual TUC Congress, the 

highest decision-making body, has been the most important arena of debate about European integration. 

Between Congresses European issues have been dealt with by the TUC General Council 

(GC) and the GC’s Economic Committee.

Turning Eurosceptic: British trade unions and European integration (1961-1975) 87 

focused article is confined to the years between 1969 and 1971. 16 Both authors do 

not systematically address the question of British unions’ Eurosceptic turn. 

The article starts out with a description of the change of TUC policy towards a 

positive endorsement of European integration in the early 1960s. The main part 

then reconstructs and explains the turn towards Euroscepticism in the late 1960s 

and early 1970s. Particular attention will be paid to the changing perceptions of 

multinational firms with examples often drawn from the automobile sector. In the 

conclusions the article sketches out some broader implications of the case study for 

European integration history research. 17 

British trade unions as cautious advocates of EC membership (1960-63) 

In his work about the TUC Teague depicted a situation of almost permanent 

infighting over the question of British EC membership between pro-marketeers, 

anti-marketeers, and a more pragmatic “centrist” fraction. The latter was by far the 

largest group, and its approach corresponded to the “Labourist” tradition of British 

trade unionism: 18 attention was concentrated on the economic and social benefits 

and/or costs of EC membership while little interest was shown for the “high politics” 

of European unity. Consequently, the shifts of TUC positions over time must 

primarily be accounted for by changing attitudes within this “centrist” group. 19 

The first of these shifts occurred in the early 1960s. Until the late 1950s the 

TUC majority regarded the EC with scepticism – as did most employers and the 

British government. TUC positions closely resembled those leading to the withdrawal 

of the British government representatives from the Spaak Committee in 

November 1955: UK trade still strongly gravitated towards the Commonwealth 

countries, and there were good reasons to believe that future British prosperity 

would have little to do with a European customs union. 20 

Change came in 1960 and 1961 again basically in line with the parallel transformation 

of government positions leading to the first application for EC membership 

endorsed by the Conservative Macmillan cabinet in July 1961. 21 The first public 

16. C. WURM, Verbände und europäische Integration. Großbritanniens Beitritt zur EG aus der Sicht 

von Industrie (CBI) und Gewerkschaften (TUC) 1969-1971, in: F. KNIPPING, M. SCHÖNWALD 

(eds.), Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation. Die europäische Einigung 1969-84, Wissenschaftlicher 

Verlag, Trier, 2004, pp.329-377. 

17. This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the HEIRS colloquium “European voices: 

Actors and Witnesses of European Integration” in Geneva in March 2007. I would like to thank the 

participants of the colloquium, in particular Anne Deighton, Linda Risso, and Antonio Varsori, for 

their helpful suggestions. 

18. See J. SAVILLE, The Ideology of Labourism, in: R. BENEWICK et. al. (eds.), Knowledge and Belief 

in Politics, Allen & Unwin, London, 1973, pp.213-226. 

19. P. TEAGUE, Labour and Europe …, op.cit. 

20. See A. MILWARD, The Rise and Fall of a national strategy. The UK and the European Community, 

Vol.1, 1945-1963, Frank Cass, London, 2002, pp.178 ff. 

21. Ibid., pp.310-351.

88 

Thomas FETZER 

trade union endorsement of British entry into the EC was expressed in a report of 

the Confederation of Engineering and Shipbuilding Unions (CSEU) on the future 

of the automobile industry in August 1960. It urged the government to seek immediate 

talks about EC membership before “irreparable damage” was done to British 

car exports. 22 

It is worth looking in more detail at the case of the motor industry to analyse the 

background to this new pro-EC position: Since 1945 Britain had become a 

car-exporting nation, and the industry could not maintain its production and 

employment levels without success in overseas markets. However, by the late 

1950s, export prospects became clouded. Orders from Commonwealth countries 

decreased heavily due to local development policies backed up by tariffs and 

local-content provisions. These losses were temporarily offset by increased exports 

to North America, however with the launch of “compact cars” in the United States 

this option quickly evaporated. 23 

In this situation British motor industry unions, as much as the automobile 

employers, joined the chorus of those who saw the fast-growing markets in Western 

Europe as primary targets for British exports. The CSEU document noted that 

“with the competition from the US in building compact cars and the growth of native 

car industries in other parts of the world, there is no doubt that the British car industry 

will have to look for its export increasingly to Western Europe”. 24 

In this context, the unions also started to worry about the effects of Britain’s 

exclusion from the EC since UK producers now suffered a competitive disadvantage 

compared to Fiat, Renault or Volkswagen, each of whom benefited from a new 

larger “home market”. Membership in the European Free Trade Association 

(EFTA) was not seen as compensating this disadvantage. The CSEU document 

concluded that the government should “face up to the fact that to protect our 

interests there is no sensible alternative but for this country to offer to join the 

Common Market straight away”. 25 

Deliberations between the TUC, the CSEU, and individual motor industry unions 

in 1961 resulted in a joint policy paper, which reinforced this pro-EC approach. It 

was acknowledged that turning to the EC meant facing tough competition, and if the 

British motor industry proved not efficient enough, this could mean “the loss of home 

markets without a corresponding build-up in European markets”. But this negative 

scenario was dismissed because “there is little reason to doubt that the British car 

industry could compete favourably” provided the UK would join the EC soon. 26 

22. R.J. LIEBER, British Politics and European Unity. Parties, Elites and Pressare Groups, University 

of California Press, Berkeley, 1970, p.106. 

23. See T.R. WHISLER, The British Motor Industry. 1945-1994. A Case Study in industrial decline, 

Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 312 ff. 

24. MRC (Modern Records Centre Warwick), MSS. 44/TEN.4/8, CSEU, Draft Report on the motor 

industry, undated [August 1960]. 

25. Ibid. 

26. MRC, MSS. 292B/617/1., CSEU, The Motor Manufacturing Industry. Observations of the 

Sub-Committee on the questions circulated by the TUC, undated [July 1961].


There was another, more specific aspect of the EC issue. Unlike other major 

European car-producing countries such as Italy or France, though similarly to Germany, 

the British motor industry was characterised by a strong presence of multinational 

US-owned firms – Ford and General Motors had established subsidiaries in 

the UK already in the 1920s, and they were to be followed by Chrysler with the 

take-over of Rootes in the mid 1960s. 27 This meant that the export capacity of the 

British car industry depended to a large extent on investment decisions by multinational 

firms. Here, the question of EC membership took a particular twist since 

Ford and General Motors both had subsidiaries in Germany potentially able to cater 

for European exports, too. The issue was less salient with regard to GM since the 

company’s British and German subsidiaries kept two competing model ranges until 

the early 1970s. In the case of Ford, however, sourcing decisions in Europe started 

to be influenced by considerations about the political future of the EC since the late 

1950s – basically leading to a slow upgrading of the German subsidiary. 28 

The impact of this emerging competition for investment on British union thinking 

became discernible in November 1960 when Ford requested government permission 

to buy out the minority shareholders of the UK subsidiary as it had done in 

Germany shortly before. Union leaders concurred with government views that refusal 

would result in investment diversion to Cologne in Germany, and hence the loss 

of valuable export potential. 29 On the other hand, they hoped that Ford UK would 

benefit from the major sales efforts the company was expected to undertake in 

European markets in the 1960s, thus stabilising and further improving employment 

prospects in Britain. Clearly, these hopes and fears were all directly connected to 

the question of British EC membership. Ford might for a while have accepted marginal 

profits in European markets but in the longer term sourcing advantages over 

the German subsidiary could only be expected if rapid entry into the EC was secured. 

30 

The example of the automobile industry thus confirms what has been repeatedly 

emphasised as the basic feature of British union attitudes in the early 1960s, 

namely its “economistic” bias, which stood in sharp contrast to the Labour Party’s 

hardening political opposition to the EC. 31 Admittedly the TUC leadership raised a 

number of other points in the consultations with government ministers in 1961 and 

1962, on the one hand with regard to safeguards for Britain’s national economic 

sovereignty and its links with the Commonwealth that ensured low food prices, on 

the other related to the need for a better representation of trade union interests 

27. See R. CHURCH, The rise and decline of the British motor industry, Cambridge University Press, 

Cambridge, 1994. 

28. See S. TOLLIDAY, The origins of Ford of Europe: From multidomestic to transnational corporation, 

1903-1976, in: S. TOLLIDAY, H. BONIN, Y. LUNG (eds.), Ford, 1903-2003: The European 

History, vol.1, pp.153-242, here: pp.182 ff. 

29. MRC, MSS.44/TEN. 4/8, Unsigned note „United States private investment in Britain”, undated 

[November 1960]. 

30. MRC, MSS. 126/TG/Sack 24/1, Notes of proceedings of Ford Joint Negotiating Committee, 

29.05.1961. 

31. P. TEAGUE, Labour and Europe …, op.cit., pp.83-84; R.J. LIEBER, British Politics …, pp.109 ff.

90 

Thomas FETZER 

within EC institutions. Yet, these either subsided because of government reassurances 

or were simply dropped because of the overriding argument about the link between 

European trade and national welfare. At the 1961 TUC Congress, for 

example, the General Council’s report on the EC stressed once more the 

importance of entry for British trade; significantly, the example of motor cars was 

again put forward as the paradigm case justifying rapid accession. 32 TUC leaders 

were nearly unanimous in their support of entry. It is true that the official policy 

stance adopted by Congress and General Council was to reserve final judgement 

until the concrete terms of entry became known. However, as Robert Lieber has 

argued, this public policy line is probably foremost attributable to a concern not to 

embarrass the Labour Party. 33 

The Eurosceptic Turn (1969-1975) 

The timing of British unions’ anti-European turn is somewhat controversial. 

Teague’s chronology closely follows official TUC Congress decisions, which 

declared opposition to entry for the first time in 1971, and, in a more principled 

form, in 1972. 34 Against this rather rigid focus on formal decisions Wurm has 

rightly emphasised that a clear shift towards scepticism within the movement 

already occurred in the late 1960s. 35 Admittedly, the “official” TUC position in 

1970 was little different from that in 1962, namely the reservation of final judgement 

until after the precise terms of entry were available. There can be little doubt, 

too, that after June 1970 the trade unions’ more general policy to oppose the new 

Tory government under its Euro-enthusiastic Prime minister Edward Heath encouraged 

a stance of rejection. 36 Yet, already the General Council reports on the issue 

in 1969 and 1970 were much less optimistic than they had been in the early 1960s, 

and Congress debates acquired a much stronger critical tone. To fully understand 

the historical dynamics of the shift in British union thinking we are well advised to 

look for longer-term changes, all the more so if we consider that the anti-European 

turn was not to be a short-lived interlude but was to continue until the 1975 referendum, 

and, after a brief period of adaptation “enforced” by the clear polling defeat 

of the anti-EC camp, was to resurface in the late 1970s. 

How and for what reasons then did the majority within the British union movement 

shift to anti-European positions in the late 1960s and early 1970s? We can largely 

discard Tom Nairn’s argument that the anti-EC camp within the British labour 

movement was imbued with an isolationist political and social culture (the “little 

32. TUC, Report of Proceedings of the 93 rd Annual Trades Union Congress, 4-8 September 1961, 

pp.325 ff. 

33. R.J. LIEBER, British Politics …, op.cit., p.111. 

34. P. TEAGUE, The British TUC, op.cit., p.32. 

35. C. WURM, Verbände …, pp.358-359. 

36. J.W. YOUNG, Britain and European Unity, Houndmills, Macmillan, 1993, p.114.


Englander” attitude), portraying the EC as an institution of bureaucrats and big 

capital alien to British political traditions. 37 Nairn was primarily concerned with 

the European policy of the Labour Party. His assessment appears to have a certain 

validity for the attitudes of a number of left-leaning organisations within the TUC 

but these attitudes did not change much between 1962 and 1970, and they also 

remained those of a rather small minority. 38 

The decisive shift occurred in the large “centrist” group within the TUC, and it 

is here that we must look for explanations. Since the “centrists” were mainly interested 

in the concrete economic and social effects of EC membership, and in the precise 

terms of entry, there are two basic options of interpretation: Either the terms of 

accession as negotiated between the Six and the British government had worsened 

or were considered to have worsened, or the broader assessment of economic and 

social benefits and risks had become more negative. This article opts for the second 

approach. This choice is not meant to downplay the salience of the often hotly 

debated terms of entry themselves. Their importance is easily understood if the 

changes of the EC’s budget and agricultural policies between the early and late 

1960s are considered. From a British point of view these changes basically amounted 

to the simple truth that accession became more expensive - a fact that undoubtedly 

affected trade union attitudes. 39 

Yet, as the remainder of the article attempts to demonstrate, British union views 

of accession shifted partly independent of the precise terms of entry. Two aspects 

were of crucial importance, first a changed assessment of economic benefits and 

risks of EC membership, and second, the increasing importance of European elements 

for domestic debates about a reform of the British political economy, in particular 

with regard to industrial relations. 40 The analysis will now turn to these two 

aspects in more detail. 

Roots of the Eurosceptic turn I: 

A changed assessment of economic benefits and risks 

British trade union support for EC accession in the early 1960s had mainly been 

based on the optimistic assessment of national welfare gains through increased 

European trade and foreign investment in the UK. Yet, by the late 1960s much of 

this optimism had been lost. Already at the time of the second application by the 

Labour government in 1967 union assessments had struck a more sceptical note. 

37. T. NAIRN, The Left against Europe, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973. 


39. See C. WURM, Verbände …, pp.338 f. 

40. The term ‘industrial relations’ is used here in its conventional meaning as the system of relationships 

between workers, trade unions, employers and the state concerned with rules pertaining to 

labour aspects of production – see J. ZEITLIN, From labour history to the history of industrial relations, 

in: Economic History Review, 40(1987), pp.159-184, here: p.159.

92 

Thomas FETZER 

The General Council had in principle supported the renewed attempt for entry but 

its report to that year’s Congress emphasised that opinions about the wisdom of EC 

entry were divided within the movement and the country not least because effects 

on the British balance of trade and capital appeared to be uncertain. The report 

admitted that most employers and the government were confident about long-term 

gains yet stressed that even government estimates assumed a strong growth of 

imports and capital outflows in the first years following accession. The paragraph 

on foreign investment illustrates this more sceptical view: 

“The government is thought to believe that after Britain had joined the EEC it would 

become a more attractive field for American investment, and that increase in this 

would more than compensate for capital outflow from Britain to the wider EEC. It is 

not known whether this view is based on any quantitative analysis. There are various 

general reasons for taking the view that, if an US investor had to choose between the 

Continent and Britain his choice would be for Britain. But it must be acknowledged 

that this is only conjectural while the short-term deteriorating effects are certain”. 41 

If the majority of TUC leaders supported the 1967 application for membership 

the main argument underpinning their case had shifted away from the optimistic 

hopes for welfare gains of the early 1960s towards a position that saw entry as “inevitable” 

because of the lack of viable alternatives; rather than potential benefits it 

were the costs of non-entry alone that were at stake now. As general secretary 

George Woodcock put it: “In the long run it is really the only thing we can do; we 

have to do it”. 42 

Pessimism was strongly reinforced during the renewed debate about the EC between 

1969 and 1971. Unlike in 1967 the TUC carefully avoided to declare principled 

support for the opening of negotiations despite the fact that the Labour 

government of Harold Wilson conducted the initial steps. At the 1969 Congress a 

General Council representative took great pains to secure the withdrawal of an 

anti-EC motion from the floor but pointed out himself that “we all know that entry 

into the Common Market would present considerable difficulties for Britain”. 43 In 

the consultations with Wilson and other ministers in early 1970 several union leaders 

questioned the optimistic government distinction between probable short-term 

difficulties and beneficial longer-term “dynamic effects” of entry enabling British 

firms to operate in a larger “home market”. They argued that short-term problems 

might well lead to serious balance of payment problems, triggering the need for 

deflationary policies, which could slow down growth and thus deteriorate the position 

of British companies vis-à-vis their continental competitors. In this case entry 

was likely to boost the exports of firms from EC countries to the UK rather than the 

other way around. 44 

It is true that the General Council report for the 1970 Congress was fairly neutral 

in assessing potential benefits and risks, and it gave much attention to the pre- 

41. TUC, Report of the 99 th Annual Trades Union Congress, 4-8 September 1967, p.417. 

42. Ibid., p.578. 

43. TUC, Report of the 101 st Annual Trades Union Congress, 1-5 September 1969, p.598. 

44. MRC, MSS.292B/560.1/23, TUC Economic Committee, 13.05.1970.


cise terms of entry, e.g. with regard to the Community budget and the costs 

associated with the Common Agricultural Policy. In Congress debates, too, the 

expected increase in the cost of living due to higher food prices and the introduction 

of a value-added tax were often quoted as the decisive drawbacks of EC membership. 

However, those opposing accession also consistently pointed to the likely 

balance of payment problems not only because of the EC budget burden but also 

because of an anticipated “flight of capital” from Britain to the Continent. Significantly, 

the General Council report did not anymore mention growing US investments 

as a “conjectural” factor that might offset such a trend. It also diluted the 

strong emphasis on the costs of non-entry still discernible in the 1967 debate; Feather, 

the new general secretary, alluded to general tariff reductions in the framework 

of GATT, which might make the case for EC entry less pressing. And despite 

this clear shift of leadership positions a motion challenging the General Council 

with a call for fundamental opposition to EC membership was only narrowly defeated. 

45 

The argument of a slow sliding of British union policy towards anti-European 

positions in the late 1960s can be given added weight if we consider the development 

of attitudes towards foreign-owned firms during this period. As the example 

of Ford demonstrated such firms had been regarded as vehicles of export and 

investment growth by union leaders in the early 1960s. From 1967, however, debates 

took a critical turn. There was a strong influence of increasing public uneasiness 

about the rapid rise of US investment in Europe, reflected in Jean-Jacques 

Servan-Schreibers’ international bestseller Le défi américain. 46 A key event in Britain 

was the take-over of Rootes by Chrysler in early 1967. The fact that three of 

the four major motor industry firms were now owned by Detroit giants created 

anxious debates about the potential for American control over the entire sector in 

the future. Partly connected to these developments, the terms “international” or 

“multinational” were increasingly used to describe the tendency among foreign-owned 

firms to integrate subsidiaries across borders. Again, US-owned companies 

often played the role of pioneers, already in 1967, for instance, Ford 

standardised its European car ranges and created the holding company “Ford of 

Europe” to coordinate activities on a continental scale. 47 These developments 

occurred at a time when many sectors of British industry experienced serious difficulties. 

The general economic climate in the UK had been less favourable than on 

the Continent for a number of years, resulting in relatively lower GDP and income 

growth rates. British firms had fallen behind in terms of output, investment and 

profit levels. Their positions vis-à-vis European competitors were much less 

strong than in the early 1960s. 48 

45. TUC, Report of the 102 nd Annual Trades Union Congress, 7-11 September 1970, pp.468 f., 

675-688, 741-753. 

46. J.-J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, Le défi américain, Denoel, Paris 1967. 

47. See S. TOLLIDAY, The origins of Ford …, op.cit. 

48. For the car industry: T.R. WHISLER, The British Motor Industry, op.cit.

94 

Thomas FETZER 

Against this backdrop, union scepticism about the benefits of international economic 

integration grew. In 1967, for example, the annual CSEU conference expressed 

apprehension about the potential loss of independent British research and 

development capacities, and requested a government inquiry into the degree of 

American penetration in strategic sectors of the economy. 49 In the same year the 

TUC Congress called for the application of stricter government controls over the 

outflow and inflow of capital. 50 More crucially still was a further shift in 1969 with 

the emergence of a new and critical trade union discourse on “multinational” companies, 

displaying strong anxiety that the cross-border integration of national subsidiaries 

would induce companies to switch assets from Britain to the Continent, and 

thus accelerate industrial decline. 51 

The example of Ford is instructive again. In the early 1960s British union leaders 

had hoped that European exports could be increased through the international 

Ford network, and that this would fortify the position of Ford UK among the company’s 

operations in Europe. But since the mid 1960s the opposite development 

had been set in motion. In 1965, a major expansion of capacity had taken place at 

Ford of Germany, and as a consequence the British subsidiary was soon downgraded 

to the role of a “junior partner”. From 1970 Ford UK was increasingly barred 

from exporting to EC countries, which became the almost exclusive domain of 

Ford of Germany. The export share of Ford UK sales fell from around 45 percent in 

1968/9 to about 30 percent in 1972/3. 52 

From the point of view of British trade unions examples such as this seemed to 

require a re-assessment of positions. On the one hand, the TUC launched a campaign 

for stronger government control over the operations of multinational firms, 

e.g. through so-called “planning agreements”. 53 The campaign was not without its 

ambiguities – given the traditional “apolitical” nature of British trade unionism – 

and it was not meant to ban foreign investors from the country; indeed, the more 

critical stance was combined with a continued appreciation of the advantages of 

foreign direct investment. 54 

On the other hand, a direct link was drawn between the strategies of multinational 

firms and the question of British EC membership. Within the TUC concern 

grew that the declining competitiveness of British industry would be further eroded 

by its link with the international economy – a complete reversal of the positions 

taken in the early 1960s. National officers, who back then had been among the most 

ardent promoters of integrating British industries with Europe, now became oppon- 

49. MRC, MSS. 259/5/3, Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Council of the CSEU, 10.08.1967. 

50. TUC, Report of the 99 th Annual Trades Union Congress, 4-8 September 1967, p.508. 

51. J. GENNARD, Multinational Corporations and British Labour. A Review of Attitudes and Responses, 

London, 1971. 

52. See S. TOLLIDAY, Ford of Britain: Statistical Appendix to chapters 13 & 14, in: S. TOLLIDAY, 

H. BONIN, Y. LUNG (eds.), Ford, 1903-2003, vol.2, op.cit., pp.118-149, here: pp.139, 144. 

53. MRC, MSS. 292 D, Box 936, TUC, Report of a conference on international companies, London 

21.10.1970. 

54. MRC, MSS. 292 D, 560.1/Box 1087, TUC Economic Committee, 13.06.1973.


ents of EC membership, arguing that British firms – in the face of export restrictions 

imposed by multinational management – were better off selling outside 

Europe. 55 Such concerns were voiced with increasing alarm during the late 1960s 

and early 1970s. At Ford, to quote this example once more, they were regularly raised 

during the annual wage negotiations. As a union document elaborated in 1970: 

“There are obvious grave doubts as to the economic consequences of EEC entry 

anyway, but a major ‘non-joiner’ in the export effort of our most important export 

industry stacks the cards against the employment prospects of British car workers 

with a vengeance”. 56 

It was such trade union anxiety about the competitive weakness of British industry, 

and the perceived reinforcement of that weakness by international capital 

movements, which strongly contributed to the anti-EC turn of British trade unions 

culminating in the 1971 Congress decision to oppose accession altogether. Indeed, 

these arguments gained further prominence in the subsequent years until 1974 

during which the TUC radicalised its opposition to EC entry. 57 Pessimist scenarios 

were vindicated by the deterioration of the British balance of payment not least as a 

result of a net outflow of investment capital; in the case of European investments by 

American multinationals, for example, the early 1970s witnessed a relative decline 

of the UK share from around 50 to 25 percent. 58 TUC Congress debates on the EC 

between 1972 and 1974 saw delegates time and again pointing to the link between 

EC entry and capital outflow that increasingly endangered employment prospects 

of workers in the UK. 59 

There were, however, two aspects that limited the salience of these union arguments. 

First, many unionists were well aware that the British economy continued to 

depend both on foreign direct investment and trade with EC countries – even if at 

less advantageous terms. Opposition to EC entry was never combined with convincing 

proposals for an alternative economic framework; the minority within the 

TUC criticising the opposition stance had little difficulty to expose the flawed 

nature of suggestions to reanimate Commonwealth trade or increase economic relations 

with Communist Eastern Europe. 60 At the same time, the TUC majority had 

no intention to embrace the increasingly radical questioning of international economic 

integration by the Left in the Labour Party. TGWU leader Jack Jones dismissed 

55. For the motor industry see MRC, MSS. 126/TG/3, Sack 33/2, National Advisory Council for the 

Motor Manufacturing Industry – Minutes of the 76 th meeting, 01.02.1967. 

56. TURU (Archive Trade Union Research Unit, Ruskin College Oxford), File “Ford claim 1970”, 

Supplementary Notes on Motor Industry, with special reference to Ford Claim, undated [October 

1970]. 

57. P. TEAGUE, The British TUC, p.32. 

58. J. M. STOPFORD, L. TURNER, Britain and the Multinationals, Wiley, Chichester/New York, 

1985, p.140. 

59. See for example TUC, Report of the 104 th Annual Trades Union Congress, 4-8 September 1972, 

pp.448, 521; Report of the 106 th Annual Trades Union Congress, 2-6 September 1974, pp.181, 430, 

479, 486-487, 491. 

60. See for example TUC, Report of the 102 nd Annual Trades Union Congress, 7-11 September 1970, 

p.685.

96 

Thomas FETZER 

Tony Benn’s proposals for comprehensive government planning and a vast nationalisation 

program as “airy-fairy stuff”. 61 There was a widespread view in the movement 

that such radical schemes were doomed to fail, or, if they were indeed 

implemented, they would come at the expense trade union freedom to collective 

bargaining. As in the case of most other post-war Eurosceptic groups in the UK 62 

trade union opposition to the EC lacked a strong alternative vision. 

Second, the argument that EC entry and concomitant international capital outflow 

perpetuated the competitive weakness of British industry was only compelling 

from a trade union point of view. In fact, prior to accession a large fraction of British 

employers, and to some extent even the CBI shared union concerns about the 

difficulty of many British firms to withstand the pressure of European competition. 

Yet, British employers were still firmly in favour of accession, and their case was 

not only based on the already mentioned costs of non-entry, the opinion that Britain 

could “not afford to be left out”. Employers also continued to suggest that 

short-term costs would be outweighed by long-term benefits provided British industry 

was granted the right conditions to restore its competitiveness. Indeed, EC 

entry itself was increasingly seen as an inducement in this direction since stronger 

European competition would be a helpful “cold shower” to accelerate the modernisation 

of the country’s political economy. 63 

In other words, there was a direct connection between the question of Britain’s 

EC membership, and the controversial domestic debates how to reverse relative 

economic decline. This brings us to the second major underlying cause of British 

unions’ Eurosceptic turn: Their growing resistance to EC entry not only reflected 

the competitive weakness of British industry but also their perception of a link between 

the EC issue and anti-union agendas to overcome economic difficulties. 

Roots of the Eurosceptic turn II: 

The end of the “post-war compromise” 

This second aspect of the analysis needs to be seen in the more general historical context 

of mid- to late 1960s British politics, in particular against the backdrop of the end 

of what is usually called the “post-war compromise”, that is, the tripartite consensus 

between governments, employers and trade unions based on the double commitment 

to the promotion of economic growth and full employment, supplemented by an 

expanded welfare state and a “voluntarist” industrial relations framework. 64 

61. T. BENN, Against the Tide. Diaries 1973-76, Hutchinson, London, 1989, p.46. 

62. A. FORSTER, Euroscepticism …, op.cit., p.143. 

63. C. WURM, Verbände …, op.cit., pp.338-349. 

64. See A. CAMPBELL, N. FISHMAN, J. MCILROY, The Post-War Compromise: Mapping Industrial 

Politics, 1945-1964, in: J. MCILROY, N. FISHMAN, A. CAMPBELL (eds.), British trade unions 

and industrial politics, vol.1, The post-war compromise, 1945-1964, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999, 

pp.69-113. “Voluntarism” meant that compared to most other European countries collective labour 

law played a marginal role for British industrial relations – see P. DAVIES, M. FREEDLAND, Labour 

Legislation and Public Policy. A Contemporary History, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993.


Different interpretations have been suggested as to the precise moment of rupture 

of this tripartite consensus but from a trade union point the mid 1960s were 

certainly a turning point. Slow economic growth and rising inflation restrained the 

Labour government’s commitment to ensure full employment and even led it to 

introduce an incomes policy. There was also a tendency to blame organised labour 

for British industrial problems, expressed in media agitation about the need for 

government policies to curb strikes. These developments strongly clashed with 

those on the union side. The expectations of workers had risen with employment 

security and regular pay increases after the war, an effect reinforced by the arrival 

of a new generation of young employees on the labour market. The consolidation 

of shop stewards as bargaining agents in many companies gave protest an outlet as 

the political balance within British unions shifted to more radical positions. The 

two largest blue-collar unions TGWU and AEU increasingly supported local militancy, 

partly for ideological reasons, partly as an instrument to gain ground in 

inter-union competition. 65 

Aspects of international economic integration came to be associated with this 

break of consensus since 1968/69. It is instructive in this regard to look again at the 

emerging trade union debate about multinational firms during those years, which 

was not only concerned with new business strategies facilitating cross-border shifts 

of investment but also with the concomitant rise of new bargaining practices that 

linked threats to switch capital assets to productivity “benchmarking” between 

national subsidiaries. From the point of view of British unions this entailed the danger 

of a new permanent restraint on their demands for improved wages and working 

conditions, and their ability to deploy the strike weapon to pursue these 

objectives. 66 

The case of Ford provides a good illustration again. Here, this new dynamics 

became visible for the first time during a strike in February 1969 when senior 

management representatives declared publicly that the worsening strike record was 

among the major reasons why the company was liable to fall behind the German 

subsidiary in terms of future investment. Indeed, the issue was promoted to the centre-stage 

of national public debates as Ford’s threats were discussed at length in the 

House of Commons. 67 Prime minister Wilson himself attacked the strikers publicly, 

warning that their action would induce Ford to shift development plans abroad. 68 

Subsequent years witnessed similar debates on several occasions, most notoriously 

during the nine-week long strike in 1971 when Henry Ford II flew in personally to 

tell Prime minister Heath that he could not recommend any further capital expenditure 

in Britain. Such statements triggered an unprecedented debate in parliament 

65. Cf. R. UNDY et. al., Change in Trade Unions. The development of UK unions since the 1960s, 

Hutchinson, London, 1981, pp.97 f., 275 ff. 

66. MRC, MSS. 292 D, Box 936, TUC, Report of a conference on international companies, London, 

21.10.1970. 

67. HANSARD Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, vol.779, cols.978 ff., 1373 ff. 

68. Financial Times, 15.03.1969.

98 

Thomas FETZER 

and the national media about whether trade union militancy imperilled the future of 

British operations within Ford’s international network. 69 

Debates on the EC took a similar turn. British unions could not fail to notice 

that many employers, the Conservative Party and even fractions of the Labour Party 

viewed EC membership increasingly as a useful instrument to trigger “long-needed” 

changes to modernise Britain’s political economy – with industrial relations 

and trade unionism featuring as one of the most prominent fields. 70 At TUC Congresses 

in the late 1960s and early 1970s the issue was brought up time and again. 

One delegate opposing EC entry in principle argued in 1970: 

“The fact is that we will not only be thrown in at the deep end, but we will have a 

ball and chain around our legs at the same time. As we fight back we shall be faced 

with employers, who are, increasingly, the big multi-national companies, who will 

be able to say that now we are in the Common Market they are much freer to take 

their investment to areas outside this country”. 71 

One year later Jack Jones, the TGWU leader, described his anticipation of 

employer responses to EC entry as follows: 

“What they will be saying is with all the extra competition, with imports flooding 

into the country, they will be getting tougher against any wage increases because 

they will fear that they will lose sales”. 72 

Arguments about a link between the EC issue and the domestic strength of British 

trade unionism were further fuelled by the debates about a reform of industrial 

relations. Since the mid 1960s, against the backdrop of an increasing number of 

strikes, a fraction within the employer federation CBI had increasingly argued for a 

break with Britain’s “voluntarist” tradition. In the motor industry, for example, 

employers lobbied in favour of legislation to restrict unofficial strikes and make the 

unions discipline their members and shop stewards. 73 Under pressure from 

employers, the opposition and growing media hysteria about the alleged British 

“strike disease” the Labour government appointed a Royal Commission chaired by 

Lord Donovan to look into the reform of industrial relations. And while the report 

of the Commission, published in 1968, came out clearly in favour of keeping the 

voluntarist system, the debate about how to legally curb trade union power did not 

abate. After the failure of the first, rather modest attempt by the Labour government 

in 1969 (the White Paper “In Place of Strife”) the real confrontation between 

government and unions came with the Industrial Relations Act of the Conservative 

Heath government in 1971: trade union immunities were restricted to legally registered 

organisations with registration in turn depending on rules for the conduct of 

69. HANSARD Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, vol.795, cols.1288 f.; vol.797, cols.905 f.; 

vol.815, cols.238 f. 

70. C. WURM, Sozialisten und europäische Integration: Die britische Labour Party 1945-1984, in: 

Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 38(1987), pp.280-295, here: p.288. 

71. TUC, Report of the 102 nd Annual Trades Union Congress, 7-11 September 1970, p.682. 

72. TUC, Report of the 103 rd Annual Trades Union Congress, 6-10 September 1971, p.472. 

73. PRO (Public Record Office),LAB 10/2468, Note of a meeting, 06.05.1965.


industrial disputes, an Industrial Relations Court was created with wide-ranging 

powers of intervention in strikes. 74 

This debate was connected to the question of EC entry on the one hand because 

reform proposals had an international dimension. The Industrial Relations Act of 

1971 was clearly inspired by foreign models; Heath himself is said to have wanted 

to transform British unions along the lines of their German and North American 

counterparts. 75 On the other hand, the unions perceived the legislation to be linked 

to the parallel aspirations of the government to take Britain into the EC. At the 

1971 TUC Congress Jones voiced the suspicion that “the principal purpose of the 

Industrial Relations Act was to prepare the way for us to go into Europe”. 76 A delegate 

of the Amalgamated Engineering Federation argued that 

“the overall policy of this government, its action in introducing the Industrial Relations 

Act, has in its make-up a conditioning of the British trade union movement to 

policies and laws in Europe which already condition the majority of trade union 

movements within the European Community”. 77 

The latter remark points to an additional dimension of British unions’ 

anti-European turn. Resistance to EC entry was reinforced by cross-border comparison 

with trade union models in other European countries. Continental labour 

organisations were described as being restrained by restrictive legal frameworks; 

Jones bluntly stated that “in the Common Market the trade unions are weak”. 78 

Arguments against legal regulation not only applied to legal restrictions of strikes 

and the enforceability of bargaining agreements but also to statutory instruments of 

employee representation that in different forms were in operation in almost all EC 

countries. The German works council and co-determination systems were seen as 

particularly problematic. A TUC report on German industrial relations from 1969 

perceived the impact of co-determination primarily as creating shopfloor apathy. 

Works councils and union membership in supervisory boards, unduly blurring the 

lines between capital and labour representatives, were seen as unacceptable. All 

these features militated“ against the growth and organisation of strong trade unionism”. 

79 

Clearly, then, one of the driving forces behind the resistance against EC membership 

appears to have been the desire to isolate UK unions from pressure to 

“Europeanise” domestic collective bargaining and industrial relations. If the beneficial 

growth effects of EC entry had to be bought at the price of wage moderation 

74. R. TAYLOR, The Heath government and industrial relations: myth and reality, in: S. BALL, A. 

SELDON (eds.), The Heath Government 1970-1974. A Reappraisal, Longman, London/New 

York, 1996, pp.161-190. 

75. A. TAYLOR, The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions, in: A. CAMPBELL, N. FISHMAN, 

J. MCILROY, British Trade Unions …, op.cit., vol.2, pp.151-186, here: pp. 153-4. 

76. TUC, Report of the 103 rd Annual Trades Union Congress, 6-10 September 1971, p.473. 

77. Ibid., p.482. 

78. Ibid., p.485. 

79. MRC, MSS 292 B./560.1/20, TUC, Economic Committee, 12.03.1969.

100 

Thomas FETZER 

and stronger legal regulation of trade union affairs this was a price British unions 

were not prepared to pay. 

Conclusions 

In retrospect, the Eurosceptic turn of British trade unions between the late 1960s 

and mid 1970s, culminating in their campaign for British withdrawal in the 1975 

referendum, may seem to fit into “New Labour’s” general memory tale of union 

militancy in the 1970s as “ghosts” from a different epoch, which have left little 

meaning for subsequent generations. 80 Indeed, ever since the late 1960s the British 

trade union lobby against the EC has not only been fraught with contradictions but 

has probably been one of the least successful campaigns in the post-war history of 

the movement. In the light of this, what is the broader significance of the case study 

for European integration historiography? 

First of all, it is useful to recall that the outcome of the British referendum in 

1975 could by no means be taken for granted at the time. A study dedicated to the 

run-up to the poll has suggested that an early vote at the time of the elections in 

March 1974 might well have yielded the opposite result. 81 If we take this counterfactual 

seriously the case study can be read as a typical example of the indirect 

influence of Eurosceptic groups in post-war British politics: Devoid of any substantial 

“input” Euroscepticism acted as a negative constraint on government policy, 

forced pro-Europeans to move cautiously, and caused enormous problems for party 

leaderships (here for Labour) to keep a united front. 82 Moreover, the case of trade 

unions helps to account for the changing character of British Euroscepticism in the 

late 1960s and early 1970s; as Forster has argued it was precisely during this period 

that previously dominant arguments related to ideology, geopolitics and national 

sovereignty were superseded by stronger concerns for the economic and social 

implications of European integration. 83 

In a longer-term perspective such concerns were by no means completely new. 

Frank Trentmann has demonstrated that anxiety over the implications of international 

economic integration for domestic welfare was widespread in the British labour 

movement already in the period prior to the First World War. 84 The core belief was 

similar to that underlying opposition to EC entry in the early 1970s, namely that the 

creation of wealth through international trade and investment should not be looked 

80. J. MCILROY, The enduring alliance? Trade unions and the making of New Labour, 1994-97, in: 

British Journal of Industrial Relations, 36(1998), pp.537-564, here: p.542. 

81. D. BUTLER, U. KITZINGER, The 1975 Referendum, Macmillan, London, 1976, p.34. 

82. See A. FORSTER, Euroscepticism …, op.cit., pp.138-140. 

83. Ibid., p.39. 

84. F. TRENTMANN, Wealth versus Welfare: the British Left between Free Trade and National Political 

Economy before the First World War, in: Historical Research, 70(1997), pp.70-98.


at in isolation from its impact upon national labour markets and social policy institutions. 

Indeed, this is an issue whose significance goes beyond the specific case of UK 

accession: Social policy and industrial relations, while legally still today almost 

exclusive domains of nation-states, have always been affected by EC measures to 

boost market integration, in the enabling way described by Alan S. Milward, 85 yet 

increasingly also in a constraining sense by placing adaptation pressures on national 

socioeconomic institutions. 86 In the light of recent controversies about EU 

directives related to the free movement of services and workers we may interpret 

the case of British trade unions in the early 1970s as setting a “template” for 

Euroscepticism in the name of the protection of national social standards and institutions. 

It would be worthwhile to apply this analytical perspective to other countries, 

too, incidentally also in the case of non-state actors, which were not 

fundamentally opposed to European integration, yet at times attempted to block 

particular EC initiatives perceived to endanger national social policy achievements. 

The British example highlights the limits of such a policy, too. British trade 

union attitudes were purely defensive shying away from the radical alternatives of 

the Labour Left while failing to put forward a coherent alternative international 

economic framework. There was also little awareness that non-participation in the 

EC by one of the largest European trade union movements by definition weakened 

the potential to build up pressure for a more labour-friendly Community – as 

Teague has emphasised the TUC’s “naïve Keynesianism” 87 excluded a vision of the 

EC as a social policy arena. 

In methodological terms, the article lends support to new approaches to European 

integration historiography focusing on non-governmental networks and the 

informal politics of integration. 88 It also demonstrates the potential of these approaches 

to link integration historiography more strongly with other areas of the discipline. 

Rather than being focused on the political and institutional logics of bargains 

between national governments and the European Commission the analysis of civil 

society groups reaches out into the various sub-fields of economic, social and cultural 

history. At a time of a general historiographical turn towards European and 

transnational approaches 89 this may not only provide new perspectives on the 

history of integration itself, but may also help to strengthen the place of EC historiography 

within the discipline. 

85. See A.S. MILWARD (assisted by G. BRENNAN and F. ROMERO), The European Rescue of the 

Nation State, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992. 

86. See G. AMBROSIUS, Institutioneller Wettbewerb im europäischen Integrationsprozeß seit dem 

19. Jahrhundert, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 27(2001), pp.545-575. 


88. See W. KAISER, Transnational European Union …, op.cit. 

89. See for example J. OSTERHAMMEL, Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Erweiterung oder 

Alternative?, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 27(2001), pp.464-479.

102 

Thomas FETZER

The Treaties of Rome: 

Continuity and Discontinuity in SPD’s European Policy 


103 

July 5 th , 1957: the German Social-Democratic Party (SPD) voted in favour of the 

ratification of the treaties establishing the European Economic Community and the 

European Atomic Energy Community. The decision has a relevant historical 

significant, not the least for the fact that it was the first time that a European 

initiative, supported by Konrad Adenauer’s government, received the approval of 

the main opposition party. As we know, until that time, the SPD had rejected all the 

main integrationist steps: the Federal Republic’s participation in the International 

Ruhr Authority, its entry in the Council of Europe, the ECSC treaties and the 

unsuccessful EDC, and finally the treaties of Paris in 1955. 1 

However, the voting position, although rather relevant, is not an element which 

in itself may help us establish whether and to what extent the treaties of Rome 

marked a rethinking within the German social-democracy, and specifically its 

relations with Europe. In order to assess its widest meaning, in terms of continuity 

and discontinuity, the vote of July 1957 should be re-examined within a wider 

framework, taking into consideration the European policy pursued by the SPD in 

the previous period, the specificity of the context, where the choice of supporting 

the Common Market and Euratom was elaborated, as well as the specific reasons 

pushing the SPD to embrace the contents of the treaties signed in Rome on March 

25 th , 1957. 

A thorough analysis of development stages within the European policy of the 

German social-democracy from 1949 to 1957 exceeds of course the scope of the 

present paper. Therefore, we will focus here on the phase of the so-called 

«European revival»; a period between June 1955 and July 1957, which in the 

history of SPD’s European policy has not yet been fully studied and explored, 

especially with respect to the importance attributed to phases following the signing 

of the Rome treaties. 

In particular, starting from the prevailing position in historiography, 

establishing 1955 as the «turning» point in SPD’s European policy, an analysis will 

be carried out in order to assess whether the social-democrats’ position on the 

Common Market and Euratom, was converging, or diverging, with the governing 

party’s, and whether, and to what extent, the decision to cast a vote in favour of the 

1. The article is the expanded and amended version of a paper presented in the workshop organised 

by Società italiana di Storia contemporanea (SISSCO) at Marsala in September 2007.

104 


ratification of the Rome treaties should be considered a sort of natural outcome of a 

process which had evolved since 1955. 2 

1. 1955 as «turning point»: a point of convergence among scholars 

As regards the 1949-1955 period, historiography has reconstructed in precise 

details the European policy pursued by the SPD, also with similar conclusions. In 

order to grasp their essence, it is necessary to start from the end of the period of 

interest, namely from the divide represented by the signing of the treaties of Paris 

in October 1954, by which the Federal Republic acquired its sovereignty back, and, 

with the institution of the WEU, became a member of NATO. In a wider-scoped 

historical perspective, the treaties of Paris marked the final demise of the illusion 

that the problem of the country’s separation could be solved before the Federal 

Republic entered a system of military alliances. The full awareness of this 

development was however not immediate: the SPD continued in fact to put forth – 

in the following months – the request for negotiations with the Soviet Union on the 

unification, before the treaty ratification made the re-armament decision 

irrevocable. With the treaties coming into force, the social-democrats continued 

nonetheless to present proposals, such as the «German Manifesto» of 1955 or the 

«Plan for Germany» (Deutschlandplan) of 1959, which advocated the need for 

detaching the Federal and Democratic Republics from the two existing systems of 

military alliances, and to attain unification within a system of collective security 

under the aegis of the United Nations. 3 

2. For SPD’s European policy in the first half of the 1950’s, see a recent essay by D. RAMUSCHKAT, 

Die SPD und der europäische Integrationsprozeß: Kontinuität und Wandel in der Sozialdemokratischen 

Europapolitik 1949-1955, Videel, Niebüll, 2003. For a long-term reconstruction, see two pioneer 

works by R. HRBEK, Die SPD-Deutschland und Europa. Die Haltung der Sozialdemokratie 

zum Verhältnis von Deutschland-Politik und Westintegration 1945-1957, Europa Union Verlag, 

Bonn, 1972 and by W.E PATERSON, The SPD and European Integration, Westmead-Farnborough-Hants, 

Saxon House, 1974. For the phase following the treaties of Rome: J. Bellers, Reformpolitik 

und EWG-Strategie der SPD. Die innen- und außenpolitischen Faktoren der europapolitischen 

Integrationspolitik einer Oppositionspartei (1957-63), München, Tuduv, 1979 and R. 

Markowitz, Option für Paris? Unionsparteien, SPD und Charles De Gaulle 1959 bis 1969, Studien 

zur Zeitgeschichte, Oldenbourg, München, 1996. For an analysis of the relationship between the 

SPD and Europe in a comparative perspective, see: K. FEATHERSTONE, Socialist Parties and European 

Integration. A comparative history, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1988, 

pp.141- 169; A. AGOSTI, Le radici e gli sviluppi dell’europeismo. Sinistra italiana e tedesca a confronto, 

in: G.E. RUSCONI, H. WOLLER (ed.), Italia e Germania 1945-2000. La costruzione 

dell’Europa, il Mulino, Bologna, 2005, pp.295-321; D. ROGOSCH, Vorstellungen von Europa: 

Europabilder in der SPD und bei den belgischen Sozialisten 1945-1957, Hamburg, 1996. 

3. See also the contribution by A.L. LEUGERS-SCHERZBERG, Von den Stalin-Noten bis zum 

Deutschlandplan: Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Neutralismus in den 1950 er Jahren, in: 

D. GEPPERT, U. WENGST (ed.), Neutralität-Chance oder Chimäre? Konzepte des dritten Weges 

für Deutschland und die Welt 1945-1990, Oldenbourg, München, 2005, pp.45-58.

The Treaties of Rome: Continuity and Discontinuity in SPD’s European Policy 105 

The effects of the treaties of Paris and subsequent developments taking place in 

the international scenario resulted much more disrupting for the social-democrats’ 

European policy. In particular, with the Federal Republic becoming a member of 

NATO, the issue of defence was separated from European integration, so that, from 

that time onward, the backing by the SPD of a project for a united Europe based on 

economic integration, became certainly easier or, better still, less compromising for 

its national-neutralist wings. The close resolution of the Saar question, after the 

defeat of the referendum of October 1955 in favour of the Europeanization of the 

territory, removed a second important aspect which until then had made it difficult 

for the SPD to support the integration process. 4 

Several internal factors also contributed to the shift in the SPD’s European 

policy, such as the pressure of trades unions, which, already in 1950 had decided to 

back the Schuman Plan, and in particular the growing influence within the party of 

Willi Birkelbach, Fritz Erler, Karl Mommer and Herbert Wehner. 5 Thanks to the 

experience developed within the ECSC Common assembly and the Consultative 

assembly of the Council of Europe, these politicians had acquired relevant 

negotiating skills and – what is more important – a wider awareness of how much 

the association between economic welfare and European integration was 

widespread in the public opinion of the six founding countries. In the Federal 

Republic the younger generations seemed increasingly attracted by the European 

idea, also in view of the opportunity it provided to distance themselves from the 

Germans of the Nazi period. 

In this perspective, the SPD joining the integration project around the mid 

1950’s may be read also as a process of internal maturation, in close connection 

with the phenomenon of de-ideologization and modernization of the party, leading 

to the turning point of Bad Godesberg in 1959. However, even scholars who have 

pointed at the gradualness of the change taking place, linked to the disappearance 

from the political scene of Kurt Schumacher, agree in recognizing the importance 

of the year 1955. 6 This year, in fact, the revirement in the SPD’s European policy 

seemed to come to its full definition, by taking for the first time the form of specific 

decisions. Firstly, in June-July 1955 the SPD expressed its position in favour of the 

Messina resolution, by which the 6 ECSC member states assigned a preparatory 

commission the task to study the possibility of implementing the two presented 

projects: 

«the creation of a joint organization for the peaceful development of atomic energy 

and […] the creation of a common market to be implemented on stages, via the pro- 

4. On the solution for the Saar problem, see: B. THOß, Die Lösung der Saarfrage 1954/1955, in: Vierteljahreshefte 

für Zeitgeschichte 47(1999), pp.57-86. 

5. The latter, in particolar, according to Paterson’s reconstruction, played a «crucial role» in fostering 

a change of direction in the European policy, also in views of his ties with Jean Monnet. W.E PA- 

TERSON, op.cit., p.118. 

6. Ibid., p.115. See also K. FEATHERSTONE, op.cit., p.150, A. AGOSTI, Le radici e gli sviluppi 

dell’europeismo. Sinistra italiana e tedesca a confronto, in: G.E. RUSCONI, H. WOLLER (ed.), 

op.cit., p.308.

106 


gressive reduction of quantitative limitations and the unification of customs 

regimes». 7 

Secondly, in the following October, several important party members, like 

president Erich Ollenahuer and Herbert Wehner, joined the Action Committee 

established by Jean Monnet in order to put pressure on the governments of the Six 

so that the Messina conference would become an «effective step towards the 

United States of Europe». 8 A few historians, like Hanns Jürgen Küsters, recognized 

in Monnet’s initiative the pivotal factor for the SPD’s shift towards the idea of 

Europe: 

«Now it was Monnet’s initiative for the Action Committee which caused the change 

of the Social Democrats’ attitude towards European Integration». 9 

2. SPD, Bundesregierung and «Europe’s revival», 1955-1957: 

different perspectives, shared goals 

The great relevance assigned to events in 1955 ended by influencing on the one 

hand also the analysis of the SPD’s European policy in the following months. In 

particular the assertiveness of some scholars, starting from William Paterson, in 

pointing at the turning point of 1955 as the time from which the process of 

European integration stopped to represent an arena for political division between 

the main party in government, CDU-CSU, and the social-democratic opposition, 

should be remarked: «In the following years, the SPD’s policy on European affairs 

became virtually indistinguishable from that of the CDU/CSU». 10 

Now-available documents on German European policy in the phase of the «European 

revival» show, however, a much more complex context than it may be expected. 

Since the first favourable statement backing the projects presented during the 

conference of Messina, several authoritative party representatives, such as Wehner 

and Mommer, clearly stated that for SPD the creation of a pool for the peaceful 

exploitation of atomic energy should have the priority over the project of the 

Common Market. 11 In this perspective, also the subsequent decision of Ollenhauer 

7. The text of the Messina resolution is mentioned in: P. GERBET, La naissance du marché commun, 

Ed. Complexe, Bruxelles, 1987, pp.165-168. 

8. Political and Economic Planning, Statements of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe, 

Allen & Unwin, London, 1969, p.11. 

9. Cf. H.J. KÜSTERS, The Federal Republic of Germany and the EEC-Treaty, in: E. SERRA (ed.), 

Il rilancio dell’Europa e I trattati di Roma. Actes du colloque de Rome 25-28 Mars, Bruylant, 

Giuffré, L.G.D.J, Nomos, Bruxelles, Milano, Paris, Baden-Baden, 1987, p.505. 

10. W.E PATERSON, op.cit., pp.X f. 

11. Cf. H. WEHNER (24 June 1955), in: Proceedings of the ECSC Common Assembly, pp.609-611; 

H. WEHNER (8 July 1955), Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestags, pp.5415-5418; K. MOM- 

MER (7 July 1955), in: Proceedings of the Council of Europe Consultative assembly, pp.112-116. 

Mommer again reconfirmed the priority action on favour of Euratom in an article published by 

Vorwärts, 10.02.1956.


and Wehner to join the Action Committee seems a logical and consistent 

consequence, not least because the Committee’s founder, Jean Monnet, fully shared 

the priority option. 12 In order to understand the thorough commitment by which the 

SPD prepared to support the Euratom plan right from the start of the negotiations, 

we should consider the relevance of prospects associated by the social-democrats 

to the implementation of the project: responding to modernization challenges in the 

atomic era; neutralizing the danger that one day Europe and Germany might come 

to hold weapons of mass destruction; and finally making the socialist option prevail 

in this important and strategic production sector. 13 To this end, the speech by 

Ollenhauer of 18 October 1956 seems particularly relevant, by which the party 

president explained in the plenary session the main reasons why he had decided, 

together with Wehner, to join the Monnet Committee: 

«You know that at the time we decided to join the so-called Monnet Committee, as it 

established a series of principles concerning the exploitation of atomic energy for 

peaceful uses, and the need to assure an effective control. We thought that this was 

the right thing to do […], as there was the opportunity to secure public property and 

public control of raw materials and finished products in a sector where no consolidated 

ownership interests yet existed». 14 

At first, also the Christian-Democratic chancellor Adenauer seemed to share the 

priority option in favour of Euratom, when the delegation sent to the conference of 

Messina were given the task to support only what France was willing to accept. 

This means – as clearly emerged from a note by the Foreign ministry: «Consider 

the issue of atomic energy as the most important item on the agenda». 15 

However, the reasons behind Adenauer’s decision to adopt this cautious stand 

resides outside the scope of the integrationist preferences of the government and 

the majority party: at the time the chancellor believed in fact that the right time had 

not yet come to promote a new and wider initiative in Europe, particularly in view 

of the weak position held at the time by the forces favouring integration in the 

French IV Republic. 16 On the other hand, later negotiation rounds clearly showed 

how for the German government and the so-called sector experts (Experten) the 

Common Market was the priority project, while Euratom was the most 

problematic. In particular, especially after Adenauer himself had Franz Josef 

12. The priority option clearly emerges also in the two final resolutions of the 2 meetings of the Committee, 

taking place in January and September 1956, respectively. Cf. Political and Economic Planning, 

Statements of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe, op.cit., p.11 and pp.16-18. 

13. The aspirations are explained also in an article by the social-democratic MP, Kreyssig, published 

in Vorwärts. G. KREYSSIG, Sozialistische Forderungen zu Euratom, in: Vorwärts, 18.05.1956. 

14. E. OLLENHAUER, speech of 18 October 1956, made during the joint meeting of the party’s executive 

Committee, the party branch and the control Commission. AdsD, PV Protokolle 1956. 

15. PA AA Berlin, 900, Bl. A9010, Ermächtigung Adenauers für Messina, 26.05.1955. Document 

quoted by M.L.L. SEGERS, Zwischen Pax Americana und Pakt Atomica. Das deutsch-amerikanische 

Verhältnis während der EURATOM-Verhandlungen 1955-1957, in: Vierteljahreshefte für 

Zeitgeschichte, 3(2006), pp.432-458 (438). 

16. Cf. H.J. KÜSTERS, Adenauers Europapolitik in der Gründungsphase der europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 

in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 31(1983), pp.646-673, here, p.650.

108 


Strauss indicated for the post of minister for Atomic energy issues in October 1955, 

the German government moved to strongly critical positions on the Euratom 

dossier, despite more conciliatory positions by the ministry of Foreign affairs and 

pressures from the United States. 17 

For our analysis, it is noteworthy to stress how the main controversial point, on 

which minister Strauss and other influential cabinet members remained adamant 

throughout negotiations, referred to France’s demand that the future Atomic Energy 

Community should be assigned an exclusive right of ownership and procurement of 

fissionable materials; an aspect of the project which – as we have seen - was 

instead quite appreciated by the SPD. And more precisely, contrary to the 

social-democrats, during the negotiations, the German government did not hint at a 

possible sacrifice of private interests of the German nuclear industry, and the more 

so if this was deemed necessary in view of the surreptitious financing of France’s 

military nuclear programme. 18 

Here we have come to the second question which saw the party in government 

and the social-democratic opposition supporting totally opposite positions during 

negotiations. While the SPD continued to consider essential the principle according 

to which the exploitation of nuclear energy should be limited to civilian use, 19 the 

German government, at least from the intergovernmental conference of Paris of 

February 1956, no longer harboured any illusion of banishing the military use of 

uranium within Euratom. 20 Also, in close correlation with later developments on 

the international arena, such as the announcement of the Radford plan in July 1956 

and the position taken by the United States during the Suez canal crisis, chancellor 

Adenauer started to increasingly consider – despite the never-assuaged perplexities 

of minister Strauss – the Euratom project more of an opportunity enabling the 

Federal Republic to «produce their own nuclear weapons as soon as possible». 21 

This seems also to explain Adenauer’s decision to participate directly in the 

negotiations in order to find a compromise solution concerning the definition of 

exclusive rights of properties and procurement of fissionable material, as well as 

his willingness to let himself be involved by the French government in a 

programme envisaging the first French nuclear test within the next 5 years. This 

position was later to lead to the signing of the tripartite agreement between 

Germany, France and Italy for atomic bomb development. When the military 

cooperation agreement was made public on 21 st January 1958, in Germany a wide 

extra-parliamentary campaign was started «against atomic death» (Kampf dem 

Atomtod), which the SPD decided to take part in, a further confirmation of the 

17. M.L.L. SEGERS, op.cit., pp.439 f. 

18. Ibid. 

19. E. OLLENHAUER, speech of 18 October 1956, op.cit.; H. WEHNER, Europa mit Vorbehalt, in: 

SPD-Pressedienst, 10.01.1957. 

20. Minutes of the cabinet session of 15.02.1956, published in U. HÜLLBÜSCH (ed.), Die Kabinettsprotokolle 

der Bundesregierung, vol.9, München 1998, pp.194-202, here, p.202. 

21. Minutes of the cabinet meeting of 05.10.1956, in: ibid., pp.618-631, here, p.626.


chasm existing between the position of the party in government and the main 

opposition party. 

In reality, also the social-democrats drew from the Suez crisis the understanding 

of the urgency to establish as soon as possible the Community for Atomic Energy, 

but moving from positions and strategic perspectives quite different from the 

chancellor’s. While Adenauer measured the negative outcome of the diplomatic 

mission of France and Great Britain in the light of the price that Europe was 

ultimately to pay, were it not to strengthen itself at political-military level, 22 for 

Ollenhauer the Suez crisis pointed instead to the urgency of solving the problem of 

oil dependence and, at the same time, the need to promote détente on the 

international arena. 23 This diversity of view helps us also to explain the reason why 

the SPD, despite many objections, especially touching on the clauses enabling 

individual member states to use atomic energy for military purposes, 24 decided to 

accept the final proposition. 

As regards the dossier on the Common Market, the discourse is undoubtedly 

more complex, also because within the individual parties very different, if not 

contrasting, positions could be found side by side. This is certainly true for the 

government forces, which, starting from spring 1955 developed within their midst a 

wide-ranging debate on integration forms and methods, with the backers of a free 

trade area enlarged to OEEC countries on the one hand, and people like Walter 

Hallstein and Hans von der Groeben, who believed that the Common Market had to 

be anchored to an institutional structure following the ECSC’s, on the other hand. 25 

For the SPD, instead, institutional issues, which had nonetheless some weight in 

the debate over Euratom, had only a secondary importance in the debate over the 

ECM. Within a widespread consensus on the perspectives of growth and social 

welfare that the project of an economic integration, no longer sector-based but 

rather horizontal, seemed to embody, the SPD’s internal debate developed mainly 

around the long-drawn national issue: whether and to what extent the merging of 

22. At this regard, what Adenauer said during the meeting of 6 th November with the French Prime minister 

Guy Mollet is particularly relevant: «En ce moment, les pays européens doivent s’unir. Il ne 

s’agit pas de supranationalité. Mais nous devons nous unir contre l’Amérique et, après les élections, 

demander aux Américains ce qu’ils veulent. C’est l’Amérique qui est responsable de la crise 

de Suez. Les Etats-Unis sont si mal informés sur la situation en Europe et sur la politique européenne, 

c’est à en pleurer», in: Documents Diplomatiques Françaises [DDF], 1956, vol.II, 

doc.138, pp.231-238, quoted by L. NUTI, La sfida nucleare. La politica estera italiana e le armi 

atomiche 1945-1991, il Mulino, Bologna, 2007, p.124. See also Adenauer’s speech in Amsterdam 

on 23 rd November 1956 for the Europäische Kulturstiftung: “Die Selbstbehauptung Europas. Grundsätzliche 

Ausführungen zur europäischen Einigungspolitik, vor allem zur Zusammengehörigkeit 

von Ost- und Westeuropa, in: K. ADENAUER, Reden 1917-1967, Böhlau, Köln, 1998, 

pp.373-380. 

23. E. OLLENHAUER, speech of 18 th October 1956, op.cit. 

24. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, second legislature, session of 9 th May 1957, p.12022. 

25. On the topic, see H.J. KÜSTERS, Der Streit um Kompetenzen und Konzeptionen deutscher Europapolitik, 

in: L. HERBST, W. BÜHRER, H. SOWADE (ed.), Vom Marshallplan zur EWG. Die 

Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt, Oldenbourg, München, 

1990, pp.335-370.

110 


Western European economies would contribute to further deepen the division of the 

country. As clearly emerging from the minutes of the meeting of the SPD’s 

executive Committee, at the time not all the party members were convinced that a 

Europe free from political-military aspects did not represent a hurdle in view of a 

reunification of Germany. Thus, for example, the vice-president of the party and 

parliamentary group, Wilhelm Mellies, recalled during the meeting of 7 th March 

1957 that: 

«the economy of the Federal Republic will increasingly intermingle with the Western 

camp. Vice versa, the DDR is increasingly integrated with Eastern economy. 

This will make unification much more difficult. Further difficulty will be engendered 

by customs tariffs». 26 

The shared interest in kindling the hope for unification led the German 

government to ask for, and receive – in the closing phase of negotiations – an 

important formal commitment of the Six to not recognize as definite the division of 

Germany. Firstly, it was established that the single external tariff was not to be 

applied to trade relations between the Federal Republic and the Democratic 

Republic. Secondly, in an additional protocol of 28 th February 1957, which had 

been promoted on the initiative of Carl Friedrich Ophüls, the five partners accepted 

to add a clause for the review of treaties in case of a future German unification. 27 

These measures were not deemed enough by the liberals and the party of the 

«expelled and exiled», who ended by voting against the ratification of the treaties. 

However, also CDU-CSU and SPD continued to back their clearly diverging 

strategic perspectives: while Adenauer’s party perceived the process of European 

integration as a containment tool, precisely, as a resource to counter the activism of 

Nikita Khrushchev's leadership, also following the constantly increasing calls for 

détente, 28 Ollenhauer’s SPD, instead, never stopped stressing the détente potential 

of economic integration. Particularly relevant is Ollenhauer’s statement reported by 

the newspaper Die Welt: 

«on the long run the true political progress of the Common Market will depend on 

the Federal Republic’s readiness to develop relations with countries from the Eastern 

bloc». 29 

The diverging perspective between the two sides is also mirrored in the 

perplexities stated by both parties, during the parliamentary debate of 21 st March 

1957, concerning the failed participation of Great Britain, the definition of an 

external tariffs which were deemed too high, and assistance measures for overseas 

26. W. MELLIES, session of the SPD’s executive Committee of 7 th March 1957, AdsD, PV Protokolle. 

27. The protocol was referred to by Hallstein at the Bundestag four days before the signing of the treaties. 

W. HALLSTEIN, Erklärung der Bundesregierung vor Unterzeichnung, Bonn, 21.03.1957, 

in: G. RINSCHE (dir.), Frei und Geeint. Europa in der Politik der Unionsparteien. Darstellungen 

und Dokumente, Köln, Weimar, Wien, 1997, pp.133-143 (139). 

28. Also, W. LOTH, Adenauer’s Western Choice, 1955-1958, in: W. LOTH (ed.), Europe Cold War 

and Coexistence, 1953-1965, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2004, pp.7-22. 

29. E. OLLENHAUER, in: Die Welt, 05.05.1957.


territories. 30 In particular, while the Erhard-like liberalists continued to consider 

Great Britain as the natural meeting point between the Atlantic and the 

continental-European perspective within the framework of a single free trade zone 

enlarged to OEEC and GATT countries, the majority of social-democrats lamented 

the absence of the United Kingdom, as well as Scandinavian countries’, for their 

presumed higher affinity and reliability at ideological level. At the time of voting, 

Great Britain’s absence represented in particular for some SPD members a sufficient 

reason to oppose the ratification of the Rome treaties. Let us recall here the names of 

Helmut Schmidt, Helmut Kalbitzer and Fritz Baade; and not by chance the three 

political personalities were coming from areas geographically and culturally closer to 

Nordic countries. 31 As regards instead objections concerning the single external tariff, 

several majority members supported the interests of big industrial concerns, which 

feared that the customs union could turn into a sort of protection to the detriment of 

trade relations with third countries, whereas the social-democrats, supported by trade 

unions, voiced the fear that protectionist measures could entail negative effects on 

social and employment policies, as well as on the trade relations with Eastern Europe. 

Finally, with respect to the association policy of overseas countries envisaged by the 

treaties, the German social-democracy stated a strong concern for a possible 

neo-colonialist drift, which instead we do not find in the declarations of the majority 

party. The initial proposal of presenting a common resolution at the time of 

ratification, came probably to nothing also due to the different ways by which CDU 

and SPD perceived or, at least, declared to perceive, the diverse aspects of the treaty. 

3. The vote of 5 th July 1957: an expected, but not forgone vote 

A more attentive analysis of the debate which developed inside the SPD executive 

Committee in the last months before ratification leads us to move away from 

essentially deterministic interpretations, which consider the voting stand in July 

1957 an already inescapable conclusion, after the decision of October 1955. Please 

refer also to Paterson’s position: 

«[…] with the entry of the SPD into the Monnet Action in October 1955, any prospect 

of real opposition to European Institutions was over». 32 

What seems instead significant is the fact that Wehner himself, one of the 

protagonists of the 1955 turning point, even in May 1957 was still proposing 

abstention at the time of ratification in view of the already outlined controversial 

30. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestags. Stenographische Berichte, second legislature, session 

of 21 st March 1957, pp.11332-11340. 

31. Cf. W. LOTH, Deutsche Europa-Konzeptionen in der Gründungsphase der EWG, in: E. SERRA 

(ed.), op.cit., pp.585-602, here, p.598. 

32. Cf. W.E PATERSON, op.cit., p.125. Similarly, the scholar Kevin Featherstone «[…] the SPD had 

entered Monnet’s Action Committee in October 1955, and this in itself represented the end of the 

earlier opposition strategy. Cf. K. FEATHERSTONE, op.cit., p.150.

112 


issues. 33 This voting option would not however jeopardize the treaty ratification; 

however, considering that the SPD was not discounting the possibility of 

abstaining, the persistence of a strong uncertainty within the party was thus shown. 

An uncertainty which found its explicit expression also in the speech of the 

social-democratic member of parliament, Ludwig Metzger, at the time of the vote: 

«the SPD’s indecision springs from the fact that positive and negative aspects of the 

treaty are mixed together, to the point that it is difficult for me to cast a clear-cut yes». 34 

Officially the decision to vote in favour of the ratification of the Rome treaties 

was formalized within the executive committee only 10 days before the vote, on 

24th June 1957, with a vote declaration not bound by the president’s directive. The 

outcome of the internal voting confirmed, however, the presence of a rather 

substantial minority: of the 16 members, 10 voted in favour, while 6 abstained. 

Then a voting internal to the parliamentary group took place with the majority 

supporting the vote in favour of ratification, but with 13 abstentions. Finally, on 5th July 1957, a minority of 17 MP’s, including the already-mentioned Helmut 

Schmidt, Helmut Kalbitzer and Fritz Baade, ended in any case by voting against 

the treaty ratification. 35 Nothing to do, however, with the compact front shown in 

the previous period by the social-democrats in their almost unanimous opposition 

against the ECSC treaty and later the failed EDC. 36 

The now-accessible documents also clearly show how the voting behaviour of 

the social-democratic executive members was strongly influenced by several 

factors which in 1955 were not present. In particular, the political election set for 

the following month of September certainly played an important role. To this end, 

Fritz Erler’s statement of 30th May 1957 appears quite significant: 

«We must keep on stating our criticism, also in the case of us voting in favour. However, 

we cannot afford that in the election the SPD is accused of voting “no” once 

again, or of not knowing what to do. Abstention is almost a “yes”. This is why we 

must say a clear “yes”. 37 

Ollenhauer himself, a week later, lamented that the treaty ratification would 

precede the political election of September 1957, 38 while Adenauer has 

expressively requested European partners a date before the German election day. 39 

33. The proposal was put forward by Herbert Wehner during the session of the party’s executive committee 

on 30.05.1957. AdsD, PV Protokolle 1957. 

34. L. METZGER, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestags, Second legislature, vol.38, session of 

5 th July 1957, p.13345. 

35. Cf. W. LOTH, Deutsche Europa-Konzeptionen …, in: E. SERRA (ed.), op.cit., p.598. 

36. According to figures reported by Haas, of 131 social-democratic MP’s elected in the Bundestag, 

123 voted against the ratification of the ECSC, and 128 against the EDC. In either voting, no SPD 

MP’s voted in favour. Cf. E.B. HAAS, The Uniting of Europe, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 

1968, p.156. 

37. Thus Fritz Erler, during the meeting of the party’s executive Committee of 30 May 1957. AdsD 

Protokolle 1957. 

38. E. OLLENHAUER, in: SPD-Pressedienst, 07.06.1957. 

39. M-T. BITSCH, Histoire de la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours, Ed. Complexe, Bruxelles, 

1996, p.122.


The two perspectives mirrored the same strategic consideration, namely that of two 

parties vying for power in the election, the governing one would certainly benefit 

more in terms of consensus from the new integrationist phase. This also explains 

the reason why the social-democratic leaders, despite the growing awareness of the 

popularity of the integration process in public opinion and the impossibility to 

“vote no again”, decided to downplay themes of European policy during the 

election campaign. 

Besides the contextual motivation, we should also recognize that for the 

majority of social-democrats approving the text of the EEC treaty as a framework 

agreement was easier, or better still, less compromising, considering that a lot was 

depending on the political battle around the implementation of the Common 

Market. Thus, for example, for Zinn the EEC treaty was like a «offspring needing 

care and assistance in order to be successful in life», 40 while for Mommer it 

represented only «the beginning, a base for later developments». 41 

Conclusions 

With the shift observed in the SPD’s European policy around the mid 1950’s on the 

background of the vote in favour of the ratification of the 1957 Rome treaties 

cannot surely be considered an accident in history. The social-democrats 

themselves were the first to claim – in their vote declaration on 5th July – a certain 

degree of continuity and consistency with the policy expressed in the previous 

period: 

«European cooperation and the bypassing of political and economic nationalism are 

fundamental principles for the SPD. However, previously the SPD has always considered 

the possible consequences for our divided country of the proposed integrationist 

measures for the integration of the Federal Republic with our Western neighbours. 

A military and politico-constitutional integration makes reunification more 

difficult. The SPD considers economic, social and cultural sectors as the most promising 

ground for the success of European policies». 42 

These motivations mirror, however, only a partial truth. Perplexities, and in 

particularly criticism raised by several authoritative SPD members, during the 

closing debate, where neither few nor little relevant. The voting behaviour of 

social-democrats also showed the convergence of motivations lying outside the 

specificity of the contents of the Rome treaties. Undoubtedly, the constitutive 

nature of the EEC treaty, namely its being a «framework treaty», where 

implementation timeframe and regulatory contents were not detailed, facilitated the 

40. G. ZINN, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundesrates, Sitzungsberichte, second legislature, session 

of 3 rd May 1957, p.618 

41. K.MOMMER, Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestags, second legislature, session of 5 th July 

1957, p.13321. 

42. Voting declaration of 5 th July 1957, published in: SPD Jahrbuch 1956/1957, pp.15 f.

114 


final decision for social-democrats (and probably not only for them). This last 

remark may help us to explain how it was possible that CDU/CSU and SPD, 

although moving from diverging assumptions and totally opposed strategic 

prospects, came to share the same objectives. 

Finally, for the SPD the treaties of Rome represented an acceptable compromise 

not only because, as Mommer said in 1963, they did not contain «any trace of a 

crushing victory of the majority», 43 but also because they offered the party a big 

opportunity to counter the charge of being anti-European, without forcing it to 

openly challenge the guidelines of its foreign policy and its Deutschlandpolitik. 

Thus, detecting an anticipation of the shift in foreign policies, which was to be 

outlined by the well-known speech of Herbert Wehner in June 1960 on the primacy 

of the Western choice, would be an evident overstretched interpretation. At the 

same time, however, undoubtedly, with the choice to vote in favour of the 

ratification of the treaties of Rome, the SPD took a first important step to become, 

in the eyes of the German constituency, a possible and legitimate alternative 

candidate for government. As is well known, the SPD was to start reaping benefits, 

in terms of consensus-building, from its progressive transformation into an 

ideologically-moderate party only after the «Bad Godesberg» turning point of 

1959. 

Another totally different matter would be whether the social-democratic 

leaders, by bending – in some cases quite openly – the interpretation of the 

meaning of the Rome treaties, had not contributed to disseminate that specific 

ideological approach to European themes, consisting in considering in a positive 

way the development of Community institutes independently from their specific 

contents. 

43. K. MOMMER, Europa als Ziel und Wirklichkeit, in: Neue Gesellschaft, 3(May/June 1963), p.192.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 

115 

Curt GASTEYGER – Europa zwischen Spaltung und Einigung. Darstellung 

und Dokumentation 1945-2005, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2006 575 S. – ISBN 

3-8329-2011-0 (pb) – 30,45 €. 

Quelleneditionen zur Geschichte Europas und der europäischen Integration können 

für die Forschung, vor allem aber für die universitäre Lehre zur Zeitgeschichte der 

EU nützlich sein. Zunehmend werden nicht nur schriftliche, sondern auch visuelle 

Quellen im Internet zugänglich gemacht. Das gilt etwa für den Luxemburger 

„European Navigator“ (http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm) oder die Zeitzeugen-Interviews 

des EHI-Archivs in Florenz (http://www.iue.it/ECArchives/EN/OralHistory.shtml). 

Allerdings konzentrieren sich diese Server ähnlich wie die meisten 

gedruckten Quelleneditionen wie Harryvan und van der Harst (1997) auf die Vorgeschichte 

der heutigen EU. Dagegen hat der Schweizer Curt Gasteyger für seine 

zuerst 1990 vorgelegte und inzwischen 2006 vollständig überarbeitet erschienene 

kombinierte Darstellung und Quellenedition einen anderen Fokus gewählt. Dieser 

Band behandelt die Spaltung Europas genau so wie dessen Einigung und somit osteuropäische 

und gesamteuropäische Entwicklungen ebenso wie die westeuropäische 

Integration zwischen 1945 und 1990. 

Das Buch ist in sieben Hauptkapitel mit Unterkapiteln eingeteilt, denen wiederum 

einige Dokumente zugeordnet sind. Dabei handelt es sich ausschließlich um 

öffentlich zugängliche, wenngleich teilweise in die deutsche Sprache übersetzte 

Dokumente wie Auszüge aus Verträgen, Regierungserklärungen, Reden und Zeitungsberichten. 

Die gesamteuropäische Anlage wird in den kurzen einführenden 

Darstellungen zu Zeitabschnitten und Themen genau so wie in der Auswahl der 

Dokumente deutlich. Neben Ausführungen Léon Blums zu einer föderalistischen 

Lösung der deutschen Frage von 1939 (D1) stehen Planungen des nationalen polnischen 

Widerstands für Nachkriegseuropa (D4). Ausschnitte aus dem EWR-Vertrag 

von 1992 (D78) werden ebenso berücksichtigt wie eine Rede Michael Gorbatschows 

vor dem Europarat 1989 (D83). Insgesamt hat sich der Schwerpunkt des 

Bandes verschoben, so dass inzwischen 200 Seiten mit etwa nahezu der Hälfte der 

142 Dokumente der Zeit seit 1990 gewidmet sind. Ergänzt wird der Band durch 

eine knappe Auswahlbibliographie, ein Abkürzungsverzeichnis und ein Personenregister. 

Diese kombinierte Darstellung und Dokumentation ist vor allem für den Unterricht 

deutschsprachiger Studenten oder anderer, des Deutschen mächtiger Studenten 

geeignet. Allerdings enthalten die einführenden Darstellungen zu den Dokumenten 

keine Verweise auf den Forschungsstand und Forschungskontroversen, was 

sich aus der Produktion des Buches für die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 

erklärt, die mit ihrem Programm auch ältere Schüler und Laien ansprechen will und 

muss. Außerdem wäre es wünschenswert, wenn ein solcher Band neben schon 

gedruckten und teilweise bereits über das Internet zugänglichen Quellen zumindest 

für die Zeit bis in die 1970er Jahre auch unveröffentlichte Quellen aus staatlichen

116 


und anderen Archiven enthielte. Schließlich überkompensiert Gasteyger die Vernachlässigung 

Osteuropas und gesamteuropäischer Entwicklungen in westeuropäisch 

geprägten Darstellungen und Quellenbänden, wie schon ein Blick in das Personenregister 

zeigt. Dort taucht Nikita Chruschtschow 13, Gorbatschow 15 und 

Josef Stalin gar 33 Mal auf, hingegen Jean Monnet, Jacques Delors und François 

Mitterrand nur einmal und Robert Schuman zweimal, Eisenhower einmal und Dulles 

gar nicht. Die Auswahlbibliographie ist sehr kurz und äußerst selektiv und spärlich 

kommentiert und enthält überdies nur wenig nicht deutschsprachige Literatur, 

wobei sich direkt kleinere Fehler eingeschlichen haben (Richard nicht Peter Gillespie, 

S. 567). Insofern ist diese kombinierte Darstellung und Dokumentation vor 

allem für die Verwendung der deutschsprachigen Quellen für die universitäre Lehre 

zur Geschichte Europas und der EU seit 1945 zu empfehlen. 

Wolfram Kaiser 

Universität Portsmouth 

Hubert KIESEWETTER – Das einzigartige Europa. Wie ein Kontinent reich 

wurde, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2006, 232 S. – ISBN 3-515-08927-6 – 

24,00 €. 

Folgt der Erstausgabe einer wissenschaftlichen Publikation zehn Jahre später eine 

zweite Auflage, wie im vorliegenden Fall der wirtschafthistorischen Untersuchung 

der Industrialisierung in Europa, dann kann dies eigentlich nur zwei Ursachen 

haben. Entweder hat sich das Werk als Standardwerk einer Disziplin etabliert oder 

der Verfasser hat es grundlegend überarbeitet. Hubert Kiesewetter darf ersteres für 

‚Das einzigartige Europa’ wohl nicht beanspruchen. Insofern scheint sich die 

zweite Auflage nur über eine grundlegende Überarbeitung zu erklären. Schon im 

Vorwort scheint sich diese These auch zu bestätigen, kündigt der Verfasser doch an, 

dass «dieses Buch seit der ersten Auflage immer wieder ergänzt, aktualisiert und 

überarbeitet» worden ist. Damit macht er den (wirtschaftshistorisch) interessierten 

Leser neugierig. Wie hat die teils deutliche Kritik 1 an der Erstausgabe reflektiert 

und in die zweite Auflage einfließen lassen? Inwiefern hat die (durchaus überschaubare) 

neuere Forschungsdiskussion seine Ausführungen beeinflusst? 

Die Antwort auf beide Fragen fällt kurz aus: Gar nicht. Die kritischen Anmerkungen 

der Rezensenten hinsichtlich methodischer Schwachstellen oder die 

Anmahnung einer präziseren Beachtung der Forschungsdiskussion scheinen den 

Verfasser wenig berührt zu haben. Neuere Forschungen, etwa die breit rezitierten 

Ansätze der Neuen Institutionenökonomik 2 , werden von Kiesewetter gerade einmal 

1. WELSKOPP Th., Rezension: Hubert Kiesewetter, Das einzigartige Europa. Zufällige und notwendige 

Faktoren der Industrialisierung, Göttingen 1996, in: Internationale wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz 

zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, 33(1997), S.148-150. 

2. WISCHERMANN Cl., NIEBERDING A., Die institutionelle Revolution, Stuttgart, 2004; ELLER- 

BROCK K.P., WISCHERMANN Cl. (Hrsg.), Die Wirtschaftsgeschichte vor der Herausforderung 

durch die New Institutional Economics, Dortmund, 2004.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 117 

im Nebensatz erwähnt. Dies ist bedauerlich, bringt doch gerade die Neue Institutionenökonomik 

eine interessante Perspektive in die Debatte um die Industrialisierung 

ein. Man muss diese (neue) Theorierichtung auch nicht gleich mögen; ignorieren 

sollte man sie aber nicht. In diesem Kontext wundert es insbesondere, dass 

Kiesewetter die Monographie des Wiener Wirtschaftshistorikers Felix Butschek 

‚Europa und die industrielle Revolution’ 3 komplett ignoriert. Immerhin setzt sich 

Butschek mit nahezu derselben Fragestellung auseinander. Er bezieht sich sogar 

explizit auf Kiesewetter. Überhaupt erschöpfen sich die Ergänzungen und Aktualisierungen 

leider allzu oft in kurzen und eher oberflächlichen Anknüpfungen an 

tagespolitisch aktuelle Debatten, wie etwa die 2005 von Franz Müntefering angestoßene 

‚Kapitalismusdebatte’. Angesichts dieser Ausgangslage möge man es dem 

Rezensenten der Zweitauflage verzeihen, wenn er im Vergleich zu den Rezensenten 

der Erstauflage keine fundamental neuen Aspekte diskutieren kann. 

In seinem Werk ‚Das einzigartige Europa’ setzt sich Hubert Kiesewetter mit der 

Frage auseinander: «Warum ist es in einigen Staaten – die wir mit dem Sammelbegriff 

Europa bezeichnen – seit dem 16. Jahrhundert gelungen, einen Wohlstand zu 

erzeugen, der lange Zeit in der Welt als einzigartig bezeichnet werden kann»? Einleitend 

entwirft er ein Polyfaktorenmodell, von dem er überzeugt ist, dass es eine 

präzise Erklärung der «Ursachen und Wirkungen dieser epochalen Veränderung» 

liefern kann. Die dabei getroffene Unterteilung nach Faktoren, die in Europa zufällig 

vorhanden waren (Geographie, Bodenschätze, Klima, Fruchtbarkeit des 

Bodens) und Faktoren, die in Europa perfektioniert wurden (Kapital, Technik, 

Unternehmerschaft, Bildung), wirkt wenig innovativ und lückenhaft. Wo bleiben 

etwa rechtliche, gesellschaftliche oder politische Strukturen? Zählen diese nicht 

zum Bündel der für die Industrialisierung in Europa notwendigen Faktoren? Auf 

eine abschließende Präzisierung seines ‚Modells’ wartet der Leser auch vergeblich. 

Welchen Einfluss einzelne Faktoren auf die Industrialisierung in Europa nahmen 

bleibt offen. Anstatt Interdependenzen aufzuzeigen, bleiben die einzelnen Faktoren 

isoliert nebeneinander stehen. Insofern entspricht Kiesewetters Polyfaktorenmodell 

nicht in Ansätzen modelltheoretischen Anforderungen. 

Die einzelnen Faktoren arbeitet Kiesewetter im Hauptteil des Werkes empirisch 

kenntnisreich ab, wenngleich vereinzelte Lücken auffallen. So wäre die Northsche 

These, dass «systematische Anreize zur Förderung des technischen Wandels erst 

entstanden, als durch die Ausdifferenzierung der Eigentumsrechte die privaten 

Ertragsraten von Innovationen an die gesellschaftlichen Ertragsraten angepasst 

wurden» 4 durchaus eine Bereicherung der Ausführungen zum Faktor Technik 

gewesen. Interessant liest sich wiederum das Abschlusskapitel, in dem Kiesewetter 

nach der Übertragbarkeit der europäischen Industrialisierung fragt. Liegen der 

Industrialisierung in Europa allgemeingültige Faktoren zu Grunde, die heutigen 

Entwicklungsländern als wirtschaftspolitische Leitlinien dienen können? Obwohl 

man nicht jedes Argument Kiesewetters teilen muss und einige Erkenntnisse doch 

4. BUTSCHEK F., Europa und die industrielle Revolution, Wien, 2002. 

5. NORTH D.C., Theorie des institutionellen Wandels, Tübingen, 1988.

118 


eher banal sind («Eine unerlässliche Maßnahme zur Ankurbelung wirtschafts- und 

wachstumsdynamischer Entwicklungen in ökonomisch unterentwickelten Staaten 

ist der Ausbau einer Infrastruktur», S.194), liest sich der Schlussteil durchaus 

unterhaltsam und anregend. 

So bleibt am Ende der Lektüre die Erkenntnis hängen, dass die Industrialisierung 

in Europa ein einzigartiger, komplexer (polyfaktoraler), evolutionärer und 

regionaler Prozess war, der sich nicht einfach in Entwicklungsländer exportieren 

lässt. Ob diese eine Erkenntnis allerdings eine Zweitauflage rechtfertigt, muss 

ernsthaft bezweifelt werden. 

Christian Henrich-Franke 

Universität Siegen 

Pierre MANENT – La raison des nations. Réflexions sur la démocratie en 

Europe, coll. L’Esprit de la Cité, Gallimard, Paris, 2006, 100 p. – ISBN 

2-07-077734-0 – 11,00 €. 

L’ouvrage de Pierre Manent s’apparente à un essai, court mais percutant. Il s’agit 

en effet pour l’auteur de faire part, en quelques pages, de ses appréhensions 

concernant la façon dont l’Union européenne se vit aujourd’hui, et donc 

d’introduire dans cet appel, en même temps qu’un éloge de la raison, une certaine 

dose d’inquiétude. L’urgence tourne autour du besoin de l’Europe de se définir, par 

rapport à elle-même, mais aussi, et peut-être surtout, par rapport aux autres. On 

reconnaîtra là le thème de l’identité, évoqué ailleurs, mais qui ici se débarrasse des 

subtilités rhétoriques pour poser crûment la question de la survie de l’Europe. 

«L’Europe» désigne ici un territoire de culture, qui dépasse le simple espace 

politique que l’on désigne sous le nom d’«Union européenne». Il faut noter que 

l’interrogation de Manent est fidèle à sa filiation au libéralisme aronien: elle est 

éminemment politique, et ne se contente pas de théoriser l’économie pour mieux 

comprendre les comportements et les destinées humains. 

Manent prouve ainsi que l’on peut prendre l’Europe comme sujet en écartant les 

thèses trop faciles du filon néo-libéral ou de la pseudo-mondialisation, consistant à 

faire l’apologie ou la condamnation du «monstre» dérégulateur européen. Son but 

est de réfléchir aux traditionnels axes de recherche qui guident sa pensée, 

démocratie, nation et religion, en donnant dans cet ouvrage une dimension 

polémique, parfois courageuse, suivant le modèle de la «conversation civique». 

Cette démarche peut se justifier dans la mesure où l’auto-identification passe, non 

seulement par un effort conceptuel qui doit prendre en compte tous les aspects de la 

vie communautaire et concerner une collectivité qui hésite encore à se nommer, 

mais également par un effort de délimitation, dont on sait qu’il a toujours posé 

problème à l’Europe. Certes, les Européens ont commencé à se définir par la mise 

en avant du régime politique qui contient le mieux les fameuses valeurs 

«européennes», soit la démocratie. Par conséquent, ils ne souffrent pas de la 

comparaison avec les Américains, parangons de ce système dans le monde entier,


phares de la liberté et de sa défense. Or, justement, c’est là que le bât blesse, et 

Manent y insiste largement: les Américains, eux, n’hésitent pas à défendre un 

régime dont ils mesurent la fragilité, tout en lui reconnaissant un aspect 

messianique, spirituel, dimension qui n’entre pas en compte dans la définition 

européenne, toute faite de rationalité et de prudence excessive à l’égard de tous les 

mots, reste de notre tumultueux passé. La différence se fait ainsi entre une croyance 

qui est fortement encouragée d’un côté, avec d’autant plus de vigueur depuis le 11 

septembre, et trop mollement défendue de l’autre. 

Les Européens acceptent ainsi, comme principes d’expansion de l’idéal 

démocratique, qu’ils pensent eux aussi universel, la vertu de l’exemple et la force 

de la persuasion; les Américains s’avèrent moins patients, plus déterminés, et 

conscients qu’il existe une force «négative» opposée au rêve de la grande 

réconciliation (ce mal qui est nécessaire au Bien qu’ils anticipent, et qui peut 

prendre la forme d’«Etats voyous»). Or, cette différence séparant les deux rives de 

l’Atlantique n’est pas seulement historique, elle provient aussi d’une façon diverse 

d’appréhender la démocratie, au sein même de nos Etats: ces Etats, nous les avons 

désacralisés, la construction même de l’Europe devant opérer cette démystification, 

qui est attendue sans ambiguïté aucune par toutes les parties prenantes dans le jeu 

européen. D’après l’auteur, «la version européenne de l'empire démocratique se 

signale par la radicalité avec laquelle elle détache la démocratie de tout peuple réel 

et construit un kratos (un pouvoir) sans demos (sans peuple)». Le sacré est ainsi 

renié comme synonyme de déviance dangereuse pour la communauté politique, 

alors qu’il est totalement admis dans le jeu démocratique américain, où l’adhésion 

à des valeurs communes n’est pas seulement déclarée, mais vécue, ce que l’auteur 

appelle lui-même une «communion». 

Manent nous décrit les sociétés européennes comme étant atomisées à mesure 

que le mouvement d’unification se réalise: il n’y a plus d’idée de représentation 

dans un système politique qui renie ou se méfie par nature de la notion de 

«gouvernement», lui préférant le terme plus neutre en même temps que plus 

rassurant de «gouvernance». Le pouvoir est ainsi morcelé, hyper-spécialisé, soumis 

au «principe de précaution», en même temps que l’universalité de notre cause 

(notre baptême et notre être «démocratiques») remet en question le principe même 

de la démocratie «historique»; la représentativité perdrait ainsi son sens initial, 

dans la mesure où les Européens définiraient une communauté où les maux sont 

temporaires et les besoins similaires. C’est mettre de côté la démocratie telle 

qu’elle s’est imposée dans l’histoire, au nom d’une rationalisation de la politique 

où l’Etat ne serait plus que l’étage supérieur de toute une série de commissions et 

d’agences spécialisées ayant analysé et défini le contour exact de l’action à 

entreprendre. L’Europe communautaire n’aime pas les symboles, leur préférant les 

instruments, ces emboîtements d’espaces «signifiants» qui font se marier l’UE avec 

l’ensemble des régions qui la constituent, contribuant à la remise en question de la 

nation comme pouvoir encore légitime. C’est pourtant Aron qui a appris à Manent 

que l’on devait pouvoir concilier son propre enracinement culturel dans la nation 

avec l’aspiration à une Europe la plus fidèle possible «à la communication des

120 


nations européennes et de leurs mémoires», sans passer par la dénationalisation des 

nations. Or, la perte du cadre de référence national ne s’est parallèlement 

accompagnée d’aucune autre forme de mise en scène du pouvoir, qui aurait pu être 

acceptée comme résultant d’un exercice renouvelé de la citoyenneté dite 

«européenne». Celle-ci est plus mise en scène qu’elle n’est projetée, défendue ou 

vécue, donnant plus de droits que de devoirs, contribuant à dessiner la figure d’un 

consommateur plutôt que d’un citoyen. 

Ce divorce avec la réalité, au nom d’un universalisme abstrait et étouffant, se 

prolonge au point de vue de la politique étrangère. Dans ce domaine, les Européens 

s’avèrent incapables d’une quelconque entreprise, pétrifiés qu’ils sont par leur 

méfiance de la violence comme instrument politique, et de leur méconnaissance 

volontairement entretenue des mobiles les plus profonds à l’œuvre dans l’action 

des nations, la Nation étant condamnée comme le précipité chimique du Mal, 

obstacle à l’unification du monde. L’auteur insiste ici sur la difficulté que les 

Européens ont à comprendre Israël et sa politique, cette nation qui est 

indirectement un «produit de l’Europe», mais qui a gardé sa spécificité consistant à 

faire s’épouser le religieux et le politique, lui préférant une vague «nation arabe», 

qui n’a jamais existé, mais dont les contours se rapprochent de l’universel, du 

modèle des grands ensembles tel qu’il peut être le mieux appréhendé par 

l’Européen. 

Ce problème du manque de repères historiques et politiques se pose à propos de 

notre définition même, rendu plus pressant avec la question de l’élargissement, que 

l’on contrôlait auparavant, que l’on ne contrôle plus aujourd’hui, toujours sous la 

vertueuse mais impérieuse nécessité de ne laisser personne dehors, et sous 

l’emprise de la «passion de la ressemblance» que charrie l’aspiration à un monde 

sans frontières. Cette façon de raisonner, dont on a du mal à percevoir la fin (une 

«finalité sans fins», dixit l’auteur), fait que nous nous trouvons aujourd’hui 

confrontés au délicat problème de l’intégration de la Turquie. Que faire de cet 

espace? L’inclure au nom d’un passé (partiellement et négativement) commun, ou 

l’inclure au nom du respect de l’Autre? Certes, cette dernière tendance est une 

qualité, et l’une des caractéristiques de l’esprit européen, celle de «l’ouverture». 

Mais cette dernière, poussée à son extrême, ne revient-elle pas à nier ou à ignorer 

ses propres qualités, au nom de valeurs universelles dont le contenu reste largement 

à définir, voire à démontrer? En quoi la notion de «club chrétien» peut-elle 

choquer, et qui doit-elle choquer, dans la mesure où, dans toute civilisation, les 

interactions entre mythe, croyance et politique sont interpénétrables, 

complémentaires et au final, étroitement liées? 

Jamais la laïcité, qui est une grande victoire de notre démocratie (et, notons-le, 

la seule qui ait une application concrète dans une partie seulement du globe) n’a 

déclaré nécessaire de rejeter tout héritage religieux, comme il est impossible de 

demander à quiconque de renier ses origines. Le fonds religieux, dans ce sens, n’est 

pas à vocation essentialiste, mais participe de la vie d’une communauté, 

accompagne sa respiration profonde, qu’aucun décret, aucune loi, aucune volonté 

humaine ne peut, et ne doit, interdire. On voit là l’expérience de la cité antique , le


nœud gordien de l’approche théologico-politique qui est celle de Manent à propos 

de la réflexion sur le politique, jamais véritablement affranchi de sa fonction 

sacrée, mais dont le but est d’ancrer la nation «au cœur» de la modernité libérale. 

Dans ce sens, l’«agence humaine centrale» que représente l’UE aux yeux de 

Manent est bien la preuve que l’ère post-nationale, chantée par Habermas, n’est pas 

advenue. La nation reste un cadre d’expression valable, et même nécessaire à 

l’épanouissement d’individus, qui ne doivent plus être sommés d’en finir avec leur 

passé. Nouvelle attaque contre un esprit de repentance qui tourne à vide, et un 

«renoncement» qui prend prétexte d’un sens de l’histoire pour s’immiscer dans les 

esprits. Manent, en ce sens, ne se situe pas dans la vague auto-complaisante des 

«déclinistes» … L’espoir, nécessaire à toute vie politique, a encore la vie longue. 

Bertrand Vayssière 

Maître de conférences à l’Université de Toulous II-Le Mirail 

Robert FRANK, Rosalind GREENSTEIN (dir.) – Gouvernance et identité en 

Europe, coll. Axes Savoir, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005, 278 p. – ISBN 2 8027 1981 5 

- 30,00 €. 

Cet ouvrage a pour origine un colloque organisé en novembre 2001 à Paris I 

Panthéon-Sorbonne, rassemblant des représentants de différentes disciplines. Le 

but est de s’intéresser au terme de «gouvernance», vocable d’une nouvelle langue 

bruxelloise dont il s’agit de comprendre quelle mutation de l’action publique il 

signifie. Dans le même temps, l’objectif est de s’interroger sur la résonance sociale 

de ce même terme, et de confronter ce dernier au mot «identités» (pris ici dans son 

sens pluriel): en d’autres termes, l’acte de gouverner tel que désigné par le mot 

«gouvernance» ne suffit pas, il s’agit aussi de s’intéresser aux gouvernés, à ce 

«vécu concret», qui doit rappeler l’importance de réfléchir aux termes d’une 

véritable démocratie à l’échelle européenne. 

La première partie s’intéresse à ce rapport gouvernés/gouvernants, en essayant 

de comprendre les blocages et les dynamiques de leur interaction. L’étude 

commence par un article de la linguiste Rosalind Greenstein, qui tente de juger de 

l’appréhension du mot «gouvernance» par les opinions, afin de voir si ce dernier ne 

ressortit pas exclusivement du jargon d’experts. S’appuyant sur des dictionnaires, 

le Livre blanc sur la gouvernance européenne (27 juillet 2001), ainsi qu’un 

micro-trottoir, Greenstein tente d’analyser la réception du terme, et ainsi sa 

compréhension (ou non) par un vaste public. La langue joue un rôle important: en 

français, le terme est ainsi singulièrement absent, ou alors défini succinctement, ou 

encore assimilé au substantif «gouvernement»; en anglais, le constat est similaire, 

mais englobe une définition autour de la manière ou de la méthode de gouverner 

(ex. de corporate governance). Dans l’ensemble cependant, l’enquête menée par 

l’auteur est sans appel dans ses résultats: le mot reste peu parlant, relativement 

hermétique aux yeux de la plupart des sondés qu’elle a rencontrés. C’est 

regrettable, dans le sens où le Livre blanc semble signifier que le citoyen européen,

122 


dans la formule de la gouvernance, devrait avoir son mot à dire dans la politique 

qui le concerne (ouverture, participation, responsabilité, efficacité, cohérence), ce 

qui change de l’acception «gouverné». Au final cependant, ce mot est victime 

d’une polysémie qui affecte sa compréhension immédiate. Robert Frank, lui, se 

penche sur la question du point de vue historique. Il rappelle au préalable le travail 

effectué par le réseau sur l’identité créé par René Girault, faisant une synthèse des 

principales étapes qui caractérisent les rapports entre l’Européen et l’Europe: 

l’identique ou identicité européenne (traits communs d’ordre général); l’identité 

européenne, qui est surtout culturelle, mais qui est restée cantonnée aux élites, 

pendant que l’identité politique était associée à l’idée nationale; l’idée européenne, 

pas suffisante pour pousser au sentiment d’identité; la conscience, qui date des 

premiers cataclysmes (14-18 et 39-45), et qui rime avec le besoin de continuer le 

mouvement vers la construction européenne (associé aux différentes relances qui 

marquent le processus européen); le sentiment, qui est l’attachement sentimental à 

la collectivité, supposant autant de droits que de devoirs (et de sacrifices); enfin 

l’identité politique européenne. Les années 1970 ont représenté à ce niveau un 

consensus mou, une «conscience sans sentiment» orchestrée par des stimuli 

négatifs. Certes, on a bien parlé d’identité européenne à Copenhague en 1973, ou 

d’identité européenne de défense à Saint Malo en 1998, mais le ressort en est le 

même: «à partir d’une identité de vues, on espère créer une identité politique 

vécue». Cependant, si la démarche fonctionnaliste ne fonctionne pas, le 

pessimisme n’est pas non plus de mise: les Européens se disent de plus en plus 

capables d’assumer une double identité (environ 50% dans les différents sondages). 

C’est pourquoi Frank évoque une Europe non pas post-nationale, mais 

post-nationaliste. Il avoue cependant la difficulté pour l’historien de définir la 

gouvernance, qui renvoie à une série de règles permettant à un groupe humain de 

vivre en bonne entente: cette façon de gérer comprend-elle ou non l’idée classique 

de gouvernement? Pour lui, un premier sens historique se dégage de ce sentiment 

confus: le mot sert surtout à masquer le manque de gouvernement européen, et 

cherche à donner un sens au bric-à-brac politique européen, dont on ne sait avec 

certitude où sont le sommet et la base. Le déficit démocratique réside surtout dans 

l’écart entre citoyenneté et identité européennes, entre processus d’identification et 

processus de politisation: l’opinion se sentant impuissante dans le mécanisme de 

décision, la démagogie et l’abstentionnisme risquent d’avoir une longue carrière 

devant eux. Axer le mot «gouvernance» au seul critère d’efficacité n’est peut-être 

pas la bonne réponse, car «l’identité culturelle ne produit pas nécessairement de 

l’identité politique» (p.50). 

Le géographe Georges Prévélakis continue l’étude de la confrontation 

gouvernance/identités en s’appuyant sur la théorie de Jean Gottmann sur le 

cloisonnement: selon lui, la «circulation» traduit un mouvement d’ouverture, 

volontaire ou non, qui dépasse les frontières traditionnelles et risque de remettre en 

question les différentes identités (voir la mondialisation, dernier avatar de ce 

mouvement); cependant, cette «circulation» finit toujours par être cloisonnée, grâce 

aux «iconographies» («l’ensemble des symboles auxquels tient une population»),


qui permettent d’adapter ou d’apprivoiser le mouvement. Ce type de pensée 

ressortit de «l’idéologie géographique», qui entraîne une classification du monde 

par la prise en compte d’espaces clos, définis en fonction de principes de gestion 

d’un territoire présenté comme continu et «logique» caractérisé par des frontières, 

et où l’individu est précisément situé dans l’espace. Avant la fin de la guerre froide, 

l’Europe s’inscrivait dans une stratégie plus réticulaire que territoriale, avec un 

espace délimité, constitué d’un réseau d’Etats souverains. La fin du mur de Berlin a 

posé la question de la finitude de l’espace, et introduit les questions de 

l’approfondissement et de l’élargissement, remettant en jeu «l’impératif territorial» 

(p.56) à travers lequel se pose la question de la gouvernance européenne, qui 

s’attaque bien plus vivement aux souverainetés nationales. Cependant, 

l’iconographie européenne est modeste, en gros limitée à l’euro, qui reste 

simplement une «promesse de prospérité» (p.57). De même, cette remise en cause 

pose la question de choix différents dus à une culture de l’espace elle-même 

différente: d’après l’auteur, ce qui risque de l’emporter, et qui donnerait tout son 

sens au mot «gouvernance», c’est l’acceptation d’une vision réticulaire de l’espace 

européen, associée à l’existence de réseaux différents de territoires, faisant ainsi 

accepter l’idée d’hétérogénéité qui rompt avec la notion «westphalienne» du 

territoire. 

Michel Gérard, professeur de sciences politiques, s’intéresse au rôle des 

politiques externes dans la définition de l’identité européenne. L’identité collective 

est fortement liée à l’idée de mémoire et d’héritage à transmettre. Certains vecteurs 

peuvent jouer ce rôle pour l’Europe: réconciliation franco-allemande, sorties de 

dictatures, etc. Certains facteurs peuvent influer: la communication politique des 

gouvernants, les médias, quelques symboles forts comme l’euro. Il faut de même 

tenir compte de la «pluri-appartenance» de chaque individu, en fonction de 

marqueurs qui ne sont pas tous politiques (ville, musique). Ce qui paraît frappant, 

c’est que les Européens sont définis comme tels par la vision que l’on a d’eux 

depuis l’extérieur: un havre de paix pour les uns, une «forteresse» pour les autres. 

De même, ces «Européens à part entière» peuvent exister concrètement dans 

certaines enceintes, comme l’ONU, l’Unesco, l’OMC, mais également la PESC/ 

PESD. Un auteur comme Charles Kupchan (The End of the American Era) a pu 

estimer que l’impact de cette Europe diplomatique sur la scène internationale 

donne l’idée d’un grand avenir, où l’influence américaine déclinera (voir ce qu’en 

dit Jeremy Rifkin). Il est cependant évident que les différents acteurs de l’Europe 

(commissaires, Javier Solana) ne prennent du poids que vus de l’extérieur, où 

l’identité nationale joue un faible rôle dans l’identification de chaque Européen. 

Ainsi, un ferment d’identification est en route, mais dont nous ne sommes hélas pas 

les acteurs. 

Christian de Boissieu fait ensuite une comparaison entre gouvernance mondiale 

et européenne. Pour lui, ce concept de «gouvernance mondiale» n’est pas 

forcément associé au 11 septembre, mais a pu se faire connaître à chaque crise 

affectant l’ensemble de la planète (politique mais surtout économique). La quête 

d’une nouvelle architecture financière internationale démontre cependant le besoin

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accru de faire face à une globalisation mal maîtrisée, et nous renseigne sur le retard 

des structures institutionnelles, quelles qu’elles soient, sur les systèmes 

économiques et sociaux ainsi que leurs interdépendances. L’auteur évoque ces 

«biens collectifs internationaux» (paix, développement durable) dont l’impact et la 

résonance condamnent à terme, d’après lui, des forums particularistes comme le 

G7/G8. Selon de Boissieu, une nouvelle architecture pour les organismes 

internationaux est possible et souhaitable, passant par une re-réglementation 

d’ordre bancaire et financière (blanchiment, paradis fiscaux, terrorisme). A 

l’échelle européenne, il estime que la gouvernance doit passer par une transparence 

de la politique monétaire (il s’insurge ainsi contre l’indépendance trop forte de la 

BCE), et la coordination des politiques monétaires, afin d’obtenir une cohérence 

plus claire de la zone euro vis-à-vis du reste du monde. 

Georges Saunier étudie la PAC, assimilée par lui à un «instrument de régulation 

– de gouvernance […] pour l’Europe communautaire» (p.83). Dans la première 

moitié des années 1980, le budget de la PAC augmente plus vite que celui de la 

CEE, à un moment où les différents pays se posent la question de la finalité du 

budget (voir par exemple la notion de «juste retour»). La crise agro-budgétaire qui 

en résulte fait voler en éclats le compromis de Luxembourg; elle permet, ce faisant, 

une prise de conscience que la machine s’emballe, même chez les Français, qui 

acceptent que les prix des céréales se rapprochent graduellement des prix 

mondiaux et le principe des quotas laitiers. Cette prise de conscience a été 

salvatrice, et a permis de relancer certains dossiers (voir comités Dooge et 

Adonnino de 1984). L’article est intéressant, mais à vrai dire, on ne comprend pas 

très bien ses liens avec le thème de la gouvernance (voir l’aveu de la note 9 p.92). 

Les géographes Pierre Beckouche et Yann Richard s’interrogent ensuite sur 

l’enjeu frontalier soulevé par Interreg. Ils en rappellent l’historique: le premier 

enjeu est économique, visant un aménagement territorial intégré; mais dans le 

fond, l’enjeu s’avère politique: il s’agit de faire reculer la logique territoriale de 

l’Etat-nation, et d’entraîner une diversification des acteurs et des objectifs (surtout 

avec Interreg II et III), qui comprennent aussi les PECO, la notion de voisinage et le 

thème de la connexion des réseaux: on ne raisonne plus en terme de contiguïté. On 

constate cependant que les régions frontalières souffrent de cette approche, puisque 

les grandes villes et les capitales profitent beaucoup plus de la logique de réseau. 

Les auteurs prennent l’exemple d’un espace frontalier avec le cas 

germano-polonais: à l’échelle locale, cet espace est vécu avec beaucoup de 

réticences (souvenir des atrocités, thème du retour des Allemands, mémoires de la 

polonisation), et il paraît difficile d’en faire de nouveau un lieu de passage et de 

coopération. Autre cas décrit: la Grande Région Saar-Lor-Lux, qui a certes une 

logique historique et économique, mais qui se révèle au final une absurdité au point 

de vue institutionnel. Les problèmes rencontrés par Interreg sont ainsi récurrents: 

acteurs aux pouvoirs différents le long de la frontière; prolifération des projets 

(absence de gestion commune des crédits); problèmes de discontinuité territoriale; 

parfois des espaces en concurrence; déficit de légitimité et de visibilité des 

territoires transfrontaliers. On doit ajouter le problème des flux, avec des


investissements qui délaissent ouvertement la partie orientale. Certes, l’aide 

européenne se concentre de plus en plus sur cette partie-là, et c’est en grande partie 

par le biais de la coopération transfrontalière qu’un rattrapage et une harmonisation 

resteront possibles, mais le volontarisme sera pendant encore longtemps capital en 

la matière. 

L’étude de la BCE par Hubert Kempf, professeur de sciences économiques, 

démontre que, sur le plan des faits, l’UEM est un succès. Cependant, au point de 

vue de l’adhésion, l’affaire est bien plus compliquée. Certains facteurs peuvent 

expliquer ce décalage: la dévalorisation initiale de l’euro face au dollar; la 

comparaison avec la Fed, qui se fait au détriment de la BCE, à la recherche de 

crédibilité à travers des présupposés dogmatiques; une politique de communication 

désastreuse; des désaccords criants entre politique monétaire et budgétaire, avec 

des critiques de plus en plus ouvertes (Lafontaine, Schröder, Verhofstadt), dont le 

point d’orgue est la crise de novembre 2003. Il faut reconnaître que la BCE est plus 

indépendante que la Fed, elle-même sous la coupe directe du Congrès, alors que les 

gouverneurs sont nommés par le président. L’auteur pense que les résultats positifs 

de cette Fed sont largement dus à l’expérience, dont ne peut se targuer la BCE. 

Dans ce cas de figure, le point d’équilibre entre indépendance et responsabilité 

paraît idéal, et la BCE devrait, selon Kempf, s’en inspirer (l’obligation de rendre 

des comptes, the accountability, ne s’oppose pas forcément à indépendance). Il ne 

s’agit donc pas d’ignorer le projet politique global que contient une monnaie, ce 

que la BCE pourrait être tentée de faire: l’art.109b(3) de Maastricht impose le 

moindre des contrôles, ce qui fait que la prise démocratique est vraiment minimale, 

et l’opacité de règle. T. Padoa-Schioppa, membre du directoire de la BCE, a pu 

parler d’une «monnaie sans Etat», ce qui traduit un découplement entre le signe et 

sa crédibilité. Or, il faut éviter à tout prix la «solitude» de la BCE et appuyer sur 

l’exigence de cohérence. C’est dire que la position de la BCE est fragile: seule son 

intégration politique (ou dans la politique) permettra de parler de succès. 

La deuxième partie pose plus directement la question institutionnelle, 

commençant par une réflexion de Hartmut Kaelble sur l’espace public européen. 

Plusieurs chercheurs, notamment allemands, commencent à valider ce concept: cet 

espace est multilingue (de plus en plus d’Européens parlent une langue étrangère), 

composite (les réseaux s’y développent, favorisant l’interconnexion d’espaces 

autres que nationaux), repose sur des transferts non institutionnalisés, mais 

s’intéresse peu à la politique à l’échelle européenne, très élitiste (espaces 

d’experts). Pour l’auteur cependant, on assiste à l’émergence d’indices qui 

démontrent l’affirmation de cet espace public dépassant la nation: le débat 

renouvelé autour de la civilisation européenne, l’européanisation des réseaux 

d’experts (publications, réunions, etc.), l’augmentation des symboles européens 

(passeport, euro, etc.), l’apparition d’une société civile européenne (associations, 

syndicats, ONG), ainsi que l’importance accrue de la thématique européenne dans 

les médias et les campagnes électorales. 

Le thème de la transparence politique est abordé par Amanda Frost 

(Washington) par comparaison entre l’Europe et les Etats-Unis. Son constat de

126 


départ est que les crises de confiance donnent matière à la publicisation des 

processus décisionnels. Elle part du cas de l’UE, qui a émis un nouveau règlement 

en matière d’accès à l’information le 3 décembre 2001, ce qui existe depuis une 

trentaine d’années outre-Atlantique. Or, dans ce cas, la volonté n’est pas, comme 

aux Etats-Unis, d’améliorer le système, mais de tenter de créer une légitimité 

démocratique. Il faut dire que l’UE propose peu de place aux acteurs non 

gouvernementaux dans la prise de décision. Aux Etats-Unis, on cherche à améliorer 

l’exécution de la loi, et non pas à répondre à une crise de légitimité: le processus se 

fait en amont, avec l’existence de voies d’accès des acteurs intéressés par telle ou 

telle procédure, qui ont une chance de peser sur l’élaboration de la loi. La 

transparence finit par incarner la légitimation de la décision, car le public est 

réellement associé (participation aux réunions du Congrès, droit de pétitionner le 

gouvernement): dans ce sens, la transparence insuffle véritablement de la 

démocratie. Pour l’Europe, la «culture du secret» est prédominante (l’Europe reste 

«un projet de diplomates», p.186): quelques documents de relations publiques, 

mais sans plus. Le PE reste un organe secondaire, et la comitologie la règle. La 

transparence, refusée dans un premier temps dans le Traité de Maastricht, a donc 

été imposée par les circonstances, mais il ne s’agit pas pour autant d’améliorer la 

production législative européenne, pour des raisons d’efficacité (peur d’une 

«re-nationalisation» des politiques, du ralentissement des décisions). Or, «là où les 

Américains considèrent la transparence comme une simple pratique, parmi 

d’autres, de bonne gouvernance, l’UE en fait une condition constitutionnelle sine 

qua non de la démocratie» (p.193). Le problème de la participation, si crucial en 

Europe, n’est en effet pas réglé par la question de la transparence du droit à 

l’information. L’auteur propose ainsi trois voies pour la démocratisation de 

l’Europe: un modèle «majoritaire supranational», qui implique la préférence pour 

les majorités; un modèle «intergouvernemental», qui laisse toute sa place aux 

comités d’experts et à l’intégration des parlements nationaux; un modèle 

«républicain civique», qui s’appuie sur la société civile, actrice dans le processus 

décisionnel. Dans tous les cas de figure, d’autres décisions que celle sur la 

transparence devront être prises pour permettre une véritable appropriation de la 

gouvernance par le public. 

Elisabeth du Réau propose une réflexion plus historienne sur les différents 

projets d’union politique: la première étude porte sur la vague d’espoirs qui a 

présidé à la création du Conseil de l’Europe (voir l’hommage de Mitterrand à cette 

génération prête à «inventer l’Europe réconciliée»); la seconde sur l’échec de la 

CED et sur la condamnation de l’approche fédéraliste («les fédéralistes sont les 

adversaires de l’Etat-nation et veulent lui substituer l’Europe-Communauté», 

Debré); la dernière sur la multiplication des projets qui marque les années 1980, 

notamment le projet Spinelli du 14 février 1984, qui a marqué plus qu’on ne le 

pense les discussions au sein de l’Etat et présidé à la réorientation de la 

construction européenne à cette époque. On ne peut que faire le constat de l’échec 

de ces différents plans, qui démontre qu’il est plus facile d’évoquer l’Europe que de 

la vivre.


Liêm Hoang-Ngoc évoque ensuite la notion de «gouvernement économique» 

européen, dans un article qui cherche à «traiter, au plan théorique, des fondements 

des différents critères de convergence économique et des objectifs de politique 

économique qui sont susceptibles d’être élaborés dès lors que plusieurs économies 

nationales décident de s’engager dans un projet de coordination supranationale» 

(p.219). L’auteur décrit le processus par étapes qui semblait s’être imposé à partir 

de l’AUE: marché unique, monnaie unique, puis règles institutionnelles de nature 

fédérale. Mais c’est sans compter avec les difficultés de concilier souci d’efficacité 

économique et gestion politique: le débat sur les critères de convergence 

empoisonne ainsi la relation entre les deux approches, alors que le critère retenu 

(3%) n’a rien de scientifique, mais se révèle être la moyenne des déficits des pays 

membres au cours des années 1980. Hoang-Ngoc se montre favorable à la 

renégociation du pacte de stabilité, surtout parce que le budget communautaire 

reste faible (1,27% du PIB communautaire); or, la politique budgétaire doit 

l’emporter sur l’interprétation orthodoxe des critères de convergence. La décision 

du 25 novembre 2003 semble marquer la fin d’un tabou, alors que certains 

proposent de nouveaux critères pour évaluer le déficit public (les Italiens proposent 

ainsi d’écarter l’investissement du calcul des dépenses publiques), dont le rôle 

stratégique de relance ne peut pas être assumé par le capital privé. 

Jean-Claude Colliard esquisse ensuite une réflexion autour du concept de 

«patrimoine constitutionnel européen». Celui-ci consacre certains principes, 

comme la primauté de l’individu ou la force du principe d’égalité. Est-ce que le fait 

de transposer ces éléments peut favoriser le processus constituant? Il est évident 

que tous les pays se retrouvent dans le régime parlementaire, mais il y a aussi des 

pratiques qui divergent: au sein des Etats, l’élection parlementaire devient élection 

au suffrage universel du Premier ministre; or, au niveau de l’UE, il y a déconnexion 

entre élection et composition de la Commission. Tout cela peut aussi expliquer la 

désaffection des électeurs, d’autant plus que ce Parlement ne vote ni l’impôt ni la 

loi. Il faudrait peut-être commencer par transposer certaines pratiques à l’échelle 

nationale: pour l’élection du PE, une procédure électorale uniforme avec élection à 

la représentation proportionnelle dans des circonscriptions régionales et la 

reconnaissance d’un système de partis communs. 

La dernière intervention est celle de Didier Maus et porte sur la «problématique 

de la constitution pour l’Europe», article écrit à l’automne 2001, et volontairement 

non actualisé. L’auteur s’intéresse aux questions de vocabulaire (peut-on parler de 

constitution?), au contenu, à la procédure (il recommande par exemple 

l’uniformisation de la procédure d’adoption avec des référendums dans tous les 

pays au même moment). Pour lui, «à partir du moment où le mot ‘constitution’ […] 

figurera dans l’intitulé du prochain traité, l’histoire de l’Europe ne sera plus la 

même» (p.274). La dernière phrase est intéressante: «c’est […] la confrontation 

entre la date de (l’)élaboration (de l’article) et le futur droit positif qui est 

susceptible d’intéresser le lecteur», (p.275), bien que le débat, à la suite de mai 

2005, reste ouvert.

128 


Ainsi, différents points ont été abordés pour mettre en scène cette notion de 

gouvernance, sans aboutir à une vision d’ensemble relativement précise. Il faut dire 

que le mot reste à définir, tant son intervention dans la vie publique est récente: la 

période qui l’a vu naître reste marquée par les séquelles de la fin de la Guerre 

froide, où le pouvoir semble s’être dilué de manière inquiétante sans que l’on ait 

trouvé de solutions nouvelles aux différents déficits démocratiques dénoncés par 

l’opinion, spécialement à l’échelle européenne. Pour beaucoup de pays, dont la 

France, le mot de gouvernance n’a pas de racines dans notre vie politique, et 

signifie d’emblée une véritable remise en question de notre vision du contrat social. 

Le mot de gouvernance traduit de toute manière une certaine dévaluation du rôle de 

l’Etat, mis en cause dans son efficacité et dans son essence politique même, que les 

circonstances actuelles semblent condamner au profit de l’épanouissement 

personnel, soutenu par certaines reviviscences identitaires, en même temps que par 

un climat libéral qui semble pour certains être le résultat final de l’Histoire. 

Situation confuse qui appelle une réponse où l’Europe, parce qu’elle est le fruit de 

traditions politiques diverses, en même temps qu’une expérience inédite propre à 

toutes les souplesses, peut jouer un rôle moteur: celui d’éviter une situation 

anarchisante où des regroupements se constitueraient dans les marges des Etats ou 

carrément en dehors d’eux. Il faudra pour cela faire un pas, grand pour certains, qui 

consiste à reconnaître la représentation des intérêts privés, le lobbying, cette 

interaction qui met en question notre conception de la représentation publique, et 

pose les bases d’une démocratie renouvelée où l’acte de gouverner est l’affaire de 

tous, et où la discussion incessante d’arbitrages précaires s’avère un gage de 

démocratie. En ce sens, le livre atteint son objectif en liant le mot gouvernance à 

celui d’identité, car cette notion nouvelle est plus que la chronique annoncée d’une 

mutation du pouvoir, elle traduit également la volonté de faire de l’Europe un projet 

collectif, objectif qui ne pourra pas être atteint sans une réadaptation de nos 

traditions politiques, qui devra d’abord commencer dans chacun des Etats avant de 

se propager à l’ensemble communautaire: en ce sens, l’UE peut devenir une force 

d’impulsion, tout en redevenant une idée d’avenir. 

Bertrand Vayssière 

Université de Toulouse II-Le Mirail 

Birgit RAMSCHEID – Herbert Blankenhorn (1904-1991). Adenauers 

außenpolitischer Berater, Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf, 2006, 460 S. – ISBN 

978-3-7700-1901-4 – 38,00 €. 

In her University of Bonn PhD thesis Birgit Ramscheid gives a comprehensive and 

“thick description” of the political career of Herbert Blankenhorn, who was one of 

the very few top advisors to chancellor Konrad Adenauer and therefore a key figure 

in the process of co-ordinating and directing the foreign policy activities of West 

Germany from the late 1940s to the mid 1950s, when he left Bonn to serve as 

ambassador to NATO. Although his impact may have been more important in the


field of staff policy, he also contributed to the conception and implementation of 

foreign policy, especially as far as the “German question” was concerned. 

Blankenhorn grew up surrounded by an upper class-Protestant milieu. He 

joined the Foreign Office in 1929, serving among other places at Geneva, 

Washington, and, of course, Berlin. Although no dedicated Nazi – he became a 

member of the Party not until December 1938 – American officials remembered 

him as “the most pro-German” of all the secretaries of the German embassy in 

Washington during the second half of the 1930s (p.46). Since on the other hand 

Blankenhorn got in contact to the “20th July”-conspiracy, Ramscheid describes his 

attitude as fluctuating between “inner resistance and external conformity” (p.47). 

Between spring and autumn 1945 he was arrested by the American military 

authorities. During the interrogations he tried to make his American counterparts 

sensitive of the “Communist threat”, bringing the Germans into play as allies 

against the Russians. After his denazification procedure he was elected, in May 

1948, secretary general of the CDU in the British Zone of Occupation, a post that 

brought him in contact with Adenauer, who needed – and trusted in – 

Blankenhorn’s foreign policy expertise. So his protégé was able to gain top 

positions in the chancellery and in the “new” Foreign Office, established in March 

1951. Although Adenauer had warned him not to rebuild some sort of 

“Wilhelmstraße” – the synonym for the former German Foreign Office – this was 

exactly the accusation Blankenhorn had to face during the early 1950s. 

Nevertheless, Adenauer always shielded him. 

Whereas Ramscheid introduces Blankenhorn as a man with new ideas and 

proposals to solve the “German question”, this did not apply to the field of 

European integration policy. He admired Jean Monnet and was well aware of the 

tremendous importance of the Schuman Plan – “a landmark of European history” 

(p.151) –, but lacked own ideas worth mentioning. During his service as 

ambassador in Paris between 1958 and 1963 he at least opposed general Charles de 

Gaulle’s temporarily successful attempts to keep the British out of the European 

Economic Community and also rejected the so-called Elysée Treaty. This attitude 

may explain why Blankenhorn’s relationship with Adenauer cooled down even 

before the latter left office. And his influence had been declining already since the 

mid 1950s. 

Birgit Ramscheid’s book draws on extensive archival research including, of 

course, the Blankenhorn papers at the Bundesarchiv Koblenz, but also a nearly 

endless number of German and foreign archives. She offers an impressive inquiry 

into successful networking and into the way of thinking and acting of a powerful 

“second row” official. Although she sometimes tends to make Blankenhorn appear 

in a rather favourable light, all in all she keeps the necessary distance to her 

protagonist. 

Prof. Dr. Werner Bührer 

Technische Universität München

130 


Julie M. NEWTON – Russia, France, and the Idea of Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, 

Basingstoke, 2003, 357 S. – ISBN 0-333-72100-4 – 20,00 £. 

Als wesentlichster Hebel der Westeuropapolitik Moskaus diente in den 1960er und 

1970er Jahren das gaullistische Frankreich, dessen auf nationale Eigenständigkeit 

bedachten Kurs der Kreml für eine Schwächung des westlichen Bündnisses zu 

instrumentalisieren strebte. Julie M. Newton hat zur sowjetischen Frankreichpolitik 

1958 bis 2001 eine insbesondere über Akteure und Hintergründe der Moskauer 

Europadiskussion detailliert informierte und prägnant formulierte Studie vorlegt, 

welche die bisherige Forschung zum Thema 1 um einige Aspekte bereichert. Paris 

wird dabei von Newton auch als zumindest bis 1970 gerne benütztes Sprachrohr 

der sowjetischen Westpolitik präsentiert: „Während – wie Harold Macmillan konstatierte 

– ‚de Gaulle Europa sagte und Frankreich meinte‘, sagte Moskau Frankreich 

und meinte Europa“ (S. 62). Sowjetische Archivquellen, wie sie etwa in der 

Studie Gomarts über die Chruščëvjahre ausgewertet wurden, aber für den Zeitraum 

von Newtons Werk nicht in gleicher Dichte zugänglich sind, wurden von ihr nicht 

herangezogen. Darin liegt auch ein Hauptmanko des Buches, dessen Aussagen in 

Zukunft durch Dokumente gegengeprüft werden müssen. Dennoch gelingt es Newton, 

durch Analyse zahlreicher russischer Zeitschriftenpublikationen sowie durch 

Gespräche mit ehemaligen Politikern, Diplomaten und Experten, darunter 

Chruščëvs Schwiegersohn und „Sondergesandter“ Aleksej Adžubej, der Außenpolitikexperte 

Georgij Arbatov und der spätere Gorbačëvberater Andrej Gračëv, einen 

Eindruck der internen Diskussionen auf Experten- und Beraterebene zu vermitteln. 

Dabei identifiziert sie drei Gruppen, welche ihrer Interpretation der Lage in 

Westeuropa und ihren Vorschlägen Gehör bei der obersten Führung zu verschaffen 

strebten: die vor allem im Institut für Weltwirtschaft und internationale Beziehungen 

sowie der Prager Redaktion der Zeitschrift „Probleme des Friedens und des 

Sozialismus“ konzentrierten „Europäisten“ (die für eine Aufwertung Europas in 

der sowjetischen Politik plädierten, um damit die atlantischen Bindungen zu unterminieren), 

die „Amerikanisten“ (welchen Deutschland weiterhin zu unberechenbar 

schien, um auf die amerikanische Präsenz in Westeuropa verzichten zu wollen) und 

die „Ultraorthodoxen“ (welche das Dilemma durch Hochrüstung zu kontrollieren 

vorschlugen). In allen drei Gruppen beeinflussten ideologische Dogmen wie jene 

der wachsenden inneren Konflikte im Kapitalismus, der inhärenten Aggressivität 

der „imperialistischen“ Mächte und der steigenden Resonanz von Entspannung und 

Sozialismus die Standpunkte. Da die zentrifugalen Strömungen und zwischenstaatliche 

Zwistigkeiten im „Westblock“ als „objektive“ Tendenzen interpretiert wurden, 

meinten insbesondere die Ultras, dass die Sowjetunion nicht auf ihre 

Rüstungsprogramme verzichten müsse, um eine Détente zu erzielen. 

1. M.-P. REY, La tentation du rapprochement: France et l’URSS à l’heure de la Détente 1964-1974, 

Sorbonne, Paris, 1991; T. WOLTON, La France sous l’influence: Paris-Moscou 30 ans des relations 

secrètes, Grasset, Paris, 1997; T. GOMART, Double détente: Les relations franco-soviétiques 

de 1958 à 1964, Sorbonne, Paris, 2003.


Das gaullistische Frankreich wurde dabei zum „nützlichsten Instrument“ von 

Moskaus Westeuropapolitik. Der Erfolg dieser Instrumentalisierung bestärkte den 

Kreml in seiner Vision eines zumindest mittelfristig geteilten Europas, dessen 

Osten unter sowjetischer Kontrolle bleiben, dessen Westen aber aus der NATO 

gelöst, in der Integration gehindert und sowjetischem Einfluss geöffnet werden 

sollte. Unter dem Eindruck des Gaullismus wurde ab den frühen 1960er Jahren 

auch die EWG zunehmend als Chance zur Schwächung der transatlantischen Allianz 

begriffen und damit der „instrumentale Europäismus“ geboren, der 1962 Einfluss 

auf Nikitia Chruščëv zu gewinnen vermochte. Dessen Nachfolger konzentrierte 

seine Entspannungsinitiativen unter Beibehaltung der konventionellen 

sowjetischen Übermacht aber neuerlich auf Frankreich, das 1964 die EWG in eine 

Krise stürzte, 1965 das amerikanische Projekt einer Multilateralen Atomstreitmacht 

(MLF) unter westeuropäischer Beteiligung torpedierte und sich 1966 aus 

den Kommandostrukturen der NATO zurückzog. Die höchst erfreute Sowjetführung 

überschüttete de Gaulle anlässlich seines Moskaubesuches mit Ehrungen, wie 

sie noch keinen ausländischen Politiker je in der UdSSR zuteil geworden waren, 

und gestattete ihm sogar, einem katholischen Gottesdienst in Leningrad beizuwohnen. 

Der General, so ein Sowjetfunktionär rückblickend in Anspielung auf Henri 

IV, sei „wohl eine Messe wert“ gewesen (S. 76). Obwohl Leonid Brežnev gegenüber 

dem als „Feind“ erkannten de Gaulle, der aus seinem Ziel eines selbstbestimmten 

und befreiten Europas „vom Atlantik bis zum Ural“ nie ein Hehl machte, 

misstrauisch blieb, wurde Frankreich zum wesentlichsten westlichen Verbündeten 

des Kremls in der Frage einer Konferenz für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in 

Europa. 

Dass sich Paris nicht nur durch seine außenpolitischen Kapricen als für die 

Sowjetunion überaus nützlich erwies, sondern diesem auch mehrfach diplomatisch 

zu Hilfe kam, beweisen die Aussage des Außenministers Michel Debré, der die 

militärische Zerschlagung des Prager Frühlings als „accident de parcours“ herunterspielte, 

und die Missachtung des unter dem Eindruck des sowjetischen Einmarsches 

in Afghanistan eingeleiteten westlichen Sowjetunionboykotts. Obwohl François 

Mitterrand eine „atlantischere“ Politik verfolgte, blieb die sowjetische Haltung 

gegenüber Paris zweckoptimistisch-freundlich und auch für die EG hatte Moskau 

Anfang der 1980er Jahre wieder lobende Worte übrig. 

Ein grundlegend neuer Ansatz kam jedoch erst unter Michail Gorbaëv zum 

Durchbruch. Die bisher „instrumentalen Europäisten“, die nicht zuletzt aufgrund 

der Hoffnung, damit innere Reformen auszulösen, ihre Instrumentalisierungsbestrebungen 

zugunsten einer wirklichen Verbesserung der Beziehungen aufgegeben 

hatten, gewannen die Oberhand. Die neue Führung griff überwiegend auf liberale 

Mitarbeiter des Parteiapparates zurück. Die EG wurde in den Jahren 1985 bis 1992 

als Partner akzeptiert, und Deutschland löste Frankreich als Hauptadressat ab. 

Nachdem Westeuropa unter Boris El’cin in der sowjetischen Prioritätenskala 

zurückgestuft wurde, widmete Vladimir Putin Europa wieder mehr Aufmerksamkeit 

und behielt dies auch nach seiner Hinwendung zu den USA nach dem 11. September 

2001 bei. Im Zuge des – von Newton nicht mehr behandelten – zweiten

132 


amerikanischen Irakkrieges, der nicht nur die atlantische, sondern auch die innereuropäische 

Partnerschaft einer schweren Belastungsprobe aussetzte, erlangte die 

Achse „Paris-Berlin-Moskau“ durch ihre gemeinsame Ablehnung der Intervention 

kurzfristig an Bedeutung. Trotz der inflationären Verwendung des Prädikats einer 

„strategischen Partnerschaft“ zwischen Russland und der EU erinnern die Beziehungen 

aber heute eher an eine Zweckallianz machtpolitisch selbstbewusster Konkurrenten. 

Newtons Darstellung überzeugt trotz kleiner Ungenauigkeiten – so ist von einer 

sowjetischen Anerkennung der EWG 1971 (S.24), von Mitterrand als EG-Kommissions- 

(nicht Rats-) -präsident (S.26) und von Zaire als ehemals französischer 

Kolonie die Rede (S.95); missverständlich ist auch, vom NATO-Bombardement 

„des Kosovo“ 1999 (S.4) zu sprechen. Die Feinstruktur mit Mikrokapiteln und Seitenüberschriften 

trägt mehr zur Verwirrung als zur Klärung bei. An den Verlag ist 

eine technische Kritik zu richten: Kapitelweise nummerierte Anmerkungen am 

Ende eines Buches sind generell nicht leserfreundlich; ohne einen Hinweis in der 

Kopfzeile, auf welche Textseite(n) sich die Endnoten beziehen, gerät das Nachschlagen 

zum langwierigen Herumblättern. 

Wolfgang Mueller 

Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 

133 

Linda Risso 

Against Rearmament or Against Integration? 

The PCI and PCF’s Opposition to the European Defence Community and the Western 

European Union, 1950-55 

This article examines comparatively the French and Italian communist opposition to 

German rearmament. It demonstrates how communist criticism passed from total opposition 

between October 1950 and March 1953 to a more articulated strategy in the following years. 

The study of archival material along with a detailed analysis of the parties’ newspapers and 

congresses’ decisions reveal that after the death of Stalin and the end of the war in Korea, 

outright rejection of all integration gave way to a more differentiated criticism. This new 

approach aimed to delay the ratification process in the hope that the governing coalitions in 

France and Italy would divide on the issue and that the public would grow tired with the 

debate. This article also deals with the reasons behind the alleged “silence” of the 

communists during the Western European Union debate and demonstrates that if after 1953 

the French and Italian communists accepted a controlled form of German rearmament, they 

were still persuaded of the need to oppose the political integration of Western Europe. 

Contre le réarmement ou contre l'intégration? 

L'opposition du PCI et du PCF au projet de la Communauté européenne de défense et 

de l'Union occidentale (1950-1955). 

Moyennant une étude comparative, cet article analyse l’opposition des communistes italiens 

et français au réarmement allemand. Il montre comment la critique communiste est passée 

d’une totale opposition entre octobre 1950 et mars 1953 à une stratégie plus articulée dans 

les années suivantes. Le recours à des sources d’archives ainsi qu'une analyse détaillée des 

journaux de partis et des actes de congrès révèlent en effet qu’après la mort de Staline et la 

fin de la guerre en Corée, le refus catégorique de toutes formes d’intégration a cédé la place 

à une démarche critique plus nuancée. Cette nouvelle approche visait à retarder le processus 

de ratification dans l’espoir que la coalition gouvernementale en France et en Italie fussent 

divisées sur cette question et que le public se serait lassé de la discussion. L'article examine 

ensuite les raisons à l'origine du soi-disant «silence» des communistes italiens et français 

pendant le débat sur l’Union occidentale en démontrant que l'acceptation, après 1953, du 

réarmement allemand sous une forme contrôlée n'empêchait néanmoins pas le PCI et le PCF 

de continuer à s’opposer à l’intégration politique en Europe de l'Ouest. 

Gegen die Wiederaufrüstung oder gegen die Integration? 

Das Nein der Kommunistischen Parteien Italiens und Frankreichs zur Europäischen 

Verteidigungsgemeinschaft und zur Westeuropäischen Union. 1950-1955 

Der Aufsatz analysiert in einer vergleichenden Studie die Opposition der Kommunistischen 

Parteien Italiens und Frankreichs gegen die Wiederaufrüstung Deutschlands. Er zeigt wie 

sich ihre zunächst totale Kritik zwischen Oktober 1950 und März 1953 allmählich während 

den nachfolgenden Jahren abschwächt. Die auf Archivquellen gestützte, und durch Parteizeitungen 

und Kongressakten ergänzte Analyse verdeutlicht in der Tat wie nach dem Tod 

von Stalin und dem Ende des Koreakriegs die ursprünglich kategorische Ablehnung aller

134 


Formen der Integration nun einer kritischeren und nuancierteren Darstellung wich. Diese 

neue Haltung zielte darauf ab den Ratifizierungsprozess hinauszuzögern in der Hoffnung, 

dass sich die Koalitionsregierungen in Italien und in Frankreich über die Abstimmung auseinanderdividieren 

ließen und die Öffentlichkeit sich gelangweilt aus der Debatte verabschieden 

würde. Der Beitrag untersucht sodann die Gründe des sogenannten „Schweigens“ 

der italienischen und französischen Kommunisten während der Diskussion über die Westeuropäische 

Union. Er belegt, dass die Zustimmung, nach 1953, für eine kontrollierte deutsche 

Wiederbewaffnung die beiden kommunistischen Parteien nicht davon abhielt, die politische 

Integration Europas nach wie vor abzulehnen. 

Maud Bracke 


Italian and French Communism and the Question of Europe, 1956-1973 

In line with Soviet analyses, the French and Italian communist parties had since the start of 

the Cold War taken on strongly negative positions on the EEC. The anti-EEC stance of PCI 

and PCF was based on a social argument (European integration as the concentration of 

capital) and, in the case of the PCF especially, an argument relating to the loss of national 

sovereignty. While during the 1960s the PCI gradually shifted towards a more positive 

stance, the PCF continued to oppose any form of West European integration up to the early 

1970s. It was only in the context of its domestic alliance with the socialist party, problematic 

relations with the Soviet communist party, and under the influence of the PCI, that it came to 

accept, although never welcome, West European integration. 

It is argued that the two parties’ changing positions with regard to Europe should be 

understood as resulting from the specific impacts of European détente on domestic politics 

in the two countries. The PCI supported the EEC because European integration was seen as 

leading to détente on the European continent, which, in turn, was understood as beneficial to 

the party’s domestic strategy. The PCF was faced with the far less positive implications of 

Gaullist détente on its domestic and international strategies. It had little interest in European 

détente and therefore no interest in European integration. 

De l'Atlantique à l'Oural? 

Les communistes italiens et français et la question de l'Europe. 1956-1973 

Conformément à la ligne soviétique, les partis communistes italien et français ont adopté 

depuis les débuts de la Guerre froide une position résolument négative à l'égard de le CEE. 

Cette approche était fondée sur un argument social (l'intégration européenne était fustigée 

comme étant l'expression d'une concentration du capital) et, spécialement dans le cas du 

PCF, sur l'argument de la perte de souveraineté nationale. Tandis que le PCI évoluait 

progressivement pendant les années 1960 vers une attitude plus positive, le PCF s'obstinait à 

rejeter toute forme d'intégration de l'Europe occidentale et ce, jusqu'au début des années 

1970. C'est alors seulement que, sans pour autant devenir vraiment favorable à l'intégration 

européenne, il se ravisait sous l'influence à la fois de l'alliance nationale avec les socialistes, 

des relations de plus en plus problématiques avec le PC soviétique et de l'ascendant exercé 

par le PCI. 

L'évolution notée au sujet des positions changeantes des deux partis doit être attribuée à 

l'impact spécifique provoqué par la détente en Europe sur les politiques intérieures dans les 

deux pays. Le PCI soutenait la CEE parce que l'intégration européenne était considérée 

comme étant génératrice de détente sur le continent et que celle-ci, à son tour, s'avérait

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 135 

bénéfique pour la réalisation des stratégies nationales du parti. Le PCF par contre se trouvait 

aux prises avec les implications nettement moins positives de la détente gaulliste. Il affichait 

peu d'intérêt pour la détente en Europe et partant, pas d'intérêt pour l'intégration européenne. 

Vom Atlantik bis zum Ural? 

Die italienischen und französischen Kommunisten und die Europafrage (1956-1973) 

Getreu der Linie Moskaus, nahmen die kommunistischen Parteien Italiens und Frankreichs 

seit dem Beginn des Kalten Krieges eine resolut negative Haltung gegenüber der EWG ein. 

Ihre Stellungnahme beruhte auf einem sozialen Argument (die westeuropäische Integration 

sei Ausdruck der Konzentration des Kapitals) und dem Argument des nationalen Souveränitätsverlusts. 

Letztere Ansicht war besonders in Frankreichs KP verbreitet, denn, während 

sich die Genossen in Italien im Laufe der 1960er Jahre allmählich zu einer positiveren Einschätzung 

durchrangen, beharrten die französischen Kommunisten bis in die frühen 1970er 

Jahre auf ihrer strikten Ablehnung jeder Form der Integration Westeuropas. Ohne jemals 

echte Anhänger der Europaidee zu werden, begannen sie dann doch ihre sture Einsätzung 

aufzuweichen unter dem Endruck der innenpolitischen Allianz mit den Sozialisten, der problematischer 

werdenden Beziehungen zur KPdSU und dem Einfluss aus Italien. 

Die sich verändernde Einschätzung steht unter dem Zeichen der spezifischen Auswirkungen 

welche die Entspannung in Europa auf die Innenpolitik der beiden Länder ausübte. Die KP 

Italiens unterstützte nun die EWG weil sie in ihr einen Entspannungsfaktor erblickte, der 

sich darüber hinaus hervorragend eignete, um die nationalen Strategien der Partei zu begünstigen. 

Die Schwesterpartei in Frankreich hingegen war mehr mit den weniger positiven 

Auswirkungen der gaullistischen Entspannung auf ihre innenpolitischen und internationalen 

Strategien befasst. Sie hatte nur wenig Interesse an der Entspannung in Europa und daher, 

auch kein Interesse an der europäischen Integration. 

Muriel Baive 

Internationalism, Patriotism, Dictatorship and Democracy: 

The Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Exercise of Power, 1945-1968 

This article deals with the dichotomy between internationalism and patriotism and the way 

it has been interpreted and instrumentalized in the Czechoslovak context, and in the wider 

context of the developing integration process in Western Europe, a process which 

challenged traditional patriotism with a new form of internationalism. To meet this, in 

Czechoslovakia the « international » aspect was mainly pictured as representing 

« Moscow ». The « patriotic » side, on the other hand, was said to embed Czechoslovak 

national democratic traditions alongside the positive side of communism’s achievements. 

While this stark vision failed to address the main issues of communist domination in 

Czechoslovakia, this had not really been challenged yet. 

Internationalisme, patriotisme, dictature et démocratie: 

Le parti communiste tchécoslovaque et l'exercice du pouvoir (1945-1968) 

Cet article traite de la dichotomie entre internationalisme/patriotisme et de la manière dont 

elle a été interprétée, ou plutôt: instrumentalisée, à la fois dans le contexte tchécoslovaque et 

dans le contexte élargi du processus d'intégration de l'Europe occidentale qui confrontait le 

patriotisme classique a une nouvelle forme d'internationalisme. Aussi, en Tchécoslovaquie, 

l'aspect «international» a-t-il été dépeint le plus clair du temps comme représentant

136 


«Moscou», c'est-à-dire le côté le plus sombre de la domination communiste. L'aspect 

«patriotique» a en revanche été considéré comme ciment des traditions nationales et 

démocratiques et partant, comme élément positif de l'ère communiste. Cette vision 

manichéenne cache cependant la vraie nature de la domination communiste tchécoslovaque 

qui attend toujours d'être sérieusement abordée. 

Internationalismus, Patriotismus, Diktatur und Demokratie: 

Die kommunistische Partei und die Machtausübung in der Tschechoslowakei, 

1945-1968 

Der Aufsatz behandelt die Dichotomie zwischen Internationalismus/Patriotismus und die 

Art und Weise wie sie interpretiert, bzw. instrumentalisiert wurde und zwar sowohl im 

tschechoslowakischen Rahmen als auch im erweiterten westeuropäischen Umfeld in dem 

sich der klassische Patriotismus mit einer neuen Form des Internationalismus verband. Der 

«internationale» Aspekt wurde stets hingestellt als stellvertretend für «Moskau», d.h. als die 

schwärzeste Seite der kommunistischen Herrschaft in der Tschechoslowakei. Der «patriotische» 

Aspekt wurde dahingegen als Kern der nationalen und demokratischen Tradition, also 

als positives Element der kommunistischen Machtausübung betrachtet. Diese 

Schwarz-Weiß-Malerei übertüncht allerdings das wahre Gesicht des kommunistischen 

Regimes, dessen Darstellung übrigens bis heute noch immer nicht so recht in Angriff 

genommen wurde. 


Reactions of Eastern Europe to the Economic Integration Process of Western Europe: 

Czechoslovakia and Poland from the Fifties to the Seventies 

Although the communist party officially disapproved the European economic integration 

process, this position was neither uniformly shared nor invariable in time in both Central 

and Eastern Europe. The present contribution shows the contradiction that existed between 

the politically motivated rejection and economic constraints which the Eastern popular 

democracies had to cope with and which led some socialist states to enter into trade relations 

with EEC and EFTA countries. Actually, statistics show that trade relations between 

socialist and West European countries were slowly increasing from the beginning of the sixties 

and this especially after the EEC had made cuts in customs tariffs. During the seventies 

however particularly the policy of détente following the Conference on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe (CSCE ) was responsible for the progression of economic relations 

between Czechoslovakia and Poland on one hand and the EEC on the other. 

Les réactions de l'Europe orientale à l'intégration économique de l'Europe occidentale: 

La Tchécoslovaquie et la Pologne des années 1950 aux années 1970 

Malgré sa condamnation officielle par les partis communistes, le processus de l'intégration 

économique européenne n'a point été perçu en Europe centrale et orientale d'une manière 

unilatérale et invariable dans le temps. La présente contribution établit que le refus 

politiquement motivé est une chose; les contraintes économiques auxquelles doivent faire 

face les démocraties populaires de l'Est en sont une autre. Aussi certains États socialistes 

nouent-ils des contacts commerciaux avec les pays de la CEE et de l'EFTA. Les données 

statistiques font en effet preuve d'une lente progression des échanges dès le début des années 

soixante et ce, notamment par suite des réductions tarifaires opérées par la CEE. Dans le


courant des années 1970, ce fut par contre essentiellement la détente consécutive à la 

Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe (CSCE) qui fit figure de moteur 

d'une progression des relations économiques entre la Tchécoslovaquie et la Pologne d'une 

part, et d'autre part l'Europe communautaire. 

Reaktionen auf die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa: 

Die Tschechoslowakei und Polen von den fünfziger bis zu den siebziger Jahren 

Die Wahrnehmung der westeuropäischen Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa war 

trotz der offiziellen Ablehnung dieses Prozesses durch die kommunistischen Parteien nicht 

einseitig. Er unterlag im übrigen auch Wandlungen. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass es 

ein Spannungsfeld zwischen der politisch motivierten Ablehnung der westeuropäischen 

Integration in den sozialistischen Staaten und dem wirtschaftlich bedingten Bestreben einiger 

Staaten gab, mit den EWG- und EFTA-Mitgliedsländern Handelskontakte zu unterhalten. 

Die statistischen Daten bestätigen, dass seit dem Anfang der 1960er Jahre langsam eine 

Ausweitung der Handelsbeziehungen zwischen den sozialistischen und westeuropäischen 

Ländern zu registrieren ist. Der Zollabbau der EWG spielte in diesem Prozess eine große 

Rolle. In den 1970er Jahren bewirkte dagegen die Entspannungspolitik im Rahmen der Vorbereitung 

für die Konferenz für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE) auch die 

Änderung des wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisses der Tschechoslowakei und Polens insbesondere 

zur EWG. 

Thomas Fetzer 

Turning Eurosceptic: British Trade Unions and European Integration (1961-1975) 

The article analyses British trade unions’ turn to Euroscepticism since the late 1960s - in 

contrast to the cautiously pro-European attitudes in the early 1960s. It is argued that this 

transformation was not merely a reaction to the changed terms of UK entry (budget, CAP) 

but also reflected changed trade union assessments with regard to the economic benefits and 

risks of European economic integration, and the growing importance of European elements 

for socioeconomic reform debates in the UK. In contrast to the early 1960s British trade 

unions perceived EC membership as reinforcing rather than mitigating the country’s 

economic difficulties. Employer and government attempts to use European integration as a 

vehicle of “modernisation” reinforced scepticism as they were seen to display an anti-union 

bias. The article demonstrates why it is useful to study Eurosceptic groups not only in the 

British case but also as part of a more general perspective of European integration history. 

Le passage vers l’Euroscepticisme: Les syndicats britanniques et l'integration 

européenne (1961-1975) 

L'article analyse le passage des syndicats britanniques vers l’Euroscepticisme à la fin des 

années soixante. Le changement d'attitude, qui contraste singulièrement avec l’approche 

pragmatique du début de la décade, se comprend non seulement comme une réaction aux 

conditions retenues pour l’entrée du Royaume Uni au Marché commun, mais encore comme 

le reflet d'une mutation de la perception syndicale à propos de l’impact de l’intégration 

européenne sur l’économie britannique et sur le débat relatif aux réformes 

socio-économiques nationales. Puisque les dits projets de réforme émanaient des milieux 

patronaux et du gouvernement conservateur, et qu'ils faisait souvent référence aux nouveaux 

défis européens, l'adhésion à l'Europe fut perçue comme une œuvre dirigée contre les

138 


syndicats. L’opposition du mouvement ouvrier au processus d'intégration en fut la 

conséquence. L’article établit du coup l’utilité des études traitant des organisations 

eurosceptiques, à la fois pour le cas du Royaume Uni, mais aussi, d'une manière plus 

générale, pour toute l’histoire de la construction européenne. 

Eine euroskeptische Wende: Britische Gewerkschaften und europäische Integration 

(1961-1975) 

Der Artikel analysiert die euroskeptische Wende britischer Gewerkschaftspolitik seit den 

späten 1960er Jahren. Die Abkehr von den pragmatischen und vorsichtig pro-europäischen 

Positionen der frühen 60er Jahre wird nicht lediglich als Reflex auf die sich wandelnden 

Bedingungen des britischen EG-Beitritts gedeutet. Vielmehr spiegelt diese Transformation 

einen längerfristigen Wandel wider, der sowohl mit den von der Gewerkschaftsseite vermuteten 

Effekten des EG-Beitritts für die britische Wirtschaft als auch mit dem Einfluss der 

EG-Frage auf nationale Reformdebatten in Zusammenhang stand. Versuche des Arbeitgeberlagers 

und der Tory-Regierung den britischen EG-Beitritt als Instrument für eine als 

gewerkschaftsfeindlich empfundene Reformpolitik zu benutzen, führten zusehends zu verschärften 

Vorbehalten gegenüber der europäischen Integration. Der Artikel zeigt auch, 

inwiefern die Analyse europaskeptischer Gruppen über den britischen Fall hinaus von allgemeinem 

Nutzen für die europäische Integrationsforschung sein kann. 

Gabriele D’Ottavio 

The treaties of Rome: Continuity and Discontinuity in SPD’s European Policy 

After the seminal works by Rudolf Hrbek and William Paterson, published in the early 

1970s, SPD’s European policy has been the subject of several historical investigations. 

Nonetheless, the relationship between the SPD and the integration process during the 

“relance européenne” (1955-1957) has been relatively neglected. In particular, starting from 

the prevailing position in historiography, establishing 1955 as the «turning» point in SPD’s 

European policy, an analysis will be carried out in order to assess whether the 

social-democrats’ position on the Common Market and Euratom, was converging, or 

diverging, with the governing party’s, and whether, and to what extent, the decision to cast a 

vote in favour of the ratification of the Rome Treaties should be considered a sort of natural 

outcome of a process which had evolved since 1955. 

Les traités de Rome et la politique européenne du SPD: Continuité ou rupture? 

Suite aux deux travaux pionniers de Rudolf Hrbek et de William Paterson, publiés au début 

des années 1970, la politique européenne du SPD a fait l’objet d’investigations 

historiographiques. Un sujet qui reste néanmoins un peu dans l’ombre, à savoir, le rapport 

entre le SPD et le processus d’intégration pendant la période de la «relance européenne» 

(1955-1957). En partant de la thèse dominante, qui considère 1955 comme la date du 

«virage» dans la politique européenne du SPD, et sur la base des documents actuellement 

disponibles, cet article se propose d’analyser la nature des positions des socialistes 

allemands en matière de Marché Commun et d’Euratom. L’article évalue également les 

motivations qui ont influencé le plus la décision du SPD en faveur du vote pour la 

ratification des traités de Rome.


Kontinuität oder Bruch? Die SPD und die Romverträge 

Nach den Anfang der 70er Jahre erschienenen Pionierarbeiten der beiden Politikwissenschaftler 

Rudolf Hrbek und William Paterson, hat das Thema “SPD und Europäische Integration“ 

inzwischen auch das Interesse der Historiker geweckt. Über die Bedeutung der 

«relance européenne» für die Europapolitk der deutschen Sozialdemokratie ist jedoch erst 

recht wenig geschrieben worden. Ausgehend von der Zäsur von 1955, und anhand der heute 

zugänglichen Quellen, untersucht der Verfasser dieses Beitrags die Stellung der SPD gegenüber 

dem Gemeinsamen Markt und Euratom, im Zusammenhang mit der Regierungspolitik. 

Dabei setzt er sich mit der Frage auseinander, welche Faktoren im einzelnen die Entscheidung 

der SPD vom 5. Juli 1957 bewirkt haben, der Ratifizierung der Romverträge zuzustimmen.

140 

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Contributors – Auteurs – Autoren 

BLAIVE Muriel, Dr, Researcher at the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for 

European History and Public Spheres, Vienna 

Address: Hegelgasse 6/5, 1010 Wien, Austria 

Email: muriel.blaive@ehp.lbg.ac.at 

141 

BRACKE Maud, Dr, Lecturer in Modern European History, Department of 

History, University of Glasgow 

Adress: 1, University Gardens, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, United 

Kingdom 

Email: m.bracke@history.arts.gla.ac.uk 

D’OTTAVIO Gabriele, PhD–Candidate in Contemporary Political History, 

University of Bologna 

Address: Via Giacomo della Torre 1, University of Bologna, Forlì- Campus, 47100, 

Italy 

Email: gabriele.dottavio@unibo.it 

FETZER Thomas, Dr, Marie Curie Post-Doctoral Fellow, London School of 

Economics 

Address: Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom 

Email: T.Fetzer@lse.ac.uk 

JAJEŚNIAK-QUAST Dagmara, Dr, Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am 

Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung Potsdam, 

Adresse: Am Neuen Markt 1, 14467 Potsdam, Germany 

Email: jquast@zzf-pdm.de 

RISSO Linda, Dr, Lecturer in Modern European History at the University of 

Reading 

Adresse: Department of History, University of Reading, Whiteknights, RG6 6AA, 

Reading, UK 

Email: l.risso@reading.ac.uk

Contributors – Auteurs – Autoren 

BLAIVE Muriel, Dr, Researcher at the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for 

European History and Public Spheres, Vienna 

Address: Hegelgasse 6/5, 1010 Wien, Austria 

Email: muriel.blaive@ehp.lbg.ac.at 

141 

BRACKE Maud, Dr, Lecturer in Modern European History, Department of 

History, University of Glasgow 

Adress: 1, University Gardens, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, United 

Kingdom 

Email: m.bracke@history.arts.gla.ac.uk 

D’OTTAVIO Gabriele, PhD–Candidate in Contemporary Political History, 

University of Bologna 

Address: Via Giacomo della Torre 1, University of Bologna, Forlì- Campus, 47100, 

Italy 

Email: gabriele.dottavio@unibo.it 

FETZER Thomas, Dr, Marie Curie Post-Doctoral Fellow, London School of 

Economics 

Address: Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom 

Email: T.Fetzer@lse.ac.uk 

JAJEŚNIAK-QUAST Dagmara, Dr, Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am 

Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung Potsdam, 

Adresse: Am Neuen Markt 1, 14467 Potsdam, Germany 

Email: jquast@zzf-pdm.de 

RISSO Linda, Dr, Lecturer in Modern European History at the University of 

Reading 

Adresse: Department of History, University of Reading, Whiteknights, RG6 6AA, 

Reading, UK 

Email: l.risso@reading.ac.uk

Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher 

143 

BARIÉTY Jacques – Aristide Briand, la Société des Nations et l’Europe 

1919-1932, Strasbourg, Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2007, 542 p. – 

ISBN 978-2-86820-307-6 - 30,00 €. 

BITSCH Marie-Thérèse, LOTH Wilfried, BARTHEL Charles – Cultures politiques, 

opinions publiques et intégration européenne, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 

2007, 477 p. – ISBN 978-2-8027-2373-8 – 65,00 €. 

CLEMENS Wurm – Die Türkei und Europa, LIT-Verlag, Berlin, 2007, 288 S. – 

ISBN 3-8258-0782-5 – 24,90 €. 

DIETL Ralph – Emanzipation und Kontrolle. Europa in der westlichen Sicherheitspolitik 

1948-1963, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2007, 430 S. - ISBN 

978-3-515-09034-6 - 76,00 €. 

DUCHENNE Geneviève, DUJARDIN Vincent, DUMOULIN Michel – 

Paul-Henri Spaak et la France. Actes du colloque organisé les 15 et 16 

mai 2006 à Louvain-la-Neuve, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007, 300 p. – ISBN 

978-2-8027-2413-1 - 45,00 €. 

DUMOULIN Michel - La Commission européenne 1958-1972. Histoire et 

Mémoires d’une Institution, Office des Publications officielles des Communautés 

Européennes, Luxembourg, 2007, 642 p. – ISBN 978-92-79-05495-2 

– 30,00 €. 

FISCH Stefan, GAUZY Florence, METZGER Chantal – Lernen und Lehren 

in Frankreich und Deutschland, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2007, 240 

S. – ISBN 978-3-515-08945-6 – 43,00 €. 

HUDEMANN Rainer, HEINEN Armin – Das Saarland zwischen Frankreich, 

Deutschland und Europa 1945-1957, Kommission für Saarländische 

Landesgeschichte und Volksforschung e.V., Saarbrücken, 2007, 678 S. - 

ISBN 978-3-939150-02-2 – 29,00 €. 

HUGHES Gerald – Britain, Germany and the Cold War: The search for a European 

Detente 1949-1967, Routledge, London, 2007, 253p. – ISBN 

978-0-415-41207-0 – 122,39 €. 

JOLLY Mette – The European Union and the People, Oxford University Press, 

Oxford, 2007, 261 p. – ISBN 978-0-19-921307-8 – 90,00 £. 

JOPP Mathias, SCHLOTTER Peter – Kollektive Außenpolitik – Die 

Europäische Union als internationaler Akteur, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 

2007, 397 S. – ISBN 978-3-8329-2910-7 – 49,00 €.

144 

KERNIC Franz – Die Außenbeziehungen der Europäischen Union, Peter Lang, 

Frankfurt/Main, 2007, 307 S. – ISBN 978-3-631-54952-0 – 48,10 €. 

LUDLOW Piers N. – European Integration and the Cold War. Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 

1965-1973, Routledge, London, 2007, 224 p. – ISBN 

978-0415421096 – 125,00 £. 

MINISTERE FRANCAIS DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES – Diversité et culture, 

Culturesfrance, Paris, 2007, 95 p. – ISBN 978-2-35476-012-0 – 

15,00 €. 

MIOCHE Philippe – Penser et construire l’Europe XIXe–XXe siècles, Hachette, 

Paris, 2007, 152 p. – ISBN 978-2-01-145967-1 – 11,90 €. 

PHILIPPE Hartmut – “The Germans hold the Key”. Anglo-German relations 

and the Second British Approach to Europe, Wißner-Verlag, Augsburg, 

2007 – ISBN 978-3-89639-587-0 – 28,00 €. 

RAMSCHEID Birgit, BLANKENHORN Herbert – Adenauers außenpolitischer 

Berater, Droste, Düsseldorf, 2006, 460 S. – ISBN 978-377001901-4 

– 39,90 €. 

TRUNK Achim – Europa, ein Ausweg. Politische Eliten und europäische Identität 

in den 1950er Jahren, Oldenbourg, München, 2007, 387 S. – ISBN 

978-3486-58187-4 – 49,80 €. 

VARSORI Antonio – Inside the European Community, Actors and Policies in 

the European Integration 1957-1972, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2006, 483 p. - 

ISBN 978-3-8329-1191-1 - 98,00 €.

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EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION


The purpose of The Journal of European Integration History is to encourage the 

analysis and understanding of different aspects of European integration, especially 

since 1945, in as wide a perspective as possible. The Journal publishes the 

conclusions of research on diplomatic, military, economic, technological, social 

and cultural aspects of integration. Numbers devoted to single themes as well as 

to diverse subjects are published in English, French or German. Each number 

includes reviews of important, relevant publications. 

REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE L'INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE 

L'objectif de la Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne est de promouvoir l'analyse 

et la compréhension des différents aspects de l'intégration européenne 

particulièrement depuis 1945, mais sans exclusive. La Revue publie les résultats des 

recherches sur les aspects diplomatiques, militaires, économiques, technologiques, 

sociaux et culturels de l'intégration. Les numéros à thème ou ceux ouverts à diverses 

perspectives sont publiés dans l'une des langues suivantes: anglais, français, allemand. 

Chaque numéro comprend des comptes rendus d'ouvrages importants. 



Die Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration bietet ein Forum zur 

Erforschung des europäischen Integrationsprozesses in allen Aspekten: den politischen, 

militärischen, wirtschaftlichen, technologischen, sozialen und kulturellen. 

Ihren Schwerpunkt bilden Beiträge zu den konkreten Einigungsprojekten seit 

1945, doch werden auch Arbeiten zu den Vorläufern und Vorbereitungen 

publiziert. Die Zeitschrift erscheint zweimal im Jahr. Neben Themenheften stehen 

„offene" Ausgaben, und jedesmal werden auch Besprechungen wichtiger Neuerscheinungen 

veröffentlicht. Die Beiträge eines internationalen Autorenkreises 

erscheinen in englischer, französischer oder deutscher Sprache. 


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