Slides-1 [Dynamic Semantics] - UCLA Department of Linguistics

Presupposition
UCLA, Fall 2007
Philippe Schlenker
(UCLA & Institut Jean-Nicod)

Presupposition
Approximation: A presupposition of S is a condition that
must be met for S to be true or false.
Presuppositions
a. John knows that he is incompetent.
π: John is incompetent.
b. Does John knows that he is incompetent?
π: John is incompetent
c. John doesn’t know that he is incompetent.
π: John is incompetent.
Entailments
a. John is French. => John is European.
b. Is John French? ≠> John is European.
c. John isn’t French. ≠> John is European.
2

Why Study Presupposition ?
I. Presuppositions are ubiquitous
John regrets that he is incompetent.
π: John is incompetent.
John has stopped smoking.
π: John used to smoke.
It is John who left.
π: Someone left.
What John drank was vodka.
π: John drank something.
She is clever!
π: The person pointed at is female.
3

John too was jailed.
π: Someone other than John was jailed.
John was jailed again.
π: John was jailed before.
Only John was jailed.
π: Somebody was jailed.
4

Why Study Presupposition ?
II. Presuppositions and Dynamic Semantics
Static View of Meaning
Meaning = Truth Conditions
Dynamic View of Meaning (after the 1980’s)
Meaning = Context Change Potential
= potential to change beliefs
Motivations for the dynamic view
a. Pronouns, e.g. Every man who has a donkey beats it.
b. Presuppositions.
5

Why Study Presupposition ?
III. The Semantics vs. Pragmatics Divide
Semantics = study of meaning as it is encoded in words
John is an American student
=> John is a student
John is a former student
≠> John is a student
Pragmatics = study of the additional information that
can be obtained by reasoning on the speaker’s motives
Mr. Smith is unfailingly polite and always on time
=> Smith is a bad student
6

Semantics vs. Pragmatics
7

Entailments vs. Implicatures
Difference 1: Entailments follow from what is
linguistically encoded. Implicatures do not.
Difference 2: Entailments satisfy the following test.
Implicatures generally don't.
To check whether p entails q, check whether:
In every conceivable situation in which it is true that p, it
is true that q.
Difference 3: Implicatures can be cancelled. Entailments
cannot be.
8

Scalar Implicatures
a. Rick is a philosopher or he is a poet
(B. Schwarz)
b. John will leave or Mary will leave.
c. Paris is pleasant or London is pleasant.
9

Hypothesis 1.
Disjunction is unambiguously exclusive.
[[ [i or i'] ]] = true iff exactly one of [[i]], [[i']] is true
Notational variant (with 1 = true, 0 = false)
[[ [i or i'] ]] = 1 iff exactly one of [[i]], [[i']] is equal to 1
10

1. a is predicted to be a contradiction; it should have
the same status as b.
a. Rick is a philosopher or he is a poet. In fact, he is both.
b. #Rick is a philosopher or he is a poet but he is not both.
In fact, he is both.
2. Incorrect predictions
a. Every Italian who is a philosopher or a poet is a
socialist.
b. Whenever I invite a philosopher or a poet to a party, it
ends up being a success.
11

Every Italian who is a philosopher or a poet is a socialist.
i 1, is a philosopher but not a poet, and he is a socialist.
i 2, is a poet but not a philosopher, and he is a socialist.
i 3, is both a philosopher and a poet, but he is not a socialist.
12

Hypothesis 2.
Disjunction is ambiguous
1. Cross-linguistic morphology
2. The ambiguity theory predicts that a. could be
understood as true in the situation we described earlier.
3. Ellipsis (Fox, crediting T. Stephenson)
John read Chomsky or Montague. Mary did too. In fact,
she read both
13

General observation about ellipsis
John went to the bank. Mary did too.
bank is ambiguous:
bank 1 = slope near the side of a river
bank 2 = financial institution
Ok John went to the bank 1. Mary went to the bank 1 too.
Ok John went to the bank 2. Mary went to the bank 2 too.
* John went to the bank 1. Mary went to the bank 2 too.
* John went to the bank 2. Mary went to the bank 1 too.
Ok John went to the bank 1. Mary did go to the bank 1 too.
Ok John went to the bank 2. Mary did go to the bank 2 too.
* John went to the bank 1. Mary did go to the bank 2 too.
* John went to the bank 2. Mary did go to the bank 1 too.
14

4. Yet another problem...
a. It is certain that John will read Chomsky or Montague.
b. Every student read Chomsky or Montague.
15

Hypothesis 3.
Scalar Implicatures
Hypothesis:(i) ‘or’ is inclusive disjunction. (ii) an
implicature is responsible for the not and inference.
S said: F or G
form a scale: F and G entails F or G.
If S believed that F and G, it would have been more
cooperative to say: F and G
Primary Implicature: NOT S believes (F and G)
If John is well informed and either believes or disbelieves
(F and G), we also get:
Secondary Implicature: S believes NOT(F and G)
16

I. Alternatives
Alt(S) = {S': S' is a sentence obtained from S by replacing
simultaneously any number of occurrences of or by and
and any number of occurrences of and by or}.
a. S 1 = Rick is a philosopher or a poet
Alt(S 1) = {Rick is a philosopher or a poet, Rick is a
philosopher and a poet}
b. S 2 = Rick is a philosopher and a poet
Alt(S 2) = Alt(S 1) = {Rick is a philosopher or a poet, Rick is
a philosopher and a poet}
c. S 3 = I doubt that Rick is a philosopher and a poet
Alt(S 3)={I doubt that Rick is a philosopher and a poet, I
doubt that Rick is a philosopher or a poet}
17

Ordering
II. Ordering and Cooperation
Let S be a sentence and let S' be a member of Alt(S).
S' is better than S if:
a. S' entails S and S does not entail S'
[terminology: we say that S' asymmetrically entails S]
b. The speaker believes that S'
Cooperation
A sentence S is not uttered cooperatively if for some S' in
Alt(S), S' is better than S.
18

Scalar Implicatures
a. Rick is a philosopher or a poet
b. Alt(a)={Rick is a philosopher or a poet, Rick is a
philosopher and a poet}
c. __ and __ >> __ or __
a. is not uttered cooperatively if the speaker believes that
Rick is a philosopher and a poet.
-Primary Implicature: If the speaker is cooperative, it's
not the case that the speaker believes that Rick is both a
philosopher and a poet.
-Secondary Implicature: If the speaker has an opinion on
this matter, it must be that he believes that Rick is not both
a philosopher and poet.
19

Scalar Implicatures
a. Rick is a philosopher and a poet
b. Alt(a)={Rick is a philosopher and a poet, Rick is a
philosopher or a poet}
c. No member of Alt(a) asymmetrically entails a, so
nothing additional is inferred.
20

'Scale Reversal'
a. I doubt that Rick is a philosopher and a poet
b. Alt(a)={I doubt that Rick is a philosopher or a poet, I
doubt Rick is a philosopher and a poet}
c. I doubt that __ or __ >> I doubt that __ and __
a. is not uttered cooperatively if the speaker doubts that
Rick is a philosopher or a poet.
... hence if the speaker is cooperative, the speaker does not
doubt that Rick is a philosopher or a poet (i.e. he believes
that Rick is a philosopher or a poet)
a philosopher and poet.
21

'Scale Reversal'
a. Every Italian who is a philosopher or a poet is a
socialist
=> no additional inference (because the version with and
would be less informative)
b. Every Italian who is a philosopher and a poet is a
socialist.
=> it’s not the case that every Italian who is a philosopher
or a poet is a socialist,
i.e. some Italian who is a philosopher or a poet (but not
both) is not a socialist.
22

'Scale Reversal'
a. Whenever John is next to Mary or Ann, he behaves like
an idiot
=> no additional inference
b. Whenever John is next to Mary and Ann, he behaves
like an idiot.
=> It's not the case that whenever John is next to Mary or
Ann, he behaves like an idiot.
23

Some, Most, Every
a. Some of my friends are clever
=> Not all of my friends are clever.
=> A minority of my friends are clever.
b. Some of my friends are clever. In fact, all of them are.
a. Most of my friends are clever
=> Not all of my friends are clever.
b. Most of my friends are clever. In fact, all of them are.
a. Whenever most of the students come to class, there is a
pleasant atmosphere.
b. Every student who read most of the articles on the
reading list will get an A.
24

Extensions
25

a. John read some book.
Why are Scales Necessary?
b. John read exactly one book.
c. (b) is more informative than (a), therefore the speaker
was not in a position to assert (b)
d. Therefore it is likely that John didn’t read exactly one
book.
☞ This is the opposite of the result we want!
26

Other Implicatures
John is in Paris or he is in Rome
=> it is not the case that:
a. the speaker believes that John is in Paris.
b. the speaker believes that John is not in Paris.
c . the speaker believes that John is in Rome.
d. the speaker believes that John is not in Rome.
If John is in Paris, he is there for business.
=> the speaker takes it to be possible but not certain that
John is in Paris
27

Experiment - Scalar Implicatures
(Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland)
28

[Credits: Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland]
30

[Credits: Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland]
31

[Credits: Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland]
32

[Credits: Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland]
33

[Credits: Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland]
34

Children and Scalar Implicatures
Children appear not to compute Scalar Implicatures in
some environments where adults do.
Paradox: children appear to be 'more logical' than adults!
35

Scalar Implicatures Take Time
Noveck and Posada 2003
38

Three Properties of Scalar Implicatures
Unlike entailments, they can be cancelled.
They ‘disappear’ in certain environments (and ‘appear’ in
others).
They are acquired relatively late by children.
They take time to compute.
40

Presuppositions
41

Presuppositions vs. Entailments
Difference 1 (dubious)
If an entailment of S is false, S is false, not weird.
-John is French.
-No. He is South African.
-John knows that he is going to be fired.
-No. He doesn’t know it.
- No. He is going to keep his job.
42

Presuppositions vs. Entailments
Difference 2 (very clear)
Presuppositions ‘project’ differently from entailments.
a. Is John French? ≠> John is European
b. John is not French. ≠> John is European
c. None of these 10 students is French
≠> Each of these 10 students is European
≠> Some of these 10 students is European
a. Does John know that he is incompetent?
=> John is incompetent
b. John does not know that he is incompetent
=> John is incompetent
c. None of these 10 students knows that he is incompetent
=> Each of these 10 students is incompetent
43

Presuppositions vs. Entailments
a. Does John take care of his computer?
=> John has a computer
b. John doesn’t take care of his computer
=> John has a computer
c. None of these 10 students takes care of his computer
=> Each of these 10 students has a computer
a. Did John stop smoking?
=> John used to smoke.
b. John didn’t stop smoking
=> John used to smoke
c. None of these 10 students stopped smoking
=> Each of these 10 students used to smoke
44

Presuppositions vs. Implicatures
An analysis of presuppositions as implicatures
Hypothesis: If pp’ is a clause described as having
presupposition p and assertion p’:
(i) pp’ has as its meaning the conjunction of p and p’
(ii) but forms a scale
Examples
a.
b.
c.
45

Predictions I
pp’ entails p
a. John knows that he is incompetent
=> John is incompetent
b. I’ll invite John and Mary
=> I’ll invite John or Mary
not pp’ implicates p
because (not p) is more informative than (not pp’) !
a. John doesn’t know that he is incompetent
implicates: John is incompetent
b. I won’t invite (both) John and Mary
=> I’ll invite John or Mary
46

Predictions II
No student PP’ implicates Some student P
because No student P
is more informative than No student PP’
hence the inference that not No student P
i.e. Some student P

Presuppositions vs. Entailments:
An Experiment (French, Chemla 2007)
48

Experimental Conditions
Triggers
• Presuppositions
attitude verbs: know, be unaware
change of state: start, stop
definite descriptions: his computer
• Implicatures: , ,
Environments
-Inferences: universal-like and implicature-like
-Operators: John ___, I doubt that John ___, More than 3
of these 10 students ___ , Each of the 10 students ___,
None of these 10 students ___, Exactly 3 of these 10
students ____.
49

Examples
Less than 3 of these 10 students know that their father is
about to receive a congratulation letter.
=>? The father of each of these students is about to receive
a congratulation letter.
=>? The father of at least 3 students is about to receive a
congratulation letter.
None of these 10 students read the handout and did an
exercise.
=>? Each of these 10 students did (at least) one or the other
=>? At least 1 of these 10 students did (at least) one or the
other
50

Main Results (Chemla 2007)
Presuppositions display a different a behavior from
scalar implicatures under no:
-Non-universal inferences for implicatures
-Universal implicatures for presuppositions
Not all quantifiers behave on a par:
at least 3, more than 3, exactly 3 display an intermediate
behavior (universal inferences half the time).
Not computing a presupposition takes time.
51

NO and Universal Inferences
Left, from left to right
1. Every student stopped
smoking => every student
smoked
2. No student stopped
smoking => at least one
student smoked
3. No student stopped
smoking => every student
smoked
Right, from left to right
1. Every student did A and
B => every student did (at
least) one
2. No student student did A
and B => at least one
student did (at least) one
3. No student did A and B
=> every student did (at
least) one
52

NO and Universal Inferences
53

Less than three and Universal Inferences
54

Universal Inferences for Various Quantifiers
55

Reaction Times: Universal Inferences
56

Triggering Problem
Questions
Why do some elementary clauses have presuppositions?
a. John knows that it is raining
π: It is raining.
b. John rightly believes that it is raining
π: none, or possibly: John believes that it is raining.
57

Projection Problem
Questions
How do the presuppositions of elementary clauses get
transmitted to complex clauses ?
a. If John is realistic, he knows that he is incompetent.
π: John is incompetent
b. If John is an idiot, he knows that he incompetent
π: none, or possibly: if John is an idiot, he is incompetent
58

Questions
Architectural Question
Where do presuppositions belong in the architecture or
language?
Are they a semantic or a pragmatic phenomenon?
59

The Projection Problem
60

Conjunction
a. John knows that he is incompetent
b. Is it true that John knows that he is incompetent?
π: John is incompetent
c. I doubt that John knows that he is incompetent
π: John is incompetent
d. None of these 10 students knows that he is incompetent.
π: Each of these 10 students is incompetent.
a. John is incompetent and knows that he is.
b. Is it true that John is incompetent and knows that he is?
π: none
c. I doubt that John is incompetent and knows that he is.
π: none
d. None of these 10 students is incompetent and knows it.
π: none
61

Conjunction
a. John is depressed and his boss knows that he is
incompetent
b. Is it true that John is depressed and that his boss knows
that he is incompetent?
π: John is incompetent
c. I doubt that John is depressed and that his boss knows
that he is incompetent.
a. John is an idiot and his boss knows that he is
incompetent.
b. Is it true that John is an idiot and that his boss knows that
he incompetent?
π: if John is an idiot, he is incompetent (?)
c. I doubt that John is an idiot and that his boss knows that
he is incompetent.
62

Conjunction
p and qq’ presupposes p ⇒ q
(... to be refined)
John is incompetent and he knows it / that he is
π: none
John is an idiot and he knows that he is incompetent
π: if John is an idiot, he is incompetent
John is depressed and his boss knows that he is
incompetent
Predicted π: If John is depressed, he is incompetent
Actual π: John is incompetent
Maybe because: the most plausible way to make the
conditional true is to assume that its consequent is!
63

Conditionals
a. If John is incompetent, he knows that he is.
b. Is it true that if John is incompetent, he knows that he is?
c. I doubt that if John is incompetent, he knows that he is.
a. If John is realistic, he knows that he is incompetent.
b. Is it true that if John is realistic, he knows that he is
incompetent?
c. I doubt that if John is realistic, he knows that he is
incompetent.
a. If John is over 65, he knows he can’t apply.
b. Is it true that if John is over 65, he knows he can’t apply?
c. I doubt that if John is over 65, he knows he can’t apply.
64

Conditionals
a. If John knows that he is overqualified, he won’t apply.
b. Is it true that if John knows that he is overqualified, he
won’t apply?
c. I doubt that if John knows that he is overqualified, he
won’t apply.
a. If John knows that he is overqualified, he is depressed
b. Is it true that if John knows that he is overqualified, he is
depressed?
c. I doubt that if John knows that he is overqualified, he is
depressed.
a. if p, qq’ presupposes p ⇒ q
b. if pp’, q presupposes p
65

Disjunctions
a. If John is incompetent, he knows that he is.
b. Either John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.
a. If John is realistic, he knows that he is incompetent.
b.Either John is not realistic,or he knows he is incompetent.
a. If John is over 65, he knows he can’t apply.
b. Either John isn’t over 65, or he knows he can’t apply
a. If John knows that he is overqualified, he won’t apply.
b. Either John doesn’t know that he is over qualified, or he
won’t apply.
a. p or qq’ presupposes (not p) ⇒ q
b. pp’ or q presupposes p
66

Stalnaker’s Pragmatic Analysis
67

A Pragmatic Analysis
p and qq’ presupposes p ⇒ q
‘... when a speaker says something of the form A and B, he
may take it for granted that A (or at least that his audience
recognizes that he accepts that A) after he has said it. The
proposition that A will be added to the background of common
assumptions before the speaker asserts that B.
Now suppose that B expresses a proposition that would, for
some reason, be inappropriate to assert except in a context
where A, or something entailed by A, is presupposed. Even if A
is not presupposed initially, one may still assert A and B
since by the time one gets to saying that B, the context has
shifted, and it is by then presupposed that A.’
Stalnaker, ‘Pragmatic Presuppositions’, 1974
68

Assumptions
Assumption 1: Sentences may be true, false or #
Assumption 2: A sentence S is a presupposition failure if it
has the value # with respect to at least one of the states of
affairs compatible with what the speech act participants
take for granted.
Definition 1: Common Ground = what the speech act
participants take for granted.
Definition 2: Context Set = set of worlds compatible with
what the speech act participants take for granted.
Assumption 3: The Context Set is updated incrementally
in discourse and in conjunctions.
69

Possible Worlds
A possible world w = a complete specification of what is
going on. It determines for every sentence S whether
[[ S ]] w = true, [[ S ]] w = false, or [[ S ]] w = #.
Different clauses give rise to different functions, e.g.:
The President of
France is Chirac
w 1 → false
w 2 → true
w 3 → #
w 4 → #
...
The US
President is Bush
w 1 → true
w 2 → false
w 3 → true
w 4 → #
...
Two plus two
is four
w 1 → true
w 2 → true
w 3 → true
w 4 → true
70

Non-Contradiction
Further Conditions
A sentence S uttered in a Context Set C is deviant if S is
true in no world of C.
Non-Triviality
A sentence S uttered in a Context Set C is deviant if S is
true in every world of C.
71

Stalnaker’s Analysis
John knows that he is incompetent is:
-true in w if John is incompetent and believes that he is
-false in w if John is incompetent and doesn’t believe he is
-# in w if John is not incompetent.
Suppose that the speech act participants do not know
whether John is or isn’t incompetent. Suppose further that
the Context Set C is C = {w 1, w 2, w 3, w 4}
w 1 : John is incompetent and believes that he is
w 2: John is incompetent and believes he isn’t
w 3: John is not incompetent but believes he is
w 4: John is not incompetent and believes he isn’t
72

Stalnaker’s Analysis
T = John knows that he is incompetent uttered in C is a
presupposition failure because this sentence is # in w 3 and
w 4, which both belong to C
Suppose that the speech act participants do not know
whether John is or isn’t incompetent. Suppose further that
the Context Set C is C = {w 1, w 2, w 3, w 4}
w 1 : John is incompetent and believes that he is
w 2: John is incompetent and believes he isn’t
w 3: John is not incompetent but believes he is
w 4: John is not incompetent and believes he isn’t
73

Stalnaker’s Analysis
S = John is incompetent is:
-true in w if John is incompetent in w.
-false in w in all other cases
(i.e. the sentence does not have a presupposition)
a. Acceptability
Clearly, John is incompetent uttered in C is not a
presupposition failure.
b. Update
-Initially, the Context Set was C = {w 1, w 2, w 3, w 4}
-After S is uttered,
the new Context Set is: C’ = {w 1, w 2}
(i.e. only the worlds compatible with S are retained)
74

Stalnaker’s Analysis
John is incompetent. He knows it.
= S. T.
Step 1.
-The initial Context Set is C = {w 1, w 2, w 3, w 4}
-After the first sentence is uttered,
the new Context Set is C’ = {w 1, w 2}
Step 2.
-The second sentence is evaluated with respect to C’
-By construction, in each world in C’, T has a value
different from #. So T is not a presupposition failure in C’.
Step 3.
C’ is updated to C” = {w 1} .
75

Conjunction
Stalnaker’s Analysis
a. Treat S and T in the same way as the discourse S. T: the
assertion of a conjunction is a succession of two assertions.
b. Beautiful analysis of presupposition projection:
every world in C that satisfies S must satisfy T.
In other words: C |= S ⇒ T
Limitations
a. How does the analysis extend to other operators?
b. How does the analysis extend to embedded
conjunctions?
e.g. None of my students is rich and proud of it.
76

Heim’s Semantic Analysis
(following in part Karttunen 1974)
77

Karttunen I: The Limits of Brute Force
78

Karttunen II: Admittance Conditions
a. Brute Force Method
define recursively the (complex!) rules by which the
presuppositions of complex sentences are computed on the
basis of the presuppositions of their parts.
b. Admittance Conditions
(i) take as primitive the notion of a context satisfying the
presuppositions of an elementary clause.
(ii) extend recursively the notion of satisfaction.
79

Heim’s Synthesis
Karttunen
Separate specification of:
(i) admittance conditions
(ii) truth-conditional (assertive) content.
Gazdar’s critique (of Karttunen & Peters): this is not
explanatory!
Heim
a. The ‘context change potential’ of an expression cannot
be derived from its assertive content.
b. But its assertive content cannot be derived from its
context-change potential.
(... once one has the right context change potential!!!)
80

Heim’s Synthesis
Heim vs. Stalnaker
a. Keep from Stalnaker’s analysis
-the idea of an update
-the analysis of presupposition projection in conjunctions
b. Drop the pragmatic derivation of Stalnaker’s analysis.
Heim vs. Karttunen
-In Karttunen’s system, admittance conditions are specified
separately from the assertive content of expressions.
-For Heim, Context Change Potentials do double duty.
The Dynamic Conception of Meaning
-Old conception: meanings as truth conditions
-New conception: meanings as Context Change Potentials,
i.e. as functions from Context Sets to Context Sets.
81

Heim’s Synthesis
Notation: C[F] = update of the Context Set C with F
Elementary Clauses
a. C[John is incompetent]
= # iff C = #
= {w∈C: John is incompetent in w} otherwise
b. C[John knows that he is incompetent]
= # iff C=# or for some w∈C, John is not incompetent in w
= {w∈C: John believes he is incompetent in w}, otherwise
Truth
If C[S] ≠ # and w∈C, then: S is true at w iff w ∈ C[S]
Conjunction
C[F and G] = C[F][G]
82

Heim’s Synthesis
Negation
C[not F] = # iff C[F] = #
= C - C[F] otherwise
a. not F = John doesn’t know that he is incompetent.
b. C[not F] = # iff C[F] = #, iff for some w∈C, John is not
incompetent in w
= C - C[F] otherwise,
i.e. = C - {w∈C: John believes he is incompetent in w}
F
83

Heim’s Synthesis
Negation
C[not F] = # iff C[F] = #
= C - C[F] otherwise
This means that
not(pp’)
presupposes that p
a. not F = John doesn’t know that he is incompetent.
b. C[not F] = # iff C[F] = #, iff for some w∈C, John is not
incompetent in w
= C - C[F] otherwise,
i.e. = C - {w∈C: John believes he is incompetent in w}
F
84

Heim’s Synthesis
Negation
C[not F] = # iff C[F] = #
= C - C[F] otherwise
a. not F = John doesn’t know that he is incompetent.
b. C[not F] = # iff C[F] = #, iff for some w∈C, John is not
incompetent in w
= C - C[F] otherwise,
i.e. = C - {w∈C: John believes he is incompetent in w}
F
85

Heim’s Synthesis
Conditionals (analyzed as material implications)
F
C[if F, G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[F][not G] = #
= C - C[F][not G], otherwise
Worlds that
refute
if F, G
G
86

Heim’s Synthesis
Conditionals (analyzed as material implications)
F
C[if F, G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[F][not G] = #
= C - C[F][not G], otherwise
This means that if pp’, q presupposes that p,
and that if p, qq’, presupposes if p, q
Worlds that
refute
if F, G
G
87

Heim’s Synthesis
Conditionals (analyzed as material implications)
F
C[if F, G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[F][not G] = #
= C - C[F][not G], otherwise
Worlds that
refute
if F, G
G
88

Heim’s Synthesis
if F, G = If John is incompetent, he knows it
C[if F, G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[F][not G] = #
But C[F] ≠ # and furthermore
C[F] = {w∈C: John is incompetent in w}
C[F][not G] = # iff C[F][G] = #, which is not the case (by
construction). Furthermore,
C[F][not G] = {w∈C: John is incompetent in w}[not G]
= {w∈C: John is incompetent in w}
- {w∈C: John is incompetent in w and John believes he is
incompetent in w}
= {w∈C: John is incompetent but doesn’t believe it in w}
C[if F, G] = C - {w∈C: John is incompetent but doesn’t
believe it in w}
89

Summary
Meaning of an elementary clause = a CCP
Conjunction
C[F and G] = C[F][G]
Negation
C[not F] = # iff C[F] = #; = C - C[F] otherwise
Conditionals
C[if F, G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[F][not G] = #
= C - C[F][not G], otherwise
Disjunction
C[F or G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[not F][G] = #
= C[F] ∪ C[not F][G], otherwise
90

Disjunctions
a. If John is incompetent, he knows that he is.
b. Either John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.
a. If John is realistic, he knows that he is incompetent.
b.Either John is not realistic,or he knows he is incompetent.
a. If John is over 65, he knows he can’t apply.
b. Either John isn’t over 65, or he knows he can’t apply
a. If John knows that he is overqualified, he won’t apply.
b. Either John doesn’t know that he is over qualified, or he
won’t apply.
a. p or qq’ presupposes (not p) ⇒ q
b. pp’ or q presupposes p
91

Heim’s Analysis
Disjunction
C[F or G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[not F][G] = #
= C[F] ∪ C[not F][G] otherwise.
F
a. John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.
b. C[not I or K] = # iff C[not I] = # or C[not not I][K] = #,
i.e. iff C[I] = # or C[I][K] = #, which is never the case.
Thus C[not I or K] = C[not I] ∪ C[I][K]
G
92

Heim’s Analysis
Disjunction
C[F or G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[not F][G] = #
F
= C[F] ∪ C[not F][G] otherwise.
a. John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.
b. C[not I or K] = # iff C[not I] = # or C[not not I][K] = #,
i.e. iff C[I] = # or C[I][K] = #, which is never the case.
Thus C[not I or K] = C[not I] ∪ C[I][K]
G
This means that
pp’ or q presupposes
that p,
and that p or
qq’presupposes
if (not p), q
93

Heim’s Analysis
Disjunction
C[F or G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[not F][G] = #
= C[F] ∪ C[not F][G] otherwise.
F
a. John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.
b. C[not I or K] = # iff C[not I] = # or C[not not I][K] = #,
i.e. iff C[I] = # or C[I][K] = #, which is never the case.
Thus C[not I or K] = C[not I] ∪ C[I][K]
G
94

Heim’s Analysis
Definition of Truth
If w∈C,
a. F is # in w relative to C iff C[F] = #
b. If ≠ #, F is true in w relative to C iff w∈C[F]
John is incompetent. He knows it.
= S. T.
C = {w 1, w 2, w 3, w 4}
C[S] = C’ = {w 1, w 2}
C[S][T] = C” = {w 1} .
a. Relative to w1, C, the discourse is true, since w1∈C[S][T] b. Relative to w2, C, the discourse is false , since
w2∉C[S][T] 95

Heim’s Explanatory Problem
Problem: is the account explanatory? (Soames 1989)
C[F and G] = (C[F])[G]
C[F and* G] = (C[G])[F]
When F and G are not presuppositional,
C[F and G]=C[F and* G]={w∈C: F is true in w and G is
true in w}
96

Heim’s Explanatory Problem
There are many ways to define the CCP of or...
F
C[F or 1 G] = C[F] ∪ C[G], unless one of those is #
C[F or 2 G] = C[F] ∪ C[not F][G], unless one of those is #
C[F or 3 G] = C[not G][F] ∪ C[G], unless one of those is #
G
97

Gazdar’s Account
98

Non-Contradiction
Reminder 1: Non-Triviality
A sentence S uttered in a Context Set C is deviant if S is
true in no world of C.
Non-Triviality
A sentence S uttered in a Context Set C is deviant if S is
true in every world of C.
99

Reminder 2: Other Implicatures
John is in Paris or he is in Rome
=> it is not the case that:
a. the speaker believes that John is in Paris.
b. the speaker believes that John is not in Paris.
c . the speaker believes that John is in Rome.
d. the speaker believes that John is not in Rome.
If John is in Paris, he is there for business.
=> the speaker takes it to be possible but not certain that
John is in Paris
100

An Explanatory Account ?
Step 1: Compute the various implicatures of a sentence
Step 2: Keep only those presuppositions that are
consistent with all implicatures.
John is incompetent and he knows that he is.
a. Implicature: If John is incompetent is uttered, it
cannot be trivial that John is incompetent,
i.e. C |≠ John is incompetent
b. Potential Presupposition: the second conjunct triggers
the potential presupposition that John is incompetent.
c. Filtering: The presupposition is filtered out because it
is inconsistent with the implicature.
101

An Explanatory Account ?
John is depressed and he knows that he is incompetent.
a. Implicature: If John is depressed is uttered, it cannot
be trivial that John is depressed,
i.e. C |≠ John is depressed
b. Potential Presupposition: the second conjunct triggers
the potential presupposition that John is incompetent.
c. Filtering: The presupposition is not filtered out because
it is consistent with the implicature.
Note: Gazdar thus predicts that the entire sentence
presupposes that John is depressed. Stalnaker and Heim
predict: if John is depressed, he is incompetent.
Most examples go in Gazdar’s direction.
102

An Explanatory Account ?
If John is incompetent, he knows it.
a. Implicature: The speaker cannot utter If F, G
felicitously if he knows that F is true. If we represent as S
the set of worlds compatible with what the speaker believes
S |≠ John is incompetent
from which it follows that
C |≠ John is incompetent.
b. Potential Presupposition: the main clause triggers the
potential presupposition that John is incompetent.
c. Filtering: The presupposition is filtered out because it
is inconsistent with the implicature.
103

Reminder: Other Implicatures
John is in Paris or he is in Rome
=> it is not the case that:
a. the speaker believes that John is in Paris.
b. the speaker believes that John is not in Paris.
c . the speaker believes that John is in Rome.
d. the speaker believes that John is not in Rome.
If John is in Paris, he is there for business.
=> the speaker takes it to be possible but not certain that
John is in Paris
104

An Explanatory Account ?
Either John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.
a. Implicature: The speaker cannot utter F or G
felicitously if he believes that F is false
S |≠ John is incompetent
from which it follows that
C |≠ John is incompetent.
b. Potential Presupposition: the second clause triggers the
potential presupposition that John is incompetent.
c. Filtering: The presupposition is filtered out because it
is inconsistent with the implicature.
Note: Gazdar thus predicts that the entire sentence
presupposes that John is depressed. Stalnaker and Heim
predict: if John is depressed, he is incompetent.
105

An Explanatory Account ?
If John is depressed, he knows that he is incompetent.
a. Implicature: S |≠ John is depressed
from which it follows that
C |≠ John is depressed
b. Potential Presupposition: the main clause triggers the
potential presupposition that John is incompetent.
c. Filtering: The presupposition is not filtered out because
it is consistent with the implicature.
Note: Gazdar thus predicts that the entire sentence
presupposes that John is depressed. Stalnaker and Heim
predict: if John is depressed, he is incompetent.
Most examples go in Gazdar’s direction - but not all do!
106

Problem for Gazdar’s Account
If John is French, he must know that he can travel within
the European Union without a passport.
a. Gazdar’s prediction: π = John can travel within the
European Union without a passport.
b. Actual presupposition: probably none.
a. Implicature: S |≠ John is French
from which it follows that C |≠ John is French
b. Potential Presupposition: the main clause triggers the
potential presupposition that John can travel within the
European Union without a passport.
c. Filtering: The presupposition is not filtered out because
it is consistent with the implicature!
If John has twins, then Mary will not like his children.
107

A Very Partial History
1973-1974
-Stalnaker’s analysis: pragmatics + local contexts.
-Karttunen’s analysis: recursive admittance conditions +
local contexts.
1970’s
-Karttunen & Peters
-Gazdar’s recursive pragmatics
1980’s
-Heim’s theory of presupposition projection
-Overgeneration problem (Soames, Rooth).
1990’s
van der Sandt & Geurts’s critique of Heim. DRT analysis
108

Back to Heim’s Account!
Accommodation
109

My sister is pregnant.
Global Accommodation
'... it's not as easy as you might think to say something that
will be unacceptable for lack of required presuppositions.
Say something that requires a missing presupposition, and
straightway that presupposition springs into existence,
making what you said acceptable after all.' I said that
presupposition evolves in a more or less rule-governed way
during a conversation. Now we can formulate one
important governing rule: call it the
Rule of accommodation for presupposition
If at time t something is said that requires presupposition P
to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t,
then - ceteris paribus and within certain limits -
presupposition P comes into existence at t."
110

Local Accommodation
a. The king of France is not wise because there is no king of
France.
b. None of my students takes good care of his car because
none of my students has a car!
c. John doesn't know that he is incompetent because he just
isn't incompetent!
a. It's not the case there is a king of France and he is wise
because ...
b. None of my students has a car and takes good care of it
because...
c. It's not the case that John is incompetent and knows it ...
Question: can we do without Local Accommodation by
appealing to meta-linguistic uses of various operators?
111

Global vs. Local Accommodation
C[not F]= # iff C[F]=#
= C - C[F], otherwise.
Global Accommodation:
C' = {c∈C: France is a monarchy at the time and in the
world of c}.
We then compute C'[the king of France is not powerful].
Local Accommodation: Instead of computing
C - C[F] (which wouldn't even be defined, since C[F]=#),
we compute:
C - C'[F], where C'={c∈C: France is a monarchy at the time
and in the world of c} (as in A.)
112

Directions
Allow for local accommodation whenever global
accommodation would contradict
a. the literal meaning of a sentence
b. or an implicature of a sentence [or possibly: certain types
of implicatures, e.g. primary implicatures]
In effect, this allows us to capture the good properties of
Gazdar’s system within Heim’s dynamic semantics.
113

Summary
Presuppositions cannot be analyzed as implicatures.
The dilemma of dynamic semantics
a. Stalnaker’s approach is explanatory but not general
Update the context set in time as you process a sentence.
b. Heim’s approach is general but not explanatory
The meaning of words is dynamic from the start, i.e. their
lexical entries specify how they change the context set.
Gazdar’s account was explanatory and general but
incorrect
(i) Compute the implicatures of a sentence.
(ii) Project those potential presuppositions that don’t
contradict the entire sentence or one of its implicatures.
114

The Proviso Problem
a. If the problem was easy, it is not John who solved it.
b. John knows that if the problem was easy, someone
solved it (Geurts 1999)
Predicted presupposition of (a) and (b):
If the problem was easy, someone solved it
Actual presupposition of (a)
Someone solved the problem
Actual presupposition of (b)
If the problem was easy, someone solved it
115

The Proviso Problem
John is an idiot and he knows that he is incompetent
π: if John is an idiot, he is incompetent
John is depressed and he knows that he is incompetent
Predicted π: If John is depressed, he is incompetent
Actual π: John is incompetent
Maybe this is because the most plausible way to make
the conditional true is to assume that its consequent is!
... but this kind of reasoning fails to address the minimal
difference between:
-If the problem was easy, it is not John who solved it
-John knows that if the problem was easy, someone solved
it (Geurts 1999).
116

The Proviso Problem
Direction 1 (van der Sandt 1992, Geurts 1999)
-This problem refutes the standard dynamic approaches -
as well as all approaches that make similar predictions.
-A different analysis must be proposed, in which
presuppositions are treated in a more syntactic fashion
(‘Discourse Representation Theory’)
This is a major contender among current theories.
Direction 2 (still promissory)
With enough pragmatic reasoning, we can stick to Heim’s
predictions - which in any event seem to be correct in other
cases, e.g.
If John is over 65, he must know that he is too old to apply
117

Back to Heim’s Account!
Quantification
118

Replacing Worlds with Contexts
Example1. An amnesiac gets lost...
“An amnesiac, Rudolf Lingens, is lost in the Stanford library. He
reads a number of things in the library, including a biography of
himself, and a detailed account of the library in which he is lost...
He still won’t know who he is, and where he is, no matter how
much knowledge he piles up, until that moment when he is ready to
say, “This place is aisle five, floor six, of Main Library, Stanford. I
am Rudolf Lingens.” [Perry 1977]
“It seems that the Stanford library has plenty of books, but no
helpful little maps with a dot marked “location of this map.” Book
learning will help Lingens locate himself in logical space. (...) But
none of this, by itself, can guarantee that he knows where in the
world he is. He needs to locate himself not only in logical space but
also in ordinary space”. [Lewis 1979 p. 138]
119

Standford Harvard
120

Standford Harvard
121

Example 2. 'My pants are on fire'
‘If I see, reflected in a window, the image of a man whose
pants appear to be on fire, my behavior is sensitive to
whether I think, ‘His pants are on fire’, or ‘My pants are on
fire’, though the object of thought may be the same'
(Kaplan)
122

123

Referential Uncertainty
Situation: Lingens, who is lost in the Stanford library, knows
everything there is to know about the world.
I wear a coat. My coat is black.
[Lingens, a well-read amnesiac, knows everything there is to
know about the world; but he does not know whether he is
Alfred, who is having a conversation with Berenice, or
Charles, who is having a conversation with Denise.
Berenice used to smoke but Denise never did]
Compare:
Did you stop smoking?
You are Berenice. Did you stop smoking?
124

Referential Uncertainty
Situation: Lingens, who is lost in the Stanford library, knows
everything there is to know about the world.
I wear a coat. My coat is black.
[Lingens, a well-read amnesiac, knows everything there is to
know about the world; but he does not know whether he is
Alfred, who is pointing towards Berenice, or
Charles, who is pointing towards Denise.
Berenice used to smoke but Denise never did]
Compare:
Did she stop smoking?
She is Berenice. Did she stop smoking?
125

Static Account with worlds
[[ it is raining ]] w = false
[[ PS is in Los Angeles ]] w = true,
[[ the British President is happy]] w = #
Rule
[[ Pro VP ]] w = true if and only if [[ Pro ]] w + w ∈ [[VP ]]
where [[VP ]] + w is the set of things of which VP is true in w
[[ Pro VP ]] w = false if and only if [[ Pro ]] w - w ∈ [[VP ]]
where [[VP ]] - w is the set of things of which VP is false in w
[[ Pro VP ]] w = # in all other cases!
126

Static Account with contexts
A context =
[[ I smoke ]]
= true if and only if PS smokes in w
= false if and only PS does not smoke in w
[[ She 2 smokes]]
= true if and only if Mary smokes in w
= false if and only Mary does not smoke in w
[[ She 2 stopped smoking]]
= true if and only if Mary used to smoke but doesn’t now in w
= false if and only Mary used to smoke and still does in w
= # if and only if Mary didn’t use to smoke.
127

Dynamic Account with contexts
The rules are exactly the same as before, replacing
worlds with... contexts!
Elementary Clauses [now C is a set of contexts]
We write as c w the world of c, as c(1) the denotation of pro 1
a. C[John is incompetent]
= # iff C = #
= {c∈C: John is incompetent in c w} otherwise
b. C[John knows that he is incompetent]
=# iff C = # or for some c∈C, John is not incompetent in c w
= {c∈C: John believes he is incompetent in c w}, otherwise.
c. C[she 2 stopped smoking]
= # iff C = # or for some c∈C, c(2) didn’t smoke in c w
= {c∈C: c(2) doesn’t smoke in c w}, otherwise.
128

Quantification in a Static Setting
[[ [no x 1: x 1 student] x 1 smokes]]
≠ # iff for every d which is a student in w,
[[x 1 smokes ]] ≠ #.
If ≠ #,
= true iff for no d which is a student in w,
[[x 1 smokes]] = true.
= false iff for some d which is a student in w,
[[x 1 smokes]] = true.
129

Quantification in a Static Setting
[[[no x1: x1 student] x1 stopped smoking]]
≠ # iff for every d which is a student in w,
[[x 1 stopped smoking]] ≠ #.
If ≠ #,
= true iff for no d which is a student in w,
[[x 1 stopped smoking ]] = true.
= false iff for some d which is a student in w,
[[x 1 stopped smoking ]] = true.
130

Quantification in a Dynamic Setting
Notations
c[i → d] = that context which is exactly like c except that
pro i denotes d
C[i → d] = {c[i → d]: c∈C}
C[[no x i: x i NP] x iVP] = # iff
C = # or {c[i→d]: c∈C and d is an object}[x i NP] = #
or {c[i→d]: c∈C and c[i→d] ∈ C[i→d][x i NP]} [x i VP] = #.
If ≠ #, C[[no x i: x i NP] x i VP] = {c: c∈C and for no object
d, c[i→d] ∈ C[i→d][x i NP] and c[i→d] ∈ C[i→d][x i
NP][x i VP]}
C[[every xi: xi NP] xiVP]: same thing as for no ..., replacing
no with every.
131

Quantification in a Dynamic Setting
[no x 1: x 1 student] x 1 smokes
Let us assume that C ≠ #. Then:
C[[no x 1: x 1 student] x 1 smokes] ≠ # because
C = #, {c[1→d]: c∈C and d is an object}[x 1 student] ≠ #,
and {c[1→d]: c∈C and c[1→d] ∈ C[1→d][x 1 student]} [x 1
smokes] ≠ #. Furthermore,
C[[no x 1: x 1 student] x 1 smokes]
= {c: c∈C and for no object d, c[1→d] ∈ C[1→d][x 1
student] and c[1→d] ∈ C[1→d][x 1 student][x 1 smokes]}
= {c: c∈C and for no object d, d is a student in c w and d
smokes in c w}
132

Quantification in a Dynamic Setting
[no x1: x1 student] x1 smokes
Let us assume that C = {c1, c2, c3, c4} and for each i, ci = , with:
w1 : All students used to smoke. All students still smoke.
w2: All students used to smoke. One doesn’t any more.
w3: One student didn’t use to smoke. No student smokes.
w4: One student didn’t use to smoke. One student smokes.
C[[no x1: x1 student] x1 smokes]
= {ci: i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and for no object d, ∈ {: i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}}[x1 student] and
∈ {: i ∈ {1, 2, 3,
4}}[x1 student][x1 smokes]}
= {ci: i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and for no object d, d is a student in
wi and d smokes in wi} = {c3} 133

Quantification in a Dynamic Setting
[no x 1: x 1 student] x 1 stopped smoking
Let us assume that C ≠ #. Then:
C[[no x1: x1 student] x1stopped smoking] = #
iff {c[1→d]: c∈C and d is an object}[x1 student] = #,
or {c[1→d]: c∈C and c[1→d] ∈ C[1→d][x1 student]} [x1 stopped smoking] = #,
iff {c[1→d]: c∈C and c[1→d] ∈ C[1→d][x1 student]} [x1 stopped smoking] = #
iff for some c∈C, for some d, d is a student in cw and d
didn’t use to smoke in cw. If ≠ #,
= {c: c∈C and for no object d, d is a student in cw and d
stopped smoking in cw} 134

Quantification in a Dynamic Setting
[no x i: x i student] x i stopped smoking
Let us assume that C = {c 1, c 2, c 3, c 4}
(with c 1, c 2, c 3, c 4 defined as before)
C[[no x 1: x 1 student] x 1 stopped smoking] = # because
{c[1→d]: c∈C and c[1→d] ∈ C[1→d][x 1 student]} [x 1
stopped smoking]
= {: i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and d is a student in
w i} [x 1 stopped smoking]
= # because in w 3 and w 4 there are students who didn’t use
to smoke.
135

Quantification in a Dynamic Setting
[no x i: x i student] x i stopped smoking
Let us now assume that C’ = {c 1, c 2}
(with c 1 and c 2 defined as before)
It can be shown C’[[no x 1: x 1 student] x 1 smokes] ≠ #.
Furthermore, C’[[no x 1: x 1 student] x 1 stopped smoking]
= {c: c∈C’ and for no object d, d is a student in c w and d
stopped smoking in c w}
= {c 1}
136