European Security Review EUBAM Libya: story of a long-awaited CSDP mission

Almost two years after the end of 

Col. Muammar Gaddafi’s 40 year- 

long grasp on power, the Council of 

the European Union gave the green 

light on 22 May 2013, for the 

establishment of an integrated 

border management assistance 

mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya). This 

new mission under the Common 

Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 

aims at supporting Libyan authorities 

in enhancing the security of the 

country’s land, sea, and air borders. 

Why has the EU taken so much time 

to make use of its CSDP instruments 

in Libya? What are the challenges 

ahead of EUBAM’s success for the EU 

and for Libya? If the new European 

mission appears necessary, one can 

legitimately wonder whether it will 

be sufficient to safeguard Libyan 

and European interests, given the 

magnitude of the problems that 

confront this country and the 

neighbouring Sahel region. 

European Security Review 

EUBAM Libya: 

story of a long-awaited 

CSDP mission 

ESR 66 – May 2013

Introduction 

Almost two years after the end of Col. Muammar Gaddafi’s 40 year-long grasp on 

power, opinions and assessments of the EU’s performance in face of the Libyan crisis differ 

substantially. Although the official EU line is that “the EU responded rapidly to support the Libyan 

people”, 1 analysts and critics hasten to characterise the Libyan crisis as the “death sentence” of 

the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and in particular, of the Common Security and 

Defence Policy (CSDP). 2 

On 22 May 2013, the Council finally adopted a decision launching a new and long- 

awaited civilian CSDP mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) which will be deployed by the beginning of 

June. As expected, the mission will take the form of an integrated border assistance mission in 

order to tackle the pressing issue of building up Libyan authorities’ capacity to secure national 

borders. The challenges ahead of the EUBAM Libya are significant, as this new CSDP mission is 

highly symbolic. Indeed, although EU Member States already marked their engagement with 

Libya by setting up a CSDP military operation (EUFOR Libya), and a no-fly zone with their NATO 

partners, these initiatives have been strongly criticised. On the one hand, criticisms have been 

addressed to NATO, and especially to its European members who spearheaded the 

intervention, for having let Libya descend into chaos after Gaddafi’s collapse. On the other 

hand, the EU’s External Action Service (EEAS) and the CSDP have suffered a great deal from 

having designed a military operation, which, ultimately, never came into being. EUFOR Libya’s 

failure severely affected the EU’s image as an international security actor, and raised the stakes 

for the new civilian mission EUBAM Libya. 

Libya is in the process of reconstruction and faces a series of challenges, ranging from 

the security of its borders to new constitutional processes, transitional justice, protection of 

human rights and reversing economic decline. More than two years after the beginning of the 

revolt, EUBAM is the first EU mission to be deployed in Libya. Why has the EU taken so much time 

1 «Country Cooperation: Libya», European Commission’s DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, last update 11 

March 2013, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/countrycooperation/libya/libya_en.htm 

2 « The CFSP died in Libya – we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it », quoted in Alvise Armellini 

« Diplomats mourn ‘death’ of EU defence policy over Libya», Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 24 March 2011, available at: 

http://www.acus.org/natosource/diplomats-mourn-death-eu-defence-policy-over-libya 

ESR 66 – EUBAM Libya: story of a long-awaited CSDP mission 2

to make use of its CSDP instruments? Does it mean that the EU lost interest in Libya? What are the 

challenges ahead of EUBAM’s success for the EU and for Libya? In this perspective, if the new 

European mission appears necessary, there will inevitably be those who will wonder if EUBAM 

Libya will be sufficient to safeguard Libyan and European interests, given the magnitude of the 

problems that confront this country and, more generally, the neighbouring Sahel region. 

The EU in Libya 

EUFOR Libya: the death sentence of CSDP? 

In reality, the credibility and effectiveness of the EU’s CSDP was badly undermined by the 

non-implementation of a virtual military operation in support of humanitarian assistance 

operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya (EUFOR Libya). 3 The mission’s mandate 

stipulated that activation was dependent on a request from the UN Office for the Coordination 

of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Given EU internal weaknesses and divisions, 4 and concerns over 

blurring the lines between military and humanitarian actions, EUFOR Libya can be filed in the 

“ghost CSDP operation” shelf after the formal termination of the non-operation on 10 November 

2011. 5 The purpose of this paper is not to analyse the advisability and the bien-fondé of the 

European initiative in the framework of CSDP. It does not go into the question of whether such a 

restrictive clause was attached to the deployment of EUFOR Libya. Rather, it aims, from a factual 

perspective, to describe the instruments that were mobilised and put into use (or not) by the 

European Union in response to the Libyan crisis, and EUFOR Libya must be listed as one of them. 

It has been argued that EUFOR Libya was intended to be deployed. Indeed, making its 

activation dependent on an OCHA request was not only a constraint for an operation which 

was already planned in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 

3 Common costs of EUFOR Libya were estimated at €7,900,000 million and Italian Commander Rear Admiral Claudio 

Gaudiosi was appointed Head of Mission. Its Operational Headquarters were located in Rome, Italy. Council Decision 

2011/210/CFSP, 1 April 2011 

4 Germany went as far as abstaining from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 

5 Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, « La fin sans gloire d’une opération », Bruxelles 2, Nov. 9, 2011, available at : 

http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/maghreb/la-fin-sans-gloire-dune-operation.html 


and 1973, but also a debatable case of waiting for approval from a single UN agency, and an 

unprecedented restriction imposed on a CSDP operation/mission. The operation was intended 

to contribute to the safe movement and evacuation of displaced persons, and to support, with 

specific capabilities, the humanitarian agencies in their activities. Nonetheless, analysts have 

argued that OCHA already had the required means to deal with the refugee crisis in and 

around Libya and that there was no place for military involvement in the delivery of 

humanitarian aid. What was identified as lacking was the capacity to reconstruct the country 

and to build transport infrastructures (bridges, landing strips or airports), which would in any case 

not fit in the mandate of EUFOR Libya. 6 

The EU’s response to the Libyan crisis 

Yet, if the daunting failure of EUFOR Libya weighed heavily upon the newly-founded 

European External Action Service (EEAS) and on the expectations related by its creation, one 

needs to take into consideration the importance of the series of diplomatic and civilian 

instruments launched by the European Union. Indeed, the EU’s immediate reaction to the Libyan 

descent into violence did not involve the use of the controversial Battlegroups, 7 nor a mission 

under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), but rather a mix of diplomatic 

measures, humanitarian assistance and civil protection. 

The EU responded quickly with diplomatic measures such as declarations, official 

statements, high-level meetings and sanctions; soon after the beginning of the revolt in February 

2011, the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy became vocal about the events in Libya, 

and on 11 March 2011, an extraordinary meeting of the European Council urged Col. Gaddafi 

to step down. On 22 May, a liaison office meant to give immediate support to the National 

Transitional Council (NTC) and civil society was opened in Benghazi and another one in August 

2011 in Tripoli. It soon became an EU Delegation in November 2011. Building on the UN Security 

6 Sebastian Bloching, «Council Decision of 1 April 2011 on a European Union military operation in support of humanitarian 

assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya (EUFOR Libya)», Briefing Note 2011:1, ISIS Europe, 8 April 

2011, available at: http://isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-downloads/2011_artrel_624_isis-briefing-note- 

2011-1-libya.pdf 

7 Two Battlegroups were on the standby on the first semester of 2011: the «Saxon» and the «Nordic» Battlegroups, 

respectively led by the Netherlands and Sweden. See Annex I, Myrto Hatzigeorgopoulos, «The role of EU Battlegroups in 

European defence», European Security Review n° 56, ISIS Europe, June 2012, available at: http://www.isiseurope.eu/sites/default/files/publications-downloads/esr56_EUBattlegroups-June2012%20MH_2.pdf 


Council Resolution 1970 (2011), the EU adopted Council Decision 2011/137 which set up a range 

of sanctions against Libya aimed at interrupting the Gaddafi’s regime flow of weapons and 

money. These sanctions were amended on 16 September 2011 to allow transfer of arms to the 

new Libya authorities under some specific conditions. 8 

In the field of humanitarian assistance, the EU was quick to unblock millions of euros, with 

€80,5 million coming from the EU budget and being directed to meeting basic needs, treating 

the injured, assisting refugees, preventing human rights abuses and supporting demining. To 

date, the Union has provided more than €156 million in humanitarian support. Through the 

activation of the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism, teams and assets were mobilised to alleviate 

the suffering of civilians both in Libya and at its borders. They have also worked in cooperation 

with humanitarian partners on the ground to ensure adequate standards and coordination are 

met. The EU’s activities have been focused on supporting stability in the country. 

Beyond humanitarian support, the EU has been putting into place a series of 

programmes aimed at stabilising the country, supporting its transition and building its education 

and health systems. The EU’s total comprehensive package for Libya sums up to €79 million 

dedicated to projects with a long-term perspective: 

Public administration and Democratic Transition: support for the drafting of the Constitution 

and for the development of a democratic and efficient public administration (€4,5 million) 

Security: 

- Security Sector Reform and Rule of Law programme (€10 million) 

- Support for “Capacity building for crisis response and crime investigations” (€4,3 million) 

- Supporting the Libyan authorities on physical security and stockpile management 

(PSSM) of conventional weapons and ammunition (€5 million) 

- Clearance of unexploded ordnances to create a safe and secure environment (€5 

million) 

Civil society and local governance (€3 million) 

8 SIPRI Database, «EU embargo on Libya», Last update 23 November 2012, available at : 

http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/libya/Libya_2 


Health: programme which addresses both immediate service delivery and quality 

improvement of the sector (€8,5 million) 

Vocational training and education: improve the quality of training on offer and support 

reintegration of former fighters (€6,5 million) 

Migration: five programmes are being implemented at bilateral and regional levels (€19 

million). Special focus is given to migrants’ rights, especially on the fights against trafficking 

crime, protection of victims through capacity building, assistance to voluntary return and 

reintegration from Libya to the respective origin countries. In addition, work is also being 

made at the level of regional protection programmes in order to develop a sound and 

sustainable protection regime for asylum seekers (€10 million) 

Protection of vulnerable groups: developing effective protection and enhancing the 

capacity of national and local authorities and non-state actors to meet their needs (€4 

million). 9 

An additional €25 million package was recently allocated through the European 

Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) to the strengthening of the EU’s activities in 

the fields of education, health care and security and the rule of law for 2013. These programmes 

are implemented and followed up by the EU Delegation in Tripoli. The aforementioned amounts 

of the different programmes have been made available through the contributions from different 

budget lines such as: 

The Instruments for Stability (IfS) with two programmes supporting civil society and institutional 

actors (€2 million), and preventing health epidemics of HIV (€1 million) 

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (€1 million) 

The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI): Although Libya is not part 

of the European Neighbourhood Policy and has not concluded a bilateral Action Plan with 

the EU, it is still applicable for the ENPI. (€60 million for 2011-2013 + €10 million as special 

measures following the revolution) 

The Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in development (NSA/LA) (€2 million) 

9 «Country Cooperation: Libya», European Commission’s DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, last update 11 

March 2013, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/countrycooperation/libya/libya_en.htm 


Finally, as part of its support for transition and democracy, the EU deployed Election 

Assessment Teams (EU EAT) to cover the historic parliamentary elections of 7 July 2012. Relations 

between the EU and Libya have been steady, and in January 2013, Libya expressed the 

willingness to join the Union for the Mediterranean as an observer country. Yet, criticisms have 

increasingly been voiced as regards the EU’s engagement in Libya; with the EU liaison office 

having closed down, the under-staffed Delegation in Tripoli, the limited scope of the upcoming 

border assistance mission, as Andrew Jacobs and Fabienne Bessonne from the European 

Commission’s DG EuropeAid, “Libya does not need cash, what it needs it expertise”. 10 

Prioritising the issue of border control 

With a 4,348 km land border, shared with six countries (Algeria, Niger, Sudan, Egypt, 

Chad and Tunisia) and a 1,770 km maritime border, Libya’s borders are characterised as being 

extremely porous. Thus, border security in Libya is of primary importance. Indeed, if some control 

was exercised under Colonel Gaddafi’s dictatorship, the 2011 civil war and the slow transition to 

the establishment of stable institutions have brought up serious questions about the need to 

better protect Libyan borders. Major problems related to ineffective border control encompass 

mass migration flows, arms and drugs trafficking and terrorist activity in a highly volatile region. 

Protecting Libya’s borders: a national, regional but also European challenge 

Since the beginning of 2012, armed militias took over control of custom posts consisting 

of young people from tribes historically located near or horseback these borders, as well as 

networks of smugglers. 11 The consequences of the failure to supervise Libya’s borders are felt not 

only in Libya but throughout the Sahel region. Two main issues have to be arisen: “South-South” 

immigration and access to uncontrolled territories by criminal organisations. 

10 Interview with Andrew Jacobs and Fabienne Bessonne, “Talking about the Neighbourhood”, EU Neighbourhood Info 

Centre, 2012, available at http://www.enpi-info.eu/files/features/Interview_Libya%20(en)II.v.5.pdf 

11 «Affrontement armés, réseaux tribaux et prédation aux frontières de la Libye», Institut de Recherche sur le Magheb 

Contemporain, 11 December 2013, available at : http://irmc.hypotheses.org/656 


At the end of August 2012 the UNHCR registered approximately 10,000 refugees and 

asylum-seekers present in Libya, and estimated that Libya would count about 12,000 refugees 

from various origins by December 2013. 12 Similarly, on 2 May 2013, the UNHCR Office in Libya 

registered 8,357 Syrian refugees. 13 Conversely the number of returnees fleeing Libya to 

neighbouring countries, mainly due to the declining economic activity of the country, 

amounted to 209,000 people in August 2012. 14 Thus, Libya acknowledges a double movement of 

immigration and emigration, creating a chaotic situation along its borders. This has 

consequences for the stability of the region, of the Sahel, and of Libya itself, as the lack of 

border control leaves room for the emergence of trans-border criminal activities. 

In this context, Libya has become a prominent arms trafficking platform. International 

observers agree that “the vast weapons stores held by Gaddafi were widely looted and 

distributed during the revolution and there is no doubt that some of this supply has already been 

transported out of the country”. 15 In addition, the lack of control and stability, especially in the 

southern part of Libya, incites to the expansion and grounding of criminal groups thereby 

affecting the entire region of the Sahel. Mali has probably been the first victim of the Libyan 

crisis. Indeed, reports indicate that the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), 

which began a military campaign to free Northern Mali, was formed by Tuaregs having 

previously served in Gaddafi’s military. 16 

If Libya and the Sahel region are the most affected by the situation at the Libyan 

borders, the European Union has a vested interest in contributing to the country’s border 

management. Firstly, building a long-term Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy in 

Libya will prevent a spillover of some of the challenges faced in the Sahel into Libya, and 

reciprocally from Libya into the Sahel. Consequently, supporting the reconstruction of Libya is a 

12 «2013 UNHCR country operations profile – Libya», UNHCR, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e485f36.html 

13 «External update», UNHCR Libya, April 2013, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/501f781e9.html 

14 Princy Marin George, «The Libyan crisis and the Western Sahel: emerging security issues», Institute for Defence Studies 

and Analyses, 14 August 2012, available at: 

http://www.idsa.in/backgrounder/TheLibyanCrisisandWestAfricanSahel_140812 

15 «The transitional problem of Libyan Border Security», The Libyan Intelligence Group, available at: 

http://www.libyaintelligence.org/content/transnational-problem-libyan-border-security 

16 Scott Stewart, «Mali Besieged by fighters fleeing Libya», Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2 February 2012, available at: 

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mali-besieged-fighters-fleeing-libya 


necessary link for the success of the EU’s comprehensive approach in the Sahel. 17 Secondly, the 

waves of immigration from northern Libya to the European continent have been a great matter 

of concern for some European countries. In this perspective, the particularly alarming situation 

caused by the large number of North African people trying to reach the Italian island of 

Lampedusa in the spring of 2011, created a lot of distress on the EU’s side with regard to the 

Libyan crisis. The issue of borders security was already highlighted during the Paris Conference on 

Libya’s future which took place on 1 st September 2011. Bringing together the National 

Transitional Council of Libya, Western leaders, as well as some international organisations such as 

the UN and the World Bank, this Conference resulted in a Joint Needs Assessment. The EU took 

part in this assessment under the overall control of the UN and was particularly in charge of 

leading in the key field of border management. Libyan authorities, thus, have to deal with 

pressures from the European Union which does not want to become a haven for refugees. It is in 

this context that the EU intends to focus its assistance to Libyan authorities on securing Libya’s 

Mediterranean coast and prevent migration flows towards Europe. If this initiative is part of the 

EU’s policy of driving back irregular immigrants from North Africa, it has incidentally led the EU to 

overlook the pressing situation at the south of Libya within the context of its new CSDP mission to 

the country. 

Initiatives for securing Libyan borders 

From the outset of the revolt that led to the armed uprising against the oppressive regime 

of Muammar Gaddafi, the massive influx of migrants from North Africa has put some EU Member 

States under strained pressure (especially Italy and Malta). A FRONTEX Joint Operation Hermes 

2011 was set up in February 2011 to assist Italian authorities in handling ongoing and prospective 

migration flows. 18 The migratory consequences of the Arab Spring quickly became a point of 

discordance and contention amongst EU Member States, some states calling for putting the 

Schengen area in a parenthesis and reinstating border controls to protect their territories. The 

regional dimension of migratory issues further appeared as extremely critical with the outbreak 

of the conflict in Northern Mali. With growing concern over European economic problems, 

17 The EU’s Comprehensive approach in the Sahel: EUBAM Libya completes the EU action in the Sahel, alongside EUCAP 

Sahel Niger (Security Sector Reform/SSR mission), EUTM Mali (training mission) and the appointment of the EU Special 

Representative for the Sahel. 

18 FRONTEX mandate rapidly extended to Crete. 


migration was viewed depicted as an economic and security concern on the European side of 

the Mediterranean. Several actions have been undertaken to strengthen border control 

management of Libyan authorities, and thereby increase Libya’s and Europe’s security. 

In September 2012, an INTERPOL real-time passport control capacity at Tripoli 

International Airport was initiated by INTERPOL, the EU and Libyan officials. The RELINC project 

(Rebuilding Libya’s Investigative Capability) has made available a €2,2 million funded by the EU. 

The project enables Libyan border control authorities to access INTERPOL’s global database to 

detect stolen and lost passports. 19 In this sense, the project increases the possibility to identify 

persons seeking to conceal their true identity, including internationally wanted persons, 

suspected terrorists and transnational criminals. Bringing tangible benefits on both sides 

(providers and recipient), this practical support is part of the EU’s wider efforts to build up the 

Libyan government’s and authorities’ capacities in fighting organised crime and terrorism, 

increasing international police cooperation and improving border control. It is against this 

framework that the EU launched its intergrated border management assistance mission to Libya. 

In addition, some national and regional initiatives have been launched. For example, a 

Tripoli Action Plan was signed in March 2012 between Libya and neighbouring countries aiming 

to strengthen joint border patrols. But not much has moved beyond the conceptual stage. As 

previously mentioned, besides these national and regional initiatives the EU has seized upon the 

issue of Libya’s borders’ security since 2011. 

A necessary Border Assistance Mission? 

Due to EU Member States’ reluctance but also because of the slow transitional process in 

Libya, the EU encountered difficulties in setting up the integrated border management 

assistance mission in the country. Because of the deterioration of the situation, the 27 EU 

Member States accelerated the decision-making process. After several months of reflection and 

observation, the Council of the EU approved the crisis management concept of EUBAM Libya on 

19 «INTERPOL and EU project to enhance border security in Libya takes off», Media Release, INTERPOL, 7 March 2013, 

available at: http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2013/N20130307 


31 January 2013. It planned a civilian mission aiming to support Libyan capacity building for 

border management. 20 At the beginning of March 2013, the EU launched a needs assessment 

mission consisting of 10 experts. The team was in charge of preparing the deployment of EUBAM 

Libya. Two weeks later, on 16 March 2013, the EU’s first preparatory elements of the mission 

arrived in Libya and held a series of constructive discussions. Antti Hartikainen, an expert on 

international border security was appointed Head of EUBAM Libya at the end of March, and was 

rapidly deployed in theatre. This sudden acceleration of the decision-making process can be 

partially explained by the relative political stabilisation in the country, the need to prevent 

fighters from returning into Libya in a context of upsurge of international activities in Mali, and by 

the EU’s pressing interest in stabilising Libya’s borders for its own security. 

The 24-month mission consists of approximately 110 staff and will cost €30 million for the 

first year. The Headquarters will be based in Tripoli and, contrary to what was originally planned, 

the mission will not be deployed in southern Libya, although the porosity of the southern border 

constitutes the biggest security challenge for the country. Indeed, all the training, mentoring, 

advice and assistance activities aiming to help Libyan authorities in strengthening border control 

capacities and in defining a national Integrated Border Management strategy will be held in 

Tripoli only. 

The necessity to secure the southern border is probably the most important challenge 

faced by Libya, as previously highlighted. Although concentrating on securing the 

Mediterranean coast is intended to achieving short-term improvements for EU’s security, 

refraining from tackling the problems in the South will run against the Union’s interest in the long- 

run. Indeed, in the context of the EU’s implementation of its comprehensive approach in the 

Sahel, and in particular in Mali, the Western countries’ military upsurge is likely to trigger new 

flows of migrants, movements of organised criminal groups and drugs and illegal arms trafficking 

across the southern Libyan border. From this perspective, overlooking the situation in the South of 

Libya will contribute to further damaging the security and stability of the Libyan state, with 

potentially disastrous consequences in the EU’s immediate neighborhood. It is important to note 

that the limited mandate (border management), scope (North of the country), ambition (small- 

20 «EU prepares support to border management in Libya », Press Release Presse 37, Council of the European Union, 31 

January 2013, available at : http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135129.pdf 


scale mission) of EUBAM Libya has to be apprehended in the light of the major divisions within 

the EU and amongst Member States that the 2011 Libyan crisis brought in its wake. One must 

bear in mind that the EU underwent an internal crisis which analysts have compared to the one 

caused by the war in Iraq in 2003. This has extended to the setting up of EUFOR Libya, whose 

flaws and failure have already been mentioned. Therefore, a CSDP mission or operation in Libya 

appeared as necessary for the EU to rebuild its legitimacy as an actor with the capacity to 

handle international crises through CSDP. EUBAM Libya was, thus, a long-awaited CSDP mission. 

With high stakes looming over the mission and despite its limited mandate, EUBAM has already 

stricken an early success in managing to bring together EU Member States on the issue mutually 

beneficial issue of border management. 

Conclusions 

Redressing the situation at the Libyan borders is a necessary priority for the country’s 

integrity and stability. Yet, as aforementioned, the efficiency of EUBAM Libya will be significantly 

limited by its narrow geographical scope. In addition, in the absence of appropriate upstream 

work aiming to strengthen the central government and its institutions, it will remain an insufficient 

isolated act overlooking many of the problems faced by the country. From a security 

perspective, border management needs to be accompanied by clear and decisive actions in 

the fields of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform 

(SSR), as was constantly asserted by several analysts. As highlighted by MEP Ana Gomes, “the 

CSDP mission to assist on building capacity for border security (…) is far too little, too late (…) the 

EU must assist Libya in facing the challenges of DDR, which must proceed in parallel with SSR, 

that implies going well beyond the border security assistance”. 21 In this context, one can 

legitimately wonder why the EU did not set up a mission aimed at tackling these issues under the 

CSDP, which is, after all, one of its domains of predilection. DDR and SSR are naturally part of the 

EU’s response to the situation in Libya, but they have taken the form of programmes which are to 

be implemented and followed up by the EU Delegation in Tripoli. 

21 MEP Ana Gomes, « Report on my latest visit to Tripoli, Libya », 19 to 22 April 2013, available at: 

http://www.anagomes.eu/PublicDocs/8fe01d66-2369-4d8f-ad66-895caa1a834b.pdf 


The challenges are, thus, significant for the newly appointed Head of EU Delegation to 

Libya, Ms. Nataliya Apostolova 22 . Having faced a series of internal changes and restructurings, 

the EU Delegation in Tripoli had remained without a Head of Delegation over the past few 

months. 23 The Delegation runs the risk of being rapidly overwhelmed by the range of 

programmes to implement and of funds to administer, against a background of a complex 

security situation and with limited staff and resources. Indeed, it is through the provision of 

financial support directed to programmes in the fields of democratic transition, health, and civil 

society that the EU has partially responded to other challenges ahead of Libya on its way to 

reconstruction. Yet, it has been often claimed that financial backing, without real engagement, 

capacity-building, technical assistance and real-time support of experts on the ground, seldom 

produced tangible results. Financial aid administered through a three persons-strong EU 

Delegation in Tripoli is likely to quite insufficient to achieve the goal of building a democratic, 

stable and prosperous country. 

The stakes are high for the EU, as failure to build long-lasting partnerships with its 

neighbours is not a viable option. The EU has already been losing ground in Libya and in Arab 

Spring states, and it cannot afford internal divisions on the courses to take. If divergences 

appear as regards the urgency of international security and immigration linked to Libya’s porous 

borders, economic issues should also be highlighted as they also justify the resurgence of interest 

of the EU in the Sahel. As major powers, including European countries, are seeking to consolidate 

their economic positions in this region full of raw of materials (oil, gold, uranium…), the EU should 

ensure the consolidation of its own position and role in the long-run. 

by Myrto Hatzigeorgopoulos, Programme and Office Manager 

and Lorène Fara-Andrianarijaona, Programme Associate 

ISIS Europe 

Follow us on Twitter, Facebook, or Blog 

Web: www.isis-europe.eu 

22 She was appointed on 21 May 2013, http://enpi-info.eu/medportal/news/latest/33142/Nataliya-Apostolovanomm%C3%A9e-chef-de-la-d%C3%A9l%C3%A9gation-de-l'UE-en-Libye 

23 Interview with EU official, May 2013

European Security Review EUBAM Libya: story of a long-awaited CSDP mission

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