The Dutch Tulip Mania - Maurits van der Veen
The Dutch Tulip Mania - Maurits van der Veen
The Dutch Tulip Mania - Maurits van der Veen
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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong>: <strong>The</strong> Social Politics of a Financial Bubble<br />
Abstract<br />
A. <strong>Maurits</strong> <strong>van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Veen</strong><br />
Assistant Professor<br />
Department of International Affairs<br />
University of Georgia<br />
March 2009<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> tulip mania of 1636-1637 is widely seen as the first recorded instance of a<br />
financial bubble. In recent years, however, economists have argued that prices offered<br />
and paid for tulip bulbs, while extremely high, nevertheless reflected un<strong>der</strong>lying<br />
economic fundamentals. If valid, such claims imply that the tulip mania cannot be<br />
consi<strong>der</strong>ed a true bubble. This paper demonstrates that attempts to rationalize the bubble<br />
in this manner cannot be justified with the available data: the tulip mania really did<br />
produce a bubble. Moreover, the paper presents a model based on social networks and<br />
information cascades that explains the emergence of the bubble as well as its subsequent<br />
collapse. <strong>The</strong> salient feature of the tulip mania was not the astronomical prices that were<br />
paid for bulbs, but instead the remarkably dense and localized social network within<br />
which the tulip market was embedded.<br />
Keywords<br />
<strong>Tulip</strong> mania, financial bubbles, speculation, investment, social networks, Holland
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong>: <strong>The</strong> Social Politics of a Financial Bubble<br />
I shall eliminate…<br />
Those who ran with rabid lust after filthy profit,<br />
And poured so much of their poisoned juice<br />
That they nearly corrupted the real [flower-loving] people<br />
To no longer revere my flowers as they used to<br />
But weigh trash with pounds and bulbs by weight<br />
— Flora [the goddess of flowers], 1637. 1<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> tulip mania of the 1630s has long served as the epitome of the financial<br />
bubble. In his book Irrational Exuberance, Shiller calls it “the most famous bubble of<br />
all.” 2 No asset bubble is too small or too large or its bursting will be compared to the<br />
<strong>Dutch</strong> tulip craze. Indeed, references to tulips have come thick and fast in discussions of<br />
the current financial crisis. <strong>The</strong> Economist refers to “all those overpriced <strong>Dutch</strong> tulips” in<br />
an article examining financial instability, 3 while the New York Times asks: “It can’t<br />
possibly be that in the sophisticated, computerized 21 st century, we find ourselves<br />
experiencing the same kind of financial panic — the same kind of financial insanity,<br />
really — that has dogged mankind at least since the <strong>Dutch</strong> tulip mania of the 1630s. Can<br />
it?” 4<br />
<strong>The</strong> tulip craze has maintained its grip on the public imagination not just as a<br />
reference point in finance, but also as a fascinating episode in itself — witness Dumas’<br />
1 (De Verstoorde, 1637) (<strong>The</strong> angry and not-yet-dead Flora.) All translations are by the author.<br />
2 (Shiller, 2000, p. 177) Similarly, though Kindleberger’s standard work <strong>Mania</strong>s, Panics and Crashes<br />
offers only a very superficial discussion of the mania, he nonetheless lists it as the first of the “big 10<br />
financial bubbles” (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005, p. 8)<br />
3 ("Wild-Animal Spirits," 2009)<br />
4 (Nocera, 2008)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 2<br />
classic novel <strong>The</strong> Black <strong>Tulip</strong> and Moggach’s more recent <strong>Tulip</strong> Fever. 5 In recent years,<br />
however, some authors have called into questions its status as an early example of a<br />
financial bubble. <strong>The</strong>re is some disagreement among economists on the proper definition<br />
of a bubble, but Shiller’s definition — “a situation in which temporarily high prices are<br />
sustained largely by investors’ enthusiasm rather than by consistent estimation of real<br />
value” — appears relatively uncontroversial. 6 <strong>The</strong> controversy lies in its<br />
operationalization: how does one judge whether “consistent estimation of real value” is<br />
taking place? Clearly, high prices do not suffice: the fact that single bulbs sold for more<br />
than the price of a house during the tulip mania appears foolish today, but it may well<br />
reflect the value placed on those bulbs by contemporaries.<br />
Several authors have challenged the tulip mania’s iconic status as a financial bubble.<br />
First, Garber has suggested that the pattern of price changes observed during the tulip<br />
craze matches the pattern one would expect for novel luxury goods in limited but<br />
gradually growing supply. 7 His argument is widely cited but rarely examined closely.<br />
More recently, Thompson has claimed that the dramatic increases in tulip prices during<br />
the winter of 1636-1637 were due to a shift in market instruments from standard futures<br />
contracts to options. 8 If either author is correct, the literature on financial bubbles may be<br />
forced to make do without this popular episode. As I show in this paper, however, both<br />
are wrong.<br />
5 (Moggach, 1999)<br />
6 (Shiller, 2000, p. xii)<br />
7 (Garber, 1989, 2000)<br />
8 (Thompson, 2006)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 3<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> tulip mania undeniably meets Shiller’s definition of a bubble, and as such<br />
deserves to retain its place as an early illustration of “the madness of crowds.” 9 More<br />
importantly, the episode sheds a valuable light on a feature of speculative bubbles often<br />
ignored by market fundamentalists: the impact of social networks and norms. <strong>The</strong> tulip<br />
mania illustrates the ease with which a bubble can emerge within comparatively small<br />
and densely connected social networks. <strong>The</strong> remain<strong>der</strong> of the paper is divided into three<br />
parts. <strong>The</strong> first part briefly presents the key features of the tulip craze. Next I analyze the<br />
available evidence on tulip prices during the mania, which demonstrates that a bubble did<br />
arise, and that claims to the contrary cannot be sustained by the data. <strong>The</strong> third part,<br />
finally, shifts the emphasis to the social context that made the bubble possible, but also<br />
limited its scope and duration.<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> Craze<br />
<strong>Tulip</strong>s arrived in Western Europe from Turkey during the sixteenth century. <strong>The</strong>y<br />
rapidly came to be prized above all other flowers, and the well-to-do were willing to pay<br />
quite extraordinary sums to obtain the latest, most spectacularly colored variety. 10<br />
Particularly prized were tulips with darker colored stripes and “flames” on a lighter<br />
background. Many of the most valuable striations were created, we now know, by a virus.<br />
This was not un<strong>der</strong>stood at the time, however, hampering the systematic development of<br />
new varieties. Moreover, such “flaming” tulips were always a risky investment, since it<br />
9 (Mackay, 1932 [1852])<br />
10 Indeed, a 1614 book of emblems displays a tulip alongside the proverb “A fool and his money are soon<br />
parted” (Visscher, 1614)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 4<br />
was never certain whether their patterns would be as desirable, and valuable, from one<br />
year to the next. 11 To minimize uncertainty, serious tulip collectors contracted to buy and<br />
sell bulbs while they were in bloom, making payment and taking delivery only later, once<br />
the bulbs were lifted from the ground.<br />
<strong>Tulip</strong> prices were high because supplies of the most exciting new varieties were<br />
extremely limited. <strong>The</strong> supply of the most famous tulip of the 1620s, the Semper<br />
Augustus was in the hands of a single owner, who held on to the bulbs as prices offered<br />
rose from 1000 gulden per bulb in 1623 to 3000 gulden per bulb in 1625. 12 When a<br />
Semper Augustus bulb was finally sold some time later, the owner attached the<br />
stipulation that the buyer could sell neither the bulb itself, nor any of its offsets — small<br />
bulbs that develop on the outside of the main bulb — without permission of the original<br />
seller. 13 <strong>The</strong> problematic combination of uncertainty about the quality of a bulb’s next<br />
flower and mostly informal inevitably resulted in some failed transactions. Indeed, most<br />
of our reliable knowledge about tulip prices during this period <strong>der</strong>ives from such<br />
transactions, since the disappointed party would often approach a notary to file an official<br />
complaint. Records of these complaints are still kept in the city archives of many cities in<br />
Holland, whereas almost no original transaction records remain. <strong>The</strong> first of these<br />
complaints show up in the city archives as early as 1611. 14<br />
11 (Roman, 1637b, p. 22)<br />
12 (Krelage, 1942a, pp. 31-33; <strong>van</strong> Wassenaer, 1625) <strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> currency at the time was the gulden,<br />
often translated as guil<strong>der</strong>. <strong>The</strong> annual earnings of a skilled artisan such as a carpenter around 1630<br />
were about 300 gulden (Goldgar, 2007, p. 225) At 3000 gulden, the Semper Augustus was valued at<br />
about 10 times the annual income of someone in the lower middle class.<br />
13 (Roman, 1637a, pp. 18-19)<br />
14 (Posthumus, 1927, pp. 11-13)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 5<br />
<strong>The</strong> number of different varieties of tulips increased very rapidly during the 1620s<br />
and 1630s — far too rapidly for any consistent naming scheme to evolve. 15 Some names<br />
were descriptive, but many signaled high quality and the bulb’s original owner or town.<br />
Thus we find many tulips whose name begins with Admirael or Generael, applying<br />
military ranks to signify the fine quality of the bulb. Admirael <strong>van</strong> Enckhuysen was a<br />
bulb originally grown in the town of Enkhuizen, while the tulip grower Van <strong>der</strong> Eijck<br />
was the original owner of the first Generael <strong>van</strong> <strong>der</strong> Eijck bulb. 16 Despite the large<br />
number of varieties, supply remained quite limited, as new bulbs needed to grow for a<br />
number of years before they bloomed for the first time. Though there were dozens of<br />
highly prized varieties, the total supply for any given variety was frequently only a<br />
handful of bulbs, property of an even smaller number of growers.<br />
Until the early 1630s, the market for tulips was composed almost entirely of<br />
aficionados trading amongst themselves. <strong>The</strong>se were mostly wealthy merchants whose<br />
financial fortunes would not be negatively affected by the occasional disappointing<br />
purchase of a bulb that turned out to be less fine than expected. Moreover, as bulb lovers<br />
they also had a thorough knowledge of tulip growing and of the characteristics of<br />
different varieties. Most importantly, since transactions took place during the time when<br />
bulbs were in bloom, the quality of the flowers could be assessed. By 1634, however,<br />
15 By the peak of the mania in early 1637 about 500 different varieties had been developed in Holland.<br />
Few of these same varieties still exist today, but we have contemporary pictures of about 80% of them<br />
(Krelage, 1942a, p. 59)<br />
16 (Krelage, 1942a, pp. 35-38; see also Roman, 1637a, p. 16) Inevitably, name inflation occurred: one of<br />
the most famous varieties during the tulip craze was the Gouda bulb, named for the <strong>Dutch</strong> town.<br />
However, its original name was actually Generael <strong>der</strong> Generaelen <strong>van</strong> Gouda, i.e. “general of<br />
generals.”
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 6<br />
sales had begun to take place throughout the year. 17 A futures market developed shortly<br />
thereafter: people began to sell bulbs for which they had signed a contract but which they<br />
did not yet have in their possession. 18 This permitted tra<strong>der</strong>s to make a profit without ever<br />
having to plant a bulb of their own. Not surprisingly, it took little time for speculators to<br />
enter the market.<br />
A number of factors served as catalysts for speculation. First, <strong>Dutch</strong> commerce in<br />
general was flourishing during this period, creating new wealth not only at the elite levels<br />
but also among an increasingly prominent middle class. 19 Second, the large profits<br />
generated by the East Indian trade — as well as speculation in the shares of the <strong>Dutch</strong><br />
East India Company (VOC) — generated not only high incomes, but also a level of<br />
comfort with risky futures contracts. 20 Third, no guild controlled the tulip trade, so<br />
barriers to entry were comparatively low. 21 Finally, it has been suggested that the free<br />
coinage policy of the Bank of Amsterdam may have attracted additional money to<br />
Holland. 22<br />
One additional contributing factor deserves separate mention: the plague which<br />
ravaged Holland in 1635-1636. Amsterdam lost about 20% of its inhabitants over two<br />
17 (Velius, 1648)<br />
18 (Goldgar, 2007, pp. 206-207)<br />
19 Indeed, a near-contemporary account characterizes the tulip craze as a “remarkable example”<br />
(verwon<strong>der</strong>enswaardig exempel) of the growth in wealth and mass participation associated with<br />
commerce (Aitzema, 1669-1672, p. 2:503)<br />
20 Indeed, the <strong>Dutch</strong> appear to have had an appetite for risk in general. Goldgar cites numerous examples<br />
of contracts for the purchase or sale of bulbs that include side bets on the outcome of military<br />
campaigns, or the survival of parties to the contract (Goldgar, 2007, pp. 219-221)<br />
21 (Schama, 1988, p. 350)<br />
22 (French, 2006)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 7<br />
years. Haarlem, one of the centers of the bulb trade, lost more than 20% in 1635 alone. 23<br />
In fact, several contemporary authors drew a causal link from the tulip craze to the<br />
plague. <strong>The</strong> title of one pamphlet says it all: New Year’s Plague Mirror in which is on<br />
display God’s Just Plague-Punishment, for the attention of the well-to-do Netherlan<strong>der</strong>s<br />
in this bold, rotten Century. <strong>The</strong> implication was that God was punishing the bulb<br />
speculators for their limitless greed. 24 Recent writers reverse the causal arrow: the ever-<br />
present threat of a rapid death may well have inclined people towards taking greater<br />
risks. 25<br />
As prices began to rise and new, less knowledgeable tra<strong>der</strong>s entered the market, three<br />
new types of deals were introduced. First, transactions began to make explicit reference<br />
to a bulb’s weight. <strong>The</strong> first recorded disputes to mention bulb weights concerned<br />
contracts signed in the late summer of 1635. 26 Bulb weights were expressed in “azen”,<br />
with one “aas” equivalent to about 0.05 grams. Next, a lively trade developed in the<br />
offsets of bulbs. For example, buyers would offer a certain price per aas for the largest<br />
offset of a particular bulb. <strong>The</strong> total payment would be determined when the bulb was<br />
dug up and its offsets examined and weighed. 27 Finally, bulbs began to be sold in bulk,<br />
by weight. <strong>The</strong> archives record many deals for 1000 azen of a particular variety —<br />
23 (Noordegraaf & Valk, 1996, p. 54)<br />
24 <strong>The</strong> title in <strong>Dutch</strong> is: Nieu-Iaers Pest-Spiegel waer in te sien is de Rechtveerdighe Pest-straffe Gods<br />
voorghestelt tot opmerck <strong>der</strong> weeldige Ne<strong>der</strong>-Lan<strong>der</strong>s in dese snoode bedurven Eeuwe. <strong>The</strong> pamphlet,<br />
originally published in Haarlem, was sufficiently popular to be reprinted almost immediately in<br />
neighbouring towns (<strong>The</strong>uniszoon <strong>van</strong> <strong>der</strong> Lust, 1637).<br />
25 (E.g. Garber, 2000, pp. 37-38; Goldgar, 2007, pp. 254-260)<br />
26 (Posthumus, 1927, p. 17)<br />
27 (Posthumus, 1927, pp. 23, 29, 32)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 8<br />
usually about 3-6 bulbs. Lesser-valued cultivars could also be traded by the pound,<br />
roughly 30-60 bulbs.<br />
This last innovation in particular fueled the speculative bubble. As the epigram<br />
opening the paper indicates, contemporary observers recognized this too, and many<br />
looked askance (partially out of envy) at those who traded primarily in so-called ‘pound<br />
goods.’ Earlier contracts had always been linked to specific bulbs. However, a contract<br />
for 1000 azen Gouda, for example, could be filled with any set of Gouda bulbs the seller<br />
chose. With the link to specific bulbs severed, it became possible to engage in<br />
transactions in which neither party had any idea about the eventual source of the bulbs.<br />
Moreover, no real knowledge of either tulips or their bulbs was required, only a sense of<br />
the going rate per aas for a particular tulip variety. Where prices had risen gradually but<br />
steadily over the preceding years, the rise accelerated once these bulk contracts were<br />
introduced into the market. Single-bulb prices appreciated faster too, but prices rose<br />
fastest on the bulk contracts.<br />
<strong>The</strong> elimination of the need to have one’s own bulb garden or even to be a<br />
connoisseur of tulips, combined with the lure of quick and easy profits, drew new<br />
entrants into the tulip market in growing numbers beginning in the fall of 1635. As new<br />
entrants multiplied, transactions increasingly moved from the gardens and drawing rooms<br />
of the most active collectors to regular, organized venues, usually at local inns. A system<br />
of ‘colleges’ soon developed across the main towns of Holland. <strong>The</strong>se colleges,<br />
composed of a core of regular tra<strong>der</strong>s, met at a specific inn two or three times per week,<br />
usually in the evening (most tra<strong>der</strong>s held on to their day jobs). Outsi<strong>der</strong>s were welcome,<br />
but needed to be introduced first. Most deals took places with the mediation of one or two
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 9<br />
“neutral” observers, and all sales were sealed with the payment of a small surcharge<br />
called the “wijnkoop” (wine purchase/fee) of about 2.5%. <strong>The</strong>se funds were spent<br />
immediately by the members of the college in attendance, on food, drink and tobacco,<br />
thus lubricating the deal-making. Wijnkoop monies also paid for lamps and a fire, as well<br />
as tips for the serving girls. Even the poor were not forgotten, and some alms were set<br />
aside. 28 Prominent tulip collectors and growers regularly attended these colleges, and<br />
some of the more successful tra<strong>der</strong>s in the colleges developed ties to a number of<br />
collectors, further tightening the social networks within which all were embedded. 29<br />
<strong>The</strong> real speculative bubble did not last very long. Prices began to rise faster once the<br />
bulbs had been planted in October 1636. Bulk contracts became increasingly common by<br />
December 1636, giving the market a final boost. Peak prices were paid during the last<br />
few days of January and first few days of February 1637. From the beginning of this<br />
three-month period to the end, some individual bulbs were sold as many as 5-10 times,<br />
and increased more than ten-fold in price, while bulk quantities of cheaper goods<br />
increased as much as twenty-fold. A contemporary account notes that even varieties for<br />
which there had been no demand previously because they were too common or plain now<br />
were sold for large sums. 30 Although disquiet about skyrocketing prices had been<br />
building, the end still arrived suddenly and unexpectedly, with plummeting prices for<br />
some of the most common pound goods in Haarlem on February 3rd. A public auction of<br />
28 (Roman, 1637b, p. 5)<br />
29 (Goldgar, 2007)<br />
30 (Roman, 1637b, p. 24)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 10<br />
choice bulbs in Alkmaar on February 5th garnered peak prices, 31 but this was merely a<br />
last hurrah. 32 By February 7th, it had become clear throughout the main trading centers<br />
that the market had crashed. I discuss the crisis and its resolution in more detail below.<br />
First however, we need to establish that a bubble indeed took place, by taking a closer<br />
look at the available data on bulb prices.<br />
Data on <strong>Tulip</strong> Prices<br />
Most tulip contracts were informal, and many were probably not even written down.<br />
Those that were committed to paper were generally torn up once completed. Moreover,<br />
there were no regular newspapers to cover the crisis as it unfolded: weekly newspapers<br />
only emerged in most Holland towns in the 1660s. However, the tulip bubble fascinated<br />
contemporary observers, who produced a wealth of — mostly critical — pamphlets,<br />
which accordingly constitute one of the main sources of empirical data on tulip prices. 33<br />
Unfortunately, contemporary historiographers relied almost exclusively on these<br />
pamphlets, even where access to the principals and other original documents would have<br />
been feasible. 34 Pamphlet authors were usually more interested in criticizing — or , in a<br />
few case, defending — the bulb trade than in explaining it. As a result, most of the useful<br />
31 (Lijste <strong>van</strong> Eenighe Tulpaen, 1637)<br />
32 Though distances between Holland towns were not great, people did not travel frequently. As noted,<br />
most bulb tra<strong>der</strong>s had other professions and traveling did take time away from their other pursuits. As a<br />
result, the peak did not occur on the same day all across Holland (Krelage, 1942a, pp. 50-51)<br />
33 (Krelage, 1942b; Posthumus, 1926)<br />
34 (E.g. Aitzema, 1669-1672, p. 2313)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 11<br />
specific information about the tulip mania we have today is drawn from a series of just<br />
three pamphlets.<br />
<strong>The</strong>se pamphlets were published — and likely written —by Adriaen Roman in<br />
Haarlem, between February and May 1637. 35 Each is presented in the form of a dialogue<br />
between two main characters, Gaergoedt (GreedyGoods) and Waermondt (Truemouth).<br />
Gaergoedt is a well-to-do weaver who has been active as a bulb tra<strong>der</strong>, and who<br />
un<strong>der</strong>takes to educate Waermondt about the tulip market, in or<strong>der</strong> to explain and defend<br />
his actions. Waermondt, in response, offers moralistic tales intended to highlight the folly<br />
of various aspects of the tulip mania. One of the most valuable features of these dialogues<br />
is that they reproduce sample bulb sale contracts as well as data on the prices fetched for<br />
particular bulbs near the beginning and towards the end of the bubble. <strong>The</strong>re is little firm<br />
corroboration for the data provided in these dialogues, and they can be shown to contain<br />
some errors. Accordingly, no single price or weight can be consi<strong>der</strong>ed entirely reliable.<br />
Nevertheless, there is no reason to suspect any systematic distortion of the price<br />
information, and most students of the tulip mania have accepted it as valid. 36<br />
Similar problems hamper the use of the sole other source of price data: complaints<br />
and legal cases whose records survive in town archives. Few students of the tulip craze<br />
have consulted these archives themselves: the only recent exceptions I am aware of are<br />
35 (Roman, 1637a, 1637b, 1637c)<br />
36 <strong>The</strong> dialogues are fictional, and their publisher/author does not pretend otherwise, which might lead us<br />
to suspect all of the reported prices. Moreover, they have an agenda, which is to highlight the folly of<br />
the tulip mania. However, no contemporary pamphlet authors challenged the data provided in these<br />
dialogues, and some of the prices listed in the dialogues match those printed in a broadside reporting<br />
the results of the Alkmaar auction of 5 Feb. 1637, at which some of the highest prices for any bulbs<br />
were recorded (Lijste <strong>van</strong> Eenighe Tulpaen, 1637). Still, some of the prices in the dialogues are faulty<br />
transcriptions from the Alkmaar auction. For example, example, a bulb of 171 azen that sold for 173<br />
gulden is listed in the dialogue as weighing just 71 azen but selling for 175 gulden.
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 12<br />
Dash and Goldgar. 37 Instead, most rely on the collection of transcriptions published<br />
during the 1920s and 1930s by Posthumus. 38 Unfortunately, Goldgar has found<br />
Posthumus’ transcriptions to be “extremely sloppy” and riddled with errors. 39 In other<br />
words, no single piece of evidence is completely reliable here either. All in all, the<br />
available price evidence is both thin and somewhat uncertain. We have about 400 price<br />
points, the vast majority of which refer to peak prices only. About 65 data points provide<br />
pre-peak prices, from before late January 1637. Of these, about 50 concern the three<br />
month-period of the bubble from November through January. <strong>The</strong>se 50 observations<br />
reference 30 different varieties of tulips. On the far side of the peak, we have data on only<br />
about 5 transactions for the remain<strong>der</strong> of 1637 and the first part of 1638. We do,<br />
however, have a few general statements in the third dialogue about the drastic drop in<br />
value after the crash.<br />
Writers on the tulip mania have adopted different strategies to overcome the difficulty<br />
of drawing solid conclusions based on such limited data. <strong>The</strong> simplest tactic is to rely<br />
heavily on the hyperbole found in the pamphlets. For example, the post-script to the first<br />
dialogue between Gaergoedt and Waermondt claims that “some goods ran so high that<br />
one or two guldens became one hundred, sometimes more.” 40 If true, this would be strong<br />
evidence for a bubble. However, the prices listed in the dialogues — which are explicitly<br />
intended to illustrate the dramatic nature of the price increases observed — do not<br />
37 (Dash, 1999; Goldgar, 2007)<br />
38 (Posthumus, 1927, 1934)<br />
39 (Goldgar, 2007, pp. 328-329, fn. 329)<br />
40 (Roman, 1637b, p. 23)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 13<br />
support this claim, and only the most superficial treatments of the tulip mania take it<br />
seriously.<br />
A more promising approach is to interpolate based on the available data, as Garber<br />
does. 41 Garber generates 16 charts showing the price evolution of different tulip varieties<br />
by connecting observations in a straight line. However, each chart has only a few data<br />
points: three of them have only an initial and a final price. While the charts demonstrate<br />
that prices rose a lot, they cannot be used to draw any conclusions about the price<br />
trajectory between the individual observations. Simply imposing a straight line<br />
contradicts all contemporary accounts, which indicate a gradual increase at first, with a<br />
far steeper slope near the end of the bubble.<br />
Garber’s data on the other side of the peak suffer the same flaw. As noted earlier, we<br />
have very little data from the period immediately following the bubble. Garber, therefore,<br />
is forced to rely on prices from a sale in 1642/43. All one can do with such data is<br />
calculate average annual depreciation; they say nothing about the actual shape of the<br />
price curve. Nevertheless, Garber concludes that “the crash of February 1637 for rare<br />
bulbs was not of extraordinary magnitude” simply by assuming a linear price decline for<br />
the period between the end of the crash and 1642. 42 However, if we trust the peak price<br />
data offered in the dialogues — as Garber does — we must also take seriously the<br />
evidence they provide on the values of bulbs after the crash. Gaergoedt notes that it is<br />
hard to estimate price levels “since there is no demand for bulbs; everybody is silent.”<br />
Nevertheless, he records that a garden filled with common varieties of tulips brought only<br />
41 (Garber, 1989, 2000)<br />
42 (Garber, 2000, p. 70)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 14<br />
about one hundredth of the price it might have fetched at the peak. More importantly for<br />
our purposes, a sale of several individual bulbs only fetched about 22 gulden each,<br />
whereas Gaergoedt suggests they might have been worth 400 gulden at their peak. 43 This<br />
implies that prices of individual bulbs fell by as much as 95% within a few months,<br />
invalidating Garber’s assumption of a steady, linear drop in prices over the course of the<br />
six subsequent years. Garber does acknowledge the price surge and decline in the more<br />
common bulbs, sold in bulk, but waves away the problem by blaming it on the lack of<br />
regulation of contracts within the colleges. 44 I address this argument in more detail<br />
below.<br />
Interpolating from one observation to the next would be less problematic if we had<br />
more data points, with less time elapsing from one to the next. This might be possible if<br />
we could generate an index of relative prices that permits comparisons across different<br />
tulip varieties. Thompson’s argument about the price developments in the tulip market<br />
relies on the validity of such an index. 45 However, Thompson fails to address some fatal<br />
problems with this approach. First, an index must be based on price observations taken at<br />
the same point in time, but Thompson <strong>der</strong>ives his baseline from a book of tulip paintings<br />
for which neither the source nor the date of the prices listed are known. 46 Second, not all<br />
bulb sales are directly comparable. Transactions may involve offsets, bulbs, or bulbs in<br />
43 (Roman, 1637a, p. 12). Among these latter bulbs was a Gheel ende Root <strong>van</strong> Leyden. At the height of<br />
the bubble, a large bulb of this variety was sold for 550 gulden, so an estimated value of 400 gulden for<br />
a single bulb is not unreasonable (Lijste <strong>van</strong> Eenighe Tulpaen, 1637)<br />
44 (Garber, 2000, p. 81)<br />
45 (Thompson, 2006)<br />
46 A number of the prices <strong>der</strong>ive from the February 5th auction, but most do not. <strong>The</strong> book has been<br />
digitized and can be seen at http://library.wur.nl/tulips/blauw_content.html (accessed 15 February<br />
2009).
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 15<br />
bulk; the value per aas is not the same across these three transaction types, with bulk<br />
goods worth the least and offsets the most. Nor does the value of a bulb increase linearly<br />
with its weight. 47 <strong>The</strong> third problem, fatal all by itself, is that an index can only be used to<br />
compare prices for different varieties at different points in time if we assume, against all<br />
the available evidence, that the shape of the price curve over time is identical for every<br />
tulip variety, so that relative prices remain constant. 48<br />
In sum, neither Garber’s nor Thompson’s attempts to explain away the tulip bubble<br />
can be sustained by the available data. Arguing that price fluctuations did not exceed<br />
those supported by market fundamentals, as Garber does, requires ignoring key points of<br />
evidence from the post-crash period, as well as assuming that prices increased and<br />
decreased linearly prior to and after the peak, an assumption contradicted by every<br />
contemporary account. Making more precise claims about the timing of particular aspects<br />
of the bubble, as Thompson does, requires ignoring the problems inherent in aggregating<br />
price information for bulbs of different weights and varieties at different points in time,<br />
as well as placing complete faith in the accuracy of each individual price observation.<br />
Though the data are limited, they quite clearly indicate a rapid rise in prices, accelerating<br />
through December 1636 and January 1637, followed by a steep and sudden decline after<br />
the first week of February. Contemporary pamphlets unanimously support this picture.<br />
47 <strong>The</strong> results of the February 5th auction suggest that a doubling in weight is associated with a ≈50%<br />
increase in price. Garber ignores this problem too (Garber, 2000, p. ch. 8)<br />
48 To give just one example, the Gouda had doubled in price before the Oudenaerde began increasing<br />
rapidly in price, while the Switser did not really start gaining in value until three weeks later still. If we<br />
have only one pre-peak price for a bulb, there is no way to know where on its price curve to locate it —<br />
has it already gained most of its value, or is the steepest rise still to come? Relative prices across<br />
different bulbs changed day by day.
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 16<br />
Social and Informational Features of the Bubble<br />
How, then, can we explain this bubble? In this section, I argue that the key to the<br />
explanation lies in the dense social networks and strong social norms within which<br />
commerce in Holland was embedded at the time. Efficient market models — of the kind<br />
proposed by both Garber and Thompson — assume that those who bought and sold rare<br />
and bulk bulbs used their own private knowledge about the fundamental supply of and<br />
demand for various bulbs. Prices might rise while increases in fundamental (non-<br />
speculative) demand exceeded increases in supply, but they would be kept un<strong>der</strong> control.<br />
Bulb tra<strong>der</strong>s would begin selling once prices threatened to deviate from un<strong>der</strong>lying<br />
fundamentals. As we have seen, however, in the winter of 1636/37 people behaved<br />
differently. Still, the bubble did not develop because the tra<strong>der</strong>s’ private knowledge about<br />
the actual supply of particular bulbs was faulty. As we shall see, the market was quite<br />
localized, and those active in the trade were familiar with the gardens where the tulips<br />
were planted and with the tulips themselves.<br />
<strong>The</strong> key factor, instead, was the social connectedness among tulip tra<strong>der</strong>s, who were<br />
linked to one another by religion, by marriage, by trade, etc. As a result, market<br />
participants assigned a greater weight to the decisions of other tra<strong>der</strong>s than they would<br />
have if they had interacted only through the arms-length transactions of the market. 49<br />
Aggregated across the entire market, these decisions came to outweigh the influence of<br />
private knowledge, setting the bubble in motion. <strong>The</strong> tulip bubble thus emerged as the<br />
49 (Cf. Uzzi, 1999)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 17<br />
result of an information cascade. 50 <strong>The</strong> basic insight associated with such cascades is<br />
individuals may rationally ignore their own private information and be guided by the<br />
decisions of others. Applied to markets this means that people may rationally ignore their<br />
own knowledge about the demand for or supply of a particular good. Crucially, this also<br />
implies that lack of knowledge need not be an impediment to a rational actor’s entrance<br />
into a market.<br />
In an elegant application of an information transmission model to investment bubbles,<br />
Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong show how a bubble can emerge in a situation where<br />
technological innovation has ren<strong>der</strong>ed the knowledge of some advisors much less<br />
valuable. 51 Those advisors who do un<strong>der</strong>stand the innovation have an incentive to signal<br />
their type by inflating their forecasts so as to stand out from those whose advice is now<br />
less valuable. If there are many naïve investors who accept any forecast at face value, a<br />
bubble readily emerges. <strong>The</strong> mechanism I propose here is similar in many respects. <strong>The</strong><br />
crucial difference is that investors and advisors are not separate groups. This changes<br />
some of the basic dynamics and makes the social connections among the actors rather<br />
more significant.<br />
In his earlier work on the science of social networks, Watts suggests that a densely<br />
connected network may be resistant to information cascades, since “the more people<br />
whose actions or opinions you take into account before making a decision, the less<br />
influence any one of them will have.” 52 <strong>The</strong> idea is that all individuals are “locally stable”<br />
50 (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992)<br />
51 (Hong, Scheinkman, & Xiong, 2008; cf. Nairn, 2002)<br />
52 (Watts, 2003, p. 240)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 18<br />
and hence no shock, however large, to a single node in the network is likely to result in<br />
any kind of cascade. However, that conclusion only applies if all members of the network<br />
can be observed at once. If members of the network act in small groups, the potential<br />
stabilizing influence of the rest of the network largely disappears. In fact, in subsequent<br />
research, Watts has found that cascades are made possible by “the presence… of a critical<br />
mass of easily influenced people, each of whom adopts… after being exposed to a single<br />
adopting neighbor.” 53 As we shall see, the tulip bubble contains features of both of these<br />
scenarios. <strong>The</strong> overall connectedness of the social network actually made things less,<br />
rather than more, stable; and a small-group setting made it unnecessary for people to be<br />
so naïve that exposure to just a single neighbor drove their decisions.<br />
<strong>The</strong> social logic behind the tulip bubble can be illustrated by way of analogy to the art<br />
auction market. Art dealer X, who has bought and sold art at major auctions for years,<br />
will know most of the other active art dealers — especially the local ones — and will<br />
have come to trust their knowledge and judgment. Imagine that a piece of art outside X’s<br />
area of expertise has caught her eye. She would like to acquire it, but does not wish to<br />
pay more than the work is worth. Three possible strategies readily suggest themselves: 1)<br />
research the value of the piece, thus acquiring sufficient private knowledge to judge<br />
value; 2) see how much her colleagues have recently bid on comparable pieces; and 3)<br />
simply outbid any of her colleagues whose judgment she trusts, but stop bidding if an<br />
unknown person drives up the bid further. No strategy can eliminate all uncertainty: no<br />
two pieces of art are exactly alike, and even art experts are not always sure how much a<br />
work of art might fetch on the open market. Hence, strategy 1 may not be worth pursuing,<br />
53 (Watts, 2007)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 19<br />
since it is not guaranteed to repay the consi<strong>der</strong>able costs involved in acquiring sufficient<br />
knowledge, especially compared to the far more modest costs associated with strategies 2<br />
or 3. This implies that the adoption of strategies 2 or 3 may be rational, even if X<br />
recognizes that these strategies are far riskier.<br />
<strong>The</strong> risk associated with strategy 3 is the most obvious. If art buyers X and Y each<br />
trust the knowledge and judgment of the other, they may end up in a bidding contest well<br />
beyond the “fundamental” value of the piece, up to a point where the price reaches a level<br />
that even the imperfect knowledge of either X or Y tells her that it is not worth that much.<br />
At this point, she will stop bidding, leaving the other to pay far too much. <strong>The</strong> risks with<br />
strategy 2 are less obvious but no less severe. <strong>The</strong> strategy will work well if bids made in<br />
the recent past on similar pieces by other dealers were based on private knowledge, i.e.<br />
on strategy 1. However, if they were based on strategies 2 or 3, the actions of X will<br />
simply reinforce the misvaluation, and help generate an information cascade. It is easy to<br />
see how the social context — art dealers who know and trust one another — makes such<br />
outcomes far more likely than if nobody trusted the knowledge and judgment of her<br />
colleagues. After all, the less one’s confidence in one’s fellow dealers, the greater is the<br />
incentive to acquire adequate private knowledge.<br />
Now imagine novice art dealers X1 through Xn who, one after the other, decide to get<br />
involved in the market, attracted by the lure of easy money, or because their disposable<br />
incomes has risen consi<strong>der</strong>ably in recent times. <strong>The</strong>y can begin purchasing art most easily<br />
by adopting strategies 2 and 3 exclusively. However, doing so reduces the fraction of the<br />
auction participants with private knowledge. As a result, for each successive<br />
collector/dealer that enters the market in this manner, there is a smaller likelihood that a
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 20<br />
randomly chosen auction participant has valuable private knowledge. Nevertheless, it<br />
may continue to be rational for each new entrant not to invest resources in acquiring<br />
private knowledge. Finally, the rising prices that result from such an information cascade<br />
will attract additional works of art to the auction house. This further reduces the<br />
comparative value of the private information of dealers who have been active longer,<br />
because their knowledge of the total supply will be less complete.<br />
Translating this basic model to the <strong>Dutch</strong> tulip mania is relatively straightforward. In<br />
what follows, I first characterize the market by discussing the supply of bulbs, the nature<br />
of tulip sale contracts and the community of tulip tra<strong>der</strong>s. Next I apply the basic logic<br />
presented in the preceding paragraphs to the case of the tulip bubble. I show that the<br />
bubble logically emerged from a combination of two factors: an innovation in the market<br />
— bulbs sold in bulb, by total weight — and the entry of new tra<strong>der</strong>s embedded<br />
alongside existing bulb lovers in a densely connected social network. A brief discussion<br />
of the aftermath of the bubble un<strong>der</strong>scores the key role played by these two factors. As<br />
noted earlier, a number of facilitating factors were undeniably present: the <strong>Dutch</strong> were<br />
comfortable with speculation, the plague may have made them more risk-acceptant, tulip<br />
trading was rarely the sole source of income for the participants, and no guild existed to<br />
impose strict regulations and penalties. But without the tight social network<br />
encompassing all tra<strong>der</strong>s and the introduction of a new type of bulb contracts, we would<br />
not have seen a bubble.<br />
<strong>The</strong> supply of bulbs was comparatively fixed; it increased through the growth of<br />
offsets, but these took several years to become full-grown bulbs capable of flowering and<br />
creating their own offsets. With the newest varieties often in greatest demand, growers in
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 21<br />
possession of such bulbs could be fairly certain of controlling the market for a few years.<br />
<strong>The</strong> rapid expansion of the professional and merchant class within the towns of Holland<br />
meant that demand easily kept pace with the development of new varieties. With demand<br />
growing faster than supply, as it did starting in the early 1630s, it is no surprise that<br />
prices rose, or that a market emerged for lower-quality bulbs too. Not surprisingly, rising<br />
prices attracted others to the market, and made existing bulb tra<strong>der</strong>s more enthusiastic.<br />
Eventually, however, supply was bound to outstrip demand: the bulb supply could<br />
grow faster than did that of wealthy burghers, and there was a limit to the number of<br />
recognizably different varieties that could be developed. Prices would, therefore<br />
inevitably fall in the medium term. This, in essence, is the story told by Garber, and it<br />
adequately explains both the rise in prices up to the summer of 1636 and the gradual<br />
decline that appears to have set in once the crash had been sorted out by the late summer<br />
of 1637. As we have seen, however, it cannot account for the dramatic increase in the<br />
prices not just of the bulk goods, but also of the rarest bulbs, in the fall and winter of<br />
1636-1637. Nor does it explain the crash that followed.<br />
Most tulip sales followed a standard format. Transactions in the colleges were<br />
conducted in a ritualized fashion, with separate procedures for sales and purchases, and<br />
were confirmed with the payment of the “wijnkoop” fee. 54 As Schama notes, “what is<br />
actually striking about the popular-speculative phase of the tulip mania is how quickly it<br />
54 <strong>The</strong> procedures are described in (Roman, 1637c, p. 23) and (Roman, 1637b, pp. 4-5), respectively.<br />
Sales were open to multiple bid<strong>der</strong>s and were done in an auction format, whereas purchases were<br />
conducted as bilateral negotiations in which buyers and sellers tried to find a mutually acceptable<br />
middle ground. Detailed explanations can be found in (Krelage, 1942a, pp. 70-73). In addition to<br />
entering the sale in the college’s ledger, both sides to a transaction often wrote out a small sales note,<br />
or enter the text in their own ledgers. <strong>The</strong> second dialogue between Gaergoedt and Waermondt gives<br />
some examples of the latter (Roman, 1637c, p. 14).
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 22<br />
improvised highly ritualized and formal conventions in which to conduct its trade.” 55 <strong>The</strong><br />
sales agreement provided for simultaneous payment and delivery only at the moment a<br />
bulb was dug up, with the opportunity to verify the flower beforehand. 56 Deals struck<br />
outside the blooming period therefore always involved some features of a futures<br />
transaction. Deals were usually recorded in a ledger, either that of a notary or that of one<br />
of the colleges.<br />
Even with the norms governing the manner of buying and selling, uncertainties<br />
remained: buyers worried about the quality of the bulbs they were buying, while sellers<br />
worried about being paid in full. As a result, contracts themselves were subject to norms<br />
too. A standard, but implicit, feature of sales contracts was that when a bulb turned out to<br />
be of a different variety than promised, the sale was nullified, and the seller did not have<br />
to accept it. 57 To reassure the seller, a system of “borgen” — guarantors of payment —<br />
emerged, in which one or two friends or relatives of the buyer would guarantee payment<br />
if the buyer could not or would not pay. In addition, buyers often explicitly pledged their<br />
assets. A sample contract listed in the second dialogue — and described as being<br />
representative of almost all such contracts — states: “in case of non-payment of the<br />
aforementioned sum, I hereby pledge all my goods, movable and immovable, placing<br />
them un<strong>der</strong> the control of all the laws and courts.” 58 Such language makes it hard to<br />
sustain either Garber’s claim that these deals were the outcome of “a meaningless winter<br />
drinking game” with insufficient “internal control over the nature of contracts” or<br />
55 (Schama, 1988, p. 359)<br />
56 (Cf. Goldgar, 2007, p. 241)<br />
57 (Posthumus, 1927, p. 85)<br />
58 (Roman, 1637c, p. 15)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 23<br />
Thompson’s odd assertion that tra<strong>der</strong>s all intuited in December 1636 that the nature of<br />
tulip contracts had suddenly but fundamentally changed. 59<br />
Though some trading in bulbs took place among towns and even across bor<strong>der</strong>s, there<br />
was virtually no systematic cultivation of bulbs for trade during the tulip mania; most<br />
growers were aficionados working in their own small gardens. 60 Notarized complaints<br />
make clear that the main participants regularly visited the various gardens around town in<br />
which tulips were planted, and hence were quite knowledgeable about the locally<br />
available supply of particular varieties, and even the quality of individual bulbs. 61 <strong>The</strong><br />
picture that emerges is one of mostly local markets within individual towns. Complaints<br />
still on file in the <strong>Dutch</strong> archives reinforce this impression: most recount disputes<br />
between tra<strong>der</strong>s from the same town, who all knew one another quite well.<br />
In addition, the total number of active participants in the tulip market appears to have<br />
been comparatively small, ranging from several dozen in the smaller towns such as<br />
Enkhuizen or Hoorn to several hundred in Haarlem. 62 More than one merchant appears<br />
just once in the archival record, purchasing or selling just a single bulb from or for his<br />
garden, so the number of regular tra<strong>der</strong>s was smaller still. In fact, the first dialogue notes<br />
59 (Garber, 2000, p. 81; Thompson, 2006)<br />
60 (Krelage, 1942a, p. 69). Bulb exports only began to take off in the second half of the seventeenth<br />
century, after the tulip mania had ended. Even then, Krelage notes, only a few growers aimed at the<br />
export market, and quantities were small — most foreign buyers were just interested in a single bulb of<br />
a particular variety (Krelage, 1942a, p. 102; see also Krelage, 1946, pp. 7-8,269-275)<br />
61 (E.g. Posthumus, 1927, p. 16). A contract dispute describes how a Haarlem baker who was interested<br />
in buying a bulb from a local merchant in one college visited another college within town and received<br />
additional information about that same bulb. This indicates just how small and well-informed the<br />
market was (Posthumus, 1927, pp. 27-28)<br />
62 (Goldgar, 2007, p. 137)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 24<br />
that new participants in the colleges attracted immediate notice. 63 Significantly, most of<br />
those active in the tulip trade in a given town were closely connected through several<br />
different networks. Many were related by blood or by marriage, a disproportionate<br />
number were Mennonites, and a consi<strong>der</strong>able number appear to have engaged in mutual<br />
business transactions unrelated to the tulip trade. 64 <strong>The</strong>se close ties further facilitated the<br />
rapid dissemination of information among tra<strong>der</strong>s, but they may also have given new<br />
tra<strong>der</strong>s an inflated sense of the expertise of their peers.<br />
<strong>The</strong> fact that most of the bulb trade was localized, and that it appears not to have<br />
spread much beyond a about a dozen <strong>Dutch</strong> towns, helps explain why the end of the tulip<br />
mania had only a minor impact on the rest of the <strong>Dutch</strong> economy. 65 In fact, though there<br />
is some disagreement among historians about rates of growth in the <strong>Dutch</strong> economy<br />
during this period, nobody seriously suggests that the tulip mania had a sizeable impact<br />
on its fortunes. 66 <strong>The</strong> collapse of the tulip bubble even failed to cause much local<br />
economic dislocation. Almost all tulip tra<strong>der</strong>s had other careers — they were merchants,<br />
successful artisans, or professionals — and most were comparatively wealthy. A few of<br />
the poorer tulip speculators may have faced economic ruin, but most of the active bulb<br />
63 (Roman, 1637b, p. 4)<br />
64 (Goldgar, 2007, pp. 146-149)<br />
65 Claims to the contrary in the literature are largely due to uncritical copying from Mackay’s<br />
sensationalist account, which declares that “the commerce of the country suffered a severe shock, from<br />
which it was many years ere it recovered (Mackay, 1932 [1852], p. 97).”<br />
66 (E.g. de Vries & <strong>van</strong> <strong>der</strong> Woude, 1997, pp. 150-151; Israel, 1995, p. 533)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 25<br />
tra<strong>der</strong>s remained quite prosperous in the late 1630s, despite losing all of their paper<br />
profits from the bubble. 67<br />
<strong>The</strong> tulip market functioned efficiently as long as two conditions were met: the<br />
tra<strong>der</strong>s all knew one another as fellow tulip aficionados, and they all had ample private<br />
information about the market, i.e. about the supply and quality of individual bulbs. As we<br />
have seen, the first of these conditions probably applied until 1635, and the second until<br />
1636. When novice tra<strong>der</strong>s entered the market, it became less stable, because this<br />
produced a drop in the average amount of expertise. Once a number of new tra<strong>der</strong>s had<br />
entered the market, it became increasingly difficult to distinguish those with solid private<br />
knowledge from those who were simply following the crowd. <strong>The</strong> final straw was the<br />
introduction of bulk sales. As noted earlier, these constituted a new kind of trade, no<br />
longer linked to individual bulbs. This meant that the private knowledge of established<br />
bulb lovers was suddenly much less rele<strong>van</strong>t.<br />
Returning to the art auction analogy, it was as though it had become possible to buy<br />
and sell a piece of art to be named later by the seller, and even for the seller to import that<br />
piece from elsewhere. Pamphlets and town records alike suggest that the established tulip<br />
tra<strong>der</strong>s were not initially active in this new trade, implying that prices were determined<br />
almost exclusively by tra<strong>der</strong>s playing strategies 2 and 3 from our art auction example,<br />
with the latter dominant initially. <strong>The</strong> bubble which followed inevitably spread to the rare<br />
bulb trade. After all, the two trades were linked: new tra<strong>der</strong>s were also interested in the<br />
67 (Goldgar, 2007, pp. 166-167, 247-169). Though many accounts of the bubble suggest that people from<br />
all walks of life were involved, these claims appear to <strong>der</strong>ive from some hyperbole in the first dialogue<br />
between Gaergoedt and Waermondt, where the latter claims that “daughters and maids, farmers and<br />
noblemen, even letter carriers… [and] chimney-sweeps” had entered the speculation (Roman, 1637b,<br />
p. 18)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 26<br />
rare bulbs, and rare bulb buyers were not immune to the lure of profits from the faster-<br />
rising prices of bulk sales. Moreover, a number of bulb lovers may have convinced<br />
themselves that they un<strong>der</strong>stood the market better than the latest entrants — that their<br />
private knowledge of individual bulbs had some value in this context too.<br />
In the end, it probably did. Prices could rise consi<strong>der</strong>ably as long as bulb tra<strong>der</strong>s —<br />
new entrants as well as established tulip lovers — continued to play strategies 2 and 3.<br />
Tra<strong>der</strong>s could rationalize rising prices by assuming that all new entrants in the market<br />
wanted bulbs to plant rather than merely for speculation — in other words, that<br />
“fundamental” demand had increased several times over. Moreover, (paper) profits made<br />
from trading bulk goods could be used to bid higher sums for prized individual bulbs. But<br />
there were limits to the price increases one could rationalize for either rare bulbs or bulk<br />
goods. For bulk goods, bulb tra<strong>der</strong>s who had been active for some years knew how long<br />
these varieties had been around, and how easily additional supplies could be found, not<br />
just in Holland, but also abroad. At some point, rising prices in Holland would inevitably<br />
begin to attract tulips from France or Germany.<br />
Most of the rare bulbs, in contrast, were new varieties, for which the supply was<br />
inelastic. Moreover, all established bulb tra<strong>der</strong>s knew who owned those bulbs. Here, the<br />
built-in limit was the price beyond which even the wealthiest merchants would not be<br />
interested in acquiring a bulb. That such a limit existed was clear from the beginning:<br />
even at the height of its desirability, for example, the famous Semper Augustus had never<br />
fetched prices that were beyond the reach of most bulb lovers — they simply did not wish<br />
to own it at all costs. Since private knowledge was more significant in rare bulb trades,<br />
this bubble did not expand as far. In turn, this implied that the bursting of the bubble
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 27<br />
would lead to less of a price collapse. <strong>The</strong> limited price data we have suggest that this is<br />
exactly what happened. Prices for pound goods could rise further because private<br />
knowledge mattered less: there was more uncertainty both about local supplies and about<br />
the price level that would attract imports.<br />
In the end, the bubble reached its limit first for the so-called pound goods. By the end<br />
of 1636 numerous outsi<strong>der</strong>s were already predicting an imminent crash. 68 As January<br />
progressed, and prices rose ever faster, tra<strong>der</strong>s, too, began to fear that prices might be<br />
unsustainable. 69 Moreover, the dense social networks joining all tulip tra<strong>der</strong>s guaranteed<br />
that such fears were common knowledge. Things went sour in Haarlem first, on February<br />
3rd. Waermondt, in the first dialogue, recounts the episode. 70 Members of a college<br />
decided to test market confidence by putting up for sale amongst themselves bulk<br />
quantities of common tulips — Switsers or Croonen. Just one buyer made any bids in<br />
three successive sales, and each of the sellers accepted his offer, even though the sum he<br />
offered was successively 15% below, 25% below, and finally 35% below recent prices<br />
for comparable bulbs. News of this precipitous drop in prices spread like wildfire<br />
throughout town, and the next day trading came to a complete halt, with tra<strong>der</strong>s simply<br />
staring at one another in stunned silence. 71<br />
Still, the bubble had not burst completely, or at least not everywhere. Two days later,<br />
at an auction in Alkmaar — only about 20 miles north of Haarlem — peak prices were<br />
reached for many individual bulbs, as well as for numerous varieties sold in 1000 aas<br />
68 (E.g. <strong>The</strong>uniszoon <strong>van</strong> <strong>der</strong> Lust, 1637)<br />
69 (Krelage, 1942a, p. 80)<br />
70 (Roman, 1637b, p. 17)<br />
71 (Roman, 1637b, p. 17)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 28<br />
quantities. However, that the prices fetched by the pound goods on offer did not appear in<br />
the broadside was published to advertise the auction results. 72 It seems plausible that<br />
these prices had already been affected by collapse of the market in Haarlem. By this<br />
point, moreover, news of the latter had spread to other towns, and bulb tra<strong>der</strong>s<br />
everywhere were girding for the crash. <strong>The</strong> first recorded evidence of a response on the<br />
part of the tra<strong>der</strong>s was a Feb 7 th meeting in Utrecht to decide which representatives to<br />
send to a meeting to be held in Amsterdam on February 23 rd of the trading colleges<br />
throughout Holland.<br />
That Amsterdam meeting included representatives not only from Amsterdam and<br />
Utrecht, but also from Haarlem, Leiden, Delft, Gouda, Alkmaar, Enkhuizen, Medemblik,<br />
Hoorn, and De Streek. 73 In the event, it proved impossible to arrive at a jointly acceptable<br />
solution. <strong>The</strong> final proposal was to honor all contracts signed through November 30,<br />
1636. All those signed December 1 st or later, however, would be canceled if the buyer<br />
announced by March 1637 that he wished to cancel the contract, and paid a buyout fee<br />
(“roucoop,” i.e. regret fee) of 10% of the agreed purchase price. In the latter case, the<br />
seller would retain ownership of the bulbs. 74<br />
Local authorities did not feel bound to sign on to the solution proposed by the<br />
colleges. On March 7, Haarlem officials announced they were inclined to annul all<br />
contracts signed since the bulbs had been planted in September or October. 75 Similarly,<br />
72 (Lijste <strong>van</strong> Eenighe Tulpaen, 1637)<br />
73 <strong>The</strong> tulip colleges of Rotterdam did not send delegates, but announced ahead of time that they would<br />
abide by any solution arrived at during the meeting.<br />
74 (Barckman, 1637)<br />
75 (Posthumus, 1927, p. 51)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 29<br />
the regents of Hoorn instructed their representatives in the States General of Holland to<br />
propose annulling all contracts, to avoid bankrupting buyers who had agreed to high-<br />
priced deals. 76 <strong>The</strong> Alkmaar authorities, on the other hand, recommended on March 14<br />
that all contracts be upheld, and encouraged their deputies the States assembly to<br />
convince the Haarlem representatives to change their mind. 77 By early April, they appear<br />
to have succeeded, as the Haarlem authorities now suggested that contracts agreed to in<br />
the colleges ought to be upheld. 78 Overall, it is clear that local regulation, which had<br />
played no role during the bubble, was not going to have much of an impact on its<br />
resolution either.<br />
Some looked to the provincial authorities for resolution instead. <strong>The</strong> States finally<br />
agreed to address the issue on April 11th. 79 A few days later the Haarlem officials had<br />
changed their mind again, and sent a missive supporting their colleagues from Hoorn in<br />
the effort to have all contracts nullified. <strong>The</strong>y argued that the bulb trade had involved<br />
“purely imaginary value” and hence was noting more than “empty commerce, tending to<br />
divert people and resources from other honest and necessary trades”. Of equal<br />
importance, they emphasized that annulling contracts “would not only preserve many<br />
hundreds of persons of good name and reputation from ruin and scandal”, but also would<br />
not involve anybody outside these circles, thus preserving peace and tranquility. 80 <strong>The</strong><br />
implication that the crisis was both localized and limited is clear.<br />
76 (Posthumus, 1927, p. 52)<br />
77 (Goldgar, 2007, p. 236)<br />
78 (Dash, 1999, p. 182)<br />
79 (Posthumus, 1927, p. 53)<br />
80 (Posthumus, 1927, pp. 57-58)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 30<br />
On April 25th the Court of Holland recommended that the States pursue further<br />
inquiries into to the origin and starting date of the bubble, as well as of the sudden price<br />
collapse. Pending a final decision by the States, all contracts were to remain valid, and<br />
the town authorities were to do their best to mediate and negotiate contract disputes.<br />
Although contracts were to remain in force, the Court recommended a moratorium on any<br />
official enforcement of contracts. Two days later, the States of Holland adopted the<br />
Court’s recommendation verbatim. 81 Numerous towns took the moratorium to mean that<br />
they should not allow their officers to intervene on behalf of one party or another to a<br />
dispute by issuing writs, summons, etc., and passed decrees to this effect. 82<br />
In the absence of government involvement, bulb tra<strong>der</strong>s were forced to resolve<br />
contract disputes amongst themselves, as they had been attempting to do all along. <strong>The</strong><br />
first record of a sales contract canceled by mutual consent dates to February 10th. <strong>The</strong><br />
seller accepted a buy-out payment of 160 gulden for a contract that had been worth 1800<br />
gulden. 83 Many contract disputes were, in fact, settled more or less amicably. Some<br />
contracts already contained buyout clauses, often specifying a penalty payment of 10% of<br />
the purchase price. 84 For those that did not, tra<strong>der</strong>s arrived at their own figures, which<br />
were typically lower. One notary certified that buyout rates ranged from 1-5%, with<br />
plenty of buyers in default refusing to make any payment at all. 85<br />
81 (Posthumus, 1927, pp. 58-60)<br />
82 (Dash, 1999, p. 188; Posthumus, 1927, p. 61)<br />
83 (Posthumus, 1927, pp. 45-46)<br />
84 (Munting, 1696, p. 911)<br />
85 (Posthumus, 1927, pp. 70-71)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 31<br />
Many cases appear to have turned on the principle of honoring contracts, rather than<br />
on the sums involved, which were often quite modest compared to each party’s assets.<br />
What appears to have disturbed those involved in complaints most was the breach of<br />
social norms implied by the refusal to abide by a contract. Here, once again, we see the<br />
importance of the social network within which the tulip traded had been embedded. <strong>The</strong><br />
bursting of the bubble was not much of an economic threat, but it did pose a threat to the<br />
strength of the social network. Since the commercial success of the <strong>Dutch</strong> merchant class<br />
relied heavily on social network ties, such a threat could have serious wi<strong>der</strong> implications.<br />
As Goldgar notes, “the tulip crash struck at the heart of a commercial society that by<br />
necessity relied on reputation and mutual credit.” Moreover, reputation and trust were<br />
particularly important in commercial interactions with high levels of uncertainty — not<br />
just tulips, but also the highly profitable exploitation of the East and West Indies. As a<br />
result, “It was this social anxiety, this sense of not having the measure of others, that was<br />
most frightening for contemporaries.” 86 While broken contracts were nothing new, they<br />
had always been the exception. In the aftermath of the tulip bubble, they briefly became<br />
the rule, and that was deeply disconcerting. 87<br />
Conclusion<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> tulip mania of 1636-1637 clearly qualifies as a bubble, in the sense that<br />
prices were not sustained by private estimations of value. Claims that market<br />
fundamentals explain the observed price patterns cannot be sustained, despite their<br />
86 (Goldgar, 2007, p. 267)<br />
87 (Goldgar, 2007, p. 294; cf. Krelage, 1942a, p. 101)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 32<br />
popularity in recent years. Nor do arguments about inadequate government regulation<br />
offer much explanatory leverage. Authorities remained largely uninvolved in the bubble<br />
— although the States did consi<strong>der</strong> taxing tulip profits in 1636-1637 — and they mostly<br />
refused to be drawn into the adjudication of individual cases, at least until a year later. 88<br />
However, this does not mean that there was no regulation: the market was regulated by<br />
the rituals and norms that developed around the tulip trade, as well as by the broa<strong>der</strong><br />
social connections within which it was embedded.<br />
<strong>The</strong> social network that made the bubble possible also was the strongest promoter of<br />
amicable resolutions. As we have seen, contemporary observers often blamed the<br />
problems on a few speculators in pound goods. However, while such speculators clearly<br />
existed, what made them influential was that socially they were almost indistinguishable<br />
from tulip tra<strong>der</strong>s of long standing. Despite what the epigram at the start of this paper<br />
suggests, they could not be neatly separated from such “true” bulb lovers. In the end, it<br />
was the very strength of the social network that tied all bulb tra<strong>der</strong>s together, new and old<br />
alike, that made the bubble possible.<br />
All this suggests that the tulip mania deserves to retain its position as a classic<br />
financial bubble. However, it also indicates that the lessons to be drawn from the bubble<br />
are less about a spectacular rise in prices followed by a collapse, and more about the<br />
social structures within which the market is embedded. <strong>The</strong> collapse of Bernard Madoff’s<br />
investment empire has led many to highlight to the importance of the social connections<br />
that made investors forego due diligence. 89 However, similar problems also arose in the<br />
88 (Goldgar, 2007, p. 224; Posthumus, 1927, pp. 80-81)<br />
89 (E.g. Schweitzer & Shell, 2009)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 33<br />
much more extensive subprime mortgage market, as Lewis shows in his analysis of the<br />
current crisis. Much of his story centers around the degree to which the collapse of the<br />
subprime mortgage edifice was inevitable, foreseeable, and indeed foreseen by some. <strong>The</strong><br />
message is that those who continued to invest in subprime mortgages and the various<br />
<strong>der</strong>ivates thereof were simply stupid. 90<br />
However, one of the key components in the argument is that Moody’s, the rating<br />
company, misvalued collateralized debt obligations constructed from the weakest part of<br />
the mortgage market. Many other actors in the market trusted Moody’s because they had<br />
been working with Moody’s for a long time and had come to trust its judgment. 91 Indeed,<br />
the current crisis reinforces a central lesson from the tulip bubble: the dangers associated<br />
with a relatively small number of key players embedded in a social network that has<br />
developed over a longer period of time, producing network connections in which trust<br />
and judgment have become dissociated from the specific arena in which they developed.<br />
People trusted Moody’s not because they were experts on subprime mortgages, but<br />
because their judgment had proven reliable in other fields. <strong>The</strong> tulip bubble continues to<br />
be rele<strong>van</strong>t, then, not because it shows that there have always been people willing to pay<br />
many times what something is fundamentally worth, but because it demonstrates that<br />
such people tend to be social fools rather than economic idiots.<br />
90 (Lewis, 2008)<br />
91 (Lewis, 2008)
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dutch</strong> <strong>Tulip</strong> <strong>Mania</strong> 34<br />
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