ARMOR, September-October 1987 Edition - Fort Benning - U.S. Army

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forces is considered. During the tac- scale cliffs, hump rucksacks, TOWs, supported. Ground lift of troops, tical exercise, the entire para- and mortars all night, secure the ob- and Class I11 and V are all usually trooper force of 400+ troopers jective, and then march to reorient within the capability of the heavy with fighting loads and ground on a newly-arrived OPFOR was a force. For example, in a link-up mounted TOWs and mortars were bit excessive. They proved less able operation it is fairly easy for small airlifted into battle. This ability to to rapidly reorient to enemy thrusts arms, TOWs, and mortar ammuni- quickly place substantial manpower on the ground at the location of the attacker’s choice is a strategy to be reck- oned with. Additionally, the capability to sling-load TOWs in at night, totally blacked out, also provides light forces with the ability to project their firepower and manpower quickly. The speed of a successful insertion will stun even a prepared enemy. Coupled with surprise and audacity, this tactic can succeed. During the exercise, however, large scale air movements were restricted by the enemy situation. A light commander will not use his helicopters in situations where the enemy air defense array is unknown or strong. Large scale lifts were used only once, to move the task force to the jumpoff point for a 10-kilometer foot movement across rugged terrain. The insertion was successful in its execution, but the paratroopers still had a long foot march before they reached their objective. This fast-slow movement requires different planning techniques, especially for mounted heavy forces who think of rates of movement in tens of kilometers per hour. On the NTC battlefield, light forces had little mobility once they were committed to foot approach. Yes, they could traverse devastatingly difficult terrain at night, but only within limits. To expect a foot-mobile force to UH-60A Blackhawks than their mounted counterparts. That is not a criticism nor a surprise, only another consideration when conducting heavyflight operations. The heavy force could move much faster, orient and reorient to unexpected enemy parries, and move more quickly than its deployed light counterpart. Of course, its inability to traverse and seize demanding, untraffkable terrain oftentimes prevented the use of this armored force. Clearly, this mobility differential can easily be planned for and capitalized on during a battle. Good planning, keying on each force’s strong hand, can result in a well-orchestrated tactic that will defeat the enemy by the cooperative application of the two forces. Supporting the Fight From the perspective of the heavyforce, light forces are easily tion to be piggybacked for- ward, on combat vehicles if necessary, to resupply the light force. The reverse is not true, however. In planning a for- ward passage, the only logistical support that the light force could provide was a medical treatment point and vehicle collection points. No emergen- cy Class 111 or V, recovery, or maintenance was possible. Al- though doctrinally there is no fnced requirement for these assets, their complete un- availability must be considered. In operations where heavy sub-ele- ments are chopped to light forces, the problem is exacerbated. The inability to provide adequate fuel and ammunition, other than the attached heavy unit’s organic assets, could quickly become a logistical nightmare. The opposite is not as great a problem, because heavy forces appear to be more able to support light forces, with the possible exception of JP4 and other aviation- specific requirements. Tactical Employment Translation One would think that both forces would have been able to work with each other easily, especially after an- ticipated missions had been reviewed by each staff. In reality, the translation of heavy tactics and light tactical employment schemes into a commonly understood lan- 12 ARMOR September-October 1987
guage - - was a much larger issue than expected. The armo?mech force with emcrience in airborne and mech weye used extensively. face-to-face ability to quickly access the other force’s intelligence, trained to and was completely con- maneuver, and fire support systems versant in FM 71-15 (Draft), The Along with the exchanged liaison was essential in providing positive Tank and Mechanized Infantry officers, they were essential in ensur- command and control of both Company Team, and FM 71-21, The ing that units truly understood what brigades and their subordinate task Tank and Mechanized Infantry the other force meant. forces. Task Force. All members of the 41D team had trained with this document as their Alternate Communications Means - Both brigades had rcfercnce, while the airborne different communication sysforce was generally unfamiliar tems. The Airborne relied with it. Upon initiation of heavily on TACSAT for coordination for joint exer- commo links with its task cises, it became clear that a force, while the heavy force common, understandable lan- primarily relied on FM. guage was not being spoken. During one phase of the Obviously, airborne acro- operation, the assault CP nyms and armored acronyms lost all commo with its paraare different and were initial- troopers. Critical intelly conrusin& but the problem Heavy force tankers had difficulty in vehicle ligence was needed about went much deeper than that. identification because the OPFORss visually the enemy situation in an During discussion of passage modified She&,ans resembled the 3,3 Armor,s objective area, but was unand link-up operations, it be- TOE vehicles. available due to the comcame apparent that a communication lapse. The mon language was missing. Perhaps heavy force, using its organic rea measure of the way the Army trans equipment, was able to net trains its infantry officers, the heavy Lessons Learned with the attached Sheridan comforce had several officers who readi- pany of TF Strike and receive timely understood light tactics and methods, but the opposite was not Command, Control and Communications - Several of the missensitive intel information that was critical for the heavy force. This true. Although mech-experienced of- sions required that brigade and bat- ability to reinforce or augment each ficers were doubtlessly in the air- talion command posts be co-located other’s primary communication borne brigade, their numbers were to ensure positive control of assets, means was an unexpected benefit. significantly less than the opposite arrangement. particularly during passage operations. The airborne assault CP lo- Use of Liaison Officer - Although cated with the brigade jump CP and exchange of liaison officers is cer- Because of this lack of mech/ar- the main CP on two different oc- tainly not a new idea, the utility of mored experience, graphics, com- casions. During these co-locations, these young officers far outweighed monly used expressions, and com- the light force CP merely moved their junior grades. While performmon knowledge items often had to into the heavy CP complete with tac- ing the traditional role of transportbe carefully explained. In fact, diagrams and examples from FW 71tical satellite communications antennas and remote units to FM radios. ing orders and overlays and keeping their force alerted to changes in the 21 were reproduced, annotated, and In one situation, the entire cells for other force’s plans, these officers used by the light force to brief its both units were placed in a M577, were also called upon to describe staff on upcoming operations. More with the heavy force radios in the and explain the capabilities ol their time than expected was consumed in ensuring that each force undervehicle, and the light force S3 in the extension. RE, Army aviation and parent force’s equipment and the manner in which it would be stood what the other was saying. Air Force LNOs also located ad- employed. Although previous brief- Translators in the form of officers jacent to each other nearby. This ings had described some unit September-October 1987 ARMOR 13
Page 2 and 3: In case you havsn't heard, the next
Page 4 and 5: Reaction to Light Forces years back
Page 6 and 7: Orto panzer stopped in front 61 the
Page 8 and 9: Armor Badge proposal, 1 feel that A
Page 10: Attendance Update I thought this ar
Page 13: ficers and commanders to get a head
Page 17 and 18: Maneuver Seizure of Terrain - The a
Page 19 and 20: MAP 1 The French defense was based
Page 21 and 22: the main perimeter. Bigeard’s at-
Page 23 and 24: Graduate Studies in Combat Vehicle
Page 25 and 26: predictions of suspension behavior
Page 27 and 28: ing into the German defense’s ope
Page 29 and 30: corps maintenance support intact fo
Page 31 and 32: ''...Tanks and assault guns coming
Page 33 and 34: ACompany Commander's Guide For Cond
Page 35 and 36: Again, the point lo remember is ope
Page 37 and 38: on the things they have practiced d
Page 39 and 40: "Scouting is an art, as well as a s
Page 41 and 42: form, while the numbed majority is
Page 43 and 44: The Newest M1: A Fourth Variation o
Page 45 and 46: M1A1 Block II improvements looked a
Page 47 and 48: ~~ _____ The 1553 mil standard data
Page 49 and 50: Airhnd Battle doctrine, the reality
Page 51 and 52: you know about fear, the better you
Page 53 and 54: without understanding of the "whys"
Page 55 and 56: A new cleaning wand for the M1 Abra

ARMOR, September-October 1987 Edition - Fort Benning - U.S. Army

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