Civil Society, Civic Education and Election Observation in Kenya

Civil Society
First, civic and voter educators and election observers
should establish fruitful partnerships with media
organizations that go beyond funding, sponsoring programmes
and advertisements to profi le their activities.
Second, civil society should avoid engaging in partisan
and other unprofessional behaviour in order to enhance
its credibility and win the confi dence and trust of all the
stakeholders in the electoral process.
Third, civil society organizations should closely co-ordinate
their activities and avoid unnecessary competition and
duplication. All civil society election observation initiatives
should adopt a common checklist, coordinate the deployment
of observers and/or share the same. Civic and voter education
providers should also adopt a common curriculum and map
out the country to facilitate effective and effi cient delivery.
Fourth, given the time constraints civil society should adopt a
phased-out approach to civic education. Between now and the
next elections, it should focus on imparting civic knowledge
to help the citizens understand the institutions and processes
created by the new Constitution, and voter education to equip
voters with information about the new electoral processes,
issues and players. It should thus plan to conduct rigorous
continuous civic education to impart civic skills and civic
dispositions after the elections.
Government Agencies
First, IEBC should allow election observers unfettered
access to information, including the complete list of voter
registration centres, complete voter register (disaggregated at
the lowest registration unit), complete list of polling stations
(lowest electronic unit) with voter assignments (number of
registered voters), all in accessible formats. It should also
facilitate technology-based real-time reporting by election
observers by allowing them to use their mobile phones in
polling stations.
Second, IEBC should come up with effective accreditation,
regulations and monitoring mechanisms to facilitate
professional delivery of voter education and observation of
elections.
Third, the Police Service should come up with a strategic plan
on electoral security ahead of the next elections and share the
same with election observers.
Fourth, the Ministry of Finance should signifi cantly increase
its allocation to K-NICE through a supplementary budget.
Sixth, MOJNCCA should seek a waiver of government
procurement requirements to enable it to provide grants to
NSA civic education providers.
Donors
First, donors should speed up the disbursement of funds
to civil society’s civic and voter education, as well as
election observation, initiatives.
Second, donors should increase their support to civic education
for optimal coverage and reach; and also their support for
election observation to allow for adequate deployment of
observers and comprehensive long-term observation.
Third, donors should set up a contingency fund to facilitate
rapid response by civil society in the event of serious
deteriorations in the electoral environment.
References
Branson, M. S. and Quigle, C. N., 1998, The Role of
Civic Education. http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/pop_civ.html
[Accessed 15 August 2012].
Economic and Social Policy Research Centre (ES-PRC)
(2011), Evaluation of the ELOG Project – Monitoring and
Observing the Referendum on the proposed Constitution of
Kenya 2010 30th June 2011
Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) (2009),
IIEC Voter Education Handbook: Module 1 – Voter
Registration
Intermedia NCG (2008), Kenya National Civic Education
Programme (URAIA) Technical Advisory Team End-of-
Contract Report
International IDEA (1997), Code of Conduct for Ethical and
Professional Observation of Elections – International IDEA
Code of Conduct Series 1, Stockholm: International IDEA
Kibwana K., and Wambua K., Learning Together to Build
Community: A Comparative Study of the Civic Education
Programme and Approaches in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania,
Background Paper Presented at the MS Symposium “Civic
Education for Political Empowerment”, held in Arusha on
16th-17th February 2009.
Masime, K., “The Changing Role of Civil Society in Kenya’s
Democratic Transition”, in Aywa, F., and Zein, Z.A., (eds),
Taking Stock, Learning Lessons and Moving Forward,
Nairobi: CSMG.
The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR)
(2012), Monitoring Project: Reforms and Preparedness for
Elections, Review Report.
The Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional
Affairs (MOJNCCA) (2011), Kenya National Integrated
Civic Education (K-NICE) Programme Strategy and
Implementation Plan.
USAID (2009), The Second Kenya National Civic
Education Programme II (URAIA): Goals, Findings and
Recommendations from Participants and Civil Society
5 6
Elections Dispatch No.1
Elections Dispatch No.1
ARRF
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Goal: To improve and promote evidence-based regional development policymaking
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Networking of Development Policy Research Institutions in
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Project Coordinator
Nsamba Adam Morris
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ARRF Publications
ARRF (2011). State Building and Development
in South Sudan. Nairobi: ARRF.
Kararach, G. (2011). Macroeconomic Policy
and the Political Limits of Reforms Programmes
in Developing Countries. Nairobi: ARRF.
ARRF (2010). Civil Society and Governance
in Kenya since 2002: Between transition and
Crisis. Nairobi: ARRF.
Wanyande, P., & Okebe, M. (2009). Discourse
on Civil society in Kenya. Nairobi: ARRF.
Chege, M., Mukele, G., & Kabeberi, N. (2007).
The Electoral System and Multi-Partism in
Kenya. Nairobi: ARRF.
Anyang’ Nyong’o, P. (2007). A Leap into
the Future . Nairobi: ARRF.
Yohana, J., Tingwa, P., & Yongo-Bure, B.
B. (2007). Building a New and Prosperous
Society in Southern Sudan in the Post Confl ict
Period. Nairobi: ARRF.
Anyang’Nyong’o, p. (2006). The Political
Economy of Corruption in Kenya. Nairobi:
ARRF.
Nowrojee, P. (2006). The November 2005
Referendum and Kenyan Politics Today.
Nairobi: ARRF.
Anyang’Nyong’o, P., & Chege, M. (2004).
Winning the Peace and Starting Reconstruction
in Southern Sudan . Nairobi: ARRF.
Anyang’Nyong’o, p., & Mghanga, M. (2004).
Sustaining Dialogue for Peace and Confl ict
Resolution in the Horn of Africa . Nairobi:
ARRF.
Anyong’Nyong’o, P., & Mghanga, M. (2004).
Building Blocks for Peace in the Horn of Africa
and the Great Lakes Region. Nairobi: ARRF.
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AFRICAN RESEARCH AND RESOURCE FORUM (ARRF)
Elections Dispatch
Civil Society, Civic Education and Election Observation in Kenya
Kennedy Masime 1
Introduction
The successful toppling of authoritarian regimes by civil
society in East and Central Europe in the late 1980s
triggered demonstration effects in other parts of the world,
especially in Asia, Latin America and Africa. Indeed, civil
society in Kenya has been instrumental in pushing for
democratic reforms; for example, the liberalization of the
country’s political system, the initiation of the democratic
transition process in 1997, and regime change in 2002
(Masime 2012: 9-18). Among the key strategies employed
by civil society in this endeavour are the provision of civic
and voter education (before, during and after elections) and
observation of elections and referenda.
According to International IDEA (Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance), election 2 observation is “[t]he
purposeful gathering of information regarding an electoral
process, and the making of informed judgments on the
conduct of such a process on the basis of information
collected. . .” (IDEA, 1997:10).
election observation is “[t]he purposeful
gathering of information regarding an
electoral process, and the making of
informed judgments on the conduct of
such a process on the basis of information
collected
Civic education refers to the process of imparting civic
knowledge, civic skills and civic dispositions to the citizens
of a country. Civic knowledge has to do with the content of
what citizens have to know; for example, the institutions and
processes as well as the values and principles of democracy.
1 Executive Director, Centre for Governance and Development (CGD) and Chairman, Steering Committee, Elections Observation Group (ELOG).
2 An election is a formal decision-making process through which the citizens of a country express their will by choosing their leaders or governors.
It is one of the key mechanisms of actualizing representative democracy.
Kenya Elections Project
Supported by
No.1
Civic skills are the intellectual skills or critical thinking
skills and participatory skills for interacting, monitoring,
and infl uencing. Civic dispositions are private and public
character traits that support democratic governance
(Branson and Quigley 1998). Voter education is a subset
of civic education that focuses on elections. Effective
voter education, among other things, provides citizens with
information on electoral processes, issues and players. It
inter alia increases voter turnout; discourages electoral
fraud; reduces wastage of election materials, time spent by
individual voters to cast their votes, and the number of spoilt
ballots; minimizes the manipulation of voters by politicians;
facilitates the election of capable leaders; and also promotes
peaceful elections (IIEC 2009).
Over the last two decades civil society has been in the
forefront in the provision of civic education. It has also
mounted successive election observation initiatives that
have, among other things, facilitated the participation of
citizens in electoral processes, and secured the integrity and
also contributed to the reform of the electoral system and
processes.
However, the failure of civil society to safeguard the integrity
of the electoral process during the 2007 General Election
and the anti-democratic tendencies exhibited by the citizens
in the ensuing post-election violence raises serious concerns
regarding the effi cacy of civil society interventions. Such
concerns are particularly critical, given that the next General
Election is only six months away.
This paper, thus, critically examines the role of civil society
in civic and voter education and election observation since
the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in Kenya. The
intention is to draw some lessons and conclusions about the
role of civil society in civic education and voter education
and election observation that might have a bearing on the
next elections.
This project contributes to peaceful elections management and state stability in Kenya, by refl ecting and
analysing the legal framework, political processes as well as practice of elections management. It off ers opinion
on contested aspects of the electoral and political process. Analysis is undertaken by a team of analysts comprised
of individuals from the academia, civil society and government. Each output of the project is peer reviewed by six
diff erent individuals and debated at a review meeting, so as to ensure quality. Th e project regularly publishes its
outputs as Elections Dispatch, which is disseminated in soft and hardcopy. Th e Elections Dispatch is a practical
policy oriented publication. It feeds into and informs the electoral and political process by providing practical and
easy solutions to policy makers in government, civil society, development partners, and the general public.

Elections Dispatch No.1
2
Civic Education
Kenya has had a rich history of civil society initiatives
and activities around civic and voter education since
the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1992. The
National Elections Monitoring Unit (NEMU) pioneered civic
education by providing voter education ahead of the 1992
General Election (MOJNCCA 2012: 6). Since then civil
society has been instrumental in providing civic and voter
education under several arrangements, including the Daraja
Kenya has had a rich history of civil society
initiatives and activities around civic and voter
education since the re-introduction of multi-party
politics in 1992.
civic initiative forum in 1996, which provided impetus to civil
society civic education initiatives (Kibwana and Wambua
2009: 15), by producing a book on civic education for
schools and colleges (MOJNCCA: Op cit); and the National
Civic Education Programme (NCEP I), which was the fi rst
systematic and comprehensive civil society civic education
programme initiated in 1998 in partnership with external
donors (Intermedia NCG 2008:13; MOJNCCA 2012: 7). The
second phase of the latter, branded Uraia 3 , was initiated in
2006 and gender made a cross-cutting issue (USAID 2009:
2).
In the aftermath of the 2007/2008 post-election violence
spawned a number of civic education initiatives in Kenya.
Some of the initiatives include Amkeni Wakenya, which
supports grassroots civil society; USAID supported Pact Kenya
(now Act! Kenya), the Kenya Civil Society Strengthening
Programme (KCCSP) and the Kenya Transitional Initiative
(KTI). NCEP II Uraia serves as a donor basket under the
National Response Initiative (NRI).
Although the Constitution of Kenya 2010 does not explicitly
provide for civic education, it presumes it in two ways. First,
Article 1 (1) and (2) declare that sovereignty belongs to the
people and that they can either exercise it directly or through
democratically elected representatives, respectively. Second,
Article 10 (2) (a) provides for public participation. Article 1 (2)
The Constitution thus puts more emphasis on voter
rather than civic education, yet Article 1 (1) and
(2) cannot be fully achieved without a civic and
active citizenry. Voter education is very narrow in
focus and periodic.
also presupposes voter education, which is expressly provided
for in Article 88 (4) (g). The latter provision is given force
by Section 40 of the Elections Act 2011, which requires the
independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC)
to establish mechanisms for the provision of continuous voter
3 Uraia is the swahili word for citizenship
education and also prepare a voter education curriculum.
The Constitution thus puts more emphasis on voter rather
than civic education, yet Article 1 (1) and (2) cannot be fully
achieved without a civic and active citizenry. Voter education
is very narrow in focus and periodic. Although IEBC has
commenced modicum voter education through the media,
it does not have the capacity to carry out exhaustive and
direct countrywide voter education and its efforts are being
complemented by civil society. Information gaps occasioned
by delays in the implementation of electoral process reforms
have further undermined voter education; for example, IEBC
is yet to gazette the new constituency boundaries; and the
regulations to the Election Act 2011 have not been ratifi ed by
Parliament. A survey conducted by South Consulting in May
2012 revealed that 29% of the respondents were ignorant
about the role of the governor and a shocking 44% have no
clue regarding the role of a regional assembly representative
(KNDR 2012: 36). Millions of young voters have also
attained the age of majority.
Of the several civic and voter education initiatives in place
or under plan only two – the Kenya National Integrated
Civic Education (K-NICE) Programme and the Uraia
Trust Basket – are large enough to make an impact at the
national level. The Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion
and Constitutional Affairs (MOJNCCA), in response to a
Cabinet directive, on 17th August 2010, established K-NICE
as a national civic education programme, in partnership with
non-state actors (NSAs). K-NICE seeks to actualize the idea
of popular sovereignty as provided for in the Constitution of
Kenya 2010 by facilitating active citizens’ participation in
the implementation of the same. But budget constraints are
likely to make its interventions sub-optimal. It received only
$3.2 million for the current fi nancial year. K-NICE will thus
only be able to disburse a much smaller amount to its NSAs
implementing partners. Moreover, K-NICE has restricted
its allocation to about $12,000 per organization which is
inadequate for established and more professional civil society
organizations.
Further, the K-NICE funds are subjected to government
procurement procedures and are thus disbursed on a reimbursement
basis, a practice entirely unsuitable for the
donor- dependent democracy and governance civil society
organizations. Indeed, this has resulted in the marketization
and commoditization of civic and voter education, which
may compromise quality. Moreover, past experiences of
government-civil society partnerships – for example, the
Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector-wide (GJLOS)
Programme – show that civil society is usually unable
to infl uence government policies and actions in such
arrangements as the latter is always distrustful of the former
(Kibwana and Wambua 2009: 15).
Uraia, which was restructured and turned into an independent
trust, has mobilized about $5.9 million and is currently in the
Elections Dispatch No.1
3 4
process of rolling out civic and voter education. Although
it has a much bigger war chest compared to K-NICE, the
resources are trickling in rather slowly from the donors, hence
the delay. Also Uraia and K-NICE have to contend with the
fact that politicians have already hit the ground with partisan
and divisive messages. Indeed, with the ban on harambee4 and voter bribery, politicians have resorted to funding ‘civic
Indeed, this has resulted in the marketization and
commoditization of civic and voter education,
which may compromise quality.
education workshops’ where they provide lunch and generous
transport allowances to participants .
Election Observation
Civil society’s involvement in election observation almost
follows the same historical trajectory as that of civic
education. During the 1992 multiparty elections, civil society
mounted the fi rst domestic observation exercise in Kenya
under the umbrella of NEMU (ES-PRC 2011: 8). NEMU
was made up of faith-based organizations6 , the Institute for
Education in Democracy (IED), and other democracy and
governance civil society organizations. The fi rst two teamed
up to form the Joint Election Monitoring Group (JEMG)
during the next elections in 1997 (see ES-PRC 2011: 9;
MOJNCCA 2011).
In 2002, the Kenya Domestic Observation Programme
(K-DOP) was established 7 . K-DOP members, among
others, included the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
(SUPKEM), the Hindu Council of Kenya, the National
Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Catholic Justice
and Peace Commission (CJPC), and IED. Disagreements
among the faith-based groups over the Kadhi courts saw
them stay out of the next observation initiative; the Kenya
Section 42 (a) and (b) of the Elections Act 2011
empowers it to accredit election observers. This
exercise is not without challenges, given the large
number of applications, the majority of which are
opportunistic
Civil Society Observation Program (KSCOP) was formed in
2005 to observe the referendum. KSCOP was a much smaller
operation but managed to train and deploy 5,270 poll watchers
in 154 purposively sampled constituencies, documenting and
deterring electoral malpractice during the referendum (ES-
PRC 2011: 9).
The follow-up grouping to KSCOP was the Kenya
Domestic Observation Forum (KEDOF) 8 . KEDOF was a
conglomeration of democracy and governance civil society
organizations and the faith-based organizations (ES-PRC
4 Harambee literally means pulling together. It refers to collective fundraising events. Such events have over the years been
hijacked by politicians who usually patronize them by featuring as guests of honour.
2011: 10). Although KEDOF established a very elaborate
infrastructure, delays and gaps in funding led to the
deployment of fewer observers when compared to K-DOP.
KEDOF recruited and deployed 16,595 poll watchers, 454
constituency supervisors and 13 regional coordinators. The
post-election violence complicated KEDOF’s work, resulting
into the displacement of poll-watchers and, consequently, the
disappearance of vital data. Further, the leading faith-based
organizations decided to focus their attention on peacebuilding,
effectively abandoning the observation initiative.
In April 2010, four democracy and governance civil society
organizations and one faith-based organization 9 established
the Elections Observation Group (ELOG) as a long-term
platform for observation of elections in Kenya and the Africa
region. But some of the faith-based organizations 10 stayed
out of the exercise on account of their strong and partisan
positions on the draft constitution.
ELOG engaged a three-pronged approach to the observation
exercise: pre-referendum monitoring, parallel vote tabulation
(PVT), and traditional observation. It recruited and trained 22
trainers of trainers (ToTs), 210 PVT constituency supervisors,
240 traditional observation constituency supervisors, 702
PVT observers and 10,000 general observers. The PVT
exercise enabled ELOG to undertake quick, frequent and
real-time assessments of the referendum day processes and
release timely statements. It also enabled ELOG to accurately
project the referendum results, thereby, building public
confi dence in the offi cial results and calming anxieties. Late
disbursement of funds, however, made ELOG give up on
long-term observation.
Article 88 (4) (h) of the Constitution requires IEBC to
facilitate election observation, monitoring and evaluation
whilst Section 42 (a) and (b) of the Elections Act 2011
empowers it to accredit election observers. This exercise is not
without challenges, given the large number of applications,
the majority of which are opportunistic. Indeed, IEBC is now
in the process of accrediting long-term observers
A number of civil society election observation initiatives 11
have been established ahead of the forthcoming General
Election. ELOG is the oldest and the largest among them.
The faith-based organizations have since joined ELOG 12
, which is now engaged in long-term observation of the
forthcoming elections and is also planning to undertake PVT
and traditional observation of Election Day events. ELOG
has also established a high level advisory and intervention
panel to help promote peaceful elections by urging Kenyans
to promote peace during campaigns and elections; engage in
4 Harambee literally means pulling together. It refers to collective fundraising events. Such events have over the years been hijacked by politicians who
usually patronize them by featuring as guests of honour.
5 Reports by participants at the Coalition for Accountable Political Financing (CAPF) forum on ‘Political and Campaign Financing Reforms in Kenya’
held on 13th August 2012, at Batian Hotel, Nyeri.
6 The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC)
7 Civil society was also very instrumental in pushing for legislative reforms that enhanced the integrity of electoral processes ahead of the 2002 general
elections.
8 There were also other civil society initiatives focusing on thematic monitoring, for instance, the Coalition for Accountable Political Financing (CAPF)
that successfully documented and exposed unethical mobilization and utilization of resources by parties and was also instrumental in the enactment of
the Political Parties Act 2007.
9 The democracy and governance organizations are the Centre for Governance and Development (CGD), CEDMAC, CRE-CO, and IED, whilst the
faith-based organization is SUPKEM.
10 NCCK and CJPC
11 These include the Kenya Human Rights Commission election monitoring and observation project and peace building initiatives, the Electoral Institute
for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, Kenya Field Offi ce (EISA-Kenya), Mkenya Daima, etceteras.
Elections Dispatch No.1
dialogue with political players in the electoral process; and
advise and encourage confl ict prevention, management and
resolution, especially in violence-prone areas.
Although ELOG has taken steps to avoid the challenges
that faced its predecessors – by, for instance, establishing
itself as a permanent platform, adopting an electoral cycle
approach and embracing technology – it has not been able to
mobilize adequate resources to fully implement its strategies.
With a budget of $5 million, which is currently only partially
funded, ELOG will be able to undertake PVT, deploy about
9,500 general observers for the fi rst round and another 3,500
for a runoff in addition to deploying about 100 long-term
observers for a period of fi ve months. The PVT observers
will be sampled from the general observers already provided
for. While 9,500 general observers backed up by PVT are
adequate, 3,500 are sub-optimal. Also, limited long-term
support undermines ELOG’s ability to effectively respond
to developments in the fast-changing political environment,
and facilitate and coordinate robust participation of the wider
civil society sector in long-term observation.
Lessons and Conclusions
First, despite the instrumental role played by civil society
in enhancing civic education in Kenya, some of its
initiatives are heavily infl uenced by the political directions
and agitations in the country. For example, the early civic
education activities focused more on constitutional reforms,
while in the recent past most of the civic education by
civil society is heavily tilted toward peace education and
reconciliation. Whereas it is good for civic education to
focus on peace and reconciliation, given the 2007/2008
post- election violence experience, there seems to be limited
distinction between peace and civic education, as Kenya
heads to the next General Election.
Peace education hardly focuses on civic knowledge, civic
skills and civic dispositions. It does not usually question
political and social identities in a manner that gives precedence
to national rather than ethnic identities. In addition, peace
education tends to be apolitical, yet some of the issues
concerning the next General Election are very political and
need to be talked about and addressed in a political fashion.
Since civic education has tended to focus more on peace
education and reconciliation, the next elections may be
peaceful, but the ability of voters to critically scrutinize their
leaders, discern political messages, and manifestos is likely
to remain the same as in the 2002 and 2007 elections. Voter
the next elections may be peaceful, but the ability
of voters to critically scrutinize their leaders,
discern political messages, and manifestos is
likely to remain the same as in the 2002 and 2007
elections.
12 Four other organizations, the Ecumenical Centre for Justice and Peace (ECJP); United Disabled Persons of Kenya (UDPK); Youth Agenda (YAA)
and the Federation of Women Lawyers of Kenya (FIDA) were also co-opted into ELOG.
Issue 1
turn-out is likely to be low after the massive investments in
peace education. In addition, voter turn-out and electoral
choices may continue to be linked to partisan and subjective
rather than objective criteria.
Second, the funding of civil society civic education (and
election observation) initiatives remains donor-driven,
despite government programmes on civic education. This
infl uences civil society’s approach to civic education and
election observation. Civil society organizations normally
compete for donor funds. This undermines effective
cooperation and creates unnecessary duplication or lack of
synergy (Kibwana and Wambua 2009: 22). Donor funding
that is normally inadequate and inconsistent often comes late,
close to elections, thus compromising the quality of training
and continuous civic education and long-term election
observation. Due to limited funding, civic education only
reaches a small percentage of the population (Kibwana and
Wambua 2009: 22), and election observation is more focused
civic education by civil society is heavily tilted
toward peace education and reconciliation. There
seems to be limited distinction between peace
and civic education, as Kenya heads to the next
General Election.
on the polling day events rather than the electoral process.
Third, the partisan nature of some civil society organizations
has undermined professional standards in terms of how they
relate with the public or conduct their activities (Intermedia
NCG 2008: V; 42). Consequently, some of the civic education
and election observation initiatives by civil society may not
produce the intended results.
Fourth, despite the existence of civil society umbrella
platforms like ELOG and CRECO, civil society interventions
in civic education and election observation are often
fragmented. This is partially informed by the nature of
some institutions, but most importantly by the fact that civic
education and elections monitoring exercises are viewed as
opportunities for rent-seeking by some of the organizations
(Ibid). Rent-seeking is a common feature in Kenyan political
history, but when civil society institutions take on this
character, it undermines their institutional creditability and,
ipso facto, their capacity to hold politicians accountable.
Some of the civil society institutions have turned into lobbies
and vanguards of specifi c politicians who bankroll them in
the name of civic education. This is likely to introduce bias
in civic education, especially during the pre-election period.
Recommendations
In view of the above lessons and the fact that the next
elections are only six months away, we make the following
priority recommendations to civil society, government
agencies and the donors: