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Schmitt-Political Theology I.pdf - Townsend Humanities Lab

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xx Tracy B. Strong<br />

“not of the ordinary kind” 33 (PT, 12). The point therefore of this<br />

notion of sovereignty ultimately unconstrained by formal rules is<br />

to “create a juridical order” (Recht zu schaffen) under conditions<br />

that threaten anarchy. 34 The sovereign must decide both that a<br />

situation is exceptional and what to do about the exception in order<br />

to be able to create or recover a judicial order when the existing<br />

one is threatened by chaos.<br />

The necessarily extraordinary quality of sovereignty is made<br />

clear in the analogy he uses to explain his point. He writes: “The<br />

exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology”<br />

(PT, 36). What does it mean to refer the “exception” to a<br />

“miracle”? Clearly, this appertains to “political theology.” To<br />

move towards an answer one should look first at the author who<br />

remained <strong>Schmitt</strong>’s touchstone. In chapter 37 of Leviathan,<br />

Hobbes first identifies a miracle as an occurrence when “the thing<br />

is strange, and the natural cause difficult to imagine” and then<br />

goes on to define it as “a work of God (besides His operation by<br />

the way of nature, ordained in the creation) done for the making<br />

manifest to His elect, the mission of an extraordinary minister for<br />

their salvation.” 35 Hobbes’ definition is apposite to <strong>Schmitt</strong>, as<br />

for him the “exception” is the occasion for and of the revelation of the<br />

true nature of sovereignty. Thus the sovereign does not for <strong>Schmitt</strong><br />

only define the “exception”—he is also revealed by and in it,<br />

which is why <strong>Schmitt</strong> must refer to a “genuine” decision.<br />

What would be wrong with at least trying to rest human affairs<br />

on the rule of law? <strong>Schmitt</strong> finds two major problems. The first<br />

comes from the epistemological relationship between the exception<br />

and the norm. Sovereignty is what <strong>Schmitt</strong> calls a Grenzbegriff,<br />

33. Indeed, in such circumstances “the decision emanates from nothingness” (PT, 31–32).<br />

See the discussion in R. Howse, “From Legitimacy to Dictatorship—and Back Again,” in<br />

Dyzenhaus Law as Politics, 60–65.<br />

34. PT, 13. I have modified Schwab’s translation, which is “to produce law.”<br />

35. Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter 37.

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