ChangingCottonLandscapeNeilForrester
ChangingCottonLandscapeNeilForrester
ChangingCottonLandscapeNeilForrester
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Changing the Cotton<br />
Landscape in Pakistan<br />
Dr. Neil Forrester<br />
October 2008<br />
Ali Tareen Farms, Pakistan
Copyright © 2009 Ali Tareen Farms<br />
Permission is granted for copying and distribution after due acknowledgement.<br />
iii
Preface<br />
The importance of improving cotton production for cotton growers, the textile industry and other<br />
members of the cotton value chain in Pakistan can hardly be overstated. Considering its role in<br />
the national economy, it is surprising how little the public and the private sector in Pakistan has<br />
invested in cotton research and development (R&D) during the last few decades. The public<br />
sector’s large infrastructure of research institutes and agricultural universities suffers from the<br />
endemic problems of lack of resources and poor management. It has been unable to keep pace<br />
with the latest discoveries in production and crop management. Consequently, Pakistan’s per<br />
acre yield continues to remain below the world average. It grows cotton on 3.2 million hectares,<br />
yet the total production has fluctuated around a meager 12 million (170 kg) bales during the last<br />
decade, leaving a shortfall of 2-3 million in domestic consumption every year. This places a<br />
heavy burden on cotton growers and the textile industry – the two most important members in<br />
the value chain – to come forward and fill this gap in cotton R&D.<br />
This research is one small contribution towards this objective. Dr. Neil Forrester is a leading<br />
international expert on cotton production, who has kept himself abreast of the latest<br />
developments in cotton biotechnology and other innovations. His familiarity with Pakistani cotton<br />
landscape enabled him to produce a valuable report within the short time period of two weeks.<br />
This research serves two important functions. First, it helps cotton farmers to better understand<br />
the disease and pest complex they face each year. Second, it constitutes the starting point for<br />
further in-depth research on the constraints identified in this report.<br />
Hopefully, other progressive growers and the textile industry will take this work from here and<br />
invest in rigorous and scientific investigation of the problems that have so far condemned<br />
Pakistan farmers to a below average performance.<br />
v<br />
Jehangir Khan Tareen
Table of Contents<br />
Page<br />
Acronyms vii<br />
Introduction 1<br />
Major constraints on Cotton Production in Pakistan 1<br />
Cotton leaf curl virus 5<br />
Mealybugs 9<br />
Lack of a professional seed industry 13<br />
Weeds 18<br />
High input costs and water scarcity 21<br />
Bollworms 22<br />
Research 27<br />
Future Pipeline Technologies 27<br />
Insecticide Resistance Management 28<br />
Sources for Germplasm and Public Sector Technologies 33<br />
Summary of Recommendations 34<br />
Appendix A: Terms of Reference<br />
Appendix B: Stakeholders Engaged for this Study 38<br />
35<br />
vii
Acronyms<br />
AARI Ayub Agricultural Research Institute<br />
APTMA All Pakistan Textile Mills Association<br />
CABI Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux International<br />
CAMB Centre for Applied Molecular Biology<br />
CCRI Central Cotton Research Institute<br />
CLCV Cotton Leaf Curl Virus<br />
CRDC Cotton Research and Development Company<br />
CRI Cotton Research Institute<br />
EPA Environmental Protection Agency<br />
HRAC Herbicide Resistance Action Committee<br />
ICAC International Cotton Advisory Committee<br />
IP Intellectual Property<br />
MINFAL Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock<br />
NIAB Nuclear Institute of Agricultural Biology<br />
NIBGE National Institute of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering<br />
PARB Punjab Agricultural Research Board<br />
PARC Pakistan Agricultural Research Council<br />
WUE Water Use Efficiency<br />
viii
1. Introduction<br />
This report is based on the research conducted in Pakistan during October 2008 to review the<br />
current production constraints and problems in the Pakistan cotton industry and to recommend<br />
possible solutions. All aspects and stakeholders of the Pakistan cotton industry were covered<br />
including a range of both provincial and federal government officials, private seed companies,<br />
multinational businesses, research and breeding facilities, textile and ginning industry<br />
representatives and cotton growers. Site visits to cotton fields and research institutes were<br />
undertaken in Lahore, Multan, Lodhran, Vehari, Karachi, Islamabad and Faisalabad. The terms<br />
of reference for this study are attached as Appendix A. The list of persons interviewed is<br />
attached as Appendix B.<br />
The main body of this report will cover the key problems affecting the Pakistan cotton industry<br />
and will suggest ways for the Pakistan cotton industry to overcome them to become a vibrant,<br />
forward looking, productive and globally competitive industry. The specific technical issues<br />
covered are: 1) resistance management of Bt cotton; 2) sources for available transgenic<br />
technologies; 3) suitability of Chinese Bt cottons; 4) sources of public-good biotechnology; 5)<br />
sources of cotton germplasm; 6) control of CLCV and mealybug; and 7) possible new research<br />
and development (R&D) structures. These will be addressed at the end of this report.<br />
A detailed presentation of the findings from this research was given in Lahore to a broad cross<br />
section of participants. This meeting was organized and hosted by the All Pakistan Textile Mills<br />
Association (APTMA) whose support and encouragement for this review is acknowledged. A<br />
final summary presentation was also given to the federal Finance Minister and the federal<br />
Minister for MINFAL (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock) in Islamabad.<br />
2. Major Constraints on Cotton Production in Pakistan<br />
The principal problem of the Pakistan cotton industry is a shortfall in production of cotton lint<br />
versus consumption. Production is variable from year to year at 12 million bales (170 kgs) or<br />
less while consumption is at 15 million bales. This leaves a shortfall of around 3 million bales of<br />
cotton lint which has to be imported each year to satisfy the demand of the Pakistan spinning<br />
industry. The cost of these raw cotton imports and the oil and meal forgone if the cotton could<br />
have been grown in Pakistan, is around US $ 0.8-1.0 billion per year.<br />
1
Millions of Bales (170 kgs)<br />
Yield (kgs/ha) Area (,000 ha)<br />
18.0<br />
16.0<br />
14.0<br />
12.0<br />
10.0<br />
8.0<br />
6.0<br />
4.0<br />
2.0<br />
0.0<br />
3,500<br />
3,000<br />
2,500<br />
2,000<br />
1,500<br />
1,000<br />
500<br />
1980<br />
0<br />
1981<br />
1980<br />
1982<br />
1981<br />
1983<br />
1982<br />
1984<br />
Area & Yield of Cotton in Pakistan for the past 28 years<br />
1983<br />
1985<br />
1984<br />
1986<br />
Data Source: ICAC Cotton Statistics<br />
1985<br />
Data Source: ICAC Cotton Statistics<br />
1987<br />
1986<br />
Pakistan Emerging as Importer<br />
1987<br />
Production Mill use Imports Exports<br />
1988<br />
1989<br />
1988<br />
1990<br />
1989<br />
1991<br />
1990<br />
1992<br />
1991<br />
1993<br />
1992<br />
1994<br />
Area Yield<br />
1993<br />
1995<br />
1994<br />
1996<br />
1995<br />
1997<br />
1996<br />
1998<br />
1997<br />
1999<br />
1998<br />
2000<br />
1999<br />
2001<br />
2000<br />
2002<br />
2001<br />
2003<br />
2002<br />
2004<br />
2003<br />
2005<br />
2004<br />
2006<br />
2005<br />
2007<br />
2006<br />
2<br />
2007
The figure above represents the area of cotton grown in Pakistan over the last 3 decades and<br />
the average yield. Over this time, the area has increased steadily from just over 2 million<br />
hectares to just over 3 million hectares but yield has stagnated. Every time the yield has<br />
threatened to increase (e.g. the early nineties and 2004), some disaster has befallen the<br />
industry (e.g. CLCV, mealybugs, etc). The increase in production in Pakistan over time has<br />
been driven by increased area planted, not so much by any increase in productivity. The<br />
industry is in a 25 year time warp.<br />
The current average cotton yield in Pakistan is 18 maunds (1 maund = 37.32 kgs) of seed<br />
cotton per acre which would produce 11.7 million (170 kg) bales on 3.2 million hectares. In order<br />
to meet current mill demand, the yield would need to increase by 30% to 23.4 maunds average<br />
which would produce 15.2 million bales. This is an extra 3.5 million bales of cotton production<br />
which would put an extra US$ 0.9-1.1 billion per year into the pockets of Pakistan cotton<br />
farmers, not overseas cotton farmers.<br />
Now pushing the concept of potential yield increases a little further, what if yield can be<br />
increased 67% to 30 maunds average which would produce 19.5 million bales. This is an extra<br />
7.8 million bales of cotton production which would give Pakistani cotton farmers an extra US$ 2-<br />
2.5 billion per year. The extra production over current mill demand would go to either export of<br />
excess lint or increased mill demand, probably a combination of both. Assuming that all could<br />
be value added in the local textile industry, the increased textile production would be worth an<br />
extra US$ 3 billion per year, over and above the extra US$ 2-2.5b/yr for the lint mentioned<br />
above.<br />
These are certainly impressive numbers but are they realistically achievable? I believe so.<br />
Firstly, this is already the set target for the Cotton Vision 2015 Project (20m bales by 2015) and<br />
secondly, the Indian cotton industry has already achieved this level of improvement.<br />
3
Millions of bales (170 kgs)<br />
35.0<br />
30.0<br />
25.0<br />
20.0<br />
15.0<br />
10.0<br />
5.0<br />
0.0<br />
India Emerging as Exporter<br />
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
Data Source: ICAC Cotton Statistics<br />
The figure above demonstrates the profound changes in the Indian cotton industry since the<br />
introduction of Bt cotton. Prior to the introduction of Bt cotton in India in 2003, India had the<br />
world’s lowest average yield (302 kg lint/ha in 2002) and was importing cotton lint to meet mill<br />
demand. Within 5 years, average yield had increased 88% to 567 kg lint/ha (Data Source: ICAC<br />
Cotton Statistics) and India is now the world’s second biggest cotton exporter. So the potential<br />
67% yield increase mentioned for Pakistan is not unrealistic.<br />
However, India’s yield constraints were different to Pakistan’s. Number one problem was<br />
Bollworm control which was addressed immediately by the introduction of Bt cotton. Other<br />
problems were (and still are) erratic monsoon rains (to be addressed by the introduction of<br />
future drought tolerant cotton?), weeds, particularly in the northern irrigated crop (to be<br />
addressed by the introduction of herbicide tolerant cottons) and CLCV (Cotton Leaf Curl Virus)<br />
but only in the north (0.5m out of a total of 9m ha).<br />
Production Mill use Exports<br />
Bt introduction<br />
Pakistan has a different set of problems. Number one problem is CLCV which first arose in the<br />
early nineties and which was solved by the breeding of CLCV resistant varieties. However, this<br />
early success was short lived with the development of a recombinant mutant strain of the virus<br />
4
(called Burewala strain after the village where it was first discovered) which overcame all<br />
previously resistant varieties and even to date, there are no known cotton varieties resistant to<br />
this new strain despite extensive testing of global germplasm collections. Until this problem is<br />
solved, any benefits to be potentially gained from solving the other problems (including the<br />
introduction of Bt cotton) will not be fully realized. The second major problem for the Pakistan<br />
cotton industry is the lack of a professional seed industry resulting in poor quality seed (poor<br />
germination and lack of genetic purity) to the farmer. Investing in new transgenic technologies<br />
will not produce results if these cannot be delivered to farmers in a consistently high quality<br />
seed, which in turn cannot be achieved without a professional seed industry. The third major<br />
problem for the Pakistan cotton industry has been mealybugs. These have arisen as a key pest<br />
in just a matter of a couple of seasons and there is no clear understanding why this is so or<br />
what will happen to their pest status in the future. The fourth major problem for the Pakistan<br />
cotton industry is the high input cost (principally diesel and fertilizer) which is a common<br />
problem for farmers around the globe. The fifth major problem for the Pakistan cotton industry is<br />
lack of water, although it is unclear whether the problem is scarcity of water or its distribution.<br />
Weeds are also a major problem for Pakistan cotton farmers although they are hardly<br />
mentioned by most people, presumably because it is just accepted that weeds are a problem<br />
about which little can be done. Last but not least, bollworms and armyworms have been a<br />
consistent problem for Pakistan cotton farmers with some years being much worse than others.<br />
The solution to bollworms is relatively simple (the introduction of transgenic Bt cottons) but as<br />
stated previously and which cannot be emphasized enough, the full potential of Bt cotton will not<br />
be realized until all the other problems are solved as well.<br />
There are no clear data on the economic impact of these various problems mentioned above<br />
but I will attempt below to estimate the cost of these problems to the Pakistan cotton growers.<br />
Problem Estimated yield losses (170 kg bales lint)<br />
CLCV 2-3 m<br />
No professional seed industry 2-3 m<br />
Mealybugs 1 m<br />
Water 1 m<br />
Weeds 2 m<br />
The total yield losses are somewhere in the range of 8-10 million bales. On top of that, improved<br />
crop management techniques could add an extra 2-3 million bales, making a grand total of an<br />
extra 10-13 million bales per year, if all of Pakistan’s cotton production problems could be<br />
solved. This figure is double the current production and would be worth an extra US$ 2.7-<br />
5
4.1b/year in extra lint, oil and meal yield. The extra lint production over the current mill<br />
requirement could be met either by exports or increased mill use or both (as was the case with<br />
India) with the value adding figure if it all went to increased textile production being another US$<br />
4.7-6.7b/year. These figures would represent a very significant improvement in Pakistan’s<br />
national economic position if the Pakistan cotton industry can be turned around and revitalised.<br />
In addition, there is a developing decline in US cotton production due to the competition from<br />
biofuel crops and the US cotton production may end up moving off shore as has the US cotton<br />
processing industry. If this happens, it will open up a great opportunity for other cotton<br />
producing countries to meet this potential shortfall in the US cotton exports and Pakistan should<br />
ensure that it can be one of those countries along with India, Africa, Brazil and the cotton<br />
growing countries of the CIS.<br />
Now to deal with the major cotton problems in detail.<br />
2.1 Cotton Leaf Curl Virus<br />
This problem has been in Pakistan for a very long time, probably as long as cotton has been<br />
grown in the region. The local cotton species Gossypium arboreum has developed a natural<br />
resistance to CLCV but the introduced commercial cotton species Gossypium hirsutum is mostly<br />
naturally susceptible to CLCV as it evolved elsewhere. The introduction of the smooth leaf<br />
highly virus susceptible S12 variety in the late 80s, saw an increase in spraying for jassids<br />
initially, then for bollworms induced by the jassid sprays which in turn induced a whitefly<br />
problem.<br />
Whitefly vector of<br />
CLCV<br />
Left – adults & nymphs<br />
(scales)<br />
Right – adults & eggs<br />
As whitefly is the vector for CLCV and there was a large area of the highly CLCV susceptible<br />
S12 variety being grown, the conditions were ripe for the first CLCV epizootic. This severely<br />
affected Pakistan cotton production in the early 90s and the problem was eventually solved by<br />
the breeding of conventional CLCV resistant varieties by a number of local Pakistan breeding<br />
6
institutes. However, later research indicated that there were only three sources of CLCV<br />
resistance discovered (LRA 5166, CP 15/2 and Cedex) and that the first two were actually the<br />
same, so effectively there were only two sources. As the CLCV problem declined in severity, the<br />
industry ended up growing a mixture of CLCV resistant and tolerant varieties which allowed a<br />
residual CLCV population to flourish. Additionally, this allowed the virus to recombine and<br />
mutate to a different form, and in this case unfortunately, to a more virulent form called the<br />
Burewala strain. This new mutant strain overcame all previously known sources of conventional<br />
host plant resistance and is still spreading gradually from its original source at Burewala near<br />
Vehari throughout the Pakistani Punjab and even into the Indian Punjab. Pakistani cotton<br />
breeders have been assiduously screening germplasm from around the world to try to identify a<br />
source (or hopefully sources) of resistance to this new CLCV strain but have so far been<br />
unsuccessful, despite screening over 12,000 lines at the Vehari Cotton Research Station near<br />
the virus epicentre.<br />
The solution to the CLCV problem must come from research and as the CLCV problem is<br />
restricted to Pakistan and the Indian Punjab, this will have to rely largely on a local regional<br />
solution. Clearly help will also be required from external virus research institutes such as the US<br />
Danforth Institute but most of the effort will have to come from local research institutes to solve<br />
a local problem. The eventual solution will come from either conventional breeding, mutation<br />
breeding such as carried out at the Nuclear Institute of Agricultural Biology (NIAB), interspecific<br />
crosses from resistant but commercially distant wild cottons (such as carried out at the Central<br />
Cotton Research Institute (CCRI) and the Ayub Agricultural Research Institute (AARI)) or<br />
transgenic (genetically modified) approaches such as carried out at the National Institute of<br />
Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering (NIBGE). All these 4 approaches should be funded as a<br />
priority and when a solution is eventually found, a country wide cotton crop management<br />
strategy should be concurrently implemented to ensure the maximum durability of the new<br />
solution e.g. quit growing CLCV susceptible varieties as quickly as possible to reduce the virus<br />
inoculum level and thus reduce the potential for virus recombination and mutation, as happened<br />
previously.<br />
7
CLCV susceptible variety in the Indian Punjab<br />
However, it could be some time before a successful solution is found and in the meantime there<br />
should be a concerted extension campaign to mitigate the economic impact of CLCV. This<br />
should be planned on two fronts; one to reduce the whitefly vector population and another to<br />
reduce the CLCV inoculum level. In regards to the latter, CLCV can only exist in a live host so<br />
all cotton plant sticks should be removed immediately after harvesting is finished and in<br />
particular, all cotton crops abandoned due to severe CLCV should be uprooted as soon as<br />
possible. Whitefly populations on weeds and crops should be managed early season with soft,<br />
non-disruptive chemicals (e.g. mineral oils, buprofezin and pyriproxyfen) and all hard spray<br />
options should be delayed as long as possible. Early season sunflowers are excellent whitefly<br />
nurseries and should be avoided at all costs in cotton areas.<br />
8
Some growers have tried to avoid the CLCV problem by planting earlier and earlier, some even<br />
as early as February or March. They then treat this crop as a high input 300 day crop and aim to<br />
maximize yield from the cotton crop as a rotation with wheat is no longer possible. Many larger<br />
farmers have tried this approach with some success but in the long term, I can foresee lots of<br />
problems if this trend is continued. The most important problem being encountered is the<br />
problem of Bronze Wilt (also called Sudden Wilt or Reddening in Pakistan) which is a<br />
physiological disorder caused by trying to fill bolls during the hottest part of the season. The<br />
optimum temperatures for cotton are 35 degrees Centigrade during the day and 26 degrees<br />
Centigrade at night. February/March planted cotton will be fully loaded up with fruit and at the<br />
boll-fill stage when the extremely hot May/June temperatures come (45 degrees during the day<br />
and 35 degrees during the night being not uncommon). This is a physiological impossibility for<br />
the cotton plant which then goes a red/bronze colour, wilts and sheds it fruit. It can recover later<br />
and grow a good second crop during milder conditions. This is a bigger problem in the hotter<br />
areas of the Punjab with the northern Punjab crops faring better (and thus yielding better)<br />
because of the milder temperatures in the north. However, the growing of 300 day cotton is not<br />
a sustainable proposition. It uses a lot of extra inputs (especially fertilizer and number of<br />
irrigations) and requires pest control (especially whitefly control) for a long period, creating a<br />
pesticide resistance risk and fosters CLCV inoculum buildup for a large part of the season. Also,<br />
the level of Bt cotton efficacy would be questionable during the latter half of the crop as Bt<br />
efficacy usually begins to decline after 100 days or so. All in all, I see very early planting<br />
9<br />
CLCV damage –<br />
Multan district Aug<br />
2006
(Feb/March) of part of their cotton crop to avoid CLCV, as continuing to be a popular option for<br />
some growers (particularly in the milder parts of the Punjab). But, I stress, this should not be<br />
promoted as a solution to the CLCV problem. It should be considered only as a short term risk<br />
spreading strategy until a longer term CLCV solution is found. Mid to late May plantings are<br />
probably the best compromise to minimize CLCV risk and to avoid boll filling in adversely hot<br />
weather.<br />
2.2 Mealybugs<br />
Mealybugs are generally considered as a curiosity on cotton and rarely need controlling. Thus<br />
the mealybug explosion in Pakistan cotton from 2005 to 2007 came as a surprise to everyone in<br />
the industry. It seemed to come from nowhere, peaked in 2007 and there is some evidence that<br />
the problem may be now declining in importance. There are a couple of different theories as to<br />
why this happened.<br />
The first is that this is an introduced virulent new pest species but if this is the case, then it is<br />
very hard to explain how it could have become a pest across the whole Pakistan cotton belt<br />
almost simultaneously. Its damage would have been traceable over time from its point of<br />
introduction but there is no evidence of this. Mealybug females can only disperse by crawling or<br />
being moved on infested plants or produce (only the males can fly), so dispersal of mealybugs<br />
across the Pakistan cotton belt would have been a very slow process and this does not fit with<br />
the massive population explosion observed over just a two year period.<br />
Close up of mealybugs Mealybugs can prematurely kill cotton plants<br />
10
What is more probable is that the mealybug was already spread throughout the Pakistan cotton<br />
belt but that it was at such low levels that it was hardly ever noticed, and then some sort of<br />
event triggered the population explosion. In regards to the first part of this theory, a recently<br />
published paper 1 suggests that the mealybug was first introduced into Karachi in 1974 and then<br />
spread slowly north. By 1988, it was recorded throughout the cotton growing areas of the Sindh<br />
province. It then continued to spread slowly and gradually north into the Punjab province where<br />
it was recorded in 11 cotton growing districts in 2005. The original 1974 identification was the<br />
Hibiscus mealybug Phenacoccus (= Maconellicoccus) hirsutum which has not recently been<br />
found in Pakistan. The cotton mealybug is similar to but different to Hibiscus mealybug and is<br />
considered a new species Maconellicoccus sp. nov. Yousuf et al. (2007) probably very rightly<br />
conclude that the original 1974 identification was incorrect and that the new introduction all<br />
along was the cotton mealybug, not the Hibiscus mealybug. If this is correct, it explains the<br />
broad distribution of the cotton mealybug throughout the Pakistan cotton belt (albeit at low<br />
numbers) but not the trigger that set off the mealybug population explosion.<br />
There are a couple of theories on the putative trigger which could have set off the mealybug<br />
population explosion. If the mealybug had been present previously throughout the cotton belt for<br />
many years, then something clearly different must have happened prior to the start of the<br />
population explosion in 2005. Some people suggest an environmental trigger such as high<br />
temperatures or high humidity which would favour the mealybug, while another theory is that the<br />
population explosion was induced by intensive spraying for other pests which disrupted the<br />
natural balance between the mealybug and its natural enemies (various parasites and<br />
predators), perhaps even more likely, a combination of both factors. There needs to be research<br />
on these potential triggers to sort out what happened just prior to 2005. If these factors can be<br />
identified, then steps can be taken to predict future mealybug outbreaks to either avoid them if<br />
possible or at least mitigate their economic impact.<br />
In this regard, the following data was obtained to help with identifying potential mealybug<br />
population explosion triggers, specifically: 1) broad-scale spraying of armyworms, etc. with hard<br />
insecticides in 2003; and 2) unusually warm and humid weather from 2005 to 2007. A third<br />
possible trigger (the wide scale early spring spraying campaign against whitefly in 2003) was<br />
discounted as a possible trigger as the soft insecticide buprofezin was largely used in that<br />
campaign but if any broad spectrum insecticides were used in that campaign, then this could<br />
have also contributed to the mealybug outbreak..<br />
1 Yousuf et al. 2007, Pakistan Entomologist Vol 29(1):49-50<br />
11
The following table presents data on the average daily maximum and minimum temperatures (in<br />
ºC) and relative humidity and total rainfall for spring to autumn (Feb-Oct) for the years 2000 to<br />
2007 at Multan CCRI. Numbers in bold in the table below are the years where the season<br />
average is above the 2000-2007 long term average.<br />
Spring to<br />
Autumn<br />
(Feb-Oct)<br />
Av. daily max<br />
temp ºC<br />
Av. daily min<br />
temp ºC<br />
Av. Daily 8 am<br />
relative humidity<br />
Av. Daily 5 pm<br />
relative humidity<br />
Total rainfall<br />
(mm)<br />
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Av.<br />
2000-<br />
2007<br />
34.8 34.3 34.5 33.5 34.3 32.6 34.4 33.5 33.9<br />
22.3 22.2 22.4 21.9 22.5 21.9 23.2 22.4 22.3<br />
67.0 69.5 68.1 68.4 68.9 71.6 72.1 74.3 70.4<br />
43.3 47.3 39.0 47.2 48.6 52.0 53.1 56.8 48.7<br />
57.6 240.3 60.9 179.6 102.6 151.9 76.3 165.3 128.6<br />
Data Source: Dr. Naveed, CCRI Multan, Pakistan.<br />
The following table presents date on the average number of insecticide sprays applied on cotton in<br />
Pakistan in the years 2000 to 2007.<br />
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />
4.8 5.7 4.8 7.0 5.7 5.3 5.6 5.4<br />
Data Source: Directorate of Pest Warning and Quality Control of Pesticides, Multan, Punjab.<br />
12
The 2003 cotton season was marked by heavy mid-late season rains and an expansive<br />
armyworm outbreak in cotton which was controlled with indiscriminate use of insecticides,<br />
particularly when supplies ran out and growers had to resort to broad spectrum insecticides<br />
such as the organophosphates. In fact the 2003 season had the heaviest spray pressure in the<br />
last eight years. The theory is that this broad-scale spraying in 2003 killed the mealybug natural<br />
enemies which had been holding the mealybug populations in check previously. This would then<br />
have allowed the mealybug populations to increase unchecked in the following years, maybe<br />
assisted by favourable weather conditions. In fact, the weather data for the 2005-2007 outbreak<br />
period indicates very favourable humid weather (see table above) for the mealybug but no clear<br />
temperature trigger.<br />
If this theory is correct, then ultimately, the natural enemies would be able to build back up and<br />
once again assert their control over the mealybug population. In fact, the reduced mealybug<br />
problem in 2008 may be the start of the redressing of the natural balance of things. There<br />
appears to be some evidence for this from data for late season mealybug collections taken from<br />
cotton in October 2008. These were made by independent research entomologist Dr. David<br />
Chamberlain, Crop Protection & Research Consultant, JDW Sugar Mills, Rahim Yar Khan,<br />
Pakistan who made two collections of mealybugs off cotton from the lower Punjab (Lodhran and<br />
Rahim Yar Khan) and recorded very high levels of parasitism by an encyrtid 2 wasp (94.2 and<br />
2 * Parasitoid specimens collected by CABI South Asia from Maconellicoccus sp. attacking cotton in Tando Jam in<br />
August 2008 and sent to the Natural History Museum UK were identified as Aenasius sp. nov. nr. longiscapus<br />
Compere (Hymenoptera: Encyrtidae) – see http://www.cabi.org/default.aspx?site=170&page=1303. Although<br />
the specimens collected from Maconellicoccus sp. attacking the cotton at Lodhran and Rahim Yar Khan in 2008 were<br />
not officially identified, it is likely they are the same species.<br />
13<br />
Mealybugs<br />
attended by ants<br />
and on brinjal (egg<br />
plant)
96.1%, respectively). High levels of parasitism (up to 70%) were also reported by entomologists<br />
in the Sindh late season in 2008. Dr. Chamberlain followed up these late 2008 season<br />
collections with further collections from the lower Punjab in the following season (mid and late<br />
season mealybug collections at two sites and from another two sites where mealybugs<br />
appeared only late in the season). Once again very high levels of parasitism were recorded (88-<br />
94%) in late season populations where the parasites had time to establish with lower levels (30-<br />
35%) where infestations were only recent (see Dr. Chamberlain’s data in the Table below).<br />
2008 Oct<br />
2009<br />
Date<br />
9th<br />
July<br />
12th<br />
Sept<br />
Location<br />
Number of<br />
mealybugs<br />
sampled<br />
9 12 15 18 21 24 Total<br />
Lodhran 86 - 8 12 31 30 - 81 94.2<br />
Rahim Yar Khan 103 - 10 28 40 21 - 99 96.1<br />
Iqbal Bagh 76 - 6 12 18 9 - 45 59.2<br />
Rang Pur 97 - 9 19 24 7 - 59 60.8<br />
Iqbal Bagh 84 - 13 23 29 14 - 79 94.0<br />
Rang Pur 65 - 9 19 17 12 - 57 87.7<br />
Kot Sardar Khan 102 - 5 15 7 4 - 31 30.4<br />
Roti Shareef 75 - 4 7 10 5 - 26 34.7<br />
Data source: Kindly supplied by Dr. David Chamberlain (pers. comm.)<br />
Number of parasites emerging (days after<br />
collection)<br />
14<br />
%<br />
parasitism<br />
Dr Chamberlain’s observations on the abundance of the encyrtid parasite Aenasius sp. certainly<br />
fit with field observations of declining mealybug infestations starting in 2008 with a continuing<br />
decline into 2009. Given continuing high levels of parasitism, one should be confident to<br />
anticipate that the mealybug populations will be reduced to very low levels and assuming that<br />
they are not triggered off again, should now be able to held in check by their natural enemies. In<br />
this regard, the current introduction of the mealybug destroying ladybird Cryptolaemus<br />
montrouzieri by CABI can only help in assisting to keep the mealybug populations in check.
What is the long term solution to the mealybug menace? Pakistan entomologists need to do<br />
some basic research on the ecology of the mealybug and its natural enemies to determine what<br />
the trigger for the mealybug population explosion was in 2005-2007. If and when this trigger is<br />
identified and it can be attributed to be caused by human activities, then all management efforts<br />
should be made to ensure that this trigger is never again activated.<br />
2.3 Lack of a professional seed industry<br />
Pakistani cotton growers have been plagued with this problem for many years. The result is that<br />
the planting seed they have been supplied with often has poor germination and is mostly lacking<br />
in genetic purity because of breeding shortcuts, haste to market and seed contamination, often<br />
at the gin. Growers often end up trying to manage a mixture of varieties in the one field so that<br />
any one crop management decision may not necessarily be the best one for all the varieties in<br />
the field. For example in the picture below, there is a pure seed production block in the<br />
background, rogued for off types. In the foreground, is a commercial field of the same variety<br />
with clearly a range of different types and maturities in the same field, including even desi cotton<br />
(Gossypium arboreum) off types.<br />
Pure seed<br />
production block<br />
Same variety, commercial<br />
seed, separated by road<br />
Desi cotton<br />
contaminants<br />
This has been an on-going problem for the conventional seed market and will become even<br />
more important for the developing transgenic cotton seed market. Quality assurance is critical<br />
15
for transgenic seed production otherwise you can end up with mixed and/or segregating seed<br />
which gives rise to a number of problems, such as: 1) Bt resistance risk – bollworm larvae can<br />
crawl between Bt and non-Bt plants to recover from Bt poisoning; and 2) yield loss from the non-<br />
Bt plants in the field which are unprotected from bollworm attack. In fact, research from the US<br />
has shown that for every 1% loss in Bt purity, the farmer loses 0.5 - 0.9% yield, depending on<br />
the pest pressure 3 . For example, if Bt purity is only at 90%, then growers would suffer a 5%<br />
yield loss under low bollworm pressure, up to 9% under high bollworm pressure. These potential<br />
yield losses are significant enough in their own right, let alone the risk to the future efficacy of Bt<br />
cotton.<br />
There are other consequences of the lack of a professional seed industry, such as the following:<br />
1) Growers held to ransom by the uncontrolled seed mafia<br />
2) Unauthorised introduction of Bt cotton<br />
3) New varieties are sometimes released prematurely just to exploit the novelty marketing factor<br />
without adding significantly to the range of grower choice<br />
The smooth leaf variety in<br />
the centre of this jassid<br />
screening trial indicates<br />
the potential severity of<br />
jassid damage<br />
4) The foreign germplasm introduced as the unauthorized Bt donor is not necessarily adapted to<br />
the local environmental or pest and disease conditions. For example, most potential Bt donor<br />
varieties from the US, China and Australia are smooth leaf and therefore susceptible to jassid<br />
attack. They are also usually very susceptible to CLCV and not generally heat tolerant. This<br />
means that the Bt backcrossing introgression programme needs to be conducted with<br />
scrupulous attention to detail with sufficient enough backcross generations (maybe even up to<br />
BC6) to breed out the unwanted traits. If not, then these unwanted traits such as jassid and<br />
3 Agi, A.L., Mahaffey, J.S., Bradley Jr., J.R. & Van Duyn, J.W. (2001) Journal of Cotton Science 5: 74-80<br />
16
CLCV tolerance will segregate in the subsequent commercial crops and will be observed to<br />
varying degrees in growers’ fields, adding to the growers’ yield loss problems. This is already<br />
happening in commercial planting seed of unauthorized Bt with many growers observing more<br />
jassid and CLCV damage than they would normally expect in such a variety.<br />
The extent of the problem of lack of genetic purity in commercial crops is difficult to quantify but<br />
a survey of commercial cotton crops by the Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (PARC) in<br />
the 2007 season gives an idea of the degree of the problem.<br />
Sindh Punjab<br />
% of crop as Bt cotton 80% 50%<br />
Planting seed source Gins private<br />
% off types noted 10-20% 10-20%<br />
% fake Bt 10% 5%<br />
% mixed Bt or segregating 15% 4%<br />
The problem seems worse in the Sindh, maybe because it started first with Bt cotton or maybe<br />
because the seed was sourced from potentially contaminated seed from gins. Nevertheless,<br />
these figures paint an alarming picture which can only become worse over time if nothing is<br />
done to improve the Pakistani cottonseed industry.<br />
Why then is there no professional cottonseed industry in Pakistan, as there is in, say, India?<br />
Government policy over the years has pushed for a public breeding and seed supply system but<br />
this has clearly not delivered. There are no incentives for the private seed sector investment and<br />
no Intellectual Property (IP) protection for the development of new germplasm. The draft Plant<br />
Breeders Rights Act must be enacted as soon as possible and once in place, must be enforced.<br />
Patent protection laws are already in place for the protection of new technologies and traits but<br />
they must be regarded and enforced if necessary. These protections will benefit both local<br />
public and private and multinational seed sector and technology companies and will most<br />
definitely encourage the development of a professional seed industry in Pakistan.<br />
A viable private seed sector must be encouraged and supported in Pakistan. In addition to the<br />
IP protection measures mentioned above, the following actions are strongly recommended:<br />
1) Pass the Seed Act 1976 amendment to include the private sector.<br />
17
2) Ensure all private seed sector companies have open access to any public germplasm<br />
releases, on the same commercial royalty terms. Public seed companies, such as the Punjab<br />
Seed Corporation, should be treated no differently.<br />
3) Ensure that public sector and private sector variety approvals are treated equally and that<br />
the approval process is not influenced by the parties with vested interests.<br />
India took a different path to professionalise its cottonseed industry. It made a conscious effort<br />
about 30-40 years ago to develop hybrid cotton which took a while to develop but which now<br />
accounts for about 70% of the Indian cottonseed market. Heterosis or hybrid vigour in cotton so<br />
far has been much less than that experienced in other crops such as corn, sorghum and<br />
sunflowers (say around 5% at most versus 20% or so for these other crops), so hybrid cotton<br />
was adopted more for higher quality seed (better germination and genetic purity) than for hybrid<br />
vigour. The adoption of hybrid cotton in India then allowed a private seed sector to develop as<br />
growers had to now buy fresh seed each year (de facto IP protection if you like). The growers<br />
were also happy as they were now being supplied with genetically pure, high quality planting<br />
seed with good germination and seedling vigour. The growers were prepared to pay more for<br />
the more expensive hybrid cotton seed as it delivered growers a greater economic benefit and<br />
seed companies were prepared to invest in plant breeding and seed processing improvements<br />
as they were assured of a return on their investments. So the Indian cottonseed industry has<br />
flourished and India has been able to enjoy the benefits of a professional cottonseed industry<br />
with ready access to the full range of currently available transgenic technologies for cotton and<br />
no doubt continuing access to the pipeline of future transgenic technologies in cotton. So what<br />
about the possibility of developing a hybrid cotton industry in Pakistan?<br />
Hybrid cotton production is a very labour intensive process with most commercial production<br />
requiring hand emasculation in the afternoon and hand pollination the following morning. Hand<br />
emasculation is the most demanding task and does require a level of dexterity and children are<br />
preferred for this task. So this has led to the problem of the use of child labour in hybrid cotton<br />
production systems in India and China. While this may be considered less of a problem for local<br />
seed companies, it is a very significant issue for multinational seed companies who are at an<br />
economic disadvantage as they do not support this practice. This would also be a problem for<br />
Pakistan, in addition to the problem of having no experience base in the practice of hybrid<br />
cottonseed production. In comparison, India has 30-40 years of experience, and a specialized<br />
hybrid cottonseed industry is already in place with dedicated hybrid cottonseed producing<br />
districts and villages with professional “organizers”.<br />
18
There are two other conventional hybrid production systems used but these do have their own<br />
set of problems and are not that widely used. These are: 1) Genetic Male Sterility is used but<br />
you have to rogue out the 50% fertile plants in the seed production fields and the yield drag from<br />
heat stress is around 3-5%. It is a complex two gene recessive system and requires a longer<br />
backcrossing programme; and 2) Cytoplasmic Male Sterility is rarely used because of the<br />
unacceptable 8-10% yield loss due to heat sensitivity.<br />
In addition to the lack of any history of hybrid cottonseed production infrastructure and<br />
experience in Pakistan, there are a number of other major technical and logistical difficulties.<br />
These are discussed below briefly.<br />
Technical problems<br />
1) Lack of suitable seed production areas – it is generally too hot in the central Pakistan cotton<br />
belt for successful hybrid cottonseed production. Seed production will either have to be in the<br />
milder northern Punjab or southern Sindh to avoid excessive heat during the seed production<br />
period. However, in the more industrialized north there will be competition for labour and in the<br />
south, it may be too wet for reliable production of high quality seed.<br />
2) Lack of compensatory ability in low planting density hybrids – because of the higher cost of<br />
hybrid seed, it is planted at a much lower planting rate than that used for varieties. Hybrid cotton<br />
is planted at around 1 kg per acre in the Indian Punjab and varieties are planted at around 5-8<br />
kg per acre in Pakistan. So debilitating problems like CLCV and jassids (which severely affect<br />
the growth and productivity of infected/infested plants), become much more important problems<br />
as the same percentage infection at low planting rates will cause significantly more production<br />
losses because of the reduced compensatory ability. For example in the two photos below, we<br />
can clearly see the reduced biomass production capability in the substantial bare areas<br />
surrounding the badly affected plants.<br />
Hybrid<br />
cottonseed<br />
production in<br />
China<br />
19
Logistical problems<br />
It will be very hard to quickly ramp up the hybrid production capability in Pakistan from a zero<br />
base to a level that can effectively meet the hybrid seed demands for a 3.2m hectare cotton<br />
industry in Pakistan. While not an impossible task, it could take up to 10 years or so to develop<br />
a viable hybrid cottonseed production industry in Pakistan using currently available systems. For<br />
example, if you have say 200 seed production farms or villages at 20 acres each, this will give<br />
you 4,000 acres of seed production capability. Given current production capabilities, this should<br />
produce enough planting seed for 100,000 hectares at a variety competitive planting rate of 2 kg<br />
hybrid seed per hectare and this would meet only 3% of the country’s needs. The estimated<br />
labour requirement to do this would be 300 workers per 20 acre farm or seed production village<br />
per day from August to mid September. In addition, the production cost of this seed would be<br />
high at around 500 PR per kg of black seed compared to around 30 PR/kg black for varietal<br />
seed.<br />
2.4 Weeds<br />
Weeds are a major yield constraint in Pakistan cotton production but surprisingly are hardly<br />
mentioned by anyone as a problem. Perhaps people are fatalistic about weeds and just accept<br />
that they cannot do much about them and take the yield losses. But herbicide tolerant cottons<br />
will offer growers a new weed control tool.<br />
Left – CLCV in<br />
Pakistan. Note<br />
hybrid in front<br />
– variety at<br />
back.<br />
Right – Jassid<br />
damage in<br />
India<br />
There are a number of herbicide tolerant technologies currently available in cotton from multiple<br />
technology suppliers and some which will become available in the near term. In fact, the first<br />
cotton biotech product to be commercialised was BXN cotton from Calgene in 1995 (technology<br />
went to Bayer and now withdrawn). This was an herbicide tolerant cotton resistant to<br />
bromoxynil, a photosystems II photosynthesis inhibitor (HRAC [Herbicide Resistance Action<br />
20
Committee] mode of action class C3). This was followed in 1997 by Monsanto’s Roundup<br />
Ready cotton resistant to glyphosate, an aromatic amino acid inhibitor at EPSP synthase<br />
(HRAC mode of action class G).<br />
This first version of glyphosate tolerant cotton had full vegetative (that is pre-squaring) tolerance<br />
but only limited reproductive (that is squaring, flowering, boll development and maturation)<br />
tolerance to glyphosate resulting in glyphosate use in this initial technology being restricted to 2<br />
over-the-top sprays before the 4 true leaf stage followed by up to another 2 possible post-<br />
directed sprays to the base of the plant until row closure. Full vegetative and reproductive<br />
tolerance to glyphosate was not achieved until the release of Monsanto’s improved 2-gene<br />
Roundup Ready Flex technology in 2006 which allowed growers much greater flexibility in<br />
glyphosate spray applications (up to 3 over-the-top sprays to 16 nodes and one post-directed<br />
spray from 16-22 nodes plus 1 end-of-season spray if required).<br />
The only other herbicide tolerant biotech trait commercialised so far is Bayer’s Liberty Link<br />
cotton back in 2004, which is resistant to glufosinate, a glutamine synthesis inhibitor (HRAC<br />
mode of action class H). So far this technology has not been out-licensed in cotton but cross-<br />
licensing agreements have been announced in other crops and just recently in cotton.<br />
Weed control is compounded by the CLCV problem<br />
Monsanto has also announced that it is developing a second herbicide tolerance trait to stack<br />
with Roundup Ready Flex. This new cotton technology will confer resistance to dicamba, a<br />
synthetic auxin growth regulator (HRAC mode of action class O). This should certainly help<br />
address the developing concerns over the increasing number of glyphosate resistant weeds<br />
which will be further exacerbated by the wider and more liberal application window afforded by<br />
21
the introduction of Roundup Ready Flex cotton in 2006. However, there may be volatility and<br />
drift issues with dicamba herbicide which will have to be closely watched and managed if<br />
required.<br />
Bayer is proposing a 2-gene stacked Glytol / Liberty Link herbicide tolerant technology. Glytol<br />
will be Bayer’s own glyphosate resistance technology which will be stacked with their current<br />
Liberty Link (glufosinate resistant) technology.<br />
Dow has also announced the development of its own 2-gene stacked DHT herbicide tolerant<br />
technology. DHT stands for Dow Agrosciences Herbicide Tolerance Trait and is based on<br />
resistance to 2 separate herbicide classes: the synthetic auxin growth regulators (HRAC mode<br />
of action class O) and the aryloxy phenoxy propionate or “fop” herbicides (HRAC mode of action<br />
class A). Once again, this should help to manage potential herbicide resistance problems but<br />
the auxinic herbicides do present potential volatility and drift management issues.<br />
Syngenta is also developing its own glyphosate tolerant cotton technology (Touchdown<br />
Tolerance).<br />
Dupont has also recently announced the development of its new OPTIMUM GAT herbicide<br />
tolerance technology for cotton and other field crops. OPTIMUM is an umbrella brand name and<br />
GAT stands for Glyphosate ALS Tolerant which is based on resistance to 2 separate herbicide<br />
classes: glyphosate and the acetolactate synthase (ALS) inhibitor herbicides such as the<br />
sulfonylureas and imidazolinones (HRAC mode of action class B). The OPTIMUM technology is<br />
based on DuPont’s proprietary “gene shuffling” technique to optimise expression/activity of<br />
candidate transgenes. Once again, this will certainly help in the management of potential<br />
herbicide resistance problems.<br />
However, it should also be noted that in Pakistan, weeds serve an important function for the<br />
local villagers who harvest them for forage for their household livestock. This source of historical<br />
“free fodder” should be recognized and alternatives devised if and when herbicide tolerant<br />
technologies are adopted, so that underprivileged villagers are not disadvantaged.<br />
The recommendation for herbicide tolerant technologies in Pakistan is to go straight to<br />
Monsanto’s Roundup Ready Flex glyphosate tolerant cotton and to stack it with double gene<br />
Bollgard 2 or triple gene Bollgard 3 (to be discussed later). There is no point in delaying as all<br />
these technologies are available here and now for introgression into local germplasm. Other<br />
potential technology providers should also be consulted.<br />
22
HRAC Herbicide Tolerance Classes in Cotton<br />
A = fops & dims<br />
B = su’s & imi’s<br />
C = BXN<br />
G = glyphosate<br />
H = glufosinate<br />
O = auxins<br />
DOW<br />
A<br />
DOW<br />
O<br />
DOW<br />
MON<br />
MON<br />
2.5 High input costs and water scarcity<br />
Like most farmers around the world, Pakistan cotton farmers are being hit by rising input costs,<br />
particularly diesel and fertilizer costs. The cost of pumping water is being exacerbated by the<br />
disruption of electricity supplies with extra demands on diesel to maintain pumping capacity.<br />
While these issues are extremely important to growers, they are beyond the remit of this review<br />
and will not be discussed further here.<br />
In regards to the claim of water scarcity, some people suggest it is not a matter of the shortage<br />
of water but more an inefficient management of its supply and distribution. I suspect this is<br />
probably the case from what I have seen and read but again, this is not part of the remit of this<br />
G<br />
MON<br />
DuPont<br />
Bayer<br />
SYT<br />
MON / Bayer 3-way stack<br />
G + O + H<br />
DuPont<br />
Bayer<br />
H<br />
B<br />
Bayer<br />
DuPont<br />
Bayer<br />
C3<br />
23
eview and will not be discussed further here except to say there should be more research on<br />
WUE (Water Use Efficiency) in cotton in Pakistan. Consider the following figures 4 :<br />
WUE in Australia - 227 kg lint produced per megalitre of water used<br />
WUE in Egypt - 136 kg lint produced per megalitre of water used<br />
WUE in Pakistan - 50 kg lint produced per megalitre of water used<br />
There is certainly lots of room for improvement in WUE in Pakistan.<br />
2.6 Bollworms<br />
Bollworms and armyworms have been a consistent but variable constraint on cotton production<br />
in Pakistan requiring in most years 4 to 5 sprays. Up until the last couple of years, these have<br />
been controlled with varying levels of success by conventional synthetic insecticides. With the<br />
wide scale introduction of unauthorized MON 531 cotton (effectively Bollgard 1 cotton), the pest<br />
status of the majority of these pests in cotton has declined.<br />
There are a number of insecticide tolerant technologies currently available in cotton from<br />
multiple technology suppliers and some which will become available in the near term.<br />
Currently available insect tolerance cotton technologies are:<br />
1) Monsanto’s (MON 531) Bollgard 1 – introduced in the US and Australia in 1996, contains Cry<br />
1Ac protein from Bacillus thuringiensis. It is effective on a range of lepidopteran (chewing<br />
caterpillar) pests, including all the main ones in cotton (American bollworm, spiny and spotted<br />
bollworms and pink bollworm) but is only marginally effective on Spodoptera armyworm. It has<br />
high efficacy for around 100 days after planting, thereafter efficacy gradually declines; so some<br />
supplementary spraying may still be required, depending on pest pressure. MON 531 was<br />
brought into Pakistan unofficially and backcrossed into local germplasm. It has been adopted<br />
widely across the whole of the Pakistan cotton belt and would account now for around 80% of<br />
the cotton plantings in Sindh province and around 60% in the Punjab. MON 531 has not yet<br />
been approved by the Pakistan regulatory authorities so it currently has unauthorized regulatory<br />
status, although there are now efforts to rectify this situation. Monsanto never applied for a<br />
patent on MON 531 in Pakistan so it is legal to use Bollgard 1 technology in Pakistan. The<br />
situation on exports of textile products made from lint from unpatented Bollgard 1 cotton grown<br />
in Pakistan into countries where MON 531 has patent protection, has been examined in detail<br />
by the Government of Punjab Task Force on Promotion of Bt Cotton in Punjab (June 2008 –<br />
4 Irrigation of Cotton – The ICAC Recorder Vol 21(4) Dec 2003 pp. 4-9<br />
24
Findings & Recommendations). Their conclusion is that the case law studies so far indicate that<br />
MON 531 protection in North America and the EU (where it is patented), does not extend to<br />
import of products made from cotton plants containing Bt genes. Their conclusion on this is<br />
quote: “It is now crystal clear that in the absence of patent protection on MON 531, plant<br />
breeders and molecular biologists have a legitimate right (without jeopardizing Pakistan’s<br />
commercial interests in export markets) to use MON 531 for improvement of cotton and other<br />
crops in Pakistan.”<br />
2) Monsanto’s (MON 15985) Bollgard 2 – introduced in the US and Australia in 2002, contains<br />
Cry 1Ac and Cry 2Ab proteins from Bacillus thuringiensis. This certainly improved efficacy<br />
longevity and the range of pests controlled (now much more effective on Spodoptera<br />
armyworms), as well as greatly enhancing the potential durability of the technology from a<br />
Resistance Management perspective. Monsanto has broadly out-licensed this technology which<br />
is also patented in Pakistan.<br />
3) Dow’s WideStrike® – introduced in the US in 2004, contains Cry 1Ac and Cry 1F proteins<br />
from Bacillus thuringiensis. WideStrike® has not yet been commercialized outside the US but<br />
Dow has done some cross-licensing deals with Monsanto. Efficacy on New World Heliothis<br />
virescens has been excellent but it is unclear yet how well it will work on Old World bollworms.<br />
4) Chinese Bt – introduced in China in 1997 by Biocentury from research out of the CAAS<br />
(Chinese Academy of Sciences). Two technologies were introduced: a single gene product (a<br />
‘fused’ Cry 1Ac/Cry 1Ab gene from Bacillus thuringiensis) and a 2-gene stacked product also<br />
containing CpTi (a trypsin inhibitor from cowpea). It is unclear if the 2-gene product is still being<br />
sold but there are claims that the single Cry 1Ac/1Ab-fusion gene technology accounts for<br />
around 80% of Bt cotton sales in China. However, Monsanto’s Bollgard 1 technology was also<br />
commercialised at the same time as the CAAS technology so it is almost impossible to<br />
accurately determine the surviving technology mix in China’s current varieties. Biocentury has<br />
also just received permission to commercialise its Cry 1Ac/Cry 1Ab-fusion technology in Indian<br />
cotton hybrids and is actively pursuing other markets and licensees. There have been mixed<br />
reports on efficacy of the Chinese Bts.<br />
5) Indian Bt – introduced in India in 2007 by the local Indian seed company JK Agrigenetics.<br />
This is single gene insect tolerant cotton utilising a modified Cry 1Ac protein from Bacillus<br />
thuringiensis developed by the Indian Institute of Technology at Kharagpur. Efficacy is unknown.<br />
25
Following is a list of insect tolerance cotton technologies that are likely to be available in the<br />
market in the near term.<br />
1) Monsanto’s Bollgard 3 – Monsanto has recently announced a proposed 2014 global release<br />
date for their new Bollgard 3 product (subject to a favorable regulatory approval process). It will<br />
be a breeding stack of the current Bollgard 2 with the Vip 3A gene to be licensed in from<br />
Syngenta. This should improve the potential durability of the technology from a Resistance<br />
Management perspective and may also enhance the efficacy and range against some<br />
lepidopteran pests.<br />
2) Monsanto’s Lygus bug (sucking insect) tolerance - Monsanto has also announced its work to<br />
develop Lygus bug tolerance which, if successful, will be the first transgenic technology to work<br />
on non-lepidopteran sucking insects. However, highly mobile insects such as the heteropteran<br />
mirids which have damaging adult as well as juvenile stages, will present a real challenge for<br />
insecticidal transgenes which have to be ingested first to work.<br />
3) Bayer’s TwinLink® - Bayer is also developing its own Twin Link 2-gene insect control<br />
technology based on Cry 1Ab and Cry 2Ae from Bacillus thuringiensis. This will be stacked with<br />
the proposed 2-gene stacked Glytol / Liberty Link herbicide tolerant technology.<br />
4) Syngenta’s VipCot® - Syngenta is also close to commercialisation of its 2-gene stacked<br />
VipCot insect control technology based on Cry 1Ab and Vip 3A from Bacillus thuringiensis. The<br />
Cry 1Ab endotoxin protein is very similar to the Cry 1Ab and Cry 1Ac proteins used by all the<br />
other companies but the Vip 3a exotoxin has a unique mode of action and will be a very useful<br />
component for future resistance management programmes for insecticidal transgenic cottons.<br />
However, the recent acquisition of Syngenta’s VipCot commercialisation partner Delta and Pine<br />
Land Company leaves some uncertainty as to the commercial future of this technology.<br />
5) CAMB Bt – CAMB (Centre for Applied Molecular Biology in Lahore) has isolated its own local<br />
versions of Cry 1Ab and Cry 2A from Bacillus thuringiensis and has been granted a patent in<br />
Pakistan in 2005 (Patent # 138279). Commercial agreements have been made with at least one<br />
local company for use of this technology in cotton (both single and double gene variants) and<br />
biosafety studies are proceeding. Backcrossing into elite local cultivars has also started.<br />
There are also a number of other companies/institutes developing various insecticidal<br />
transgenic cottons based on Cry proteins derived from Bacillus thuringiensis, including the<br />
Central Institute for Cotton Research in India (for Gossypium arboreum as well as G. hirsutum)<br />
and NIBGE in Pakistan. An Australian company Hexima is also developing insecticidal<br />
26
transgenic cotton based on 2-gene stacked proteinase inhibitors from ornamental tobacco and<br />
potatoes.<br />
PIs<br />
Hexima<br />
Insecticidal Proteins in Cotton<br />
VIP 3A<br />
SYT<br />
Metahelix<br />
Cry 1C<br />
MON MON / / SYT SYT 3-way 3-way stack stack<br />
Cry Cry 1Ac 1Ac + + Cry Cry 2Ab 2Ab + + Vip Vip 3A 3A<br />
SYT<br />
Meta<br />
helix<br />
CpTi<br />
China<br />
Cry 1Ab/c<br />
China<br />
MON<br />
Bayer<br />
DuPont<br />
MON<br />
Bayer<br />
DuPont<br />
DOW<br />
NBRI<br />
Chinese Bt<br />
SYT<br />
Metahelix<br />
JK Agrigenetics<br />
ICGEB<br />
CICR<br />
NIBGE NBRI<br />
CAMB<br />
Cry 2Ab/e<br />
Cry 1E<br />
NBRI<br />
DOW<br />
MON<br />
Bayer<br />
DuPont<br />
DOW<br />
Cry 1F<br />
Bollworms in Pakistan are currently considered under control in Pakistan due to the wide scale<br />
adoption of unauthorized MON 531 Bt cotton but as stated previously in the section on the<br />
organization of the Pakistan cottonseed industry, this could be soon at risk. A lack of proper<br />
Quality Assurance procedures during seed production and backcrossing during the Bt gene<br />
introgression process, has resulted in widespread significant plantings of “de facto seed mixes”.<br />
These are a considerable threat to the continued viability of Bt cotton and these problems<br />
should be rectified as soon as possible if Pakistan is to continue benefiting from the bollworm<br />
control afforded by Bt cotton.<br />
27
The key factors affecting the development of resistance to Bt cotton will be addressed later but it<br />
is clear that Pakistan should be planning now for the introduction of pyramided or stacked gene<br />
products for bollworm control. It is much more difficult for insects to develop resistance to two or<br />
more combined toxins than it is for them to develop resistance to the same toxins presented<br />
individually and sequentially.<br />
This then brings the first of a number of recommendations concerning the adoption of insect<br />
tolerant cottons for the Pakistan cotton industry:-<br />
1) It is strongly recommended that Pakistan introduce Bollgard 2 or 3 (and other stacked<br />
insecticidal transgenes) as soon as possible and that this should be done through a professional<br />
cottonseed industry. Do not delay because of the current high resistance risk to segregating and<br />
mixed single gene Bollgard 1. Stack this with Roundup Ready Flex.<br />
2) Negotiate with Monsanto for either a one-off fee or a per kg based technology fee. Details of<br />
both these pricing models have been communicated separately. The subsidy could be gradually<br />
phased out after, say, 5-10 years. Pricing should be based on parity for the same product sold<br />
in the Indian Punjab. Explore alternative funding sources e.g. US aid funds.<br />
3) Negotiate also with other potential technology providers.<br />
4) As part of the Tech Fee, ask for training in introgression breeding and genetic purity Quality<br />
Assurance. Ideally, a Centre of Excellence for this should be set up in Pakistan.<br />
5) Independently check to verify the efficacy of all potential Bt cottons against a standard<br />
reference technology (e.g. Bollgard 1 for single gene Bts and Bollgard 2 for double gene Bts).<br />
This should be done in side by side replicated field tests, artificially infested if need be.<br />
6) Ask for information on primers for all new Bt technologies to be lodged in all regulatory<br />
applications (Commercial-in-Confidence if required) so that potential future disputes on genetic<br />
integrity of commercial products can be effectively investigated.<br />
7) As a matter of urgency, set up a Bt Resistance Monitoring facility in Pakistan so that any<br />
changes in bollworm susceptibility to Bt toxins can be closely tracked.<br />
8) Improve and develop local Bio-Safety Evaluation capacity so that the relevant Pakistan<br />
authorities are capable of following the world’s best practice in the evaluation of new GM<br />
regulatory applications. This should involve training in such places as the US/Canada and/or<br />
Australia as well as contact with such organizations as the International Society for Bio-Safety<br />
Research (http://www.isbr.info/) and the International Life Sciences Institute<br />
28
(http://www.ilsi.org/AboutILSI/IFBIC/). Attendance at relevant conferences should also be<br />
encouraged.<br />
3. Research<br />
Research is essential to underpin a large number of the objectives suggested here in this report.<br />
Unfortunately, the current research system is failing the growers, not for want of talent from<br />
many of the researchers but a failure of the system to allow researchers the freedom to operate<br />
their research programmes effectively. The bureaucracy beats them. The system has to be<br />
changed if Pakistan is to resolve the problems identified in this report.<br />
The competitive funding model being suggested by Dr. Mubarak Ali of the Punjab Agricultural<br />
Research Board (PARB) is a refreshing novel approach to the funding model for agricultural<br />
research in Pakistan and I strongly recommend that it should be implemented as soon as<br />
possible.<br />
I can also see a need to set up a new Cotton Research & Development Corporation sponsored<br />
specialist cotton research facility. This should be set up anew so that it can be unencumbered<br />
by previous organizational structures. Funding for this could come from the current industry<br />
surcharges and taxes. For example, APTMA currently pays US$ 28m per year in surcharges<br />
and cesses to support cotton research in Pakistan while the ginners currently pay another US<br />
$5m per year in cesses.<br />
4. Future Pipeline Technologies<br />
Pakistan needs to enter the mainstream science and technology arena with strong IP laws and<br />
enforcement. This will allow Pakistan prompt access to future technologies and breakthroughs.<br />
Otherwise, Pakistan will be left behind scrambling for outdated technologies or left to fend for<br />
itself.<br />
There are a number of new transgenic technologies being worked on around the world of<br />
relevance to cotton, in addition to those insect and herbicide tolerant technologies mentioned<br />
previously. Most are output traits but there are also some new input traits for disease and<br />
nematode control. Some of the more important ones are:<br />
• Drought tolerance from Monsanto (getting closer to commercial release) and other<br />
companies<br />
29
• Disease tolerance, especially Fusarium and Verticillium tolerance in Australia and CLCV<br />
tolerance in India and Pakistan<br />
• Nematode tolerance in the US<br />
• Yield enhancement (including improved photosynthetic ability)<br />
• Improved nutrient use efficiency<br />
• Tolerance to high temperatures<br />
• Chilling tolerance<br />
• Salt tolerance<br />
• Water logging tolerance<br />
• Improved oil quality (e.g. healthier high oleic cottonseed oils)<br />
• Improved fibre quality (length, strength etc)<br />
• Fabric quality (e.g. Bayer’s work on flame retardance, improved chemical reactivity and anti-<br />
wrinkle)<br />
• Coloured cotton (so far unsuccessful)<br />
• Novel insect control products (e.g. Dow’s work on toxins from Photorhabdus and<br />
Xenorhabdus symbionts from entomopathogenic nematodes) and toxins from spiders,<br />
scorpions, ant lions, parasitic wasps, etc., and lectins, cyclotides, monoterpenes,<br />
peroxidases, etc.<br />
There are also a range of new biotechnologies to facilitate cotton breeding. Recent discoveries<br />
in cotton genomics have facilitated new biotechnology tools to help cotton breeders breed better<br />
cottons. New Marker-Aided Selection tools will help breeders select for rare traits of economic<br />
value or those left behind during the domestication of crops. Biotechnology breakthroughs will<br />
allow much of this previously tedious work to be conducted more efficiently by moving testing<br />
from the field to the lab. Gene chip microarrays will also allow the identification of large numbers<br />
(+ 10,000) of short sequences of DNA or RNA at one time which will allow the simultaneous<br />
tracking of many genes for complex traits such as fibre quality and stress tolerance.<br />
5. Insecticide Resistance Management<br />
I have already addressed the issue of preferentially using Bt genes in pyramided stacks rather<br />
than deploying them individually and sequentially. A number of researchers have modeled the<br />
various factors which can affect the rate of anticipated resistance development to Bt toxins in<br />
30
transgenic plants. In the following figure, Dr. Rick Roush 5 has modeled the impact of either<br />
using two genes stacked together from the start such as in Bollgard 2 (pyramid line in the figure)<br />
or using one of them alone first, such as in Bollgard 1, and then introducing the second after<br />
resistance has developed to the first gene (sequence line in the figure). The starting resistance<br />
gene allele frequency which is normally used is 10 -4 (I in 10,000). There are normally 4-5<br />
generations of American bollworm per year and of these about 2-3 would be subject to selection<br />
pressure each year, so the number of generations for 50% of the population to develop<br />
resistance (on the vertical axis in the figure, note this is a log scale) should be divided by 2-3 to<br />
work out the anticipated viability of a technology in years. So pyramided gene technologies<br />
would be anticipated to last 150 to 250 years and single genes used sequentially 6-9 years.<br />
Clearly, it is highly advantageous to progress to pyramided (Cry 1Ac + Cry 2Ab) Bollgard 2<br />
before using up the efficacy of Cry 1Ac alone in Bollgard 1 and the triple gene stack Bollgard 3<br />
would be even better.<br />
The role of refuges is also important to discuss. In Australia and the US, separate conventional<br />
refuge crops were mandated to be used to allow production of Bt susceptible moths to allow<br />
dilution of any resistant moths selected in the transgenic Bt crops. The size of these compulsory<br />
refuge crops varied from 5-10% (if they were left unsprayed) of the total planted Bt cotton area<br />
in the US and Australia, respectively. A similar requirement was mandated in India but adoption<br />
of these conventional unsprayed refuge areas will always be problematic in small scale<br />
agriculture such as practised in India, China and elsewhere. In these cases, it is argued that<br />
5 Roush, R. T. 1997. Managing Resistance to Transgenic Crops. pp. 271-294, in Advances in Insect Control: The Role of<br />
Transgenic Plants, N. Carozzi and M. Koziel, eds. Taylor and Francis (London)<br />
31
whatever natural refuges are available will dilute any resistant moths. This may or may not be<br />
the case as the refuges have to be: 1) sufficient in moth production capacity to dilute resistant<br />
moths from any Bt crops; 2) close enough to the Bt crops to ensure cross mating; and 3)<br />
producing moths at the same time as the Bt crops, also to ensure cross mating. These<br />
conditions may not necessarily be met in all cases, so resistance risk will be generally greater in<br />
these scenarios. The resistance risk will be greatly enhanced if these countries then deploy the<br />
same Bt toxins as found in Bt cotton (such as Cry 1Ab/c), in these other deemed refuge crops<br />
which would then not be diluting resistance but simply adding to it. This could be happening<br />
soon in many developing countries with plans to incorporate Cry 1Ab/c Bt toxin into current<br />
bollworm conventional refuge crops such as corn, chick peas, sorghum etc.<br />
The efficacy of the various Bt technologies is also an important factor in designing or evaluating<br />
the requirement for refuge size. Efficacy is defined as the ability for a Bt cotton plant to kill<br />
heterozygous larvae in the field. Heterozygous bollworm larvae carry only one of the two<br />
potential resistance alleles and are the commonest individuals found in the early stages of<br />
resistance development. These are the individuals that are targeted for mating with susceptible<br />
refuge moths so that resistance alleles can be kept heterozygous (that is single) rather than<br />
homozygous (that is carrying two copies and thus being more resistant and usually harder to<br />
control). The following figure shows Roush’s model for the varying estimated kill levels of<br />
Bollgard 1 and Bollgard 2 compared to a relative poor performing Bt technology. In this case, we<br />
are looking for the necessary refuge sizes for each of these Bt technologies to keep resistance<br />
under control for say 20 generations, (equals 7-10 years). This is where the thin horizontal line<br />
at 20 generations in the figure below, meets the three vertical red lines representing the varying<br />
levels of field efficacy.<br />
32
This model shows that for the poor expressing, lower efficacy sub-standard Bt that 20%<br />
unsprayed refuges would be required but only 10% and 2% refuges would be required for<br />
Bollgard 1 and Bollgard 2, respectively. To get 40 generations (14-20 years) of resistance<br />
management, you would need to increase the Bollgard 1 and Bollgard 2 refuges, to 20% and<br />
5%, respectively while the poor expressing Bt technology would blow out to over 50% estimated<br />
(see figure below).<br />
1<br />
0<br />
Poor expressing Bt<br />
High Dose & Refuges<br />
BG1 BG2<br />
33
The models above clearly indicate the importance of high dose (which equals high efficacy) in<br />
managing resistance. This is why checking for efficacy in the range of various commercially<br />
available Bt products is so critical. You should always choose the most efficacious products and<br />
reject the poorer performing products which are a greater resistance risk requiring much larger<br />
refuges. This is all the more important where structured refuges are not possible and where<br />
natural refuges are all that are available. In these situations, the higher efficacy products will<br />
require less natural refuge than the lower efficacy products for the same level of resistance<br />
management. This is why the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently removed the<br />
5% structured refuge requirement for Bollgard 2 in most of the US cotton belt but still maintained<br />
the 5% refuge for Bollgard 1. They argued that the natural refuges were satisfactory for the<br />
more efficacious Bollgard 2 product in most cases.<br />
1<br />
0<br />
Poor expressing Bt<br />
High Dose & Refuges<br />
BG1 BG2<br />
34
6. Sources for Germplasm and Public Sector Technologies<br />
The cotton breeders in Pakistan have already good connections with many of the publically<br />
available cotton germplasm resources. In fact, many of these have already been exploited in<br />
trying to identify new sources of CLCV resistance, e.g. the CIRAD cotton germplasm collection,<br />
principally from Africa and Central and South America.<br />
There has also been a recent initiative from Dr. Rafiq Chaudhry at the International Cotton<br />
Advisory Committee (ICAC) to organize a “North-South” germplasm exchange between paired<br />
“sister Cotton Research Institutes” from the northern and southern hemispheres. This is an<br />
excellent idea to facilitate germplasm exchange between public research institutes. However,<br />
there is still a large amount of cotton germplasm in the hands of private institutions and the best<br />
way to get access to this germplasm resource is to encourage and support a viable private seed<br />
sector in Pakistan, as outlined previously.<br />
In regards to access to public-good biotech products and processes, there are really only a few<br />
viable alternatives, other than the public sector universities in the developed countries of<br />
Canada, US, Australia and Europe. Even in these institutions, there is now a push to<br />
commercialise their biotech research efforts, closing off many public-good opportunities. The<br />
main institutions worth approaching on this are:-<br />
CAMBIA in Australia (http://www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/home.html)<br />
ICGEB in Italy (http://www.icgeb.trieste.it/about-the-centre.html)<br />
BRDC in USA (http://www.biordc.com/technolo/a4.htm)<br />
CIMBAA in USA (http://cimbaa.org/)<br />
Crawford Fund in Australia (http://www.crawfordfund.org/about/governors.htm)<br />
IFPRI in USA (http://www.ifpri.org/themes/themes_menu.asp)<br />
Syngenta Foundation<br />
(http://www.syngentafoundation.org/syngenta_foundation_plant_genetic_resources.htm)<br />
The Rockefeller Foundation (http://www.rockfound.org/)<br />
35
7. Summary of Recommendations<br />
1) Enact the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act<br />
2) Pass the Seed Act 1976 amendment to ensure equality to private seed sector<br />
3) Empower the Cotton Research & Development Company (CRDC) with freedom to<br />
operate<br />
4) Establish Centre of Excellence for Cotton R&D as part of the CRDC<br />
5) Commission PARB competitive funding model<br />
6) Negotiate BG 2/3 + RR Flex licence from MON<br />
7) Push for one off or per kg licence fee and explore alternative funding sources<br />
8) Involve multiple technology providers (e.g. Bayer, Syngenta, Dow, Chinese Bt) to ensure<br />
competition<br />
9) Implement interim extension programme to mitigate the economic impact of CLCV<br />
10) Improve Bio-Safety evaluation capacity<br />
11) Set up a Bt Resistance Monitoring facility<br />
36
Changing the Cotton Landscape in Pakistan<br />
Terms of Reference<br />
37<br />
Appendix 1<br />
Cotton is the most important crop in Pakistan and livelihoods of millions of people (directly or<br />
indirectly) depend upon its successful cultivation and processing. There has been considerable<br />
improvement during the last few decades in increasing yield per unit of land and improving<br />
agronomic properties, especially fibre quality. However, both yield and fibre quality is still below<br />
the international standards.<br />
Biotechnology application in agriculture has emerged as a major technical innovation that<br />
promises to increase yields and improve quality. In Pakistan, Bt cotton was introduced through<br />
informal sector in 2002 as a means to reduce crop damage due to bollworms and consequently<br />
improve yields. This was a major step forward, but a number of factors have kept Bt from<br />
realising its full potential. There exists a need for science based analysis of issues concerning<br />
cultivation of Bt cotton and suggesting ways and means of its sustained use in the years to<br />
come. In particular, an in-depth examination is warranted of the ways and means for Pakistan to<br />
move from the current position of lagging far behind other agricultural economies in the<br />
introduction of BT technology to a position at par with the rest of the world wherein it becomes<br />
possible for the most cutting edge BT technology to be introduced in Pakistan at the same time<br />
as it is done in the leading agricultural economies.<br />
With this broad objective, following issues need to be probed specifically.<br />
1) Detailed examination of the prospects of resistance development in cotton bollworms<br />
due to large scale cultivation of informal Bt cotton in Pakistan<br />
Bt cotton presently occupies around 90% and 60% of cotton area in Sindh and Punjab<br />
respectively. In the absence of any regulatory oversight, the level of toxin expression in many Bt<br />
varieties may be less than optimal. This may expedite the development of resistance in cotton<br />
bollworm against Cry toxins. Also, there is no concept of maintaining the 20% refugia as part of<br />
the resistance management strategy. Local experts, however, have discounted such fears on<br />
two grounds: 1) landholdings are fragmented and many different crops are planted side by side;<br />
and 2) double-gene products will be available in the market before resistance has developed.<br />
How serious is the threat of resistance build up and how valid are the arguments of local experts<br />
needs to be carefully examined. To be specific what are the chances of significant resistance<br />
build up happening before the minimum four to five years required for the availability of ‘real’ Bt<br />
technology, or can the current crop of Bt varieties disintegrate in that interim period?<br />
2) Comprehensive examination of the range of biotech products available from<br />
multinational organisations (other than Monsanto) for Pakistani cotton farmers<br />
There is a general impression that Monsanto is the only company which has multiple products<br />
ready for Pakistani markets. Other companies (Dow, Syngenta, Bayer, Pioneer, etc.) either do<br />
not have marketable products or are not vigorously exploring the Pakistani market. In either
case, we need to carefully examine the range of (insect resistant in particular but also other)<br />
products on offer from alternate (i.e. non-Monsanto) sources, and how the access of Pakistani<br />
cotton farmers to these products can be increased.<br />
A related issue is that of Bt 121 – a variety of exotic origin that occupies around 90% of<br />
transgenic cotton area. The variety has so far given good yield and protection against<br />
bollworms. How (and whether) this potential can be sustained is an important concern.<br />
3) Assessment of the suitability of Chinese biotech products for Pakistani cotton<br />
landscape<br />
Government of Punjab as well as many private seed companies are negotiating with the<br />
Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) (through their authorised agents like M/s<br />
Biocentury and M/s Silver Land) for import of various Bt cotton products. The CAAS products<br />
are available at a much lower cost as compared with Monsanto products. But before we make a<br />
decision, the efficacy and effectiveness of CAAS products for Pakistani cotton landscape needs<br />
to be examined critically, especially in comparison with Monsanto products.<br />
4) Identification of international sources of public-good biotech products and processes<br />
Many technologies are available as open source products through international organisations<br />
(e.g. FAO) and public sector universities. What are some of the more important biotech products<br />
and processes that we can access through the open source and use in local research and<br />
development programmes?<br />
5) Identification of sources for import of elite germplasm<br />
Pakistani cotton has narrow genetic base, which constitutes a serious constraint on<br />
development of new varieties. The genetic base needs to be widened to maintain genetic<br />
diversity and to integrate useful traits into local cotton varieties. The linkages with international<br />
sources of cotton germplasm are weak and need to be strengthened.<br />
6) Identification of ways and means to meet the challenges of CLCV and mealybug, and<br />
to improve fibre qualities of cotton<br />
Bollworms are an important threat to cotton production in Pakistan. But other issues, like CLCV<br />
and mealybug are equally important. Recently, these have become more serious issues in the<br />
face of relative protection from bollworms through cultivation of Bt varieties. Finding practical<br />
solutions to these threats is a challenge for Pakistani agriculture. So far our research system<br />
has not been successful in identifying cotton germplasm that is tolerant to CLCV and resistant to<br />
mealybug. Until such germplasm is identified, can the chemical products available with different<br />
Chinese companies provide an effective control? As for the mealybug, we need to examine<br />
current strategies and see how these can be improved. Also, we need to explore technological<br />
and cultural ways and means to improve fibre qualities of our cotton.<br />
7) Developing a framework for making CRDC a dynamic and forward looking R&D<br />
company that can lead the change in cotton landscape<br />
The Government of Punjab has recently created a Cotton Research and Development<br />
Company (CRDC) as an autonomous corporate entity to oversee cotton R&D in the public<br />
sector. This is a step in the right direction, but the company struggles to find answers to<br />
questions as important as stewardship, stakeholder engagement, private sector investment, and<br />
asset management. To help CRDC, we need to deliberate on these (and other) issues and<br />
develop a comprehensive framework for its working in the long run. The framework should<br />
suggest measures to transform CRDC into a private-sector led, dynamic and progressive R&D<br />
organisation that follows a research agenda in sync with the needs of farmers. It should also be<br />
able to reach out to the farmer and bridge the gap between research and extension.<br />
38
These issues will be examined by Dr. Neil Forrester during his visit to Pakistan in October 2008.<br />
Trained as an entomologist, Dr. Forrester has vast experience of resistance management for<br />
synthetic insecticides and Bt cotton. He has worked with various public and private sector<br />
research organisations (including Deltapine International) and has also served at the Board of<br />
Cotton Research and Development Corporation, Australia.<br />
Dr. Forrester will be assisted by Mr. Muhammad Ahsan Rana in carrying out this assignment.<br />
Mr. Rana has studied law, economics and sociology, and is presently a PhD candidate at The<br />
University of Melbourne. He is working on the political economy of agricultural biotechnology<br />
and is particularly interested in the policy making process concerning Bt cotton in Pakistan. As<br />
his Pakistani counterpart, Mr. Rana will assist Dr. Forrester in data collection, analysis and<br />
report writing.<br />
The two-member team will engage with a range of stakeholders including government officials<br />
(Punjab, Sindh and Federal Governments), public sector research institutions, (national and<br />
international) seed companies, ginners, textile industry and farmers. (An indicative list is<br />
attached). It will also examine the available literature and prepare a comprehensive report. Both<br />
team members will retain their freedom to publish elsewhere.<br />
Deliverables<br />
• A detailed report covering the issues mentioned above<br />
• A presentation to the Chief Minister, Punjab on the findings and recommendations<br />
• A seminar presentation to be attended by the stakeholders listed above<br />
39
Stakeholders Engaged for this Study<br />
Government officials<br />
40<br />
Appendix B<br />
1. Mr. Zia ur Rehman, Secretary Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock (MINFAL),<br />
Islamabad<br />
2. Mr. Shahid Hussan Raja, Additional Secretary , MINFAL, Islamabad<br />
3. Dr. Qadir Bux Baluch, Agriculture Development Commissioner, MINFAL, Islamabad<br />
4. Dr. Muhammad Aslam Gill, Cotton Commissioner, MINFAL, Islamabad<br />
5. Dr. M E Tusneem, Member (Agriculture) Planning Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad<br />
6. Mr. Nazar Hussain Mehar, Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi<br />
7. Mr. Sabhago Khan Jatoi, Secretary Agriculture, Government of Sindh, Karachi<br />
8. Dr. Ibad Badar Siddique, Vice Chairman, Pakistan Central Cotton Committee (PCCC),<br />
Karachi<br />
9. Mr. Javed Iqbal Awan, Secretary Agriculture, Government of Punjab<br />
10. Dr. Mubarak Ali, Chairman, Punjab Agricultural Research Board, Lahore<br />
11. Dr. Noor ul Islam, CEO (designate) CRDC, Lahore<br />
12. Dr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Secretary CRDC, Lahore<br />
Private seed companies<br />
13. Mr. Hasan Raza Gardezi, CEO Neelum Seeds, Multan<br />
14. Mr. Shahzad A. Malik, CEO Guard Seeds, Lahore<br />
15. Mr. GM Avesi, Technical Manager, Guard Seeds, Lahore<br />
16. Mr. Attiq Cheema, General Manager Auriga Seeds, Lahore<br />
17. Dr. Zahoor Ahmad, Ali Akbar Seeds, Multan<br />
18. Ch. Muhammad Hanif, Ali Akbar Seeds, Multan<br />
Multinational organisations<br />
19. Mr. Aamir Mahmood Mirza, Country Lead, Monsanto Pakistan<br />
20. Mr. Muhammad Asim, Technology Development Lead, Monsanto Pakistan<br />
21. Mr. Arshad Saeed Hussain, General Manager, Syngenta Pakistan<br />
22. Mr. S A Wahab Mehdi, Managing Director, Bayer CropSciences, Pakistan<br />
23. Mr. Muhammad Afzal, Head Market Development, Bayer CropSciences, Pakistan<br />
24. Mr. Munir ud Din Khan, Advisor Crop Development, FMC<br />
25. Mr. Sarwar Rahi, Technical Manager, FMC<br />
Molecular biologists, entomologists and plant breeders<br />
26. Dr. David Chamberlain, Consultant Ali Tareen Farms, RY Khan<br />
27. Dr. Kausar Abdullah Malik, former Member (Agriculture) Planning Commission of<br />
Pakistan, Lahore<br />
28. Dr. Aklhaq Hussain, Director General, Federal Seed Certification and Registration<br />
Department, FSC&RD, Islamabad<br />
29. Dr. Yusuf Zafar, Project Director, Nuclear Institute of Genetic Engineering and<br />
Biotechnology (NIGAB), Islamabad<br />
30. Dr. Ejaz Pervez, Director General Pest Warning and Quality Control, Lahore<br />
31. Dr. Ghulam Mustafa, Director Entomology, ARI, Faisalabad
32. Dr. Rao Iftikhar, Dean, AU, Faisalabad<br />
33. Dr. Sheikh Riaz ud Din, Director, Centre of Excellence in Molecular Biology (CEMB),<br />
Lahore<br />
34. Dr. Tayyub Hussnain, Professor, CEMB, Lahore<br />
35. Dr. Idrees Ahmad Nasir, Associate Professor, CEMB, Lahore<br />
36. Dr. Zafar M. Khalid, Director, National Institute of Biotechnology and Genetic<br />
Engineering (NIBGE), Faisalabad<br />
37. Dr. Shahid Mansoor, Head Plant Biotechnology Division, NIBGE, Faisalabad<br />
38. Dr. Ehsan ul Haq, Director NIAB, Faisalabad<br />
39. Muhammad Arshad, CCRI, Multan<br />
40. Dr. Iqbal Bandesha, Associate Professor, Islamia University, Bahawalpur<br />
41. Dr. Mahboob Ali, Scientist Emeritus, ex-Director Central Cotton Research Institute,<br />
Multan<br />
42. Ch Waheed Sultan, former Director Cotton, Lahore<br />
Farmers<br />
43. Mr. Asim Nisar Bajwa, Manager Ali Tareen Farms, Lodhran<br />
44. Ms. Rabia Sultana, Lahore<br />
45. Mr. Athar Khakwani<br />
46. Mr. Sajid Mehdi, Vehari<br />
47. Ch Arshad, Khanpur<br />
48. Mr. Ijaz Rao, Bahawalpur<br />
The Textile Industry<br />
49. Mr. Iqbal Ibrahim, Chairman All Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA), Karachi<br />
50. Mr. Akbar Sheikh, Chairman, APTMA Lahore<br />
51. Mr. Tariq Mahmood, Chairman Cotton Committee, APTMA<br />
41