SAE J2578 - Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Safety
SAE J2578 - Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Safety
SAE J2578 - Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Safety
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Developing <strong>SAE</strong> <strong>Safety</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ards for<br />
<strong>Hydrogen</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fuel</strong> <strong>Cell</strong> Vehicles (FCVs)<br />
Status of <strong>SAE</strong> FCV Committee Activities<br />
Michael Veenstra<br />
Ford Motor Company<br />
NextEnergy<br />
<strong>Hydrogen</strong> Codes & St<strong>and</strong>ards Conference<br />
September 21, 2010<br />
1
<strong>SAE</strong> <strong>Fuel</strong> <strong>Cell</strong> Vehicle Committee<br />
DDeveloping l i vehicle hi l <strong>and</strong> d systems-level, t l l performance- f<br />
based st<strong>and</strong>ards based on best available knowledge.<br />
CCooperating ti with ith other th organizations i ti to t verify if<br />
current st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> develop new capabilities,<br />
when appropriate.<br />
DOE-funded verification testing of methodologies<br />
Japan Automobile Research Institute (JARI)<br />
CSA America<br />
Overall objective<br />
Use FCVs as current ICEs are used (without restrictions)<br />
Facilitate rapid advances by the industry<br />
Provide a technical basis for national <strong>and</strong> global requirements<br />
2
<strong>SAE</strong> <strong>Fuel</strong> <strong>Cell</strong> Vehicle Committee<br />
Why the Focus on Systems Systems-level level<br />
Performance-based Requirements?<br />
Establishes clear expectations for the vehicle system<br />
based on foreseeable use<br />
Addresses all parts, connections, <strong>and</strong> interactions within<br />
the system<br />
Provides flexibility for future development<br />
Does not dictate specific component or configurations<br />
Avoids arbitrary flow down of requirements to components<br />
Ensures direct connection to requirements for the<br />
targeted vehicle applications<br />
St<strong>and</strong>ard passenger<br />
Heavy-duty commercial<br />
3<br />
Probability<br />
Dem<strong>and</strong> Distribution<br />
(Exposures in Use)<br />
Level of stress<br />
Response Distribution<br />
(System Capability)<br />
Minimum Performance Criteria<br />
(Design Qualification & Production Control)
<strong>SAE</strong> FCV ENABLING St<strong>and</strong>ards<br />
St<strong>and</strong>ard # Descriptions Last Working Status<br />
Published Group<br />
<strong>SAE</strong> J1766 Post-crash electrical safety 04-2005 <strong>Safety</strong> Being revised<br />
<strong>SAE</strong> J2572 Measuring fuel consumption <strong>and</strong> range 10-2008 Perf. Static<br />
<strong>SAE</strong> J2574 <strong>Fuel</strong> cell vehicle terminology 03-2002 <strong>Safety</strong> Static<br />
<strong>SAE</strong> <strong>J2578</strong> Integration of hydrogen <strong>and</strong> electrical<br />
systems on FCVs<br />
01-2009 <strong>Safety</strong> Being revised<br />
<strong>SAE</strong> J2579 Vehicular hydrogen systems (TIR) 01-2009 <strong>Safety</strong> Being revised<br />
<strong>SAE</strong> J2594 Design for recycling PEM fuel cell system 09-2003 Perf. Static<br />
<strong>SAE</strong> J2600 Compressed hydrogen fueling<br />
receptacles<br />
<strong>SAE</strong> J2601 Compressed hydrogen fueling<br />
protocol (TIR)<br />
10-2002 Interface Being revised<br />
03-2010 Interface Being revised<br />
<strong>SAE</strong> J2617 Testing performance of PEM fuel cell 11-2007 Perf. Static<br />
<strong>SAE</strong> J2719 <strong>Hydrogen</strong> quality (TIR) 04-2008 04 2008 Interface Being revised<br />
<strong>SAE</strong> J2760 <strong>Hydrogen</strong> system terminology (TIR) 05-2006 <strong>Safety</strong> Static<br />
<strong>SAE</strong> J2799 70 MPa hydrogen fueling receptacle <strong>and</strong><br />
interface (TIR)<br />
4<br />
05-2007 Interface Revisions per<br />
J2600 & J2601
<strong>SAE</strong> <strong>J2578</strong> <strong>and</strong> J2579<br />
Pi Principle i l of f“D “Design i ffor S<strong>Safety</strong>” f t ”<br />
No single credible failure should cause unreasonable<br />
safety risk to persons or uncontrolled vehicle behavior<br />
Fail-safe design<br />
Isolation <strong>and</strong> separation of hazards to prevent cascading of events<br />
Fault Management with staged-warning <strong>and</strong> shutdowns<br />
Isolation <strong>and</strong> containment of stored hydrogen is<br />
required to practice fault management on hydrogen<br />
<strong>and</strong> fuel cell vehicles.<br />
5
<strong>SAE</strong> J2579 Vehicle Storage Systems<br />
Typical <strong>Hydrogen</strong> Storage System Addressed in <strong>SAE</strong> J2579<br />
Must be capable of isolating<br />
stored hydrogen from --<br />
• down-stream fuel systems<br />
• the surrounding environment<br />
Receptacle<br />
with check<br />
Fill<br />
Check<br />
Valve<br />
Excess<br />
flow<br />
Container<br />
Isolation<br />
Valve<br />
Full System<br />
Isolation<br />
Requires that the CHSS --<br />
PRD<br />
vent<br />
Container Vessel<br />
• does not burst<br />
• meets leakage/permeation<br />
Compressed <strong>Hydrogen</strong><br />
Storage g System y<br />
Includes all components <strong>and</strong> parts<br />
that form the primary pressure<br />
boundary for stored hydrogen<br />
6<br />
High<br />
Pressure<br />
Regulator<br />
PRV<br />
Low<br />
Pressure<br />
Regulator<br />
Service<br />
Defuel<br />
Shufoff<br />
PRV<br />
Downstream <strong>Hydrogen</strong> Piping<br />
for delivery to <strong>Fuel</strong> <strong>Cell</strong><br />
System or Engine
<strong>SAE</strong> J2579 Vehicle Storage Systems<br />
While general hydrogen system <strong>and</strong> storage requirements are<br />
considered, the focus of the document is design <strong>and</strong><br />
qualification of the Compressed <strong>Hydrogen</strong> Storage System<br />
(CHSS) over the service life of the vehicle.<br />
Expected Service Performance<br />
• Fast fills <strong>and</strong> static holds with hydrogen over the full operating temperature range<br />
• Covers the expected service life of most vehicles<br />
Durability under Extended Usage <strong>and</strong> Extreme Conditions<br />
• Accounts for possible tank damage <strong>and</strong> chemical exposure<br />
• Considers possibility of extended use by performing hydraulic cycles.<br />
Performance under Service-terminating g Conditions<br />
• Engulfing fire (bonfire) tests to demonstrate that the PRD(s) can protect the CHSS<br />
• Penetration tests to demonstrate robustness of the wrap<br />
• Burst (<strong>and</strong> perhaps other) tests to show consistency<br />
7
Expected Service Performance Verification Test for<br />
Compressed <strong>Hydrogen</strong> Storage Systems<br />
Initial<br />
Burst<br />
Pressuure<br />
<br />
Pressure <br />
Durability Performance Verification Test for<br />
Compressed p <strong>Hydrogen</strong> y g Storage g Systems y<br />
Initial<br />
Burst
<strong>SAE</strong> J2579 Vehicle Storage Systems<br />
TTest t protocols t l for f qualification lifi ti of f Compressed C d <strong>Hydrogen</strong> H d<br />
Storage Systems were verified.<br />
Addressed both Type yp 3 <strong>and</strong> 4 tanks<br />
Demonstrated ability to identify tanks with known problems in service<br />
Required about 3 months to complete qualification tests<br />
10
<strong>SAE</strong> J2579 Vehicle Storage Systems<br />
Status of Next Revision<br />
Streamlining CHSS test protocols to reduce verification time<br />
without sacrificing g technical adequacy q y ( (safety) y)<br />
Developing test methods for determining hydrogen<br />
compatibility p y of materials ( (hydrogen y g embrittlement) )<br />
Improving reproducibility of fire tests by requiring propane fuel<br />
More uniform flames<br />
Better flame control <strong>and</strong> response<br />
Improving relevance of fire tests to real real-world world situations<br />
Addressing entire CHSS with thermal shields<br />
Adding localized fire evaluation<br />
11
12<br />
<strong>SAE</strong> J2579 Localized Fire Evaluation<br />
CNG Cylinder In-Service Failures<br />
2000-2008<br />
10<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
Need for Refined Fire Test<br />
Vehicle Fire<br />
Environmental<br />
Over-Pressure<br />
During Filling - unknown<br />
Metal Liner - unknown<br />
Metal Liner - manf.<br />
User Error<br />
Mech. Damage<br />
0<br />
Source: Powertech Root Cause Analysis<br />
<strong>and</strong> Report for CNG Cylinders, 1/25/08<br />
~50% 50% of f the th CNG cylinder li d<br />
failures were due to vehicle fires<br />
12<br />
In-Service CNG Tank Ruptures<br />
Source: Powertech CNG & <strong>Hydrogen</strong> Tank<br />
<strong>Safety</strong>, R&D, <strong>and</strong> Testing, 12/10/09
<strong>SAE</strong> J2579 Localized Fire Evaluation<br />
Establishing Test Conditions<br />
Transport Canada <strong>and</strong> NHTSA conducted<br />
research on localized fire tests to study<br />
bbench h ttest t methods th d <strong>and</strong> d mitigation iti ti ddevices i<br />
Vehicle fire tests conducted<br />
BBy JARI <strong>and</strong> d US manufacturers f t<br />
Passenger vehicles, SUVs, <strong>and</strong> vans tested<br />
Different fires origins investigated<br />
Passenger compartment<br />
Trunk<br />
Wheel wells<br />
PPool l fi fires bbeneath th vehicle hi l<br />
Representative localized fire test conditions<br />
were established based on data provided.<br />
13<br />
Source: Powertech Localized Fire Protection<br />
Assessment for Vehicle Compressed<br />
<strong>Hydrogen</strong> Containers, 7/23/09<br />
Source: Powertech CNG & <strong>Hydrogen</strong> Tank<br />
<strong>Safety</strong>, R&D, <strong>and</strong> Testing, 12/10/09
<strong>SAE</strong> J2579 Localized Fire Evaluation<br />
Key Findings from Specific Laboratory Fire Testing<br />
1) About 40% of the fires investigated resulted in localized fire<br />
conditions before conventional PRDs on end bosses would have<br />
activated.<br />
2) While vehicle fires often lasted 30-60 minutes, the period of<br />
llocalized li d fi fire ddegradation d ti on th the storage t containers t i llasted t d lless<br />
than 10 minutes. See figure on next page.<br />
3) The average maximum temperature during the localized fire<br />
period was less than 570°C with peak temperatures reaching<br />
approximately 600°C in 2 cases <strong>and</strong> 880°C in one case.<br />
4) The rise in peak temperature near the end of the localized fire<br />
period often signaled the transition to an engulfing fire condition.<br />
14
<strong>SAE</strong> J2579 Localized Fire Evaluation<br />
Potential Profile for Generic Localized Fire Test<br />
800° C<br />
600° C<br />
Localized Fire Engulfing Fire<br />
Region of<br />
localized impact<br />
3 8 10<br />
Time (minutes)<br />
15<br />
(1.65m max length)<br />
Regions of localized<br />
<strong>and</strong> engulfing fire<br />
impact
<strong>SAE</strong> J2579 Localized Fire Evaluation<br />
Two options are provided to the manufacturer for flexibility:<br />
1.Generic (Non-specific) Vehicle Installation<br />
Allows only shields <strong>and</strong> features that are attached to the vessel or<br />
system<br />
Size of fire set to 250mm long, covering the full diameter<br />
Di Direction ti <strong>and</strong> d location l ti of f fi fire set t tto maximize i i di distance t ffrom<br />
PRD(s).<br />
2. Vehicle-specific f Installation<br />
Allows for thermal shields <strong>and</strong> features that are part of the vehicle<br />
Vehicle features may require reduction in generic fire size.<br />
Di Direction ti <strong>and</strong> d location l ti of f fi fire bbased d on th the vehicle hi l<br />
16
<strong>SAE</strong> <strong>J2578</strong>: <strong>Fuel</strong> <strong>Cell</strong> Vehicles (FCVs)<br />
IIntegrating t ti hydrogen, h d electrical, l t i l <strong>and</strong> d fuel f l cell ll systems t<br />
Compressed <strong>Hydrogen</strong><br />
Containment System y<br />
Battery<br />
System<br />
Electric Drive<br />
Motor<br />
17<br />
<strong>Fuel</strong> <strong>Cell</strong>s<br />
Electric Power<br />
Control
<strong>SAE</strong> <strong>J2578</strong>: <strong>Fuel</strong> <strong>Cell</strong> Vehicles (FCVs)<br />
A revision to <strong>J2578</strong> was published in January 2009:<br />
Improved methods to measure post-crash hydrogen<br />
loss as basis for future FMVSS<br />
Harmonized electrical system safety with ISO<br />
TC22/SC21<br />
Exp<strong>and</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> improved methods to evaluate the<br />
safety of hydrogen discharges<br />
18
<strong>SAE</strong> <strong>J2578</strong>: Improved Methods to Measure<br />
Post-Crash Post Crash <strong>Hydrogen</strong> Loss<br />
Allowable based on FMVSS 301 (gasoline)<br />
Same energy loss of fuel in 60 minutes after crash<br />
(72,590kJ based on LHV)<br />
Corresponds to allowable loss of 606g (6737L) of hydrogen<br />
Approach builds on FMVSS 303 (CNG)<br />
Measures pressure decay of Compressed <strong>Hydrogen</strong> Storage<br />
System (CHSS) after crash<br />
Extends measurement time after crash, crash when necessary, necessary to<br />
improve measurement accuracy for large systems at high<br />
pressure<br />
19
<strong>SAE</strong> <strong>J2578</strong>: Management of Electrical Issues<br />
BBased d on EExisting i ti Electric El t i VVehicle hi l (EV) St St<strong>and</strong>ards d d<br />
<strong>and</strong> on-going harmonization activities with ISO TC22/SC21<br />
El Electrical t i l shock h k protection t ti<br />
8 Electrical Isolation<br />
8 Supplemental insulation, barriers, <strong>and</strong> enclosures<br />
8 DDe-energization i ti<br />
High voltage dielectric withst<strong>and</strong><br />
High voltage wire <strong>and</strong> connectors<br />
Over-current protection<br />
Labeling <strong>and</strong> access to live parts<br />
Automatic disconnects<br />
Manual disconnect functions<br />
20
<strong>SAE</strong> <strong>J2578</strong>: Management of <strong>Hydrogen</strong><br />
Discharges<br />
Passenger Compartment<br />
Other Compartments<br />
Less than 25% LFL Non Non-Flammable Flammable<br />
General Surroundings<br />
Less than 25% LFL<br />
Exhaust<br />
Locally non-hazardous<br />
21
<strong>SAE</strong> <strong>J2578</strong>: Management of <strong>Hydrogen</strong><br />
Discharges in General Surroundings<br />
Vehicle<br />
Operating<br />
State<br />
Parked<br />
Idling<br />
Situations Addressed<br />
Condition Being Simulated<br />
Minimallyventilated<br />
Residential<br />
Garage<br />
Mechanically-<br />
Ventilated Structure<br />
Revised Revised<br />
Added Revised<br />
22<br />
Outdoor on a<br />
Still Day<br />
Not<br />
Necessary<br />
No Longer<br />
Necessary
<strong>SAE</strong> <strong>J2578</strong>: <strong>Fuel</strong> <strong>Cell</strong> Vehicles (FCVs)<br />
Status of Next Revision<br />
Refining guidance for the installation of hydrogen components<br />
such as TPRD vent lines <strong>and</strong> the use of vent boxes for storage<br />
systems to prevent release of hydrogen to the passenger <strong>and</strong><br />
luggage compartments<br />
Reassessing the post-crash safety option to limit the electrical<br />
energy level due to an inconsistency with other st<strong>and</strong>ards<br />
Evaluating general areas that need clarification in the use of<br />
the st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />
23
Global Technical Regulations (GTRs)<br />
for <strong>Fuel</strong> <strong>Cell</strong> Vehicles (FCVs)<br />
Approved by Working Party 29 of the United Nations<br />
Includes the USA, Canada, China, Japan, South Korea, EU<br />
(<strong>and</strong> Germany) as active participants<br />
Requires signees to harmonize their internal regulations with<br />
the approved GTR<br />
Two subgroups addressing unique safety issues of FCVs<br />
Subgroup on <strong>Safety</strong> (SGS) <strong>Hydrogen</strong><br />
Electrical <strong>Safety</strong> (ELSA) Electrical Propulsion<br />
24
Challenges Being Faced During<br />
Development of the GTR<br />
The GTR on FCVs is supposed to be performance-based<br />
but must also accommodate differences<br />
in style of regulation between various countries <strong>and</strong> regions.<br />
Self-certification<br />
in USA <strong>and</strong> Canada<br />
Vehicle-level Requirements in<br />
Regulations<br />
Not<br />
Design-Prescriptive<br />
Manufacturers <strong>and</strong> Integrators<br />
Voluntarily Use Industry St<strong>and</strong>ards<br />
for Components <strong>and</strong> Systems<br />
25<br />
Type-testing<br />
in EU <strong>and</strong> Japan<br />
Compliance Often Achieved Through<br />
Proper Assembly of “Approved”<br />
Components<br />
Facilitates Approval<br />
Pi Prior tto SSales l<br />
Component Requirements<br />
Often Based on Presumed System <strong>and</strong><br />
Translation of Requirements<br />
q
SUMMARY<br />
<strong>SAE</strong> has published st<strong>and</strong>ards to address hydrogen <strong>and</strong><br />
electrical issues for hydrogen y g <strong>and</strong> fuel cell vehicles ( (FCVs). )<br />
The <strong>SAE</strong> FCV <strong>Safety</strong> Working Group is cooperating with<br />
organizations g such as US-DOE, , CSA, , JARI, , <strong>and</strong> JAMA to<br />
refine requirements as the industry matures <strong>and</strong> knowledge<br />
improves.<br />
The UN is developing a Global Technical Requirement for<br />
FCVs that will allow world-wide compliance to a common<br />
design <strong>and</strong> thereby facilitate commercialization.<br />
commercialization<br />
26