SAE J2578 - Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Safety

Developing SAE Safety Standards for
Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Vehicles (FCVs)
Status of SAE FCV Committee Activities
Michael Veenstra
Ford Motor Company
NextEnergy
Hydrogen Codes & Standards Conference
September 21, 2010
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SAE Fuel Cell Vehicle Committee
DDeveloping l i vehicle hi l and d systems-level, t l l performance- f
based standards based on best available knowledge.
CCooperating ti with ith other th organizations i ti to t verify if
current standards and develop new capabilities,
when appropriate.
DOE-funded verification testing of methodologies
Japan Automobile Research Institute (JARI)
CSA America
Overall objective
Use FCVs as current ICEs are used (without restrictions)
Facilitate rapid advances by the industry
Provide a technical basis for national and global requirements
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SAE Fuel Cell Vehicle Committee
Why the Focus on Systems Systems-level level
Performance-based Requirements?
Establishes clear expectations for the vehicle system
based on foreseeable use
Addresses all parts, connections, and interactions within
the system
Provides flexibility for future development
Does not dictate specific component or configurations
Avoids arbitrary flow down of requirements to components
Ensures direct connection to requirements for the
targeted vehicle applications
Standard passenger
Heavy-duty commercial
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Probability
Demand Distribution
(Exposures in Use)
Level of stress
Response Distribution
(System Capability)
Minimum Performance Criteria
(Design Qualification & Production Control)

SAE FCV ENABLING Standards
Standard # Descriptions Last Working Status
Published Group
SAE J1766 Post-crash electrical safety 04-2005 Safety Being revised
SAE J2572 Measuring fuel consumption and range 10-2008 Perf. Static
SAE J2574 Fuel cell vehicle terminology 03-2002 Safety Static
SAE J2578 Integration of hydrogen and electrical
systems on FCVs
01-2009 Safety Being revised
SAE J2579 Vehicular hydrogen systems (TIR) 01-2009 Safety Being revised
SAE J2594 Design for recycling PEM fuel cell system 09-2003 Perf. Static
SAE J2600 Compressed hydrogen fueling
receptacles
SAE J2601 Compressed hydrogen fueling
protocol (TIR)
10-2002 Interface Being revised
03-2010 Interface Being revised
SAE J2617 Testing performance of PEM fuel cell 11-2007 Perf. Static
SAE J2719 Hydrogen quality (TIR) 04-2008 04 2008 Interface Being revised
SAE J2760 Hydrogen system terminology (TIR) 05-2006 Safety Static
SAE J2799 70 MPa hydrogen fueling receptacle and
interface (TIR)
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05-2007 Interface Revisions per
J2600 & J2601

SAE J2578 and J2579
Pi Principle i l of f“D “Design i ffor SSafety” f t ”
No single credible failure should cause unreasonable
safety risk to persons or uncontrolled vehicle behavior
Fail-safe design
Isolation and separation of hazards to prevent cascading of events
Fault Management with staged-warning and shutdowns
Isolation and containment of stored hydrogen is
required to practice fault management on hydrogen
and fuel cell vehicles.
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SAE J2579 Vehicle Storage Systems
Typical Hydrogen Storage System Addressed in SAE J2579
Must be capable of isolating
stored hydrogen from --
• down-stream fuel systems
• the surrounding environment
Receptacle
with check
Fill
Check
Valve
Excess
flow
Container
Isolation
Valve
Full System
Isolation
Requires that the CHSS --
PRD
vent
Container Vessel
• does not burst
• meets leakage/permeation
Compressed Hydrogen
Storage g System y
Includes all components and parts
that form the primary pressure
boundary for stored hydrogen
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High
Pressure
Regulator
PRV
Low
Pressure
Regulator
Service
Defuel
Shufoff
PRV
Downstream Hydrogen Piping
for delivery to Fuel Cell
System or Engine

SAE J2579 Vehicle Storage Systems
While general hydrogen system and storage requirements are
considered, the focus of the document is design and
qualification of the Compressed Hydrogen Storage System
(CHSS) over the service life of the vehicle.
Expected Service Performance
• Fast fills and static holds with hydrogen over the full operating temperature range
• Covers the expected service life of most vehicles
Durability under Extended Usage and Extreme Conditions
• Accounts for possible tank damage and chemical exposure
• Considers possibility of extended use by performing hydraulic cycles.
Performance under Service-terminating g Conditions
• Engulfing fire (bonfire) tests to demonstrate that the PRD(s) can protect the CHSS
• Penetration tests to demonstrate robustness of the wrap
• Burst (and perhaps other) tests to show consistency
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Expected Service Performance Verification Test for
Compressed Hydrogen Storage Systems
Initial
Burst
Pressuure

Pressure
Durability Performance Verification Test for
Compressed p Hydrogen y g Storage g Systems y
Initial
Burst

SAE J2579 Vehicle Storage Systems
TTest t protocols t l for f qualification lifi ti of f Compressed C d Hydrogen H d
Storage Systems were verified.
Addressed both Type yp 3 and 4 tanks
Demonstrated ability to identify tanks with known problems in service
Required about 3 months to complete qualification tests
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SAE J2579 Vehicle Storage Systems
Status of Next Revision
Streamlining CHSS test protocols to reduce verification time
without sacrificing g technical adequacy q y ( (safety) y)
Developing test methods for determining hydrogen
compatibility p y of materials ( (hydrogen y g embrittlement) )
Improving reproducibility of fire tests by requiring propane fuel
More uniform flames
Better flame control and response
Improving relevance of fire tests to real real-world world situations
Addressing entire CHSS with thermal shields
Adding localized fire evaluation
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SAE J2579 Localized Fire Evaluation
CNG Cylinder In-Service Failures
2000-2008
10
8
6
4
2
Need for Refined Fire Test
Vehicle Fire
Environmental
Over-Pressure
During Filling - unknown
Metal Liner - unknown
Metal Liner - manf.
User Error
Mech. Damage
0
Source: Powertech Root Cause Analysis
and Report for CNG Cylinders, 1/25/08
~50% 50% of f the th CNG cylinder li d
failures were due to vehicle fires
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In-Service CNG Tank Ruptures
Source: Powertech CNG & Hydrogen Tank
Safety, R&D, and Testing, 12/10/09

SAE J2579 Localized Fire Evaluation
Establishing Test Conditions
Transport Canada and NHTSA conducted
research on localized fire tests to study
bbench h ttest t methods th d and d mitigation iti ti ddevices i
Vehicle fire tests conducted
BBy JARI and d US manufacturers f t
Passenger vehicles, SUVs, and vans tested
Different fires origins investigated
Passenger compartment
Trunk
Wheel wells
PPool l fi fires bbeneath th vehicle hi l
Representative localized fire test conditions
were established based on data provided.
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Source: Powertech Localized Fire Protection
Assessment for Vehicle Compressed
Hydrogen Containers, 7/23/09
Source: Powertech CNG & Hydrogen Tank
Safety, R&D, and Testing, 12/10/09

SAE J2579 Localized Fire Evaluation
Key Findings from Specific Laboratory Fire Testing
1) About 40% of the fires investigated resulted in localized fire
conditions before conventional PRDs on end bosses would have
activated.
2) While vehicle fires often lasted 30-60 minutes, the period of
llocalized li d fi fire ddegradation d ti on th the storage t containers t i llasted t d lless
than 10 minutes. See figure on next page.
3) The average maximum temperature during the localized fire
period was less than 570°C with peak temperatures reaching
approximately 600°C in 2 cases and 880°C in one case.
4) The rise in peak temperature near the end of the localized fire
period often signaled the transition to an engulfing fire condition.
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SAE J2579 Localized Fire Evaluation
Potential Profile for Generic Localized Fire Test
800° C
600° C
Localized Fire Engulfing Fire
Region of
localized impact
3 8 10
Time (minutes)
15
(1.65m max length)
Regions of localized
and engulfing fire
impact

SAE J2579 Localized Fire Evaluation
Two options are provided to the manufacturer for flexibility:
1.Generic (Non-specific) Vehicle Installation
Allows only shields and features that are attached to the vessel or
system
Size of fire set to 250mm long, covering the full diameter
Di Direction ti and d location l ti of f fi fire set t tto maximize i i di distance t ffrom
PRD(s).
2. Vehicle-specific f Installation
Allows for thermal shields and features that are part of the vehicle
Vehicle features may require reduction in generic fire size.
Di Direction ti and d location l ti of f fi fire bbased d on th the vehicle hi l
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SAE J2578: Fuel Cell Vehicles (FCVs)
IIntegrating t ti hydrogen, h d electrical, l t i l and d fuel f l cell ll systems t
Compressed Hydrogen
Containment System y
Battery
System
Electric Drive
Motor
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Fuel Cells
Electric Power
Control

SAE J2578: Fuel Cell Vehicles (FCVs)
A revision to J2578 was published in January 2009:
Improved methods to measure post-crash hydrogen
loss as basis for future FMVSS
Harmonized electrical system safety with ISO
TC22/SC21
Expanded and improved methods to evaluate the
safety of hydrogen discharges
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SAE J2578: Improved Methods to Measure
Post-Crash Post Crash Hydrogen Loss
Allowable based on FMVSS 301 (gasoline)
Same energy loss of fuel in 60 minutes after crash
(72,590kJ based on LHV)
Corresponds to allowable loss of 606g (6737L) of hydrogen
Approach builds on FMVSS 303 (CNG)
Measures pressure decay of Compressed Hydrogen Storage
System (CHSS) after crash
Extends measurement time after crash, crash when necessary, necessary to
improve measurement accuracy for large systems at high
pressure
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SAE J2578: Management of Electrical Issues
BBased d on EExisting i ti Electric El t i VVehicle hi l (EV) St Standards d d
and on-going harmonization activities with ISO TC22/SC21
El Electrical t i l shock h k protection t ti
8 Electrical Isolation
8 Supplemental insulation, barriers, and enclosures
8 DDe-energization i ti
High voltage dielectric withstand
High voltage wire and connectors
Over-current protection
Labeling and access to live parts
Automatic disconnects
Manual disconnect functions
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SAE J2578: Management of Hydrogen
Discharges
Passenger Compartment
Other Compartments
Less than 25% LFL Non Non-Flammable Flammable
General Surroundings
Less than 25% LFL
Exhaust
Locally non-hazardous
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SAE J2578: Management of Hydrogen
Discharges in General Surroundings
Vehicle
Operating
State
Parked
Idling
Situations Addressed
Condition Being Simulated
Minimallyventilated
Residential
Garage
Mechanically-
Ventilated Structure
Revised Revised
Added Revised
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Outdoor on a
Still Day
Not
Necessary
No Longer
Necessary

SAE J2578: Fuel Cell Vehicles (FCVs)
Status of Next Revision
Refining guidance for the installation of hydrogen components
such as TPRD vent lines and the use of vent boxes for storage
systems to prevent release of hydrogen to the passenger and
luggage compartments
Reassessing the post-crash safety option to limit the electrical
energy level due to an inconsistency with other standards
Evaluating general areas that need clarification in the use of
the standard
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Global Technical Regulations (GTRs)
for Fuel Cell Vehicles (FCVs)
Approved by Working Party 29 of the United Nations
Includes the USA, Canada, China, Japan, South Korea, EU
(and Germany) as active participants
Requires signees to harmonize their internal regulations with
the approved GTR
Two subgroups addressing unique safety issues of FCVs
Subgroup on Safety (SGS) Hydrogen
Electrical Safety (ELSA) Electrical Propulsion
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Challenges Being Faced During
Development of the GTR
The GTR on FCVs is supposed to be performance-based
but must also accommodate differences
in style of regulation between various countries and regions.
Self-certification
in USA and Canada
Vehicle-level Requirements in
Regulations
Not
Design-Prescriptive
Manufacturers and Integrators
Voluntarily Use Industry Standards
for Components and Systems
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Type-testing
in EU and Japan
Compliance Often Achieved Through
Proper Assembly of “Approved”
Components
Facilitates Approval
Pi Prior tto SSales l
Component Requirements
Often Based on Presumed System and
Translation of Requirements
q

SUMMARY
SAE has published standards to address hydrogen and
electrical issues for hydrogen y g and fuel cell vehicles ( (FCVs). )
The SAE FCV Safety Working Group is cooperating with
organizations g such as US-DOE, , CSA, , JARI, , and JAMA to
refine requirements as the industry matures and knowledge
improves.
The UN is developing a Global Technical Requirement for
FCVs that will allow world-wide compliance to a common
design and thereby facilitate commercialization.
commercialization
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