John T. McNaughton and Vietnam: The Early Years as ... - Viet-studies

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BENJAMIN T. HARRISON AND CHRISTOPHER L. MOSHER 511 that South Vietnam is near collapse’. 80 In that memo, one scholar has concluded that McNaughton was saying he believed ‘the chance of victory for the US . . . was near zero’. 81 The month of July did not end without McNaughton arguing that the US terms for negotiations amounted ‘to capitulation by a Communist force that is far from beaten’. 82 That autumn McNaughton once again prepared a critical ‘Analysis of the Program of Bombing North Vietnam’. He reiterated that the bombing had actually increased the morale of the enemy ‘reinforcing the North’s determination not to negotiate’ because ‘they cannot appear to “bug out” on the VC in the south’. What was needed was ‘A UN or other third-party initiative asking us to stand-down the bombing’ and pursue a peaceful settlement to the conflict. 83 During this time period, McNaughton lunched with Washington Post reporters, Murray Marder and Chad Roberts. He asked them if they had any idea on how to convince the enemy in Vietnam that the United States was serious about getting out of that country. The suggestion was made to make an offer to place US military bases there under United Nations control as an act of good faith. McNaughton thought it was a promising idea, but when he later brought it up at a Pentagon meeting he was laughed at by the JCS. 84 The next month McNaughton wrote to McNamara stating that escalation requests by the JCS should be denied. 85 By the autumn of 1965, the secretary of defense was apparently becoming worried about his chief Vietnam aide’s views. On 28 September 1965, he told George Ball that ‘there should be no communication back to Pentagon except at their [meaning McNamara’s and Ball’s] level’. 86 He must not have wanted Ball’s dovishness to feed McNaughton’s and vice versa; so Ball agreed to talk to McNamara as the only person he would communicate with in the Pentagon. In November, McNaughton’s confidant, Forrestal, wrote that withdrawing from Vietnam where ‘the people we were trying to help seemed unable to help themselves’ might encourage Chinese expansion. He still believed the United States should delay ‘China’s swallowing up Southeast Asia until (a) she develops better table manners and (b) the food is somewhat more indigestible.’ 87 But McNaughton disagreed, continuing his criticism of US involvement by pointing out that in the direction that the Vietnam involvement was going, ‘war costs at a rate equal to 10–20 times the GNP of the people 80 JTM Papers, Box 1 File IV, #53, ‘Analysis and Options for South Vietnam’, 13 July 1965, LBJL and GPP, iv. 21. 81 Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 465. 82 NYTPP, pp. 470–2, 20 July 1965. 83 Gibbons Papers, Box 11, File 2, #43, 8/5/65, LBJL. 84 Inside the Pentagon Papers, p. 49. 85 John T. McNaughton to Robert S. McNamara, 8 Sept. 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vietnam, iii 377–8. 86 George Ball Papers, Box 7, Telcon, Ball/McNamara, 28 Sept. 1968, LBJL. 87 JTM Papers, Box 8, File II, #8, M. Forrestal to William Bundy, 4 Nov. 1965, LBJL. © 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 The Historical Association and Blackwell Publishing.
512 JOHN T. MCNAUGHTON AND VIETNAM being fought for’ were likely in the future. He also bemoaned the lack of a ‘diplomatic offensive’ on the part of the US government. 88 During the last month of 1965, McNaughton appealed even more strongly for negotiations to end US involvement in Vietnam. He drafted a memo, dated 1 December 1965, saying, ‘I believe that we should be prepared – in the dialogue during a pause, in negotiations or unilaterally . . . to present the other side with a ceasefire’. He justified a unilateral ceasefire on the basis that ‘we have already accomplished the important objectives of preventing a military take-over’. He concluded: ‘no course of action has more than a modest chance of assuring a more favorable outcome’. 89 When an aide drafted a memo on Vietnam for his consideration on 20 December 1965, it included a ‘McNaughton note’ in which his aide observed that ‘the costs of stopping [the war] now rather than later seem acceptable’. McNaughton, with his sarcastic sense of humour, added a note that ‘surely no one thinks we can perform lobotomies on all indigenous VC!’ 90 At one point he sarcastically observed in his personal diary that Secretary of State Dean Rusk was always claiming that no free election had ever resulted in a communist victory, but what he forgot to add was, ‘we’re going to see to it that none ever does’. 91 These comments speak volumes. McNaughton knew that most Vietnamese supported Ho Chi Minh and an independent, unified Vietnam. To change those hearts and minds would take lobotomies because the Saigon government was not a legitimate entity. In June he had noted that indigenous Vietnamese should solve their troubles themselves and a unified Vietnam was in their wishes. The only solution was for the United States to get ‘Out! Out! Out!’ The year ended with McNaughton repeating that, as another bombing pause was attempted, the United States should ‘unilaterally’ declare a ceasefire. Before getting deeper into an impossible situation, the United States had to reverse its current course of action in Vietnam immediately. In 1966 and 1967, McNaughton would continue his struggle to get the United States out of Vietnam even on disadvantageous terms. He was caught in an awkward dilemma. He wanted to be a team player; he wanted the support of McNamara; and he wanted to hang on to whatever position of authority he had in order to make his case. He was ambitious, 92 but he was also a realist who did his job as best he knew how. When he taught at Harvard, he used to walk into his law classes and pretend to shoot a student with a toy gun. Afterwards, he would 88 John McNaughton to Robert McNamara, 9 Nov. 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vietnam, iii. 554–6. 89 JTM Papers, Box 1, File I, #14, LBJL. 90 JTM Papers, Box 1, File I, #15, memo drafted by Adrian Fisher, deputy director for Arms Control, LBJL. Many third-country initiatives had tried to bring the warring factions to the peace table unsuccessfully, as McNaughton well knew. 91 McNaughton Diary, 6 Jan. 1966, p. 9, Alex McNaughton Files. 92 Halberstam, Best and Brightest, pp. 362–3, 527; Lawrence Freedman, ‘Vietnam and the Disillusioned Strategist’, International Affairs, lxxii (1996), 133–51; Thomas W. Janes, ‘Rational Man – Irrational Policy’, University of Harvard BA Honors Thesis, 1977. © 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 The Historical Association and Blackwell Publishing.
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John T. McNaughton and Vietnam: The Early Years as ... - Viet-studies

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