Bogere Joseph Alfred1, Dr Julianne Sansa-Otim2 and Ronald ...
Bogere Joseph Alfred1, Dr Julianne Sansa-Otim2 and Ronald ...
Bogere Joseph Alfred1, Dr Julianne Sansa-Otim2 and Ronald ...
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Part 2: The Feasibility of National Roaming in Highly Competitive Mobile Markets: A Case Study of Ug<strong>and</strong>a 65<br />
biggest issue about National Roaming is not its technical implementations but rather<br />
the economical aspect associated with it.<br />
Economical Feasibility of National Roaming<br />
Based on our one to one talk with some of the employees of both networks “A” <strong>and</strong><br />
“B”, their line of argument is economical. National Roaming is most likely to meet<br />
strong resistance from the operators. An operator will not want subscribers from a<br />
competitor network to use his network after putting in so much investment.<br />
Furthermore National Roaming involves site sharing, but this entails a high degree<br />
of common costs between operators. The substantial common costs limit the scope for<br />
price competition on retail markets <strong>and</strong> this leads to co-ordinate effects. Also, the extent<br />
of site sharing is very limited to masts, antennae, power supplies, etc., but the most<br />
sensitive parts of the sites (Intelligent elements which determine the nature <strong>and</strong> range<br />
of services) constitute the majority of the costs which are only shared in exceptional<br />
circumstances. Hence, the level of common costs which in turn infl uence decisions on<br />
prices <strong>and</strong> output is likely to be low [Petit 2004].<br />
Monopolistic behaviours among well established providers: |New entrants into<br />
telecoms markets often complain of anti-competitive or unfair monopolistic behaviours<br />
adopted by dominant incumbent players who would have established wide network<br />
coverage before the entry of the new players. Hence, these monopolistic players can<br />
create barriers to entry by showing unwillingness to share infrastructure. A typical<br />
example is network ”B” that enjoys a competitive advantage of having the largest GSM<br />
coverage in the country. In this case, roaming with other operators may deprive it of<br />
that advantage. So they will have to have a second thought before they fi nally sign the<br />
roaming agreement.<br />
Roaming between operators may result in higher tariffs due to agreements between<br />
operators. This is specifi cally an issue when it comes to bundled subscriptions e.g. where<br />
a number of free SMSs or a specifi ed amount of downloaded data is included in the<br />
subscription. In such a situation, the tariffs are reverted down to basic pricing models<br />
such as price per SMS or per Kbyte of data generated. But many operators have become<br />
multinational operators providing the same tariffs “Whenever you are” as a means of<br />
competition [Winberg 2007].<br />
Roaming rates regulation hinders investment in network deployment <strong>and</strong> reduces<br />
incentives for smaller carriers to exp<strong>and</strong> the geographic coverage of their network.<br />
If the competitive advantage of building out nationwide or large regional networks<br />
is reduced, larger carriers’ incentives to exp<strong>and</strong>, upgrade or maintain their existing<br />
networks diminishes [Pines 2010].<br />
Recommendations<br />
The main objective of the study was basically to investigate the feasibility of National<br />
Roaming taking into account the current telecomunication market structure (with stiff<br />
competition among the existing mobile operators) in Ug<strong>and</strong>a. We have seen from our