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Grant may still argue that his actions do not fall within the purview of the statute because, unlike the defendants in Gooch who held the officers “with the expectation of benefit” to themselves, Grant did not hold Schweitzer with an expectation of benefit to himself. Rather, he did so for the exclusive benefit to Dr. Horner, whose NSF grant would be in jeopardy if Schweitzer appeared before the grant committee. This argument fails for two reasons. First, Grant did receive a benefit from his actions, in that he acknowledged his actions were conducted either as payment for Horner’s past assistance or with an expectation of future benefit from Horner. Grant stated that Horner had asked him “if [Grant] could do him a favor.” Acknowledging that Horner had “done a lot for [Grant’s] career in the past,” Grant “wanted to do [Horner] a favor,” adding, “You know, one hand washes the other.” Secondly, and more importantly, this argument fails because the captor’s purpose or motivation for the kidnapping is irrelevant. Kidnapping a person for “any reason” is sufficient. Thus, the government can prove that Grant “held [Schweitzer] for ransom, reward or otherwise.” 3. Willful Transportation Across A State Border The government will be able to prove that Grant willfully transported Schweitzer across a state border. The Federal Kidnapping Act requires that the defendant “willfully transport [the victim] in interstate or foreign commerce . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006). Willful transportation exists when the defendant transports the victim from one point to another and, in so doing, crosses a state line. United States v. Napier, 518 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1975). Neither the defendant’s knowledge nor his intention of crossing 10
state lines is relevant. Id. (citing Bibbins v. United States, 400 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1968)). The requirement that the offender cross state lines merely furnishes a basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction and does not constitute an element of the offense. Id. In Napier, the court held that the jurisdictional element had been satisfied when the defendant transported his victim from Oregon to Washington. Id. The defendant argued on appeal that the trial court’s jury instructions were erroneous because knowledge of crossing state lines was an essential element of the kidnapping offense. Id. The court rejected the argument and held that knowledge of a border crossing is not an essential element of the kidnapping offense. Id. Here, Grant admitted he took Schweitzer across the state line from Montana into Idaho: “We traveled into Idaho before I could catch a direct road back into Montana and up to the museum.” Like the defendant in Napier who willfully transported his victim from Oregon to Washington, Grant willfully transported Schweitzer when he took her from Montana into Idaho. Although Grant did not intend to take the road into Idaho, he did so, and the mere occurrence is what matters since this element merely provides the jurisdictional predicate for federal jurisdiction. Thus, the government will be able to prove that Grant willfully transported Schweitzer across state lines. 4. While so Kidnapped The government can prove that Schweitzer’s kidnapping was still in progress at the time Grant drove across the border. Under the Federal Kidnapping Act, the victim 11
Page 1 and 2: MEMORANDUM To: Senior Assistant U.S
Page 3 and 4: testimony before the NSF.” Schwei
Page 5 and 6: was crossed while the victim was st
Page 7 and 8: oad, he “took [Schweitzer’s] ar
Page 9: courts reached this conclusion prio
Page 13: his truck at the museum, Schweitzer

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