Sample Memo Formatted

establish that the defendant held the victim “for ransom or reward or otherwise.” 18
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).
The terms “ransom” and “reward” are not limited in meaning to “benefits of
pecuniary value.” Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 126 (1936). Rather, “reward”
implies something given in return for good or evil done or received.” Id. The word
“otherwise” broadens the reach of the Kidnapping Act by extending it to those defendants
who kidnap and hold victims not only for reward, but “for any other reason”. Id. at 127
(citing S. Rep. No. 534, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., Mar. 20, 1934; H.R. Rep. No. 1457, 73rd
Cong., 2d Sess., May 3, 1934, pg. 2). Therefore, an expectation of benefit to the
transgressor that is not pecuniary and does not fall within the commonly understood
meaning of “reward,” falls within the broad term “otherwise.” Gooch, 297 U.S. at 129.
However, because “kidnapping is undesirable in itself, without regard to its
purpose,” the Court subsequently held that an illegal purpose need not be shown. Gawne
v. United States, 409 F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing United States v. Healy, 376
U.S. 75 (1964)). The legislative wording of the statute “suggests no distinction based on
the ultimate purpose of a kidnapping.” Id. Instead, the focus is on the term “hold,” since
“involuntariness of seizure and detention . . . is the very essence of the crime of
kidnapping.” Id. at 1403 (citing Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 464 (1946)).
Consequently, “the true elements of the offense are an unlawful seizure and holding,
followed by interstate transportation,” rather than the defendant’s motive. Id.
Several circuits accept this theory that “the kidnaper’s [sic] motivation is not an
element of the offense.” Gawne, 409 F.2d at 1403 (internal citations omitted). Some
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