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TQM AND THE FUTURE OF POLICING

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VOLUME 5 NUMBER 2 APRIL 1995<br />

<strong>TQM</strong> <strong>AND</strong> <strong>THE</strong> <strong>FUTURE</strong> <strong>OF</strong> <strong>POLICING</strong><br />

Previous papers (Manning, 1992, 1994, 1994a), identified<br />

central ideological and political forces I felt were lransfonning<br />

police organizations, especially the ideology of top and<br />

middle management The problematic was the unanticipated<br />

consequences of managerial and economic rhetoric as reform<br />

vehicles and the impact of infonnation technologies on<br />

police work. These papers overlooked several matters of<br />

considerable importance to the future of policing and police<br />

research. Events have progressed more rapidly than I expected.<br />

This brief comment again assays the character of<br />

current effortS at police reform.<br />

Imagery<br />

Policing, like all organizations, works in part because audiences<br />

and organizational performers trust, credit and inter·<br />

nalize the imagery by which it defines itself, and accept both<br />

the mystification and reality of the institutional mandate.<br />

Insofar as participants are committed to an organization, they<br />

tend to both overvalue and elevate their own organization<br />

when compared with others. This halo effect has valuable<br />

positive consequences for morale, governance, perfonnance<br />

and external relations. Problems arise, however, when<br />

ideologically driven imagery outstrips established institutional<br />

functioning. There are also material limits on symbolic<br />

claims and rhetoric.<br />

An organization like public policing that is losing authority,<br />

and witnessing its mandate contracting, is often engaged in a<br />

struggle of imageries-several being proposed as part of<br />

refonn movements. Policing has long battled the "paramilitary"<br />

imagery developed in part to produce the semblance of<br />

managerial control over lower participants. This imagery of<br />

tight control, supervision, and swift punishment, as in the<br />

nineteenth century in England, has tenacious ideological<br />

clout with citizens, managers, and politicians who fear police<br />

violence, deviance and corruption. The paramilitary command<br />

and control imagery is justone amongst many compet·<br />

P.K. Manning<br />

School of Criminal Justice<br />

Michigan State University<br />

ing images of policing. The police are vulnerable to ideological<br />

trends and fads because they are questioning their mandate,<br />

and seeking new validation and justification for their<br />

traditional functions.<br />

The confiating economic imagery that views policing as an<br />

imperfectly managed or even failed business, has become a<br />

specious vision for reformers (See the series of brief publica·<br />

tions from NO and The Kennedy School at Harvard). Economic<br />

rhetoric, which caricatures organizations, public and<br />

private, as governed by inexorable market mechanisms that<br />

reward "efficiency," "performance," and "effectiveness;"<br />

produce goods and services that can be compared strictly<br />

using a monetary metric; and have "outputs," ''reward structures"<br />

and "incentives" that are universal, comparable and<br />

measurable, has penetrated public sector organizations. Even<br />

the notion of "collective or public goods," that to which all<br />

contribute and from which all benefit, has been reduced to a<br />

positive externality often passed on the public sector by<br />

private corporations. Extending this imagery, one could see<br />

these as social 'costs' that corporations and other agencies<br />

passon. "[Perhaps] the height of cynicism is to bring the cops<br />

up against efficiency rules and productivity standards (John<br />

Van Maanen, personal communication 17 March, 1995).<br />

Economistic thinking is now reshaping the infrastructure of<br />

evaluation, supervision and reward throughout the "private<br />

sector": in universities, government, and agencies such as the<br />

police, social services, and corrections (called "correctional<br />

services," in an Eastern Kentucky University job notice of<br />

February, 1995).<br />

Variants of this economic imagery are found in appeals for<br />

quality management (to reduce costs), continuing education<br />

and accreditation (to reduce liability and civil suits), and new<br />

information technologies (to reduce pass through costs and<br />

increase output). These are cynical attempts at reducing the<br />

altruism, sacrifice and welfare structures ofAnglo-American<br />

societies. All are couched in the misleading language of the<br />

@ 1995 Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences ISSN 1061·1517<br />

Published by Alpha Enterprises, Post Office Box 326, Richmond, Kentucky 40476 (606) 623-0792


market, advance current managerial ideologies, and serve to<br />

constrain and bureaucratically "manage" the good people do<br />

for each other.<br />

Clearly, the consequences of adopting this new economic<br />

imagery are complex and differential for police departments<br />

of varying size, mission and age. Generally, new imagery is<br />

shaped and diffuses from the top, usually adopted or borrowed<br />

from other sources, and thus generally indicatesmanagerial<br />

power. Conversely, it indicates the impotence of the<br />

lower participants to shape the mission and imagery of the<br />

institutions they serve. They can control praxis and generally<br />

they do. Thus, it is not surprising that lower participants<br />

remain loyal to "the job" and to economic rewards, not to<br />

nascent imagery, profits, and shifting managerial ideologies.<br />

In policing, with a tripartite occupational culture with command,<br />

middle management and lower participant (sergeants<br />

and patrol officers) segments, the social bases of self-investment<br />

differ. The appearance of a new rhetoric in connection<br />

with police reform suggests, as it has for forty years or so, a<br />

power struggle between command "management" and the<br />

lower participants. Managerial rhetoric is atool in asymbolic<br />

struggle over control of predominant imagery and action<br />

choices.<br />

Changes in Policing<br />

A series of important changes in big city policing have taken<br />

place in the last 20 years (See longer summaries in Manning,<br />

1994). These include reduced personnel, shrinking Pudgets,<br />

the spread of declining multi-problem urban neighborhoods<br />

and the on going attempt to control drug use and dealing by<br />

use of the criminal law. Sophisticated information-processing<br />

technology is changing the police role (Manning, 1992).<br />

Political interest is increasing in new forms ofcrime. Crimes<br />

of order and property (which with the exception of burglary<br />

and auto theft have been declining) remain, while symbolic<br />

crimes, local terrorism, and computer crime and corporate<br />

malfeasance merit attention. The fear of crime is rising,<br />

suggesting "crime" is symbolic and non-local in many respects.<br />

The crime-focus of the police is needed, yet is inadequate<br />

alone to calm public concerns. Historically, the police<br />

target areas and people who are most likely to cause eruptions<br />

variations in routines, work, family life, and leisure (Bittner,<br />

1990). This makes the police ill-prepared for preventing or<br />

punishing symbolic crimes, crimes of technological stealth,<br />

crimes of trust and disloyalty (treason, industrial espionage,<br />

embezzlement, fraud, and malfeasance).<br />

As Albert J. Reiss Jr. (1992) brilliantly outlined, the<br />

consequence of the scientific management reform movement<br />

was to isolate officers in cars, reduce contact and interaction<br />

with the public; and contain corruption. It also served to<br />

erode political legitimacy and power within local government,<br />

and to produce public dissatisfaction with a distant and<br />

Police Forum! 2<br />

officious police. I would add that it elevated the power of<br />

unions and focused issues of job control on the conditions of<br />

work because unions became the only viable form of collective<br />

opposition to command and control ideologies. Crime<br />

fighting became a managerial priority, while public contact,<br />

service, and providing comfort to the weak, helpless and<br />

exploited did not. The police are thus challenged to broaden<br />

their forms and types of "services" while faced with rising<br />

costs and reduced (relatively) budgets and personnel.<br />

Internally, the police typically displace energies from goals<br />

to means, from crime control and order to discipline and<br />

control of the lower participants (Goldstein, 1990). The<br />

primary concern of command officers is not crime control,<br />

service, or order maintenance; it is control and direction of<br />

the patrol officer. Two new variants on this theme are<br />

"communitypolicing" and"total quality management." Both<br />

have facilitated new modes of control and discipline under<br />

the guise ofchanges in the ethics and management of policing.<br />

Community policing is discussed elsewhere (Manning,<br />

1994). <strong>TQM</strong> is yet another means-focused strategy that aims<br />

to reform by refming and applying managerial techniques in<br />

the absence of other structural changes.<br />

Police are affected by broad trends in American management,<br />

and the erosion of public sector autonomy and authority<br />

generally. For example, interest in <strong>TQM</strong> arises in part<br />

from the enthusiastic endorsement of budget and planning<br />

officers and City managers acting through their professional<br />

associations. Moreover, changes in police management are<br />

amplified by the current anti-intellectual populism (and an<br />

anti-government congress) that supports privatization of<br />

institutional functions, and the use of market mechanisms to<br />

ameliorate social problems, bureaucratic stagnation and ossification.<br />

I restrict the remainder of this essay to an analysis<br />

of the ostensive effects of <strong>TQM</strong> in policing.<br />

<strong>TQM</strong> and Policing as Depicted l<br />

The argument for <strong>TQM</strong> has apparent validity and appeal. Let<br />

us review some ofthe claims for <strong>TQM</strong> in policing. I take the<br />

metaphoric language as given, and will not burden the reader<br />

with quotes around the concepts employed. Suffice it to say<br />

the key concepts are slippery, contextual, shifting in meaning<br />

over time, and often borrowed uncritically from the closed<br />

system logic of economists. Each of these assertions is a<br />

claim.<br />

<strong>TQM</strong> is said to produce results in industry by empowering<br />

employees through setting mutual performance goals with<br />

management; increasing performance thereby, and so reducing<br />

(transaction orpass through) costs, and indirectly increasing<br />

profit<br />

It is said also to encourage, or even perhaps, require more<br />

ethical kinds of supervision insofar as it rejects a "blame and


shame" model and strives for mutually negotiated accountability<br />

and work -process analysis and correction. Instead of<br />

capricious managerial intervention, workers internalize and<br />

"buy into" standards for evaluation and the quality of work.<br />

It is said to be service-oriented and attends to customer<br />

demands and needs, and eventually to precipitate customerbased<br />

modes of evaluation of both products and services.<br />

<strong>TQM</strong> is said to induce or bring about increased efficiency. It<br />

reduces the need for immediate work supervisors, since<br />

quality control is built into workers' values and the structure<br />

of the work or "production"; it reduces worker opposition to<br />

supervision that is punitive and external because workers<br />

accept and internalize the nature of work processes and<br />

accountability; and it reduces time wasted on irrelevant tasks<br />

(and reduces occupational deviance and lost worker time).<br />

Finally, <strong>TQM</strong> claims that it increases managerial flexibility.<br />

An "avoidance culture" or a shame and blame culture (based<br />

on fear of punishment for mistakes) does not develop, and<br />

union strength may be undercut (a value from this managerial<br />

perspective) by workers' acceptance of <strong>TQM</strong>. Material rewards<br />

are less significant than symbolic ones, and internal<br />

commitments to quality work will increase long term worker<br />

satisfaction. The overall purpose of applying <strong>TQM</strong> has been<br />

summarized well by Gary Sykes, a leading advocate of<strong>TQM</strong><br />

in policing. He argues: "We need to change the business<br />

they're in [the police] and change the way they do business"<br />

(Seminar at MSU cited above).<br />

Some Consequences of <strong>TQM</strong> in Policing<br />

The economic metaphor embodied in the language of <strong>TQM</strong><br />

when applied to people work, is profoundly misleading. As<br />

I have argued previously, police is a product of the collective<br />

consciousness that imputes sacred properties to agents of the<br />

authoritative core of a society. The question of efficiency is<br />

a vexing and primary one because it applies the flawed<br />

product language ofnineteenth century economics to government<br />

service.<br />

Policing does not "produce" a product, and its "services" are<br />

fundamentally subject to conflict and dispute. Policing is an<br />

exercise in symbolic demarking of what is immoral, wrong,<br />

and outside the boundaries of acceptable conduct. It represents<br />

the state, morality and standards ofcivility and decency<br />

by which we judge ourselves. That society gets (roughly<br />

speaking) the police they deserve is an old, but nevertheless<br />

true, English clicM. More importantly, the contribution of<br />

the police to civil society cannot be measured, demarcated<br />

narrowly, nor reduced to a monetary metric. It is precisely in<br />

doing that which third-rate economics applied to policing<br />

threatens to end: serving the collective interests of society<br />

that people find difficult to precisely define (They know what<br />

it is not- exploiting the weak to make profit). The sacred and<br />

mysterious quality that attaches to policing endures because<br />

it is, metaphorically at least, a kind of service or even "gift"<br />

society uses to stimulate the best in citizens on behalf of<br />

others.<br />

The proposition that efficiency should govern policing is<br />

dubious and naive. Ifeconomic terms of reference alone are<br />

used, absent the very political and social values that underlie<br />

all our great institutions, the reduction and mitigation of<br />

human risks and losses, we destroy the moral web in which<br />

we are entangled and by which we are sustained. Further<br />

efficiency in social control violates other values such a<br />

individualism, freedom of action, the entrepreneurial and<br />

innovative spirit, non-conformity to governmental rules and<br />

edicts, civil liberties, and the protections offered by the Bill<br />

of Rights.<br />

Police work is unexpected work, uneven, unpredictable, and<br />

diverse, dispersed over time and space, and thus it is essentially<br />

inefficient. Policing is inefficient because it was so<br />

designed. Police functions were public functions precisely<br />

because they could not be privatized and made profitable<br />

without threatening the civil fabric. Police cope with the<br />

untoward at length and in an inefficient manner because their<br />

"technology" is language and speech- persuasion, guile, lies,<br />

and fmally, threats and applied force, just as their primary<br />

work is "people work." Their fundamental resource is public<br />

trust, and their obligation is to sustain it. Without it, they must<br />

resort to force or unmitigated fraud.<br />

Policing necessarily retains and nurtures "slack resources"<br />

(Thompson, 1967), resources held in abeyance for allocation<br />

to matters arising. These resources, personnel, weapons,<br />

tools, and reciprocal mutual aid obligations binding them to<br />

other agencies, are built into the structure and process of<br />

policing. To trim (or add to) police resources on the basis of<br />

a hypothecated ideal level would fly in the face of all<br />

reasonable experience with hazards, terror, riots, frres, civil<br />

disturbance and rebellion, any matter which if left alone<br />

could become even more vexatious and dangerous (Bittner<br />

1990).<br />

<strong>TQM</strong> in the police context, as I have shown, advances a<br />

number of specific claims. No research has established the<br />

advantages or disadvantages of adopting <strong>TQM</strong> in a police<br />

department, so one can only speculate, not cite data. Let us<br />

consider them in brief.<br />

Claims<br />

1. <strong>TQM</strong>isdesigned to empowerthe worker, but the discretion<br />

of officers at the bottom stands as antithetical to managerial<br />

authority, and the values of the lower participants in patrol<br />

surround job control, original authority to act in the name of<br />

the state, and loyalty to one's colleagues. Reducing costs and<br />

increasing ''profits'' or even output has different meaning to<br />

sub-segments of the patrol world (Walsh, 1988}-some seek<br />

April 1995/ 3


ank promotion. some time off. some overtime and related<br />

income. some avoid work generally. The unity of this<br />

segment is based on opposition to managerial supervision<br />

and control. not loyalty to a common culture. Because the<br />

work is fundamentally uncertain, standards for judging it are<br />

"clinical" and obviate easy evaluation after the fact. Interventions<br />

by supervisors are prefigured as unwanted and<br />

capricious.<br />

The "oppositional culture" (Sykes, seminar cited above) that<br />

develops around the lower participant's life interests of<br />

policing has always been problematic for command officers.<br />

But perhaps one might consider this-the working officer's<br />

culture operates in effect to loosely couple managerial<br />

schemes, visions and plans. with the demands made upon<br />

officers dealing with human misery and despair. Itefficiently<br />

provides the necessary "cushion" that pennits slack to be<br />

mobilized. and produces situationally sound. shrewd, creative<br />

and weD-crafted responses to complex problems. The<br />

fundamental purpose of policing in a democratic society is<br />

not efficient law enforcement, but maintaining the peace and<br />

reducing human misery.<br />

2. <strong>TQM</strong> wishes to increase responsiveness to the "customer."<br />

As James Q. Wilson (1968) notes. the police are not popular-the<br />

police keep a jail. arrest people, apply violence,<br />

write tickets. and surveil, control, and manage citizens'<br />

conduct. The role implies conflict and conflict-resolution.<br />

The police officer does not serve individual citizens. nor seek<br />

to please them; the officer serves the public interest as the<br />

state and its political officers define it. This role is supported<br />

by law, public morality and tradition. To reduce officers'<br />

functions to providing "public service," even defmed as a<br />

source of conflict, is to make a mockery of the work: and the<br />

traditional mission of policing in a democratic society. Since<br />

the middle classes and above are typicaUy seen in the victim<br />

role, responsiveness to the customer will hold within it a<br />

potential for producing increases in class inequalities, rationing<br />

of service to the more powerful and conventionaUy<br />

worthy. in order to increase customer satisfaction.<br />

Ifthe "customer" is to be given the power tojudge, evaluate,<br />

and alter the nature of the "services" provided, then the<br />

fundamental grounds of an occupational mandate are undercut.<br />

As E.C. Hughes (1958) argues, occupations, once given<br />

a mandate, believe it is within their authority to define the<br />

nature of work and to hold out judgments of competence. A<br />

consumer orientation is appropriate when the consumer has<br />

the skiD, knowledge and willingness to risk consequences of<br />

a decision, but inappropriate when the consumer cannot<br />

judge, is held at law to be unable to judge, or whose our selfinterest<br />

supersedes the public interest. If"customer satisfaction"<br />

is weighed heavily, then market forces may substitute<br />

for values. judgment. discretion and forbearance of others'<br />

flaws and weaknesses, the very mobilizing touchstones that<br />

Police Forum/4<br />

make policing and other civil justice roles humane and<br />

tolerable in a mass democratic society.<br />

3. <strong>TQM</strong> seeks to increase managerial flexibility. Implementation<br />

of a <strong>TQM</strong> scheme, as with all refonns, hinges upon<br />

managerial decisions. It will be carried out via top-down<br />

commands and orders, often associated with implicit or<br />

explicit punishment and persuasion. What goals of policing<br />

are being mutually discussed and implemented? The focus<br />

here ison means, and it serves to displace attention away from<br />

unclear and ambiguous ends.<br />

It appears that <strong>TQM</strong> is yet another attempt by top command<br />

to control the patrol officer, to coopt officers to a pseudo<br />

democratic approach while encouraging self-surveillance,<br />

internalized controls, reduced control over the conditions of<br />

work (unions and reduction of procedural guarantees for<br />

certain delicts) and a false sense of public accountability.<br />

"Citizens" do not exist as a social group and wield no power<br />

or legitimate authority.<br />

4. The idea that workers can be converted to value symbolic<br />

rewards overmonetary rewards assumes that they wiD take to<br />

heart the governance of the organization. There is no evidence<br />

that a large number of police chiefs are willing to do<br />

this or have done it. Experiments with <strong>TQM</strong> have been done<br />

on a top-down basis, ordered from outside, or carried out in<br />

service-oriented departments with prevailing "customer orientation"<br />

because they were low-crime small towns or suburbs.<br />

The very fact that the few large departments that have<br />

introduced <strong>TQM</strong> have encountered strong employee resistance<br />

suggests that it has elements of managerial arrogation<br />

of power, not a sharing of responsibility and accountability<br />

with officers.<br />

5. <strong>TQM</strong> holds out reduced operating costs as a consequence,<br />

yet it is unclear how <strong>TQM</strong> might reduce costs. The police,<br />

except with respect to seizures and traffic tickets, have little<br />

potential to generate "profits." A police budget is relatively<br />

fIXed, and officers can do little to reduce costs. Cost control<br />

is by definition a top management function, not the worker's<br />

role (in fact workers are prohibited from doing so). Unit<br />

activities, arrests, traffic tickets. seizures, clearances are not<br />

measured, given precise value, nor costed out, so they cannot<br />

be compared across units. The fixed costs of policing<br />

(buildings. vehicles, salaries, retirement and benefits), like<br />

those of corrections, are vast and almost irreducible, so costsavings<br />

will be effectuated by further rationing of services.<br />

Externalities, such as the costs of suits for damages, and<br />

payments for settlement of suits out of court, are not controlled<br />

by the police, but detennined by City officials, attorneys.<br />

and negotiators. Savings effectuated here would have<br />

no direct bearing on police operating costs. In summary, the<br />

economic concepts used to refonn police are also misleading.<br />

The 'business of the police' is not 'business.' <strong>TQM</strong> hides


managerial aims that may not further the purposes of democmtic<br />

policing. It may serve to undermine unions and their<br />

ability to argue for legalistic protections, civil procedures,<br />

and tolemnce. It will serve to rationalize firing and<br />

"downsizing" on the grounds of "efficiency," or "good business,"<br />

or "productivity." While the community policing<br />

movement has the potential for reforming and opening up<br />

opportunities for officers to redefine their roles, <strong>TQM</strong> is a<br />

countermovement designed to arrogate further power neither<br />

to officers nor citizens, but to command management.<br />

Comment<br />

In the context of the present struggle for policereform several<br />

images are competing for salience. <strong>TQM</strong> substitutes new<br />

versions of managerial control for previous bureaucratic<br />

approaches. The net result would appear to besubstitution of<br />

an inappropriateeconomic metaphorforreviewing andevaluating<br />

traditional police practices. The consequence is not the<br />

spread of democmtic values within policing, but a broadening<br />

of the scope of managerial power with no appreciable<br />

gain to citizens or officers.<br />

Note<br />

IMany ofthese points were advanced by Prof. Gary Sykes in<br />

a seminar at Michigan State University School ofCriminal<br />

Justice, on Feb 13,1995.<br />

References<br />

Bittner, Egon 1990. Aspects of Police Work. Boston:<br />

Northeastern University Press.<br />

Goldstein, H. 1990. Problem-oriented Policing New York:<br />

McGmw-Hill<br />

Hughes, E.C. 1958. Men and Their Work Glencoe: Free<br />

Press.<br />

Manning. P.K. 1992. "Police and Information Technologies"<br />

in M. Tonry and N. Morris (eds.) Modern PoliCing.<br />

Chicago: University of Press.<br />

1994 ·'Community Policing" in V. Kappeler ed.<br />

The Police and Society. Prospect Heights,lll: Waveland<br />

Press.<br />

1994 "Economic Rhetoric and Police Reform" in<br />

V. Kappelered. The Police and Society. Prospect Heights,<br />

lll: Waveland Press.<br />

1994a" Violence and Symbolic Violence" in V.<br />

Kappeler ed. The Police and Society ProspectHeights, Ill:<br />

Waveland Press.<br />

Reiss, AJ. Jr. 1992 "Twentieth Century Policing" in M.<br />

Tonry and N. Morris (eds.) Modern Policing. Chicago:<br />

University of Press.<br />

Thompson. J. 1967 Organizations in Action. New York:<br />

McGmw-Hill.<br />

Wilson, J.Q. 1968 Varieties ofPolice Behavior. Cambridge:<br />

Harvard University Press.<br />

Walsh, W.1985 "Patrol officer Arrest Rates..." Justice Quarterly<br />

2 (September): 271-290.<br />

Call for Papers<br />

The Society of Police<br />

Futurists International<br />

invites those interested in the future of<br />

crime, criminal justice, and public policy to<br />

submit a paper for<br />

presentation at PFI's Second Symposium:<br />

2020 Vision: Policing<br />

25 Years in the<br />

Future<br />

October 1-4, 1995<br />

Chicago, Illinois<br />

Abstracts due: May 1, 1995<br />

Papers due: August 1, 1995<br />

Details may be obtained from<br />

Symposium Program Chair:<br />

Richard W. Myers<br />

Chief of Police<br />

lisle Police Department<br />

1040 Burlington Avenue<br />

Lisle, Il 60532<br />

(708) 719-0800<br />

FAX: (708) 719-0807<br />

April 1995/ 5


J<br />

[.... POLICE PUBUCATION NEWS ·<br />

Book Review<br />

Common Sense About Police Review<br />

by Douglas W. Perez.<br />

Temple University Press, 1994.<br />

322 pages.<br />

Can police departments objectively and adequately police<br />

themselves? Can civilian review mechanisms evaluate the<br />

intricate workings of the police from an outside position.<br />

Douglas W. Perez's Common Sense About Police Review is<br />

an ambitious look at the base causes of complaints against the<br />

police, how various jurisdictions review alleged police misconduct,<br />

and what system best answers the needsofthe police<br />

and the public. Perez's research covers seven- teen years of<br />

studies and observations of several selected police departments<br />

and their chosen methods of review. However, the<br />

most important facet of this book is the extraordinary effort<br />

made by Perez to balance statistics and laws with the human<br />

elements of both the police and civilian complainants.<br />

The Introduction to Common Sense About Police Review is<br />

one of the strongest points of the book. Instead of immediately<br />

entering into a discussion of various types of review<br />

systems, Perez discusses the multiple roles and responsibilities<br />

which society has assigned to the police and how the<br />

police administer those tasks. He is particularly on target<br />

when he likens the police officer to an administrator who<br />

must base his decisions on more than black and white laws.<br />

The flexibility of the police officer's job is what makes it<br />

often times successful, and sometimes leads to complaints of<br />

misconduct.<br />

Perez devotes all of Chapter One to the nature of police<br />

malpractice. The history of police malpractice is reviewed to<br />

show that major change in police review has always come on<br />

the heelsofa majorincidenL He then reviews two currentday<br />

incidents, Rodney King (Los Angeles) and Malice Green<br />

(Detroit), which are used during the remainder of the book to<br />

compare opposing styles of police review. Complaint demographics<br />

are discussed as they relate to the types of complaints<br />

ftled and the different types of review processes<br />

adopted in various localities. Perez's discussion of the<br />

various categories of police abuse in present day society is<br />

very useful in that it offers the reader a view of why some<br />

segments of society are more likely to sustain certain types of<br />

abuse than others. Perez also tries to give some insight into<br />

how the community's acceptance of certain types ofmalpraclice<br />

affects the outlook and actions of their police force.<br />

Police Forum/6<br />

No present day system can operate in a vacuum and in<br />

Chapter Two Perez outlines some of the environmental<br />

forces affecting present day review systems. The limits to<br />

reform begin with the conceptions, both true and misconceived,<br />

held by the police and public of each other. Perez<br />

touches on the feelings of ostracism harbored by many police<br />

officers because ofthe unwarranted hostility directed toward<br />

them and the many administrative and judicial obstacles<br />

placed in their path. He also examines the "growing anonymity"<br />

(p. 36) of American society and how the problems<br />

brought to the police are more polarized and more difficult to<br />

resolve. The public's distrust of government is often directed<br />

toward the most visible symbol; the police.<br />

Reform, according to Perez, is also limited by various institutions;<br />

prosecutors, courts, legislatures, grand juries, and the<br />

media. They apply pressure in the form of laws, rulings and<br />

publicity which help form the boundaries within which the<br />

police review system must function. Perez is very informative<br />

in his descriptions of the many emotional and administrative<br />

factors affecting the review systems ability to succeed<br />

and how these factors both help and hinder the police officer<br />

involved.<br />

Chapter Three involves the discussion of what makes an<br />

effective complaint review system. Perez looks at the three<br />

main groups involved in the complaint process (complaining<br />

citizens, police officers, police organizations) and evaluates<br />

those areas which are of importance to each group in the<br />

review process. The fair representation of each group's<br />

desires. interests. and rights is what determines the effectiveness<br />

of any given review system, according to Perez.<br />

Perez uses integrity. legitimacy. and learning as the three<br />

evaluators of the effectiveness of a review system. He is open<br />

in his admitting that the rating of these three factors is most<br />

certainly subjective in many instances, but he nonetheless<br />

outlines several criteria which he has used in his study to<br />

make his results as accurate and applicable as possible. Perez<br />

makes an excellent case for the importance of learning as a<br />

criterion through its ability to not only deter future misconduct,<br />

but to also provide the police organization with feedback<br />

concerning public perceptions of the departmentand the<br />

success or failure of current institutional processes.<br />

Chapters Four, Five, and Six are the heart of Common Sense<br />

About Police Review because they combine Perez's in-depth<br />

study and personal observations of the three main types of<br />

police review systems. These systems are evaluated using<br />

integrity• legitimacy , and learning as the major determinants<br />

of effectiveness. He also reviews the input mechanisms,<br />

investigative procedures, and method of deliberation and


determination. Perez makes it easier for the reader to keep<br />

track of the similarities and differences between the three<br />

system styles by reviewing important points of comparison<br />

periodically within his analysis.<br />

Oneofthe few criticisms I have ofthis book is that Perez often<br />

interjects subjective opinion alongside objective observations<br />

without clearly delineating between the two. This is<br />

done in several observations concerning the early development<br />

of certain review institutions and how their members<br />

worked against harmony with the police organizations involved.<br />

The third and final section of Common Sense About Police<br />

Review looks at the various entities that are able to affect<br />

change in administrative review systems, compares the review<br />

systems examined, and proposes an ideal police review<br />

system. In Chapter Seven, Perez identifies police unions,<br />

chiefs, the media, the community, political elites, and local<br />

bar members as potential agents of change who share some<br />

responsibility for police misconduct and should also share in<br />

solving the problems identified with the police and review<br />

systems. Perez outlines the current status of these players and<br />

suggests how they might augment active review systems to<br />

better provide needed solutions. He provides not only theoretical<br />

fodder, but includes examples of real-life programs<br />

and situations involving the previously mentioned agents of<br />

change.<br />

A comparative analysis of the police review systems mentioned<br />

earlier in the book allows Perez to compare specific<br />

points as the relate to the three main evaluation criteria of<br />

integrity, legitimacy, and learning. Perez highlights the most<br />

positive aspects of the systems and how those areas can be<br />

implemented to best serve the goals ofpolice review. In his<br />

comparisons Perez is very astute at pointing out the personal<br />

concerns of the groups effected by the review process and<br />

how the individual systems answer those concerns. Chapter<br />

Eight provides the components for Perez building the "ideal<br />

police review system" in Chapter Nine.<br />

In the last chapter, Perez assembles what he feels are the best<br />

components of the systems previously observed into one<br />

proposal which best outlines the necessities for a fair, impartial,<br />

and functional review system. He views the police<br />

accountability system as consisting of three information<br />

loops which channel review findings in several directions;<br />

police policy development, training, and complaint investigation<br />

I adjudication.<br />

The training and learning element is singled out by Perez as<br />

the most important mission of any review mechanism. He<br />

emphasizes, and I believe rightfully so, that the knowledge<br />

gained from the review system can be very critical in the<br />

formulation of training procedures in recruit and in-service<br />

systems. Training can be instrumental in both curbing actual<br />

misconduct and in making officers aware of the perceptions<br />

held by citizens which may contribute to the number of<br />

complaints reported.<br />

One of the more innovative and potentially beneficial elements<br />

of Perez 's "ideal system" is the use ofpeer counseling,<br />

mediation, and other forms of informal resolution for minor<br />

complaints. These methods, according to Perez, will allow<br />

peer pressure and retraining to correct misconduct in a more<br />

positive manner while saving countless dollars spent during<br />

a full scale review.<br />

Douglas Perez has presented a well thought out and researched<br />

analysis of existing and proposed police review<br />

systems, while acknowledging the impossibility of doing so<br />

in clear-cut, black and white finality. He has made a commendable<br />

effort to look at all sides and provide the reader<br />

with a workable outline for a system which incol'JX)rates the<br />

best ideas from several working models. Instating what most<br />

legitimate complainants look for, Perez states, "they want a<br />

reasonably objective evaluation of their allegations. They<br />

want some action taken, not necessarily punitive, which will<br />

assure that future similar incidents will not recur. In short.<br />

they want to have their government respond to their grievances<br />

openly and effectively" (pp. 67). Perez has providedan<br />

outline for a system which seems to reasonably provide that<br />

response.<br />

Robyn A. Wiley<br />

Indiana University at Fort Wayne<br />

Book News<br />

Policework:<br />

The Need for a Noble Character<br />

by Rickey D. Lashley<br />

Forward by Stan Stojkovic<br />

Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995<br />

144 pages, $49.95<br />

to A strong challenge against the present American system of<br />

law enforcement, this book contends that politics have prevented<br />

police from achieving their sworn mission. Although<br />

his analysis is based on established theory, the author uses his<br />

own research and experience as evidence of the failure of the<br />

criminal justice system. Police departments are revealed as<br />

examples of a bureaucracy that has lost sight of its pU1JX>se<br />

and only seeks to survive. This work will be of interest to<br />

those seeking a different and controversial view of criminal<br />

justice, police science, public administration, urban studies,<br />

and political science programs."<br />

April 1995/ 7


CHANGING <strong>THE</strong> FACE <strong>OF</strong> <strong>POLICING</strong>:<br />

The Community Policing Paradigm<br />

A. Steven Dietz<br />

Research Specialist<br />

Austin Police Department<br />

Austin, Texas<br />

Community policing, though not a new concept for police,<br />

has only recently been the focus ofa presidential administration.<br />

Through the 1980' s and into this decade the Department<br />

ofJustice has funded community oriented policing programs<br />

and projects inan effort to help city government reduce crime<br />

and assist neighborhoods in reclaiming their identity. These<br />

programs were generally conducted by a relatively small<br />

number ofofficers. and in neighborhoods requiring substantial<br />

repair of "broken windows." 1 The results indicate community<br />

policing is successful. However, maintaining these<br />

programs has required resources beyond those normally<br />

provided a police department. The programs are seen as<br />

special assignments for the officers involved, and once officers<br />

are reassigned the neighborhoods return to their earlier<br />

state or worse, and the officers return to their traditional<br />

policing techniques. The importance placed on community<br />

policing at all levels of government suggests that there is a<br />

need to identify effective methods oftransition to community<br />

policing.<br />

Research on policing, and in particular community policing.<br />

has been undertaken from a traditional policing paradigm.<br />

This paradigm is based on the reactive nature of the traditional<br />

9-1-1 driven semi-military hierarchy of traditional<br />

policing. A community policing paradigm provides a more<br />

comprehensive framework for policing and also includes the<br />

critical aspects or tools of a traditional policing paradigm<br />

which are essential to police being able to protect citizens and<br />

enforce laws and ordinances in their precincts. This represents<br />

a significant change for policing and police research.<br />

Austin Police Department<br />

Community policing has been a fact of life for the Austin<br />

Police Department (APD) for a number of years, as it has<br />

been in many other departments across the country. However,<br />

while APD has initiated numerous community oriented<br />

activities, coordinating these activities became extremely<br />

staff and time demanding.<br />

APD received a Bureau of Justice Assistance Community<br />

Policing Demonstration Site Grant in October of 1993. The<br />

department decided this would be the catalyst for becoming<br />

a true community policing department. To accomplish this<br />

Police Forum/ 10<br />

the department has developed three goals/ assumptions that<br />

are in keeping with the basic concepts of community policing:<br />

• police departments must understand the needs/ expectations<br />

of the citizens they serve;<br />

• police departments must live within their means;<br />

• police departments must optimize resources through<br />

investment in technology and long range planning for<br />

unresolved budget issues.<br />

These assumptions represent the foundation fora community<br />

policing paradigm. They suggest that the police in Austin<br />

must understand the expectations of citizens, and teach<br />

citizens what police are able to do to meet those expectations,<br />

as well. APD has recognized that funding and staffing levels<br />

for the department cannot keep pace with the growth of the<br />

city. The assumptions also suggest a systemic organizational<br />

change as opposed to simply implementing community p0licing<br />

programs, pilots or projects. Finally, the department<br />

must make a concerted effort to invest in cutting edge<br />

technology and innovative organizational strategies.<br />

In traditional policing the reality of crime is considered the<br />

problem of police, and the perception of crime is discounted<br />

as the problem of the citizen. The community policing<br />

paradigm suggest that the perception of crime is real to the<br />

citizen and is as much a challenge for the police as it is for<br />

citizens. Therefore, the role of community oriented police is<br />

to understand the citizens' perception, develop initiatives to<br />

reduce the crimes! incidents that form the basis of these<br />

perceptions. and work with citizens to change these perceptions.<br />

This first goal, identifying the needs and expectations of<br />

citizens, may be one of the hardest facing police. APD<br />

conducted public meetings to get an initial understanding of<br />

the expectations of citizens. These meetings suggested several<br />

areas of concern:<br />

• crime in general;<br />

• perception of crime in one's own neighborhood;<br />

• fear of becoming a victim of crime.<br />

To further determine the extent of these concerns among the<br />

citizens of Austin, APD conducted a city-wide survey. The<br />

results of the citizen survey and neighborhood meetings<br />

provided APD with a clearer understanding of what citizens<br />

expect and what APD needs to do to meet those expectations .<br />

However, meeting the identified needs of citizens required<br />

APD to conduct further analysis. The perspectives provided


y the second and third assumptions - living within their<br />

means. and optimizing resources -applied to the results of the<br />

surveys generated the following list of recommendations:<br />

• Use citizens' perception of the "quality of police<br />

service" as one measure ofthe effectiveness of APD' s<br />

community policing initiatives;<br />

• Use measures of fear of crime, and citizens' perception<br />

of crime as measures of neighborhood wellness<br />

(quality of life), and not effective policing;<br />

• Examine current police policies and determine which<br />

support a community policing department and which<br />

do not;<br />

• Establish criteria for recruit selection and training.<br />

reflecting the appropriate qualities of an ideal community<br />

oriented police officer;<br />

• Align officer assessment and in-service training more<br />

closely with the community policing paradigm and<br />

with the criteria used for hiring and for the training<br />

academy;<br />

• Organize so that APD can take advantage of the<br />

experiences of the patrol officer to respond flexibly to<br />

an ever changing environment by allowiqg decisions<br />

to be made at the lowest possible level of the department;<br />

• Examine the very structure of the organization to<br />

identify those aspects of the organization which most<br />

limit the systemic shift to a community policing department.<br />

Comment<br />

A change in perspective or paradigm has never been easy for<br />

any organization, including police, and has always been done<br />

in bits and pieces. One day the chief of police looks out and<br />

realizes that policing is not the same as it was in the "good old<br />

day." Historically, there have been few changes that have<br />

affected the very foundation of policing. This is the impact<br />

the community policing paradigm will have on policing. It<br />

will be a systemic change that will effect the very structure of<br />

the policing organization. Community policing represents<br />

notonly a change in perspective for conducting policing. but<br />

also a change in evaluating policing effectiveness. and police<br />

initiated programs.<br />

Note<br />

IBroken Windows. by James Q. Wilson and George L.<br />

Kelling was published in the March 1992 issue of The<br />

Atlantic Monthly.<br />

This Periodical is Indexed in<br />

The Criminal Justice Periodical Index<br />

U·M·I<br />

A Bell & Howell Company<br />

300 North Zeeb Road<br />

Ann Arbor, M148106·1346 USA<br />

April 1995/ 11

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