Synthetic report - EURAC

Nina Baltic, Tomasz Milej
Synthetic Report on Human Rights
under the Yugoslav System,
Processes of Ethnic Mobilization
and EU Crisis Management

This report was compiled in the frame of the FP6 project “Human and Minority Rights in the Life Cycle of Ethnic
Conflicts”.
The authors were affiliated to the Institute for East European Law, part of the Faculty of Law at the University of
Cologne (Germany), one of the partners in this project.
Copyright March 2007: the executing contracting institution

Human and Minority Rights in Violent Ethnic Conflict
Synthetic report on the basis of MIRICO Work Package 2 Reports: Human and
Minority Rights under the Yugoslav Communist System, Country-Specific
Reports on Actors and Processes of Ethno-Mobilization in Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia and EU
Reactive Crisis Management
Nina Baltic, Tomasz Milej
MIRICO: Human and Minority Rights in the Life Cycle of Ethnic Conflicts

Table of contents
Table of contents.........................................................2
List of Abbreviations .....................................................4
Abstract ....................................................................5
1. Introduction............................................................6
2. Basic Concepts and Definitions .....................................8
2.1. Ethnicity ............................................................. 8
2.2. Ethnic Conflict ...................................................... 8
2.3. Ethnic Group/Nation ............................................... 8
2.4.Perception ............................................................ 9
2.5.Cognitive Frames .................................................... 9
2.6.Ethno-Mobilization .................................................11
2.7.Summary .............................................................13
3. Prelude to violent conflict and ethnic mobilization under the
Yugoslav Communist System ...................................... 14
3.1. Concept of Statehood during Socialist Yugoslavia ............14
3.1.1. Development of the Concept of Nations and Minorities ......14
3.1.2. Self-determination and secession in particular ................15
3.1.3. The concept from Serbia’s perspective: ........................17
3.2. Economic Preconditions for Ethno-Mobilization ..............18
3.3. Increasing of Ethnic Tensions ....................................20
4. Actors and means of ethno-mobilization ........................ 22
4.1. Politicians/Political Parties ......................................22
4.1.1. Developments on the political scene ............................22
4.1.2. Evaluation ............................................................24
4.2. Civil Society and Intellectuals ...................................25
4.3. Military, Paramilitary and State Intelligence Agencies ......25
4.3.1. JNA ....................................................................25
4.3.2. Republics .............................................................26
4.3.3. Kosovo ................................................................27
4.3.4. Evaluation ............................................................27
4.4. Influence of the Diaspora.........................................29
4.5. Churches and Religious Communities...........................30
4.6. Media ................................................................31
2

5. Minorities in the New Republics .................................. 32
5.1. BiH, Croatia and Serbia...........................................32
5.2. Macedonia...........................................................33
5.3. Kosovo ...............................................................33
5.4. Evaluation ..........................................................33
6. Violence ............................................................. 36
7. Third-Party Intervention ........................................... 37
7.1. Individual States in the Region ..................................37
7.2. The Mujahedin and Islamic States...............................38
7.3. Individual States on the Geopolitical Scene ...................39
7.4. The Role of the EU (initially EC only) ..........................40
7.4.1. General ...............................................................40
7.4.2. Croatia................................................................40
7.4.3. BH and Kosovo.......................................................40
7.4.4. Macedonia............................................................41
7.5. The Role of the UN ................................................41
7.5.1. Croatia and BH ......................................................41
7.5.2. Croatia in particular................................................41
7.5.3. Serbia .................................................................42
7.5.4. Macedonia............................................................42
7.6. The Role of NATO ..................................................42
7.7. The OSCE ............................................................42
8. Conclusion............................................................ 44
Bibliography ............................................................. 46
3

List of Abbreviations
ARBH Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine (Bosnian Army)
BH Bosnia Herzegovina
BiH Bosnia i Herzegowina
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIVPOL Civilian Police (created by United Nations)
EC European Community
EU European Union
FADORUK Federal Fund for Accelerated Development of the
Undeveloped Republics and Kosovo
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
HDZ Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian Democratic
Union)
HVO Hrvatsko vijeće obrane (Croatian Defence Council)
IMF International Monetary Fund
IVZ Islamska Vjerska Zajednica
JNA Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav Peoples Army)
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
LCY League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Savez komunista
Jugoslavije)
MBO Muslim Bosniak Organisation
MUP Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova (Serbian Ministry of
Interior)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDH Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (Independent Croatian State)
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NLA National Liberation Army
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SANU Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti (Serbian Academy of
Sciences and Arts)
SAO Serbian Autonomous Oblast
SDA Stranka Demokratske Akcije
SDS Srpska Demokratska Stranka
SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SPS Socijalistička Partija Srbije (Serbian Socialist Party)
SR Socialist Republic
TDF Territorial Defence Forces
UN United Nations
UNCRO United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNPA United Nations Protected Areas
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
US United States
USA United Stats of America
VMRO-DPMNE Vnatrešno-Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija-
Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko Narodno Edinstvo
(Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-
Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity)
4

Abstract
The Synthetic Report elaborates the factors of ethno-mobilization that led to
outbreak of violence on the territory of former Yugoslavia, the position of
minorities within the conflicts and the role of third parties. Therefore it raises and
analyses the results of the country specific reports from Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH), Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia, the Report on Human and Minority
Rights under the Yugoslav Communist System and other sources on the basis of
explanatory models and theories developed in the scholars’ writings. The results
show how within a declining Yugoslav socialist state model serious security
concerns emerged which made people vulnerable to ethno-mobilization, initiated
by authoritarian political top leaders in Serbia, Croatia and BH. The right to
(external) self-determination and an effluent right to secession – perceived to be
held by both nations and (newly defined) national minorities - became the most
central question. Despite this common root, the nature of the conflict was
different in each republic and in Kosovo. The emphasis is put on political and
economic factors that contributed to the security concerns as well as on religious
communities, their leaders’ involvement in politics and ethno-mobilization. Finally,
the report addresses the question of the so called “point of no return” in the
republics concerned, at which a violent ethnic conflict could be said to be no
longer avoidable. The developed results are supposed to serve as a basis for the
further work packages of the MIRICO-project.
5

1. Introduction
The Synthetic Report elaborates the contents and the results of the Report on the
Theory and Practice of Human Rights and Minority Rights under the Yugoslav
Communist System and the country specific Reports on Actors and Means of Ethno-
Mobilization, Third-Party-Intervention and Violence. The present survey will
attempt to explain why violent ethnic conflict occurred in Yugoslavia. It will also
try to establish “the point of no-return” at which ethno-mobilization was so
advanced that a violent ethnic conflict became unavoidable.
Dealing with of the process of ethno-mobilization leading to ethnic
violence, one must first observe that four different views on its nature have
basically been presented in the literature. 1 The first (“primordial”) explanation
model stresses the primordial character of ethnic affiliation, attaching to it an
“overpowering emotional and non-rational quality”. According to this view, in the
former Yugoslavia, a fierce competition for political power combined with
uncertainty and distrust turned entire ethnic communities against each other and
activated hatred that had previously been hidden just under the surface of
“normal” inter-community relations. According to the second (“instrumentalist”)
view, ethnic loyalties are manipulated by politicians and intellectuals for political
ends, such as, for example, the establishment of a new state. The third
(“constructionist”) model opposes the idea of a primordial character of ethnic
affiliations, arguing that ethnicity is only one of several roles and identities that
matter and is subject to change, as it is constructed and eroded by political
institutions and choices. Finally, according to the fourth (“collapse”) model, the
security dilemma arising from the conditions of state-breakdown is the main source
of ethno-mobilization as it let the ethnic group appear to be the powerful
protector of life and property against ethnic rivals.
Instead of relying on one particular model, the present report will take an
analytical-comparative approach based mainly on the data provided in the
aforementioned reports and, where appropriate, evaluating the findings against
the conceptual framework presented. The variety of concepts taken alone shows
that convincing results cannot be reached by limiting the analysis only to one group
of actors, for example politicians. Therefore the report will attempt to define the
major actors of the process of ethno-mobilization, make an assessment of their
role and means used to trigger it, to slow it down or to minimize its impact.
It begins with an analysis of some basic concepts put forward in the
literature and definitions provided in the country reports. On this basis, country
specific definitions of ethno-mobilization and its common traits are elaborated.
The second part deals with the “grass roots” of the conflict which have to
be sought in the Yugoslavian Communist system. The emphasis is put on the final
stage of its development. This part includes an analysis of the concept of statehood
and the rights which were granted to the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia
that left all of the ethnic groups unsatisfied, a special focus being put on the
Serbian constitutional crisis.
According to the initially prepared questionnaire the following three parts
draw up a comparison of the country specific results on actors and means of ethnomobilization,
minorities and third-party interventions. The subsection on actors
and means of ethno-mobilization concentrates on the most important actors: the
political elites and the clergy, also showing how important the media were in this
1 The following overview is based on Anthony Oberschall, “The manipulation of ethnicity:
from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia”, Ethnic and Racial Studies
(2000), 982-984.
6

process. The next subsection points out the legal and actual effects on minorities
in the respective republics, the last subsection deals mainly with the role of foreign
states, international institutions and their (in)effective influence on negotiations,
violent escalation and peace settlement.
7

2. Basic Concepts and Definitions
The Croatian report provides a definition of ethnicity, which will be used as basis
for further reflections on the term “ethno-mobilization” and the analysis of the
following processes.
2.1. Ethnicity
Ethnicity is defined as “[…] use of descent as basis for membership in ethnic groups
[…]. The belief of a common origin is encouraged by a common language, a shared
religion, a sense of homeland, common customs and shared historical narratives.” 2
In a simplified way, ethnicity is an “identity with one’s ethnic group […]”. 3
Despite the ethnic identity, individuals have various identities based on their
profession, sex, religion, etc. “[…] When ethnicity becomes politically relevant and
determines the life prospects of people belonging to distinct ethnic groups, it is
possible to mobilize group members to change a situation of apparently perpetual
discrimination and disadvantage or in defence of a valued status quo.” 4
Ethnic identification within a national collective became important when
the republics of Yugoslavia sought to become truly sovereign (national) states for
the first time in their history – a right, which was contested by ethnic groups within
their own territory and by other republics. Ethnic affiliation became dominant in
everyday life, in matters of residence, citizenship, job loss or maintenance and -
the worst case - physical integrity or survival.
2.2. Ethnic Conflict
“Ethnic conflicts are a form of group conflict, in which at least one of the parties
involved interprets the conflict, its causes, and potential remedies along an
actually existing or perceived discriminating ethnic divide”. 5
2.3. Ethnic Group/Nation:
The term nation will be used in contexts which will deal with ethnic groups that
are the titular nation within a certain republic (nation state). “Ethnic group” will
be used as general clause.
2 Antonija Petricusic, Country Specific Report on Croatia, p. 3, see also classical studies on
ethnicity: Max Weber, “Ethnic Groups” in Werner Sollors (ed.) Theories of Ethnicity, (New
York University Press, New York, 1922); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (Verso,
London, 1983); Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1996).
3 Stefan Wolff, Ethnic conflict, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), 31.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 2.
8

2.4. Perception
The Yugoslav leadership had claimed from the very beginning that the national
question was resolved with the establishment of the second Yugoslavia. The old
national plans of Serbs and Croats and hatreds of other peoples inhabiting
Yugoslavia were considered to be obsolete.
Far from that - it seems that the mutual perceptions of the ethnic groups or
the mutual perceptions of old (hegemonic or separatist) threat they presented to
each other in the Balkans were the only perceptions in the collective memories
that survived and became true eventually, beside the fact that there have also
been reverse developments. To say it with the words of the Serbian report in a
generalised way: The “[…] threat in the consciousness of one ethnic group was real
because it was the perceived reality that guided action and in turn, mobilized the
other ethnic groups, corroborating their thesis of the others’ hostility”. 6
2.5. Cognitive Frames
The sharp contrast between the situation after World War II until late eighties, in
which nations and nationalities were living peacefully together, 7 and atrocities
committed in the course of the war call for a special explanation. It is hereby not
necessary to explain why Yugoslavia fell apart, but why the process of falling apart
took such violent forms. 8 The issue will be addressed on the basis of a concept of
cognitive frames. 9 A cognitive frame is to be understood as a “mental structure
which situates and connects events, people and groups into a meaningful narrative
in which the social world that one inhabits makes sense and can be communicated
and shared with others.” 10 According to Anthony Oberschall the people in the
Balkans experienced ethnic relations through two frames: a “normal” frame and a
“crisis” frame. The aforementioned contrast can be explained by the fact that
during the time of communist Yugoslavia the normal frame was dominant and the
ethnic relations were cooperative and neighbourly. The crisis frame which
dominated in the subsequent war was grounded in the experiences of the Balkan
wars and World War II in particular. In this frame:
Atrocities, massacres, torture, ethnic cleansing, a scorched-earth
policy were the rule. Everyone was held collectively responsible for
their nationality and religion, and became a target of revenge and
reprisals. 11
The official policy of Yugoslavia was striving to erase the crisis frame 12 but these
attempts were not successful. The absence of an open debate 13 on the tragic past
6
Vesna Pešić, Country Specific Report on Serbia, 4.
7
See Nina Baltić, Special Report on Theory and Practice of Human Rights and Minority
Rights under the Yugoslav Communist System, 39 et seq. For BH see also Wolfgang
Petritsch, Bosnien und Herzegovina 5 Jahre danach. Hat der Friede eine Chance?, (Wieser
Verlag, Klagenfurt et al. 2001), 31.
8
The necessity to distinguish between these two questions is pointed out by John B. Allcock,
Explaining Yugoslavia, (Columbia University Press, New York 2000), 419.
9
Oberschall, 989.
10
David Snow et al., “Frame alignment processes, micromobilization and movement participation”,
American Sociological Review (1986), 464-481, cited after Oberschall, 989
11
Oberschall, 989.
12
Baltić, 49.
13
According to Hansjörg Eiff a political debate about the recent past (World War II) aiming
at reconciliation was “completely missing”. Hansjörg Eiff, “Anmerkungen zum Zerfall Jugos-
9

may be the major reason for this. What the authoritarian regime offered was not
an open debate, but a party-managed top-down equalisation of ethnic groups,
applying an “ethnic key” in many areas of public life. Even if the Yugoslav system
is considered to be a quite liberal one as compared with other countries of “real
socialism”, an articulation of collective needs by ethnic groups and representation
of collective interests belonged to the restricted domain. Initiating a debate about
the roots of past ethnic violence would definitely overstep the borderline drawn
for the permitted public debates by the communist leadership. 14 Such a debate
would undermine the crucial partisan myth lying at the roots of Tito-Yugoslavia
and legitimating it. A common Communist Party-led antifascist fight of all Yugoslav
peoples was this myth. It was not only propagated by the party but also enforced
by prosecuting its objectors. 15 At the end of the day, however, precisely this lack
of public debate actually conferred upon the not-outspoken past inter-ethnic
violence legendary or mythological forms 16 which could be easily used by
nationalists. The crisis frame was dormant but it still existed. It could be activated
and amplified 17 and this is what actually happened in the course of ethno-
mobilization.
lawiens in den Jahren 1988-1992”, in Dittmar Dahlmann and Milan Kosanović, Sozialistisches
Jugoslawien. Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Vorträge der Michael-Zikic-Stiftung
2001-2005, (Michael-Zikic-Stiftung, Universität Bonn, Bonn 2005),177-104, at 189.
14 Baltić, 48-49.
15 Aleksandar Jakir, “Nationale Ideologien und das System der Arbeiterselbstverwaltung im
sozialistischen Jugoslawien“, in Dittmar Dahlmann and Milan Kosanović, Sozialistisches Jugoslawien.
Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Vorträge der Michael-Zikic-Stiftung 2001-
2005, (Michael-Zikic-Stiftung, Universität Bonn, Bonn 2005), 99-149, at 123.
16 For examples, see Allcock, 382-383.
17 Oberschall, 989.
10

2.6. Ethno-Mobilization
The table below summarizes definitions of an ethnic mobilization provided for in
country reports.
BH Croatia Serbia Kosovo/a Macedonia
The bringing of
members to a state
of
readiness/mobility
that should be a
pre-requisite for the
performance of
other actions or
obstacle to the
sudden or
unannounced attack
by opposing ethnic
groups. In simple
words, ethnomobilization
could
be defined as
“closing ranks”
within a single
national corps in
order to achieve a
certain goal or
perform some
extraordinary work,
most frequently for
the purpose of
“organizing defense
from an enemy”,
i.e. removing the
causes of
vulnerability. 18 It
means bringing
members of one
ethnic group in a
state of readiness,
mobility, what
should be a prerequisite
for
performance of
other actions and/or
obstacle and barrier
to the sudden or
unannounced
“attack” by another
“opposing” ethnic
group or groups
Ethno-mobilization
can be understood
as an
instrumentalization
of ethnic
identities, or in
other words, (mis-)
use of the ethnicity
by the elites, in
order to mobilize
the masses for the
realization of their
political objectives
and (even
personal) interests.
Ethnic mobilization
implies grouping
around the ethnic
lines and the (re)emergence
of
ethnic cleavages
that had
consequences for
the segmentation
of the society.
Ethnic mobilization
can be said to
emerge as a
response to the
threats and fears
that were
intentionally
fostered, or even
manipulated by
politicians who
simply employed
already existing
historical
narratives.
Ethnic
mobilization is
the statebuildingmovement
of a people
led by an
authoritarian
leader who has
succeeded in
assuming control
over the state
apparatus, the
media, the
Church and the
cultural elite,
the involvement
of which is prerequisite
for
achieving the
emotional,
cultural and
political
homogenization
of the nation’s
awareness of the
common enemy
war should be
waged against.
Ethno-mobilization
is ‘the process by
which an ethnic
community
becomes
politicized on
behalf of its
collective interests
and aspirations.
This process
requires
awareness, usually
promoted by
ethnic
entrepreneurs,
that political
action is necessary
to promote or
defend the
community’s vital
collective
interests. This
awareness results
in the recruitment
of individuals into
the movement or
into specific
organizations that
purport to speak
for the movement.
Likewise, financial
and other material
resources required
for political action
are drawn to the
movement.’
Ethnomobilization
is
political
mobilization
along ethnic
lines.
18 The very term “mobilization“ is primarily of military origin and it means “transition of
the nation’s armed forces from peace-time status into mobile status and reaching full battle
readiness” (Bratoljub Klaić, Veliki rječnik stranih riječi (Zora, Zagreb, 1972)). The same
dictionary describes a broader sense of the term “mobilization” as “attracting certain
groups of population [...] to perform some tasks that are required by the current circumstances”,
and “put in motion (for instance, popular masses) for the purpose of performing
some extraordinary work”. The term “ethno-mobilization” would mark the last case: “mobilizing
masses for the purpose of performing some extraordinary work, which would, in the
eve of war in former Yugoslavia, be defense of jeopardized nations (in the broadest meaning
of the word).
11

The evaluation of the term “ethno-mobilization” starts with the broadest
definition, given by the Macedonian Report, which defines ethnic mobilization as
political mobilization along ethnic lines. 19 The other reports provide definitions of
ethno-mobilization which are built on to the processes in different countries and
show what is considered the most important factors in ethno-mobilization.
The Serbian report defines ethno-mobilization as the state-building
movement of a people - led by an authoritarian leader who gained control over the
state apparatus, the media, the church and cultural elite, the involvement of
which is a pre-requisite for achieving the emotional, cultural and political
homogenization of the nation’s awareness of the common enemy war should be
waged against. 20 It is interesting that the Serbian report includes the element of
state building, as “Serbs” were perceived to be an advocate of the maintenance
and perseverance of Yugoslavia as a state - an already existing state - and “they”
accused the other republics/nations of separatist aims, building their own states.
That means that the Serb state-building movement started in a period when they
were living in a state that “they” wanted to preserve as an entity.
In the Croatian report ethno-mobilization is defined as the
instrumentalization of ethnic identities, (ab-) use of ethnicity by the elites, in
order to mobilize the masses for the realization of their political objectives and
(even personal) interests. 21 What is relevant here is that manipulation of masses for
the realization of subjective political goals.
The Bosnian report puts emphasis on the isolation of one ethnic group from
the other. Each group aims to defend itself from the enemy, “removing the causes
of vulnerability”. 22 The analytical deduction of the word “mobilization” from the
military origin - “the transition of the nation’s armed forces from peacetime status
into mobile status and reaching full battle readiness” points exactly to what
occurred in BiH within a very short period of time. 23 The eighties had been quiet in
BiH as political pressure on nationalistic forces had been heavy. Once ethnic
mobilization started, fueled by influences of ongoing military disputes in Croatia,
the level of ethnic mobilization experienced a sudden shift – inevitable military
mobilization of large parts of the (male) population.
The Kosovo report refers to ethno-mobilization as a process by which an
ethnic community becomes politicized on behalf of its collective interests and
aspirations. This process requires awareness, usually promoted by ethnic
entrepreneurs, that political action is necessary to promote or defend the
community’s vital collective interests. 24
Contrary to the other ethnic groups it appears that Albanian ethnomobilization
was a continuing process that started much earlier than in the other
ethnic groups, since they had already been struggling continuously for more rights
in Yugoslavia with a strong emphasis on their “national” affiliation. On the other
hand the point on which “they” took arms to defend themselves from their
enemies was reached much later compared to the other ethnic groups.
To sum up, in the cases of Serbia, Croatia and BiH, on the basis of the
provided definitions, one may speak of ethnic-mobilization driven from the top and
not from the bottom, which was not successfully opposed by a relatively weak civil
19
Zoran Ilievski, Country Specific Report on Macedonia, 3, cited after: James D. Fearon,
Ethnic Mobilization and Ethnic Violence (August 2004, at
http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/papers/ethreview.pdf), 7
20
Pešić, 3, 4.
21
Petricusic, 4.
22
Nerzuk Ćurak, Zarije Seizović, Nermina Šačić, Sead Turčalo, Country Specific Report on
BiH, 2.
23
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 3.
24
MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming)
12

society. 25 In Croatia and Serbia ethno-mobilization presupposes an initiative and
subsequent commitment of the political leader (-ship) steadily assuming control
over segments of society. In BiH, the situation is similar. The difference consists in
the fact that the political leadership was acting from the outside (Serbia and
Croatia). This concept is close to the instrumentalist model presented in the
introduction. The case of Kosovo is quite different, as the definition does not stress
any special role of political leadership. Stressing the “vital collective interests” of
an ethnic group, it gets close to the primordial model.
2.7. Summary
From this point a summarizing definition of ethno-mobilization is possible as
follows:
Ethno-mobilization is a process of (emotional, cultural and political)
homogenization of societies according to their ethnic identity. The intensity
depends on the promotion of a strong and influential political leader or leading
elite (political parties), religious leaders and intellectuals, and is promoted by the
media and religious communities, pointing to more recent or older collective
traumatic experiences. This leads to the isolation of ethnic groups from one
another, as members of other ethnic group(s) are perceived as enemies.
The most intensive stage of ethnic mobilization results in ethnic conflict
and in the worst case the violent unloading of tensions and attempts at the
extermination/genocide of the enemy group, or at least the backing of actions
taken by the “defence forces” to do so.
As this is an all embracing definition it is clear that not all features must be
fulfilled to set off the avalanche of ethnic mobilization; sometimes it is enough to
have one ethnic group start national homogenization, invoking an automatic
collective process in other ethnic groups.
In order to make this definition more operational, it is helpful to resort to
the concept of cognitive frames. Doing so, one may distinguish two stages of ethnomobilization
in the former Yugoslavia. A shift from the normal frame to the crisis
frame, or more properly the moment, in which the crisis frame becomes dominant
can be regarded as the crucial point. Taking into account that within the crisis
frame the peoples of Yugoslavia think about each other in terms of collective
responsibility for past harms and atrocities, one may argue that a violent ethnic
conflict became unavoidable as the crisis frame started to dominate. A shift from
the normal frame to the crisis frame is thus to be regarded as a “point of noreturn”,
at which the ethnic mobilization inevitably leads to violence. The
establishment of this point of no-return is one of the major goals of this survey.
25 The “top-down” direction in the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia in general is observed
by Allcock, 418. This author seems to link it to the authoritarian rule forcing everything
into the pattern of state-sponsored self-management and, doing so, impeding a creation
of a civil society. See Allcock, 420.
13

3. Prelude to Violent Conflict and Ethnic Mobilization under
the Yugoslav Communist System
3.1. Concept of Statehood during Socialist Yugoslavia
The constitution of 1974 postulated a concept of statehood for Yugoslavia, the
republics and the provinces that became decisive for the coming break-up of
Yugoslavia. It was the result of historical and legal decentralizing and
“democratizing” developments, which gradually conceded ground to the growing
national/republican demands that in the end led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
The concept provided for an almost equal position of republics and
autonomous provinces 26 and formally transferred almost all “decisive”
competences to the republican and provincial level. The question of whether the
republican institutions ever had real decisive power has to be seen in the context
of the decision-making process under Tito and his comrades. After his death, the
federal authorities had a problem implementing any decisions they made as all
important decision could be blocked by the mutual veto rights.
The federal state apparatus was, at least at the top level, dominated by the
principle of equal representation of republics and provinces (collective state
leadership/presidency, republican and provincial representation in the communist
party (Central Committee and Presidency of the LCY). The chairs of various state
agencies were filled according to a rotation system based on an ethnic key.
The provinces were granted a veto right concerning the changing of their
constitutional status at federal level. They issued their own constitutions, had their
own legislative, administrative and judicial system, including constitutional courts.
3.1.1. Development of the Concept of Nations and Minorities
The effect of this constitutional system, which provided Autonomous Provinces
within Serbia, was that the largest minorities (Albanians and the Hungarians living
in Kosovo and Vojvodina respectively) were directly represented at the federal
level in the same way as the constitutive nations. Most notably in Vojvodina, rules
of proportional representation and language rights were fairly applied to the state
organization. In Kosovo proportional representation was slowly progressing but in
most fields not fully achieved until the situation in Kosovo started to deteriorate.
In the rest of the republics minority quotas were implemented at a local
level as well. Minorities were proportionally represented in municipalities in the
local assemblies and socialist organizations as a result of adoption of minority
quotas. 27
Besides “political” participation, which was fairly developed since the
sixties, the promotion of cultural rights commenced immediately after the Second
World War by establishing and gradually extending a minority educational system
as well as assistance in cultural fields (newspapers or theatres in minority
languages, etc.).
Such rights were denied to the nations, which lived outside their “native”
republics and were numerically inferior to the majority population, for example
the Serbs in Croatia or the Croats in Slovenia (economic migrants whose number
had increased considerably through the years). Any aspirations to form cultural
associations were suppressed by the regime and denounced as “nationalistic”. The
status of a “nation” was regarded as sufficient, since they were in a stronger
26 Pešić, 7.
27 Since the system of minority protection was never completely applied to all communes
that had minorities living in their territory.
14

political position (which in the Yugoslav context does not mean the freedom of
political participation in a truly democratic sense), hence there was no need for
protection.
There was almost no institutional distinction between the republics and
provinces anymore. The distinction manifested itself in the status attached to the
inhabiting nations and nationalities. The first Basic Principle of the Federal
Constitution stated that the “nations, proceeding from their right to selfdetermination,
including the right to secede, […], have together with the
nationalities with which they live, united in a federal republic of free and equal
nations and nationalities …” 28 . Therefore they (the nations) were perceived to
have a right of self-determination and secession under the Yugoslav Constitution.
In the riots of 1968 and 1981 the Albanians (in particular in Kosovo) wanted
their status to be changed from a national minority to that of a nation. This would
have incorporated the mentioned rights of self-determination and secession.
The Albanians in Kosovo were intentionally not granted the status of a
nation with the Constitution of 1974 29 . Equalization was pursued by giving Kosovo a
strong status providing almost all features of statehood and the adjustment of an
Albanian representation in state agencies, hoping that a virtual equalization would
satisfy Albanian demands.
However, this compromise left the Albanians unsatisfied, as it amounted to
a denial of the right to self-determination and secession.
3.1.2. Self-determination and secession in particular
The question of self-determination and secession was hardly dealt within the
constitutional Yugoslav system and was vague under international law. How far the
right of self-determination and secession goes is and was disputed both under the
Yugoslav law and international law.
Concerning the Albanian minority it is clear that they did not possess the
right to self-determination and secession under Yugoslav national law. The
Yugoslav constitution limited this right to constituent nations and Albanians were
not granted this status. 30
Today, after a long period of disputes in international law concerning the
scope of the aforementioned rights, the right to (internal) self-determination
concerning national minorities is tending to develop into a right of participation in
political affairs and to preserve and develop their own identity. 31 In general, there
is confusion on the basis of international law as to whether national minorities have
the right to self-determination including the right to secession (external self-
28 “The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to selfdetermination,
including the right to secession, on the basis of their will freely expressed in
the common struggle of all nations and nationalities in the National Liberation War and Socialist
Revolution, and in conformity with their historic aspirations, aware that further consolidation
of their brotherhood and unity is in the common interests, have, together with
the nationalities with which they live, united in a federal republic of free and equal nations
and nationalities and founded a socialist federal community of working people – the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in which in the interests of each nation and nationality
separately and of all of them together, they shall realize and ensure ...”, see The Constitution
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, translated by M. Pavčić, (Jugoslovenski
pregled, Beograd 1989), S. 9.
29 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming)
30 This interpretation was also adopted by the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia in its decision
of 19 February 1991. Cited after Peter Radan, The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International
Law (Routledge, Oxon, 2002), 198.
31 Antonio Cassese, Self-determination, a legal reappraisal (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1995), 352, 353.
15

determination), as the latter is granted to “peoples” only and not to national
minorities. Moreover, public international law tends to preserve the sovereignty of
existing states. 32 Although the concepts of minority rights and self-determination
were developed independently, an overlap may occur, if the national minority is at
the same time “a people” or a part of it, 33 as it is the case of Albanians. One may
argue that in this situation the minorities’ rights are to be regarded as a fulfillment
of the right to self-determination. 34 The latter may, however, generate the right to
secession, if the minorities’ rights are gravely disregarded and secession represents
the only way to avoid flagrant violations of these rights. 35 There is until now no
clear legal position on Kosovo problem. Yet, it has been observed that in the
practice of the UN with regard to Kosovo, reference to the right to selfdetermination
is carefully avoided. 36
Croatia and Slovenia and afterwards BiH and Macedonia had claimed that
they had a right to self-determination and (an entailed) right to secession under
the Yugoslav Constitution. Since the right to self-determination and secession
referred to nations, the Serbs in Croatia and in BiH claimed that they also had the
right to secession from the republics that wished to leave Yugoslavia.
The claims of the four republics, however, were challenged by many
Yugoslav scholars. 37 The Federal Executive Council took the position “that the right
must result from a democratic process and not from a unilateral act.” 38 The same
position was taken by the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia which also stressed
that Yugoslavia’s international borders can only be altered by virtue of laws passed
by the Federal Assembly (Article 183). 39 This interpretation can be regarded as
being in line with the concept of self-determination prevailing in international law,
given its reluctance towards affirming a right to secession. 40 In contrast, the
principle of the Yugoslav constitution understood autonomously and literally, as
linking self-determination unconditionally to the right of secession, would go far
beyond of what is established under international law. One must keep in mind that
the right to secession under public international law, if acceptable at all, must
preserve a character of “an absolute exception”. 41
32 Knut Ipsen/ Hans-Joachim Heintze, Völkerrecht (C.H. Beck, München 2004), 423. According
to M. Shaw “Self-determination as a concept is capable of developing further so as to
include the right to secession from existing states, but that has not as yet convincingly happened.”
See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
2003), 231.
33 Ipsen/Heintze, 413.
34 This was apparently the position of Badinter Committee in its opinion regarding the status
of Serbians in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, see Opinion No. 2, (3) European Journal of
International Law (1992), 184.
35 Ipsen/Heintze, 414. This view is not shared e.g. by Shaw, 231. According to Heintze, the
right to secession must have a character of “an absolute exception”. Ipsen/Heintze, 423.
Heintze invokes an argumentum a contrario from the Resolution of the UN General Assembly
Resolution on Friendly Relations (Friendly Relations Declaration, Res. 2625 (XXV)) which
does not constitute a source of international law as such and may be only regarded as a
piece of evidence of respective customary law rule.
36 Ipsen/Heintze, 415.
37 Cp. Ben Bagwell, “Yugoslavian Constitutional Questions: Self-Determination and Secession
of Member Republics”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (1991), 489-
523, at 509.
38 Ibid., 511.
39 Cited after Radan, 169 and 173.
40 See supra, p. 15.
41 See supra, fn. 35
16

Under the international law the right to self-determination had developed
from a vague principle of a right held by peoples. 42 Nevertheless, the principle of
self-determination was not developed far enough, let alone the question about the
implementation of such a right to self-determination or secession, that it could
have provided rules for the handling of the process of dissolution in Yugoslavia. 43
Therefore “the achievement of independence by Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Macedonia […took] place beyond the regulation of the existing
body of laws.” 44
The Badinter Committee applied the uti-possidetis principle to take ground
from a further truncation of the seceding entities. Eventually, the right to selfdetermination
and secession was recognized only for the former nations of
Yugoslavia within the existing republican borders. This Badinter Committee’s idea
of the uti-possidetis concept was vigorously criticized by many scholars. 45 Minorities
like the Albanians or minorities that emerged with the dissolution of Yugoslavia
(the Serbs in Croatia) were therefore not accorded the right to secession.
Looking at the right to self-determination as a factor triggering the process
of ethno-mobilization it is difficult to claim that its actual legal contents had a
decisive impact on it. It was rather its common perception as a “right to secede”
and this perception had no foundation either in the Yugoslav constitutional law, or
in the public international law. This perception had a destructive impact.
Accordingly, it was initially used by Croatia and Slovenia to justify their
secession, 46 and subsequently by Serbian communities in Croatia and BiH to justify
their secessions, 47 the last two in the capacity of the Serbian people as a
constituent nation and not as a “minority”. This will be evaluated under point 5.4.
3.1.3. The concept from Serbia’s perspective
For all republics and nations and nationalities the development which Yugoslavia
had undergone, presented a continuing affirmative process, except for Serbia, for
which it was a reverse process.
Serbia was the only republic with autonomous provinces. And its problem
with the 1974-Constitution was twofold. Internally, the implementation of uniform
laws on the whole republican territory was very difficult or even impossible, since
laws, which were not approved by the provincial assemblies (basically laws had to
be adopted by consensus of all three entities) applied only to “Serbia proper”. 48
Externally, it was confronted with the fact the representative of the Serbia
(proper) represented only one part of Serbs living on Serbian territory 49 , while the
other republics represented their “nations” living in their republican territories
Therefore in Serbia the resistance against such a concept of the Serbian
state emerged. It was consolidated in the “Blue Book”, which was unpublished until
1990 and perceived to be nationalistic by the other republics and in particular by
42 Cassese, 65-66.
43 This is mainly due to the fact that the concept of external self-determination was shaped
largely within the decolonisation process. In this particular context, the territory for which
the external self-determination was claimed did not constitute a part of the territory of the
colonial power. Ipsen/Heintze, 422. The case of Yugoslavia’s dissolution was much different.
The seceding republics were a part of Yugoslavia’s territory, the inviolability of which
was moreover protected by constitutional provisions.
44 Cassese, 270.
45 These opinions are referred to by Radan, 242 who adopts a critical view himself too, see
Radan, 247.
46 See Radan 173 and 177 respectively.
47 Radan, 173 and 177 respectively.
48 Pešić, 9.
49 Pešić, 8.
17

the provinces. 50 On the Serbian side, the delay in addressing the attempts to
redefine Serbian competences and institutionalize Serbian authority in an
appropriate way on a common basis with the others was perceived as “part of the
anti-Serbian coalition”. 51
The incapability to resolve the problem by means of negotiation between all
republics and provinces (which was necessary to address Serbian internal affairs
according to the Constitution) resulted in the instrumentalization and exploitation
of the question of Serbia’s status by nationalistic forces in the party, military and
police. 52
Serbian mass emigrations from Kosovo, the high birth rate amongst the
Albanian population 53 and the gradual acquisition of proportional representation,
meant a gradual weakening of the Serbian population in Kosovo. This was the
starting shot for the coming tragedy of war in the former Yugoslavia.
3.2. Economic Preconditions for Ethno-Mobilization
In the economic context, two factors can be identified as contributing to ethnomobilization.
Probably the most important factor is the profound decentralization
of the decision making process resulting from the adopted system of workers’ selfmanagement.
A substantial gap in the level of economic development between the
republics is the second factor. Both factors must be seen against the background of
overall “extreme crisis” 54 which plagued Yugoslavia in the eighties.
The Constitution of 1974 at the latest transformed Yugoslavia into a de
facto confederation. 55 It is even claimed that the adoption of this constitution put
an end to the common state installing a system of Balance of Nations (or States) on
the territory of SFRY. 56 The highly complex system of organizations of associated
labour forming the key element not only of economic, but also of the political
structure of the country could be hardly understood by ordinary people. At the of
the day, a system which was supposed to defeat “technocracy” and
“managerialism” by strengthening worker control over the enterprises fell easily
under the control of local party bosses. 57 According to a study carried out in the
eighties, there were oligarchic structures of power in place that worked in favor of
50
Pešić, 9.
51
Pešić, 9,10.
52
Pešić, 8.
53
Pešić, 10.
54
Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel (Westview Press, Oxford 2002), 50.
55
Baltić, 19.
56
Milan Kosanović, “Auf dem Weg zur selbstverwalteten Konföderation. Der jugoslawische
Föderalismus im Spiegel der Verfassungstexte“, in Dittmar Dahlmann and Milan Kosanović,
Sozialistisches Jugoslawien. Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Vorträge der Michael-
Zikic-Stiftung 2001-2005, (Michael-Zikic-Stiftung, Universität Bonn, Bonn 2005), 63-98, at
93.
57
Allcock, 92. Christiane von Kohl identifies two factors which led to this development. The
first factor lies in the nature of Kardelj’s self-management concept: The decentralization of
decision-making process did not go along with the abolishment of the monopoly of the
Communist Party which was still supposed to be “responsible for everything”. The second
factor is the mentioned complexity of the system. It became complex in the course of the
reforms in the sixties and – above all – with the Law on Associated Labor (Zakon o
udruženom radu) from 1976. The bureaucratic and incomprehensible language, in which it
was written, made it vulnerable to arbitrary interpretation by the party functionaries.
Christiane von Kohl, Jugoslawien (C.H. Beck, München 1990), 19-21. See also from the economic
point of view Werner Gumpel, “Das Wirtschaftssystem”, in Klaus-Detlev Grothausen
(ed.), Handbuch Südosteuropa. Band I.Jugoslawien (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen
1975), 199-234, at 230.
18

the professional management and against the interests of workers. 58 Hence, one
may assume that the economy was controlled by managerial and party elites at the
republican or regional level advocating particular and egoistic local, mostly
republican interests. 59
Because of the aforementioned development cleft and differences in the
economic structure of the republics, their economic interests were often
contradictory and revealed high conflict potential. This conflict potential could not
be mitigated by establishment of the FADORUK (Federal Fund for Accelerated
Development of the Undeveloped Republics and Kosovo). On the contrary, it was
even aggravated as it served as reason for complaints from all parties about the
volume and allocation of FADORUK resources. 60 In general, it has been observed
that the most open conflicts taking place between the elites of various republics
referred to economic contradictions and the uneven distribution of wealth.
Therefore these must not be underestimated. 61
The impetus for ethno-mobilization could arise out of this situation and it
did arise as the articulation of economic interests of the republic shifted to
nationalistic argumentation. 62 The economic interests hidden behind the
nationalistic rhetoric were also contradictory, as assessed in the context of
potential secession. Whereas Slovenia, with its manufacturing and food-processing
links to Austria, Italy and Germany, and Croatia, with its tourism sector, were in
the position to generate economic growth as independent states, the prospects for
the Serbian economy, especially in the case of the loss of Kosovo or even
Voivodina, were very unfavourable. 63 Over the course of the economic crisis in the
eighties, the Slovenian elites for example, formulated a political program which
was summarized by the slogan “Nećemo u Evropu preko Beograda” (we don’t want
to go to Europe via Belgrade). 64 The inner-Yugoslav ties were not strong, and the
local elites were ready to break them as soon as their economic interests could be
realized in a different setting in a more effective manner. 65
The main characteristics of the economic crisis in the eighties were
tremendous foreign debt, denied access to new credits, recession and falling
industrial production. 66 The inability of the central Yugoslav government under
Ante Marković to enforce reform steps against the resistance of republican elites 67
seems to confirm the decisive role of the latter. The more the crisis proceeded,
the more economic egoism determined inter-republican relations and the more this
contradictory economic egoism generated nationalism. The Serb-Croat opposition
seems to play a particularly important role and this issue will be explored below.
As far as contradictory economic interests are to be considered as a basis
from which nationalistic feelings arose that shifted the cognitive frame and led to
the violent ethnic conflict, this process fits best into the constructionist
explanation model of ethno-mobilization.
Finally, one more aspect of the economic reforms of the eighties must be
added. The reform steps taken under the pressure of International Monetary Found
58
Jakir, 140 quoting a study of Vladimir Arzenšek, Sudbina radničkih saveta, Sociologija
(1984), 13.
59
Jakir, 122-124, 128. This view seems to be shared by Allcock, 93 and 426.
60
Baltić, 16-17; Jakir, 146.
61
Jakir, 103.
62
Jakir, 104.
63
Allcock, 427.
64
Eiff, 192
65
See also Eiff, 184.
66
Its nature and roots are not evaluated here as they have little to do with ethnomobilization.
For a compact description see Allcock, 423 and Ramet, 50-51.
67
Allcock 97; Eiff, 188.
19

(hereafter: IMF) from 1985-1986 dismantled the system of self-management and
abolished the organizations of associated labor. 68 On the one hand, it is true that
the capability of this system to generate economic growth was low and this became
visible to foreign scholars much earlier. 69 On the other hand, the symbolic power of
self-management must not be underestimated. Self-management was the
“Yugoslav road to socialism”, the entire pride arising from Tito’s “no” to Stalin, a
trump in foreign policy, an object of fascination for foreigners, and along with the
partisan myth a core element of “Yugoslav” identity. 70 Noting this, one must be
aware of how important this brace, which was taken away by the reform from
1985-1986, had been.
3.3. Increasing of Ethnic Tensions
The cleansings of Croatian Spring had led to a subdued attitude of the Croatian
Communist Party in the eighties, which in turn lacked legitimacy from the Croatian
population. 71 As there was no official political forum, nationalism spread latently
through the civil society in Croatia. It was promoted by the processes going on in
Serbia.
Milošević picked up what was provided by the church and the intellectuals. 72
He put it on the political stage and made it accessible to a broader population so
that nationalism could spread. He used mass-movements and an anti-bureaucratic
revolution against the institutionalized system of the provinces “impeding” Serbian
power (in his nationalistic sense). Thus he brought down the provincial leadership
in Vojvodina, cleansed the leadership in Kosovo, and seized power with his allies in
Montenegro. 73
Tensions also became appreciable in Croatia. In the late eighties pro-
Serbian demonstrations of Croatian Serbs took for example place in Knin. 74 This was
another step in the spiral of ethnic mobilization in Croatia, which also shifted the
Croatian national/istic estimation to a higher level. The Croatian Communist Party
(except for many of the Serbian party members) and the Croatian population took a
critical view of Milošević’s policy. 75
While throughout the eighties the media became less and less restricted and
diverse political opinions were present in public, a definitively open stadium of
ethnic mobilization was only reached with the legalization of other parties for
democratic elections besides the Communist Party. It looked like now
“nationalism” had an open political stage in Croatia and BiH.
68 Ramet, 50.
69 See for example the critical assessment of Wolfgang Gumpel from 1975; Gumpel, 212-
214.
70 See Allcock, 422; von Kohl, 19; Tadeusz Szymczak, Jugosławia. Państwo Federacyjne
(Wydawnictwo Łódzkie, Łódź 1982), 202. From the point of view of the “official” Yugoslav
ideology, “a common progress and goals in a socialist self-managing community of peoples“
was the factor uniting multi-ethnic Yugoslavia, considered even as more important than the
partisan myth. See Michael B. Petrovich, “Population structure”, in Klaus-Detlev
Grothausen (ed.), Handbuch Südosteuropa. Band I.Jugoslawien (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
Göttingen 1975), 322-344, at 337
71 Petricusic, 5.
72 Pešić, 13.
73 Petricusic, p. 6, cited after: Paul Garde, Život i smrt Jugoslavije (Ceres, Zagreb, 1997),
246-255.
74 Petricusic, 6.
75 Petricusic, 6.
20

Nevertheless, the political protagonists promoting nationalism who emerged
in the nineties came from the opposition in Croatia - although Tuđman was a
former partisan and a Communist Party member, he belonged to the group of
dissidents who were imprisoned for their (nationalistic) opinions and attitude
against the regime in the seventies and eighties.
The fact that the republics sought independence by building nation states
loomed seriously ahead. This concept was suitable for all the republics, except BiH
in which no nation had an absolute majority. 76
The situation that arose at the eve of the war was dominated by two rival
nationalisms striving for contradictory political and economical aims.
76 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, , 7.
21

4. Actors and Means of Ethno-Mobilization
4.1. Politicians/Political Parties
4.1.1. Developments on the political scene
Knowing well the fragile situation in BiH, the Communist Party of BiH tried to
impede the establishment of political parties based on national or religious
grounds. The attempt failed and the multi-party elections brought the country a
political break-up almost entirely along ethnic lines. None of the three large
nationally-affiliated parties in the parliament won an absolute majority,
proportional to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s population, however they defeated the
former Communist Party (13 %) and the other small parties that altogether had a
share of 4.6 % in the elections. 77
In addition to participation in the newly built Bosnian state, the
representatives of the SDS (Srpska Demokratska Stranka) - the Serbs in BiH -
created their own para-state institutions (the Assembly of the Serb People in BiH)
and issued an unconstitutional referendum on the question of whether the citizens
agreed with “the decision made by the Serbian people in BiH and Herzegovina on
24 October 1991, that the Serbian people should remain in the common country of
Yugoslavia, together with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonija, Baranja
and Western Srem”. 78 The outcome of the referendum marks the end of the
parliamentary work of all three nations in BiH. 79
BiH was the last of the four republics seeking international recognition to
conduct a referendum on independence - one of the conditions for recognition as
an independent state posed by the Badinter Committee. In February/March 1992
the Referendum of Independence of BiH was held and affirmed by 99.44 % of the
participating population (Bosniaks and Croats), while the Serb population
boycotted the referendum. Shortly before the Republika Srpska of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was created, a Constitution proclaiming the “state of the Serbian
people and all other citizens” was issued. 80
The completion on the Bosnian Croatian side was established with Hrvatska
zajednica Herceg-Bosna (18 October 1991), renamed the Hrvatska Republika
Herceg-Bosna on 28 August 1993 – a separate economic, political, cultural and
ethno-territorial unit on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 81
Ethnic cleansing took place in the form of expulsion of non-Croatian
population, removing of local non-Croatian leaders, spreading ideas of Larger
Croatia and Croatian symbols. 82
The behaviour of their fellow-citizens, the Bosnian Serbs and Croats,
induced the ethno-mobilization and ethno-religious radicalization of Bosniaks. The
Bosnian report sees ethno-mobilization in BiH as a reaction to the ethnomobilization
in Serbia and Croatia, in which the Bosniaks were the last group
grasped by nationalism and ethnic hatred. 83
The SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije) (Muslims/Bosniaks) emerged as the
strongest party from the elections in 1990. However, the MBO (Muslim Bosniak
Organization) split from the SDA immediately after a rally in Velika Kladusa on 15
77 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 12, 13.
78 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 16, 17.
79 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 36.
80 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 42.
81 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 38.
82 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 36.
83 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 20 fn. 20, 24, 36.
22

September 1990 which bore Muslim-nationalist symbols, with the argument that the
SDA was too religious. 84
In this context it is interesting that the group around Alija Izetbegovic,
adopted leading political positions only after the first multi-partisan elections,
while they played no outstanding role during the electoral campaign. 85
The Croatian report also postulates that the emerging nationalism in the
late eighties was spilling over from the eastern neighbourhood. 86
The voting system in Croatia 87 and Serbia allowed the HDZ and the SPS to
occupy the absolute majority of the parliamentarian seats - while their majority
was only a relative one according to the election results.
Once the HDZ, with Tuđman on top, assumed institutionalized political
power, it developed further political supremacy. For this purpose the media were
aligned and freedom of (oppositional) speech was suppressed. The triumph of the
HDZ in the elections, whose members revealed ultra-nationalist statements against
Serbs and Jews, shifted radicalism and support for the, until then, rather weak
party of the Croatian Serbs (established in 1990) to a higher level. 88 The
referendum on the independence of Croatia (May 1991), adopted in (25 June) and
proclaimed in October 1991, was partly boycotted by the Serb population. A
“referendum on Serbian autonomy” had taken place in August 1990. In December
1990, Croatian Serbs in Knin proclaimed the Serbian Autonomous district Krajina
and announced independence from Croatia. 89
Milošević’s Socialist Party of Serbia, a transformation of the League of
Communists of Serbia, continued the policy it commenced of intermingling left
ideologies and nationalism, using the slogans of extreme right wing parties to make
people believe that these parties would direct the country into war. 90 The state
media were in line with Milošević’s policy, and he did not hesitate to use all means
to suppress any opposition in Serbia.
In Pristina, three days before the provincial assembly was dissolved by
Milošević it issued The Declaration of Independence. Three months later, deputies
from the dissolved assembly proclaimed a Constitutional law for “The Republic of
Kosovo,” and finally one year later a referendum – attended by Albanians - was
held on the same issue, in which 99 % voted in favour of an Independent Kosovo.
The report from Kosovo states that the political leadership in Kosovo
pursued a rather passive approach towards the increasing Serbian suppression. This
ineffectiveness, which did not lead anywhere for the Albanians in Kosovo, caused
the formation of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), who pursued different tactics
to remedy the situation of the Albanians in Kosovo. 91
In Macedonia a relative majority was won by the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE,
however the transformed Communist party and other parties acted as
counterbalance and the presidency went to a person with a moderate attitude:
Kiro Gligorov. 92 After the admission of the equalization of the Albanian ethnic
group, the referendum on independence, held on 8 September 1991 was boycotted
and the Constitution adopted on 17 November 1991 was rejected by the Albanian
population. 93 They organized a referendum on their own for the establishment of
84
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 39.
85
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 15.
86
Petricusic, 5.
87
Petricusic, 6, 7.
88
Petricusic, 7.
89
Petricusic, 7.
90
Pešić, 15, 19,
91
MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming).
92 Ilievski, 5, Pešić, 21.
93 Ilievski, 37.
23

an “Autonomous Republic of Ilirida” in January 1992 on the territory inhabited
predominantly by Albanians. 94
The Badinter Committee considered all conditions to be fulfilled by the
Macedonian state (including the minority rights protection) and recommended its
recognition 95 ; however, at first Macedonia was not recognized since Greece
prevented recognition by the EC States due to the dispute over the name of the
newly independent state. 96
4.1.2. Evaluation
The results of the first multi-party elections, and in particular the voting systems
implemented in different republics, set the course for further developments
throughout the nineties. It was in particular the strong position that the HDZ and
SPS gained in Croatia and Serbia respectively without a real political
counterbalance that enabled political power to be channeled in a certain direction.
This also influenced the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The transformed
Communist Parties lost elections in all republics to the right wing parties, except in
Serbia. 97 In Macedonia, however, there was some counterbalance from the other
parties who were involved in the political decision-making process.
The time of 1990-1992 was full of referenda and counter referenda and
proclamations of independence in all republics throughout former Yugoslavia –
except in Serbia (“Proper” and Vojvodina), Montenegro, 98 and Kosovo.
On the one hand it was a reaction to the conditions posed by the Badinter
Committee to gain independent statehood for the republics (as the republics had
proclaimed independence before the referenda were held). At the other hand it
was the desire to form new entities adjusted to the needs of the different ethnic
groups within the actually existing borders, based on a perceived right to selfdetermination
and secession.
In the comparative perspective, one may observe a twofold similarity of the
situation in Serbia and in Croatia. In both republics, an absolute majority was won
by parties advocating nationalistic ideologies led by charismatic leaders willing to
consolidate political power. These victories – generated by the electoral system to
a larger extent in Croatia than in Serbia – resulted in the radicalization of political
forces acting within the other ethnic (“minority”) communities in both republics:
the Serbs in Croatia and the Albanians in Serbia. This scenario was avoided in
Macedonia with respect to the Albanian community because of, first, the moderate
approach of the President, and second, the existence of real political counterweights
limiting the power of the victorious party. The consolidation of the Bosnian
political scene along ethnic lines 99 can be seen as a derivative of what had
happened in Croatia and Serbia. At the time of elections in BiH (18 November
1990), an authoritarian nationalistic rule was already consolidated in Croatia and
Serbia as a result of the elections in April/May 1990 and the “anti-bureaucratic
revolution,” respectively. The established condominium of forces, becoming
94 Ilievski, 4, 37.
95 Ilievski, 28.
96 Ilievski, 28.
97 And Slovenia, which can be left aside in this particular context.
98 The referendum of Independence of Montenegro from Serbia followed in 2006.
99 Each of the nationalist parties attracted at least 84 per cent of votes from their respective
national constituencies. See Radan, 183. One must, however, note that also the parties
of Bosnian Serbs and the Croats had quite moderate programmes initially, which became
more and more nationalistic due to the influence exerted on them by Belgrade and Zagreb
government respectively.Petritsch, 32-33.
24

themselves more and more nationalistic, 100 could not integrate the ethnic-groups in
Bosnia and Herzegovina or significantly slow down ethno-mobilization.
The process of how the political leaders in Croatia, but also in Serbia
assumed control over the intellectuals is well described by Dubravka Ugresic. 101 It
consisted mainly in corrupting one group appointing them for various “honourable”
state positions, while fingering the others as traitors, the latter method being also
consequently used towards all moderately minded people.
4.2. Civil Society and Intellectuals
The initiative of Serbian intellectuals culminating in the Serbian Academy of
Science and Arts (SANU) memorandum of 1986 remained without example in the
other republics. In the late eighties intellectuals publicly expressed complaints
about the suppressive regime throughout all the republics. Within the newly
established states many of them took the same line with the respective regimes. In
Croatia, however, there emerged NGOs who monitored human rights and helped
minority members with legal and factual assistance. 102
In Macedonia the political scenery was more diversified than in Serbia and
Croatia. Intellectuals who did not adopt a nationalistic attitude nevertheless
remained in the minority. 103
The situation in Kosovo was different. The demonstrations in 1968, 1981
were all dominated by students and professors. During that time the University in
Pristina and the schools were regarded as strongholds of Albanian nationalism.
Later on, intellectuals were not just one of many groups who played an important
role in the political process - they were the group from which most of the political
protagonists were recruited. This might be explained by the desire to compensate
for the lack of education that was attached to the Albanian ethnic group for a long
time. 104
The role of intellectuals in ethno-mobilization was decisive, as they gave
the nationalist movements the “scientific” shift and justification on which the
other strata of society could rely to justify their own views or deeds.
4.3.1. JNA
4.3. Military, Paramilitary and State Intelligence Agencies
The Yugoslav Peoples Army (hereinafter JNA – Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija) was
regarded as the guardian of Yugoslav Integrity under Socialist Yugoslavia and
remained a stronghold of conservative forces closely connected to the Communist
Party. The JNA derived its position from the “heroic victory” over the fascist
enemies and the “liberation of the South Slav peoples”. It was the military wing of
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. 105 When the routing institution - the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia - disintegrated and the position of the JNA was
questioned in the changing political atmosphere in the republics, it had to seek a
100
Petritsch, ibid.
101
Dubravka Ugrešić, The Culture of Lies. Antipolitical essays, (Penn State University Press,
Pennsylvania 1998), passim.
102
Petricusic, 9.
103
Ilievski, 9.
104
MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming).
105 Pešić, 14.
25

new ally who would secure the strong position it once held. 106 JNA officers had
offered to defend Yugoslavia’s unity but were rejected by the Yugoslav Federal
presidency. 107 JNA became de facto “vojska bez države” – an army without a
state. 108
Milošević, claiming to be the guardian of Yugoslav unity and assertor of
socialist values, won the high representatives in the JNA over to his purposes,
pursuing his goals with behaviour models well known and well fitting to the JNA
from former Yugoslav times. 109
When tensions rose, the military servants were withdrawn to their
respective republics and the JNA-Corps became nationally homogenized with a
composition of almost exclusively Serbs and Montenegrins. 110 This “Serbization” of
the JNA was to some extent also brought about by members of other nationalities
which deserted from the army or simply left it, as they were unwilling to
participate in its attempts to preserve Yugoslavia. 111 Much of the personnel who
left the JNA became the root of new armies in the separatist territories. 112 The
decisive fact is that in a relatively early stage of the conflict the JNA was standing
shoulder-to-shoulder with Milošević’s regime and Serb separatists in Croatia and –
most evidently – in BiH. This mere fact was known to the Croats and Bosniaks and,
as will be argued below, could have contributed to ethno-mobilization. One may
also conclude that the Titoist JNA was not a source of ethno-mobilization but let
itself be used by politician as an instrument of it.
4.3.2. The Republics
Military staff in the territories barricaded by the Serbs comprised regular JNA units,
local Territorial Defence Forces (hereinafter: TDF 113 ), Serbian and Montenegrin
TDFs, local and Serbian Ministry of Interior (hereinafter MUP) police forces and
paramilitary units. 114
The JNA officially withdrew from the Croatian territory in May 1992, leaving
equipment behind, which provided the local Serb rebels with arms. Initially the
JNA did not openly take sides between the Croatian government and the Croatian
Serb population. With these events, the JNA openly took sides with Serbs in
Croatia. 115
A similar scene developed in BiH, even though the incidents in the forefront
of violent conflict were less spontaneous than in Croatia. The JNA’s own newsletter
regularly issued accusations against the Croatian and Muslim parties and individuals
for taking a hostile attitude towards Serb leaders and the Army. 116 The Bosnian
report traces the scaremongering in the Serb population by diverse Serb institutions
precisely. In November 1989 the National Security Service of Serbia had already
evacuated the Serb population in two Bosnian municipalities allegedly under
106
Pešić, 14.
107
Petricusic, 8.
108
Eiff, 180.
109
Petricusic, 8.
110
Pešić, 15.
111
See Eiff, 197
112
The armies of Slovenia, Croatia and BH consisted mainly of military personnel and
equipment of the former JNA. Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts established
pursuant to security council resolution 780 of 1992 (hereinafter: “Bassiouni Report”),
Annex III, The military structure, strategy and tactics of the warring factions, available
under http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/ANX/III.htm, at § II.
113
Which were republican Territorial Defence Forces.
114
Petricusic, 8.
115
Petricusic, 8.
116
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 18, 19, 20.
26

Muslim fundamentalist pressure. 117 Such actions and Serb propaganda were used to
provoke destabilization in BiH in order to involve the JNA, 68% of whose soldiers
were stationed in BiH, and further federation militia in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
affairs. 118
Due to the violent conflicts with the JNA, the Bosnian Serbs and later the
Croatian Defence Council, ethno-mobilization also reached the ARBH (Armija
Republike Bosne i Hercegovine - Bosnian Army), which absorbed more and more
mono-national (Muslim/Bosniak) and religious elements.
In this period the Macedonians managed to withdraw their soldiers from the
JNA and the territory of the other republics without violent incidents. The JNA left
the Macedonian territory peacefully in 1992 and took most of the valuable military
equipment with them. This is mainly attributed to the fact that Macedonia had no
significant Serb population on whose behalf Milošević’s regime could make
territorial demands. 119 Furthermore, the JNA was already engaged in Croatia and
BiH, and Milošević counted on Macedonia’s inability to survive on its own. 120 There
was therefore no issue regarding the triggering ethno-mobilization by the JNA in
Macedonia.
Armed crisis did not break out on the territory of Macedonia until 2001.
Throughout the nineties the establishment of Albanian paramilitary formations was
reported. However the Albanian National Liberation Army involved in the clashes in
2001 was formed in 1999. 121
Ethnic conflict is defined as ethnic Albanian insurgency in Macedonia, led by
the NLA and initially sparked from Kosovo, after pressure had been released there
by the NATO bombardments in Serbia.
4.3.3. Kosovo
After the Autonomy of Kosovo had been abolished, a repressive period followed in
which schools were closed and students ousted from the university. The police
forces tightened the repression and torture of Albanians. After the outcome of the
negotiations on the termination of the war in BiH, the problems of the Albanians in
Kosovo passed unnoticed internationally. 122 This increased frustration amongst the
Albanians and led to the foundation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The
attacks on Serbian local representatives and policemen caused a brutal reaction by
fully equipped Serb police, military and paramilitary forces against KLA units and
masses of civilians until the NATO bombardments of 1999. 123
4.3.4. Evaluation
The JNA was not only an important factor in ethno-mobilization, but it was also
subjugated to it 124 by the withdrawal of all non-Serb or Montenegrin soldiers from
the JNA to their respective republics and the internal dissemination of propaganda
(accusations that the Croatian and Muslim enemy allegedly wanted to harm the JNA
and the Serbs). However, with the ethnic separation of the JNA, the Yugoslav
National Army ceased to exists. It might be said that the JNA was mistrusted by the
117
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 21.
118
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 20, cited: Suzan Vudvord, Balkanska tragedija: Haos i
disolucija nakon Hladnog rata (Filip Višnjić, Beograd, 1997), 255.
119
Ilievski, 8,9.
120
Ilievski, 33, 34.
121
Ilievski, 9.
122
MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming).
123
MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming).
124
In General: Petricusic, 8, cited after, Donald. L. Horwitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University
of California Press, Berkeley, 1985), 443-471.
27

other nations due to the overrepresentation of Serb and Montenegrin leading staff
in Yugoslavia. 125 And again, the prefabricated perception – in this case which side
the JNA would take - was fulfilled.
Looking at the role of the military from the perspective of changing the
cognitive frame, it might have been important that the JNA entered visibly into a
sort of alliance with the Serbs and became Serbian-dominated. This fact changed
the situation insofar as it entailed an armed power siding with just one party in an
already considerably sharp ethnic conflict. Bosniaks and Croats found themselves in
such a situation for the first time after World War II. Given this, the perception of
being threatened, in this case by the Serbs, may have become significantly more
intense and consequently contributed to changing the cognitive frame to a crisis
frame.
One can, however, hardly speak about the spontaneous formation of armed
units and militarization as a consequence of ethno-mobilization, as it seems to be
rather a process driven and organized from the top. 126 Although 83 paramilitary
units operating on the territory of the former Yugoslavia were counted in 1994,
there is strong evidence that they were indirectly controlled or at least supplied by
the respective political leaders. 127 The command chains were, however, purposely
blurred in order to shield the perpetrators of serious war crimes committed by
these units from responsibility. 128 In addition, the decentralization of military
activities and structures (combined with conventional warfare) corresponded to the
official Yugoslav military doctrine of Total National Defence, the latter relying on
positive partisan experience with these tactics in World War II. Political parties
founded their own military units directly as well. 129
The contribution of the newly formed units to the process of ethnomobilization
was overwhelmingly made after the border to the crisis frame had
already been crossed and atrocities committed by the units were revealed. The
Kosovo Liberation Army was formed relatively late, although it can be argued that
Kosovars had been acting within the crisis frame since riots of 1981 at the latest.
Another kind of contribution of the numerous paramilitary units to ethnomobilization
should be seen in the enhancement of the security concerns of
ordinary people, which is particularly significant from the point of view of changing
the cognitive frame to crisis frame. Judging on the basis of the date on which the
units were founded (Arkan Tigers: November 1990, Šešejl’s forces: late 1990/early
1991) 130 their impact could have slightly differed in Croatia on the one hand and in
BiH on the other. In Croatia, ethnic tensions were already more advanced (HDZ and
Tuđman had won the elections half a year earlier), whereas it was the time of
election campaign or directly following it in BiH. There is reason to believe that
the frame had already been switched to the crisis frame in Croatia, whereas this
process was still to come in BiH. This will be referred to below.
Scaring, threatening and even killing moderates and non-nationalists can, as
said, surely be regarded an important factor triggering ethno-mobilization to which
the paramilitary groups contributed. According to Anthony Oberschall:
125
Already in the Croatian Spring, there had been demands for a separate army. Baltić, 17.
126
See also Eiff, 199.
127
See Bassiouni Report, Annex III.A Special forces, at § C. Some of the leading figures of
these units, for example Arkan and Vojislav Šešejl, were directly involved in the politics.
128
Bassiouni Report, Annex III, The military structure, strategy and tactics of the warring
factions, available under http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/ANX/III.htm, at § II.
129
Bassiouni Report, ibid.
130
Bassiouni Report, Annex III.A Special forces, § I D 1.
28

Ordinary people could not escape ethnic polarization. In an interview a
Serb taxi driver explained: “No one wanted the coming war, but if I
don’t fight, someone from my side will kill me, and if my Muslim friends
don’t fight, other Muslims will kill them” 131
There are no reasons to believe that the situation in this regard was much
different outside BiH. However the exclusion of moderates was, as noted, a
general political plan which was only reinforced by threats of violence. The only
republic in which the paramilitary units played a more or less autonomous role in
this regard was Macedonia with the NLA. 132
The declining JNA made it possible for Serb rebels in Croatia and BiH to
keep the territories won by force. The Serb military, police and paramilitary forces
helped stabilize the occupation through ethnic cleansing conducted by executions,
deportation of non-Serb civilians, or in BH by deportation. Similar tactics were used
by the Croatian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bosnian Croats were assisted financially and technically by Croatia and the
Croatian army. Once ethno-mobilization captured the ARBH, each of the three
armies stood for one ethnic group and religion.
4.4. Influence of Diaspora
The role of the diaspora was very important among the Croats, Albanians and
Macedonians, even if the modes of influence fundamentally differ.
The situation in Croatia is best explained with the citation from the Croatian
report, which comprises all that can be said.
General Martin Špegelj, first minister of defence, argues that the
Ustashism in Croatia has “been brought from outside, by the return of
extreme emigrants in Croatia. They were not high or lower ranking
officers of former NDH, but those who thought that heritage of
Ustashism will be good ground for creation of new power in Croatia, and
that they would obtain personal profit. Indeed, they won power and
personal profits; however, their presence in politics has caused shaking
of power and big problems even nowadays. That fact, alongside with
undermining of Serb’s houses in Spring 1991, made worse damage to the
Croatia’s defence than whole JNA aggression. We have suffered
consequences ever since and witness different sorts of neo-fascism
emergence”. 133
The Macedonian diaspora supported the independence of Macedonia and the rights
of Macedonian minorities in the neighbouring countries in the sight of disputes with
Greece and Bulgaria. 134
The Albanian diaspora, of which some members had immigrated to western
countries to find refuge and were politically involved, endowed Albanians in Kosovo
financially. 135 Some of the young diaspora members returned to Kosovo to take part
in the hostilities. 136
131
Oberschall, 996.
132
Ilievski, 17-18.
133
Petricusic, 21, cited after Martin Špegelj , Sjećanje vojnika (Memories of a Soldier)
(Znanje, Zagreb, 2001), 55-56.
134
Ilievski, 4.
135
MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming); Ilievski, 4.
There are estimations that about half a million of Kosovo Albanians were living abroad, paying
regularly 3 % of their income for the maintenance of the “shadow state” led my Ibrahim
29

In the balance, one may observe a very considerable influence of the
Croatian and Albanian diasporas, the former triggering ethno-mobilization by
putting forward nationalistic ideas, the latter supporting the paramilitary KLA
financially.
4.5. Churches and Religious Communities
The rise and powerful expansion of the Serbian church began in Kosovo. 137 It was
the Serbian clergy in Kosovo - the “cradle of Serbian civilization” - who complained
about the decay of the Serbs. However there is no indication in the reports that the
Albanian actions were somehow motivated in a religious sense (Islam). Nevertheless
the Serbian clergy in Kosovo saw an immediate need to save the Serb nation and
used a purely political problem to put forward its own position. A religious
connotation was added to the situation of the Serbs in BiH and Croatia, in the form
of complaints referring to the Ustasha regime and the atrocities of the Second
World War. 138 The Kosovo myth was revived largely with the festivities of the 600 th
anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje, celebrated amongst other things with the
transport of Emperor Lazar’s relic through BiH (to mark the future borders of a
Greater Serbia). 139 This had clearly effects in creating a psychosis of war in BiH. 140
After the clergy had been kept out from politics for almost half of the
century it now had not only the possibility to publicly comment the events, but
also to become an active part in the politics in Serbia, Croatia and BiH.
The pro-nationalistic parts of the clergy supported Tuđman’s HDZ regime in
Croatia. Politicians were welcomed on various religious festive occasions, and vice
versa, that were broadcast on television in Croatia. 141
In BiH the regularly elected reis-ul-lema of IVZ (Islamska Vjerska Zajednica),
a Muslim Macedonian, was replaced by Mustafa effendi Ceric through an unpleasant
procedure by the political elite around Alija Izetbegovic. 142 The influence of the
Muslim clergy increased amongst Bosniaks as well. Before the war, Bosnian Islam
was regarded as a cultural expression of identity of members belonging to a secular
community and was described as a “secular Euro-Islam”. This changed very much in
the course of hostilities and is regarded as a reaction to the “crusade of the
Serbs”. 143
Religion and clergy therefore played a very important role in ethnic
mobilization amongst Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks, although according to the
Croatian report, the strengthening of religious affiliation served the purpose of
national identification, and that the wars in Croatia and BiH are not to be
considered as truly religious wars. The destruction of places of worship and the
Rugova. Later, however, they preferred to pay for the KLA-run endowment fund “The
homeland is calling”. Jens Reuter, “Zur Geschichte der UÇK” in Jens Reuter and Konrad
Clewing (eds.), Der Kosovo Konflikt. Ursache, Verlauf, Perspektiven (Wieser Verlag, Klagenfurt
et al. 2000), 171-186, at 172.
136
Reuter, 172.
137
Pešić, 11, 12.
138
Pešić, 12.
139
Pešić, 12.
140
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 24.
141
Petricusic, 10.
142
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 27.
143
Bassam Tibi, „Der bosnische Islam. Von säkularer Religion zum Fundamentalismus?“, (7)
Internationale Politik (1997), 21-28, at 21 and 23.
30

killings of clergy during the wars were atrocities that symbolized the destruction of
a certain ethnic group. 144
4.6. Media
The media are the most important instrument in building public opinion. After the
democratization of the former Yugoslav republics, however, the democratization of
the media failed in Serbia and Croatia. The state media were completely in line
with the new regimes. In Serbia the daily Politika helped consolidate Milošević’s
regime, the television and print media were used to spread propaganda to scare
the population of the Ustasha and the fanatic Muslims. 145
In Croatia, “Slobodni Tjednik” directed chauvinistic hate speeches mostly
against the Serbian minority. 146 Croatia’s fascist past was rewritten with an
attempt to “correct” the image of the NDH regime. 147 Employees belonging to
minorities, mainly Serbs, lost their jobs at the public Croatian TV and Radio. Two
of the rare regime-critical media outlets, the Feral Tribune and Radio 101, were
subjugated to repressive measures, including the attempts to close them down. 148
The instrumentalization of the media in the two republics had enormous
effects on BiH. The propaganda of hatred was broadcast from Croatia and Serbia
and was readily accessible to the Croat and Serb populations respectively, while
broadcasting from Sarajevo had difficulties reaching all parts of Bosnia and
Herzegovina clearly. 149 Furthermore, from the Bosnian report it can be concluded
that the concept of nation, national state, the principles of natural and historical
rights, historical injustices or current threats, that could have been used for
propaganda, were lacking amongst the Bosniak population, 150 whereas it
constituted a credo for the Serbs and Croats. The Bosnian population was
concentrated on the preservation of BiH as a whole.
In Kosovo the media were brought in line with Milošević’s politics, while the
two main Albanian official media outlets RTVP and the daily Rilindja were banned
and the Albanian employees dismissed. 151
In Macedonia the media were not eager to adopt an “objective” view. 152
However, as the political landscape is reflected in the media it might be concluded
that in Macedonia a wider scale of political opinions was represented in comparison
to Serbia and Croatia.
144
Petricusic, 10, cited after: Milan Vukomanović, The Religious Dimension of the Yugoslav
Conflicts (University of Belgrade, at http://kotornetwork.info/papers/easr2004/dimension.mv.htm).
145
Pešić, a13, 16, 17.
146
Petricusic, 21.
147
Petricusic, 21.
148
Petricusic, 21, 22.
149
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 35.
150
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 35.
151
MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming).
152 Ilievski, 20.
31

5. Minorities in the New Republics
It was not unexpected that in their struggle for independence the four republics
stressed the significance of the titular nation in the new constitutions. All
introduced different concepts of minority rights. The creation of nation states was
at first perceived as entailing a reduction of the privileges in the status of national
minorities and impediments for contacts between minority groups living in other
republics. At the later stage, the war had a devastating effect on minorities.
5.1. BH, Croatia and Serbia
Except for BiH, all the republics have - or at least had before the wars - a
considerable number of national minorities. In Serbia fourteen national minorities
have set up minority councils since Serbia introduced a very wide concept of
minority rights. 153 The difficult situation in Croatia, the separation and
reintegration of parts of its territories and the conflicts with other republics,
entailed various changes and suspensions of minority rights and even the legal
elimination of “minority” groups from the Constitution (Albanians, Bosniaks and
Slovenes in 1997). 154 However, a legal framework for collective (political
participation and cultural rights) and individual minority rights has been
established in Croatia, Serbia and BiH.
The practice looked more and more difficult. The wars in Croatia and BiH
have caused affliction to minorities in Serbia and Croatia and BiH. In Serbia and
Croatia the number of minority members was reduced by approximately 50 % and
60 % respectively. The Croats and Bosniaks in Serbia and Serbs in Croatia were hit
the hardest. In Serbia, Croats or Serbs married to Croats were discriminated
against; there were incidents in which Bosniaks were killed and Hungarians were
denied the guaranteed right to transcribe their names in their own languages in
personal documents or to the bilingual naming of streets or settlements. 155 The
Serbs in Croatia faced similar problems. 156 The discrimination against Serbs
continued after the war. If they tried to return to Croatia they were confronted
with problems in acquiring citizenship or the assertion of property rights. 157 In
Serbia the high level of centralization proved to be a problem for minorities. 158
Both in Serbia and Croatia there was almost no legal protection against
discriminating perpetrators or administrative measures. 159 The situation for
minority members did not improve in Croatia and Serbia until the change of
governments in 2000. 160
As a result of the wars, it was not the “classical” minorities that faced the
harshest discrimination, even though the growing nationalism affected them as
well 161 , it was the former members of the Yugoslav constituent nations that
became minorities in the new republics.
153 Pešić, 23.
154 Petricusic, 13,14.
155 Pešić, 31, 32.
156 Petricusic, 14-16.
157 Petricusic, 15, Pešić, 32.
158 Pešić, 24.
159 Petricusic, 14, 15.
160 Petricusic, 14, Pešić, 32.
161 After the reintegration of the formerly occupied territories the parliament temporarily
suspended provisions ruling the minority participation of Serbs, while the participation of
smaller minority communities remained valid in Croatia in 1995, Petricusic, 13.
32

5.2. Macedonia
The new Macedonian Constitution reduced the protection of minority rights as it
aimed to integrate citizens individually and not at group level. 162 This caused
discontent particularly amongst the Albanian parts of the population and proved to
be entirely inappropriate. The other minorities in Macedonia stayed out of these
conflicts. 163
Indeed Albanians participated in all government coalitions since
Macedonia’s independence, and some positions within the government and
administration were distributed to Albanians. Nevertheless, Albanians were
generally underrepresented in the administration. 164
The government pursued to resolve the ethnic tensions with concessions
towards the Albanians, coercive means and corrupt exchanges between ethnic
elites. 165 The adherence/lobbying of political elites impeded the process of finding
a democratic solution. Problems were left unsolved and therefore led to an
accumulation of discontent at the base, where the NLA could recruit its
combatants after its foundation in the late nineties. Main Albanian demands were
the recognition of the Albanian group as a constitutive nation (some parts favoured
a separation from Macedonia), the Albanian language as an official language and
official recognition of the University of Tetovo, which was founded illegally in the
early nineties. 166 The process of the Albanian rebellion had two stages. It was
brought in from Kosovo, where the pressure from the Serbian side was released
after the bombardments of 1999, and then gained momentum from the internal
forces in Macedonia. 167
A real solution was not looked for until problems erupted violently in 2001.
It was found with the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001, which was negotiated
with constructive international assistance and broadened the political, language
and educational rights of the Albanians.
5.3. Kosovo
The Kosovo conflict is dominated by disputes between the Serbs and the Albanians.
Other minorities have largely kept out of it, although the side effects concern the
other minorities as well. The Roma somehow became directly involved in the
conflict when some of them took sides with the Serbs, which the Albanians
resented. 168
5.4. Evaluation
The conflicts that arose between the Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks, between the Serbs
and Albanians and the Macedonians and Albanians were caused by growing
nationalism. Side effects hit the other minorities living in the republics of former
Yugoslavia as well. 169
162 Ilievski, 5.
163 Ilievski, 5, 15.
164 Ilievski, 5.
165 Ilievski, 5.
166 Ilievski, 18, 19.
167 Ilievski, 20.
168 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming).
169 MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming).
33

In the newly created nation states, new national minorities emerged, e.g.
Serbs in Croatia. These minorities had enjoyed a status of a constituent nation in
the SFRY. From the legal point of view, the shift of status from constituent nation
to national minority does not per se mean that the set of rights conferred upon a
given community is reduced. Nevertheless, the perception of these rights and the
right to self-determination and the right to secede in particular, does differ.
Because of this different perception, not only “new” minorities like Serbs in
Croatia, but also Albanians in Kosovo and in Macedonia, 170 were not willing to
accept the status of a national minority and kept struggling for another status, e.g.
being recognized as a constituent nation within Macedonia. The negative
perception of the status of a national minority was reinforced, as the minorities
were exposed to the nationalistic pressure of the respective majority.
Answering the question of when the normal frame shifted to the crisis
frame, one must address the new minorities individually. As for the Serbs in
Croatia, one may argue that the prospect of becoming the minority in an
independent Croatian state and thus loosing the status of constituent nation was
decisive. This seems to be, however, not convincing, even given the negative
perception of minority status. Taking the decentralized structure of the SFRY into
account and the fact that according to the constitution of 1974 the decisive powers
were overwhelmingly vested within the socialist republics, the Serbs in Croatia
must be considered as being de facto national minority on Croatia since then
(1974). Moreover, there are no findings that the exercise of the collective rights
granted to Serbs under the Constitution of SR Croatia was subject to dispute. 171 The
independence of a Croatia willing to assure a basic set of minority rights would
have led to a symbolic loss of the status of constituent nation, but would not have
had any actual impact on the real state of affairs and living conditions. The mere
symbolic loss of the constituent status cannot be sufficient to change the normal
frame to the crisis frame. Rather, the change of frame seems to be brought about
by the electoral victory of the HDZ and Tuđman in April/May 1990. Given the
victors’ ambiguous attitude to the Ustaša regime and nationalistic rhetoric, the
Serbs were for the first time confronted with the perspective of living in a state
with a genocidal past. 172 The memory of World War II was revived and irrespective
of all formal guarantees of minority rights given by the Croatian state, the victory
of nationalistic forces was perceived as a clear sign that Serbs under the new rule
would not be respected and safe. 173
A similar observation has been made by Hansjörg Eiff, German Ambassador
to SFRY from 1988 to 1992. In his opinion, the real far-reaching deterioration of the
relationships began as Tuđman came into power, because with him a counterplayer
to Milošević appeared on the field. Tuđman himself had no scruples to enter
a conflict with Serbs, and it was his seizure of power that gave Serbs a reason and
pretext to revolt. According to Eiff, the Serbs would not have revolted had Ivica
Račan (the Prime Minister after 2000) won the election in 1990. 174
The history of relative observance of minority rights in the SFRY did not
seem to be relevant, as the observance of minority rights in the normal frame does
not necessarily mean its observance in the crisis frame. Furthermore, all nation
states opposed the introduction or, in the case of Serbia, the implementation of
adequate minority rights provisions as they considered them as counter-productive
in their struggle for sovereignty over their republican territory.
170 Ilievski, 5.
171 See Baltić, 41.
172 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging. Journeys into the New Nationalism, (Farrar,
Straus & Griraoux, New York 1993), 47, as quoted by Radan, 178.
173 Oberschall, 991.
174 Eiff, 194.
34

The fate of the Albanian ethnic group in Macedonia was influenced and
closely connected to the fate of the Albanians living in Kosovo. The change of
frame seems to be influenced from there. In Kosovo, on the other hand, the
Albanians and Serbs were acting within the crisis frame since the riots in 1981 at
the latest.
35

6. Violence
The intensity of violence differed from republic to republic. Since in Serbia
(“proper” and Vojvodina) war never broke out, violent incursions were confined to
occasional but sometimes lethal incidents. The Albanian population experienced a
time of suppression that initially resembled more a totalitarian dictatorship than a
war, Albanian infrastructure was systematically destroyed and Albanians were
subjected to torture, detention and murder by the Serbian police forces.
With the establishment of the KLA and the attacks on Serbs, however, the
violence reached a new stadium. Fights with Albanian combatants entailed large
scale massacres, torture and rape by Serbian police and military forces.
In Croatia the occupied territories were cleansed by the murder and
expulsion of the non-Serb population, the unoccupied territories were bombarded
and put under artillery attacks form the occupied territories in Croatia, BiH and
Montenegro. 175 Many Serbs disappeared or were killed during the first half of the
nineties in the unoccupied territory of Croatia. 176 However, the main revenge
followed when the occupied territories were freed and atrocities were committed
on the Serbian population.
The fate of the Bosnian civilians is well known, a tragedy in which the
Bosniaks were the most numerous victims. 177 The forms of violence described also
took place in BiH, however, in much larger dimensions. In Macedonia a large scale
escalation and military solution of the Albanian insurgence was avoided, since all
the political parties were forced to negotiate by international interference.
175 Petricusic, 24.
176 Petricusic, 27.
177 Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 23.
36

7. Third-Party Intervention
7.1. Individual states in the region
Serbia and Croatia 178 exerted influence on “their” national communities in other
states emerging from Yugoslavia fostering the process of their ethnomobilization.
179 The Bosnian report puts a special emphasis on this kind of external
fostering of ethno-mobilization and the Croatian report refers to it as well. The
following instruments of this process are mentioned:
- propaganda of state-controlled broadcasting stations of Croatia and Serbia
aimed at the respective national community in BH; 180
- granting support to “the extremist” politicians (by Croatia and Serbia); 181
- inspiring the JNA to deploy more troops on the territory of BiH in order to
prevent it from proclaiming independence and/or to secure the “survival”
of Serbs in one single state; 182
- secret operations of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior to destabilize BH; 183
- providing financial and training assistance, military equipment and
operational support to the HVO and help in organizing and planning its
military operations (Croatia). 184
The ties between the Croatian state and the Croats in BiH were tightened by the
fact that Croats from BiH had no difficulties in obtaining Croatian passports and
participating in Croatian elections. 185
One may assume that the Serbian external influence was exerted through
the largely Serbian-dominated JNA, 186 whereas Croatia had no other choice than to
support its compatriots more directly. This estimation equally applies to the policy
of the Serbian government towards Serbs in Croatia. Furthermore, the Croatian
report stresses that the policy of the new Croatian government provoked the
ethno-mobilization of Serbs to a large extent. 187 The newly created Serb “states”
on the Croatian territory depended, however, on financial help from Belgrade
which was actually provided. 188
The Macedonian report mentions that the continuous challenging of
Macedonian national, state and religious identity by various neighbouring countries
including Greece and Bulgaria played a special role as an important factor of
ethno-mobilization. 189
The policy of the Albanian government cannot be regarded as fostering
ethno-mobilization. Its quite constructive attitude at Rambouillet and towards
178
Both are regarded as „neighbouring countries“ by Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 3.
179
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 17; Petricusic, 26, 27; Pešić, 32.
180
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 35.
181
Pešić, 32, Petricusic 26, 27.
182
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 19
183
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 21.
184
Petricusic, 26, 27.
185
Petricusic, 26.
186
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 8 and 17.
187 Petricusic, 7.
188 Petricusic, 24.
189 Ilievski, 26.
37

Macedonia has been observed. 190 However, Albania has to be considered as an
important base for the KLA, which did contribute to ethno-mobilization. There
were KLA training camps in Albania and the Albanian territory was used as a base
for guerrilla attacks in Kosovo. There is some evidence that this was at least
tolerated by Albanian authorities. 191 Moreover, one may even argue – and this is the
major point about Albania’s role in the Kosovo conflict – that the KLA would not
have been effectively established without weapons stolen from magazines of the
Albanian army during the riots in 1997. It is estimated that up to 1 million guns
were robbed and their price at the black market was as low as 15 German marks
initially, rising later to 250 marks. 192
According to UN-Report: 193
7.2. The Mujahedin and Islamic states
Mujahedin, or “holy warriors”, is a generic term for Muslim volunteers
fighting in the former Yugoslavia. Many Mujahedin originate from Muslim
countries outside the former Yugoslavia. It was reported that the
Mujahedin began arriving in BiH as early as June 1992. Reports on the
number of Mujahedin forces operating in BiH vary, but it is unlikely that
the Mujahedin forces have made a significant military contribution to
the BiH Government's war effort. The Mujahedin forces came from
several Muslim states and many of them were veterans of the Afghan
war. The Mujahedin forces were reported to be under the command of
the BiH Army. However, they frequently acted with independence and
their presence is no longer welcomed. They are alleged to be terrorizing
the Muslims they came to protect in an effort to enforce Islamic
practices. Their presence, the Serbs and Croats have argued, is
evidence that the Bosnian Muslims intend on turning BiH into a
fundamentalist Muslim state.
The presence of Mujahedin was meaningful for the ethno-mobilization of Serbs and
Croats, insofar as Serb and Croat propaganda made an extensive use of the “radical
Islamism” of Bosniaks. 194 On the other hand, their presence had little impact on the
ethno-mobilization of Bosniaks. 195 Iran is mentioned as a state directly involved in
the Bosnian conflict by providing President Izetbegović with financial aid. 196 There
is insufficient evidence of the involvement of Mujahedin or Islamic states in the
Kosovo and Macedonia conflicts. 197
190
Peter Schubert, “Der Kosovo-Konflikt und Albanien“, in Jens Reuter and Konrad Clewing
(eds.), Der Kosovo Konflikt. Ursache, Verlauf, Perspektiven (Wieser Verlag, Klagenfurt et
al. 2000), 213-225, at 214 and 217.
191
Schubert, 216.
192
Reuter, 171-172.
193
Bassiouni Report, Annex III.A Special forces, at § II B 2.
194
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, passim, see for example 16, 20, 22, 26, 27.
195
This is also the conclusion of the Srebrenica Report by Netherlands Institute for War
Documentation from 2002 (hereinafter: “Srebrenica Report”), available at
www.srebrenica.nl, Appendix 6, Chapter 4, Section 5 “The Mujahedin in Bosnia”.
196
Srebrenica report, ibid.
197
Although the Macedonian authorities repeatedly claimed that there had been Mujahedin
involvement on the side of Albanian rebels, the Western officials were however sceptical
about the claims. The issue arose, as the Macedonian police shot 7 persons dead at the Albanian
border, the majority of them stemming form Pakistan. The Minister of Interior
Boškoski, now tried in Hague, claimed the these persons were “Mujahadin terrorists”. See
38

7.3. Individual states on the geopolitical scene
A special role of Germany and to a lesser extent of Greece and the USA is pointed
out throughout the reports.
The German role is connected to its initiative for the recognition of Slovenia
and Croatia and dates back to mid 1991. 198 It contributed to the shift in the policy
of the European Union (see infra.) from a policy of containment of the Yugoslav
federation in any form whatsoever to a policy of recognition of the successor
states. This policy culminated in the German unilateral recognition of Croatia 199
which took place before the Badinter Committee presented its findings as to
whether Croatia fulfilled the conditions for recognition set out in the declaration of
EC foreign ministers of 16 December 1991 (guidelines for recognition). The US did
not have a clear stand on the Yugoslav conflict, although, according to the Bosnian
and Kosovo report 200 , though it sympathized with the containment policy. In spite
of the Badinter’s Commission assessment 201 that Macedonia and Slovenia met all
the recognition criteria, Macedonia was initially not recognized by the EC due to
Greek lobbying. 202 The actions taken by Germany and Greece had serious
implications for the credibility of the EC as a neutral and assertive actor.
Russia is considered to have been in a military and economic sense too weak
to put forward and enforce a coherent Balkan policy. The major steps taken by the
Western countries were not thwarted. This situation changed slightly with the
Kosovo conflict, although the capability of Russia to influence the course of events
was rather minor and largely overestimated. 203 NATO’s military threats aiming at
preventing the brutal action of the Serbian armed forces against Albanian civilians
in July 1998 was thwarted, at least symbolically, by Moscow inviting Milošević’s to
Kremlin. 204 At the later stage, the myth of Panslavic brotherhood cultivated in
Serbia helped Russia to co-act as a mediator. 205
Ana Petruseva, Macedonia says seven “Mujahideen”' shot dead, Reuters, 3 March 2002, as
quoted by UNIMIK Division of Public Information, http://www.unmikonline.org.
198
See also Radan, 163-164.
199 th
The declaration on recognition of December, 19 1991 has been suspended and took
effect on January, 15 th 1992. See Radan, 181.
200
MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming).
201 th
Opinion delivered on January 11 1992.
202
Ilievski, 28.
203
Klaus Segbers and Christoph Zürcher, „Russland und der Kosovo-Konflikt“, in Jens Reuter
and Konrad Clewing (eds.), Der Kosovo Konflikt. Ursache, Verlauf, Perspektiven (Wieser
Verlag, Klagenfurt et al. 2000), 171-186, at 383 and 386
204
Segbers/Zürcher, ibid.
205 Segbers/Zürcher, 383
39

7.4. The role of the EU (initially EC only) 206
The role of the EC and EU can be summarized as initiating peace talks and sending
contradictory signals as to its policy of recognition of the successor states.
7.4.1. General
The crisis management of the EU indirectly fuelled the process of ethnomobilization
in Serbia and deepened distrust of the EU:
- Given that Serbian leaders stemmed from the communist party, there was
initial distrust towards the EC inherited from the cold war period. The EC
was blamed by the Serbian party for lacking objectivity as early as the
Peace Conference in The Hague in autumn 1991. 207 It can be interpreted as
a general distrust towards “The West” which was fostered by Germany’s
action. 208
- The EC recognized Croatia, although, according to the Badinter Committee,
it did not meet the conditions set in the recognition guidelines for the EC;
- Economic sanctions imposed by the EC at the eve of the conflict were kept
intact with regard to Serbia, whereas they were lifted with regard to other
post-Yugoslav republics; 209
- The last two points were presented by Serbian propaganda as a conspiracy
of Croatian allies. 210
- On the basis of the very same facts, it cannot be ruled out that some parts
of the European leadership and public opinion looked at the Yugoslav
conflict through the prism of cold war divisions, also perceiving the “postcommunist
led” Serbs as being on the other side of the barricade.
7.4.2. Croatia
There has initially been little involvement in crisis management within Croatia. It
cannot be ruled out that the shift it the EC in late 1991 strengthened ethnomobilization
in this republic, providing Croatia with prospects of recognition.
Additionally, the recognition of Croatia by the EC despite its non-fulfilment of
recognition conditions set out in its own guidelines undermined its credibility as an
international actor. 211
7.4.3. BiH and Kosovo
The crisis management of the EC failed to prevent the war in BiH. 212 With the
recognition of BiH, the full-scale military conflict erupted. As pointed out in the
Special Report, the EC refused to send troops to BiH despite a respective request of
its authorities and another round of peace-talks was initiated instead rejected by
the Serbian delegation. The recognition approach adapted by the EC was dangerous
206 Regarding the entire section on international organizations, see also Ugo Caruso, The
Interplay between CoE, OSCE, EU and NATO, Report for MIRICO Work Package 1.
207 Pešić, 27, 28.
208 Pešić, 25.
209 Pešić, 29.
210 Pešić, 25.
211 Stefan Wolff/Annemarie Peen Rodt, Report on the Reactive Conflict Management of the
EU in the Western Balkans, 5.
212 The question, how the various „peace plans” for BH, (e.g. plan of Cutilheiro, plan of
Owen and Stoltenberg) influenced the ethno-mobilization will be explored within the Work
Package 3.
40

for BiH as it created tensions resulting from a paradoxical situation: on the one
hand the dismembering of the multi-ethnic SFRY into national states was accepted;
on the other hand the unity of a multi-ethnic BH was supposed to be preserved. 213
The EC’s reliance on uti-possidetis principle with regard to the borders of
Yugoslavia’s republics is also indirectly criticized by the Kosovo report, as it
prevented the EC from questioning the situation in Kosovo which was detrimental
to Kosovo Albanians and eventually led to the armed conflict in the late nineties. 214
7.4.4. Macedonia
The EU had no weight to put behind its warnings in the early nineties, given the
lack of credible military capacities to support diplomatic action and visible
disagreement among the EC-Members as to the nature of the conflict and the
means of resolving it. Yet, as the instruments of the CFSP were evolving, the
conflict management ability of the EU was improving. Hence, there is a positive
assessment of conflict management after 1999, especially with regard to
Macedonia. 215 However, the EU benefited from the steadily strong support for
European integration in this country. The positive outcome of the EU actions after
1999 is linked to the accession perspective which it can open to the states in the
West Balkans. The latter aspect is also mentioned by the Croatian report. 216
7.5.1. Croatia and BH
7.5. The role of the UN
There is a negative assessment of the UNPROFOR-mission, both in BiH and in
Croatia. 217 The soldiers under the UN-mandate entitled to use force to “selfdefence”
failed to stop ethno-mobilization from generating violence and to create
conditions for peaceful negotiations. In Croatia, the UNPA’s were perceived as
consolidating Serb control over Croatian territory and UNPROFOR (later UNCRO)
neither stopped the expulsion of the non-Serb population from there nor prevented
the violent recapture of this territory by the Croatian army in 1995. 218
7.5.2. Croatia in particular
The Croatian report mentions the positive role of the UN-led civil police agents in
UNPA’s (CIVPOL) and the UNHCR. 219
213
Szulik, „Konflikt w byłej Jugosławii”, (1) Sprawy Międzynarodowe (1997), 91-108, at 99.
This explains also the Bosnian memorandum of 14 October 1991 conditioning the BHs’ staying
within Yugoslavia on Serbia and Croatia staying too (So called “letter of intention”, see
Ćurak, Seizović, Šačić, Turčalo, 37). Preserving the territorial integrity of BH was of particular
importance for Bosniaks. The majority of Bosniaks and President Izetbegović were
rejecting a potential division of the country, as they were split over the whole territory and
a division would hit them the most. Petritsch, 34.
214
MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming). The Kosovo’s
application for recognition was not even submitted to the Badinter Committee for consideration,
see Radan, 188.
215
Wolff/Peen Rodt, 24.
216
Petricusic, 31.
217
Petricusic, 34.
218
After the Croatian offensive, UNCRO helped the Serbian population on the recaptured
territory to flee, as it felt threatened under the new rule. Szulik, 105.
219
Petricusic, 34.
41

7.5.3. Serbia
As in the case of the EU-imposed sanctions, the sanctions imposed by the UN on
FRY because of its involvement in the hostilities in BiH were extensively used by
Milošević’s propaganda to “unite” the society against “the common enemy” from
outside. The analysis of the election results performed in the Serbian report
suggests that this regime’s action was quite successful. 220
7.5.4. Macedonia
Regarding the UN troops deployed in Macedonia in 1992, the assessment is quite
the opposite. It was the first preventive deployment of troops in the history of the
organization and it proved successful in maintaining the stability of Macedonia. 221
The timing of its withdrawal 222 in 1999 was, however, unfortunate as the flux of
refugees from Kosovo started to enter Macedonia in that year. The “blue-helmets”
thus succeeded in their role as a preventive conflict management, whereas they
did not in the reactive one.
7.6. The role of NATO
Whereas it is stated that NATO membership has been at least an attractive option
or even a policy priority of Croatia 223 and Macedonia 224 , a post cold war approach
dominated in Serbia, where NATO was perceived as a serious external treat in
1992. 225 The NATO bombing of Serbia during the Kosovo crisis contributed to the
consolidation of Serbian society around the defence of the country. 226
7.7. The OSCE
The OSCE is mentioned in the reports as an organization initially supporting the
containment of Yugoslavia, then suspending its membership (after the secessions,
in July 1992) and adopting various resolutions which, however, did not have much
impact on the process of ethno- mobilization. Quite the opposite is true for the
Kosovo Verification Mission established in 1998. Being perceived as biased by the
Serb population from the very beginning, its officials accused the Serbs of
massacring Albanian civilians after having discovered the bodies after a police
action in the village of Racak. These accusations deepened the distrust and
contributed to the further consolidation of the Serbian population. The Kosovo
report, on the other hand, draws attention to the fact that these accusations
raised the international awareness of the situation in Kosovo. 227
As a general conclusion on third party-intervention, one may assume with
the Macedonian report a cacophony of the international community in addressing
the Yugoslavian crisis at its beginning. 228 At this stage of the conflict, the EC and
220
Pešić, 32.
221
Ilievski, 29.
222
The mandate was not extended in 1999 and thus terminated due to the veto of China
which is supposed to be a reaction on Macedonian recognition of Taiwan.
223
Petricusic, 36.
224
Ilievski 31.
225
Pešić, 36.
226
Pešić, 34.
227
MIRICO Work Package 2 country specific report on Kosovo (forthcoming).
228 Ilievski, 28.
42

then the EU failed to take the role of a credible regional leader capable of
presenting a firm standpoint or – as in the case of BiH – assume responsibility for
the consequences of its recognition policy by taking military action. There can be
doubt as to whether the policy of early recognition fostered the ethno-mobilization
in Croatia by backing its separatist action and in Serbia by uniting the Serbs against
external threats.
43

8. Conclusion
Three types of general conclusions can be made.
First, addressing the type of the conflict, the Macedonian conflict with the
Albanians comes closest to the “classic” conflict about the extent of minority
rights, addressing questions such as granting political participation/autonomy,
defining a set of rights in the sphere of education, mother language use, and so on.
The fact that the Albanians kept putting forward the Yugoslav-rhetoric postulate of
becoming a “constituent nation” does not change the very nature of the problem.
The Kosovo conflict is, on the contrary, not a conflict about the extent of minority
rights, but rather a conflict of who – Albanians or Serbs – should be the majority.
The Albanians are the majority in Kosovo taken alone, whereas Serbs are the
majority, if Kosovo is taken together with Serbia. The conflicts in Croatia and BiH
can be regarded as conflicts over the subject and scope of the right to selfdetermination.
Second, addressing the nature of the ethno-mobilization process, the
present survey suggests that it was a top-down process driven by the emancipated
political elites of the republics or its parts (BiH). None of the initially presented
models can claim exclusivity as an explanation. It can be said to have been a
“constructionist” process initially, especially with regard to its economic
dimension. It turned into an “instrumentalist” process which, after some time (the
shift of the cognitive frames), also activated a “primordial” process which since
then has been running parallel with the “instrumentalist” process. An exception
from this is likely to be made for Macedonia, where the ethno-mobilization of
Macedonians had predominantly “constructionist” traits. 229
The establishment of a “point of no return” is the final question to be
addressed here. Rejecting historical determinism in any form, it must be stated
that ethno-mobilization ultimately leading to a violent ethnic conflict was
extremely difficult to reverse by political means after Tuđman and the HDZ came
into power in the elections in April/May 1990. In this sense the seizure of power by
this political faction can be regarded as a point of no return with regard to Croatia.
There are also good reasons to argue that the same point of no return (the
elections in Croatia) applies to the conflict in BiH, even if the cognitive frame had
not yet changed there. On the basis of the present survey, it may be regarded as
proven that manifold strong pressure was exerted from Croatia and Serbia. In fact,
this pressure was not the only, but definitely a major factor triggering ethnomobilization
in BiH. Given for example the “letter of intention” of President
Izetbegović conditioning BiH’s staying in Yugoslavia on Serbia and Croatia staying
too 230 , one my claim that without the Serbo-Croatian antagonism affecting the
Bosnian population disastrously, the stability of this country could have been
preserved. The collision course of these two (Serbia and Croatia) was a long history
in which economic factors should not be underestimated. This collision course was
definitely set with the result of the Croatian elections and by this event – this is
229 This is, what can be deduced from the comments of Ilievski who is arguing that “Macedonian
ethno-nationalism wasn’t only ‘not dominant as, for example, Croatian was in Croatia’,
but it was mobilized predominantly in the struggle for international recognition of the
state, in lobbying for the ‘name dispute’ with Greece and the struggle for rights of the Macedonian
minority in Bulgaria, Greece and Albania.”, Ilievski, 34. On the other hand, the
ethno-mobilization of Albanians in Macedonia does not seem to differ much from the general
scheme.
230 See the reference in the Footnote 213.
44

the crucial point – the crisis frame was activated at the heart of Yugoslavia for the
first time after World War II. It remains, however, an open question, whether the
collision within the crisis frame could have been avoided by a radical action from
outside, for example by denying the prospects for recognition to Tuđman-ruled
Croatia or ultimately by deploying international armed forces equipped with a
robust UN-Security Council mandate.
45

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