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BALOCHISTAN - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

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The Exponential Rise of Sectarianism<br />

The rivalry between nationalist and Islamist parties that emerged during Ziaul-Haq’s<br />

regime and continued under his successors was not an ideological<br />

struggle. The ideological façade was, first and <strong>for</strong>emost, an attempt by military<br />

regimes to break ethnic identities and centralize power.<br />

Similarly, Baloch nationalists rejected the Islamization process much less <strong>for</strong><br />

its ideological content than because they rightly perceived it as part of a larger<br />

scheme to isolate individuals and make them more amenable to Islamabad’s<br />

policies. The rejection of Islamization in Balochistan was primarily a rejection<br />

of centralization and of central dominance, not of Islamic doctrine per se.<br />

However, Islamization is currently experiencing a qualitative<br />

change in Balochistan. Amid the state of anarchy in<br />

the province and led by the Deobandi madrassa network,<br />

radicalization is on the rise and sectarian groups have<br />

stepped up their activities in the region. The number of<br />

sectarian killings has increased almost exponentially over<br />

the past few years in a province traditionally known <strong>for</strong> its<br />

deeply entrenched secularism.<br />

A strong Taliban presence in Balochistan developed<br />

under Musharraf and in connection with the MMA government.<br />

The province is also increasingly becoming a<br />

nexus of sectarian outfits. Afghan and Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban<br />

Balochistan), al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Janghvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Imamia<br />

Student Organization, and Sipah-e-Muhammad are said to have established<br />

presences in the province. 61 Their presence is partly the result of Pakistani<br />

security agencies pushing them there from Punjab, partly a result of a vast<br />

network of Deobandi madrassas, and partly a consequence of the Islamization<br />

policies pursued by the federal state since the 1970s. At the same time, some<br />

analysts credit the Afghan refugee camps in the province as a key source of<br />

recruits <strong>for</strong> the Taliban. 62<br />

Balochistan’s sectarian groups continue to multiply, fragment, and collaborate<br />

at a dramatic pace. The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan has a large support base<br />

in Balochistan. Although banned twice by the government, it remains intact in<br />

the province and provides ground support <strong>for</strong> Lashkar-e-Janghvi terrorists. The<br />

group seems to operate as two different outfits, the Usman Kurd group and<br />

the Qari Hayi group. Some factions of the defunct Jaish-e-Mohammad seem<br />

to have established an operational relationship with Lashkar-e-Janghvi, while<br />

a large number of Harakat-ul-Mujadeen and Harakat Jihad-e-Islami militants<br />

are said to have joined the group. The Imamia Student Organization, influential<br />

among Shia youth as well as in mainstream Shia politics, seems to play a<br />

role in sectarian violence as well. 63<br />

Frederic Grare | 17<br />

Baloch nationalists rejected the Islamization<br />

process much less <strong>for</strong> its ideological<br />

content than because they rightly<br />

perceived it as part of a larger scheme<br />

to isolate individuals and make them<br />

more amenable to Islamabad’s policies.

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