THE LOEWEN GROUP, INC. and RAYMOND L. LOEWEN, v. THE ...

hearing on this very issue, Loewen violated the anti-monopoly laws by (among other things)
manipulating the August 1991 settlement agreement in bad faith with the intent to drive O'Keefe
out of relevant funeral home markets, thereby enabling Loewen to continue to raise its prices
without fear of competition. See A3344-47. O'Keefe also argued that Loewen's treatment of
O'Keefe was part of a broader practice of destroying or excluding smaller competitors through
similar unfair methods. See, e.g., A158-59. As Mississippi trial lawyer Jack Dunbar explains in
his attached declaration, such allegations were more than sufficient to state a claim for a violation
of Mississippi's anti-monopoly laws. See Supplemental Statement of Jack F. Dunbar, Esq.
("Supplemental Dunbar Statement") at 2-8 (Tab C hereto).
Claimants, who merely parrot the misguided arguments of Loewen's trial counsel, are
similarly incorrect when they assert that O'Keefe, as a competitor of Loewen, lacked the requisite
legal standing to bring a monopolization claim against Loewen. See Joint Reply at 72. As a
leading antitrust treatise observes, "[s]tanding is clear and seldom challenged when the plaintiff
alleges that its rival engaged in an exclusionary practice designed to rid the market of the
plaintiff, or to preclude his entry, so that the defendant could maintain or create a monopoly."
Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law § 373d. See also, e.g., Oltz v. St. Peter's Cmty. Hosp., 19
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See id. at 5527-28 (instructing jury that, "[t]o prevail on a claim of monopolization and to
recover damages, the plaintiffs must prove . . . that the defendants had monopoly power in the
relevant market . . . [,] that the defendants willfully acquired or maintained such monopoly power
through restrictive or exclusionary conduct[,] [a]nd . . . that the plaintiffs were injured in their
business or property as a result of such . . . conduct."). Claimants and their expert, Mr. Corlew,
are thus wrong in asserting that "[t]he only antitrust jury instruction which plaintiffs were granted
involved 'predatory pricing' . . . ." Corlew Statement at 8.
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