'Five Years of President Putin: An Assessment' - Foreign Policy Centre
'Five Years of President Putin: An Assessment' - Foreign Policy Centre
'Five Years of President Putin: An Assessment' - Foreign Policy Centre
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Who Pulls the Strings in the <strong>Putin</strong> Administration? Top<br />
Dr. Alex Pravda<br />
It is widely accepted that Russia is run by a small number <strong>of</strong> people who are not democratically<br />
elected. This poses the question <strong>of</strong> whether Russia is heading down the road to<br />
authoritarianism. It is therefore necessary to examine (1) who in this small group pulls the<br />
strings <strong>of</strong> power and (2) whether effective string-pulling impedes the formulation <strong>of</strong> good<br />
policy.<br />
There has been a marked shift between <strong>Putin</strong>’s first term in <strong>of</strong>fice and the beginning <strong>of</strong> his<br />
second. In his first term, <strong>Putin</strong> cautiously dealt with the judiciary and the Duma; now he has<br />
embarked on a consolidation <strong>of</strong> power. It seems to many observers that <strong>Putin</strong> believes that the<br />
political system should be fashioned according to his beliefs and principles: Institutional<br />
contest is messy, not to mention dangerous, and is entirely unsuitable for the modernisation <strong>of</strong><br />
Russia and its return to great power status.<br />
It is difficult to know how much power actually lies at the centre <strong>of</strong> the Russian state and who<br />
pulls the strings. The more power is concentrated the more opaque it becomes and<br />
accordingly, there is less clarity now about who holds power than in the Yeltsin period.<br />
Although the oligarchs have the resources to protest at the centralisation <strong>of</strong> power, the<br />
investigation into Yukos and the trial <strong>of</strong> Mikhail Khodorkovsky has warned <strong>of</strong> the cost <strong>of</strong><br />
challenging <strong>Putin</strong>’s centralisation <strong>of</strong> power, thereby maintaining the modus vivendi.<br />
Officials, aides, key ministers and much <strong>of</strong> the state bureaucracy share similar roots; most<br />
either come form <strong>Putin</strong>’s home-town <strong>of</strong> St Petersburg, or have the required background in the<br />
security services. Bureaucrats are chosen on the basis <strong>of</strong> reliability and loyalty, not who is best<br />
for the job. The apparatus has now become self sustaining with decreasing competence and<br />
much loyalty. This has subsequently led to poor analysis on foreign policy and domestic policy,<br />
best illustrated by the popular protest at social benefit reforms last February.<br />
<strong>Putin</strong>’s Presidency is weakening: authoritarian regimes are not very effective, but are good at<br />
short-term damage limitation. This creates a climate <strong>of</strong> uncertainty, which allows <strong>Putin</strong> room<br />
for manoeuvre on deciding policy. However, this approach undermines long term sustainability<br />
because much needed reforms and policy initiatives that tackle social issues are not formulated<br />
or implemented. Regardless <strong>of</strong> who pulls the strings, it seems the strings themselves are<br />
becoming threadbare.<br />
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