The Cuban missile crisis and intelligence performance

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176 INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
summer." This implies that certain KGB units charged with transport and
custody of nuclear munitions must also have been aware of the decision at
some point. 12 But without knowing precisely who in the Soviet intelligence
community knew of the deployment, when they knew it, and why they were
(or were not) informed, it is difficult to come to a refined assessment of the
relevance and performance of Soviet intelligence in the episode.
3. Did the KGB orchestrate a campaign to mask the nuclear deployment by
funneling accurate information about it to the CIA through Cuban sources?
If the KGB was unaware of the missile deployment, then it could not have
attempted to mask it by leaking accurate information about it. Yet Domingo
Amuchastegui claims that this is precisely what the KGB did: 'This
campaign presupposed - quite correctly - that the CIA would discount this
information, because they would not consider the individuals and groups
peddling it to be credible." 3 One can only admire the daring and the genius
of such a plan. But if Fursenko and Naftali are correct that Alekseev was the
only KGB field officer briefed on the deployment, then unless Alekseev
personally directed it - and he has never claimed that he did -
Amuchastegui must be mistaken.
Here, again, we must await further documentation for a definitive
resolution. But it is entirely plausible to imagine that the KGB and Cuban
intelligence did cooperate on such a campaign.
One possibility is that the KGB in Cuba did, in fact, know about the
nuclear deployment. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that they did not.
Thousands of Soviet troops in Cuba surely were aware of it; why would the
local KGB be unaware? If they had not been informed in advance, certainly
they would have discovered it in any case (Cuban intelligence did, after all,
despite not being informed). But it is difficult to imagine why the local KGB
would not have been informed. They would have been the most useful cadre
imaginable for protecting the secrecy of the deployment. It is easy to
imagine that Fursenko and Naftali err to imply that only Alekseev knew.
It is equally easy to imagine, however, that Amuchastegui errs in
recalling - or perhaps in assuming - that the KGB could only have
conceived and carried out such a plan if they knew that the deployment
actually included strategic nuclear missiles. The KGB officers involved in
designing the campaign could have believed that the Soviet Union was only
deploying conventional military forces to the island, and yet still would
have appreciated the value of tales about nuclear missiles. Their task was to
capitalize on the CIA's low estimate of Cuban credibility. Why would they
not make use of stories that they, in their ignorance, believed to be false, and
as such all the more incredible? 14