CAP-3 had not been attacked, but they also were ordered to evacuate their Bru hamlet <strong>of</strong> Ta Con (north <strong>of</strong> Khe Sanh) and returned to the combat base. There, the CAC <strong>Oscar</strong> Marines regrouped, and rejoined the RF troops and the Popular Force Bru at the southern edge <strong>of</strong> the FOB-3 compound. However, here they found another unpleasant surprise - the Marines refused to allow the Bru and Vietnamese troops on their portion <strong>of</strong> the combat base, supposedly because they feared they harbored spies among them. The CAP Marines, already distraught at having been ordered to retreat without their Bru, were truly in a quandary. However, the Special Forces commander at FOB-3 (which was separate from and not subject to the orders <strong>of</strong> the Marine CO), already had many Bru among his CIDG teams. He happily accepted our counterparts - in fact, he was so glad to get them, he even accepted the Marines - though much less happily, I have been told! (Visualize the scene in "Blazing Saddles" where the townspeople are debating accepting the Black, Chinese, and Irish railroad workers - but don't want the Irish!) There has been some debate as to who actually gave the orders to abandon the Bru and Viet troops. COL Lownds (in a Marine Oral <strong>History</strong> interview), said he had ordered the aerial evacuation <strong>of</strong> the Bru CAPs and RFs, but that they and CPT Clarke chose to walk out. However, the accounts <strong>of</strong> CPT Clarke and SGT Balanco make it clear that the orders came from the Marine command post, relayed by LT Stamper. Of course, COL Lownds' orders may have been misunderstood by LT Stamper. It has also been speculated that it could also have been a decision <strong>of</strong> the pilots due to the situation in the LZ. However, it again seems clear from CPT Clarke's and SGT Balanco's accounts that the command was generated earlier at a higher level. Whatever its origins, it was a bad order, and only redeemed by the bravery <strong>of</strong> CPT Clarke and SFC Perry. Later that afternoon, CPT Clarke led a Special Forces unit in by chopper from FOB-3. They salvaged what they could, and destroyed everything <strong>of</strong> value to the enemy in the headquarters. Despite the great valor <strong>of</strong> the defenders and their repulse <strong>of</strong> superior numbers <strong>of</strong> NVA, inflicting heavy losses upon them, this unit has never gotten more than a footnote or a paragraph or two at most in any histories I have read. (Ray Stubbe's being one <strong>of</strong> the rare exceptions.) This valiant defense, defeat <strong>of</strong> the NVA forces, and marching out <strong>of</strong> the indigenous defenders under CPT Clarke were one <strong>of</strong> the most impressive stories <strong>of</strong> that campaign.
A small unit, less than 200 men, fought <strong>of</strong>f with few losses one <strong>of</strong> the finest regiments the NVA could throw at them, then marched back through the midst <strong>of</strong> their enemies. Back to Top