Against Parthood∗ - Ted Sider

• b
• a
• c
According to me
• b
• a
• c
T
According to my opponents
(But take the picture with a grain of salt: my opponents don’t think that T is
encircled by a faint aura, or accompanied by a ghostly “T ”.) My opponents
and I agree on the micro-description of the situation: on the intrinsic states of
the particles (such as their charges and masses) and their spatial arrangement.
Our sole disagreement is over whether these particles are accompanied by a
further object that is composed of them.
Since I accept the existence of the particles, my denial of an object composed
of them isn’t absurd. Denying that T exists in addition to a, b, and c is no more
absurd than denying that holes exist in addition to perforated things, or denying
that smirks exist in addition to smirking faces. Similarly, denying the existence
of persons, animals, plants, and the rest is not absurd if one accepts subatomic
particles that are “arranged person-wise” (to use van Inwagen’s phrase), animalwise,
plant-wise, and so on.
Indeed, it would seem that ordinary evidence is neutral over whether composite
objects or merely appropriately arranged particles exist. Which hypothesis
is correct is thus an open philosophical question, like the question of whether
there exist holes and smirks.
That is just the first skirmish; a series of battles is yet to be fought. Some say
that the existence of persons and other composites is common sense; others say
that we know of composites through perception; still others say that the dispute
between nihilists and their opponents is merely verbal. But before discussing
these and other challenges, I should say why I think that nihilism is true.
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