Fine - guide to ground.pdf - Ted Sider

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§11 Essence and Ground
Given an object or some objects, we may say that it lies in the nature of those objects that
such and such should hold – that it lies, in the nature of singleton Socrates, for example, that it should
have Socrates as a member. But what then is the connection between statements of nature or essence
and statements of ground? 22
A natural view is this. Given that the fact F is grounded in the facts G 1, G 2,
…, then it lies in
the nature of the fact F (or of the items that it involves) that it should be so grounded given that the
facts G 1, G 2,
… do indeed obtain. So, for example, given that the fact that the ball is red and round is
grounded in the fact that it is red and the fact that it is round, it will lie in the nature of the fact that
the ball is red and round that this fact will be grounded in the fact that the ball is red and the fact that
23
the ball is round (given that the ball is in fact red and is in fact round).
Unfortunately, this view will not quite do as it stands. The fact that someone is a philosopher,
we may suppose, is grounded in the fact that Socrates is a philosopher (and perhaps also that he
exists and is a person). But it does not lie in the nature of the fact that someone is a philosopher that
the fact is so grounded given that Socrates is indeed a philosopher. The fact, so to speak, knows
nothing of Socrates. Or again, the fact that the ball is colored is grounded, we may suppose, in the
fact that it is red. But it does not lie in the nature of the fact that the ball is colored that it is so
grounded given that the ball is indeed red. The fact and color, in particular, know nothing of the
specific colors.
22
The concept of essence is further discussed in Fine [1994].
23
I say that it lies in the nature of the fact that the ball is red and round and thereby treat the fact as an object
(perhaps identical to the proposition that the ball is red and round). But there is something to be said for allowing it
to lie in the nature of what it is for the ball to be red and round, where this is represented by a sentential rather than
by a nominal complement to the essentialist operator.