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A <strong>Deloitte</strong> Research publication | 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
Eurozone<br />
Could this be the<br />
turning point?<br />
United States<br />
Why the euphoria?<br />
United Kingdom<br />
The outlook brightens<br />
Japan<br />
New risk factors<br />
India<br />
A delicate balance<br />
Trade patterns <strong>of</strong><br />
the future<br />
Waking up and<br />
smelling the c<strong>of</strong>fee<br />
A <strong>Collective</strong><br />
<strong>Sigh</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Relief</strong>
2<br />
Global Economic Outlook<br />
Q2 2012<br />
We’re several months into the year 2012, and things are beginning to look less dire than<br />
the last few months <strong>of</strong> 2011. In Europe, a second bailout <strong>of</strong> Greece has at least postponed<br />
disaster. Plus, action by the European Central Bank may have averted a deeper downturn.<br />
In the United States, growth continues at a modest pace, but signs <strong>of</strong> trouble have not<br />
completely gone away. And in China, the economy appears likely to avoid a hard landing.<br />
While there is no cause for celebration, business leaders can at least utter a collective sigh<br />
<strong>of</strong> relief that things are not worse.<br />
In this issue <strong>of</strong> the Global Economic Outlook, we take a close look at the factors driving<br />
the global economy. We begin with Dr. Alexander Börsch’s analysis <strong>of</strong> the Eurozone.<br />
The title <strong>of</strong> his article — “Could this be the turning point?” — draws attention to the fact<br />
that things are not as bad as some had predicted. He notes that four major decisions in<br />
Europe in recent months have improved the outlook, reduced the risk <strong>of</strong> catastrophe, and<br />
moderated the severity <strong>of</strong> the recession. In addition, Alexander takes a close look at what<br />
may be required in order for Greek membership in the Eurozone to be sustainable.<br />
Next, Carl Steidtmann maintains his relatively pessimistic stance on the U.S. economy. He<br />
says that some <strong>of</strong> the data points that appear to herald improvement are really rather<br />
ephemeral. For example, he notes that economic activity has been boosted by good<br />
weather, temporary tax incentives, and inventory rebuilding — hardly the stuff <strong>of</strong> sustainable<br />
recoveries. He also points out some <strong>of</strong> the unintended consequences <strong>of</strong> the Fed’s<br />
monetary easing. Finally, while Carl acknowledges that modest growth can continue for<br />
some time, he cautions that there are many “fat tail” geopolitical risks that could pull the<br />
United States into another downturn. Also included in Carl’s article is an analysis <strong>of</strong> oil<br />
prices and their impact on economic activity.<br />
In our third article, I take a look at China’s economic outlook. I discuss how Chinese<br />
government policy has been effective in partially <strong>of</strong>fsetting the negative external<br />
headwinds faced by China’s export sector. The result is likely to be a s<strong>of</strong>t landing this<br />
year. However, China continues to face longer-term challenges, some <strong>of</strong> which are being<br />
pushed further down the road by the failure to address them in the short term.<br />
Next, Ian Stewart examines the UK and concludes that the economy is doing far better<br />
than earlier thought, but its performance in 2012 is still expected to be relatively poor.<br />
Ian examines the <strong>Deloitte</strong> UK CFO Survey and finds that business leaders have significantly<br />
improved their perceptions and expectations. This should have a tangible effect on<br />
economic activity. Ian also notes that a combination <strong>of</strong> easier monetary policy and the<br />
lessening <strong>of</strong> crisis in Europe will likely help the UK to avoid recession in 2012.<br />
Siddharth Ramalingam then provides his outlook for the Indian economy. He notes that<br />
the central bank is caught between a rock and a hard place. That is, the central bank must<br />
worry about uncomfortably high inflation as well as decelerating growth. In addition, a<br />
large fiscal deficit means that the government has few policy options to deal with a dete-
iorating situation. Siddharth concludes that an easing <strong>of</strong><br />
monetary policy will likely be the eventual outcome.<br />
My outlook for Japan begins by discussing problems<br />
related to Japan’s trade balance, fiscal policy, and currency.<br />
Given these issues, it would seem natural to expect<br />
economic weakness. Yet I conclude that things will likely<br />
get better in 2012 for several reasons: a more aggressive<br />
monetary policy, a weaker yen, higher inflation, and more<br />
government spending on reconstruction.<br />
In the outlook for Brazil, I note that although Brazil<br />
has experienced a deceleration, growth is expected to<br />
rebound later this year. A loosening <strong>of</strong> monetary policy<br />
and a boost to investment in infrastructure and energy<br />
should help to <strong>of</strong>fset the negative external headwinds. I<br />
also discuss Brazil’s complaints about the impact <strong>of</strong> U.S.<br />
and EU monetary policy on the Brazilian exchange rate<br />
as well as global concerns about Brazil’s protectionist<br />
policy initiatives.<br />
In my outlook on the Russian economy, I note that there<br />
are several conflicting factors influencing growth in Russia,<br />
and that the economy in 2012 is likely to grow more slowly<br />
than in 2011. I also discuss the uncertainty surrounding<br />
the future <strong>of</strong> Russian economic policy and how the choices<br />
made by policymakers will determine future growth.<br />
Next, Pralhad Burli <strong>of</strong>fers a view on the economy <strong>of</strong><br />
Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous nation and<br />
one that has lately attracted much attention for its strong<br />
growth and positive prospects. Pralhad discusses the<br />
resilience <strong>of</strong> this interesting economy and how, despite a<br />
variety <strong>of</strong> obstacles, it is likely to see strong growth in the<br />
coming years.<br />
Finally, Neha Jain and Satish Raghavendran look at global<br />
trade patterns. They note how, with rising wages and a<br />
rising currency in China, the world’s most populous nation<br />
may no longer be the “world’s factory.” Rather, global<br />
trade patterns are changing in interesting ways. Of most<br />
interest is the rising role <strong>of</strong> Africa and the Middle East in<br />
global trade.<br />
Dr. Ira Kalish<br />
Director <strong>of</strong> Global Economics<br />
<strong>Deloitte</strong> Research<br />
We are conducting a survey is to determine the level <strong>of</strong> reader satisfaction <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Deloitte</strong>’s Global Economic Outlook. The survey results will help us understand your<br />
needs and modify our product to better serve them. We ask that you provide your<br />
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Thank you for sharing your opinions.<br />
Global Economic Outlook<br />
published quarterly by<br />
<strong>Deloitte</strong> Research<br />
Editor-in-chief<br />
Ira Kalish<br />
Managing editor<br />
Ryan Alvanos<br />
Contributors<br />
Pralhad Burli<br />
Alexander Börsch<br />
Neha Jain<br />
Satish Raghavendran<br />
Siddharth Ramalingam<br />
Carl Steidtmann<br />
Ian Stewart<br />
Editorial address<br />
350 South Grand Street<br />
Los Angeles, CA 90013<br />
Tel: +1 213 688 4765<br />
ikalish@deloitte.com<br />
3
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
4<br />
Geographies<br />
Contents<br />
6 12 20 22<br />
6 Eurozone: Could this be the turning point?<br />
In recent months, four major decisions in Europe have improved the outlook, reduced the risk <strong>of</strong> catastrophe, and<br />
likely moderated the severity <strong>of</strong> the recession. After restructuring Greece’s sovereign debt, Europe will need to pursue<br />
structural reforms to stimulate growth.<br />
12 United States: Why the euphoria?<br />
Recent data that appears to herald economic improvement is anything but the stuff <strong>of</strong> sustainable recoveries.<br />
While modest growth may continue for some time, myriad geopolitical risks threaten to pull the United States into<br />
another downturn.<br />
20 China: S<strong>of</strong>t landing now, uncertainty later<br />
Recent policy decisions have been effective in partially <strong>of</strong>fsetting negative external headwinds faced by China’s export<br />
sector. The result is likely to be a s<strong>of</strong>t landing this year. However, China continues to face longer-term challenges.<br />
22 United Kingdom: The outlook brightens<br />
The UK economy is exceeding previous expectations, but its performance in 2012 is likely to be relatively poor. A<br />
combination <strong>of</strong> easier monetary policy and the lessening <strong>of</strong> crisis in Europe will likely help the UK to avoid recession<br />
in 2012.<br />
26 India: A delicate balance<br />
India’s central bank continues its efforts to strike a balance between growth and inflation. Its large fiscal deficit means<br />
that the government has fewer policy options to deal with a deteriorating economic situation.<br />
30 Japan: New risk factors<br />
Problems pertaining to trade balance, fiscal policy, and currency would suggest economic weakness in Japan, but the<br />
country’s economic performance is likely to improve in 2012 because <strong>of</strong> a more aggressive monetary policy, a weaker<br />
yen, higher inflation, and more government spending on reconstruction.
32 34 36 40<br />
32 Brazil: Worried about capital inflows<br />
Brazil experienced a deceleration, but growth is expected to rebound later this year. A loosening <strong>of</strong> monetary policy<br />
and a boost to investment in infrastructure and energy should help to <strong>of</strong>fset the negative external headwinds.<br />
34 Russia: Conflicting influences<br />
Several conflicting factors in Russia may result in slower growth in 2012. The country’s growth prospects will hinge on<br />
choices made by Russian policymakers.<br />
36 Indonesia: Unlocking potential<br />
Indonesia’s performance has been nothing short <strong>of</strong> stellar, and despite a variety <strong>of</strong> obstacles, there are plenty <strong>of</strong><br />
reasons to be excited about Indonesia’s prospects in the coming year.<br />
Special Topic<br />
40 Trade patterns <strong>of</strong> the future: Waking up and smelling the c<strong>of</strong>fee<br />
With rising wages and a rising currency in China, the world’s most populous nation may no longer be the “world’s<br />
factory.” Rather, global trade patterns are changing in interesting ways.<br />
44 Appendix<br />
Charts and tables: GDP growth rates, inflation rates, major currencies vs. the U.S. dollar, yield curves, composite<br />
median GDP forecasts, composite median currency forecasts, OECD composite leading indicators<br />
5
Dr. Alexander Börsch<br />
is Head <strong>of</strong> Research,<br />
<strong>Deloitte</strong> Germany<br />
EUROZONE<br />
6<br />
Eurozone: Could this be<br />
the turning point?<br />
by Dr. Alexander Börsch<br />
After a turbulent 2011, the first months <strong>of</strong> 2012 were<br />
comparatively promising for the Eurozone. The downward<br />
cycle <strong>of</strong> fragile financial markets, vulnerable banks, a<br />
slowing real economy, and weak sovereign debtors is<br />
subsiding. Optimists consider this a turning point in the<br />
Eurozone’s crisis, but it could prove to be little more than a<br />
lull in ongoing economic instability.<br />
Several recent developments are kindling cautious<br />
optimism. The risk <strong>of</strong> a chaotic default by Greece seems<br />
to have faded. Bond yields <strong>of</strong> countries in the Eurozone’s<br />
periphery fell substantially, while Italy and Spain — the two<br />
large countries that have experienced significant financial<br />
market pressures — are introducing substantial economic<br />
reforms. On top <strong>of</strong> that, early indicators suggest<br />
that the Euro area is experiencing only a mild<br />
recession. This rosier outlook <strong>of</strong> the Eurozone<br />
was supported by four decisions that<br />
helped reassure<br />
markets; most <strong>of</strong> these decisions are<br />
unprecedented in European economic history,<br />
illustrating just how desperate the crisis was.<br />
Decision 1. Injecting liquidity into the markets<br />
The European Central Bank (ECB) completed the second<br />
tranche <strong>of</strong> its longer-term refinancing operation in late<br />
February. Bank borrowing in the first and second tranches<br />
amounted to more than €1 trillion and has been set for<br />
an exceptionally long period (three years) at 1 percent<br />
against a wide array <strong>of</strong> collateral. More than 800 banks<br />
participated in the February tranche. This is, by far, the<br />
biggest injection <strong>of</strong> liquidity in the history <strong>of</strong> the ECB. It<br />
helped ease pressure on the Eurozone’s banking sector<br />
and sovereign debt markets as banks used part <strong>of</strong> the new<br />
liquidity to buy sovereign bonds. The yields on Spanish and<br />
Italian 10-year government bonds fell below 5 percent in<br />
March from around 7 percent in December. However, in
Figure 1. Use <strong>of</strong> ECB's deposit facility<br />
(EUR millions)<br />
900,000.00<br />
800,000.00<br />
700,000.00<br />
600,000.00<br />
500,000.00<br />
400,000.00<br />
300,000.00<br />
200,000.00<br />
100,000.00<br />
0.00<br />
Eurozone<br />
Deposit facility<br />
Geographies<br />
11/14/07 6/1/08 12/18/08 7/6/09 1/22/10 8/10/10 2/26/11 9/14/11 4/1/12<br />
Source: European Central Bank<br />
mid-March, yields started to rise again. In mid-April, Italian<br />
bond yields stood at 5.5 percent, and Spanish yields stood<br />
at 5.9 percent.<br />
While injecting massive amounts <strong>of</strong> additional liquidity<br />
was at least temporarily successful in reassuring markets<br />
and helping buttress asset prices, it is no panacea for the<br />
European crisis. First, it increases medium-term inflation<br />
risks. Second, the new liquidity has not<br />
succeeded in restoring the operability<br />
<strong>of</strong> European interbank markets. One key<br />
indicator for tension on interbank markets is the ECB’s<br />
deposit facility, which Eurozone banks use in normal times<br />
to park excess cash overnight at low interest rates. Banks<br />
dramatically increased their use <strong>of</strong> this facility during the<br />
recent crises. In mid-March, the volume stood at €750<br />
billion, almost 50 times more than a year ago (see figure<br />
1). The fact that banks prefer the safety <strong>of</strong> an ECB deposit<br />
over higher margins on the interbank market suggests<br />
that the uncertainties plaguing the European banking and<br />
financial systems are lingering.<br />
7
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
8<br />
In the short term, growth prospects for the<br />
Eurozone look better than many feared in the<br />
beginning <strong>of</strong> the year when a severe recession<br />
was widely expected.<br />
Decision 2. Signing the fiscal compact<br />
The treaty on stability, coordination, and governance<br />
— the fiscal compact — was signed by 25 <strong>of</strong> the 27 EU<br />
leaders as an intergovernmental agreement; the United<br />
Kingdom and the Czech Republic did not join. The key<br />
point <strong>of</strong> the treaty is a balanced budget rule, which<br />
mandates that annual structural budget deficits cannot<br />
exceed 0.5 percent <strong>of</strong> GDP. The rule must be incorporated<br />
into national law, preferably at the constitutional level. The<br />
EU Court <strong>of</strong> Justice will oversee the rule’s transposition and<br />
will have the power to impose severe sanctions. Promoted<br />
by Germany and other northern European governments,<br />
the rule is supposed to prevent unsustainable future<br />
government debt.<br />
The fiscal compact is intended to significantly constrain<br />
government spending in the future. Whether or not it will<br />
solidify public finances will depend on its implementation<br />
and therefore on politics at both the national and<br />
European levels.<br />
Decision 3. Restructuring Greek private debt<br />
Finally realizing that it has taken on more debt than it can<br />
realistically ever expect to pay back, Greece undertook the<br />
biggest sovereign-debt restructuring in history. It is the first<br />
time in six decades that a developed country has defaulted<br />
on its debt. Technically, private investors will receive new<br />
government bonds with long maturities, which amount<br />
to a loss <strong>of</strong> 53.5 percent. Some 86 percent <strong>of</strong> Greece’s<br />
private debtors agreed to participate in the €206 billion<br />
bond swap. Through the use <strong>of</strong> collective action clauses,<br />
the government will force reluctant investors who own<br />
bonds to participate in the swap under Greek law.<br />
The program decreases Greek debt by €100 billion. As a<br />
result, Greek debt — currently 164 percent <strong>of</strong> GDP — is<br />
supposed to stand at 120 percent <strong>of</strong> GDP by 2020. After<br />
the successful swap, the European Union agreed to a<br />
second bailout package, which amounts to €130 billion in<br />
credits until 2014.<br />
While the acceptance <strong>of</strong> the bond swap by private<br />
investors averted the threat <strong>of</strong> an uncontrolled default,<br />
two uncertainties remain. The first is whether the goal <strong>of</strong> a<br />
120 percent debt-to-GDP ratio can be achieved. Given that<br />
the Greek economy is shrinking far more than expected,<br />
this is questionable. The second is that 120 percent <strong>of</strong> GDP<br />
still amounts to an enormous mountain <strong>of</strong> debt, and there<br />
are many doubts that the Greek economy will be able kickstart<br />
itself again while laboring under this burden.<br />
Decision 4. Reforming Italy and Spain<br />
Meanwhile, Italy and Spain — two large Eurozone<br />
economies that were endangered last year — are introducing<br />
substantial economic reforms. The Italian technocratic<br />
government, headed by Mario Monti, redesigned<br />
Italy’s pension system, increased the retirement age, and is<br />
opening sheltered sectors. The government also plans to<br />
liberalize employment protection.<br />
Spain’s new conservative government is reforming its labor<br />
market by introducing greater flexibility in a system that<br />
is characterized by a two-tier structure. Older employees<br />
with unlimited contracts enjoy a high degree <strong>of</strong> protection,<br />
while younger employees tend to be on limited contracts.<br />
This is one <strong>of</strong> the key factors contributing to the huge<br />
social problem <strong>of</strong> the youth unemployment rate in Spain,<br />
which now stands at an unprecedented 51 percent.<br />
This fact raises the question <strong>of</strong> whether or not these<br />
austerity programs are sustainable in a political sense.<br />
The programs introduce short-term pain for large parts <strong>of</strong><br />
the population while promising gains mainly in the long<br />
term. This could lead to a circle <strong>of</strong> austerity fatigue in the<br />
population, lobby group pressure, and protests, which can<br />
become an explosive combination. Radical parties opposed<br />
to austerity and reform policies might become stronger<br />
in elections, along with an increasing appetite for change<br />
in government.<br />
Since the beginning <strong>of</strong> the Euro crisis, governments have<br />
changed with remarkable frequency. Examples include<br />
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. So far, changes<br />
in government have not worked against the reform<br />
programs. Nevertheless, the implementation <strong>of</strong> reform<br />
programs faces serious political risks.<br />
The short-term outlook is two-tiered<br />
In the short term, growth prospects for the Eurozone<br />
look better than many feared in the beginning <strong>of</strong> the year<br />
when a severe recession was widely expected. Looking<br />
back, the Eurozone as a whole achieved a growth rate <strong>of</strong>
Figure 2. Economic Sentiment Indicator<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
60<br />
40<br />
20<br />
1.4 percent in 2011. In the last quarter <strong>of</strong> 2011, it experienced<br />
a negative growth <strong>of</strong> 0.3 percent. The European<br />
Commission expects a negative growth rate <strong>of</strong> 0.3 percent<br />
for the Eurozone in 2012, with a recovery <strong>of</strong> growth in the<br />
second half <strong>of</strong> the year.<br />
Current expectations, measured by the Economic<br />
Sentiment Indicator (ESI), are moderately optimistic.<br />
Economic sentiment is still considerably below its<br />
long-term average <strong>of</strong> 100, but it is recovering nonetheless<br />
(see figure 2). The ESI rose for a second consecutive month<br />
in February to 94.5, before decreasing by a marginal 0.1<br />
points in March. Beneath the surface, however, developments<br />
point to deepening growth differentials in the<br />
Eurozone. While Germany’s ESI stands at 104, the expectations<br />
for troubled Eurozone economies are still grim.<br />
Spain’s ESI is 91, Italy’s is 89, and Greece’s is 76.<br />
Germany’s situation is mirrored in the results <strong>of</strong> <strong>Deloitte</strong><br />
Germany’s first CFO survey. German CFOs feel that macroeconomic<br />
and financial market uncertainty is unusually<br />
high. They are also highly doubtful about the current and<br />
Eurozone<br />
0<br />
Jan ’07 Jan ’08 Jan ’09 Jan ’10 Jan ’11 Jan ’12<br />
Source: European Commission<br />
future stability <strong>of</strong> the Eurozone as well as the effectiveness<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Eurozone’s political crisis management. However,<br />
they show moderate optimism when it comes to their own<br />
business outlooks.<br />
Growth differentials and two-tiered economic performance<br />
are dangerous because they reinforce the substantial<br />
difference in competitiveness between Eurozone nations.<br />
While the European Monetary Union was meant to lead<br />
to convergence in economic performance, the reverse has<br />
actually occurred, and economic performance and expectations<br />
continue to diverge. Neither growth patterns nor<br />
unit labor costs, one <strong>of</strong> the main indicators for competitiveness,<br />
have shown convergence in the Eurozone in the<br />
last decade (see figures 3 and 4).<br />
Greece: Too much debt, not enough growth<br />
Until a few years ago, Greece was one <strong>of</strong> the fastestgrowing<br />
European economies. From 2001 to 2007, its GDP<br />
grew on average by 4.1 percent per year. The Eurozone<br />
as a whole grew by 2 percent, and Germany grew by only<br />
1.4 percent. As it turned out, after the financial crisis, this<br />
Geographies<br />
Germany<br />
France<br />
Euro area<br />
Spain<br />
Italy<br />
Greece<br />
9
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
Figure 3. Unit labor cost index<br />
(2000 = 100)<br />
140<br />
135<br />
130<br />
125<br />
120<br />
115<br />
110<br />
105<br />
100<br />
Figure 4. Annual GDP growth<br />
(% change year on year)<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
-2<br />
-4<br />
-6<br />
-8<br />
10<br />
95<br />
90<br />
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010<br />
Source: OECD<br />
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
Source: Eurostat<br />
growth performance was overwhelmingly based on high<br />
consumer and government spending, which resulted in the<br />
current debt spiral.<br />
Greece currently exemplifies two <strong>of</strong> the Eurozone’s key<br />
problems, even if it is the by far the most extreme case:<br />
too much debt and not enough growth. For 2012, Greece<br />
faces the prospect <strong>of</strong> a fifth consecutive year <strong>of</strong> negative<br />
growth. Last year, the Greek economy shrank by almost<br />
7 percent.<br />
The debt restructuring and the second EU bailout package<br />
bought time for Greece and the Eurozone as a whole<br />
by averting the threat <strong>of</strong> a disorderly Greek default, at<br />
least in the short run. However, this is not a solution<br />
in itself. Without addressing its economy’s underlying<br />
Greece<br />
Italy<br />
Spain<br />
France<br />
Euro area<br />
Germany<br />
Germany<br />
France<br />
Euro area<br />
Spain<br />
Italy<br />
Greece<br />
problems and introducing structural growth policies,<br />
Greece will continue to have a bleak long-term outlook.<br />
Greece has a structurally weak economic base, which<br />
spills over to its creditworthiness on the financial markets.<br />
Investors need to be convinced that the Greek economy<br />
can generate resources to repay its debts in the future.<br />
Even achieving a debt-to-GDP ratio <strong>of</strong> 120 percent by<br />
2020 requires substantial growth and primary budget<br />
surpluses. Greece needs to tackle both components <strong>of</strong> its<br />
debt-to-GDP ratio.<br />
Restoring Greek competitiveness<br />
Any new Greek government entering <strong>of</strong>fice after the<br />
coming elections needs to tackle the economic structures<br />
hindering growth and competitiveness. After all, economic
competitiveness is based on productivity, and economic<br />
policy can contribute to growing productivity by fostering<br />
the business environment.<br />
Looking at the structures <strong>of</strong> the Greek economy and<br />
its business environment, two characteristics are<br />
particularly noteworthy:<br />
• Economic structure: The structure <strong>of</strong> the Greek<br />
economy is different from the average EU country. For<br />
example, the share <strong>of</strong> agriculture is high, and the share<br />
<strong>of</strong> manufacturing low. What manufacturing industry<br />
exists is biased toward the production <strong>of</strong> food and basic<br />
goods, such as wood processing or paper production<br />
for local markets. The average size <strong>of</strong> Greek enterprises<br />
is exceptionally small, which implies lower productivity.<br />
Tourism is the main pillar <strong>of</strong> Greece’s economic<br />
structure; it is slightly more important for the economy<br />
than manufacturing.<br />
• Economic openness: As a rule, smaller European<br />
countries tend to have a high export ratio. Greece is<br />
an exception. In fact, Greece has the lowest export<br />
ratio <strong>of</strong> all EU countries. Greece’s exports <strong>of</strong> services<br />
are focused on tourism and transportation, especially<br />
shipping, while comparative advantages in tradable<br />
goods are hard to detect. It even runs a trade deficit in<br />
food products. Manufacturing exports primarily consist<br />
<strong>of</strong> low-technology products.<br />
Greece’s economic structure and openness imply that<br />
Greek firms have little engagement in global competition,<br />
resulting in negative consequences for productivity. Key<br />
indicators on how conducive the Greek business environment<br />
is for growth and productivity are not encouraging.<br />
Regarding corruption, in Transparency International’s<br />
Corruption Perceptions Index, Greece ranked 80 out<br />
<strong>of</strong> 182 countries. In the World Bank’s Ease <strong>of</strong> Doing<br />
Business Ranking, which measures how business-friendly<br />
the economic environment is, Greece ranked 100. Its<br />
labor markets are highly regulated and so are its product<br />
markets. In fact, according to the OECD, it is among the<br />
most highly regulated product markets in the OECD world.<br />
Growth and structural reforms<br />
The status quo <strong>of</strong> the Greek economy implies that<br />
restoring competitiveness needs to include more than<br />
cost competitiveness. A new growth model needs to<br />
go beyond the important questions <strong>of</strong> prices, costs, and<br />
wages. It should consider Greece’s advantages as well<br />
as the areas it should develop. There is a strong need to<br />
substantially improve business conditions and modernize<br />
the Greek economy, thereby boosting productivity.<br />
Improving productivity is a long-term project that involves<br />
structural reform on many levels. Some policies — for<br />
Eurozone<br />
example, upgrading systems for education and innovation<br />
— are crucial, but these improvements will mainly bear<br />
fruit in the long term. Other structural reforms, like labor<br />
market reforms, may have substantial transition costs.<br />
However, some structural reforms have positive short- and<br />
long-term effects.<br />
Reforming product markets is one main example. It can<br />
improve the functioning <strong>of</strong> markets by removing barriers<br />
for services and entrepreneurship. Such reforms tend to<br />
be associated with boosting long-term productivity and<br />
labor utilization as well as with positive employment gains<br />
in the short run. This goes especially for labor-intensive<br />
sectors with pent-up demand such as retail, trade, and<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>essional services.<br />
Stimulating growth by removing entry barriers and<br />
product-market restrictions, especially in<br />
services, is not only relevant for<br />
Greece but for the European<br />
Union as a whole.<br />
The internal<br />
market<br />
has<br />
been<br />
a great<br />
success<br />
story over the<br />
last 20 years. A<br />
further deepening,<br />
especially in the area<br />
<strong>of</strong> services, promises<br />
substantial economic<br />
benefits. With short-term<br />
fiscal stimulus becoming<br />
extremely difficult under<br />
Europe’s current fiscal<br />
situation, growth needs<br />
to come from structural<br />
reforms. The future <strong>of</strong><br />
the Eurozone depends not<br />
solely on the financial markets<br />
but at least as much on the<br />
real economy and its future<br />
growth performance.<br />
Geographies<br />
References and<br />
Research Sources:<br />
European Commission, “Interim<br />
Forecast February,” Directorate<br />
General for Economic and<br />
Financial Affairs, 2012.<br />
Karl Brenke, “Greek Economy<br />
Needs Growth Strategy,” DIW<br />
Wochenbericht, German Institute<br />
for Economic Research, 2012.<br />
OECD, “Going for Growth,”<br />
2012.<br />
11
Dr. Carl Steidtmann is<br />
Chief Economist at<br />
<strong>Deloitte</strong> Research<br />
12<br />
USA<br />
United States: Why the<br />
euphoria?<br />
by Dr. Carl Steidtmann<br />
The stock market has forecasted nine <strong>of</strong> the past<br />
five recessions.<br />
— Paul Samuelson<br />
The opposite is equally true; the stock market has also<br />
forecasted nine <strong>of</strong> the past five recoveries. The S&P 500<br />
hit its all-time high in March 2000 at 1,527. The economy<br />
fell into a recession a year later. Growth since then has<br />
been less than spectacular, and total employment is no<br />
higher today than it was in 1999. The index managed to<br />
briefly break above its old high in mid-October 2007, only<br />
to slip into a deep recession that started in December. At<br />
its current level, the S&P 500 is still below its old highs set<br />
4 ½ and 12 years ago. The tech-heavy NASDAQ’s performance<br />
has been even worse.<br />
The stock market has been partying like it’s 1999. We have<br />
seen an impressive rally since the lows <strong>of</strong> October 2011.<br />
But then we saw an impressive rally in the previous year,<br />
which was followed by less-than-impressive GDP growth in<br />
the United States and contracting growth in no less than<br />
22 countries around the world in the fourth quarter <strong>of</strong><br />
2011, including Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom<br />
— respectively the third-, fourth-, and sixth-largest<br />
economies in the world. So, why the euphoria?
USA<br />
Geographies<br />
13
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
Figure 1. Growth in central-bank balance sheets from January 2007<br />
to February 2012<br />
(Percentage change)<br />
10-year<br />
Treasury yield<br />
5.5<br />
5.0<br />
4.5<br />
4.0<br />
3.5<br />
3.0<br />
2.5<br />
2.0<br />
1.5<br />
600 700 800 900 1,000 1,100 1,200 1,300 1,400 1,500<br />
S&P 500 daily closing price<br />
14<br />
250%<br />
200%<br />
150%<br />
100%<br />
50%<br />
2007 - present Last 12 months<br />
0%<br />
ECB U.K China Japan U.S. Swiss<br />
Source: European Central Bank, Bank <strong>of</strong> England, People’s Bank <strong>of</strong> China, Bank <strong>of</strong> Japan, U.S.<br />
Federal Reserve, and Swiss National Bank<br />
Figure 2. The S&P 500 and 10-year Treasury yield<br />
Daily data<br />
2007-Sept 2011<br />
Linear (2007-Sept 2011)<br />
Oct 2011 - March 2012<br />
Linear (Oct 2011 - March 2012)<br />
Source: European Central Bank, Bank <strong>of</strong> England, People’s Bank <strong>of</strong> China, Bank <strong>of</strong> Japan, U.S.<br />
Federal Reserve, and Swiss National Bank<br />
Central banks are pumping liquidity<br />
Quantitative easing (QE) is not just for the U.S. Federal<br />
Reserve. Around the world, we have seen unprecedented<br />
efforts by all <strong>of</strong> the major central banks to buy assets,<br />
expand their balance sheets, flood the banking system<br />
with liquidity, depress interest rates, and give a boost to<br />
asset prices (see figure 1).<br />
In the past six months, the biggest contributor to global<br />
liquidity unquestionably has been the European Central<br />
Bank (ECB), whose two-tranche €1.02 trillion Long-Term<br />
Refinance Operation (LTRO) program has expanded its<br />
balance sheet by 50 percent and taken fears <strong>of</strong> potential<br />
European bank failures due to a lack <strong>of</strong> liquidity out <strong>of</strong><br />
the markets.<br />
Since mid-December, the actions <strong>of</strong> the ECB have sent<br />
equity prices up and the interest rates on sovereign bonds<br />
down. They also had a positive impact on commodity<br />
prices, with copper and oil prices up 20 percent while<br />
wheat, soybeans, and corn have risen more than 10<br />
percent. It was the rise in commodity prices in spring 2011<br />
that contributed to the Arab Spring protests throughout<br />
the Middle East and did so much to undermine real growth<br />
in the rest <strong>of</strong> the world in the summer and fall <strong>of</strong> 2011.<br />
While the ECB has been re-liquefying the European<br />
banking sector, the U.S. Federal Reserve has been engaged<br />
in Operation Twist, a very successful effort to drive down<br />
long-term interest rates by shifting Fed bond purchases<br />
from the short end <strong>of</strong> the Treasury curve to the long end.<br />
The effects <strong>of</strong> that policy, which went into effect last fall,<br />
can be seen in figure 2.<br />
Interest rates and stock markets tend to move in the same<br />
direction. A rising stock market is generally accompanied<br />
by rising rates as money flows from bonds into stocks.<br />
That has not been the case over the past six months.<br />
As the stock market has risen, longer-term interest rates<br />
have fallen. Rates on the U.S. Treasury’s 10-year note are<br />
roughly 200 basis points below the level based on their<br />
historical relationship. While some might see this as the<br />
best <strong>of</strong> all possible worlds, the Fed’s efforts to keep interest<br />
rates depressed have unintended consequences.
Figure 3. Average price <strong>of</strong> regular gasoline — all formulations adjusted for dollar weakness and inflation<br />
($ per gallon)<br />
4.50<br />
4.00<br />
3.50<br />
3.00<br />
2.50<br />
2.00<br />
1.50<br />
1.00<br />
0.50<br />
$0.00<br />
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011<br />
Source: Energy Information Administration, St. Louis Federal Reserve<br />
QE works by raising equity prices, lowering interest rates,<br />
and reducing the value <strong>of</strong> a country’s currency. Higher<br />
equity prices create a wealth effect, inducing consumers<br />
to spend more and businesses to increase investment.<br />
Lower interest rates reduce the cost <strong>of</strong> borrowing, encouraging<br />
consumers to purchase big-ticket items like cars and<br />
houses and businesses to take more risk. Finally, a lower<br />
exchange rate gives a boost to exports while encouraging<br />
consumers and businesses to buy domestic as opposed to<br />
more expensive imported products.<br />
Unintended consequences<br />
The problem with QE is that it has unintended consequences<br />
that <strong>of</strong>fset its intended positive effects. A falling<br />
dollar does more than just give a boost to exports. It also<br />
gives a boost to the price <strong>of</strong> globally traded commodities<br />
— in this case, oil. Oil prices rose sharply in spring<br />
2011, following QE2 in the United States. They are rising<br />
again following Operation Twist and the ECB’s LTRO. In the<br />
United States, gasoline prices are pushing $4 a gallon (see<br />
figure 3). In Europe, where energy taxes are much higher,<br />
gasoline prices are approaching $10 a gallon.<br />
Oil prices — when adjusted for changes in the consumer<br />
price index and the declining value <strong>of</strong> the dollar — started<br />
rising only three months ago, and they increased only<br />
modestly in the last decade.<br />
USA<br />
Second, while low interest rates are great for both<br />
consumer and business borrowers, they represent a significant<br />
challenge for savers and pension funds. Businesses<br />
with defined benefit pension funds have to put more<br />
funds aside to fund these benefits when interest rates<br />
are low. Likewise, savers and retirees receive significantly<br />
less income from interest payments when interest rates<br />
fall. Interest income in the United States has fallen $447<br />
billion or 31.5 percent since its peak in August 2008,<br />
just before the first round <strong>of</strong> QE. Risk-averse retirees are<br />
being forced to take on more risk in order to fund their<br />
own retirements.<br />
The most worrisome aspect <strong>of</strong> QE is that it enables businesses,<br />
consumers, and governments to take on more debt<br />
and risk when the problem that the economy is trying to<br />
come to grips with is an excess <strong>of</strong> debt. Low interest rates<br />
Geographies<br />
Price <strong>of</strong> gasoline<br />
Price adjusted for<br />
dollar weakness<br />
Price adjusted for dollar<br />
weakness and inflation<br />
15
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
16<br />
If debt cannot be reduced through the process<br />
<strong>of</strong> deleveraging, the only other alternative is a<br />
reduction <strong>of</strong> the debt burden through inflation.<br />
encourage leverage and put <strong>of</strong>f the adjustment process<br />
<strong>of</strong> deleveraging, distorting the economy and making the<br />
eventual day <strong>of</strong> reckoning all the more severe.<br />
Debt declined slightly during 2008 and 2009 (see figure<br />
4). The decline was due largely to the sizable reduction in<br />
mortgage debt that has come about through the foreclosure<br />
process. Banks have also been forced to reduce<br />
debt through a tightening <strong>of</strong> the regulatory process.<br />
Nonfinancial businesses have seen their debt grow<br />
modestly, and government debt growth has risen sharply.<br />
Over the past year, total debt has increased by $781<br />
billion. Nominal GDP grew by just $566 billion. Debt is still<br />
being accumulated faster than GDP is growing.<br />
Figure 4. U.S. total debt<br />
(In trillions <strong>of</strong> dollars)<br />
55.0<br />
50.0<br />
45.0<br />
$40.0<br />
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011<br />
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve<br />
If debt cannot be reduced through the process <strong>of</strong> deleveraging,<br />
the only other alternative is a reduction <strong>of</strong><br />
the debt burden through inflation. The rise <strong>of</strong> debt over<br />
the past year greatly increases the future risk <strong>of</strong> much<br />
higher inflation.<br />
Curb your enthusiasm: Just the facts<br />
The disconnect between equity markets and the real<br />
economy can be seen in myriad different statistics. Here<br />
are the most troubling <strong>of</strong> them:<br />
1. Globally, real GDP growth contracted in no less than<br />
22 countries in Q4 2011, including Japan, Germany, Italy,<br />
Spain, the United Kingdom, Thailand, Singapore, Taiwan,<br />
Indonesia, and Portugal. Purchasing managers’ indices<br />
throughout Europe in the first quarter <strong>of</strong> 2012 show the<br />
decline continuing and deepening.<br />
2. In the United States, employment growth is mainly<br />
in lower-paying jobs and temporary employment. The<br />
economy still has 5.3 million fewer jobs than when the<br />
recession started in December 2007.<br />
3. The primary target <strong>of</strong> quantitative easing in the United<br />
States was housing. It was hoped that lower mortgage<br />
rates would stimulate borrowing. In mid-March, the<br />
Mortgage Bankers Association’s index for new mortgage<br />
applications had declined eight weeks in a row.<br />
4. Despite unseasonably warm weather across the United<br />
States in February, which should have boosted housing<br />
activity, new home sales fell 1.6 percent, existing home<br />
sales fell 0.8 percent, pending sales <strong>of</strong> existing homes<br />
fell 0.5 percent, and housing starts fell 1.1 percent. It is<br />
difficult for the economy in the United States to recover<br />
without a recovery in housing. A robust housing market<br />
gives a lift to new home construction, real estate, financial<br />
services, and retail.<br />
5. In addition to a decline in home sales, home prices<br />
are also falling. Despite multiple predictions that housing<br />
has finally started to recover, home prices continue to fall.<br />
The most recent Case-Shiller Home Price Index was down<br />
3.8 percent from a year ago and remains at its lowest level<br />
since the peak in home prices in March 2007.<br />
6. Business investment in information technology<br />
has been weak. New orders for computers and related
Figure 5. Equally weighted coincidental indicator<br />
(Percentage change — year-over-year)<br />
10<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
-2<br />
-4<br />
-6<br />
USA<br />
Geographies<br />
-8<br />
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010<br />
Source: Bureau <strong>of</strong> Economic Analysis, Department <strong>of</strong> Labor, Bureau <strong>of</strong> Census and Federal Reserve<br />
equipment were down three <strong>of</strong> the past four months from<br />
October to February, for a total decline <strong>of</strong> 14.9 percent.<br />
Shipments fell just 12.8 percent as the backlog <strong>of</strong> unfilled<br />
orders contracted.<br />
7. U.S. energy consumption is declining sharply. Gasoline<br />
supplied to retail outlets is down 6.7 percent from a year<br />
ago in March. Oil consumption is down 4.5 percent. These<br />
are the largest year-over-year declines in more than 20<br />
years, exceeding the declines that occurred during the<br />
2007–2009 recession.<br />
8. Shipping is showing multiple signs <strong>of</strong> distress. Trucking<br />
and rail indexes are both declining. The American Trucking<br />
Association’s truck tonnage index was down 4.1 percent<br />
in February from its reading in December. North American<br />
railcar loadings for the month <strong>of</strong> February were down 2.9<br />
percent compared to January and down 1.9 percent from a<br />
year ago. The Baltic Dry Index, a measure <strong>of</strong> global shipping<br />
rates, collapsed from October to February, dropping from<br />
2,173 to 647 before rebounding in recent weeks to a stilldepressed<br />
908. As recently as June 2010, the index was<br />
above 3,800.<br />
9. Income from interest payments is again declining.<br />
Operation Twist, which was designed to depress long-term<br />
interest rates in hopes <strong>of</strong> stimulating housing, has had an<br />
ill effect on interest income. While housing continues to<br />
flounder, interest income has been declining. After a very<br />
brief recovery in 2011, in January, interest income was<br />
down 2.8 percent from a year ago.<br />
10. Federal tax revenues are slumping. Over the past three<br />
months ending in February, revenues are up just 0.6 percent<br />
from a year ago when revenues were depressed by the<br />
initiation <strong>of</strong> the temporary Social Security tax cut, which<br />
was extended through this year.<br />
11. Real income excluding government welfare payments<br />
is still down 3.9 percent from its 2008 peak. Government<br />
transfer payments now account for 19.5 percent <strong>of</strong> all<br />
household income. Real disposable income was up just<br />
0.5 percent in January. Real disposable income including<br />
transfers is up just 0.5 percent from a year ago.<br />
Where we are: Coincidental indicators<br />
Since the end <strong>of</strong> World War II, there have been 14 cases<br />
where real GDP growth from the previous year fell below<br />
2 percent. In 11 <strong>of</strong> those cases, a recession followed. You<br />
can build a coincidental indicator <strong>of</strong> the economy using<br />
real disposable income, employment industrial production,<br />
and real consumer spending, and you get largely the<br />
same picture.<br />
Over the past 50 years, when this coincidental indicator fell<br />
below 2 percent for more than two consecutive months, a<br />
recession followed (see figure 5). The indicator has correctly<br />
anticipated all eight post-1960 recessions, including the<br />
17
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
18<br />
recessions <strong>of</strong> 1960, 1969, 1973, 1979, 1981, 1990, 2000,<br />
and 2007. In 1986, the indicator fell below 2 percent for<br />
three nonconsecutive months as the collapse in oil prices<br />
took its toll on the oil-producing regions <strong>of</strong> the country.<br />
In December 1995, the sharp fall in real income sent<br />
the indicator just below 2 percent. In December 1994,<br />
Micros<strong>of</strong>t issued a massive one-time dividend that sent<br />
incomes up in 1994 and down on a percentage basis<br />
in 1995.<br />
The recent performance <strong>of</strong> the indicator has not been<br />
encouraging. Three <strong>of</strong> the four components <strong>of</strong> the<br />
indicator (income, spending, and production) are decelerating.<br />
The indicator has been below 2 percent for eight<br />
<strong>of</strong> the past nine months. There has never been a previous<br />
time when the indicator has performed in such a manner<br />
and a recession has not followed.<br />
Conclusions and observations: It’s the dismal<br />
science, after all<br />
It was Thomas Carlyle who labeled economics the dismal<br />
science after reading Reverend Thomas Malthus. The<br />
business cycle remains alive and well. The current cycle has<br />
grown long in the tooth despite its young age. The U.S.<br />
economy has struggled over the past nine months, despite<br />
a soaring equity market. Growth has been given a boost<br />
by inventory building, tax incentives that shifted activity<br />
from late 2011 to early 2012, and unseasonably warm<br />
weather. These are not the foundations upon which to<br />
build a recovery.<br />
Central banks around the world have been engaged in<br />
aggressive quantitative easing for more than three years<br />
now. There are limits to QE that are determined by its own<br />
set <strong>of</strong> unintended consequences. QE distorts market prices.<br />
The most obvious <strong>of</strong> these is the price <strong>of</strong> oil. Last spring,<br />
rising oil prices <strong>of</strong>fset the positive effects <strong>of</strong> the Fed’s<br />
QE2 and left the economy with weak growth and rising<br />
inflation. This spring, we once again have a rising stock<br />
market and hopes <strong>of</strong> a stronger economy, this time as a<br />
result <strong>of</strong> the European Central Bank’s first round <strong>of</strong> QE,<br />
only to run into the same problem <strong>of</strong> rising energy prices.<br />
The U.S. economy very well may be able to muddle along<br />
for another year or two with subpar growth and rising<br />
inflation. The risk, however, is from one <strong>of</strong> the many<br />
fat-tail geopolitical risks, including a reemergence <strong>of</strong> the<br />
European debt crisis, a harder-than-expected economic<br />
landing in China, or a disruption <strong>of</strong> oil from Iran or<br />
elsewhere. With inflation rising and so little margin for<br />
error, there seems little reason for euphoria in the equity<br />
markets or elsewhere.
Energy prices and consumer behavior<br />
Wars are fought over it. Business cycles rise and fall around it. Political<br />
elections are won or lost because <strong>of</strong> it. There are few prices in the<br />
world that have a bigger impact on individuals, businesses, and even<br />
governments than the price <strong>of</strong> oil. After falling steadily since the spring<br />
<strong>of</strong> 2011, the price <strong>of</strong> oil reversed course in late December and has risen<br />
sharply. The increase has been all the more surprising given the unseasonably<br />
mild winter much <strong>of</strong> the United States is experiencing. Warm<br />
winter weather traditionally puts downward pressure on energy prices<br />
because demand for heating falls as the temperatures rise.<br />
The spot price <strong>of</strong> West Texas Crude rose from $93 a barrel to $110<br />
between mid-December and early March. Prices for Brent Crude in<br />
Europe went from $102 a barrel to $126 over the same period <strong>of</strong> time.<br />
Rising oil prices have taken the price <strong>of</strong> gasoline at the pump higher by<br />
more than 50 cents a gallon in the United States.<br />
Oil consumption began declining in April 2011 when oil prices peaked<br />
and has accelerated over the past year even as prices declined in the<br />
latter half <strong>of</strong> 2011. As <strong>of</strong> March 2012, oil consumption was down 4.5<br />
percent from a year ago (see figure 6). Drops <strong>of</strong> this magnitude usually<br />
have been associated with recessions. The decline in oil consumption<br />
could be due to a number <strong>of</strong> factors. Energy productivity traditionally<br />
rises in the face <strong>of</strong> rising prices and continues to rise for several years<br />
following a price spike. Warmer winter temperatures are also holding<br />
down consumption <strong>of</strong> heating oil, contributing to some <strong>of</strong> the decline.<br />
The biggest decline, however, has come in gasoline.<br />
Gasoline is both economically and politically important. It is a<br />
commodity that most households purchase on a regular basis. It<br />
directly affects consumer confidence and approval <strong>of</strong> current political<br />
leadership even though that political leadership generally has very little<br />
to do with the actual price. It can also have a signficant impact on<br />
consumer behavior.<br />
Every penny increase in the price <strong>of</strong> gasoline costs U.S. consumers an<br />
extra $3.8 million a day. An increase <strong>of</strong> 50 cents a gallon translates to<br />
$190 million a day, $5.7 billion a month, and $68.4 billion a year. In<br />
January, household income, after adjustment for taxes and inflation,<br />
was up just $60 billion from a year ago. Higher prices for gasoline are<br />
showing up in two places: lower gasoline consumption and fewer<br />
miles driven.<br />
Gasoline consumption is down 6.7 percent from a year ago on a threemonth<br />
moving average basis, an even greater drop than the demand<br />
for oil (see figure 7). The drop is even more surprising given the severity<br />
<strong>of</strong> last winter when compared to this year’s mild weather. Milder<br />
weather should have prompted more driving.<br />
The drop in gasoline consumption represents a combination <strong>of</strong><br />
improved energy efficiency coupled with a significant decline in driving.<br />
Total miles driven on a 12-month moving average basis fell 1.2 percent<br />
in 2011 from a year ago (see figure 8).<br />
Over the past 40 years, there have only been three periods <strong>of</strong> time<br />
when the number <strong>of</strong> miles driven declined. All three were associated<br />
USA<br />
Geographies<br />
with deep recessions and sharply higher gasoline prices. While high<br />
gasoline prices limit driving, there are several others at work as well.<br />
Internet shopping continues to climb, taking share away from store<br />
purchases and reducing the number <strong>of</strong> shopping trips. Telecommuting<br />
has become a much more common practice and probably accounts for<br />
some <strong>of</strong> the decline as well.<br />
Rising energy prices have been a major factor in six <strong>of</strong> the past seven<br />
recessions since the first major oil price spike back in 1973–1974.<br />
Improved energy productivity, higher gas mileage, and greater use <strong>of</strong><br />
the Internet for both shopping and work has reduced but not eliminated<br />
the exposure <strong>of</strong> the U.S. economy to current and future rises in<br />
the price <strong>of</strong> oil. As was the case in the spring <strong>of</strong> 2011, the United States<br />
and the global economy are once more at risk from rising energy prices.<br />
Figure 6. U.S. petroleum products supplied<br />
Three-month moving average, year-on-year change through March 2012<br />
15<br />
12<br />
9<br />
6<br />
3<br />
0<br />
-3<br />
-6<br />
-9<br />
-12<br />
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010<br />
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration<br />
Figure 7. Gasoline supplies delivered<br />
13-week moving average, year-on-year change through March 2012<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
-2<br />
-4<br />
-6<br />
-8<br />
1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011<br />
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration<br />
Figure 8. Total miles driven<br />
12-month moving average, year-on-year change through December 2011<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
-2<br />
-4<br />
1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011<br />
Source: U.S. Department <strong>of</strong> Transportation<br />
19
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
ChINA<br />
20<br />
China: S<strong>of</strong>t landing now,<br />
uncertainty later<br />
by Dr. Ira Kalish<br />
The Chinese economy grew 9.2 percent in 2011, and it is<br />
widely expected to grow significantly slower in 2012. The<br />
questions is how much slower. The Chinese government<br />
recently revised its own forecast for 2012 growth from<br />
8 percent to 7.5 percent. Such growth would be widely<br />
seen as a “s<strong>of</strong>t landing.” It is the result <strong>of</strong> slower growth<br />
overseas having a negative impact on export growth.<br />
On the other hand, the central bank has eased monetary<br />
policy in order to boost domestic demand to <strong>of</strong>fset the<br />
decline in exports.<br />
The details<br />
As <strong>of</strong> now, the economy is gradually moving in a negative<br />
direction. In the first two months <strong>of</strong> 2012, there was a<br />
decline in exports and a decline in the flow <strong>of</strong> foreign<br />
direct investment into China. As <strong>of</strong> March, there have<br />
been four consecutive months <strong>of</strong> declining manufacturing<br />
activity, according to a survey <strong>of</strong> purchasing managers<br />
conducted by the private sector. Investment in both<br />
residential and commercial property has tailed <strong>of</strong>f, and<br />
government spending on infrastructure has slowed down.<br />
In addition, Chinese demand for commodities has decelerated,<br />
boding poorly for industrial output.<br />
All <strong>of</strong> this was due largely to the slowing <strong>of</strong> economic<br />
activity outside <strong>of</strong> China, principally in Europe. In response<br />
to this slowing, China’s central bank has twice lowered<br />
the required reserve ratio for commercial banks with the<br />
intention <strong>of</strong> boosting liquidity and credit market activity.<br />
Still, the combined drop in the reserve ratio <strong>of</strong> 100 basis<br />
points does not come close to <strong>of</strong>fsetting the 600 basis<br />
point increase that took place over the past two years.<br />
That tightening <strong>of</strong> monetary policy had taken place in<br />
order to fight inflation, a fight that has largely been a<br />
success. That is why the central bank is now comfortable<br />
engaging in a gradual easing <strong>of</strong> monetary policy. More<br />
is expected.<br />
The success <strong>of</strong> the easing <strong>of</strong> monetary policy is evident<br />
by the gradual nature <strong>of</strong> the slowdown — <strong>of</strong>ten called<br />
a “s<strong>of</strong>t landing.” Indeed, the Conference Board’s index<br />
<strong>of</strong> leading economic indicators for China actually rose in<br />
January, suggesting that prospects in the months ahead<br />
are fairly good.<br />
In addition, government policymakers have signaled a<br />
willingness to take new action to <strong>of</strong>fset the negative<br />
headwinds facing China. For example, the government is<br />
trying to boost first-time home ownership by providing<br />
first-time buyers with incentives in the form <strong>of</strong> low interest<br />
rates and small down payments. This is at a time when the<br />
government continues its efforts to puncture the housing<br />
bubble and discourage speculative activity in the housing<br />
market. The government has also targeted the rural sector<br />
for an easing <strong>of</strong> credit market conditions.<br />
In addition, recent government actions have been<br />
designed to boost consumer purchasing power as well<br />
as alleviate income inequality. In Beijing, Shenzhen, and<br />
Shanghai, the minimum wage has substantially increased.<br />
In the last week <strong>of</strong> February, the minimum wage in<br />
Shanghai rose 13 percent. This follows an average 22<br />
percent increase in the minimum wage in 2011 in 24<br />
major cities. The idea is to boost consumer spending,<br />
enable factory workers to improve their standard <strong>of</strong><br />
living, reduce income inequality, and reduce the risk <strong>of</strong><br />
social unrest.
Longer term<br />
Recovery overseas will eventually lead to a revival <strong>of</strong> strong<br />
growth in China. Or will it? The problem is that, although<br />
China seems destined to avoid a “hard landing” for now,<br />
there are reasons to worry about this further down the<br />
road. The ability <strong>of</strong> China to maintain growth in the wake<br />
<strong>of</strong> the crisis in 2008–2009 was due to massive government<br />
support for investment. This investment now represents<br />
48 percent <strong>of</strong> GDP, widely viewed as unsustainable as<br />
has been discussed on these pages in the past. That is<br />
why there has been much discussion lately about reform<br />
in China.<br />
The government recently cooperated with the World Bank<br />
in producing a report titled China 2030, which <strong>of</strong>fers ideas<br />
on how China can sustain growth going forward. The<br />
report says that China’s current economic model is not<br />
sustainable and must be changed. It calls for more privatization<br />
<strong>of</strong> state-run enterprises, more reliance on market<br />
forces, the end <strong>of</strong> restrictions on internal migration, a<br />
boost to the social safety net in order to encourage more<br />
consumer spending, more transparent capital markets in<br />
order to funnel capital to the most pr<strong>of</strong>itable investments,<br />
and better fiscal controls for local governments that are<br />
currently laden with debt.<br />
It is not likely that these or other reforms will be enacted<br />
this year. That is because 2012 is a year <strong>of</strong> transition to<br />
new leaders. The outgoing Premier, Wen Jiabao, has<br />
spoken out about the urgent need for reforms. Incoming<br />
Premier Li Keqiang said that China must “deepen reforms<br />
on taxes, the financial sector, prices, income distribution,<br />
and seek breakthroughs in key areas to let market<br />
forces play a bigger role in resource allocation.” Yet, there<br />
China<br />
has been nothing more specific than this. Consequently,<br />
there is some uncertainty as to nature and timing <strong>of</strong><br />
future reforms. Failure to reform could allow imbalances<br />
to fester, leading to a crisis in the future. Reforms, on the<br />
other hand, could be disruptive and might challenge the<br />
interests <strong>of</strong> those that benefit from the current system.<br />
As such, China has no easy path. Meanwhile, the leadership<br />
debates the proper role <strong>of</strong> government, the growing<br />
problem <strong>of</strong> income inequality, and the degree to which<br />
changes in the political system are needed to ensure<br />
economic reform. Stay tuned.<br />
Kicking the can down the road<br />
In a year when political power will be transferred, the<br />
government is evidently keen to avoid major disruption<br />
to the economy. As such, it is likely that the government<br />
will utilize fiscal tools to boost economic activity if the<br />
economy faces even greater headwinds from abroad. In<br />
addition, the government has shown a desire to avoid, or<br />
at least postpone, the turmoil that might come from the<br />
unwinding <strong>of</strong> imbalances. Specifically, as discussed in this<br />
publication recently, local governments have accumulated<br />
about $1.7 trillion in debts that many analysts deem unsustainable.<br />
Moreover, a loss <strong>of</strong> revenue from weak land sales<br />
has exacerbated the problem <strong>of</strong> servicing this debt. Many<br />
analysts had recently been concerned about the possibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> an imminent crisis if banks were forced to write down<br />
these debts. Instead, the government has instructed banks<br />
to roll over the local government debt, thereby postponing<br />
the day <strong>of</strong> reckoning. Thus, there will probably not be a<br />
crisis any time soon.<br />
Geographies<br />
21
Ian Stewart is Chief<br />
Economist at <strong>Deloitte</strong><br />
Research in the United<br />
Kingdom<br />
22<br />
UK<br />
United Kingdom: The outlook<br />
brightens<br />
by Ian Stewart<br />
Our last article about the United Kingdom, which was<br />
written in late-December during a time <strong>of</strong> pessimism<br />
about the outlook for the euro and for European growth,<br />
concluded, “What will be the signal to turn more bullish<br />
on UK growth and risk assets? For us, it is a marked easing<br />
Figure 1. <strong>Deloitte</strong> financial stress index<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
<strong>of</strong> financial and sovereign stress in the Euro area.” Three<br />
months <strong>of</strong> financial and sovereign stress has, indeed,<br />
eased significantly (see figure 1), and with it, the outlook<br />
for the UK has brightened.<br />
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
The <strong>Deloitte</strong> Financial Stress Index is an arithmetic average <strong>of</strong> the ratio <strong>of</strong> the three-month LIBOR to base rates, the ratio <strong>of</strong> yield<br />
on high yield bonds to yield on government bonds, the VIX index, the ratio <strong>of</strong> total market return to banking stocks return and<br />
the ratio <strong>of</strong> yield on long-term government bonds to yield on short-term bonds.
UK<br />
Geographies<br />
23
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
Figure 2. Financial prospects<br />
Net % <strong>of</strong> CFOs who are more optimistic about financial prospects for their company now than<br />
three months ago<br />
More optimistic<br />
70%<br />
24<br />
50%<br />
30%<br />
10%<br />
-10%<br />
-30%<br />
-50%<br />
-70%<br />
Less optimistic<br />
Figure 3. Consensus GDP growth forecasts for 2012<br />
3.5%<br />
3.0%<br />
2.5%<br />
2.0%<br />
1.5%<br />
1.0%<br />
0.5%<br />
0<br />
-0.5%<br />
-1.0%<br />
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012<br />
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1<br />
Source: <strong>Deloitte</strong> CFO Survey<br />
Mar-11 Jun-11 Sep-11 Dec-11 Mar-12<br />
Source: Consensus forecasts from The Economist<br />
US<br />
Japan<br />
Britain<br />
Euro area<br />
Changes in the outlook are <strong>of</strong>ten seen first in survey<br />
data, and a number <strong>of</strong> surveys point to a bounce in<br />
business confidence. The first quarter <strong>Deloitte</strong> UK CFO<br />
Survey shows that confidence among Chief Financial<br />
Officers about their own firms’ finances has risen at the<br />
fastest rate since 2007, taking it close to levels last seen<br />
in late 2010 (see figure 2). The worries about the risk<br />
<strong>of</strong> recession and a breakup <strong>of</strong> the single currency that<br />
dominated the air waves and newspapers at the end <strong>of</strong><br />
last year have eased. On average, CFOs now assign a 30<br />
percent probability to the UK economy seeing a double<br />
dip recession, down from 54 percent in December. In the<br />
Euro area, the extensive provision <strong>of</strong> liquidity to banks by<br />
the European Central Bank and a further debt bailout for<br />
Greece has reduced fears <strong>of</strong> an early breaking <strong>of</strong> the single<br />
currency. Last December, UK CFOs, on average, saw a 37<br />
percent probability <strong>of</strong> one or more members <strong>of</strong> the single<br />
currency leaving the euro in 2012, and this clearly weighed<br />
on business confidence. By March, this probability <strong>of</strong><br />
secession fell to 26 percent.<br />
Easier policy has also helped confidence and boosted<br />
financial risk appetite. The United States, UK, Japan and<br />
Switzerland have been busy pushing money into the<br />
system through quantitative easing. Stronger financial<br />
conditions, reflected in rising global equity markets, seem<br />
to be benefiting larger UK companies, with CFOs reporting<br />
an increase in credit availability in the first quarter. This<br />
more than unwinds the deterioration in credit availability<br />
seen in December, which at the time, some feared could<br />
be the start <strong>of</strong> a second credit crunch. And, as a very open<br />
economy, the UK has also benefitted from the growing<br />
mood <strong>of</strong> optimism about the U.S. economy over the last<br />
few months.<br />
It would be a premature to suggest that the UK economy<br />
is out <strong>of</strong> the woods. UK GDP growth in the first half <strong>of</strong><br />
2012 is likely to be anemic at best. While the Bank <strong>of</strong><br />
England thinks the UK should be able to avoid a recession,<br />
the OECD reckons the UK entered a technical recession<br />
in late 2011. And, <strong>of</strong> course, the future remains unpredictable.<br />
The deterioration in UK and European growth<br />
prospects in the second half <strong>of</strong> 2011 (see figure 3) derailed<br />
what, in early 2011, seemed like a solid recovery. That<br />
episode underscored how macroeconomic risks can<br />
escalate. Those risks may have receded, but they have
hardly been eliminated. From the high oil price to the<br />
recent focus on Spain’s debt problems, the risks to the<br />
recovery are changeable and numerous.<br />
In the background is the worry that rates <strong>of</strong> UK GDP<br />
growth could remain anemic for years to come. On<br />
average, economists expect UK growth over the next few<br />
years to run at significantly lower levels than were seen in<br />
the years before the recession. Current near-record levels<br />
<strong>of</strong> UK corporate cash may well be a manifestation <strong>of</strong><br />
caution on the part <strong>of</strong> corporates — and insurance against<br />
a volatile, slower-growth world in which the availability <strong>of</strong><br />
capital can shift quickly.<br />
Yet, it is the corporate sector’s hiring, exports, and<br />
capital spending that are widely expected to drive the<br />
UK recovery. A rebound in corporate sector activity may<br />
be later in arriving than previously thought (see figure<br />
4). In the last six months, the UK’s <strong>of</strong>ficial, independent<br />
forecaster, the Office <strong>of</strong> Budget Responsibility, has cut its<br />
forecast for capital spending in 2012 from 7.7 percent to<br />
just 0.7 percent.<br />
Figure 4. UK private and public sector job growth (thousands)<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
0<br />
-100<br />
-200<br />
-300<br />
Source: ONS<br />
2007<br />
Q1<br />
Q2 Q3 Q4<br />
2008<br />
Q1<br />
With the UK in its third year <strong>of</strong> a seven-year program<br />
<strong>of</strong> fiscal austerity, government spending will make no<br />
contribution to the recovery. Households face a multi-year<br />
deleveraging and rising unemployment, but, after a double<br />
dip recession for the consumer last year, things are looking<br />
up. Falling inflation should support real incomes. UK<br />
consumers’ days <strong>of</strong> free spending are over, but household<br />
spending should make some modest contribution to GDP<br />
growth in 2012.<br />
Overall, 2012 is likely to be a year <strong>of</strong> erratic, sluggish UK<br />
growth, which is likely to come in at well under 1.0 percent<br />
for the year as a whole. Hopes for a more robust recovery<br />
now reside toward the end <strong>of</strong> the year and in 2013.<br />
Whether that recovery materializes depends as much on<br />
financial and economic conditions outside the UK — and<br />
especially in the Euro area — as it does on the actions <strong>of</strong><br />
UK policymakers.<br />
Private sector job growth<br />
Public sector job growth<br />
Q2 Q3 Q4<br />
2009<br />
Q1<br />
Q2 Q3 Q4<br />
2010<br />
Q1<br />
UK<br />
Geographies<br />
Q2 Q3 Q4<br />
2011<br />
Q1<br />
Q2<br />
25
Siddharth Ramalingam is<br />
an Assistant Manager at<br />
<strong>Deloitte</strong> Research, India<br />
INDIA<br />
26<br />
India: A delicate balance<br />
by Siddharth Ramalingam<br />
Growth is slowing down, investment is falling, and<br />
business sentiment is on the decline. The recent Union<br />
Budget and policy announcements by the central bank<br />
have not mollified fears <strong>of</strong> possible economic slowdown.<br />
All quarters <strong>of</strong> the economy are hoping for more — in<br />
terms <strong>of</strong> measures to ensure long-term inflation stabilization,<br />
reduction <strong>of</strong> the fiscal deficit, and a drop in<br />
interest rates.<br />
All is not well in the workhouse<br />
For the last several months, the Indian economy has<br />
been torn between controlling inflation and maintaining<br />
robust economic growth. In order to control skyrocketing<br />
inflation, the Reserve Bank <strong>of</strong> India chose to sacrifice<br />
growth in order to rein in inflation. The 20-month period,<br />
until October 2011, <strong>of</strong> rising interest rates has slowly but<br />
surely put the brakes on economic growth. Industry is<br />
increasingly worried about the high cost <strong>of</strong> capital, and the<br />
manufacturing sector is showing signs <strong>of</strong> stagnation.<br />
GDP growth in the third quarter <strong>of</strong> the current fiscal year<br />
came in at a woeful 6.1 percent, marking a sharp drop<br />
from 7.7 percent growth in the first quarter, and 6.9<br />
percent in the second quarter. Manufacturing growth<br />
slipped to 0.4 percent from 7.2 percent and 2.7 percent<br />
in the first and second quarters respectively. The seventh<br />
successive quarterly slowdown and the slowest growth in<br />
three years have triggered fears that the economy slowed<br />
down further in the last quarter <strong>of</strong> the current fiscal<br />
(January–March 2012) and that overall growth for the<br />
fiscal year could fall short <strong>of</strong> the downwardly revised target<br />
<strong>of</strong> about 7.0 percent. Furthermore, despite the finance<br />
minister’s exhortation that the economy will grow at about<br />
8.0 percent in the next fiscal, it is possible that growth will<br />
stagnate at a “new normal” <strong>of</strong> about 6.0 percent unless<br />
significant efforts are made toward improving credit conditions<br />
and resurrecting investments in the coming months.
India<br />
Geographies<br />
27
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
28<br />
Growth data from India’s eight core infrastructure sectors,<br />
although showing improvement in February after a disappointing<br />
January, provide no cause for cheer. The core<br />
sectors expanded 6.8 percent in February, compared<br />
to January’s growth <strong>of</strong> just 0.5 percent. Growth in the<br />
factory sector slowed down for the third month in a row<br />
in March as new orders continue to fall and raw material<br />
prices headed north. The HSBC manufacturing Purchasing<br />
Managers’ Index fell to 54.7 in March from 56.6 in<br />
February and 57.5 in January.<br />
India’s exports grew 4.2 percent in February, the slowest<br />
pace <strong>of</strong> growth in three months. Imports, on the other<br />
hand, grew 20.6 percent, translating into a trade deficit <strong>of</strong><br />
$15 billion. The commerce secretary recently expressed his<br />
concern over the burgeoning trade deficit as weak demand<br />
from Western markets and global political developments<br />
are likely to exert a drag on exports in 2012.<br />
Inflation: The artful dodger<br />
Although inflation dropped to a 26-month low in January,<br />
it seems unlikely that it will stabilize at the current level,<br />
casting doubts on whether the central bank can really<br />
afford to reduce interest rates at this time. Headline<br />
inflation accelerated in February after five months to about<br />
7 percent. Core inflation, or inflation minus the effects <strong>of</strong><br />
food and fuel prices, fell to 5.8 percent in February. While<br />
this does mean that demand-driven inflation is falling, it<br />
could also imply that demand for manufactured goods<br />
is actually on the decline, adding credence to fears that<br />
the manufacturing sector is heading toward stagnation.<br />
Conversely, the fall in core inflation also implies a rise in<br />
food and fuel prices. After hitting near-zero inflation in<br />
January, food prices rose about 6 percent in February.<br />
Recent announcements by meteorologists predict a<br />
below-average rainfall this year, and absent any removal<br />
<strong>of</strong> supply-side bottlenecks in the agriculture sector, food<br />
inflation could spiral upward in 2012, taking overall<br />
inflation well above the government’s target level <strong>of</strong> about<br />
7.0 percent for the rest <strong>of</strong> the year.<br />
The fiscal deficit continues to be a cause for concern.<br />
Notwithstanding last financial year’s fiscal deficit <strong>of</strong> 5.9<br />
percent <strong>of</strong> GDP instead <strong>of</strong> the planned level <strong>of</strong> 4.6 percent,<br />
the government has set a “realistic” target <strong>of</strong> 5.1 percent<br />
for the current fiscal in the recently unveiled budget. Not<br />
only may the target be unsustainably high, the credibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> the target for the current fiscal year has already been<br />
called into question by market commentators. A large<br />
fiscal deficit surely does not bode well for inflation.<br />
Policy fears<br />
The government stressed that reining in fiscal, revenue,<br />
and current account deficits while controlling inflation<br />
were the main aims <strong>of</strong> the recently unveiled budget. The<br />
proposed debt-to-GDP ratio is 45.5 percent, down from
At a time when the government can ill afford<br />
deterioration in its current account deficit,<br />
recent policy proposals seem, at the very least,<br />
badly timed.<br />
last year’s 50.1 percent. The finance minister also proposed<br />
to reduce outlay on subsidies to below 2 percent <strong>of</strong> GDP<br />
from the current level <strong>of</strong> 2.5 percent. However, skeptics<br />
believe that the targets and measures proposed are neither<br />
spectacular nor attainable. It has been argued that the<br />
government has neither the political desire nor support<br />
to reduce subsidies on food, fuel, and fertilizers, apart<br />
from pushing through important policy reforms that are<br />
important for fostering growth. Furthermore, the Goods<br />
and Service Tax, the much-vaunted plan for fiscal consolidation,<br />
is pending the resolution <strong>of</strong> key issues regarding<br />
the division <strong>of</strong> revenues between the center and the states.<br />
In the run up to the budget, foreign investors had looked<br />
to the government for policies that would aid investment<br />
in India. However, post budget, there is increasing worry<br />
that recent government stances on foreign investment<br />
may not be tolerated by foreign investors. The government<br />
introduced a proposal that will allow tax authorities to<br />
crack down on companies that may have structured deals<br />
to avoid taxes. Firms, Indian and foreign, that have routed<br />
their investment in India through Mauritius are potentially<br />
under scrutiny. Another proposal to tax cross-border deals<br />
involving the transfer <strong>of</strong> Indian assets, with retrospective<br />
effect stretching back until 1962, is worrying current and<br />
potential investors. At a time when the government can<br />
ill afford deterioration in its current account deficit, recent<br />
policy proposals seem, at the very least, badly timed.<br />
India<br />
Few policy options<br />
Inflation, the barb that had threatened to derail India’s<br />
growth for several months, had been on the decline over<br />
the last several weeks. Inflation dropped to a 26-month<br />
low <strong>of</strong> 6.5 percent in January after remaining above 9.0<br />
percent for much <strong>of</strong> 2011. However, inflation is on the rise<br />
again, and it is likely to stay in the 7.0–9.0 percent range<br />
in the coming months. The central bank cannot afford<br />
to conclude that the inflation will stabilize in the medium<br />
term. In fact, the central bank has announced that it<br />
would be “premature” for it to start reducing interest<br />
rates without seeing any abatement <strong>of</strong> inflationary threats<br />
exerted by the high fiscal deficit and global energy prices.<br />
Thus far in 2012, the central bank has already eased the<br />
reserve requirements for banks, infusing liquidity into the<br />
economy. It is likely that further liquidity could be infused<br />
into the economy in the coming months. Measures to<br />
ease liquidity may, however, not be enough to provide<br />
a much-needed fillip to the economy. Growth is slowing<br />
down, investment is falling, and business sentiment is<br />
on the decline. Absent any credible government action,<br />
the central bank may not be able to stave <strong>of</strong>f calls for<br />
reducing the interest rate for too long. In the final analysis,<br />
questions about whether or not the interest rate will be<br />
reduced are giving way to when and how dramatically it<br />
will be cut.<br />
Geographies<br />
29
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
JAPAN<br />
30<br />
Japan: New risk<br />
factors<br />
by Dr. Ira Kalish<br />
Worrying about trade and debt<br />
For some time, pundits have bemoaned the fact that<br />
Japan’s sovereign debt is roughly 200 percent <strong>of</strong> GDP,<br />
which is widely viewed as an unsustainable number that<br />
puts Japan at risk <strong>of</strong> a financial crisis. However, other<br />
observers remain unalarmed because Japan runs a current<br />
account surplus. In other words, Japan saves so much<br />
that the savings exceeds the funds needed to service<br />
government debt and fund domestic investment. There is<br />
still money left over to lend to or invest in the rest <strong>of</strong> the<br />
world. Thus, Japan’s massive government debt should not<br />
be viewed as a problem because <strong>of</strong> its formidable savings.<br />
Yet, that is only true as long as Japan runs a current<br />
account surplus.<br />
That assumption is now being brought into question. In<br />
January, Japan ran a trade deficit. The current account<br />
balance is the trade balance plus net interest payments.<br />
Those interest payments are so large that Japan still had<br />
a current account surplus in January. Yet, the fact that<br />
Japan ran a trade deficit raised eyebrows. If continued, it<br />
could ultimately lead to a current account deficit. If that<br />
were to happen, servicing the large sovereign debt could<br />
be problematic. If markets perceived that to be so, they<br />
could push up the yield on Japanese government bonds,<br />
further exacerbating the problem <strong>of</strong> bringing the debt to a<br />
sustainable level.<br />
Why did Japan run a trade deficit? The main reason is that,<br />
following the earthquake, most <strong>of</strong> Japan’s nuclear power<br />
plants were idled. Thus, Japan had to import massive<br />
quantities <strong>of</strong> oil and natural gas in order to generate<br />
electricity, so the import bill rose. At the same time, a high<br />
valued yen conspired with weak demand in Europe to<br />
cause exports to falter. Moreover, rising oil prices could<br />
worsen the situation. The good news is that there was a<br />
trade surplus in February. Still, the stage is not yet set for a<br />
sustained improvement in the trade balance.<br />
Aggressive monetary policy<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the problems for exporters has been the high<br />
valued yen. However, in recent months, the yen has<br />
declined somewhat, thereby boosting the competitiveness<br />
<strong>of</strong> exports. This shift was mainly due to a change in<br />
monetary policy. The Bank <strong>of</strong> Japan (BoJ) has implemented<br />
two rounds <strong>of</strong> asset purchases (<strong>of</strong>ten known as quantitative<br />
easing), the second <strong>of</strong> which was announced in<br />
February and involved 10 trillion yen ($130 billion). The<br />
effect <strong>of</strong> this was to boost liquidity, boost expectations <strong>of</strong><br />
inflation, and put downward pressure on the yen. Indeed,<br />
the yen fell from roughly 77 yen per dollar to 83 yen<br />
per dollar.<br />
Now there is talk <strong>of</strong> another round <strong>of</strong> asset purchases.<br />
There are two reasons for this. First, inflation remains close<br />
to zero even though the BoJ set an explicit inflation target<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1.0 percent. While the program <strong>of</strong> asset purchases<br />
ended deflation and created a bit <strong>of</strong> inflation, it may not<br />
be sufficient. Second, there is concern that the yen could<br />
bounce back as long as the Japanese currency is seen as a<br />
safe asset in a world <strong>of</strong> risk. Further financial market stress<br />
in Europe or a stumbling <strong>of</strong> the U.S. economy could cause<br />
the yen to shoot up.<br />
Fiscal issues<br />
Meanwhile, the Japanese government is determined<br />
to put Japan on a sustainable fiscal path. Japan faces<br />
several problems. First, the debt is already very large<br />
and higher bond yields would make the situation worse.<br />
Second, Japan’s economy has grown very slowly, thereby<br />
generating modest revenue gains. Third, deflation meant<br />
that incomes were declining or stagnant at best, thus<br />
suppressing government revenue. Finally, the aging population<br />
means that future spending on pensions and health<br />
is likely to increase substantially. Many observers worry<br />
that, without a plan to create fiscal probity, Japan could<br />
face a serious crisis in the not-too-distant future.
The solution, according to Prime Minister Noda, rests<br />
in raising the sales tax from the current 5 percent to 10<br />
percent by 2015. This plan has become hugely unpopular,<br />
and it is not clear that it will pass the Parliament. If it<br />
doesn’t pass, confidence could be undermined, leading to<br />
higher bond yields. If it does pass, however, the effect on<br />
growth could be negative. Thus, Japan is caught between<br />
a rock and a hard place. Moreover, failure to pass Noda’s<br />
legislation would be indicative <strong>of</strong> a larger problem <strong>of</strong><br />
political gridlock. This means that passage <strong>of</strong> other reformoriented<br />
legislation would be less likely.<br />
Growth outlook<br />
Given the fiscal, trade, and energy situations, one could<br />
be forgiven for expecting poor economic performance.<br />
However, the reality is likely to be somewhat different —<br />
at least in the short run. There are a number <strong>of</strong> factors<br />
that should boost growth in the coming year. That would<br />
be welcome, given that Japan’s economy shrank by 0.9<br />
percent in 2011. Moreover, GDP declined in the fourth<br />
quarter at an annual rate <strong>of</strong> 2.3 percent. That was largely<br />
due to a decline in inventories and a drop in exports.<br />
The latter was due to the temporary effect on Japanese<br />
supply chains emanating from the floods in Thailand. The<br />
Japan<br />
good news is that the factors hurting growth in the fourth<br />
quarter were temporary.<br />
In 2012, growth should resume for several reasons. First,<br />
Japan’s government is expected to continue to spend<br />
massively on reconstruction, thereby boosting domestic<br />
demand. Second, the Thai floods are over, and supply<br />
chains have resumed. Third, the aggressive monetary<br />
policy has suppressed the yen, which should help export<br />
competitiveness. Fourth, the aggressive monetary policy<br />
has also boosted expectations <strong>of</strong> inflation, which have<br />
the effect <strong>of</strong> cutting real interest rates. This should help<br />
boost credit demand. Fifth, higher inflation could stimulate<br />
consumers to spend more. Sixth, following the depletion<br />
<strong>of</strong> inventories in the fourth quarter, businesses are likely<br />
to engage in inventory rebuilding in early 2012. Finally,<br />
the rest <strong>of</strong> the world is not doing as badly as previously<br />
expected. This should help to stabilize exports.<br />
Thus, a reasonable expectation for 2012 is that the<br />
Japanese economy will grow between 1.0 and 2.0 percent,<br />
inflation will be positive, and the yen will not resume<br />
its appreciation.<br />
Geographies<br />
31
BRAZIL<br />
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
32<br />
Brazil: Worried about<br />
capital inflows<br />
by Dr. Ira Kalish<br />
At a meeting <strong>of</strong> the BRICS countries in India in late March,<br />
the Brazilian delegation sought a statement criticizing<br />
the monetary policies <strong>of</strong> Europe and the United Sates.<br />
The statement never happened, but the fact that Brazil<br />
sought such a statement indicates what is top-<strong>of</strong>-mind<br />
for Brazilian policymakers. The low interest rate policies <strong>of</strong><br />
Europe and the United States have led investors to look<br />
elsewhere for higher returns. Naturally, Brazil has become<br />
a favored destination for funds in search <strong>of</strong> return. After<br />
all, Brazil currently has among the highest interest rates in<br />
a stable country. The inflow <strong>of</strong> funds threatens to increase<br />
the value <strong>of</strong> the currency enough to seriously damage<br />
export competitiveness.<br />
In addition, the Brazilian government says the country<br />
is awash with cheap imports. As such, Brazil intends to<br />
complain to the WTO that the 35 percent tariff ceiling that<br />
it authorized is too low. This could alarm China, which is<br />
Brazil’s largest trading partner. It could also alarm other<br />
members <strong>of</strong> the WTO that are concerned about Brazil’s<br />
potential tilt toward protectionist policies.<br />
One solution, <strong>of</strong> course, is for Brazil to cut interest rates,<br />
and indeed, this has been happening. The problem is that<br />
Brazil’s inflation is lingering above the central bank’s target<br />
<strong>of</strong> 4.5 percent. Cutting interest rates too quickly, while<br />
beneficial to the currency, could lead to higher inflation.<br />
Moreover, higher inflation would lead to higher labor<br />
costs, thereby damaging the competitiveness <strong>of</strong> exports<br />
even more. On the other hand, failure to sufficiently cut<br />
rates could result in an increase in the value <strong>of</strong> its currency.<br />
This would be troublesome, given that exports are already<br />
faltering due to the economic slowdown in Europe. So, like<br />
many other countries, Brazil is in a difficult position.<br />
Interestingly, Brazilian policymakers complain about the<br />
inflow <strong>of</strong> capital, even as Brazil needs an inflow <strong>of</strong> capital.<br />
Since Brazil is running a current account deficit, meaning<br />
that the country is a net borrower, capital inflows are<br />
needed to finance the deficit. Otherwise, Brazil would have<br />
to borrow from abroad. Of course, the best kind <strong>of</strong> capital<br />
inflow would be foreign direct investment (FDI) rather<br />
than the portfolio flows now entering the country. That is<br />
because FDI is more stable and less vulnerable to the mood<br />
swings <strong>of</strong> global investors. When investors get spooked,<br />
they can withdraw their cash more easily than a factory.<br />
The current situation and the outlook<br />
After four 50 basis point interest rate cuts in the last four<br />
months, the Brazilian central bank surprised markets by<br />
cutting the benchmark rate by 75 basis points in March<br />
and another 75 in April. The benchmark rate stood at<br />
9.0 percent as <strong>of</strong> the end <strong>of</strong> April. This follows news that<br />
Brazilian industrial production fell in January at its steepest<br />
pace in three years. Not only is the central bank trying to<br />
boost economic activity, it is also trying to reduce upward<br />
pressure on the currency, which has risen 5 percent<br />
this year.<br />
In the coming year, it is likely that interest rates will<br />
continue to be cut further in order to stimulate a relatively<br />
dormant economy. This expectation is based on the statements<br />
<strong>of</strong> Brazil’s central bankers. Brazil may err on the<br />
side <strong>of</strong> stronger growth rather than containing inflation.<br />
However, it is not likely that Brazil will allow inflation to get<br />
out <strong>of</strong> hand.<br />
Economic growth, which was strong in 2010, decelerated<br />
considerably in 2011. Indeed, Brazil’s economy stalled<br />
in the third quarter <strong>of</strong> 2011, a far cry from the rapid<br />
growth <strong>of</strong> 7.5 percent experienced in 2010. All sectors <strong>of</strong><br />
the economy were down except for exports. Consumer<br />
spending, which accounts for 60 percent <strong>of</strong> GDP, declined.<br />
This may represent the end <strong>of</strong> the debt-fueled consumerspending<br />
boom. Business investment also dropped. Exports
grew, but at a slower rate than in the previous quarter.<br />
Agricultural output increased at a good pace, but industrial<br />
output was down. Clearly, the end <strong>of</strong> growth was not only<br />
due to the Eurozone crisis. Rather, the lagged effects <strong>of</strong><br />
tight monetary policy, which subsequently reversed, may<br />
have had an impact.<br />
The government, keen to boost growth, will probably<br />
increase fiscal spending in the coming year, financed by<br />
borrowing. In addition, the government is expected to<br />
continue its auction <strong>of</strong> assets to stimulate private sector<br />
investment in infrastructure. It has already auctioned the<br />
right to operate several airports. The intended result is<br />
for investment spending to contribute to growth, the<br />
auctions to contribute to public finances, and the actual<br />
investments to boost longer-term growth prospects by<br />
improving productivity. Moreover, infrastructure investments<br />
will be critical to the preparation for the 2016<br />
Olympics in Rio.<br />
Brazil<br />
Another major area <strong>of</strong> investment is energy. Brazil sits<br />
astride massive ocean-based reserves <strong>of</strong> oil. Petrobras, the<br />
state-run energy company, intends to double production<br />
by the end <strong>of</strong> the decade. To do this, it may engage in<br />
more capital spending over the coming decade than any<br />
other company in the world.<br />
The bottom line is that growth in 2012 may gradually<br />
recover, assuming that outside events don’t conspire to<br />
throw a monkey wrench in Brazil’s plans. Such events<br />
could include a deeper Eurozone recession, a steeper<br />
increase in the global price <strong>of</strong> oil, or a global financial crisis<br />
that could lead to capital flight.<br />
Geographies<br />
33
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
RUSSIA<br />
34<br />
Russia: Conflicting influences<br />
by Dr. Ira Kalish<br />
Russia’s economy is performing reasonably well, but<br />
it faces some obstacles going forward. In 2011, the<br />
economy grew 4.3 percent. This included consumer<br />
spending growth <strong>of</strong> 6.4 percent and investment growth<br />
<strong>of</strong> 6.0 percent. However, growth is likely to be somewhat<br />
slower in 2012, given global headwinds. Slower growth<br />
in Europe and China will have a negative impact on the<br />
volume <strong>of</strong> exports. About two-thirds <strong>of</strong> Russia’s exports<br />
are energy related, and energy demand may decline in<br />
these markets. In China, for example, which is Russia’s<br />
largest single export market, demand for energy is<br />
expected to dampen considerably. On the other hand,<br />
there has been a significant increase in the global price <strong>of</strong><br />
oil lately, largely the result <strong>of</strong> political risk. This will boost<br />
Russian export revenues and contribute to continued<br />
trade surpluses.<br />
Influences on growth<br />
There are other factors that will influence growth in<br />
2012. First, credit market conditions in Russia have<br />
been good. Credit for consumers and construction has<br />
grown rapidly, fueling a boom in consumer spending and<br />
construction activity. Moreover, stabilization <strong>of</strong> European<br />
financial markets — the result <strong>of</strong> massive ECB lending<br />
to commercial banks — bodes well for Russia. Although<br />
Russia runs a current account surplus, making it a net<br />
creditor nation, it has a deficit in net interest payments.<br />
Consequently, Russian access to global credit markets<br />
is important. With Europe evidently stabilizing, Russian<br />
credit market conditions are likely to remain relatively<br />
good.<br />
Second, wages have been rising faster than inflation.<br />
This increase in real wages has also contributed to<br />
rising consumer spending. It is largely due to a sudden<br />
and unexpected decline in the rate <strong>of</strong> inflation. Lately,<br />
prices are up only 4.3 percent over a year ago. This<br />
low inflation, in turn, is partly due to the government’s<br />
decision to postpone increases in a tax on energy, which<br />
was originally scheduled to be implemented in January<br />
<strong>of</strong> this year, but instead was postponed to July. Thus,<br />
inflation was temporarily suppressed. In addition, a<br />
rising value <strong>of</strong> the currency recently had a disinflationary<br />
impact. On the other hand, there is concern in the<br />
market that inflation is likely to rise in the coming year.<br />
Unless nominal wages keep up, consumer purchasing<br />
power might be negatively influenced. In addition, rising<br />
inflation is likely to constrain the central bank in its ability<br />
to operate an easy monetary policy. Thus, interest rates<br />
might not come down any further. The expected rise in<br />
inflation is due to the imminent rise in energy taxes, the<br />
impact <strong>of</strong> rising oil prices, and the lagged impact <strong>of</strong> an<br />
easy monetary policy.<br />
Third, fiscal policy has lately been expansionary in<br />
anticipation <strong>of</strong> the recent presidential election, thus<br />
contributing to economic growth. It was made possible<br />
by higher-than-expected oil prices, which have boosted<br />
government revenues. The result, interestingly, has been<br />
a budget surplus when the government had originally<br />
anticipated a deficit in the year that just ended. In the<br />
coming year, government expenditures are likely to<br />
continue growing in areas such as defense, public sector<br />
compensation and pensions, infrastructure, and social<br />
spending. Again, this is feasible given the relatively high<br />
price <strong>of</strong> oil. On the other hand, it is estimated that if<br />
elevated spending is maintained, Russia will require an<br />
oil price <strong>of</strong> about $120 per barrel in order to balance<br />
the budget. As recently as 2007, an oil price <strong>of</strong> $55 was<br />
sufficient to balance the budget. The risk for Russia is
that if the price <strong>of</strong> oil were to decline, then fiscal probity<br />
would be thrown into question. The government would<br />
then face a choice <strong>of</strong> fiscal contraction, which would have<br />
a negative impact on GDP growth, or continued borrowing<br />
and spending. Given that the currently high price <strong>of</strong> oil is<br />
largely related to a political risk premium, the possibility <strong>of</strong><br />
a drop in the price cannot be dismissed.<br />
Fourth, capital flight remains a problem and reflects<br />
a dearth <strong>of</strong> confidence in Russia’s immediate future.<br />
Capital flight diminishes business investment from what it<br />
otherwise would be. Interestingly, capital flight is taking<br />
place at the same time that foreign direct investment is<br />
increasing. The latter reflects increased investment in the<br />
energy sector, especially as the government has lately<br />
taken a more open attitude toward foreign involvement in<br />
energy development. Despite capital flight, the currency<br />
recently rose in value, reflecting the rise in oil prices.<br />
Longer term issues<br />
Vladimir Putin was recently elected president for the third<br />
time, replacing outgoing President Medvedev. He will now<br />
serve a six-year term. His margin <strong>of</strong> victory was substantial<br />
and, therefore, sufficient to quash skepticism. Although<br />
Russia<br />
we know who will lead Russia, the policy regime remains<br />
somewhat murky. It is not known whether Mr. Putin will<br />
move toward market orientation or support a more statist<br />
set <strong>of</strong> policies.<br />
Notably, Mr. Putin has cited China and South Korea as<br />
examples <strong>of</strong> favorable growth environments. China, in<br />
particular, has relied heavily on state direction <strong>of</strong> the<br />
economy, while South Korea relied on state protection <strong>of</strong><br />
favored industries in the early stages <strong>of</strong> its industrial development.<br />
As such, Putin’s comments suggest a good deal<br />
<strong>of</strong> government involvement in economic management.<br />
On the other hand, Russia is set to join the World Trade<br />
Organization (WTO) this year. Membership will require<br />
more openness on trade-related issues.<br />
The most pressing challenge that Mr. Putin will face in the<br />
coming years is the level <strong>of</strong> investment as a share <strong>of</strong> GDP.<br />
Currently, it is inadequate for generating strong growth.<br />
Moreover, the level <strong>of</strong> investment in the energy industry,<br />
while rising, remains insufficient to substantially boost<br />
production. Boosting investment, in part by generating<br />
more foreign direct investment, will be critical.<br />
Geographies<br />
35
Pralhad Burli is a<br />
Senior Analyst at<br />
<strong>Deloitte</strong> Research, India<br />
36<br />
INDONESIA<br />
Indonesia: Unlocking potential<br />
by Pralhad Burli<br />
While several European economies are reeling under the<br />
shadow <strong>of</strong> a worsening debt crisis, Indonesia’s performance<br />
has been nothing short <strong>of</strong> stellar. In 2011, the<br />
economy grew at its fastest pace in over 15 years. Robust<br />
economic growth backed by fiscal prudence prompted<br />
rating agencies to raise Indonesia’s sovereign credit rating.<br />
Moreover, Indonesia’s economy has shown remarkable<br />
resilience following the currency crisis <strong>of</strong> the late 1990s,<br />
and it is currently better positioned to handle external<br />
shocks. As a result, economists, finance specialists, and<br />
international investors have plenty <strong>of</strong> reasons to be excited<br />
about Indonesia’s prospects.<br />
A macroeconomic mixed bag<br />
With nearly 240 million people, Indonesia is the fourth<br />
most populous country in the world. Furthermore, more<br />
than half the population is under the age <strong>of</strong> 30. At over<br />
$3,300, Indonesia’s per capita income is over twice as high<br />
as India’s. While there is a huge disparity in income levels,<br />
the gap is expected to narrow. In addition, Indonesia<br />
is likely to experience a significant shift in its consumer<br />
market as a large portion <strong>of</strong> its population enters the<br />
middle class. As a result, Indonesia is a very important<br />
consumer market, and domestic consumption remains an<br />
economic mainstay. International retailers, as a result, can<br />
make a strong case for entering or expanding operations<br />
in Indonesia over the next few years.<br />
If the government’s plan to roll back fuel subsidies takes<br />
effect, private consumption growth will likely shrink in<br />
2012. Given the subsidy cut, consumption may not attain<br />
its pre-crisis growth rate anytime soon. On the other hand,<br />
a delay in implementing the fuel subsidy cut will boost<br />
disposable income and consumption in the near term.<br />
Meanwhile, Indonesia’s reliance on exports is much lower<br />
than its regional peers. However, surging commodity<br />
prices turned Indonesian exports into a significant driver<br />
<strong>of</strong> economic growth, and resource-hungry nations such<br />
as India and China provide ready markets for Indonesian<br />
commodities. Moreover, Indonesia’s strategic location has<br />
led to strong trade relations with additional countries in<br />
Asia and Oceania.<br />
Exports supported economic growth during a period<br />
<strong>of</strong> subdued domestic demand, but ongoing reliance on<br />
export-led growth could make its economy vulnerable<br />
to external shocks. A weak recovery in the United States<br />
and the potential exacerbation <strong>of</strong> the Eurozone crisis pose<br />
significant downside risks. Furthermore, an economic<br />
slowdown in China coupled with cooling commodity prices<br />
could result in substantially shrinking export revenues.
A step in the right direction<br />
Indonesia’s parliament passed the land acquisition bill<br />
in December 2011, and it now awaits the president’s<br />
approval. The land acquisition bill, if approved and implemented<br />
expeditiously, has the potential to spur additional<br />
economic growth. The bill will likely reduce bottlenecks<br />
in land acquisition for infrastructure projects by streamlining<br />
the mechanism for compensating land owners,<br />
significantly reducing bureaucratic interference. The bill<br />
is expected to allow the government to fast-track infra-<br />
Indonesia<br />
structure development and also attract private sector<br />
participation. These developments are favorable as the<br />
lack <strong>of</strong> adequate infrastructure is <strong>of</strong>ten touted as the most<br />
important impediment to Indonesian growth.<br />
However, as <strong>of</strong> now, Indonesia’s prospects are comparatively<br />
positive. The recent sovereign rating upgrade could<br />
spur foreign investors and lead to a surge in foreign<br />
inflows in 2012. As Indonesia embarks on an ambitious<br />
plan to boost spending in infrastructure development,<br />
Geographies<br />
37
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
38<br />
foreign capital can play a critical role in bridging the<br />
investment gap. Furthermore, the government’s push to<br />
develop value-added industries, if successful, could benefit<br />
the economy over the medium and long term. Indonesia’s<br />
economic fundamentals are robust. Policies that leverage<br />
Indonesia’s strengths can potentially catapult the economy<br />
to achieve GDP growth rates beyond 7 percent.<br />
Smaller is better<br />
As the developed world struggles with huge deficits and<br />
debt, Indonesia’s strength lies in its low debt pr<strong>of</strong>ile and<br />
small budget deficit, which was a mere 1.1 percent <strong>of</strong> GDP<br />
in 2011. The government’s expenditure on subsidies was<br />
higher than anticipated, but strong revenues combined<br />
with lower spending on capital projects and social initiatives<br />
<strong>of</strong>fset these additional costs. Given robust GDP<br />
growth, tax revenues will likely remain strong in 2012.<br />
Current projections peg the deficit at 1.5 percent <strong>of</strong> GDP in<br />
2012. However, if the government is unable to implement<br />
its rollback on subsidies and oil prices shoot up due to<br />
geopolitical uncertainty, Indonesia’s budget deficit will,<br />
in all likelihood, be higher. Despite this downside risk,<br />
Indonesia’s budget does not pose a significant challenge to<br />
its economy. On the contrary, Indonesia’s problems stem<br />
from unspent allocations for public projects.<br />
Meanwhile, fiscal prudence put a lid on inflation, allowing<br />
the central bank sufficient leeway in pursuing an easy<br />
monetary policy. The Bank <strong>of</strong> Indonesia has been fairly<br />
proactive in its policy actions. In the Board <strong>of</strong> Governors’<br />
meeting in February, the Bank <strong>of</strong> Indonesia cut its interest<br />
rate by 25 basis points to 5.8 percent. The move came as<br />
a surprise, but it underscores Indonesia’s concern about<br />
growth prospects in the weak global macroeconomic<br />
environment. The rate cut also highlights the confidence<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Bank <strong>of</strong> Indonesia in implementing a countercyclical<br />
monetary policy while maintaining its inflation targets and<br />
exchange rate. The country has benefitted from ebbing<br />
inflation, but this trend will likely reverse during the latter<br />
half <strong>of</strong> the year if subsidies are rolled back. The Bank <strong>of</strong><br />
Indonesia is expected to uphold its policy stance in the<br />
near term and remain vigilant to emerging risks. A further<br />
interest rate cut is unlikely. However, the looming risk <strong>of</strong><br />
a worsening global economy will ensure that monetary<br />
policy is not tightened prematurely.<br />
In addition, robust GDP growth and limited borrowing<br />
requirements will reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to below<br />
24 percent in 2012. Indonesia’s outstanding public debt<br />
— 24.3 percent <strong>of</strong> GDP in 2011 — is much lower than<br />
the emerging market average <strong>of</strong> 37.8 percent. Moreover,<br />
contingency proposals that allow the government to draw<br />
on deposits accumulated through excess borrowing in the<br />
past provide a buffer. If conditions deteriorate, resulting in<br />
smaller revenues or larger expenses, the government has<br />
the means to stimulate the economy.
Persistent challenges<br />
Pervasive corruption is a major impediment to Indonesia’s<br />
growth prospects. Bureaucratic bottlenecks, political<br />
interference, and judicial inefficiencies weigh on foreign<br />
investment and private sector participation in Indonesia.<br />
Of late, the government has initiated several anticorruption<br />
measures to improve governance. Several <strong>of</strong>fenders have<br />
been prosecuted and even jailed. The recent crackdown on<br />
corruption has also resulted in bureaucratic reluctance in<br />
spending money — even on worthwhile projects. Yet, new<br />
cases <strong>of</strong> tax evasion and bribery continue to be the order<br />
<strong>of</strong> the day.<br />
Corruption and bureaucratic delays also weigh on<br />
Indonesia’s competitiveness. Indonesia’s poor performance<br />
on global comparison metrics such as days required to start<br />
a business, cost to start a business, number <strong>of</strong> procedures,<br />
etc. are a significant deterrent to investors. Together, these<br />
factors result in less-than-favorable conditions for global<br />
manufacturers to invest in Indonesia. The country also<br />
fares poorly in terms <strong>of</strong> diversification <strong>of</strong> industries and a<br />
dearth <strong>of</strong> value-added industries. Furthermore, poor labor<br />
laws result in frequent labor union strikes, road blockages,<br />
and production disruptions. As a result, Indonesia’s labor<br />
advantage remains underutilized. The government faces<br />
the uphill task <strong>of</strong> strengthening institutions, ushering labor<br />
reforms, and altering Indonesia’s image in the eyes <strong>of</strong><br />
potential investors.<br />
Indonesia<br />
Moreover, the country lacks adequate infrastructure to<br />
support its growth aspirations. Infrastructure inadequacies<br />
result in connectivity breakdowns, adding to transportation<br />
and distribution costs and eventually higher inflation.<br />
Indonesia’s ports and airports are in need <strong>of</strong> improvement<br />
and cannot cater to high-capacity vessels. While<br />
the government has indicated its desire to remove infrastructural<br />
bottlenecks, whether the plan will be backed by<br />
credible action remains to be seen.<br />
A slowing world economy will definitely impact Indonesia’s<br />
growth prospects in one way or another. Slowing<br />
commodity prices could drive down export revenues<br />
and result in economic deceleration. However, domestic<br />
demand could partially <strong>of</strong>fset the decline in external<br />
demand. Growth in Indonesian tourism has been curtailed<br />
by instances <strong>of</strong> terrorism. Notwithstanding the downside,<br />
Indonesia’s economy has significant potential. Foreign<br />
investment could increase if investors make long-term<br />
investments by pursuing high returns in Indonesia.<br />
Furthermore, private investment will likely increase if<br />
authorities can establish legislative certainty. Overall, the<br />
economy is expected to grow by 6.5 percent in 2012.<br />
However, if the government succeeds in eliminating bottlenecks<br />
that hold back Indonesia’s growth, the economy<br />
could outperform consensus expectations.<br />
Geographies<br />
39
Dr. Satish Raghavendran<br />
is Vice President at<br />
<strong>Deloitte</strong> Research, India<br />
40<br />
Neha Jain is an Analyst at<br />
<strong>Deloitte</strong> Research, India<br />
Trade patterns <strong>of</strong> the future:<br />
Waking up and smelling the c<strong>of</strong>fee<br />
by Dr. Satish Raghavendran and Neha Jain<br />
It is becoming apparent that China may be losing its status<br />
as the “factory <strong>of</strong> the world.” Cost economics that long<br />
worked in China’s favor have come full circle; domestic<br />
wages are on the rise, eroding much <strong>of</strong> the cost arbitrage<br />
<strong>of</strong>fered to foreign companies. Even Chinese companies are<br />
affected as improving living conditions in the hinterland<br />
discourage potential migrants from seeking work in urban<br />
coastal provinces. Furthermore, an aging population in<br />
the next decade will likely weigh down labor supply and<br />
impact wage competitiveness. As Chinese production<br />
moves up the value chain, workers are demanding higher<br />
wages, better working conditions, and added welfare<br />
benefits. Thus, rising labor costs, along with pressure to<br />
loosen control on its exchange rate, could pose a serious<br />
threat to China’s international competitiveness if productivity<br />
does not correspondingly improve.<br />
Economists have already begun speculating the end <strong>of</strong><br />
“cheap China,” beckoning some companies to reassess<br />
their Chinese footprint and proactively explore other<br />
low-cost geographies in emerging trading networks.<br />
While China may lose its sheen as the factory <strong>of</strong> the<br />
world, companies could benefit from leveraging the<br />
emerging Asian networks for low-tech, labor-intensive<br />
trade and production. Rapid-growth economies such<br />
as Bangladesh and Vietnam are catching up quickly,<br />
providing cheap alternative destinations. Today’s supply<br />
chains mimic complex webs involving minute levels <strong>of</strong><br />
intermediate production rather than locally produced<br />
finished goods. This structure presents immense opportunities<br />
for emerging markets to develop specific capabilities<br />
and capture a bigger share <strong>of</strong> the supply chain. From a<br />
company’s perspective, an emerging trade network with<br />
a wide portfolio <strong>of</strong> capabilities allows for diversification <strong>of</strong><br />
the supply chain rather than extreme reliance on a single<br />
country whose competitiveness may be decreasing.<br />
Nonetheless, China will remain an important, if not<br />
dominant, player in the future. The country’s burgeoning<br />
middle class is set to become more affluent and boost<br />
consumption levels in the next decade. It is estimated<br />
that urban household disposable income will grow almost<br />
tw<strong>of</strong>old between 2010 and 2020, fueling discretionary<br />
spending. The government itself is strategically envisaging<br />
a shift away from a reliance on exports in favor <strong>of</strong> a more<br />
consumption-driven economy in the future. China’s 12th<br />
Five-Year Plan for 2011–2015 calls for higher minimum<br />
wages, income tax reform, and increased welfare schemes,<br />
all <strong>of</strong> which will likely boost consumption in the future.<br />
The Plan further highlights the government’s ambition to<br />
move away from just being the world’s factory to transforming<br />
China’s coastal regions into hubs <strong>of</strong> research and<br />
development or high-tech manufacturing. Thus, as China<br />
moves up the value chain from “made in China” to “made<br />
for China,” it will likely leave room for other emerging<br />
economies to gain a larger share <strong>of</strong> global trade. The most<br />
obvious contenders are India and other APAC economies<br />
within China’s trading network. However, China and
India’s recent economic interest in Sub-Saharan Africa and<br />
the Middle East is a testament to the growing alliance<br />
between these regions, which could significantly alter<br />
trade patterns <strong>of</strong> the future.<br />
Silk road to Africa<br />
Trade linkages between China, India, and Africa date<br />
back centuries to the era <strong>of</strong> the Silk Road, which primarily<br />
involved the trade <strong>of</strong> silk, tea, porcelain, spices, and<br />
other luxury goods. However, the 21st century has seen<br />
a newfound interest in trade with Africa, which is evident<br />
from the proliferation <strong>of</strong> not just goods and services but<br />
also massive foreign investment, technology transfer, and<br />
the movement <strong>of</strong> human capital. In recent years, Africa’s<br />
trade with Asia has been booming, surpassing trade<br />
volumes with the European Union and the United States,<br />
Africa’s traditional trading partners. During 2003–2010,<br />
Africa’s exports to China and India surged by about 31–32<br />
percent per year, with the bulk going to China. During<br />
the same period, imports from China grew at an almost<br />
Trade patterns <strong>of</strong> the future: Waking up and smelling the c<strong>of</strong>fee<br />
identical pace <strong>of</strong> 32 percent, and imports from India grew<br />
at 28 percent per year. Thus, these countries are growing<br />
their trade relationship.<br />
With vast natural reserves and ample availability <strong>of</strong> arable<br />
land, Africa came under the Asian radar as a source <strong>of</strong><br />
energy and food security. The voracious appetite <strong>of</strong> Asian<br />
Tigers drove them to import high volumes <strong>of</strong> resource<br />
commodities from Sub-Saharan Africa. However, China<br />
and India’s industrial capabilities have become more<br />
sophisticated, requiring more diversified, labor-intensive<br />
imports such as light manufactured goods and household<br />
consumer goods from Africa. Consequently, the Asian<br />
interest in African exports has expanded beyond traditional<br />
oil and food imports to manufactured goods and services.<br />
Multinational firms are increasingly recognizing the<br />
long-term growth prospects <strong>of</strong> Africa. By 2020, more<br />
than 50 percent <strong>of</strong> Africa’s population will have discretionary<br />
income (beyond basic needs); meanwhile, the<br />
Topics<br />
41
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
42<br />
labor force will be steadily expanding too. The African<br />
continent constitutes almost 60 percent <strong>of</strong> the world’s<br />
arable yet uncultivated land that is waiting to be tapped.<br />
Furthermore, the heterogeneity <strong>of</strong> African countries <strong>of</strong>fers<br />
the advantage <strong>of</strong> diverse capabilities across the value chain<br />
to foreign firms. Although political stability and infrastructure<br />
bottlenecks present challenges, many countries have<br />
taken credible steps toward regulatory reform, improved<br />
macroeconomic stability, and trade liberalization. China<br />
and to some extent India are key participants in African<br />
infrastructure development and have invested a significant<br />
amount into the sector in exchange for a larger share<br />
<strong>of</strong> Africa’s natural resources. This growing partnership<br />
between Asia and Africa is representative <strong>of</strong> a strength-<br />
ening trade network and mutual dependence. As China<br />
moves up the value chain, Africa will likely <strong>of</strong>fer an attractive<br />
alternative for low-cost production, supported by its<br />
booming domestic consumer markets.<br />
Middle East rising<br />
Countries in the Middle East, especially those in the<br />
Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and<br />
UAE), are proactively forging trading alliances with Asian<br />
countries, reflecting their collective aspiration to diversify<br />
their domestic economies beyond oil exports. The composition<br />
<strong>of</strong> trade patterns from the Gulf Cooperation Council<br />
(GCC) reflects a significant increase in trade flows with<br />
BRIC countries (19.4 percent) compared to those with
Trade patterns <strong>of</strong> the future: Waking up and smelling the c<strong>of</strong>fee<br />
As economies in Sub-Saharan Africa and the<br />
Middle East develop and open up to trade, links<br />
between Asia, the Middle East, and Africa are<br />
expected to flourish.<br />
NAFTA (8.9 percent), revealing a more diversified export<br />
basket. Statistics reveal that Gulf exports to Asia, particularly<br />
China, cover a range <strong>of</strong> products like plastics, electronic<br />
equipment, and vehicles, while exports to the United<br />
States predominantly comprise oil and oil products.<br />
The strategic partnering <strong>of</strong> the GCC countries with China,<br />
India, and other economies focuses on building manufacturing<br />
bases in order to produce a wide array <strong>of</strong> products<br />
<strong>of</strong> varying complexity and to develop skills in critical areas<br />
such as water desalination, digital infrastructure, and<br />
education. The GCC has engaged China to assist with<br />
setting up telecom networks and developing knowledgebased<br />
economies. The investment in these areas has the<br />
potential to transform the Gulf into a preferred destination<br />
<strong>of</strong> global supply chains that <strong>of</strong>fer world-class infrastructure<br />
as well as access to talent and domestic consumer<br />
markets. A robust and well-diversified manufacturing base<br />
will be critical in driving prosperity <strong>of</strong> this region. The key<br />
enabler for this transformation could potentially be the<br />
policy reforms that facilitate economic integration and<br />
lower barriers for businesses. Another important influencer<br />
<strong>of</strong> strategic investments is the GCC’s deployment<br />
<strong>of</strong> sovereign wealth funds, which stand at $1.1 trillion.<br />
The GCC governments are committed to developing<br />
their strengths in areas like energy and services while<br />
enhancing allied sectors. This trend is likely to continue<br />
as the GCC governments proactively seek and incentivize<br />
foreign business.<br />
Emerging trade hubs<br />
As economies in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East<br />
develop and open up to trade, links between Asia, the<br />
Middle East, and Africa are expected to flourish. Economic<br />
integration between these regions and the emergence<br />
<strong>of</strong> South-South trade will likely result in the formation<br />
<strong>of</strong> influential trade hubs. The trade <strong>of</strong> the future will be<br />
determined by the availability <strong>of</strong> cheap resources and the<br />
destination <strong>of</strong> final demand itself. Some firms in developed<br />
economies have already begun to question whether the<br />
challenges <strong>of</strong> outsourcing their production processes<br />
outweigh the benefits <strong>of</strong> producing locally.<br />
In this respect, Africa and the Middle East <strong>of</strong>fer both<br />
low-cost production capabilities as well as a rapidly<br />
growing domestic market. While there are political and<br />
economic risks, a burgeoning consumer base will likely<br />
induce foreign business to navigate these markets and<br />
leverage locally available resources in a more cost-effective<br />
way. Supply chain disruptions following the earthquake<br />
in Japan also have highlighted the challenges <strong>of</strong> extreme<br />
specialization and reliance on a few economies. Another<br />
advantage that the Middle East and Africa <strong>of</strong>fer is the<br />
close proximity to European markets. Thus, the emergence<br />
<strong>of</strong> Africa and the Middle East as new trade hubs is likely<br />
to play a pivotal role in connecting people, products,<br />
and technology.<br />
Topics<br />
References and research<br />
sources:<br />
OECD, “Going for Growth,”<br />
2012.<br />
43
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
Appendix<br />
GDP Growth Rates (YoY %)*<br />
1.8<br />
1.7<br />
1.6<br />
1.5<br />
1.4<br />
1.3<br />
1.2<br />
1.1<br />
Source: *Bloomberg<br />
44<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
-2<br />
-4<br />
-6<br />
-8<br />
-10<br />
-12<br />
4<br />
3<br />
2<br />
1<br />
0<br />
-1<br />
-2<br />
-3<br />
Q1<br />
07<br />
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4<br />
07 07 07 08 08 08 08 09 09 09 09 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 11<br />
Jan 09 May 09 Sep 09 Jan 10 May 10 Sep 10 Jan 11 May 11 Sep 11 Jan 12<br />
USD-Yen<br />
100<br />
1<br />
Jan 09 Jul 09 Jan 10 Jul 10 Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12<br />
95<br />
90<br />
85<br />
80<br />
75<br />
20<br />
15<br />
10<br />
-5<br />
-10<br />
-15<br />
12<br />
10<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
-2<br />
-4<br />
5<br />
0<br />
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4<br />
07 07 07 07 08 08 08 08 09 09 09 09 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 11<br />
U.S. U.K. Eurozone Japan<br />
Brazil China India Russia<br />
U.S. U.K. Eurozone Japan<br />
Major Currencies vs. the US Dollar*<br />
GBP-USD Euro-USD USD-Yen (RHS)<br />
GDP Growth Rates (YoY %)*<br />
India's fiscal year is April-March<br />
Inflation Rates (YoY %)* Inflation Rates (YoY %)*<br />
Inflation data for India is based on the WPI<br />
6<br />
16<br />
5<br />
14<br />
Jan 09 May 09 Sep 09 Jan 10 May 10 Sep 10 Jan 11 May 11 Sep 11 Jan 12<br />
Brazil China India Russia
Yield curves (as on April 6, 2012)*<br />
U.S. Treasury<br />
Bonds & Notes<br />
UK<br />
Gilts<br />
Eurozone Govt.<br />
Bencmark<br />
Japan<br />
Sovereign<br />
Brazil Govt.<br />
Benchmark<br />
China<br />
Sovereign<br />
Appendix<br />
India Govt.<br />
Actives Russia‡<br />
3 Months 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.10 8.98 2.75 8.92 6.06<br />
1 Year 0.07 0.45 0.28 0.10 8.93 2.84 8.26 6.33<br />
5 Years 1.01 1.07 0.77 0.33 10.73 3.14 8.72 7.51<br />
10 Years 2.18 2.21 1.79 1.00 11.29 3.52 8.78 8.16<br />
Composite Median GDP Forecasts (as on April 6, 2012)*<br />
US UK Eurozone Japan Brazil China Russia<br />
2012 2.2 0.6 -0.4 1.54 3.4 8.3 3.5<br />
2013 2.4 1.75 1.05 1.49 4.5 8,4 3.7<br />
2014 2.85 1.95 2.4 1.1 4<br />
Composite median currency forecasts (as on January 9, 2012)*<br />
Q2 12 Q3 12 Q4 12 Q1 13 2012 2013 2014<br />
GBP-USD 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.81<br />
Euro-USD 1.29 1.3 1.31 1.33 1.31 1.31 1.29<br />
USD-Yen 82 83 84 84.5 84 87.5 94<br />
USD-Brazilian Real 1.78 1.75 1.74 1.75 1.74 1.75 1.75<br />
USD-Chinese Yuan 6.25 6.21 6.12 6.08 6.12 5.96 6<br />
USD-Indian Rupee* 51 50 49 48.13 49 47 46<br />
USD-Russian Ruble 29.65 29.7 29.6 29.7 29.6 29.75 33.49<br />
OECD Composite leading indicators (Amplitude adjusted)†<br />
U.S. UK Eurozone Japan Brazil China India Russia<br />
Mar 10 99.9 104.1 103.2 99.9 103.3 102.5 103.4 98.4<br />
Apr 10 100 103.9 103.4 100 103.4 102.1 103.2 98.9<br />
May 10 100 103.5 103.5 100.1 103.3 101.6 102.9 99.3<br />
Jun 10 99.8 103.2 103.5 100.1 103.1 101.2 102.6 99.9<br />
Jul 10 99.6 102.9 103.6 100.1 102.9 100.9 102.3 100.5<br />
Aug 10 99.6 102.7 103.6 100.2 102.8 100.9 102.2 101.2<br />
Sep 10 99.8 102.6 103.7 100.5 102.9 101.1 102.1 101.9<br />
Oct 10 100.1 102.6 103.9 100.8 103.2 101.4 101.9 102.6<br />
Nov 10 100.6 102.6 104.1 101.3 103.4 101.6 101.7 103.1<br />
Dec 10 101.2 102.7 104.2 101.9 103.5 101.8 101.4 103.6<br />
Jan 11 101.7 102.7 104.3 102.3 103.2 101.8 100.9 103.7<br />
Feb 11 102 102.6 104.1 102.6 102.8 101.7 100.2 103.8<br />
Mar 11 102.1 102.5 103.8 102.6 102.2 101.5 99.3 103.5<br />
Apr 11 102 102.2 103.3 102.3 101.4 101.2 98.3 103.2<br />
May 11 101.7 101.8 102.6 102 100.3 101 97.3 102.8<br />
Jun 11 101.3 101.3 101.7 101.7 99.1 100.8 96.4 102.5<br />
Jul 11 100.8 100.7 100.8 101.4 97.7 100.6 95.7 102.2<br />
Aug 11 100.4 100 100 101.2 96.5 100.4 95.2 101.9<br />
Sep 11 100.4 99.4 99.2 101.2 95.5 100.2 94.9 101.8<br />
Oct 11 100.6 99 98.7 101.3 94.6 99.9 94.9 101.7<br />
Nov 11 101.1 98.7 98.5 101.6 93.8 99.5 95.4 101.8<br />
Dec 11 101.8 98.7 98.5 102.1 93.4 99 96 101.9<br />
Jan 12 102.5 98.9 98.7 102.6 93.2 98.4 96.7 102.1<br />
*Source: Bloomberg<br />
‡MICEX rates<br />
†Source: OCED<br />
Note: A rising CLI reading points to an economic expansion if the index is above 100 and a recovery if it is below 100. A CLI which is declining<br />
points to an economic downturn if it is above 100 and a slowdown if it is below 100. Source: OECD<br />
45
Global Economic Outlook 2nd Quarter 2012<br />
Additional resources<br />
<strong>Deloitte</strong> Research Thought Leadership<br />
<strong>Deloitte</strong> Review Issue 10<br />
A Delicate Balance: Organizational barriers to evidence-based management<br />
To Thine Own Self Be True: Sustaining superior performance requires knowing what should change and what<br />
should stay the same<br />
The Mobile Elite: Meeting the growth challenge in the 4G era<br />
The Talent Paradox: Critical skills, recession and the illusion <strong>of</strong> plenitude<br />
A crisis <strong>of</strong> the similar<br />
Asia Pacific Economic Outlook: China, Japan, The Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan<br />
Fed Cloud: The future <strong>of</strong> federal work<br />
Please visit www.deloitte.com/research for the latest <strong>Deloitte</strong> Research thought leadership or contact<br />
<strong>Deloitte</strong> Services LP at: research@deloitte.com.<br />
For more information about <strong>Deloitte</strong> Research, please contact<br />
John Shumadine, Director, <strong>Deloitte</strong> Research, part <strong>of</strong> <strong>Deloitte</strong> Services LP,<br />
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