Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the ... - Larry L. Watts

Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State/1/
Washington, September 6, 1968, 1620Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ROM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Budapest, London, Moscow, Munich, USUN,
USNATO, Paris, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw.
2478. Subject: Meeting with FonMin Manescu.
1. Manescu received me for fifty minutes at 1530 Sept 6 and in response my initial query
for his views current situation now that he had been back in Romania for few days made
following points:
A. Manescu had just seen President Ceausescu and Premier Maurer and they again asked
Manescu transmit through me, as Manescu had done through Ball in Sept/2/ appreciation
of Romanian government and of themselves personally for President's Aug 30 statement
which they considered wise and efficacious. Manescu said statement had had "cooling"
effect on a dangerous curve which might have led to the worst.
/2/In telegram 6368 from USUN, September 3, Ball reported that he had "met briefly"
with Manescu the previous day. Manescu "was basically relaxed though not
unconcerned" about the possibility of Soviet intervention. (Ibid., POL 27-1 COMBLOC-
CZECH)
B. Danger was not completely over and it was important that this statement, which
President said was not on behalf of any particular administration but the position of the
United States, should not be allowed to die, to be discarded or pigeonholed. Manescu did
not presume to advise on how this could be done but Romanian leaders thought statement
still served useful purpose.
C. Though Manescu's first meeting with Ball had been noted in Romanian press, last one
had not nor had President's statement -- all for "obvious reasons." Nevertheless he could
assure me that Romanians not just government were aware of this statement and the
Soviet reaction thereto in Washington and elsewhere and they appreciated what President
had done.
D. Manescu paid tribute to Secretary for making point to Dobrynin that US information
and actions not based on anything Romanians had said.
E. Romania remained faithful to its commitments but otherwise was determined to make
its own decisions in its own interests as it saw them without any dictation from outside. It
desired to have good relations with all states. Whether Romania had relations with this or
that state was a question only for Romania.

G. Expressed his own deep appreciation for understanding and treatment he had
experienced in New York especially for part played by Secretary, Ambassador Ball and
Buffum.
2. I gave Manescu gist of Yugoslav and Romanian reports of Soviet troop deployments in
Hungary and Bulgaria as well as our evaluation of these reports contained State
232256./3/ Nevertheless I would like to have his views. Manescu replied that as he had
said before "danger was not over." Romania remained watchful. However, Manescu
neither confirmed nor denied these reports. But he asserted firmly that Romania was
determined to defend itself against invasion.
/3/Telegram 232256, September 4, forwarded Yugoslav and Romanian reports on
Warsaw Pact troop movements. (Ibid., POL 27-1 RUM)
3. Referring to report (Bucharest 2477)/4/ coming to Embassy's attention only this
morning that Soviets had delivered "ultimatum" two days ago demanding cessation of
provocative statements by Romanians and permission for Soviet troops to transit
Romania to Bulgaria, Manescu replied saying first alleged Soviet request for joint
maneuvers on Romanian soil had been subject discussion with Ball on Sept 2. He said it
true that one or two years ago small limited joint maneuver had been held in Romania.
He could now say on authority of Ceausescu that no such request had been received from
USSR recently. As for this morning's report reaching Embassy Romania would not and
could not change its attitude toward invasion of Czechoslovakia for to do so would be to
invite similar action against itself, he denied knowledge of reported request for transit of
Soviet troops to Bulgaria but said he would nevertheless convey this report to Ceausescu
and Maurer. Manescu commented that natural in dangerous situation people should
become somewhat alarmed and he specifically referred to especially large purchases of
sugar and flour by population.
/4/Telegram 2477, September 6, reported signs of Romanian apprehension regarding
Soviet intentions. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania,
Cables, Vol. 3)
4. Comment: I have little doubt that Manescu came from seeing Ceausescu and Maurer as
he was five minutes late for our appointment and had sent his secretary-interpreter Celac
to waiting room who explained Manescu had been delayed at Council of Ministers.
Manescu, while outwardly calm and measured in expressing his views, appeared clearly
worried that, as he put it, "danger was not entirely over."
Davis
Document 169, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964-1968 Volume XVII, Eastern
Europe, Department of State, Washington, DC