"CORRUPT BARGAIN" CHARGE AGAINST CLAY AND ADAMS

THE "CORRUPT BARGAIN" CHARGE AGAINST 

CLAY AND ADAMS: 

AN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 

BY WILLIAM G. MORGAN 

Oral Roberts University 

Tulsa, Oklahoma 

The election of 1824 provided a substantial portion of the groundwork 

for the notable political changes which emerged from the somewhat 

misnamed "Era of Good Feelings," while at the same time involving 

several unusual political phenomena. A cardinal feature of this 

electoral struggle was the large number of prominent candidates. Early 

in the contest the serious contenders totaled as many as "16 or 17," including 

William H. Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury; John Quincy 

Adams, Secretary of State; Henry Clay, long-time Speaker of the House; 

John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War; Smith Thompson, Secretary of the 

Navy; Vice-President Daniel D. Tompkins; Governor DeWitt Clinton 

of New York; Representative William Lowndes of South Carolina; 

and a comparative latecomer to politics, General Andrew Jackson] As 

the campaign progressed, several of these men dropped from contention: 

Lowndes died in 1822, while Thompson, Tompkins, and Clinton 

fell from the ranks for lack of support, though there was mention of 

the latter's possible candidacy late in 1823. 2 

Calhoun subsequently withdrew from the race, deciding to delay his 

bid for the presidency to accept the second office.8 Of the prominent 

contenders remaining in the contest, Crawford was the administration 

favorite, and his position as Treasury Secretary had enabled him to build 

a significant following in various circles.4 Despite these advantages, 

Crawford's success proved illusory: among other difficulties, the 

Georgian suffered a severe stroke in the summer of 1823 and was 

the victim of the growing antagonism toward the caucus, the very instination 

on which he was relying to bring him broad party support. 5 

Adams, Clay, and Jackson fought actively to secure an electoral majority 

or, failing that, to gain sufficient votes to be included in the top three 

who would be presented to the House of Representatives for the final 

decision. Adams did well, as expected, and Jackson finished strongly 

enough to draw much support from Clay in the West.° Whether the 

last man of the trio would be Crawford or Clay was unknown for some 

time. The collapse of Clay's hopes in New York and an electoral 

fluke in Louisiana enabled Crawford to nose out the Kentuckian.; The 

132

1968] Corrupt Bargain" Charge Against Clay and Adams 133 

role of Henry Clay was thus changed from candidate m bystander--a 

bystander, however, whose position as Speaker of the House would 

make him extremely influential in selecting the victor, s 

Clay's standing with the friends of the candidates reached a new 

high--at least on the surface. He was badgered by attempts to secure 

his support, and various spoils were mentioned if the appropriate arrangements 

should be made. The "jockeying" for position was phenomenal, 

though perhaps only to be expected in such circumstances. 

In short, the Kentuckian was welcomed by a multitude of pleadin§ 

voices when he returned to Washington for the convening of Congress. 

Clay faced an obviously important decision, but his choice to support 

Adams appears to have been almost inevitable. Crawford was eliminated 

for a variety of reasons, notably his precarious health. 1° Much 

ill feeling, moreover, had passed between Clay and Jackson, and the 

Speaker was also strongly against seeing a military man occupy the 

White House. 1 A factor which both commended and condemned Old 

Hickory was that he represented the rising aspirations of the Trans- 

Allegheny region. As a fellow Westerner, Jackson might have appealed, 

at least slightly, to the Speaker's sectional pride but certainly 

not to his self interest: the Hero was an obvious rival for support in the 

expanding West. 

Adams seems to have been the best choice--by a process of elimination, 

if for no other reason. Though bad will between Clay and the 

Secretary of State went back as far as the Anglo-American treaty negotiations 

at Ghent, their disagreements could be reconciled more easily 

than those between Clay and Jackson. 12 In addition, the domestic and 

foreign policies of Adams and Clay were similar; both believed in internal 

improvements and a protective tariff and had similar views 

toward the new Latin American republics. 13 Doubtless the Speaker 

also believed that his chances to follow a New Englander were 

greater than if he attempted to succeed a fellow Westerner. Whatever 

his reasons, Clay appears to have made an early decision to support 

Adams, 4 and, despite the Kentucky legislature's instructions to the congressional 

delegation to vote for Jackson, he remained true to this 

determination--though selecting Adams with the dubious distinction 

of being a "choice of evils.''15 One could scarcely expect Harry of the 

West to preside with unmixed feelings over the choosing of another 

man for the office he so ardently desired. 

A sensation was produced in the House of Representatives in January 

of 1825 by the report that Clay would back Adams; a commotion 

was natural since the decision had been a guarded secret. TM Shortly 

after Clay's choice was made public, an anonymous letter accusing the 

Speaker and the Secretary of State of a bargain appeared in a Phila-

134 The Filson Club Histor Quarterly [VoL 42 

delphia newspaper, the Columbian Observer. 1 Clay vigorously denied 

the charge and demanded that the author identify himself. Representative 

George Kremer of Pennsylvania acknowledged that the letter was 

his and indicated his desire and ability to substantiate his position before 

the House investigatory committee requested by Clay. But when the 

time for such action arrived, Kremer declined to testify. TM 

Despite the unsavory allegations, the Kentuckian maintained his decision 

and cast his influence toward Adams, who won in the House on 

the first ballot. After considerable thought and consultation, Clay accepted 

the President-elect's offer of the State Department. His decision 

brought forth more cries of "corruption and sale" from many Jackson 

supporters, and Old Hickory himself referred to Clay as "the ludas of 

the West.'' 9 One of Clay's friends warned him that because of his 

support of Adams "a thousand desperadoes, political and military . . . 

would think it a most honorable service to foster a quarrel upon and 

shoot you." He went on to indicate that Clay would have been condemned 

no matter which candidate he chose to support: "You prefer 

Mr. Adams... and for that you are calumniated and so it would have 

been had you announced your preference for either of the other competitors.''2° 

Some disappointed partisans were arrested in Pittsburgh 

because of a riot committed in burning the Kentuckian's effigy.2. Such 

activity was prophetic: Clay and Adams never escaped the charge, and 

it was one of the Jacksonians' most effective weapons in their victory 

over Adams in the election of 1828, despite James Buchanan's refusal 

to corroborate Old Hickory's belief that he was Clay's agent in an attempt 

to bargain with Jackson himself,m 

Though many totally rejected the idea, Jackson always considered the 

accusation to be true, as did others. Some, no doubt, were less convinced 

of the truth of the "corrupt bargain" charge than of its utility 

as a political weapon. Used with great facility in 1828, the allegation 

provided an obstacle to Clay whenever his presidential fever grew particularly 

acute.28 In any event, the question is highly controversial, 

and historians have not always concurred on the point. The purpose 

of this article is to examine how non-biographical studies present the 

subject.24 

Writers of the multi-volume works have generally dismissed the 

charges as false; their similar conclusions are often based on rather 

different sources, however. Hermann Edward yon Hoist is among those 

commentators to whom political development meant a great deal. In 

his eight-volume work, The Constitutional and Political History o[ the 

United States, Clay's conduct throughout the entire election period is 

staunchly defended. To Von Hoist, the Speaker is exonerated by several 

proofs: George Kremer's refusal to'testify before the House investi-

1968] • "CorruptBargain" Charge Against Clay and Adams 135 

gating committee after having identified himself as the author of the 

letter to the Columbian Observer, T. H. Benton's public statement that 

an early decision had been made to support Adams, and a letter from 

James Buchanan which refused to corroborate Jackson's insistence that 

he was the agent of Clay who offered Old Hickory a bargain. 2 "Con 

Hoist admits, however, that the Speaker's position of influence in the 

House enabled the Jackson forces to use the "libelous charges" with 

effectiveness. Despite the evidence indicating no corruption, the "base 

lie remained a great impediment in the way of... Clay .... The 

accusation was . . . entirely baseless." The author concludes by expertly 

refuting the Jacksonians' claim that their chief deserved to win 

because of his popular and electoral plurality. If such were the case, 

he suggests, there would scarcely be need of a House election.26 

In his multi-volume history, Edward Channing suggests that cooperation 

between Jackson and Clay was virtually out of the question: the 

Speaker had openly attacked Old Hickory regarding the latter's activities 

in Florida, and Jackson had never forgiven such an overt affront. 

On the other hand, it was "entirely natural for Adams and Clay to 

coalesce." After all, Channing notes, they both believed in the American 

System, distrusted Crawford, and shared a common lack of faith in 

Jackson's administrative abilities. It was to be expected, therefore, that 

Adams would receive Clay's support. The author gives rather cavalier 

treatment to remaining aspects of the question, merely mentioning 

Kremer's charges and subsequent refusal to testify before the House. 

He does admit, however, that this "discreditable business" hurt the 

careers of both Clay and Adams.2 

John Bach McMaster ventures one step further in defending the 

Speaker. He not only justifies Clay's actions, but also accuses the Jackson 

forces of concocting the charges of corruption as a scheme to ruin 

the Kentuckian politically--or better yet, to scare him into supporting 

his fellow Westerner for President. McMaster recounts the Kremer 

charge and related events, noting both Clay's vehement denial and 

Kremer's reticence when summoned by the House Committee.2s 

Despite Clay's acceptance of the State Department, a bargain was 

scarcely involved. The decision as to whom he should support was 

relatively easy. Crawford was eliminated by poor health, and "to vote 

for Jackson was impossible" because of Clay's rather impassioned denunciation 

of the General's conduct in the Seminole War. That left 

the New Englander and "during all this while Clay never faltered in 

his determination to support Adams." The author also indicates the 

adverse opinion entertained by Harry of the West toward the election 

of a military hero. As in most of the previous works discussed, Mc- 

Master unfortunately fails to refer to Adams' diary. In any case, he

136 The Filson.Club History Quarterly [VoL 42 

fails to prove his allegation that the charges were more than an honest 

misunderstanding on the part of Jackson's friends. The author does 

devote sufficient space to the extensive use of the charges in the subsequent 

presidential contest, noting that "the issue on the charge of corrupt 

bargain... [was] made the platform for the election yet almost 

four years away. ''29 In this instance, it was not hard to keep good men 

down. 

In his seven-volume magnum opus, James Schouler takes a rather 

indecisive position. After mentioning Clay's important influence in 

determining the victor, he digresses to indicate his belief that the President 

should be selected by a plurality of the popular vote, thus preventing 

any umpire from entering the fray. On record against the idea of a 

House election, the author proceeds to describe one. Relying largely 

on Adams' diary, he concentrates on the relationship of Clay and his 

friends with the candidate. Though mentioning Clay's letter to Francis 

P. Blair on January 8 expressing preference for Adams, he neglects 

earlier declarations of a similar nature. He very briefly discusses the 

Kremer charge but omits reference to the House investigating committee. 

Jackson's denunciation of Clay as the "Judas of the West" is 

also noted. Schouler draws no conclusions, apparently leaving the 

choice to the reader. The reader will likely fail to decide the question 

as well: neither side of the story is treated effectively enough to permit 

a conclusion. ° 

Later in the volume, however, the author finally takes a definite 

stand. He suggests that "Clay and Adams were men of probity," and 

this, in addition to their profuse denials, should dispel any thought of 

corruption. He at last chooses to point out Kremer's equivocal position 

and suggests that a visit of James Buchanan to Clay was an unsuccessful 

attempt to seduce the Speaker to Jackson's side by a similar 

deal supposedly offered, Old Hickory's men charged, to the General. 

Schouler ultimately settles on a moderate position by concluding that 

a tacit understanding likely existed between Clay and Adams. He 

exonerates the principals of evil motives, pointing to the discord with 

Jackson and Crawford's bad health as sufficient reasons to throw the 

Speaker into the Puritan's camp. 1 

At this juncture, we move to works of a more delimited nature. 

Frederick Jackson Turner's Rise o/the New IVest, 1819-1829 gives a 

balanced viewpoint on the question. Though deciding that no corrupt 

bargain existed, Turner nevertheless mentions that friends of Clay attempted 

to convey to Adams the Westerner's friendly attitude and their 

hope that a cabinet position would be in order. To these overtures, 

Adams replied that if he were elected by Western votes, it would be 

only natural to look to that section for continuing support--thus indi-

1968] "Corrupt Bargain" Charge Against Clay and Adams 137 

caring a post would be in the cards for Clay. The author notes Adams' 

diary entry--f Incedo super ignes" (I walk over fires)--without implying 

that this statement incriminated the diarist. He also labels the 

conferences between Clay and Adams as simply to express their respective 

positions on certain matters of public policy. In any case, Clay 

had long been hostile to Jackson and could not easily reverse his position. 

Moreover, it would have been mote difficult to succeed a fellow 

Westerner as President. Crawford had been eliminated because of his 

health; only Adams remained. Their similar attitudes toward domestic 

and foreign policy made Clay's choice of the Puritan entirely logical,m 

Turner also discusses the original charge, Clay's demand for an investigation, 

and Kremer's reluctance to testify. He suggests that Jackson's 

managers engineered the latter, hoping that the accusation would 

gain credence with the masses if it were not investigated and Clay subsequently 

accepted the State Department folio. If he refused the appointment, 

it could have been noised abroad that Kremer's discovery 

of the truth prevented the conclusion of the evil scheme. The author 

fails to pursue this point further, however, but reviews Clay's attempts 

to justify his course of action. Turner notes that though Clay named 

associates to whom he mentioned his early decision for Adams and no 

substantial proof appeared to justify Kremer's charge, he was long beset 

by this matter. In any case, the author feels the appointment of the 

Speaker as Secretary of State was extremely unwise--this was, he suggests, 

what gave the charge immortality,as 

Edward Stanwood's History o[ the Presidency gives a rather brief 

treatment to the corruption allegations. Stanwood mentions both the 

article in the Columbian Observer and the consequent events. Concluding 

that Clay and Adams were innocent, the author notes Buchanan's 

failure to substantiate Jackson's claim that he was a messenger 

bearing a wicked offer from Harry of the West and Thomas H. Benton's 

statement that Clay confided to him before December 15 of his choice 

for the Puritan. He neglects the salient reasons why this decision was 

made, however, but does note the effective use of the charge in the 

succeeding campaign.34 

Another historian of the presidency, Meade Minnigerode, devotes 

more attention to the question. Staunchly defending Clay, he points 

out that the Speaker made his decision for Adams early in the contest. 

The author also lists a number of reasons why this determination was 

made: Crawford's health, Clay's aversion to Jackson's military background, 

the greater possibility of succeeding a New Englander, and the 

Secretary of State's more impressive qualifications. These considerations 

were so weighty that Minnigerode concludes "it would have been an

138 The Filson Club History Quarterly ' [Vol. 42 

extraordinary thing ff Mr. Clay had not decided to support Mr. 

Adams.''ss 

Minnigerode also discusses the various offers, whether or not authorized, 

made to Clay by friends of the candidates. Of particular interest 

is Buchanan's visit to Clay in which he intimated that Jackson would 

surely appoint his fellow Westerner as Secretary of State. In addition, 

Adams was by no means idle. He gave assurances to such men as 

Daniel Webster, John Scott of Missouri, and Daniel P. Cook of Illinois 

on different matters, and Robert P. Letcher, a close colleague of Clay, 

received numerous hints that the New Englander was inclined favorably 

toward the Speaker. Yet he maintains that no bargain was concluded; 

Adams' diary is used to substantiate this position. George Kremer is 

depicted as the dupe of Jackson's managers when he first charged corruption, 

then refused to testify on the matter. The author also notes 

that many rallied to Clay's defense, including such respected statesmen 

as Webster, Lewis Cass, John Tyler, and Chief Justice Marshall. Another 

proof of Clay's innocence was Buchanan's response to Jackson's 

attempt to involve him as a material witness for the prosecution: "Mr. 

Buchanan had completely demolished the Jacksonian case." Yet Old 

Hickory refused to drop the charge; the "cry rang out more loudly 

than ever before." Jackson's managers thus attempted to cover their 

weakened position by increased activity,s° 

George Dangerfield has an extensive analysis of this political "bad 

feeling" in his The Era o Good Feelings. Noting Clay's position of 

influence in the House, he points out that the Speaker and Adams had 

"never been on good terms since the day when they had shouted insults 

at each other, at Ghent." In addition, Clay had made a virtually irreparable 

break with Jackson concerning the Seminole campaign; with 

Crawford "he had nothing in common at all." Having briefly set the 

stage, he admits that Clay told some friends before returning to Washington 

that he would "never vote for Jackson." The author reports 

Letcher's visits to Adams and the latter's "Incedo super ignes" diary 

entry and observation that Clay would back him if he could advance 

himself by doing so. In a bit of postmortem psychoanalysis, the author 

suggests that Adams was bothered by his conscience and the haunting 

realization that he could not be elected without seriously compromising 

his principles. In fact, by the conference arranged between the Puritan 

and Clay "the year began with Mr. Adams walking, not over the fires, 

but into them. ''87 

Dangerfield then accuses Buchanan of urging Jackson to make it 

known that Adams would not be continued as Secretary of State; such 

a statement would supposedly have caused Clay to support the Tennessean 

without delay. Despite the rather indefinite reply, the Penn-


sylvanian ostensibly hurried m Clay with an offer of the State Department 

if he would support General Jackson. Buchanan was acting, 

Dangerfield says, on his own authority, and Jackson should thus be 

absolved from any blame. In fact, Dangerfield intimates that Jackson 

"was personally determined to have the Presidency without a bargain 

or not to have it at all." By contrast, Adams was too possessed by 

presidential fever to reject "an understanding with Henry Clay." Thus 

an agreement did, in fact, occur suggests the author, and "if Adams had 

resisted it, Jackson would have been elected." Briefly noting the good 

reasons why Adams would logically coalesce with Clay, Dangerfield 

suggests that because of these factors "John Quincy Adams stifled his 

conscience and prepared to come to an understanding with Henry Clay." 

The tone of the narrative thus involves strong implications of definite 

bargain.as 

The author continues to focus on factors suggesting a bargain by 

mentioning Clay's statement that some of Adams friends--no doubt 

without his authority--had sought the Speaker's aid by urging 

"considerations personal m himself." In this oblique fashion, the "per. 

sonal considerations" remained in the picture. We are forced m conclude 

that the two men came to an understanding--but an understanding only, 

not a bargain: not the Presidency for the State Department in so many 

words... But no bargain, after all, was necessary; for an understanding, 

like charity, covers a multitude of sins. 

Dangerfield then proceeds to depict the results of the "alliance," as he 

terms it, and notes concessions made by Adams to other political factions 

as well. s° 

The writer then plods through the Kremer accusation, but while admitting 

that "Honest George" probably did not draw up the charges, he 

neglects to mention that the Pennsylvania congressman subsequently 

refused to testify before the House investigating committee requested 

by Clay, despite his earlier promise to do so.4° Dangerfield also recounts 

the role of Representative Stephen Van Rensselaer in deciding 

by his vote the choice of the New York delegation, which secured the 

election for Adams. But the author does view the Puritan with some 

sympathy: 

It was terrible for John Quincy Adams to be entangled with a man like 

Henry Clay . . . like a dram-drinker whose ordinary life is usually spent 

in dull sobriety, he followed one intoxicating expedient after another; 

and the more intoxicated he grew, the more his doleful inner voice aSsured 

him that nothing good would come of it.4. 

The final curtain is drawn when Dangerfield asks that Clay and 

Adams not be judged harshly, became "if corruption existed" it was an

140 The Filson Club History Quarterly [Vol. 42 

inevitable part of politics. But political morality has changed considerably 

since 1825; even the principal characters themselves denounced 

any bargain of this nature as despicable and unworthy of public officials 

42 The author suggests Adams never forgave himself for this 

compromise of conscience in order to come to grips with political 

reality. Clay, however, was genuinely astonished when the cry of 

"bargain and corruption" failed to fade away. In fact, the Kentuckian 

was harmed by the charge for many years and spent considerable effort 

attempting to refute it. Indeed, Dangerfield implies that Clay received 

what he deserved by wantonly disregarding and misevaluating the force 

of public opinion favoring the dynamic Old Hickory over the stern 

Puritan. His "tragic offense" of 1825 was to remain a significant roadblock 

whenever Harry of the West gazed longingly toward the White 

House. 4a 

In his various conclusions relative to the case, Dangcrfield has likely 

raised several questions in the reader's mind. He has indicated, for 

example, that Jackson would not accept a bargain. Yet it is suggested 

that if Adams had refused the agreement offered by Clay and company 

--as his conscience supposedly told him to do--the alleged bargainhunting 

Kentuckian would have acted in such a way that Old Hickory 

would have been elected, despite Clay's early declarations that he definitely 

would not vote for the General. If faced with this hypothetical 

rejection by both Adams and Jackson, Clay would seem to have had 

little choice but to support the New Englander anyway. Both his self 

interest and what he thought best for the nation pointed toward such a 

course. In addition, one may wonder about semantics: by saying that 

Jackson would have been chosen had Adams resisted an understanding 

between the men covered a "multitude of sins," Dangerfield has clearly 

implied that there was a bargain, whatever he might choose to call it. 

The same author's more recent treatment of the question is but a 

slightly varied distillation of the first. Dangerfield notes that Clay's 

coming in fourth in the electoral college tally put him in a crucially 

important position in deciding the ultimate victor, though losing the 

chance to come before the House himself and make the election "even 

more of a wizard's sabbath than it actually became." That the Speaker 

considered ideal none of the trio to be presented to the House is made 

clear. He was not on good terms with Adams, while having broken 

openly with Jackson on the Florida question. For Crawford's Radicalism, 

"he had no appetite at all." Yet early in the situation Clay began 

to lean toward the lesser of the evils: Adams. He told his friend 

Thomas H. Benton of this feeling even before December 16, when the 

vote of Louisiana was known in Washington. In addition, Adams' 

diary for December 17 and 23 records the visits of Robert P. Letcher,


one of the Speaker's associates, which strongly suggested a decided preference 

for the Puritan. On January 9, Clay and Adams finally met for 

their conference. The New Englander's diary account of the conversation 

simply notes that Clay wanted to ask about "some principles of 

great public importance, but without any personal considerations for 

himself." The Kentuckian freely informed Adams that he preferred 

him above either Jackson or Crawford.44 

Yet--perhaps because of an overzealous attempt at analysis (or 

post-mortem psychoanalysis)--Dangerfield does not let the situation 

remain simple, one which resulted somewhat naturally from the very 

state of things. Possibly because the author subseqently weighed the 

Adams-Clay governmental program in the balance and found it wanting, 

the magic word "bargain" must enter in somewhere: "We have 

every reason to suppose that the two men came to an understanding; 

but surely it must have been an understanding only, an implicit but 

not an overt bargain, not the Presidency for the State Department in so 

many words. Clay would have thought such a bargain naive and 

Adams would have considered it sinful." One wonders why, semantically 

speaking, an understanding of this nature must be termed a 

"bargain" of any kind, especially in view of the unsavory connotations 

associated with the word in this context. Dangerfield appears to be 

dearly saying there was, in fact, no corruption, but he leaves a haunting 

doubt merely by using the word "bargain.''45 

The discussion also briefly recounts Kremer's charge in the Columbian 

Observer, but the fact that "Honest George" offered to testify before 

the House on this matter and later refused goes unmentioned. 

After discussing the intricacies of the House election (with an emphasis 

upon the role of Stephen Van Rensselaer),4 Dangerfield describes, 

in somewhat abbreviated fashion, some reactions to the outcome: John 

Randolph declared that "the cards were packed," while Old Hickory 

branded Clay as "the Judas of the West." From that time on the Kentuckian 

was to be faced with such charges of corruption.47 

But what of Adams? Throughout his treatment, Dangerfield has 

imputed queasy feelings to the Puritan because of certain entries in his 

diary.4s He concludes that Adams' conscience was indeed tormented, 

even more because of his other "deals''4° than by his relationship with 

Clay. The New Englander "could not forgive himself for conniving, 

for electioneeting, for behaving like anyone else." Yet the analyst indicates 

Adams firmly believed Jackson's election would be against the 

nation's interest, while he himself would make a suitable chief execufive. 

Moreover, Clay embraced foreign and domestic policies similar 

to his own, and the Speaker would add strength and stability to the


administration. But "his conscience refused to be assuaged by these 

considerations."5° 

On the other hand, it was a considerable surprise to Clay that the 

cries of corruption did not soon lay urtmourned and forgotten in the 

graveyard of old slogans. "He never could see that to accept an office 

which still was supposed to carry the succession with it, after having 

delivered the votes of Kentucky, Ohio, and Missouri, could only suggest 

implications of an odious nature." The Speaker thought it only 

fair to himself, his friends, and the American System to accept Adams' 

offer of the State Department. Dangerfield cannot resist concluding 

his study of the question with a few parting blows at Harry of the 

West: 

He had, no doubt, been made the scapegoat for a king of political management 

of which he was simply the most conspicuous example; and yet, 

a popular man himself, he seems to have turned his back upon the debtors, 

the smaU farmers, the men with little property or none, now looming upon 

verge of political history and determined to get in... It is not surprising 

that the cry of "bargain and corruption" had grown quite irrepressible 

by the time Mr. Adams . . . was driven to the Capitol for his inauguration.sl 

Though both of Dangerfield's studies of this topic present several facets 

of the situation and thereby attain a certain aura of impartiality, the 

reader will scarcely fail to observe that the author has freely imbibed 

of a heady Jacksonian wine and viewed the spectacle through Hickorycolored 

glasses. 

Fifty Years o[ Party War[are by William O. Lynch also contains a 

rather extensive section devoted to the bargain question. Noting that 

Clay's support was ardently sought by the several candidates, he insists 

that the decision was not reached until rather late in the game, citing as 

evidence a letter from the Speaker to F. P. Blair on January 8, which 

refers to the "choice which we must finally make." He entirely neglects 

the earlier pronouncements to close friends that he wonld support 

Adams, though conceding that Crawford's health had soon elimiuated 

him in Clay's mind. His approach from this point continues to be somewhat 

unsound. Mentioning the long-standing disaffection between Clay 

and Adams, Lynch fails to consider the even greater hostility between 

Jackson and the Speaker. In fact, he suggests that "there was no outstanding 

reason why the friends of Clay and Jackson could not coalesce. 

"52 

On the other hand, the author says one must not assume that it was 

natural for Clay and Adams to cooperate, but gives the Speaker's primary 

reason for supporting the Secretary of State as the greater opportunity 

to succeed him as President. He thus neglects the similarity


of the two men's polities and discounts CAay's oft-expressed aversion m 

Jackson's military background as well. Buchanan is portrayed as an 

independent agent attempting m unite the two Westerners by indicating 

to Clay that Old Hickory would doubtless appoint him Secretary 

of State in the event of victory. The writer notes as well the accusation 

of John Sloane of Ohio that Sam Houston approached him with a bargain 

offer for Clay on Jackson's behalf. The visits of Robert Letcher 

to Adams are of greater significance to Lynch, however; he hints that 

this Kentuckian was Clay's bargaining agent. John Scott of Missouri 

is cast in a similar role."8 

Lynch also recounts the charge as put forward in the Columbian 

Observer and Clay's statement denying the accusation. He justifies 

Kremer in his refusal to testify, conceding, however, that there was 

probably "no evidence to present." The author uses a great deal of 

rationalization to refrain from admitting that the chargewas thereby 

proved groundless. Lynch rather abruptly drops the question, but the 

reader can scarcely fail to infer from his use of facts that a bargain did 

exist. The subtle nature of these implications make them no less real."* 

As an analyst must inevitably do in evaluating the election of 1828, 

Robert V. Remini considers the corrupt bargain question in his recent 

work, The Election of Andrew Jackson. The author begins by examining 

Clay's relationship with and attitude toward each of the candidates 

to be put before the House. To Clay, one of the few factors commending 

Jackson--while at the same time condemning him--was that 

the Hero represented the rising aspirations of the West. As a fellow 

Westerner, Jackson clearly challenged Clay's desire to achieve hegemony 

in that growing section. Moreover, the Tennessean's background 

had prepared him more thoroughly for fighting Indians or Englishmen, 

as the case might require, than for high political office: Jackson simply 

lacked the experience in national government possessed by both Adams 

and Crawford. Nevertheless, the General had an impressive number 

of electoral votes, reflecting strong backing in the South, Pennsylvania, 

much of the West, and even some areas in several Middle Atlantic 

States. Remini concludes that Clay's decision against Jackson was no 

surprise and that it was probably based more on Old Hickory's meagre 

political qualifications than on personal jealousy. Two primary factors 

caused the Speaker to turn his face from William H. Crawford: 

the Georgian's serious physical condition and his Radical political principles. 

While Clay was a nationalist, the vociferous proponent of the 

American System, Crawford and his followers condemned the program 

as a constitutional outrage. 

Decisions against both Jackson and Crawford left only John Quincy 

Adams. While recognizing Adams' inepmess in polities, as distin-


guished from government, Remini concludes that the Puritan was no 

doubt best qualified by past training and experience for the presidential 

chair. Moreover, he, like Clay, was a nationalist and, unlike Old 

Hickory and the Treasury Secretary, could appreciate the American 

System. Should the Speaker choose to support the New Englander, as 

circumstances seemed to dictate, a powerful Northeast-Northwest coalition 

would result in the House of Representatives. Remini implies 

that Clay's decision for Adams was made about January 8, 1825, after 

much consultation with political confidants, instead of before the 

Kentuckian returned to Washington for the opening of Congress in 

December.56 

Noting Martin Van Buren's comment that electing Adams with 

Clay's help would sign the Speaker's "political death warrant," the 

author suggests that the certificate of demise had already been prepared 

several weeks before when Adams and Clay met to discuss their duty 

to the country and how they would implement it. But Remini quickly 

squelches any thoughts the reader might have of corrupt bargain: 

"nothing improper was said or suggested; nothing improper was even 

remotely contemplated." However innocent the situation was, publication 

of the Kentuckian's choice brought immediate rumors of a deal 

between the principal characters. Remini notes Kremer's anonymous 

charge in the Columbian Observer and the Pennsylvania congressman's 

ackfiowledgment of the missive. Moreover, several days later, a member 

of Kremer's congressional delegation confronted him with the accusation, 

and "Honest George" replied he had not intended to impute 

corruption to Clay--and was willing to say so before the House. Before 

this could be done, James Buchanan led Ktemer away. The House 

investigation of the matter failed to reveal incriminating evidence 

against the Puritan and the Kentucky GamesterY 

But there were many rumors about the candidates during that "supercharged" 

winter at Washington. One story suggested that Jackson 

himself had talked with Crawford, offering virtually any reward in return 

for his support. Another report told of Van Buren going to 

Adams to negotiate, but without success. The most complicated intrigue 

involved James Buchanan. Some of Clay's friends, hearing that 

Jackson would exclude the Speaker and his friends from the Cabinet, 

supposedly relayed their dismay to Buchanan, assuring him they would 

end the contest in short order if Old Hickory would promise to oust 

Adams from the State Department. Buchanan then presented the 

information to Jackson, though in such a confused manner that the 

General understood little.5s 

Remini also mentions how Clay's much considered decision to accept 

the State Department brought forth renewed cries of corruption from


Jackson and his lieutenants. The new President faced the problem 

squarely by announcing the appointment was made because of the 

Kentuckian's abilities and in deference to the West, whose votes in the 

House had secured the election. Logical reasons for the nomination 

by Adams and the acceptance by Clay were to be insufficient. The step 

threw Calhoun into the Jackson camp. In addition to re-emphasizing 

the charge of corruption against Adams and Clay, the General indignantly 

accused Harry of the West of attempting to bribe him, obviously 

without success. The course of events pursued by the principals of the 

Massachusetts-Kenrucky axis had provided the basis for a ready-made 

opposition as well as a chief issue which was used to begin the next 

campaign shortly after the House had made its decision. Remini acquits 

Adams and the Speaker completely, though concluding that it 

"was foolish of him [Adams] to offer the post, but it was political 

suicide for Clay to accept it." Except for the author's suggestion that 

Clay's decision came in January, this treatment of the corrupt bargain 

question is well balanced and effective.5n 

"Jackson, Buchanan, and the 'Corrupt Bargain' Calumny," an article 

which directly bears on this question, strongly suggests that Jackson 

was responsible for instigating a scheme against Clay. In this study, 

Richard R. Stenberg generally justifies Buchanan's motives and actions 

at the expense of Jackson. The author begins his analysis by indicating 

that Clay at first favored Crawford but turned to Adams because of the 

Georgian's failing health, n° He notes that the choice to support the 

New Englander was made early, though no public announcement was 

made until late January. Unaware of Clay's decision, Buchanan, supposedly 

hoping to secure a foreign mission appointment under Jackson, 

attempted to recruit Harry of the West to the Jackson side--probably 

after having his notorious interview with Old Hickory. Stenberg mentions 

that one contemporary, John S. Barbour, asserted that at the time 

of the discussion with Buchanan, Jackson preferred to keep Adams as 

Secretary of State but lied to attract Clay's support,nl 

The article continues with a description of the charges as brought 

out in the Columbian Observer. Suggesting that Kremer actually made 

a statement before several congressmen disclaiming any intention of 

attacking the Speaker, the author says the charges were a well-constructed 

scheme to force Clay into Jackson's camp. In attempting to 

prove false the later charge that Buchanan was Clay's emissary, Stenberg 

incorrectly quotes a letter of Jackson to William B. Lewis. n2 He does 

show, however, that Jackson was, at the time, seemingly unaware of the 

possibility of Buchanan serving as Clay's agent. 63 

The author proceeds with his case against Jackson by examining the 

revival of the charge in 1827 by the Jackson-Carter Beverly letters.

146 The Filson Club History Quartedy [Vol. 42 

Portions of Clay's denials are noted, but of greater importance are 

Buchanan's denials to both Duff Green and Jackson that he most certainly 

was not the Kentuckian's emissary. At this point, Clay remarked 

that he "could not desire a stronger statement from Mr. Buchanan. The 

tables ate completely turned upon the General." As further proof, 

Stenberg turns to an af davit of Kremer to Jackson showing that Old 

Hickory perverted what Buchanan said to John H. Eaton and Kremer 

himself. Despite such thorough refutation, Jackson continued to press 

the charge. Such action, the author concludes, indicated Jackson's 

"comtant hypocrisy... [which was] malignant, ambitious, and deceitful, 

rather than polite.., and his many errors [as] something deeper 

than weaknesses of memory or of judgement.''°4 This is a rather 

strong statement, even from such a confirmed anti-Jackson historian as 

Stenberg. 

On the whole, non-biographical studies about the period including 

the election of 1824 have concluded that the charges of corruption 

against Adams and Clay were false. A variety of motives are assigned 

to the Puritan and the Kentuckian, but usually the analysts agree that 

the primary factors were a combination of what the two thought best 

both for the country and for themselves. Because of the similarity of 

their political principles ar/d interest, Clay and Adams naturally coalesced 

when faced with less pleasing alternatives. 

At any rate, political interest blood ran thicker than the water of 

Jackson's larger electoral vote. But this rather natural community of 

interests became fertile ground for the seeds of opposition sown by 

Jacksonians to the tune of "bargain and sale." Used effectively in the 

campaign of 1828, the charge of corruption was to haunt Clay for the 

rest of his career, particularly when his chronic case of "presidentialitis" 

became espedally acute. 

Yet the treatments of this question are far from identical: they often 

differ in terms of the factors emphasized and the sources utilized. While 

most authors make it dear they believe in the propriety of the principal 

figures, some, notably George Dangerfield, have viewed the struggle 

through rather Hickory-hued spectacles and leave a certain degree of 

question regarding the propriety of the actions of the Speaker and the 

Man from Massachusetts. In fact, Dangerfield and William O. Lynch 

imply that there was indeed a bargain of sorts, and by innuendo rather 

sternly reprimand Clay and Adams. But the appointment by Adams 

and the acceptance by Clay are often depicted by others as outstanding 

cases of political myopia--a disease which was to characterize Adams' 

entire term in the White House. Thus, the conceusus generally acquits 

the Speaker and the Secretary concerning their intentions and the alleged 

bargain but sometimes indicts them for lacking political sagacity. In


any event, those who are mote favorable toward Old Hickory and Jacksonian 

Democracy tend to be more readily convinced of shady dealings 

between the Clay-Adams forces, while others, particularly the Whig 

historians, find it easier to conclude that the situation was marked by 

honesty and proper behavior. 

FOOTNOTES 

.1Niles' Weakly Register, January 26, 1822, p. 338, and April 27, 1822, pp. 129-30. 

Francis Johnson to John J. Crittenden, January 18, 1822, John J. Critteaden Papers, 

Libra,, of .Con.gress: Jackson was pot into the race officially by the Tennessee Legislatures 

nommauon m July of 1822, Nilas Weekly Register, August 24, 1822, p. 402. 

ZHenry Clay to Peter B. Porter, December 11, 1823, Peter B. Porter Papers, Buffalo 

and Erie County Historical Society. 

3Niles" Weekby Register, March 27, 1824, p. 50. This decision was considerably 

influenced by the Harrisburg Convention, which nominated a Jackson-Calhoun ticket. 

Jackson was pleased to have Calhoun run for Vice-President and thought the combination 

of Jackson-Calhoun would carry the South, West, and North and South Carolina. Jackson 

to Andrew J. Donelson, Maxch 7, 1824, Andrew J. Donelsoa Papers, Library of Congress. 

But some of Old Hickory's /ieutenants in Washington were not so pleased with 

Calhoun's nomination. James Buchanan to Hugh Hamilton, March 19, 1824, Andrew 

Jackson Papers, Tennessee State Library and Archives. 

4NileJ" V/eekly Raglster, Match 6, 1824, p. 5. Charles Francis Adams, ed. Meruoirs 

o/John Quincy Adams ( 12 vols., Philade phla, 1874-1877), VI, p. 191. Thomas Jefferson, 

supposedly neutral between Adams and Crawford, suggested a preference for the latter 

m a letter to the Marquis de La Fayette, November 4, 1823, in Paul Leicester Ford, ed., 

The Works o[ Thomas Jefferson (12 vols., New York, 1904-1905), XII, pp. 322-23. 

Niles" 1Veekky Register, December 13, 1823, p. 227. Henry Clay to Peter B. Porter, 

April 26, 1824, in James F. Hopkins and Mary W. M. Hargreaves, eds., The Papers o[ 

Henry Clay (10 vols., Lexington, 1959-), III (1963), pp. 743-44. This letter noted 

that little was seen in the newspapers about Crawford's health but that his condition 

was so poor some thought he would not live through the summer. For indications that 

his situation remained serious as the election drew near, see John McLean to John W. 

Taylor, October 25, 1824, John W. Taylor Papers, New York Historical Society. 

Since Crawford was the caucus nominee, it became expedient for the other major 

candidates to oppose this "regular" selection. For an analysis of this question, see 

William G. Morgan, "The Decline of the Congressional Nominating Caucus," T nnessee 

Historical Quarterly, XXIV (Fail, 1965), pp. 245-55. Jackson rather early predicted 

that the caucus would politically ruin the man nominated. Jackson to John Overton, 

December 21, 1823, John Overton Papers, Claybroohe Collection, Tennessee Historical 

Sodety. 

• Calhoun's withdrawal and Jackson's increasing strength in the West, to he drawn 

largely from CAay's following, was foreseen by some astute political observers. Samuel 

Bell to Levi Woodbury, March 2, 1824, Levi Woodbury Papers, Library of Congress. 

The electoral vote was Jackson, 91; Adams, 84; Crawford, 41; Clay, 37. It was not 

known until mid-Decemher that Clay would not he a candidate considered by the House. 

Clay to Peter B. Porter, December 7 and 26, 1824, Peter B. Porter Papers Buffalo and 

Erie County Historical Society. Clay to [Rufus Easton], December 18, 182 , in Hopkins 

and Hatg aves, eds., Papers o/ Clay, Ill, pp. 898-99. 

SStephen Van Rensselaer to De Witt Clinton, December 7 and 14, 1824, De Witt 

Clinton Papers, Columbia University. The letter of December 7 remarked: 'It is thought 

that Mr. Clay can decide the contest." It should be pointed out, however, that Adams 

needed more than just the trio of states carried by Clay in addition to the seven he won.


aClay to Benjamin W. Leigh, December 22, 1824, in James F. Hopkins and Mary 

W. M. Hargreaves, eds., The Papers of Henry Clay, III, pp. 900-1. Clay to Francis P. 

Blair, January 8, 1825, in Calvin Colton, ed., The Works o] Henry Clay (10 vols., New 

York mad London, 1904), IV, pp. 109-10. William Phimer, Jr., to William Plumer, 

December 24, 1824; January 4, 7, 11, 13, 20, and 24, 1825, in Everett S. Brown, ed., 

The Missouri Compromises and Presidential Politics, 1820.1825, ]fore the Letters of 

William Plumer, Junior (St. Louis, 1926), pp. 123-36. Hereinafter cited as Letters ot 

Plumer. 

*°Clay to Francis Brooke, January 28, 1825, in Colton, Works of Clay, IV, p. 111. 

1 Ibid. Some observers agreed with Clay that a military man was generally unsuited 

for the presidency. See, for example, Ebenezer Foote to John W. Taylor, November 

23, 1824, John W. Taylor Papers, New York Historical Society. 

*' Plumer to Plumer, St., January 7, 1825, in Brown, Letters ot Plumer, pp. 129-30. 

la Frederick Jackson Turner, Rise el the New West, 1819-1829 (New York, 1906), 

p. 261. George A. Lipsky, John Quincy Adams: Hit Theories and Ideas (New York, 

1950), pp. 302-8. Adams was more cautious than Clay concerning the tariff but was 

even stronger on internal improvements. See Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams 

and the Union (New York, 1956), pp. 25-26. 

li Clay told his brother-indaw, Thomas Hart Benton, of his determination prior to 

December 15, 1824. Benton, Thirty Years' View (2 vols., New York, 1854), l, pp. 

48-49. See also Clay to George McChire [December 28, 1824], in Hopkins and Hargteaves, 

eds., Papers oJ Henry Clay, III, p. 906. In addition, Nilas' Weekly Register, 

April 9, 1825, carried a letter from Dr. Daniel Drake asserting that Clay has said several 

times before leaving Kentucky for Washington that he would support Adams and that 

"nothing should deter him." It is likely that his feelings on the question, however strong, 

were subject to confirmation by the existing political conditions in the capital. Since 

things were much as he expected, the original decision remained unchanged. Doubtless 

Clay s conference with Adams reaffirmed his belief that the New Englander's principles 

and oudook were more compatible with his than were those of Jackson. 

xnClay to Francis P. Blair, January 8 and 29, 1825, in Colton, Works of Clay, IV, 

pp. 110-12. The Kentucky resolution is noted in Amos Kendall to Clay, December 22, 

1824, in Hopkins and H rgreaves, eds., Papers o] Clay, Ill, pp. 901-2. 

16 James Buchanan to Thomas Eider, January 24, 1825, James Buchanan Papers, Library 

of Congsess. Nilas" Weekly Register, January 22, 1825, p. 321. 

J7 See Niles" Weakly Register (Baltimore), February 5, 1825, p. 353. 

lSlbid., February 5 and 12, 1825, pp. 353-54, 366-68, 372-76, 380-81. The Microscope 

and General Advertiser (New Albany, Indiana) fur March 25, 1825, expressed the 

feelings of many in an article entitled "Kremer ors. Kremer." After abusing the recalcitrant 

witness, the note concludes: "If such as this man can be pronounced sane, the 

Lunatick [sic) Hospital may in the future be closed, as useless." The same issue suggested 

that "Honest George" was scorned for his actions by most members of the Home. 

A number of people in Kremer's own state viewed his charges with disgust. See Francis 

Johnson to Peter Force, March 29, 1825, Hurja Collection, Tennessee Historical Society. 

°Jackson to William B. Lewis, February 14, 1825, Andrew Jackson Miscellaneous 

Manuscripts, New York Historical Society. Jackson to John Overton, February 10, 1825, 

John Overton Papers, Claybrooke Collection, Tennessee Historical Society. 

"°The Saturday Evening Post (Philadelphia), March 5, 1825, p. 2. This followed a 

comparative calm which existed--on some tronts, at least--after the House decision. 

See the issue of February 19, 1825, p. 3. Of course, the choice was entirely satisfactory to 

many. See, for example, the Circular (Wilmington, Delaware), February 25, 1825, p. 3. 

-"l John J. Crittenden to Clay (copy), February 15, 1825, John J. Crlttenden Papers, 

Library of Congress. Interestingly enough, this letter advised the Speaker to accept 

appointment as Secretary of State, if the position were offered. A central purpose of 

the bargain charge against Clay, Crittenden suggested, was to scare him into refusing 

the office. 

mBuchanan to Samuel D. Ingham, July 12, 1827, in John Bassett Moore, ed., The 

Works of James Buchanan (10 vols., New York, 1960), I, pp. 260-61. Interestingly 

enough, in the spring of 1824, Buchanan felt that if Jackson failed to receive a majority 

in the electoral college, the choice in the resulting election by the House would go to 

another candidate. See Buchanan to Hugh Hamilton, March 19, 1824, Andrew Jackson 

Papers, Tennessee State Library and Archives. 

2SHarry of the West was still trying to refute the odium as late as 1842. See his 

speech "On Returning to Kentucky," June 9, 1842, in James B. Swain, ed., The Life 

and Speeches of Henry Clay (2 vols., New York, f843), If, pp. 565-66.


-°4 For.a study of how the biographers of Jackson and Adams have treated this question, 

see Wdham G. Morgan, "Andrew JaSon Versus John Quincy Adams: Their Biographers 

and the 'Corrupt Bargain Charge, Tennessee Historical Quarterly, XXVI (Spring, 

1967), pp. 43-58. 

25 See footnote 22. 

.-,0 (8 vols., Chi go, 1876-1892), II, pp. 4-9. Quotation on p. 6. 

mA History of the United StateJ (7 vols., New York, 1908-1932), V, pp. 1358-60. 

"S History of the People of the United StateJ (8 vols., New York, 1883-1913), V, pp. 

76-81. 

- Ibid., pp. 76-81,491-95. Quotation on pp. 77, 495. 

a°History of the United States o[ America (7 vols., New York: 1880-1913), IIl, 

pp. 325-28. 

al Ibid., pp. 340-4l. Quotation on p. 340. 

- Rise of the New Wast, 1819-1839 (New York and London, 1906), pp. 261-62. 

mlbid., pp. 267-71. 

4History of the Presidency (2 vols., Boston, 1898-1912), I, pp. 138-39. 

: Presidential Years, 1787-1860 (New York and London, 1928), pp. 137-40. Quotation 

on p. 140. 

Z°lbid., pp. 141-62. Quotation on pp. 161, 162. 

7 (New York, 1952), pp. 336-37. 

s Ibid., pp. 338-39. 

°lbid., pp. 339-40. 


41 Dangarfield, Era of Good Feelings, pp. 340-41. 

4- See, for example, Clay's statement during the debate concerning appointment of an 

investigating committee in which he remarked that any person "base enough to betray 

the solemn trust which the Constitution had confided to him" should receive "instantaneous 

expulsion" from the House. Niles' Weekly Register, February 5, 1825, pp. 366-368. 

48 Dangerfield, Era of Good Peelings, pp. 344-45. 

44The Awakening of American Nationalism, 1815-1828 (New York, Evanston, and 

London, 1965), pp. 224-25. 

4 lbid., pp. 225-28. Quotation on p. 225. The author also points out various other 

"deals" made by Adams in his quest for victory, including political "understandings" with 

Martin Van Buren, Daniel Webster, and John Scott. Dangerfield agrees with the Puritan's 

biographer, Samuel Flagg Bemis, that the agreement with Clay was considerably less 

questionable. 

4 Van Rensselaer, an old Federalist Representative from New York, apparently wavered 

between the candidates. His final decision for Adams broke a deadlock in the 

New York delegation and gave the state (and the election) to the man from ,Massachusetts. 

7 Dangerfield, Awakening of American Nationalism, pp. 226-28. 

4s E.g., "lncedo super ignes," written for December 23, 1824. 


0 Dangerfield, Awakening of American Nationalistn, pp. 228-29. Quotations on p. 229. 

Ibid., pp. 229-30. 

5. Fitty Years of Party Warfare, pp. 294-96. 

" Ibid., pp. 296-306. 

U41bid., pp. 308-10. Quotation on p. 310. 

' (Philadelphia and New York, 1963), pp. 12-16. 

Olbid., p. 16. See footnote 15. 

71bid., pp. 20-22. Quotation on p. 21. 

. 8 Ibid., pp. 22-23. For Buchanan's account of this instance, see footnote 22. 

°lbid., pp. 25-29. Quotation on p. 25. 

00 One doubts whether Clay would ever have favored Crawford regardless of his health. 

1 Pennsylvania Magazine o/History and Biography, LVIII (January, 1934), pp. 61-64. 

6 -Stenherg says Jackson branded as untrue the rumors of corruption. He really said: 

"The rumor of Barter of office, intrigue and corruption still afloat, which I hope for the 

honor of our country there is no truth in." John Spencer Bassett, ed., The Correspondence 

of Andrt o Jackson (7 vols., Washington, D.C., 1926-1935), III, pp. 275-76. 

0 Stenberg, "Jackson, Buchanan, and the 'Corrupt Bargain' Calumny," pp. 64-69. 

641bid., pp. 70-81. Quotations on pp. 76, 81.

"CORRUPT BARGAIN" CHARGE AGAINST CLAY AND ADAMS

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