The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme - Stockholm ...

Business, Boycott & Bureaucracy: The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
and the Global Quest for Conflict-Free Diamonds
Prepared for presentation at the 7 th Pan European Conference on International Relations
Stockholm City Conference Centre, September 9-11, 2010
Holger Meyer
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of International Affairs
The University of Georgia
holgerm@uga.edu
Comments welcome!
Working draft - Not for citation without the author's permission
Abstract
The trade in so called “conflict” or “blood” diamonds has fuelled devastating conflicts in countries such
as Angola, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone. The
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is an international commodity tracking system,
designed to prevent the trafficking in these stones. Jointly created by diamond-exporting countries,
industry and civil society, the KPCS imposes extensive requirements on its signatories to enable them to
certify shipments of rough diamonds as „conflict-free‟. Based on an exceptional WTO-waiver and
employing a distinctive approach to multi-stakeholder diplomacy, it stands out as a unique tool to
advance international security and conflict prevention. While a substantive literature has evaluated the
success of the KPCS from the perspective of international law, few scholars have examined the
stakeholder‟s diverging viewpoints on benefits, burdens and future perspective of the scheme. This
paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature by elaborating the interplay of economic and security
concerns in shaping the KP. Analyzing interviews conducted with representatives of the diamond
industry, government officials, and NGO spokespersons it provides a comprehensive assessment of their
diverging evaluations. The responses suggest that the prevailing dissatisfaction with the scheme is
rooted in the ongoing dispute about the KPs future area of responsibility rather than in a disappointment
with its past accomplishments. Critically assessing the challenges to and future perspective of the KPCS,
the paper concludes with an analysis of the scheme's usability as a model for regulating trade in other
commodities that have the potential to fuel domestic and international armed conflict.
I would like to thank Dr. Susan Ariel Aaronson, Associate Research Professor of International Affairs at George Washington
University, for her helpful comments and suggestions. Research funding from George Washington University‟s Center for
International Business Education and Research (CIBER) is also gratefully acknowledged.
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Introduction
During the second half of the last century, the trade in illicitly mined diamonds had become a major
means for financing large scale internal conflicts in countries such as Angola, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone (Hirsch 2001; Hirsch 2001; Campbell 2002). UN
General Assembly resolution 55/56 defines these so-called “conflict diamonds” as “rough diamonds
which are used by rebel movements to finance their military activities, including attempts to undermine
or overthrow legitimate Governments” (UN General Assembly 2001,1). While some sources claim that
conflict diamonds have had a world market share of up to 25% (Lamptey 2002), the generally accepted
figure for the late 1990s is 4 per cent (Wright 2004, 702).
It is estimated that during Sierra Leone‟s decade long civil war alone, some $300 to $450 million
in diamond revenues were taken out of the country – of which over 90% bypassed government coffers
and exited through illicit channels via neighboring Liberia, Guinea or nearby Cote d‟Ivoire (Hirsch
2001). Although the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels were the main benefactors of these illicit
diamond proceeds, reports suggest that government forces, as well as the intervening Economic
Community Of West African States‟ (ECOWAS) cease-fire monitoring group and some West African-
based Lebanese diamond traders benefited from the smuggling of conflict diamonds as well (Gberie
2002; McGreal 2000). In another prominent case, the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de
Angola (UNITA) reportedly amassed about $3.7 billion in diamond revenues between 1992 and 1997 –
an amount which by far exceeds the sum it received in aid from the USA and its allies during the Cold
War (Grant and Taylor 2004, 387-88)
When large scale campaigns by non-governmental organizations (including Amnesty
International, Global Witness, and Partnership Africa Canada) brought the issue to the attention of a
larger audience in consumer countries, an unprecedented coalition of national governments, corporations
operating in the diamond industry, industry associations and NGOs was formed to curb the flow of these
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illicit stones into mainstream markets. Their efforts resulted in the implementation of the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), an international certification protocol for all rough diamonds
traded globally. It basically represents an export and import control regime. Producer countries control
the production and transport of rough diamonds from mine to point of export. Shipments of rough
diamonds are sealed in tamper-resistant containers and accompanied by a „Certificate of Origin‟ issued
for each shipment. Importing countries will inspect the seal and the certificate at the time of import.
Imports of rough diamonds not accompanied by a certificate issued by a Kimberly Process participant
are prohibited, as are exports to non-participants. As of today, the scheme encompasses 49 members
(representing 75 countries, with the Member of the European Union counting as one single participant),
industry groups and NGOs.
Research Question & Hypothesis
The KP was deliberately designed as a tripartite process. However, the current lively public, political
and scholarly debate about the scheme‟s efficiency and viability is – not surprisingly – dominated by
perspectives and assessments proliferated by NGOs (the third leg of the tripartite setup) in the
international media. While official governmental statements do come occasionally into view, the
perspectives of the diamond industry appear to be remarkably absent from this debate. In order to avoid
the drawing of premature conclusions about the success of the process by adopting the point of view of
one group of stakeholders, it is essential to consult all factions involved in the implementation of the KP.
It is often implied that for the diamond industry, the Kimberley Process is nothing more than a
PR instrument. Chaim Even-Zohar 1 , for instance, asserts that “most people you talk to will give you the
party-line: anything that helps to preserve consumer confidence in diamonds is worth it. As long as the
1 Even-Zohar is the principal of Tacy Ltd, a Tel Aviv-based consultancy specializing in all aspects of the international
diamond business.
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consumer believes that KP is working and that diamonds are clean, the KP has served its purpose from a
business perspective. I surely agree with that. You will not find diamond merchants that will argue
against Kimberley, as no one would argue against the virtues of motherhood, the virtues of clean water
and the beauty of a clean environment” (Even-Zohar 2009).
This paper is intended to address both of these issues. First, it attempts to provide a balanced
view on the Kimberley Process by portraying and interpreting the perspectives of members of all three
stakeholder groups involved in its creation and implementation – NGOs, the World Diamond Council,
and national governments. Second, it evaluates the “party-line” argument by analyzing interview
responses of industry representatives and comparing them to those of government officials and activists.
Ten years after the implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, this paper attempts a
review of the scheme from its stakeholders‟ perspectives. By doing so it intends to shed light on the
ongoing discussion within and among the stakeholder groups about achievements, shortcomings and
future of the scheme.
Central research question:
Why and in how far do perspectives on the effectiveness of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
differ between NGO representatives, government officials and members of the World Diamond Council?
Will be guided by the following primary hypothesis:
Primary Hypothesis:
The current dissatisfaction with the Kimberley Process is rooted in the discrepant interpretation of the
Kimberley Process’ purpose by the three stakeholder groups today. Changes in the goal orientation of
all three stakeholder groups have led to considerable disagreements about the schemes current purpose
and future tasks.
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The Kimberley Process
In the late 1990s, so-called “conflict diamonds” had become the currency and primary financing vehicle
of rebel movements in diamond-rich countries like Angola, the Congo, and Sierra Leone. Controlling
the diamond mining regions, rebel groups used the proceeds to acquire weapons and wage brutal,
decades- long campaigns against unarmed civilians, perpetrating killings, rapes, mutilations, and
abductions into their armies or sexual slavery. As many as 3.7 million people ultimately lost their lives
to the diamond- financed conflicts, and as many as 6.5 million were displaced, not to mention the untold
thousands who suffered other abuses of their most fundamental rights (United States Congress 2003).
Eventually, public outrage over the atrocities committed by diamond-funded rebels in Sierra
Leone jump-started an international campaign to curb the trade in “conflict diamonds.” Non-
governmental organizations began to thrust the issue into the popular conscience when they launched a
constant barrage of reports and criticism that ultimately drew the attention of diamond-producing states
and companies and the global community as a whole (Tamm 2002). Global witness, a non-governmental
organization that focuses upon the linkage between the exploitation of natural resources and human
rights, released a report titled A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan
Conflict (Global Witness 1998). Among other allegations, the report implicated that the diamond cartel
De Beers was buying diamonds from Angolan rebel groups in order to maintain market stability.
Confronted with the prospect of a potentially crippling consumer backlash and boycott, companies
engaged in the diamond trade and industry associations quickly took notice (Price 2003). In its 2000
annual report, De Beers, the world‟s largest diamond producer, acknowledged that “the possible effect
of conflict diamonds on consumer confidence is a threat to the entire legitimate diamond industry.” In an
interview with CNN, De Beers spokesperson Andrew Lamont cautioned that "there is a great danger of
throwing the baby out with the bathwater. We have heard the siren calls that diamonds could go the
same way as the fur trade” (Durham 2001).
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In May 2000, diamond producing countries of Southern Africa met to plan a method by which
trade in conflict diamonds could be halted. At the 29th World Diamond Congress, the International
Diamond Manufacturers‟ Association and the World Federation of Diamond Bourses issued a joint,
“zero tolerance” resolution on conflict diamonds, by which they created the World Diamond Council.
The WDC was intended to represent the interests of the diamond industry in the work to eliminate
conflict diamonds (World Diamond Council 2003). In December of the same year, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted Resolution 55/56, requesting the development of an international
certification scheme for rough diamonds. Forty-eight states sponsored the resolution, and it was
unanimously adopted without a vote (UN General Assembly 2001). This resolution imposed a timeline
on the process, with the UN requesting a report by December 2001. On January 1, 2003, after some two
years of negotiations the KP went into effect.
Literature Review
Since its implementation the Kimberley Process was hailed as a unique and promising new
approach to international, multi-sectoral cooperation. Scholars assessing the novel concept of close
government-industry-NGO cooperation highlighted the speed of its implementation and promising early
successes. In 2003, Taylor and Mohkawa for example conclude that KP was “largely successful […] in
altering the foreign policies of the main diamond buying states” (Taylor and Mokhawa 2003, 164).
Others pointed to the advantages of a deliberately narrow and focused scheme. According to Wright, the
decision to limit the certification scheme to rough diamonds (excluding the cutting, polishing, and
retailing sectors) was essential in ensuring the political feasibility of the project. In 2004, he
acknowledges that “the KPCS demonstrates what is achievable in the circumstances: it is also something
to build on as the realities of implementation sink in. A year ago the international community did not
have even the basic tool for tackling conflict diamonds. Now it has, and is learning how best to use it”
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(Wright 2004, 707). The development of the KP seemed indeed promising: The ending of sanctions
against Angola and Sierra Leone after the ceasing of hostilities and encouraging signs of progress in
settling the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia all pointed “towards the
beginning of the end of conflict diamonds as a threat to international peace and security” (Wright 2004,
705).
While most authors acknowledge that other factors, such as the ending of armed conflict in both
Sierra Leone and Angola, were influential in bringing down the share of conflict diamonds in
internationally traded rough diamonds to less than 1% in the late 1990s, they nevertheless attribute large
parts of this development to the existence of the KPCS. Wright, for example, highlights the degree of
discipline and sense of responsibility it has brought to the international trade in diamonds: “Paperwork
and accurate records, long anathema to the diamond industry, have become the norm under the KPCS.
Governments too have learned valuable lessons, not least in facing up to their responsibility to do
something to help to bring about an end to armed conflict. As a tool for international security and
conflict prevention, the KPCS stands out as a practical measure that the international community has
adopted” (Wright 2004, 702). In a similarly optimistic tone, Grant and Taylor remark that it is “apparent
that the conflict diamonds campaign and the whole Kimberley Process reflect an intriguing development
in global governance and multi-track diplomacy, blurring the line between „official‟ and „unofficial‟
diplomatic channels […]. Thus, the role of NGOs and states in ensuring that diamond-dealing
corporations live up to their commitments means that multi-level involvement and observation of the
situation will continue. It is this example of global governance that perhaps provides the best hope for
maintaining a watchful eye on the global diamond industry” (Grant and Taylor 2004, 399). Commenting
on the uniqueness of the scheme, Wallis points out that “the Kimberley Process was not a proclamation
crafted in the halls of the United Nations (UN) and foisted upon states and, in turn, impacted
transnational corporations without practical application or enforcement mechanisms. It was instead a
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movement initiated by those state governments and companies themselves, who devised and committed
themselves to an executable protocol and monitoring procedures” (Wallis 2005, 1).
Seven years have passed since the implementation of the KPCS. The optimistic tone of the early
assessments has given way to pessimistic, at times devastating critical assessments of the scheme.
Recent studies critique the KP‟s inefficiency, lack of funding, support and enforcement mechanisms, of
incentive and speed of action. This increasingly negative assessment of the scheme reached a
preliminary peak when Ian Smillie, Research Coordinator at Partnership Africa Canada and one of the
architects of the KPCS, announced his resigning from the scheme. In an interview given in July 2009,
Smillie remarked that "A couple of years ago, I would've said that the Kimberley Process got a seven out
of 10. It wasn't perfect, but it was pretty good. But in the last couple of years, all kinds of problems
cropped up and the Kimberley Process seems unable or unwilling to deal with it. I wouldn't give it a
passing grade now. And frankly, I think it's getting worse” (Hildebrandt 2009). In a reassessment of the
KP‟s development in November 2009 he finally remarked that "[t]he whole thing is farcical,
irresponsible and a disgrace” (Berger and Thornycroft 2009). The KP‟s lack of action with regard to the
widely reported deaths of hundreds of people when the Zimbabwean army took control of the Marange
gem fields ignited international attention. As Smillie points out, “[h]ere we have a government that has
lied repeatedly to the KP - clearly stated in the KP report - has a tenuous grip on its diamond industry -
and that courtesy of gross human rights violations - and the regulatory body that is supposed to assure
consumers that the diamonds its certifies are clean ignores its responsibility and sets up an open-ended
tea party.[…] It will turn the KP into a laughing stock and give Zimbabwe more or less carte blanche for
business as usual”(Berger and Thornycroft 2009).
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Research Design
In order to evaluate the degree of and reasons for the contemporary disagreement about the KP‟s
original and current purposes, strengths, weaknesses and future perspectives, 16 questions were devised.
The questionnaire (see appendix) was sent out via email to all 67 members of the World Diamond
Council (WDC), all 49 member-governments and 4 representatives of the three centrally involved civil
society organizations, followed by telephone requests for short interviews concerning these questions.
As of August 1, 2010, 12 WDC members 2 have granted interviews or answered the questions by email,
9 referred to other WDC members, 6 refused to comment and 40 did not (yet) respond. Of the 49
governments contacted (including the European Union as a single political entity), 9 representatives 3
answered the questionnaire, two referred to the US-government representative, and 38 did not (yet)
respond. All three representatives 4 of the major NGOs currently involved in the Kimberley Process
answered our questions, as well as Iain Smillie, former research coordinator for Partnership Africa
Canada.
2
Andrew Bone, DTC/De Beers; Pamela Caillens, Cartier; Philip Claes, High Council for Diamonds Antwerp; Sean Cohen,
Codiam, NY; Chaim Even-Zohar, Tacy Diamond Consultants; Jeffrey Fischer, Fischer Diamonds; Cecilia L. Gardner,
Jewelers Vigilance Committee /New York; Paul Koppelman, London Diamond Bourse; Pierre Leblanc, Canadian Diamond
Consultants Inc.; Matthew Runci, Jewelers of America; Udi Sheintal, Israel Diamond Manufacturers Association, one
anonymous source (d). Please consult references for further information about the interviewees.
3
Brad Brooks-Rubin (USA); Stephane Chardon ( EU); Suresh Kumar (IN); Molefhe Gofaone (BW); Louise Rawlings (AU);
Teresa Trevino (CA); three anonymous sources (a,b,c). Please consult references for further information about the
interviewees.
4
Annie Dunnebacke, Global Witness; Susanne Emond, Partnership Africa Canada; Arwind Ganesan, Human Rights Watch.
Please consult references for further information about the interviewees.
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Results:
Issue 1: Accordance with UN Mandate
Question: How well do design, strategy and structure of the KPCS match the mandate given by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/56?
Response categories:
Representatives of:
Very well Well, with
reservations
Not at all DK/NA
NGOs 2 2
National Governments 4 3 2
Industry 4 6 1 1
Total 10 9 1 5
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Response: Very well
Of the four representatives of civil society organizations interviewed for this project, Ian Smillie
(Smillie 2009), and Susanne Emond (Emond 2009) confirm that the KPCS‟s design, strategy and
structure closely match the UN mandate. However, both activists voice serious concerns about the
usefulness of the original mandate in dealing with the issues facing the scheme today.
Four of the interviewed government representatives stated that the current scheme closely
matches the original mandate. Teresa Trevino (Trevino 2009) is confident that “each and every shipment
of rough diamonds is certified by the participants‟ exporting authorities”. Gofaone Molefhe (Gofaone
2009) agrees that the mandate “asked the international community to develop a detailed yet simple
workable international rough diamonds certification scheme based on internationally agreed minimum
standards - and I believe KPCS fits that description.” Similarly, Suresh Kumar (Kumar 2009) states that
“[t]he mandate given by UNGA Resolution 55/56(2000) is clear and precise. The mandate is for all
diamond producing, processing, exporting and importing countries and the diamond industry to break
the link between conflict diamonds and armed conflict through simple and workable international
certification scheme for rough diamonds and its implementation through internationally agreed
minimum standards and ensuring compliance through periodic reporting and reviews while fully
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especting sovereignty of States. […] The KPCS document, which was negotiated between
Governments, industry and civil society, reflects this mandate.” Louise Rawlings (Rawlings 2009)
underlines that “conflict diamonds now represent less than one percent of the international trade in
diamonds, compared to estimates of up to 15% in the 1990s”.
Four industry representatives share this assessment. In Pierre Leblanc‟s view, (Leblanc 2009) it
“effectively ended the conflicts in Sierra Leone, Congo and Angola [with] no conflict diamonds – as
defined by the UN – left today.” Agreeing with Andrew Bone (Bone 2009) and Cecilia Gardner
(Gardner 2009), Sean Cohen (Cohen 2009) states that the Kimberley Process “effectively fulfilled the
task it was designed for, to help ending the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia and to strengthen
legitimate trade and legitimate companies”.
Response: Well, with slight reservations
Slightly skeptical views are being held by the EU‟s Stephan Chardon (Chardon 2009). To him, the
KPCS at many occasions appears to be “not always able to eradicate [conflict diamonds] quickly,
urgently, immediately where they are. Look at Cote d‟Ivoire: there, rebels are in possession of and
supervising producing areas. Only sending in a real army would be efficient. [The KPCS] is nevertheless
still efficient in making it more difficult and costly [for rebels to profit from diamond exploitation] by
closing doors in trading and consuming countries. We need to make it so costly that it is not even
advantageous. The Kimberley Process comes very close to this.” Two anonymous government
representatives (anonym 2009b; anonym 2009a) agree that the KPCS matches the original mandate well,
but show some concern about the mandate itself. The latter states that, “given the complexity of issues,
the KPCS was an amazing success at that time. It is a remarkable achievement, but by far not flawless.
There was a clear trade off: To get everybody on board one had to settle for the lowest common
denominator” (anonym 2009a).
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Acknowledging the overall success of the KPCS in their responses, Paul Koppelman
(Koppelman 2009) an anonymous source (anonym 2009c), Jeffrey Fischer (Fischer 2009), Matthew A.
Runci (Runci 2009), and Philip Claes (Claes 2009) concede that several compromises had to be made.
As Claes puts it, “everybody agrees that KP is functioning well, but that it is not a 100% watertight
system. But which system is? Concerning the controlling mechanisms in Belgium, we know what we are
talking about: the strictest and best regulated in the world. Every import and export is physically
inspected by experts from customs department – and yet, we still cannot have a full guarantee” (Claes
2009). Udi Sheintal, one of the founding architects of the KPCS summarizes the development of the
KPCS in the following way: “[W]e achieved what we planned. We designed a system of regulation from
scratch. Before, we had no controls of export and import of diamonds at all. The radical changes
introduced through the Kimberley Process are the maximum that could have been done. […] Of course,
people can still smuggle diamonds, but if you smuggle them and you know there are huge sanctions - for
example diamond traders are expelled from all bourses in the world if they are caught trading smuggled
diamonds - there is a small reward compared to a big risk. Consequently, funds generated for rebels are
getting smaller and smaller” (Sheintal 2009).
Response: Not at all
Even-Zohar is the only interviewee in who‟s opinion the “Kimberley Process has utterly failed and it has
not contributed at all to finishing the wars in Angola or Sierra Leone” (Even-Zohar 2009) 5 .
5 For the remainder of the paper quotes will be identified solely by respondent names, not by in text citations.
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Issue 2: Purpose and limitations
Question: Do you think the participants in the Kimberley Process (KP) share an understanding of its
purpose and limitations?
Response categories:
Representatives of:
Yes Yes, with slight
reservations
Yes, with severe
reservations
No
NGOs 1 1 2
National Governments 5 4
Industry 2 6 3 1
Total
8
19
11
5 1
Response: Yes
In Emond‟s view, all participants “fully understand” KP‟s mandate. Five government representatives,
Gofaone, Trevino, Kumar and anonymous sources (a) and (b) share this assessment. In Gofaone‟s
words, “the participating governments, NGOs, Civil Society, human rights groups and various UN
bodies share the same resolve of ridding the world off conflict diamonds.”
Agreeing with Gardner, IDMA‟s Sheintal states that all parties involved “understand perfectly
the limitations: local and domestic law is above the Kimberley Process, unless government are ready to
change local laws – look at the changes in Russia for example. They now declare their diamond
statistics; something deemed a national secret before. [All countries] understand that they have to
boycott trade relations [concerning diamonds] with non-participants. For this it was essential for the
WTO members to get a trade waver.”
Response: Yes, with slight reservations
Convinced that “in general people know the scope of the Kimberley Process,” Ganesan believes that
“the recent controversy is about inadequacy of rules and procedures, not a fundamental dispute about the
mandate [of the KP].”
To Australia‟s Rawlings, “the Kimberley Process has a unique nature and this both creates
challenges and provides benefits as the parties involved bring different perspectives and objectives to the
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table and may at times have differing understandings of the process' purpose and limitations.” According
to anonymous source (b) there is a “general, common understanding, but [there are] nuanced
differences: some see it through lenses of trade, others see it more though lenses of human rights and
human security. Everyone understands that KP does both things, but the emphasis differs depending on
who you are in process.” Chardon shares this assessment, pointing out that “certainly everybody agrees -
but with nuances. Everybody shares and has a common understanding of the KPs core and its minimum
requirements. The core document is accepted by all without restrictions and questions. […] However,
over the years KP has developed. New challenges have appeared – look at Venezuela 2007-08 and today
Zimbabwe. What was foreseen in 2003 has been overtaken by developments on the ground and new
questions have arisen. At this moment we are still discussing and have not achieved a consensus yet.
How far does the mandate of the process extend?” Seconding this point of view, Brooks-Rubin believes
that “in general participants have an understanding of the purpose and limitations […], most agree on
the basic structure, the documents are very clear. The issue is: should we expand it? Diverging views
emerge when discussing how to assess its limitations.”
Six of the twelve interviewed industry representatives mention slight reservations in their
responses to this question. Agreeing with anonymous source (d), and Caillens, Bone concludes that “any
sort of structure like this is not always a meeting of minds.” Like Runci, Claes believes that “everybody
shares the same opinion about the original purposes. However the discussion about enlarging [the
Kimberley Process] to polished diamonds as well is very, very difficult.” Leblanc notes that, while
“there is consensus to a large extend, the NGOs do not completely understand the limitations.”
Response: Yes, with severe reservations
Two civil society organization representatives, Dunnebacke and Smillie, are very skeptical about the
degree of consensus. Dunnebacke remarks that, “on the one hand there is definitely a shared
understanding of the basics, why it started, how it works, what to achieve. But mostly: no. Everyone
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involved has an own, often country specific agenda. NGOs have different agendas as well […]. There
are frequent disagreements during the meetings about what the real purpose is or how much reform is
necessary […]. While certain participants do not want to talk about human rights, this is at the core of
the Kimberley Process for the NGOs.”
Three WDC members share this opinion. Like Cohen, Fischer detects “very different lenses,
aspirations and conceptions of [the KPs] purposes”. Koppelman observes that “the NGOs do not really
understand everything from an industrial point of view. Coming from a different ankle, they would like
to see immense restrictions on trade […]. NGOs are reluctant to be tough on African countries; they try
to avoid a “neocolonial” flavor. So, we are strict on the first world, but not on the third.”
Response: No
In Even-Zohar‟s view, “the industry sees KP simply as a PR instrument” and is not interested in setting
up a truly effective system.
Issue 3: Beneficiaries
Question: Who benefits most from the existence of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme?
Response categories:*
Representatives of:
Industry Nat‟l Governments People in producing
countries
Consumers
NGOs 3 3 1
Nat‟l Governments 8 9 4 2
Industry 8 2 5
Total
*Multiple responses possible
19 14 10 2
Response: Industry
Three out of the four interviewed representatives of civil society organizations perceive the diamond
industry in general as one of the main beneficiaries of the Kimberley Process. Like Smillie and Ganesan,
Dunnebacke recognizes KPs function as “positive PR for the industry.”
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Eight out of the nine interviewed government representatives (Anonymous government sources
(a), (b), and (c) as well as Brooks-Rubin, Chardon, Rawlings, Kumar and Gofaone) mentioned the
diamond industry as a primary beneficiary. While Gofaone points to the important “benefit of improved
consumer confidence”, Chardon distinguishes between actors within the industry. To him, “big
companies in particular gain through improvements of their reputations”. Rawlings, referring solely to
the Australian diamond sector, indicates that “the success of the Kimberley Process is certainly in our
producers' interests.” Besides reputational gains, Rawlings explains that “the Kimberley Process has
brought large volumes of diamonds onto the legal market […]. For example, it is estimated that around
US $125 million of diamonds were legally exported from Sierra Leone in 2006, in comparison to almost
none at the end of the 1990s. The process has clearly assisted legitimate trade in rough diamonds and
made it harder for criminals seeking to trade in conflict diamonds.” In Kumar‟s assessment “the entire
diamond pipeline, starting from the mines to the diamond processing industry benefits from KP.”
Eight of the interviewed industry representatives explicitly mentioned reputational gains for the
industry as a major effect of the establishment of the KP. Agreeing with Bone, Koppelman, Caillens and
Claes, Fischer concludes that, the major benefits to the diamond industry are “first and foremost, the
public image, survival and commercial interests.” To Sheinthal “legal diamond traders” are main
beneficiaries of the scheme because “it provides answers when people ask where your stones are from.”
Anonymous industry source (d) voices the hope that KP “gives diamonds a better position in the market
place.” In Even-Zohar‟s view, “KP has served its purpose from a business perspective […] as long as
the consumer believes that KP is working and that diamonds are clean”
Response: National Governments
Three of the interviewed NGO representatives mentioned the legitimization of formerly illegal segments
of the diamond trade and increased revenues for participating countries as positive results of the scheme.
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According to Smillie, “a huge amount of illegal diamonds has gone legitimate. The KP was supposed to
deal with conflict diamonds, not with illicit diamonds. But, as this distinction is practically impossible, it
drove these things to the surface […]. It has actually forced a lot of criminal and criminalized parts of
the trade to become legitimate. Where it works, it can benefit a lot of poor countries. It can turn
diamonds from a problem into an asset. Look at Sierra Leone: In the late 1990 the country officially
exported about $2 million worth of stones annually, last year this figure stood at $120 million. This is
not lastly due to the KP.” Like Emond and Smillie, Dunnebacke argues that “by and large producing
governments now have significantly increased official revenues from taxes on legally mined diamonds.”
All interviewed government representatives mentioned government revenue as a major benefit of
the KP. Anonymous government source (c) points out that due to KP “rebels have largely lost an
important source of income.” Like anonymous government sources (a), (b) and Trevino, Kumar
underlines that “the legitimate trade in diamonds is an important source of revenue to many
governments around the world.” Chardon explains that it is important to consider “what was before, and
what is now: Since [the KP] was enforced you have good diamonds and bad diamonds […] It resulted in
a dramatic increase in official stones and government revenues.” Rawlings emphasizes that “the
Kimberley Process has assisted in stabilizing and supporting the development of fragile countries. It has
brought large volumes of diamonds onto the legal market which has increased the revenues of poor
governments.” Underlining the benefits to Botswana, Gofaone‟s explains that “a good, clean image for
our product increases consumer confidence and the respect for ruling and legitimate governments,
leading to development and economical growth as well as investor attraction.” Brooks-Rubin points to
the “examples of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola. They ultimately benefited from it and now have
substantial economic benefits as well.”
Anonymous industry source (d) point to the significant leverage that comes with “increased
fiscal control”, while Bone points out that “government taxes and loyalties” help foster political
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development in Africa, citing Botswana as “a glowing example of democracy and good governance in
Africa.”
Response: People in producer countries
Ganesan is the only NGO spokes person who explicitly mentioned “people in affected countries” as
beneficiaries of the scheme.
Four interviewed government officials consider the populations of producer countries to be
major beneficiaries of the KP. In Gofaone‟s view, “incentives channeling diamond proceeds into
development take us a step closer to attaining improved living standards and to attaining regional peace
in producer countries.” Agreeing with anonymous government source (b), Trevino states that “people in
affected areas […] benefit most from the implementation of the certification scheme.” In Chardon‟s
view, “as the KP came in contact with other issues such as human rights, smuggling and so on, it raised
development issues and - to some extent - helped solve these issues.”
Agreeing with anonymous source (d), Bone, and Caillens, Koppelman states that especially
“people in developing countries benefit from the scheme, because there is less child labor, people get
reasonable wages and so on.” Fischer similarly perceives a “genuine concern for the humanitarian
issues” as being a core element of the process.
Response: Consumers
Out of all spokespersons interviewed, only two government officials, Chardon and Gofaone mentioned
consumers as beneficiaries of the scheme in their responses.
18

Issue 4: Public-private partnership
Question: How would you rate the functioning of the public-private partnership?
Response categories:
Representatives of:
Very well Well, with
reservations
Problematic DK/NA
NGOs 2 2
National Governments 6 2 1
Industry 4 6 2
Total 10 10 3 2
20
Response: Very well
A two thirds majority of interviewed government representatives perceives the public-private
partnership to be functioning very well. Seconding Gofaone‟s assessment of a “blossoming public-
private partnership,” Rawlings commends “the collaborative approach of the KP […]. The joint efforts
of governments, industry leaders and civil society representatives have enabled the Kimberley Process to
curb successfully the flow of conflict diamonds since its inception.” In agreement with anonymous
source (a), Trevino, and Kumar, Brooks-Rubin remarks that “it works as well as it possibly can. This is
the only way to make something like this work […]: the industry cannot police itself, governments have
too many conflicting priorities and NGOs cannot put power on the ground.”
To De Beers‟ Bone, the KP represents a “great example of public-private partnership,
notwithstanding its limitations.” Agreeing with Gardner, Fischer evaluates the partnership as “excellent -
from the realization of the problem to the formation of the World Diamond Council and the Kimberley
Process, only very little time passed.” According to Runci, “it evolved from competition in the early
days of negotiation to genuine collaboration today. Sometimes it is entirely cooperative, sometimes
somewhat conflicted. Today, the preponderance of behavior is collaborative, cooperative. Recent critical
statements from civil society are in fact a sign that the partnership is working, a sign of vitality.”
19

Response: Well, with reservations
Acknowledging that “the international public-private partnership works fairly well”, Dunnebacke
cautions that “collaboration varies significantly on the national level. KP is much more successful on the
international then on the nation level.” Ganesan shares these reservations: “Given that multi-stakeholder
agreements are bound by rules and implementation is monitored, [KP] has pretty robust processes for
what it covers. However, political will for collaboration is sometimes lacking.”
Anonymous government source (c) agrees that “in general, [the relations are characterized by]
fruitful cooperation, even though opinions on certain subjects may differ.” In Chardon‟s view the
process “works well, although we go through moments of crisis. As the NGOs are pushing for an
extension of the mandate it is normal that you have discussion and confrontation. Apart from this, the
partnership has worked well between 2003 and 2009. Industry and NGOs take part in discussions, they
are important in putting issues on the agenda and are useful in providing research, for example in the
cases of Venezuela and Zimbabwe […]. In some instances, the industry only provided surprisingly little
information and was more passively involved. But they were present at all stages of the discussion and
sometimes played a very useful role in pushing for solutions. In the case of Ghana, the industry for
example provided technical expertise and implemented an action plan, this will hopefully happen in the
case of Zimbabwe as well.”
Anonymous industry source (d) remarks that cooperation “works quite well. In contrast to the
image portrayed in the diamond campaigns of the NGOs, we work closely with the NGOs. The public is
not aware of this. Many don‟t seem to realize that the knowledge levels of many lower service staff are
very low. For example, many people do not realize that the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
applies only to rough diamonds.” Agreeing with Koppelman, Leblanc states that “overall it works well”
but he cautions that “the NGOs are at times too pushy”. In Claes‟ view “everybody has their own role to
play and the three go generally very well together, however, there is severe criticism of the authorities:
20

They have to step up - not everybody is always on the same page. Take the example of Zimbabwe.
Concerning the diamonds coming from the Marange mines […], the European Union has been the only
participant to take action. This puts European diamond dealers at a competitive disadvantage, trade
simply moves to other centers. We ask for a level playing field, the same measures need to be
implemented in the same way across the world.” Codiam‟s Cohen thinks that “some governments -
especially in Africa - are more reluctant to deal with NGOs then others - mostly those of in Europe and
the US. This might be due to different conceptions of sovereignty and different political cultures.” In
Sheintal‟s view “in many instances, governments would not take on an issue by themselves. They only
do so because the NGO‟s “mirror” shows that they do something good.”
Response: Problematic
In Ian Smillie‟s view, “there was some very good collaboration in the beginning […]. The agreement of
late 2003 to installing monitoring mechanisms was reached through some very good collaboration. Of
course, there was a lot of suspicion in the beginning; the NGOs thought that the industry was the
problem. However, the industry is usually very supportive of the NGOs positions. Today governments
are the problem, especially with regard to the necessity of unanimity in decision making […]. No matter
what the issue is, some governments do not agree.” To Emond, KPs “problematically slow reaction” is
mainly due to its inability to “force governments to be compliant because there are just too many
interests involved.”
Anonymous government source (b) is equally skeptical about the state of collaboration in the
KP: “NGOs and industry almost walked away from the sluggish negotiations in the beginning. The
choice was: Get out or take as much as you can get. Was the decision to stay right? It remains
questionable.”
21

Issue 5: Driving forces
Question: Which stakeholder groups are the primary driving forces behind KP and KPCS today?
Response categories:*
Representatives of:
NGOs Governments Industry DK/NA
NGOs 4 2 2
National Governments 8 8 5
Industry 10 7 7 1
Total
*Multiple responses possible
22 17 14 1
Response: NGOs, Governments and Industry
A majority of respondents agrees that all three groups involved in the Kimberley Process contribute
important impulses to the scheme. According to Dunnebacke, “NGOs were the initial driving force,
generating media attention and thus initially putting pressure on the industry. Today, however,
governments and industry people have become driving forces as well […]. NGOs continue to play a key
role in raising the bar, establishing standards, and pushing [the KP]. But of course, several governments
provide positive contributions and industry is very active, though sometimes not active enough in
pushing it. Of course there are some spoilers, some countries always say no.” Evoking the particular
setup of the scheme, Emond points out that “The Kimberley Process is a membership system: by
definition, members - observers and participants - are the driving forces behind it.”
Five government representatives see all three groups as essential driving forces of the process.
Similar to Rawlings, Kumar states that “the driving force behind KP is the desire of governments, the
diamond industry and civil society to isolate conflict diamonds from legitimate diamond trade.” An
anonymous source (b) agrees that “all actors - Governments, Industry and NGOs - play an important
role. The most vocal are, obviously, the NGOs.” To Brooks-Rubin, “NGOs still play a very important
role in keeping issues alive and identifying issues to work on. They remain very important for pushing
the agenda. Obviously, the industry is in many ways still a key partner to governments, responsible for a
lot of activities, compliance, technical assistance, and so on. Anonymous source (c) states that “the real
22

start were the independent field reports by the NGOs Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada in
the 1990s […] Industry and NGOs together approached the South African Government and keep [the
KP]going.”
Echoing Caillens assessment, anonymous industry source (d) points out that “initially NGOs
drove KP, but trade has made a strong effort to take it under its own wings. The industry was very keen
to have a trade foundation to this. NGOs seem to have weakened down over the past two years, while
government input has become a stronger force.” Similar to Fischer‟s assessment, Runci views the
process as “driven by governments, civil society and industry […]. The three drivers all have particular
sets of needs and preferences.”
Response: NGOs and Governments:
Representing the European Union, Chardon points to the case of Venezuela in order to explain how a
coalition of NGOs and a number of governments steer the process: “Who is driving: At the surface of
things definitely the NGOs. They set the agenda; they put the issues on the table. In reality, however,
certain governments are essential in getting it going and keeping it going. After all it is governments
implementing the scheme, not the NGOs.” Gofaone states that “participating governments, NGOs, Civil
Society, human rights groups and various UN bodies share the same resolve of ridding the world off
conflict diamonds and are the driving forces behind it.”
Recognizing that “NGOS are still in the driving seat, otherwise Kimberley would not have much
of a future and would disappear”, industry consultant Leblanc observes that “governments are
increasingly becoming the driving force, but at the cost of increasing bureaucracy. Implementation,
control, and so on is no longer as efficient as before.” In Sheintal‟s view, initially “governments and
industry did not understand what they were talking about […]. Today, the NGOs are still driving forces -
more PAC than Global Witness – we will see what will happen as Ian Smillie left. However, today 99%
of the countries presented in the process are presented by foreign affairs offices. Once you show
23

diplomats a process you will never take it away from them again […]. Some countries are happier to
carry the burden then others. The United States, the European Union and Canada, South Africa and
Israel have become driving forces.”
Response: NGOs and Industry
Three industry representatives consider only NGOs and the Industry to be driving forces behind KP.
According to Bone, “officially, the driving forces should be the governments, as they own and run
Kimberley. In terms of driving inputs, however, it is clearly the NGOs and the industry.” Cohen shares
this view, explaining that “the industry brought the topic up and the industry approached the South
African governments to get it going. The Diamond Manufacturer Association saw a clear need for
action. The main driving energy today is really a partnership between the industry and NGOs. While the
“teeth” came through government involvement, the substance comes from industry and NGOs.” Claes
sees “still the NGOs in a leading position, taking over the main role, and main responsibility, but the
diamond industry has become more active itself in terms of signaling, identifying problems, urging
everybody to find solutions and to act. The role of the industry is growing bigger and bigger. The role of
the official authorities is a bit disappointing, especially in the African countries.”
Response: NGOs
According to Human Rights Watch‟s Ganesan, “NGO‟s are the drivers behind any type of standard
issues like this. While KP, as an institution has become a reflection of all its members, NGOs remain the
primary driving force.” Smillie complains that “no one actually takes responsibility: no one feels to have
a stake in it. Only the NGOs feel to have somewhat more to have at stake in it. Countries are going to
meetings, but if things are not working there is no big impact on your industry. If there are problems in
Venezuela this does not affect „your‟ world. No one says: „I am proud of KP it is part of our policy to
make sure that it works. While some are more concerned – like the United States, Canada, or Israel –
others like the EU, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia have forgotten about it.” An anonymous
24

government source (b) agrees that “NGOs are still the driving forces who keep the governments honest.
Koppelman, concedes that “trade has an ambivalent attitude about this – we do not like
regulations: the less, the better. On the other hand, the industry is well aware of the possible
consequences of not dealing with the issue. When the NGOs came out against the animal fur market 10-
15 years ago the industry was decimated. In order to keep industry in good light with the general public
it has to abide with the NGOs incentives. It is in the industry‟s interest to see that it is well done.”
Response: Governments
Treviso, in accordance with Gardner argues that “the driving forces are clearly the international
community and the united nations.”
Issue 6: NGO efforts
Question: How important is the inclusion of NGOs for the functioning of the Kimberley Process?
Response categories:
Representatives of:
Essential Important Problematic DK/NA
NGOs 4
National Governments 4 5
Industry 7 1 3 1
Total
15
21
6
3 1
Response: Essential
Not surprisingly, all four representatives of civil society organizations believe that NGO involvement is
essential to the scheme‟s functionality. As Ganesan puts it, NGOs “highlight problems, they have the
expertise, and they bring an important perspective to the table. While consumers, producers and the
industry have material incentives, we contribute a human right and social conflict perspective.”
Four of the nine interviewed government representatives voice a similar assessment. Anonymous
sources (a), (b), and (c) agree that “without the NGOs, the KP would not have come into existence” and
Brooks-Rubin likewise states that it was the NGOs who “got the idea of the KP up and running.”
25

To De Beers‟ Bone, “the inclusion of NGOs was essential. They remain the driving force.
Although they are inclined to a more pessimistic view, they have proven to be a very constructive
element.” Runci remarks that he sees NGO involvement as “entirely positive at this moment. Quite
frankly, industry itself would not have taken up the call. It is reassuring that NGOs are there and lead the
call.” In Caillens view, NGO involvement is “indispensible, otherwise there would be a huge credibility
issue – they constitute an absolutely critical part of it. Without them there would be no review process.”
Agreeing with anonymous source (d), Claes, and Leblanc, Sheintal states that NGO participation is
“essential, if they were not there, the Process would have died.”
Response: Important
Respondents grouped in this category consider NGO involvement important, but not critical for the KPs
existence. Trevino remarks that “civil society participates in review missions and visits, which allows
for transparency in regard to the implementation of the scheme.” According to Rawlings, “civil society
organizations make an important contribution to the Kimberley Process, often in the form of monitoring
and advocacy.” In Gofaone‟s assessment, the key benefit of including NGOs in the process is that it
“allows perspectives from outside of governments to be brought to the table.” Chardon remarks that
NGO involvement is “important, but they are not always acknowledging the sources of their
information.” To Kumar it is important that NGOs “bring in their unique perspective as well as technical
expertise. They also actively participate in the deliberations of the working groups of the scheme.”
Codiam‟s Cohen considers NGOs to be “very reasonable partners, despite their reputation, most NGOs
are not looking for consumer action, but for ways to solve a problem.”
Response: Problematic
Three industry representatives consider NGO involvement as being problematic. Gardner complains that
“NGOs assign mandates to the Kimberley Process that were never intended.” Fischer acknowledges that
“the NGOs were essential as initiators – they truly shocked the industry into realization of the truth.
26

Most of us had no idea what was going on. But today, the conflict diamond problem is very low on the
radar screen. This aggravates the NGOs […]. As they need to advertise the necessity of their existence
and to pay their bills there is a conflict of interest. Especially the less knowledgeable and less
respectable ones need to “create a 9/11” for the diamond trade. Moreover, some NGOs‟ inability to
accept the diamond industry as an ally is distasteful […]. They continue to threaten the industry. You
[the NGOs] woke us up, but now let us be. But they permanently want to increase the scope of the KP
and then to portray the Diamond Industry as slackers.” Koppelman similarly considers NGO
involvement as being “more of a burden, but if they were not there, the industry would drag its feet. The
NGOs make ridiculous demands but don‟t really know what they want. They all have different
perspectives. Just as much as a unified secretariat, an umbrella NGO would be better.”
Issue 7: Government compliance
Question: How well do participating countries comply with the provisions established by the KPCS?
Response categories:
Representatives of: Very well Well, with
reservations
Ambiguous Not well DK/NA
NGOs 1 2 1
Nat‟l Governments 1 5 3
Industry 4 4 3 1
Total 1 9 5 8 2
Response: Very well
Of all 25 respondents, only India‟s Kumar is convinced that virtually all members of the process
“recognize the importance of the Scheme […] and comply with [the schemes provisions].”
Response: Well, with reservations
Botswana‟s Gofaone, confident that “all participants do comply with the required minimum
requirements of the scheme” admits that “a lot still needs to be done to fully enforce minimum standards
in cases of non compliance." Chardon, defining compliance as “adherence to the established minimum
27

standards of 2003”, feels that “very few if any do not comply. For example, consider the presentations of
annual statistical reports and follow ups: Some are delayed but they are still overall satisfactory to very
satisfactory. Moreover, you can always argue that [countries] do not comply enough. However, this is
often caused by non-KP specific factors: How efficient can border controls be in an extremely poor,
developing African country? Compliance depends critically on institutional capacities: police, customs,
established institutions. This area is and will remain problematic, but these issues are way beyond the
scope of KP. Agreeing with anonymous source (b), Rawlings notes that “not all participating countries
comply with the KP. However, where a country fails to comply with the KP‟s requirements they are
suspended or asked to suspend themselves until they can meet its requirements. Venezuela and
Zimbabwe are good examples for this.” Brooks-Rubin believes that “there are view participants that do
nothing. In fact, last year we had 100% statistical reports and nearly 100% annual reports […]. The real
problem is that implementation is really left to governments.”
Five of the industry representatives shared this assessment. Pointing out that “the European
Union has the most sophisticated and elaborate system in place,” Bone acknowledges that “some less
developed countries neither have the political will nor the logistics and resources to implement similar
systems.” Advancing a similar argument as Sheintal, Runci claims that while “most [countries] do take
KP quite seriously, certain instances of inaccurate statistics, smuggling, and even willful flaunting – like
in the Venezuelan case – do exist. Deeper national roots [of the KP] are needed in some countries.”
“Although only view countries do not comply,” Caillens thinks that “noncompliance represents a
problem.”
Response: Ambiguous
Considering non-compliance the exception rather than the rule, Smillie nevertheless points out that
“internal controls in many producing countries are very weak.”
28

Three industry representatives (anonymous source (d), Fischer, and Leblanc) perceive a
significant difference in the level of compliance between developed and developing countries.
According to Leblanc, compliance in the consumer countries is satisfactory, due to “sophisticated
systems of control, judicial systems, computerization, and bureaucracy. However, noncompliance in
producing countries remains problematic for the Kimberley Process.” Koppelman concedes that
“although there are fewer conflict diamonds today, big loopholes still exist and traders in Lebanon, for
example, completely avoid the Kimberley Process.”
Response: Not well
Dunnebacke and Emond consider non-compliance a major problem. According to the former, “a number
of countries – like Venezuela and Zimbabwe – are not complying with the minimum requirements they
have to meet. Cases of corruption in industry, export community and government, as well as weak
internal controls are common. Take a look at Guinea and Congo, for example. Realities in diamond
producing countries with a large alluvial mining sector - diggers, traders and mine monitors – are very
different to those in, say, Belgium […]. While some improvements have been made over the years,
[non-compliance] remains one of the main issues that compromise the scheme.” Emond adds that “a lot
of countries do not comply [with KPCS] as it was set up to be. Minimum requirements are not met in
many places – Zimbabwe in particular and Africa in general – due to different standards, porous borders,
civil war, and lack of infrastructure and resources.”
One third of the interviewed government officials share this opinion. Anonymous source (c) and
Trevino consider “the lack of capacity by some participants to implement the required controls on a
consistent basis [to be] the major weakness of the entire scheme”. Anonymous source (b) points to the
fact that “12 out of the 20 most failed states in the world are diamond producers […]. We need to take
African and South American realities into consideration when evaluating the KPCS. The real issues are
in Western Africa and South America, not in Botswana or South Africa.”
29

Three WDC members conclude that non-compliance represents the single most important
problem to the scheme. To Claes, it represents “the biggest weakness of the KPCS: as everything starts
at the mine, the ways diamonds are produced and traded in diamond producing countries cause trouble
for the entire diamond pipeline.” Agreeing with Even-Zohar, Cohen believes that “governments are very
reluctant to give up their sovereignty. The Russians, for example, do not want to release their data, and
decisions on issues such as Dafur take extremely long.”
Issue 8: Government supervision
Question: How effective are the ‘Certificates of Origin’?
Response categories:
Representatives of:
Effective Effective, with
reservations
Rather
ineffective
Ineffective DK/NA
NGOs 3 1
Nat‟l Governments 4 3 2
Industry 2 5 1 1 3
Total
6
17
11
3 1 4
Response: Effective
Four of the nine interviewed government representatives consider the „Certificates of Origin‟ to be
overall effective tools to curb the trade in conflict diamonds. In agreement with Trevino, Gofaone, and
anonymous government source (a), Kumar states that “KP Certificates are one of the most important
elements of KP minimum requirements. KPCS has developed detailed protocol for issue/receipt and
accounting of certificates. No export/import in rough diamonds can take place without a KP certificate
affirming that the diamonds are conflict free.”
Two of the interviewed industry representatives hold equally positive views of the certificates‟
effectiveness. Bone emphasizes that it is “very difficult to fake these Certificates of Origin” and Sheintal
states that “the Certificates themselves underlie great technical provisions. They cannot be duplicated
30

and accompany the stones in temper proof containers. Only legitimate governments have the power to
issue them.”
Response: Effective with reservations
Dunnebacke, Smillie and Emond consider the certificates effective with reservations. The former states
that “they are quite good from a technical perspective – there are some cases of fraudulence and copying
but statistically very view. The problems are the internal controls – in some places, there are no controls
in place to guarantee where [the diamonds] come from. Diamonds from Congo or Guinea might in fact
come from somewhere else.” Smillie seconds this assessment: “[The certificates] are generally speaking
ok. Criminals will always try to fake them and will be caught. The certificates do not represent a
problem, but the meaning behind them does. If the Congo says we know where our diamonds come
from, is that true? The internal controls are very weak. This does not mean that they do come from a bad
place, but they nevertheless could come from bad place.”
Australia‟s Rawlings believes that “the certificates of origin are effective in determining the
origin of diamonds. We have not received any certificates of origin that we believe are fake or
deliberately false, although we are aware that fake certificates are occasionally used.” Agreeing with
Chardon, who reports “some problems of undervaluation of exports,” anonymous government source (c)
states that “occasionally, fake certificates appear and information on such fake certificates is exchanged
within the KP. However, this does not seem to be a widespread issue.”
Jewelers of America‟s Runci believes that the certificates are “by and large sufficient and
practical, and not very expensive. They are limited because they are not tracking beyond production.
However, they do meet the initial objective. If we want to establish something more rigorous – from
mine to counter – this would be far more difficult. From a risk-assessment point of view, I am not sure if
we could get much better results.” Koppelman recounts an anecdote that “in the beginning of KP, we
received a KP certificate from Ghana or Sierra Leone where the value on the certificate bore no
31

esemblance with the goods reported. Some of the goods were not even diamonds. However, overall the
system works today. It could be made more effective and we must be aware that in certain countries the
certificates can be stricter than in others. England, Belgium, South Africa or Australia are very strict
[…]. If you really want to make it work efficiently, every government needs to issue similar certificates
which need to be registered with importing governments. Everything needs to be emailed centrally to a
secretariat so that the latter can keep an eye on tracking certificates.” Claes agrees that the certificates
work well, but “of course there are exceptions to the rule - weak spots - but in general people are
satisfied with the results. [The system] was relatively easy to create, Antwerp for example had its own
certificates for Congo and Guinea before the KP was implemented.” Leblanc states that he “personally
saw copies of fake certificates, but all in all the mechanism works.” According to Cohen, the certificates
are “very effective in monitoring traffic between “bubbles” of countries. Their overall effectiveness is,
however, dependent on what is going on domestically. […] Now and then there are fake certificates. KP
can and should be more vigilant.”
Response: Rather ineffective
Two government representatives and one industry spokesperson consider the certificates to be rather
ineffective. According to Brooks-Rubin “it is just too easy to go to an office and say: here are my 100
carats of diamonds, please value these at $100 total. The real value is $10. We split the rest. The
expertise of customs officers and border personnel to identify a fake or overvalued certificate is just not
there. The bigger problem is the manipulation of info that is put on the certificates. And there is a
significant amount of rough diamond trade that travels around the world without certificates.” An
anonymous government source (b) adds that “38bn worth of diamonds are traded each year, but only
12bn worth of diamonds are mined. This is because we have at least four changes of hand till the stones
reach the consumer. Control will perhaps become better with technological improvements in the future,
but then we run into the cost-benefit issue. The paper system works in all countries, but sometimes the
32

loopholes are big enough to drive a truck through them. Still, the certificates are definitely deterring
some of the “bad guys”. But it remains impossible to track individual diamonds.”
An anonymous industry source (d) notes that “one of the key weaknesses is that there is no way
to measure the certificates‟ effectiveness in Africa.”
Response: Completely Ineffective
One interviewee, Even-Zohar considers the certificates completely ineffective. In his view, the system
just “„consumes‟ bureaucrats on the governmental side and represents a waste of secretary-hours on the
side of the business. As the system has so many holes, its effectiveness is close to zero. Empty
certificates are for sale in several places at a cost between 1.5 and 3% of the face value of the
diamonds.”
Issue 9: Industry leverage
Question: Does the industry hold governments accountable?
Response categories:
Representatives of: Yes
Yes, with
reservations
Ambiguous No DK/NA
NGOs 4
Nat‟l Governments 1 2 2 4
Industry 8 1 1 2
Total 1 10 7 1 6
Response: Yes
Speaking solely for Australia, Rawlings states that “our industry seeks to ensure that any activity
undertaken by the Australian Government in relation to diamond exports and imports is Kimberley
compliant [...]. Argyle Diamonds Limited (Rio Tinto) is a member of the World Diamond Council and
World Jewellery Confederation (CIBJO), requiring the implementation of the system of warranties and
exclusive trade with entities that include warranty declarations on their invoices.
33

Response: Yes, with reservations:
While believing that “business could do more,” Chardon, nevertheless considers industry to be “very
constructive. In the case of Ghana, for example, Antwerp [the Antwerp Diamond Bourse] helped in
implementing a „footprint‟ for the Marange Minefield. At the national level, however, there is much less
KP coordination with governments because the industry is much less centralized. According to Brooks-
Rubin “the industry likes to say that the governments need to do more to police us. On the one hand they
are right – of course government can always do more on everything. But a deal was struck between
governments and the industry. To permanently complain that governments do not do enough is not
constructive.”
According to De Beers‟ Bone, “this is the question of the moment: we are looking to encourage
governments to put KP closer to the heart of government activity. While we are giving a great deal of
support, this needs to be taken more sincerely.” Sheintal agrees that “although we have a set of rules and
buy laws for diamanteers, we basically see it as a government process.” Runci feels that “in general the
industry does hold governments accountable. In many cases it does have influence to try move
governments in a particular direction. For example, the supply chain of rough diamonds now has very
few choke points with the principal sources in relatively few countries. However, the capacity to
influence government behavior differs greatly between countries. In some countries where trade is
simply anecdotal, the capacity to influence governments is probably limited. But there are many
countries where the diamond industry is of political, social and economic importance.” Caillens agrees
that “the industry‟s capacity to hold governments accountable varies by how active the industry is in a
specific country and depends largely on how important the industry is for that country.” Koppelman
states that “businesses in London and Antwerp do a good job; however I can only speak of Europe.” In
Claes view, “industry oversight works well in Mumbai, New York, Antwerp, or Tel Aviv but I do not
know the situation in every country. South Africa, Canada, Botswana, Namibia, and the USA are very
34

well regulated. The main problems remain in small countries which do not have the infrastructure to set
up better controlling mechanisms.” Leblanc concludes that the industry does “as much as it can. But the
diamond industry has very little influence in most countries. We only provide a fraction of a percent of
economic output in most countries. Consequently the industry often has very little leverage. It is not at
all comparable to the oil or gas industries.” Anonymous source (d) concludes that “We work as well as
we can with all governments, but governments are the ultimate power. The industry itself has gone a
long way to make the process work, but they look to governments to police them.”
Response: Ambiguous
All four interviewed representatives of civil society are skeptical of the industries‟ efforts. Agreeing
with Ganesan, Dunnebacke asserts that “we have to differentiate between local, regional, national and
international industries. Although the WDC repeatedly called for more oversight, it remains
questionable if this means anything. The industry remains quite disconnected.” Echoing this statement,
Smillie adds that “the diamond industry in Bangladesh for example consists of one company that does
the cutting and polishing. This company has zero influence. Bangladesh obviously does not care and
does just everything to stay in business. In Botswana on the other hand, government and industry have
exactly the same opinion, due to the 50/50 ownership situation. The industry as a whole could be much
more powerful than the sum of its parts. It could be much tougher and significantly push KP. While the
WDC‟s statements look quite strong, there is not much pushing going on behind the scenes. The NGOs
are constantly hammering on issues, but this should be done by the industry. After all it is their baby,
and they should take a more proactive role.” Emond agrees: “In a lot of communiqués they ask for more
government oversight, but that is all.”
Anonymous government sources (b) and (c) are similarly skeptical. Codiam‟s Cohen remarks
that “there are too many different factions within the industry: manufacturers are in favor of action,
35

dealers are against action because of fears of more regulation, and big retailers are in general aware of
the potential issues.”
Response: No
According to Even-Zohar the “alleged efforts” of the industry to pressure government into action are
merely “window dressing.”
Issue 10: Industry self-policing
Question: How well does the industry police itself?
Response categories:
Representatives of:
Very well Well, with
reservations
Not well Not at all
NGOs 1 3
National Governments 4 3 2
Industry 3 6 2 1
Total 7 10 7 1
Response: Very Well
Four of the nine interviewed government representatives consider the industry‟s self-policing efforts to
be very effective. In Rawlings view, “the established diamond industry policies itself effectively. In
addition to the system of warranties […], industry has developed measures to address trade in conflict
diamonds which are considered complementary to the Kimberley Process, but not designed to take the
Kimberley Process‟s place.” Listing a number of principles of self regulation adopted by “all industry
organizations and their members” she mentions that “failure to abide by the above principles exposes the
member to expulsion from industry organizations.” Kumar seconds this assessment, emphasizing that
“apart from requirements of KP the diamond industry has developed several protocols for self
discipline.” Making a similar argument, Gofaone explains that “the industry polices itself through
internal controls, peer reviews, quarterly reports, and annual report analysis.” Agreeing with Kumar,
anonymous government source (b) attests that “the industry is eager to collaborate and asking
36

voluntarily for more government oversight.” Specifically referring to diamond traders in New York, the
source states that “they are a very close-knit small community of Hasidic orthodox Jews and Indian
Jains. They know when someone messes around. The small size of the commodity traded is good for
self policing. The high value Hasidim places on personal honor sets the tone in the street where packets
of diamonds worth hundreds of thousands of dollars are traded by verbal agreements.”
Representing the Jewelers Vigilance Committee, Gardner is convinced that “the industry policies
itself very well, because its own well being is at stake.” Anonymous industry source (d) emphasizes the
“very strong sanctions. Members of diamond bourses found breaching the rules are shut of the trade
infrastructure.” Caillens adds that “if any company is found in blatant non-compliance this means the
end of the company in the industry. There are lots of mechanisms put in place.”
Response: Well with reservations:
According to Smillie, “They [the industry] are not as rigorous as they could be. There are diamond
burses in several countries. If you are caught doing something bad you are kicked out of a bourse. This
happens frequently. The Council for Responsible Jewelry has developed standards for the industry.
However, the problems are not caused by the likes of De Beers, Rio Tinto or BHP, but by countries in
which mining is carried out by hundreds of thousands of artisal diggers. The Council cannot reach down
there.”
Three of the interviewed government representatives voice similar opinions. Trevino, Chardon
and Brooks-Rubin agree that big multinational companies like Rio Tinto try to comply. Chardon
cautions, however, that we need to be “careful in defining what we call „industry‟.” According to him,
“the big mines in the hands of big companies generally raise very few if any concerns - look for example
at the Rio Tinto mines in Zimbabwe […]. Even the big companies do make mistakes, but I hope and
expect them to be committed. They have reputational concerns but there will always be black sheep.
Alluvial mining – of course – is quite a different issue.” Brooks-Rubin adds that “while the industry
37

does a good job overall in complying with the KP the attitude prevails that „we may have violators, but it
is up to the governments to catch them.”
Six of the interviewed industry representatives see the industry‟s policing efforts in a favorable
way but mention reservations. Agreeing with Koppelman and Runci, Bone cautions that “the industry
can put in place sanctions but it cannot really police itself. It is legally often simply impossible – to
check private books of other companies, for example. However, we established a voluntary System of
Warranties. […] It is implemented by the World Federation of Diamond Bourses and the IDMA
[International Diamond Manufacturers Association]. The threat of being expelled is a powerful coercive
instrument but government intervention remains essential.” According to Fischer, “most people in the
industry were very eager to help when first made aware of the situation. Of course, there will always be
black sheep who circumvent provisions for personal gain or terrorist motivations.” Claes, referring to the
monitoring mechanisms in Antwerp, complains that “we already had tough controlling mechanism
through our diamond office. It is somewhat cynical: In the wake of the Fowler Report [UN report that
drew attention to the strong link between the illicit diamond trade and African militarized conflicts] we
were all of a sudden attacked for having a system that was too tough. There were cries to limit the
Antwerp system. In order to find a global lowest common denominator we actually had to weaken our
system. […]Nevertheless, so far everything is going good. Of course there are some additional
administrative and financial burdens for the industry but during a review mission in February [of 2009]
we were congratulated for our controlling efforts. There might be problems in other centers sough, and
maybe Antwerp is too strict in enforcing sanctions, thus putting us in a competitive disadvantage.”
Overall satisfied with the industry‟s self-policing efforts, Sheintal mentions that there are “some issues
with Lebanese diamanteers.”
38

Response: Not well
Three of the four interviewed representatives from civic society voiced concerns about the self-policing
efforts of the industry. Dunnebacke confirms that “many large companies have improved a lot, but they
are just a small portion of reality. While DeBeers for example only buys from own mines and knows
where the diamonds are from, smaller companies represent a problem. The WDC simply does not
represent the entire industry. In New York, for example, we recorded with a hidden camera how you can
go to an individual dealer and sell diamonds – cash on table, without any documents or questions asked.
The industry has completely failed to address these issues over the years.” Ganesan doubts the
effectiveness of any self-policing effort “in a vacuum […]. Self-policing by itself is not a solution.” In
Emond‟s view it is “very good in theory, but there are many loopholes. It is easy for those who do not
want to be legitimate to bypass the system. It works well with regard to big players, but there is really no
oversight over the small players. [...] The industry needs to force non members to comply through the
respective governments.”
Anonymous government sources (b) and (c) voice similar concerns. Source(c) explains that “the
WDC aspires to represents the industry. In reality it only represents the bigger, more credible players.
There are huge discrepancies on the national and local levels. Some local diamond mining companies
perhaps do not even try to be good corporate citizens.”
Two industry representatives share these concerns about the efficiency of self-policing efforts.
Leblanc gives “the system as a whole a bit of a failing mark. In advanced countries it is very solid. In
Canada, Japan, Israel, the United States and Europe we have sophisticated controlling and close
cooperation with governments. The problems, however, are not there, but in the developing countries.”
Cohen mentions the “fragmentation of the industry” as a major issue prohibiting coordinated self-
regulation.”
39

Response: Not at all:
In Even-Zohar‟s view, the industry considers KP to be “just another bureaucratic obstacle” to which it
only “pays lip service in order to retain consumer confidence.”
Issue 11: Strengths
Question: What are the major strengths of the scheme?
Response categories:*
Representatives of:
Tripartite
setup
Monitoring
mechanisms
Signaling
effect
National
implement.
Minimal
Bureaucracy
Flexibility
NGOs 3 3 2 2
Nat‟l Governments 7 5 3 2 1
Industry 4 4 6 2 2 2
Total
*Multiple responses possible
14 12 11 6 3 2
Response: Tripartite setup
Asked about the primary strengths of the scheme, Dunnebacke, Emond, and Smillie mentioned its
unique, comprehensive tripartite setup. In the words of Emond, due to this joint effort, “conflict
diamonds are as good as gone, and [the tripartite setup] has reduced illicit trade as well.”
Seven of the nine interviewed government representatives mentioned the tripartite setup as a
major strength. Echoing the assessments of Gofaone, Chardon, and Kumar, Rawlings believes that “the
major strengths of the scheme are its tripartite nature and its comprehensiveness, covering almost all of
the international trade in rough diamonds.” Anonymous government sources (a), (b), and (c) agree that
multi-stakeholder cooperation is particularly beneficial. In (c)‟s opinion it enabled a “win, win, win
situation for NGOs, governments and industry.” Source (a) believes that this “cooperative venture
between governments, industry and civil society is guided by a shared commitment „to make it work‟.”
One third of the interviewed industry representatives, anonymous source (d), Gardner, Bone and
Leblanc mentioned “the unique tripartite setup and collaboration” as being an essential strength of the
KP. In Bone‟s words, “it is very important to the industry and one of the primary safeguards to reinsure
40

consumers. Therefore, it is absolutely in our interest. […] Governments have a direct economic and
political interest in a well run diamond industry and NGOs are important for issues surrounding it.”
Response: Monitoring structures
The monitoring structures of the KP, including statistical reports and peer review visits, were explicitly
mentioned by Dunnebacke and Ganesan. Smillie, particularly emphasizing the theoretical soundness of
the statistical reporting structures, points out that “the Kimberley Process has all the [structural] tools
necessary to be successful…Each country is monitored every three years. Missions are supposed to
include three representatives from governments, one from NGOs, and one from the industry. They look
at internal control system to see if they work or not. The statistic section of the KP is quite a powerful
tool. Every country has to show data, a lot of noise is created if you are late with statistics. For example,
if the Republic of Congo says: we shipped diamonds worth $1mn to Israel, Israel has to have the same
statistics. KP maintains a very detailed website - which is not open to the public - which makes it very
easy to crosscheck. There are no commercial secrets to it.”
More than half of the interviewed government representatives mentioned the monitoring
structures as a major strength of the KP. Gofaone, emphasizing that “a vast pool of experts from
different fraternities and backgrounds” supports the work of the scheme, states that “the guidelines and
principles for implementation are well defined” and that “effective peer reviews, cooperation and
transparency” remain cornerstones of the process. Moreover, he point to the “administrative support and
technical assistance available to all participants.” Trevino underlines that “the major strength is the
international collaboration to jointly implement the KPCS.” Anonymous source (c) agrees that “the peer
review visits are a strength, although they have limitations – like the lack of experience of government
officials. There are few, if any free riders – as there are so many visits, everyone feels the need to
participate in some. […] Moreover, a lot of work is being done on the improvement of foot printing
technologies.” Brad Brooks-Rubin agrees that “the peer-monitoring is very effective and fairly unique.
41

Everything done in the Kimberley Process is subject to peer review.” Anonymous source (b) believes
that “monitoring activities are at the heart of the entire scheme. I have participated four times in peer
reviews and they are effective. While some are really controversial, they do have a real impact. The
United States, for example, changed the whole statistics gathering process in response to a bad review.”
Fischer, Runci, Sheintal and anonymous source (d) agree that the “introduction of controls that
did not exist before” represents one major strength of the KP. In the words of Fischer, “as long as the
system of controls is adhered to it is great, when not; existing problems come to the surface. […] KP is
an important information gathering and communication tool.”
Response: Signaling Effect
Closely linked to the tripartite character of the KP, a number of interviewees mentioned the important
signaling effect of scheme. To Emond, “its very existence is a strength and success, very unique for any
industry. […] It was obviously hailed as a model of certification, brought people together and is often
analyzed as model.”According to Ganesan, “the Kimberley Process firmly put conflict diamonds on the
map [and] set an important standard for other industries at a crucial time.”
India‟s Kumar declares that “the strength of KPCS is its uniqueness”. Brooks-Rubin explains this
effect by contrasting it to other international issues. According to him, “often, the policy is to fix an
issue ad hoc when it occurs - with no lasting solutions for instances when it might come up again. KP
brings a permanent presence to an issue that is not permanently in the news.”
The signaling effect of KP was mentioned by half of the interviewed WDC members. Caillens
highlights that “the public is well aware that the Kimberley Process played a huge role in improving
things. Although it can be criticized on various grounds, it puts issues in the public domain and enables
press, NGOs and industry to focus on these issues.” Agreeing with Fischer and anonymous source (d),
Claes emphasizes that KP “carries a lot of moral authority, and ultimately caused people to start thinking
[…]. It increased consumer awareness of „what‟ and „where‟ to buy and equally important made
42

industry aware of the possibility of severe punishment for non-compliance.” In accordance with
Leblanc, Runci‟s concludes that “the KPCS represents a powerful example of governments, voluntarily
establishing a list of certain requirements for continued trade in a particular commodity […].”
Response: National Implementation
Two respondents of each group of interviewees mention the fact that KPCS is implemented through
individual national legislation as a strength. Smillie and Emond stress that KP is based on a voluntary
agreement, not international law or an international treaty. Smillie points out that the scheme is “at the
same time voluntary and not voluntary. No one is obliged to join; there is no international umbrella
organization involved. It is really up to each government to join, but if you don‟t join, you are unable to
trade with members. To be a member you need to pass certain legislations to conform […], see for
example the United States‟ Green Diamond Act. Instead of a vague UN treaty we had a force of law.
When countries comply with the system this is a good thing.”
India‟s Kumar and Canada‟s Trevino agree that the “implementation of the KPCS […]
conducted based on national legislation” is a major strengths of the scheme.
Like Gardner, Runci points out that “implementation of any international legal scheme instead
of a voluntary political scheme would have resulted in failure. [National implementation] has
demonstrated effective voluntary restraint. It does not - and was not intended to - address broader issues
of illicit trade and smuggling. It presumes effective operation of public institutions […]. KP serves as an
example of governments voluntarily taking on certain requirements for continued trade in a particular
commodity. This is a system of internal controls implementing appropriate legal sanction under national
law.”
Response: Minimal Bureaucracy
The United States‟ Brooks-Rubin emphasizes the fact that the “relatively decentralized scheme does not
radically change the business but is - as I understand - build on ways the existing trade worked.” Fischer
43

highlights that KP was explicitly “designed for minimal bureaucracy” and Bone praises the “very flat
structure of the scheme.”
Response: Flexibility
Two representatives of the diamond industry, Fischer and Bone mention the KP‟s flexibility and
potential to evolve as a strength of the scheme. According to Bone, “this is an evolutionary process, not
something that was set up in January 2003 which would be irrelevant some day. […] They meet twice a
year to further refine the system: Due to its flexibility KP has a great future.”
Issue 12: Weaknesses
Question: What are the major weaknesses of the scheme?
Response categories:*
Representatives of:
Insufficient
enforcement
Politicization
Corruption
Lack of
resources
Negative
changes in
industry
Decentralize
d structure
Abuse by
“legitimate”
governments
Increasing
Bureaucratiz
ation
Fin. burden f.
developing
countries
NGOs 4 3 2 2 1 3 2 2
Nat‟l Governments 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2
Industry 5 5 4 2 3 1 2 2 1
Total 12 11 9 7 7 6 6 6 1
*Multiple responses possible
Response: Insufficient enforcement
All four respondents from civil society organizations voiced this concern. Agreeing with Dunnebacke,
Ganesan observes that “KP itself is very reluctant to sanction non compliant people [and] there are many
ways of getting around [KP controls] due to lack of tracking.” For Emond, “the major problem is the
fact that there is no follow up – the enforcement mechanisms look good on paper but lack real follow up
structures. “ Voicing similar concerns, Smillie adds that “all necessary structures are in place but they
are simply not being used. Monitoring is done in a half/half way. Sometimes you have good reports and
strong recommendations. Most countries apply these or explain why they cannot […]. But at the same
44

time, you have [monitoring] teams that do not know what they are doing. Some don‟t even issue reports,
like a team which was sent to Guiana last year – a country with huge diamond problems. Another team
was sent to Venezuela. It issued a very shallow report, basically repeating what the government officials
told them. Moreover, there are all kinds of problems with the statistics but no follow-up. The Republic
of Congo, for example came back in 2007 after having been kicked out in 2004. Their new statistics
make absolutely no sense. But no one asks questions. Lebanon has been in the media for at least 5
month. The country is exporting more gem diamonds then importing, while not producing any - a
miracle […]. Only when someone gets really angry – usually the NGOs – the issue gets media attention
and it gets embarrassing. Another example is Venezuela. 100% of the produced diamonds are smuggled
out of the country […]. The stones are then smuggled to Brazil. I pointed this out at a KP meeting. The
Venezuelan ambassador was present and simply denied it. Nobody did anything […] The KP is actually
condoning what it was intended to prevent.”
Australia‟s Rawlings agrees that the system needs to be strengthened “in areas such as
monitoring of implementation and the strengthening of internal controls in participating countries as
well as greater transparency in the gathering of statistical data.” Brooks-Rubin confirms that that “all
monitoring efforts suffer from less effective follow-ups.” Anonymous source (b) agrees that, while “the
monitoring works remarkably well, the follow-up remains mixed […]. The problem really is the
consensus system. Everybody has veto power. There is no “kicking out”. It is more like „name and
shame‟ than real enforcement.”
In Tacy Ltd.‟s Even-Zohar‟s view, “the enforcement system has so many holes [that] its
effectiveness is close to zero. All these governmental officials […] haven't the foggiest idea how to
interpret the data they have before them. They cannot – they are not from the diamond business.”
Anonymous source (d) concedes that “while trade in the western countries is 100% controlled lack of
enforcement in Africa and its producing countries represent a major weakness. Diamonds are not in the
45

headline right now, there is simply no political stomach to take on the issue. A new international crisis
might “help”, or perhaps political will might return after the economic recovery.” Fischer adds that
“although breaches are frequently identified there is often no enforcement. The political will is
oftentimes lacking.” In Claes‟ view, the “biggest weaknesses” are the “controlling mechanisms [in
certain countries]. This causes trouble for the rest of the diamond pipeline. As long as the international
community does not act – for international political and geopolitical reasons – this remains very big and
problematic.” Leblanc concludes that “the greatest danger of this „fiddling around‟ is the perception of
inefficiency.”
Response: Politicization
Politicization is mentioned by the second most number of respondents. Smillie complains that, while
“South Africa, Botswana and Namibia were leaders in building the KP; they now seem to have forgotten
why. South Africa, for example has gone out of its way to protect Zimbabwe. Political agendas are
clearly at work.” Emond agrees that “reaching a consensus becomes problematic when conflicts of
interest come into play. It is obvious what has to be done about Zimbabwe and Venezuela but internal
measures are not implemented due to diverging political interests [of the members].” Reaching similar
conclusions Ganesan states that “the political will for collaboration is frequently lacking.”
Anonymous government source (b) indicates that “the politics of the European Union is a big
problem: The expulsion of Venezuela took two and a half years, because Europe, the chair of the KP at
that time blocked it for political reasons.” Echoing Gofaone‟s concerns regarding “political
undercurrents”, Chardon perceives “a certain amount of politicization. The more you move from the
core mandate, the more exposed the KP becomes to critique and political relations become more
important. In reality, by all means, diamonds have never been a big issue in Venezuela. It was never a
big producer – it just became one because it was politicized.”
46

From a business point of view, Even-Zohar mentions the particular status of the United States in
the system and the political implications of this position: “The industry keeps quiet about the U.S.
because the U.S. consumes 50% of the world‟s polished [diamonds]. One just doesn't offend the U.S.”
Agreeing with Claes, Koppelman notes that “after setting out the guidelines [for KP], everything became
very political. Once governments get involved you get a lot of political horse trading […]. As soon as
governments get involved this is unavoidable.” Leblanc observes an “increasing politicization of the
process, especially in African countries, with Mugabe and Zimbabwe blocking it. It becomes too
politicized and thus looses efficiency. Sheintal complains that “countries exploit the KP rule that all
decisions need to be made unanimous. Russian support for Venezuela, for example, made any quick
decision impossible.”
Response: Corruption
Eight respondents mentioned corruption as a major weakness of the process. Agreeing with Smillie,
Dunnebacke is concerned about the “huge amount of corruption in many countries.”
Australia‟s Rawlings mentions that “corruption is a very important issue in some participating
countries, particularly developing nations.”Anonymous source (c) adds that “the KP represents a great
opportunity for bureaucrats to extract money from the industry - often through arbitrary rent-collection.”
Brooks-Rubin points out that “a fair number of producer countries perform poorly with regards to
Transparency International corruption indicators. Diamonds are an easily smuggled commodity. The
level of expertise in many diamond offices and among many people in the industry is very low. The
level of corruption is evidently quite high.”
Agreeing with anonymous source (d) Even-Zohar states that “anywhere where an official in a
corrupt regime in Africa, Russia, Asia or anywhere else gains discretionary power, you create a new
collection or extortion point. In the DRC, for example, if there is a 5% export tax on rough, a $10
million parcel should generate $500,000 tax income. At the Kimberley-valuation point, the value is
47

established at $2 million, the tax is reduced to $100,000 and the "saved $400,000" is split between the
exporter and the KP official. One can write a book with documented examples.” Agreeing with Caillens,
Koppelman sees the corruption issue rooted in the economic situation of the people in many producing
countries: “they earn so little that corruption is rampant – this lies in human nature.”
Response: Lack of resources
According to Smillie lacking resources are a fundamental problem for the Kimberley process. “For
example, if a monitoring working group tries to put together a team to work in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, it can happen that they do not get any volunteers because if you volunteer, you have to pay for
all your expenses – like plane ticket, hotel room, etc. yourself. And you do not get reimbursed for the
time spent. The same is the case for NGOs […]. Not many NGOs can afford plane tickets. KP thus is
self-selecting. Having a paid staff and a centralized budget would help to get a more efficient, effective
and democratic approach to things.” Dunnebacke shows equal concern about the lack of financing and
the fact that “everybody needs to finance themselves.”
Advancing a similar argument, anonymous government source (b) states that “the quality of the
chair [of the KP] is a factor of a country‟s capacity to put resources behind it.”Anonymous source (c)
agrees that “more funding is urgently needed.” In Brooks-Rubin view “because the process does not
have sufficient funding, countries are on their own to fund participation in the peer review process.
Some participants who would be good reviewers simply do not have the necessary funding.”
Agreeing with Caillens, Koppelman complains about the lack of funding, arguing that “there is
no need for a big apparatus with high costs. Much can be done by financing a simple email
correspondence system which sends automatic copies to a centralized secretariat.”
Response: Detrimental changes within the Industry
In Emond‟s view “individual artisanal miners in African countries are suffering from the
implementation of the Kimberley Process.”
48

Anonymous government source (c) recounts how “the government of Angola removed „illegal
miners‟ in the name of Kimberley” and Brooks-Rubin adds that while “KP was not meant to address the
conditions of the individual diamond miners, artisanal miners are indeed made very susceptible to
exploitation.” Anonymous government source (b) recounts another instance where “small scale,
„illegal‟, alluvial miners in Mugabe‟s Zimbabwe where gunned down by helicopter gunships. This is
comparable to the “terrorism pretext” in Russia or Pakistan.”
Three industry representatives mentioned negative changes in the makeup of the industry due to
the KP as one of its major weaknesses. Claes is concerned that, while “everybody [in Antwerp] realizes
the necessity of the system, the trade has just moved. People are not coming to Antwerp anymore
because here the controls are the toughest. They simply move to other trading centers.” Like Claes,
Cohen detects “a certain criminalization of people who simply want to survive. I know about an incident
where a man traded diamonds at gas station for bananas. This is like „stealing coal‟ from the railroad
tracks after World War II. Would we track and punish dirt poor people for growing and selling corn?
[…]. KP completely ignores this social dimension. I see it as a matter of development like the gold rush
in California. KP seems to favor structured, big companies at the expense of small ones. How can we
expect an alluvial miner in Sierra Leone to be able to get certificates? […] Many “illicit miners” simply
want to eat, and are not controlled by any militia. Just look at the Zimbabwean government cracking
down on alluvial miners. I think KP created the Problem in Zimbabwe.” Fischer states that “small
individual firms will be crowded out. They most likely have it harder now.”
Response: Decentralized Structure
Agreeing with Dunnebacke and Emond, Smillie complains that “there is no secretariat, no central body.
Everything has to be done by the individual participants and observers.”
Anonymous government source (c) agrees that “the lack of a secretarial structure makes it much
more difficult to establish a collective memory.” Brooks-Rubin adds that “without secretary, staff, or
49

udget, basic administrative work is not done: we have a bureaucratic system without real enforcement
tools […]. The real problem is accountability. Although the Kimberley Process is a tripartite system at
the international level implementation is really left to the individual governments. This is a problem.”
Koppelman voices similar concerns that “if you really want to make it work efficiently […],
everything needs to be emailed centrally to a secretariat so that the latter can keep an eye on tracking
certificates.”
Response: Abuse by “legitimate” governments
Emond and Ganesan feel that “KP was not designed for and is not able to prevent government forces
from reaping benefits from human rights exploitations. This is the key problem today – for example in
Zimbabwe.”
Anonymous government source (b) agrees that KP is at times deliberately “used as a pretext to
suppress people […]. It was simply not designed to deal with human rights issues. If this was the goal it
would have been impossible to get the Chinese and the Russians on board.” Anonymous source (c)
agrees that “the process was initially set up as an anti-rebel process. The supervision of legitimate but
“bad” governments in the „Zimbabwes of today‟ – especially Venezuela and Zimbabwe itself – who
apply KP in their own ways was never intended. Corrupt governments are something KP never
envisioned. This is a key weakness! The whole thing started to stop the connection between diamonds
and chopped-of hands. Venezuela simply does not fit into the KP scheme.”
Along these lines, Koppelman argues that “in Zimbabwe they kill people or push them out of
mining areas, while government people take over the mines. The Kimberley process has not worked
there – and it cannot work in a place where the state itself is abusing it.” In Cohen‟s opinion,
“„legitimate‟ governments like the one in Zimbabwe abuse the Kimberley Process to enrich themselves.
Unfortunately, the international community is obliged to side with these governments. Moreover, KP is
ill prepared to deal with failed states, where “legitimate governments” often only controls some cities.”
50

Response: Bureaucratization
Anonymous government source (a) argues that “with increasing complexity of the KP and its rules,
“there is a danger of bureaucratization.”
Agreeing with Gardner, Leblanc finds that due to the “increasing bureaucratization in the
implementation of its controls the Kimberley Process is not as efficient as it used to be.” Even-Zohar
describes KP as “just another bureaucratic obstacle.”
Response: Financial Burden for Governments
Brooks-Rubin finally fears that “governments that do not have a lot of money and resources are asked to
devote a certain amount of money and staff, which perhaps could be spend in better ways to improve the
lives of their citizens.”
Issue 13: Threats to the KP
Question: What are the biggest threats to KP and KPCS’ future development?
Response categories:*
Inactivity
Lack of
political will
Obsolescence
Unrealistic
expectations
Lack of
financing
Representatives of:
NGOs 3 3 1 1
Nat‟l Governments 4 2 2 2 1 1
Industry 5 4 3 4 1 1
Total
*Multiple responses possible
12 9 6 6 2 1 1 1
Response: Inactivity
Interstate war
Nationalizati
on
Competing
certification
systems
Three out of the four interviewed representatives of civil society organizations mentioned that the KP‟s
reluctance to act poses a critical threat to the future of the scheme. Like Ganesan, Smillie points out that
“Zimbabwe can get away with murder […]. Sooner or later some government will say: this is not worth
the effort. Countries like Canada, with their own diamond mines might pull away from it.” Emond adds
51

that “the inaction of the Kimberley Process when problems arise, the ongoing debates, the lack of
commitment, the commercial governmental interests all add to the incapacity of its members to take
hard decisions.
Australia‟s Rawlings sees “the biggest threat to the future of the Kimberley Process in the
challenge it faces in dealing with participating countries that do not fully implement the scheme. Unless
the KP is able to effectively deal with countries such as Venezuela and Zimbabwe, it risks losing the
confidence of governments, industry, NGOs and the public.” Agreeing with Trevino, anonymous source
(c) fears a “loss of credibility if major compliance issues are not solved in a timely manner.” Chardon
feels that KP repeatedly showed its “inability to eradicate conflict diamonds quickly, urgently and
immediately where they are.”
Agreeing with Koppelman and Even-Zohar, Caillens sees “one major threat in the discrepancy
between facts and ambition, disproving the effect of the Kimberley Process and undermining it as a
whole.” To Cohen the KP is running the danger of “becoming a club […] accompanied by a reluctance
to take action.” Runci concludes that at times it seems to “fall asleep, and does not pay attention to the
critical evaluation of it.”
Response: Lack of political will
Agreeing with Ganesan and Emond, Smillie fears that “apathy and lack of political will” are among the
biggest threats to the Kimberley Process.” Anonymous government sources (b) and (c) complain about
the “absence of real political will” and the “lack of political stomach as diamonds are not a headline
issue,” respectively. Agreeing with Cohen and Bone that “the the lack of political support is a major
problem” anonymous industry source (d) argues that “things especially need to be tightened up in Africa
itself.” Runci finds that “the Kimberley Process needs to move beyond the notion that consensus means
unanimity […]. It now has to show maturity of judgment that does not limit the organization to the will
of its worst members.”
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Response: Obsolescence
In Dunnebacke‟s view, the “threat of irrelevance is created by the public perception that all conflicts
ended.” Brooks-Rubin and Chardon agree. The later states that, while “not lethal, irrelevance presents a
serious threat to the Kimberley Process. It can only be relevant if it brings additional benefit in terms of
reputation. As no diamonds are really fitting the definition of “conflict diamonds” anymore it is
sometimes hard to explain its usefulness besides its role as a security mechanism.” Tacy Ltd‟s Even-
Zohar claims that KP was irrelevant from the very beginning, because “it has not contributed at all to
finishing of [any civil wars.]” To Sheintal, on the other hand “the ultimate threat is the lack of rebels in
Africa. Ironically, the Kimberley Process‟ worst enemy is its success.” Seconding this argument, Cohen
concludes that “the major problem today is posed by “problem diamonds” not “conflict diamonds” and
evil governments, not militias.”
Response: Unrealistic Expectations
In Brooks-Rubin‟s view, excessive demands and expectations pose a threat to the process. “Of late, the
tone used by NGOs often goes too far in terms of condemnation of the Kimberley Process, the fatalistic
language is not ultimately helpful for what we are trying to achieve. There is a difference between
constructive criticism and predictions of complete and utter failure. The good is not the enemy of the
perfect. If the Kimberley Process is good right now, „not perfect‟ does not mean it is a failure.” Kumar
perceives “the growing belief of participants that an informal mechanism like KP can serve as a model
for conflict prevention,” as a considerable threat to the process. Agreeing with Jewelers of America‟s
Runci and De Beers‟ Bone, who cautions that “the NGOs should not permanently attack and dismiss the
KP,” Fischer complains about “completely unrealistic and unfair demands. This is the biggest threat to
the whole process.” Koppelman voices similar concerns, mentioning that “NGOs are sometimes getting
ridiculous demands in their heads - not right now, but they had that in the beginning. If all regulations
imagined would have been enforced, trade would have come to a complete stop.”
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Response: Interstate war
In Kumar‟s view, “the biggest threat to KPCS is […] the potential of conflicts breaking out in different
parts of the world thereby disrupting the legitimate trade.”
Response: Nationalization
In Koppelman‟s, opinion “African governments, independently wanting to control diamond mining in
their own countries” pose a challenge to the process.
Response: Competing certification systems
Cohen sees a threat in the fact that “some countries - like Canada and Botswana for example” try to
build their own “brands” of conflict free diamonds. I consider this a terrible mistake. It creates a „smell
around diamonds‟. Diamonds in general need to be perceived as a brand of love and luxury.”
Issue 14: Improvements
Question: What improvements to the KP/KPCS do you suggest?
Response categories:*
Representatives of:
Political
collaboration
Technical
support
Funding
Centralized
structures
DK/KA
NGOs 3 1 2 1
Nat‟l Governments 3 5 2 1 2
Industry 6 1 2 1 4
Total 12 6 5 4 7
*Multiple responses possible
Response: Political collaboration
Dunnebacke, Smillie and Emond agree that political action needs to be better coordinated to be able to
“act proactive rather than reactive.” The United States‟ Brooks-Rubin suggests a “pooling of resources,
more cracking down on criminals and a stronger international interconnection – with Interpol for
example.” Agreeing with Gofaone, Rawlings recommends a number of actions to further strengthen
international cooperation in “areas such as monitoring of implementation and strengthening internal
controls in participating countries.” Six industry representatives call for more and better international
54

cooperation as well. Anonymous source (d), Fischer, Caillens and Runci all agree in their statements
with Cohen that “more political collaboration is necessary to enforce minimum standards on which to
base the diamond trade.” De Beers‟ Bone argues for “more collaboration between all bodies – perhaps
the Kimberley process and EITI could contribute and benefit from each other.”
Response: Technical support
Brooks-Rubin advocating for the introduction of more efficient tracking technologies, argues that
“increased collaboration needs to encompass the scientific efforts as well. The strength of the KP is and
needs to be to bring diamond experts together who can determine if statistics make sense.” Trevino
recommends that “we need to require the use of letters accompanying core samples all the way through
the chain of custody.” Chardon feels that improvements are necessary “more on the technical rather than
the political level – especially with regard to internal controls and the tracing of fake certificates.”
Anonymous source (b) agrees with Rawlings that “the technology for tracking is improving: “footprint”
instead of “fingerprint” technologies are being developed. But still a lot more data collection and
processing is necessary. It will probably only be cost efficient in disputed cases.” Cartier‟s Caillens
seconds the call for “more statistical work.”
Response: Funding
Smillie repeatedly recommends that a “paid staff and centralized budget would help to get a more
efficient, effective and democratic approach to things.” Likewise, Brooks-Rubin and anonymous source
(c) agree that “more funding is urgently needed.” Caillens feels that it is necessary to “allow for more
resources. All signatories should have a stake in the industry. Consequently, they should sponsor the
process better.” Koppelman demands that the participants need to “try and maximize the best resources
for the whole KP.”
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Response: Centralized structures
Smillie and Emond repeat their argument for an administrative centralization of the process to make it
more efficient in the future. Brooks-Rubin agrees that the “development of a more centralized KP is
really necessary.” In a similar manner, Koppelman demands a secretariat that will administratively
control the different centers.
Issue 15: Mandate Expansion
Question: Should the KP’s mandate be expanded? If so, what additional issues should be incorporated?
Response categories:
Representative of:
Keep KPCS
unmodified
Expand KPCS to incorporate
Human rights issues Cutting & polishing sectors
Abandon
KPCS
NGOs 4 2
Nat‟l Governments 5 3 1
Industry 8 2 2
Total 13 9 3 2
Response: Keep unmodified
Five of the nine interviewed government representatives prefer to retain the limited KP mandate.
Rawlings states that “the Kimberley Process needs to retain the confidence of governments, industry,
NGOs and the public. Provided it continues to do this, Australia believes it has a strong future [...].
Australia does not believe there is a need to expand the scope of the scheme beyond that. Anonymous
source (a) agrees that “KP should keep an important role in the years to come and continue to focus on
the essential.” Confident that “the KPCS will continue to be as effective in the future as it is today,”
Kumar feels that “the present structure of KPCS has served the diamond industry well. The mandate
given to KP by the UN is precise and acceptable to all member Participants.” The EU‟s Chardon fears
that “the more you want to embrace, the less you can really achieve. If the mandate gets blown up too
much, the process will get aggressively rejected by some countries. KP was intended to be a technical
instrument, not a political one. If human rights issues were added, some members would strongly oppose
56

it. This would decrease its effectiveness.” Anonymous source (b) seconds this assessment, believing that
“to incorporate the cutting and polishing facilities would be very difficult. Moreover, it is unlikely that
the Russians and Chinese would agree to include any language stressing human rights [...].”
Eight of the twelve interviewed industry representatives favor to keep KP‟s current mandate. De
Beers‟ Bone argues that “we should not pile anything on top of the process. [The recent developments
in] Zimbabwe are not about the KP and the latter can do nothing directly about it […]. This should not
be a discussion about widening the scope but widening participation.” Runci supports this statement,
claiming that “some members of civil society would like to see some parameters broadened, to expand
the conflict diamonds definition. It is a mistake to try to take on more before KP is able to take on and
resolve operating difficulties within the original mandate. The current scheme went as far as the political
will of governments could have possibly gone. Trying to implement an international legal scheme
instead of a voluntary political scheme would have resulted in failure. Still, KP continues to be
absolutely necessary, although it is not yet performing at a level everybody wants it to. It would be
dangerous with regard to the future vitality of the KP to try to expand the mandate too quickly.” Like
anonymous source (d) and Gardner, Fischer argues that “KP should maintain its current shape.” Leblanc
prefers to “keep it as a security mechanism. In case war erupts again in places like Angola, the system
would already be set up – it would be way too costly to start from scratch again. The NGOs‟ plans to
expand it - to cover poverty, child labor, and illicit diamonds - would make it too big and inefficient. It
is challenging enough to live up to the present, limited mandate. Sheintal objects to an expansion for
similar reasons: “for every issue you have other mechanisms. We do not need to step in other
organizations‟ territories.” Koppelman, “preferring to keep it as it is,” concedes that “if the general
public feels more protected by an enhanced process, only then we should expand it.”
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Response: Incorporation of human rights issues
All four interviewed representatives of civil society are in favor of an expansion of the Kimberley
Process to explicitly cover human rights issues. According to Dunnebacke, “human rights issues are
very much part of the KP mandate – but some clarification is needed. […] Many people say that [the
KP] is no longer relevant, but Zimbabwe is a forceful reminder that it still very much is.” Ganesan, in
contrast, feels that the original definition does not cover human rights issues and was “too narrow from
the beginning. Countries like Russia just saw one problem [the conflict diamond issue] that had to be
solved. The unintended consequence, however, was that it may have given the wrong impression to the
general public that it covers everything. The future success of the scheme is going to be completely
dependent on whether they can expand the definition of conflict diamonds: Will they be able to develop
policies and mechanisms to deal with human rights issues as well?” Smillie skeptically asks: “Why
should we put time and money into the KP if Zimbabwe and others can get away with murder? When
regulators do not protect the things they are designed to protect, then the whole process suffers. Human
rights need to be factored in exactly because of this issue. […] Although human rights abuses are finally
being discussed, talk and action are very different.” Emond agrees that “in order to get really „clean‟
diamonds it is essential to include human rights in the definition.”
Anonymous government source (c) feels that “the time is not right, but we do need to explore a
possible expansion of the definition of conflict diamonds. It is simply impossible to explain to the
public: yes, people were beaten and killed for these stones, but these are not conflict diamonds.” Trevino
conditions her support for such an expansion on the condition that “the controls to be established need to
be workable and implemented accordingly, and the international community has to be supportive of
such an approach.” Brooks-Rubin is unsure about the KP‟s “ability to take on additional issues now that
the „real conflict diamonds‟ have essentially disappeared.” The human rights abuses linked to the
diamond trade in Zimbabwe are -so far- outside of KP‟s mandate.” According to him, “ultimately the
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security and stability of the diamond industry is connected to security and stability of the populations of
the countries where they come from. Therefore, it has and should become a discussion ground for
human rights problems. My concern is that the KP would become simply a sounding board for NGOs to
complain about these issues.”
Cohen shares the belief that “we live in a post conflict diamond world. The definition does not fit
the problems of today anymore – as we can see in Zimbabwe. We need to expand the scheme as the
square peg does no longer fit into the round hole. A restructuring along a moral „good/bad‟ line is
necessary. We need to let free people make their living instead of supporting governments that behave
like militias. A globalized moral ethic has to evolve, with minimum standards on which to base trade.”
Cartier‟s Caillens states that “the reports about Zimbabwe are of real concern to us. We need the KP to
adjust and evolve […]. The primary focus should be and remain on human rights. We possibly need a
new, broader definition [of conflict diamonds]. Still, we need to refrain from overburdening the process
and limit it to things that really can be dealt with. If we stretch it too much, it might end up diluted.”
Response: Incorporation of the cutting and polishing sectors
Agreeing with Emond, who states that “all smuggled stones sooner or later end up in the cutting and
polishing centers,” Dunnebacke advocates that “statistical reporting needs to be expanded to the cutting
and polishing sector to monitor „what goes in and what comes out […]. I hope this would close some
loopholes. As soon as the diamonds enter the cutting and polishing centers in trading and manufacturing
countries they cease to be covered by KP. This is where the control ends. The possibility to get
diamonds into polishing centers and thus slip out of the process‟ control is a major loophole that needs
to be closed. The centers need to report their statistics.”
Gofaone believes that the current scheme “serves [Botswana‟s] government interests well as far
as protection of our clean legitimate rough diamond trade business is concerned for the benefit of the
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country‟s economy and its people.” However, he agrees that “there is room for expansion of KP – e.g.
tracking of rough [diamonds] to polished outcomes.”
Response: Abandon the entire KP
Two interviewees are in favor of a complete abandonment of the KP. In Even-Zohar‟s view, “the way
KP is evolving it tends to become a liability.” Claes agrees that “maybe we should start thinking if we
really need to keep it. Its original raison d‟être were the conflicts in Sierra Leone, Angola and so on. The
problems in Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe are something completely different. Conflict diamonds have
disappeared. Some say we need to keep the KP as a precaution. I do not agree: Diamonds alone have
never caused wars. It is obsolete. It was a good thing but now has become a burden on countries and the
industry. An expansion would defeat the purpose. Why should human rights only be dealt with in a
diamond context? Labor conditions cannot be handled in this limited framework […]. Moreover, it is
hard to compare European to African and Asian standards. We need a debate, but not in the framework
of the KP.”
Issue 16: Model function
Question: Could the KPCS serve as a model for regulating trade in other commodities that could
potentially fuel conflict?
Response categories:
Representative of:
Yes Yes, with reservations No
NGOs 4
Nat‟l Governments 1 5 3
Industry 4 7 1
Total
5
21
16
4
Response: Yes
According to India‟s Kumar, “KPCS can definitely serve as a model where exploitation of natural
resources has led to conflicts. The lessons learnt during the implementation of the KPCS can prevent the
illegal use of natural resources for fuelling conflicts.”
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In Bone‟s view “this is worth considering. It was already mentioned at the G8 summit. As a
consensus framework the KP provides an excellent example.” Anonymous industry source (d) considers
the KP to be “a good blue print for other trades […]. As diamonds are very easy to smuggle this makes it
difficult to control movement other then in producing countries. This is much easier with timber or oil.”
Cohen agrees that “oil and timber can perhaps do similar things and the tripartite setup might be used in
dealing with global warming as well.” Koppelman notes that “the agreement between major producing
countries and major trade organizations could certainly be used as a template for the trade in other
commodities.”
Response: Yes, with reservations
All four interviewed representatives of civil society organizations feel that the KP model needs to be
amended in order to be useful as a blueprint for other certification schemes. According to Dunnebacke,
“the circumstances under which the process was created were very specific and unique, so was the
political will at that time. Although it would be very difficult to reproduce such a scheme, the
certification idea could definitely be a good tool for other commodities as well.” In Ganesan‟s view, this
largely depends on the type of commodity in question.” To Smillie, “the most important lesson is that
involving all three stakeholder groups is a very good thing. This has kept the Kimberley Process as
honest as it is. Otherwise it might have become a „total zero‟. The actual business of certification might
be trickier with logs or coltan.” Emond states that “trade in diamonds is very different from other
commodities, for example coltan. Some good lessons can be taken over, but it cannot be applied 1:1 to
other resources.”
Agreeing with Gofaone who considers the KPCS to be capable of providing “a foundation upon
which other commodity tracking systems can be built,” Trevino cautions that “it is unlikely that the
conditions and elements that were present during the creation of the KPCS will ever exist for another
commodity.” Differentiating the diamond industry from other industries like coltan or gold mining and
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distribution, Chardon thinks that KP could “serve as a model to some extent. Nevertheless, it is and will
remain unique. The structure of the industry – most notably the power of De Beers – really helped to get
it started. In other industries it would not be as easy. Moreover, the industry is very sensitive to
reputational risks – this is not so much the case for coltan and gold. Brooks-Rubin mentions that “the
Burma Jade Act intended to curb Burma‟s benefit from Jade and Rubies [as] evidence that KP already
serves as a model. There are a lot of calls in other sectors that „we need something like the Kimberley
Process.‟ However, it remains somewhat unique and challenging to replicate. A lot of problems that
exist should make people think about if it is replicable.” Anonymous government source (a) cautions
that, while KP is replicable, “we should be very careful and explicit about what we want to track. KP
was designed for a particular problem at a particular time.”
Gardner and Fischer, mentioning that they do not know enough about other industries for a
qualified statement, nevertheless suggest that “KP could probably serve in such a function.” Runci feels
that “the model is certainly applicable to other supply chains, but structure and nature of that chain need
to be suitable to a KP type model.” Leblanc voices a similar opinion, saying “yes to the model function,
no to a simple replication. We need to keep the uniqueness of each industry in mind. For example in the
iron ore industry you would need to certify entire ships, not just small shipments. So we better keep the
particular characteristics of oil, timber and so on in mind.” Caillens voices the hope that the model
“might trickle down to less appealing products.” For Claes the KPCS “can serve as an example of
traceability of natural resources - but only an example, because the structure of the international
diamond industry is very unique.” Sheintal finally feels that the Kimberley Process‟ nature as “a system
of restrictions can serve as a starting model in cases where other raw materials in different areas of the
world are misused by rebels, be it precious metals, oil, or other commodities.
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Response: No
According to Rawlings, “Australia considers the KPCS to be an effective model for addressing and
stopping trade in conflict diamonds. Australia is not looking to institute export controls on other
commodities at this stage. There are diamond-specific issues associated with the design of the KPCS
which may not be appropriate for other commodities such as bulk commodities for example.”
Anonymous government source (c) is skeptical because “most commodities have nothing consumers can
readily get their head around – like the beauty of the product, or the number of countries that mine. The
commodity needs to be identifiable. This makes it very difficult.” A similar opinion is voiced by
anonymous source (b): “The good in question – diamonds – is very unique and has a lot of
values/emotions attached, like love, eternity, purity etc., which is not the case with other goods. Also,
the diamond industry‟s structure is quite unique.” Even-Zohar, feeling that “the Kimberley Process has
utterly failed,” does not see it as a model for any other commodity as well.
Discussion
The questionnaire developed for this research paper was designed to provide insight into key
stakeholders‟ evaluations of the past, present and future development of the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme. Individual and aggregate analyses of the responses received provide
comprehensive, at times counterintuitive, explanations for the current disagreement about the current
state of the KP.
Issue 1: Accordance with UN Mandate
In contrast to the overall impression conveyed in the media coverage (e.g. Dugger 2009), a great
majority of interviewed stakeholders indicated their confidence that KP does in fact match the original
UN GA mandate of 2000. Nineteen of the 25 interviewed representatives believe that KP‟s design and
modus operandi function “very well” or “well with reservations”. There appears to be a strong
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consensus that the Kimberley Process was designed to curb the trade in conflict diamonds (as defined by
UN GA resolution 55/56) and that it successfully contributed to achieving this goal. There does not
appear to be a fundamental rift between stakeholder groups regarding this issue. However, a number of
respondents voiced the concern that the original mandate does not reflect contemporary realities. As will
become apparent in the discussion of the KP‟s weaknesses (issue 12), threats to the scheme (issue 13),
and the desirability of a mandate expansion (issue 15), the current dissatisfaction about the process is
much more rooted in diverging opinions on its future than on its track record.
Issue 2: Purpose and limitations
This emerging disagreement becomes evident in the representatives‟ assessment of the participants
understanding of the purpose and limitations of the scheme. Although a significant majority (nineteen
respondents) agrees that participants do have a shared understanding, NGO representatives appear to be
more skeptical on this issue. While they concede that there is an overall agreement on the basic rules of
operation, half of the NGO representatives interviewed voiced the concern that diverging agendas and
interests tend to distort the understanding of individual stakeholders. Three of the industry
representatives agree that diverging interests significantly impede the consensus on the KP‟s purpose
and limitations.
Issue 3: Beneficiaries
The assessment of the respondents‟ view on stakeholder benefit (issue 3) reveals that a vast majority of
interviewees (19 respondents) consider the industry as a major beneficiary of the scheme. The greater
part of all stakeholder groups recognizes the PR value of the scheme and the financial gains associated
with it. More surprisingly, all government representatives, but only two industry representatives
consider national governments to be among the major beneficiaries of the scheme. Increased tax
revenues are considered to be direct results of the KP‟s implementation. These responses suggest that
over time economic considerations have supplemented, if not replaced (cf. issues 12 and 13)
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humanitarian considerations. “People in producing countries” were only explicitly mentioned by ten of
the twenty five respondents. This is surprising in comparison with the almost unanimous evaluation of
the KP‟s accordance with the original UN mandate (issue 1). A possible explanation for this result can
be found in the fact that a number of observers consider the “conflict diamond” issue as having been
solved and that KP today functions as a “safety mechanism” rather than an active tool of intervention
(cf. issues 13 and 15). Overall, these results reveal that industry as well as government representatives
are well aware of their own benefit from the process in its contemporary form. The continuing benefit
for these two stakeholder groups appears to be not only a contributing factor to their reluctance to
reform the process (cf. issue 15) but also to lie at the heart of NGO complaints about the inadequacies of
KP (cf. issue 13 and 14).
Issue 4: Public-private partnership
Twenty of the twenty-five spokespersons interviewed consider the unique public-private partnership
which is at the heart of KP to be functioning “very well” or at least “well, with reservations.” Civil
society activists are overall more skeptical then industry representatives. Problematic cooperation with
governments is mentioned most frequently by all respondents critical of the state of collaboration.
Together with the responses to questions on government compliance (issue 7), government supervision
(issue 8), weaknesses of KP (12), threats to KP (13), and necessary improvements (issue 14), a strong
impression is generated that insufficient governmental cooperation appears to lie at the heart of the
dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. The fact that a significant majority of respondents
provides a positive assessment of the public-private partnership indicates that the general setup of the
process continues to be supported by a majority of stakeholders (cf. issue 5 (driving forces), issue 6
(NGO efforts), and issue 11 (strengths)).
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Issue 5: Driving forces
Almost half (11) of all respondents mentioned all three stakeholder groups as essential driving forces
behind the KP. A vast majority, 22 of the 25 representatives interviewed considered NGOs to be among
the most important driving forces, followed by governments (17) and industry (14). While there appears
to be a strong consensus that NGOs are essential contributors to the scheme‟s ongoing development (cf.
issue 6), the industry‟s contribution to the scheme appears to be less appreciated, with only half of all
government and NGO representatives attesting the private sector a major function in driving the process.
This is explainable by the fact that most respondents perceive KP today first and foremost as an
intergovernmental issue. Once the KP was established, NGOs continued to bring attention to
shortcomings in the political process, while industry actors and associations principally restricted their
contribution to compliance with the established requirements.
Issue 6: NGO efforts
Similar to the response patterns regarding the previous issue (issue 5); a large majority of respondents
(21) considers NGO inclusion “essential” or “important” for the continuing development of KP. While
all activists as well as all government representatives appreciate the function of NGOs in the process, ¼
of the industry representatives voiced concerns about the NGOs current efforts to expand the original
mandate of KP (cf. issue 15). The by and large positive evaluation of NGO involvement by all
stakeholder groups (issues 5, and 6) indicates an overall appreciation of third party auditing in the
process. A majority of government and industry representatives perceive the NGOs continuing criticism
of shortcomings of the KP, voiced in the media, as predominantly constructive and necessary for a
continuous development of the process.
Issue 7: Government compliance
The negative evaluation of the quality of government compliance by one half of the respondents
supports the argument that the current dissatisfaction with KPs effectiveness can to a significant degree
66

e attributed to shortcomings in this issue area. While no NGO representative considers government
compliance to be satisfactory, 1/3 of government representatives and more than half of industry
spokespersons are skeptical as well. Most skeptics mention lacking compliance in developing countries
as a severe impediment to the effectiveness of the KP. Noncompliance in these countries is linked to
corruption, lack of resources, and the general socio-political situation in the countries in question. The
fact that most diamond producing countries are developing countries (anonymous source (b) explains
that “12 out of the most failed states in the world are diamond producers”) highlights the severity of this
problem. Among the example used by respondents to illustrate their arguments are Venezuela,
Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Guinea, and Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Issue 8: Government supervision
Notwithstanding the skeptical assessment of overall government compliance with the KP minimum
requirements (cf. issue 7), most respondents (17 out of 25) consider the „certificates of origin‟ to be
either “effective” or “effective with reservations.” While most respondents cite known incidences of
forgery or other problems and attribute these primarily to socio-economic or political conditions in
producing countries (cf. issue 7), they base their overall positive assessments on the certification
system‟s practicality, cost/benefit ratio, and a comparison of the status quo to the situation before the
implementation of the system. Suggestions made to improve the system include the establishment of a
central data base, more statistical comparisons, and the improvement of domestic monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms (cf. issue 14). As illustrated by the responses to issue 7, deeper sources of the
dissatisfaction with parts of the KP‟s mechanisms appear to be closely linked to institutional weaknesses
in producer countries. Based on the responses received, it appears doubtful whether a reform of the
process‟ surveillance mechanisms could succeed without being preceded by fundamental changes in the
socio-economic realities in these countries.
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Issue 9: Industry leverage
Opinions about the industry‟s efforts to hold governments accountable are divided. Eight of the twelve
industry representatives consider the industry‟s efforts to be overall adequate. However, several
interviewees emphasize that KP is today primarily a government responsibility and that the industry‟s
capacity to influence national governments are in most instances very limited. In contrast, all four civil
society representatives demand more initiative and engagement from the industry. Acknowledging that
“the industry” in reality comprises a variety of different actors and levels of operation, they urge the
major umbrella organizations, such as the WDC to not only demand stronger enforcement and oversight,
but to actively contribute to its establishment. Responses to this issue indicate the problems associated
with the attempts to operationalize „the industry‟ as one homogenous actor. On the one hand, industrial
umbrella organizations, such as the World Diamond Council, present themselves as proactive and
representative partners in the process. Most major industrial actors are members of these umbrella
organizations and perceive these organizations as the official representatives of the industry. On the
other hand, national, regional and sectoral particularities, agendas and competition impede a consistent
unified platform.
Issue 10: Industry self-policing
Similar to the responses to issue 9, the respondents‟ assessment of this issue area depends crucially on
their perception of what constitutes „the industry.‟ About 2/3 of all respondents (17) consider industry
self-policing to be “very well” or “well with reservations.” Most skeptical are the interviewed NGO
representatives, who – while acknowledging adequate compliance of the major companies and
associations – point to the tremendous problems that continue to exist in less regulated and organized
sectors of the industry. Similar to issue 9, responses to this question revealed disparities in perceptions
and disagreements about definitions which appear to be a contributing factor to the current dispute over
the Kimberley Process‟ performance.
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Issue 11: Strengths
Overall, respondents mentioned seven characteristics that are considered by some of them to be a
strength of the scheme. A majority of respondents (14) mentioned the tripartite setup (the inclusion of
civil society, government, and industry stakeholder groups), further supporting the assumption that the
general framework of the process remains largely undisputed (cf. issues 1, 2, 4, and 6). The
implementation of monitoring mechanism, despite their shortcomings (cf. issue 8 and 12) is appreciated
by a majority of NGO (3) and government representatives (5) and explicitly mentioned by 1/3 of
industry representatives. Half of the latter mention the signaling effect of the KP as an important
strength of the system, with two NGO representatives and three government officials sharing this
opinion. The very fact that a global regulation system was put in effect is perceived as an important step
in dissuading illegal activities and providing incentives to contribute to the establishment of coordinated
trade patterns. Two respondents from each stakeholder group consider the voluntary national
implementation – in contrast to a formal treaty – a major strength of the scheme, as this was the only
way to reach a global consensus. Three respondents lauded the minimum bureaucracy and two
respondents the flexibility associated with this setup. The answers suggest that there still exists a
general consensus that the establishment of the Kimberley Process represented a considerable success
and improvement over the previous situation.
Issue 12: Weaknesses
Despite the continuous support of the process in general, several severe weaknesses were mentioned by
the stakeholders. Most prominent among these is the perceived lack of enforcement. All NGO
representatives as well as 1/3 of the government officials interviewed and almost half of the industry
spokespersons complain about this issue. Moreover, 11 respondents are dissatisfied with a perceived
increasing politicization of the process. In the view of 3 NGO representatives, 3 government officials
and 5 industry spokes persons, political agendas threaten the process by hampering objective
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assessments and impartial enforcement. Corruption, particularly linked to socio-economic conditions in
producer countries, is mentioned by the third biggest group of respondents (cf. issue 7). A lack of
resources is lamented by seven respondents. A similar number perceives negative changes in the
industry, including the criminalization of small scale miners and a relocation of trade to less regulated
trading centers. The decentralized structure of the scheme is considered by six respondents to be a
weakness, with three NGO representatives being particularly concerned about this situation. Two
respondents from each stakeholder group mentioned the abuse of KP policies by authoritarian
governments in order to increase their grasp on domestic diamond resources and the increasing
bureaucratization of the process as major weaknesses, respectively. One industry representative voiced
concern about the financial burden KP represents to less developed countries.
The variety and severity of complaints, encompassing political, social, financial, economic,
bureaucratic, as well as legal issues sheds light not only on the multifarious arguments fueling the debate
about the KP‟s future, but also serves as a reminder of how many spheres of human interaction this
global regulatory regime impacts. While most stakeholders continue to support the scheme (cf. issues 2,
4, 6, 11, 13, and 16), their diverse perceptions on and expectations of the process appear to expose the
scheme to an amount and a variety of demands which can hardly be satisfied in its current dimensions.
Issue 13: Threats to the KP
Estimates concerning threats to the future development of the KP are closely related to respondents‟
perception of its greatest weaknesses. The KP‟s repeated inactivity in cases perceived to be clearly
within its mandate is mentioned by 12 respondents as a major threat to its future functionality. To 3
NGO representatives, 4 government officials, and 5 industry spokespersons, continuing inactivity will
make decision makers rethink necessity and raison d‟être of the process. Nine respondents mention a
perceived lack of political will to maintain the process as a major threat to its continuing functionality
(cf. issue 12). Six observers, explaining that „real conflict diamonds‟ defined according to the very
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narrow original UN GA definition have virtually ceased to exist, believe that KP itself might be
abandoned due to a lack of applicable cases (cf. issue 15). Two government officials and four industry
representatives warn that unrealistic expectations, voiced by the NGOs, might render the Kimberley
Process incapable of fulfilling the tasks it was originally designed for. Two observers deem lack of
financing to be a possibly existential threat to KP. The breakout of major interstate war, large scale
nationalization of diamond production facilities and the establishment of competing regional
certification systems are mentioned by one observer respectively. Echoing assessments of issues 7 and
12, it appears that reluctance to respond effectively and rapidly in crisis situations as well as a lack of
political will are closely related and widely perceived core problems of the contemporary KP. Reasons
for this assessment are not lastly reflected in the perception that KP might in fact become, or already be
obsolete (as the current UN GA definition of conflict diamonds 6 strictly applied does not fit the recent
developments in Zimbabwe and Venezuela, where government forces are accused of committing human
rights violations).
Issue 14: Improvements
In accordance with the assessments of issues 7, 8, and 12, a majority of NGO representatives as well as
1/3 of government officials and half of the industry representatives interviewed argue in favor of
increased intergovernmental cooperation. Five government representatives and one industry
spokesperson recommend improving technological support and tracking mechanisms, while five
respondents argue for increased funding and four interviewees demand a centralization f the
organizational structures of the scheme. Again, the responses suggest that the KPs future development
primarily depends on the desire of national governments to make this intergovernmental scheme work
and to enforce the minimum standards implemented by the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.
6
Rough diamonds which are used by rebel movements to finance their military activities, including attempts to undermine or
overthrow legitimate Governments (UN General Assembly 20011).
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Issue 15: Mandate Expansion
A majority of respondents is opposed to an expansion of the Kimberley Process‟ mandate. Five
government officials as well as 2/3 of the interviewed industry representatives prefer to maintain the
current UN GA mandate. While most respondents in this category are aware of the fact that „conflict
diamonds‟ as defined by the UN GA resolution have virtually ceased to exist, they are reluctant to
expand the definition. Citing the lack of political will, changed circumstances, the threat of extensive
bureaucratization and the inability of an item specific mechanism to singlehandedly change socio-
economic realities in producer countries, they prefer to maintain the process as a security mechanism in
case conflict diamonds should reappear in the system. However, almost 1/3 of the respondents,
including all civil society representatives, argue for an expansion of the KP mandate to explicitly cover
human right issues. Half of the interviewed civil society representatives would like to see the mandate
expanded to cover not only the trade in rough diamonds but the cutting and polishing sectors as well.
Two industry representatives consider the necessity for the process no longer given and would prefer a
complete abandonment of the scheme. The responses to this issue further reveal the fault lines
underlying the discussion about KPs future and help explaining some of the dissatisfaction voiced in the
news media. A majority of government and industry representatives doubt the ability to reach global
consensus on an expansion of the process, are concerned about the political feasibility and economic
consequences of such an expansion, and consequently interpret the UN GA mandate in a more narrow
fashion. NGOs and some other representatives, on the other hand, highlight the atrocities committed by
governmental forces in a number of diamond producing countries and interpret the UN GA mandate in a
broader way, allowing them to call for trade sanctions against the respective governments.
Issue 16: Model function
Despite the aforementioned disagreements about future makeup and scale of the process (issue 15), a
majority of participants agrees on the schemes overall success (cf. issues 1, 2, 4, 6, and 11).
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Consequently, a large majority of respondents (21) consider the scheme a potential model for trade
regulating mechanism for other commodities that could potentially fuel conflict. They cite the lessons
learned during the implementation, its low costs and relatively low requirements as arguments in favor
of a replication of the process. The oil, timber, gold, and coltan industries are mentioned as potential
areas of application by different respondents. However, sixteen of the twenty-one proponents of the
KP‟s function as a model caution against a premature replication of the scheme. Most proponents
acknowledge that the circumstances under which the KP was created were exceptional. Moreover they
point to the unique characteristics of the commodity regulated, different industry setups and distinctive
supply chains. Only four representatives, three government officials and one industry spokesperson,
reject this proposition.
Conclusion
The contemporary dispute about the effectiveness of the Kimberley process appears to be rooted much
more in a divergence of opinions concerning its future, then its past achievements. As only diamonds
"that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally
recognized governments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments, or in
contravention of the decisions of the UN Security Council” are considered „conflict diamonds‟
according to the UN GA definition of 2000, the end of most civil wars in diamond producing countries
at the turn of the century left the Kimberley Process without a clear-cut area of responsibility. In the
view of some observers, predominantly representatives of non-governmental organizations, the
Kimberley Process‟ mandate was never solely restricted to curbing the trade of „conflict diamonds‟ but
always included the protection of human rights as well. Emphasizing that the KPCS core document
explicitly cites the process‟ dedication to the protection of human rights (Kimberley Process 2003, 1),
they demand for a broader interpretation of the original mandate. The discrepancies between these two
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interpretations explain much of the contemporary dispute about how (and if) the Kimberley Process
should react towards the ongoing human rights violations by the recognized national governments in
states like Zimbabwe and Venezuela. Interpreting the NGO‟s at times fatalistic assessments of the
scheme‟s future and understanding their frustration with its inaction within the context of the ongoing
struggle for a redefinition of the Kimberley Process‟ core purpose allows us to reach a more balanced
assessment of the first ten years of existence of this unique tripartite commodity tracking system.
The analyses of the respondents‟ assessment of the sixteen issues outlined above reveals a
remarkably broad consensus among majorities of all stakeholder groups with regard to the original
mandate, purpose and general operation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. A majority of
interviewees expressed their satisfaction with the general framework of the scheme, not lastly through
their recommendation of the scheme as a model for commodity tracking systems in other industries.
As a pioneering attempt to curb social ills through the implementation of an economic
commodity tracking system, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme provided an innovative, if not
perfect, solution to a global problem and fostered a lively debate about the benefits and shortcomings of
multi-stakeholder processes in general and the ability of. As the future of the scheme will crucially
depend on international agreement on a new, precise mandate and a pledge to its enforcement,
consumers need to demand such commitment from their governments.
The current study represents only a preliminary attempt of exploring reasons and consequences
of the discrepant opinions about this unique certification scheme. As such it has a number of limitations
and its results need to be interpreted with caution. First of all, it does not provide a representative sample
of the opinions prevailing in the international diamond industry, national governments, or
nongovernmental organizations. As a case in point, most government officials interviewed represent
European and North American nations, compared to only one representative of a South Asian country
(Suresh Kumar, Undersecretary to the Government of India at the Department of State) and one
74

epresentative of an African producer country (Molefhe Gofaone, Scientific Officer at the Department of
Mines of the Republic of Botswana). Results from correspondence with representatives of additional
countries, NGOs, and companies will be integrated into this research project as soon as they become
available.
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Appendix: Questionnaire
Issue 1: Accordance with UN Mandate
Question: How well do design, strategy and structure of the KPCS match the mandate given by UN
General Assembly resolution 55/56?
Issue 2: Purpose and limitations
Question: Do you think the participants in the Kimberley Process (KP) share an understanding of its
purpose and limitations?
Issue 3: Beneficiaries
Question: Who benefits most from the existence of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme?
Issue 4: Public-private partnership
Question: How would you rate the functioning of the public-private partnership?
Issue 5: Driving forces
Question: Which stakeholder groups are the primary driving forces behind KP and KPCS today?
Issue 6: NGO efforts
Question: How important is the inclusion of NGOs for the functioning of the Kimberley Process?
Issue 7: Government compliance
Question: How well do participating countries comply with the provisions established by the KPCS?
Issue 8: Government supervision
Question: How effective are the ‘Certificates of Origin’?
Issue 9: Industry leverage
Question: Does the industry hold governments accountable?
Issue 10: Industry self-policing
Question: How well does the industry police itself?
Issue 11: Strengths
Question: What are the major strengths of the scheme?
Issue 12: Weaknesses
Question: What are the major weaknesses of the scheme?
Issue 13: Threats to the KP
Question: What are the biggest threats to KP and KPCS’ future development?
Issue 14: Improvements
Question: What improvements to the KP/KPCS do you suggest?
Issue 15: Mandate Expansion
Question: Should the KP’s mandate be expanded? If so, what additional issues should be incorporated?
Issue 16: Model function
Question: Could the KPCS serve as a model for regulating trade in other commodities that could
potentially fuel conflict?
78