Religion, Theology, and Philosophy on the Way to Being and Time ...

120 I. M. Fehér / Research in Phenomenology 39 (2009) 99–131
remains, although fundamentally changed, forever included in it. 61 Th ose who
fi nd themselves in a pre-Christian state are not “awake,” have no awareness of
themselves, do not possess life experience because they simply do not experience
life in its factical totality. Only the rebirth, as it were, opens up access to
the fi rst birth. Th e case is similar to what it will be with respect to the authenticinauthentic
distinction in Being <strong>and</strong> Time (which may be seen to be a specifi c
subsequent elaboration on this state of aff airs): inauthentic being always
already precedes authentic being, which in its turn erects itself upon, <strong>and</strong> has
as its fundament, the inauthentic. It is only after having performed the passage
from the inauthentic to the authentic that inauthentic being as such—<strong>and</strong>
together with it, the very distinction itself—becomes fi rst disclosed <strong>and</strong> accessible.
For to be inauthentic means having no awareness of being inauthentic
(just like the self-suffi ciency of life works against its own becoming aware
of it). And vice versa: to be authentic means gaining awareness of <strong>and</strong> assuming
consciously one’s inauthenticity as a past that has always already preceded
it <strong>and</strong> that therefore—in its specifi c quality as a past always already surpassed
<strong>and</strong> overcome—belongs intrinsically <strong>and</strong> inextricably forever to authenticity.
Facticity, Historicity, Christianity
A point that is worth special attention in this context is Heidegger’s repeated
claim that factical life or life experience is intrinsically historical. As has been
noted, one of the contemporary tendencies with which Heidegger engaged in
in-depth confrontation from the very beginning was historicism. Th e idea that
life <strong>and</strong> history belong intimately together—that life should primarily be
seen as historical life—was central to Dilthey <strong>and</strong> life-philosophy in general.
Heidegger appreciated very much indeed 62 Dilthey’s attempt to approach historical
life but criticized him for reasons analogous to those he formulated
about his approach to life—that is, the inadaquate conceptuality rooted in
a one-sided theoretical comportment. Although Dilthey did tend to grasp
historical life, his endeavor came under the infl uence of neo-Kantianism <strong>and</strong>
the erkenntnistheoretisch atmosphere of the age, so that he ultimately misunderstood
his own undertaking: the attempt at a new <strong>and</strong> fresh access to historical
life was reduced to, <strong>and</strong> replaced by, the attempt to attain possibly
objective historical knowledge <strong>and</strong> thus to elevate history to the rank of
61) See GA 9: 63: “in der gläubigen Existenz das überwundene vorchristliche Dasein existenzialontologisch
mitbeschlossen bleibt.”
62) See the references in note 27 above.