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<strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>ASEAN</strong>: 

<strong>Bank</strong>ing on a Bent Brotherhood 

The Briefing Paper was written by Nina Somera. 

<strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>ASEAN</strong>: <strong>Bank</strong>ing on a Bent Brotherhood 

Briefing 

Paper 

NGO Forum on ADB 

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<strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>ASEAN</strong>: 

<strong>Bank</strong>ing on a Bent Brotherhood 

After nearly half a century, the <strong>Asian</strong> 

<strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> (ADB) has made its 

mark in the economic l<strong>and</strong>scape of the Asia. While 

it is debatable whether it has spawned development 

among communities, ADB’s drive for regionalism 

has definitely shaped geographical boundaries <strong>and</strong> 

inevitably, regional politics. One of the regional 

blocs it has built on <strong>and</strong> has yes, overtaken is the 

Association of Southeast <strong>Asian</strong> Nations (<strong>ASEAN</strong>). 

More than a decade after the 1997 <strong>Asian</strong> Financial 

Crisis, <strong>ASEAN</strong> still refuses to be at its sunset, even 

as its members have yet to truly recover from the 

debacle that dismantled the aura of accelerated 

growth <strong>and</strong> exposed the regional bloc’s fragility. 

The aftermath of the crisis saw more <strong>and</strong> more 

loans being taken out as a remedial measure <strong>and</strong> 

from this, the panacea of regional cooperation <strong>and</strong> 

integration has further emerged. 

Today the ADB appears to st<strong>and</strong> as a caretaker 

of <strong>ASEAN</strong>, although it often engages <strong>ASEAN</strong> as 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> plus 3 or <strong>ASEAN</strong> China in terms of regional 

loans <strong>and</strong> technical assistance. It began with the 

creation of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 

which involves five <strong>ASEAN</strong> members: Burma, 

Cambodia, Laos, Thail<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Vietnam. L<strong>and</strong> 

lately, the bankit has beenis revitalizing the Brunei 

Darussalam Indonesia Malaysia Philippines – East 

<strong>Asian</strong> Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) <strong>and</strong> the Indonesia 

Malaysia Thail<strong>and</strong> – Growth Triangle (IMT-GT). 1 

Following the 1997 <strong>Asian</strong> financial crisis, <strong>ASEAN</strong> 

tasked the ADB to host <strong>and</strong> complement the 


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<strong>ASEAN</strong> Surveillance Process, a mechanism where 

members could share confidential information to 

avert a redux of the financial crisis. The ADB also 

manages the <strong>Asian</strong> Regional Integration Center 

(ARIC), a sort of think tank that is meant to buttress 

the case for regional economic integration. It has 

also set up financial resources that further involve 

<strong>ASEAN</strong>. 

Beyond <strong>ASEAN</strong>, the bank plays a key role in the 

<strong>Asian</strong> Bond Market Initiative (ABMI), which aims to 

strengthen the resiliency of countries especially in 

the event of another financial crisis. ADB is likewise 

stepping up its relationship with China <strong>and</strong> other 

East <strong>Asian</strong> countries, which happen to be major 

stakeholders in the bond market. 

Although <strong>ASEAN</strong> has come up with a Charter 

after 40 years, it must be asked whether the selfrevived 

regional bloc can leverage with ADB’s own 

pursuit of regional integration; what does ADB 

st<strong>and</strong> to gain in <strong>ASEAN</strong>, <strong>and</strong> would a partnership 

<strong>and</strong> its expected norms usher well into <strong>ASEAN</strong>, the 

community? 

Beginnings of the 

Brotherhood 

Both <strong>ASEAN</strong> <strong>and</strong> ADB trace their beginnings to the 

1960s which saw the rise of regional institutions 

<strong>and</strong> movements with the ongoing Cold War. <strong>ASEAN</strong> 

was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, 

Philippines, Singapore <strong>and</strong> Thail<strong>and</strong> in a bid to 


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control distrust <strong>and</strong> tensions in the region <strong>and</strong> 

more importantly, insulate the countries from the 

Cold War <strong>and</strong> other external threats. Prior to the 

establishment of the <strong>ASEAN</strong>, the region witnessed 

the military confrontations between Indonesia 

<strong>and</strong> Malaysia; the separation of Singapore from 

Malaysia; riots among ethnic groups such as 

Muslims <strong>and</strong> Chinese; <strong>and</strong> the Philippine's attempt 

to reclaim a territory in Northern Borneo, among 

others. 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> was thus a platform intended to build 

the confidence of each member <strong>and</strong> the region 

as a whole against possible events which may 

jeopardize each member's respective decolonization 

projects. Before the founding of <strong>ASEAN</strong>, the West 

sponsored the initiative of a South East <strong>Asian</strong> 

Treaty Organization (SEATO) which was outrightly 

rejected by Indonesia <strong>and</strong> later on Malaysia. This 

move was heavily influenced by Indonesia's fresh 

memory on the West's reluctance to support its 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> <strong>and</strong> EU 


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independence against the Dutch which intended 

to remain in control of the archipelago. In the 

1980s up the mid-1990s, <strong>ASEAN</strong> exp<strong>and</strong>ed its 

membership to Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Laos 

<strong>and</strong> Vietnam. 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> adopted two key principles towards the 

goals of building confidence among its members; 

ensuring regional security <strong>and</strong> even consolidating a 

regional identity. Consensus <strong>and</strong> non-interference. 

These key principles have led to both the success 

<strong>and</strong> failures of the body. On the outset, the 

goal of achieving consensus is quite dependent 

on the speed <strong>and</strong> progress of consultations. 

Consensus in the context of <strong>ASEAN</strong> is always at 

the bare minimum. Meanwhile, the doctrine of 

non-interference likewise puts the efficacy of the 

consultations into question. Given the diversity of 

the region politically, economically <strong>and</strong> culturally, 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> has indeed been a slow <strong>and</strong> sometimes 

ineffective process. 

The European Union (EU) <strong>and</strong> the <strong>ASEAN</strong> are just a decade apart. However, EU has a far more 

sophisticated institutional structure <strong>and</strong> more democratic governance processes, making it worlds 

apart with <strong>ASEAN</strong>. This, even though both blocs engaged in reform measures almost around the 

same time. While <strong>ASEAN</strong> was working for its Charter, EU was pursuing the Treaty of Lisbon, which 

is also known as Reform Treaty. 

While <strong>ASEAN</strong> is stuck with consensus <strong>and</strong> non-interference as key principles, the EU has been quite 

vocal on the human rights situation in Central <strong>and</strong> Eastern European states. EU may also impose 

penalty <strong>and</strong> even expulsion to recalcitrant members. One of the results of the reform treaty was the 

qualified majority voting (QMV) where voting weights corresponds with the countries’ population. 

According to EU Ambassador to the Philippines Alistair MacDonald, the Reform Treaty further 

strengthened the role of the European Parliament <strong>and</strong> national parliaments in decision-making; 

it created the post of president of the European Council; <strong>and</strong> it created the office of the High 

Representative for Foreign <strong>and</strong> Security Policy. The treaty also retired the usage of the “European 

Community,” as EU takes on a legal personality 


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Unlike <strong>ASEAN</strong>, the EU has structures such as the parliament, supreme court <strong>and</strong> court of appeals 

which “which <strong>ASEAN</strong> may or may not yet aspire.” The EU also has a civil society mechanism that 

is called right of citizen’s initiative. Civil society organizations (CSOs) may submit a proposal to the 

EU for as long as this is backed by one million signatures. 

It is generally believed that the developments at the EU triggered the formulation of <strong>ASEAN</strong>’s 

Charter. After all, both regional blocs were largely established for trade <strong>and</strong> security issues. One of 

the issues which tailed the pre <strong>and</strong> post <strong>ASEAN</strong> Charter process was the controversial EU-<strong>ASEAN</strong> 

free trade agreement, which basically intends to liberalize “substantially all goods <strong>and</strong> services,” 

including those which civil society bitterly fought at the World Trade Organization (WTO) such 

as government procurement, trade facilitation <strong>and</strong> competition policy. Although much of the EU- 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> FTA remains pending, one danger is that the EU might veer away from the regional track 

<strong>and</strong> instead further pursue bilateral with individual <strong>ASEAN</strong> members. The EU remains a major 

trading partner of <strong>ASEAN</strong>, bringing in more than 100 billion Euros. It also contributes 25 per cent 

of investments worth US$13 billion in <strong>ASEAN</strong>. 

Sources: Asia-Europe People’s Forum (2010). “Examining the EU-<strong>ASEAN</strong> Free Trade Agreement (FTA).” Retrieved on 22 October 2010. URL: 

http://www.aepf.info/campaigns/eu-asean-fta-campaign/65-examining-the-eu-asean-free-trade-agreement-fta-.html; European Union (nd). “The 

new system of qualified majority voting.” Retrieved on 22 October 2010. URL: http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/doublemajority_en.htm; 

Gramegna, H.E. Pierre Ambassador of Luxembourg to Japan (1997). European <strong>and</strong> <strong>ASEAN</strong> Integration Processes: Similar Models? Paper 

Presented at the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan on May 8, 1997. Retrieved on 15 October 2010. URL: http://www.unu.edu/unupress/ 

lecture18.html; <strong>and</strong> MacDonald, Alistair (2010). The <strong>ASEAN</strong> Charter <strong>and</strong> the building of an <strong>ASEAN</strong> Community Response to Ambassador Rosario 

Manalo. Presented at the Supreme Court, Manila, Philippines on 19 February 2010. Retrieved on 22 October 2010. URL: http://www.delphl. 

ec.europa.eu/docs/100219%20<strong>ASEAN</strong>.pdf 

Such nature has nonetheless translated into 

breakthroughs towards stronger diplomatic ties. 

As Michael Vatikiotis puts it, “One can quibble 

about the effectiveness of <strong>ASEAN</strong> as a vehicle for 

concrete economic cooperation but it cannot be 

denied that by using diplomatic rather than military 

means, as well as a style of diplomacy based on 

indigenous rather than imported principles, <strong>ASEAN</strong> 

has succeeded in fostering a greater sense of 

regional unity <strong>and</strong> security.” 2 

One more recent example of such breakthrough 

happened in the aftermath of cyclone Nargis which 

devastated Burma. The junta earned condemnation 

when it refused to allow foreign aid, including 

those in ships which were just docked on ports 

<strong>and</strong> relief workers. However it relented to <strong>ASEAN</strong> 

which eventually formed an <strong>ASEAN</strong> Humanitarian 

Task Force that provided advice to the Tripartite 

Core Group (TCG). TCG consisted of <strong>ASEAN</strong>, 

Burma <strong>and</strong> United Nations. The Task Force <strong>and</strong> 

the TCG distributed much relief <strong>and</strong> conducted 

an assessment of the damages as well as cost 

of reconstruction <strong>and</strong> recovery. The assessment 

involved the World <strong>Bank</strong> <strong>and</strong> the ADB <strong>and</strong> a few 

CSOs. As UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, John 

Holmes described, “Nargis showed us a new 

model of humanitarian partnership, adding the 


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special position <strong>and</strong> capabilities of the Association 

of Southeast <strong>Asian</strong> Nations to those of the 

United Nations in working effectively with the 

government.” 3 

But because <strong>ASEAN</strong> is largely composed of 

countries with questionable human rights track 

record <strong>and</strong> repressive policies especially towards 

the civil society organizations <strong>and</strong> the media, 

ADB in Burma 


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it could hardly put its foot down on atrocious 

developments within the bloc such as Indonesia’s 

occupation of East Timor <strong>and</strong> the junta’s order for 

the continuing detention of Burmese leader Aung 

San Suu Kyi. The <strong>ASEAN</strong> initiative for the post- 

Nargis relief <strong>and</strong> reconstruction was also viewed 

rather late, especially with the massive devastation 

the cyclone left. 

Burma has been in arrears with the ADB. Its last loan with the bank was drawn in 1986 while its 

last technical assistance was in 1987. Although Burma’s financial mess has been ADB’s convenient 

response regarding its engagement with the country <strong>and</strong> its junta, the <strong>Bank</strong> has never let its eye 

w<strong>and</strong>er off Burma’s strategic position <strong>and</strong> extremely rich natural resources. Regional programs 

<strong>and</strong> political blocs such as the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), the Bay of Bengal Initiative 

for Multi-Sectoral Technical <strong>and</strong> Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) <strong>and</strong> the <strong>ASEAN</strong> has been the 

bank’s way of making inroads to the country. 

Under the GMS for instance, Burma has been included in the East-West economic corridor which 

passes by Vietnam, Laos <strong>and</strong> Thail<strong>and</strong> before it reaches Burma. It has been widely noted that 

while connectivity projects may facilitate trade, they also render communities more vulnerable 

to poverty, especially when these communities are not consulted in the first place <strong>and</strong> eventually 

evicted from their traditional sources of livelihood <strong>and</strong> even more exposed to communicable 

diseases such as HIV-AIDS . ADB also included Burma in the GMS Power Grid, whose capacity is 

partly sourced from Burma’s Salween river. But even without the GMS, ADB is said to be actively 

sending “consultative missions” to Burma. Moreover, Burma is still included in ADB’s economic 

projections <strong>and</strong> other studies. 

Groups like the Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) urged the ADB to refrain from providing 

any form of assistance as this only tend to legitimize the ruling junta. ALTSEAN Burma likewise 

shared this view. But it also asked the ADB to be very transparent in its dealings with Burma, 

especially if the private sector is involved in a project. 

In the aftermath of cyclone Nargis, SWAN, along with several other organizations such as the 

Ethnic Community <strong>Development</strong> Forum, Burma River Network, Kachin Women’s Association – 

Thail<strong>and</strong>, Karen Environment <strong>and</strong> Social Action Network, Nationalities Youth Forum, Salween 

Watch Coalition <strong>and</strong> Shan Youth Power urged both the ADB <strong>and</strong> the World <strong>Bank</strong> to include 


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Paper 

communities in any decision-making in any activities of the banks in the country, especially as local 

organizations cannot freely express their opinions due to security threats. The said groups are 

mostly based in Thail<strong>and</strong> but have broad contacts with organizations inside Burma. 

So far, Burma has 32 loans with the bank, amounting to US$ 530.86. According to the ADB, 

it “continues to monitor economic developments in Myanmar, <strong>and</strong> an operational strategy will 

be formulated when appropriate. Close coordination is being maintained with the International 

Monetary Fund, the World <strong>Bank</strong>, <strong>and</strong> UNDP, with emphasis on assessing the government’s economic 

reform program <strong>and</strong> recommended policy actions. Liaison is also being maintained with Myanmar’s 

major bilateral donors regarding the status of their assistance programs.” 

Sources: Altsean Burma (2003). “Comment on ADB’s 1994 Disclosure <strong>and</strong> Information Policies.” Retrieved on 22 October 2010. URL: http:// 

www.adb.org/Disclosure/Documents/47_Alt_Asean.pdf; <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> (nd). “Cumulative ADB Lending (for Myanmar).” Retrieved on 

22 October 2010. URL: http://www.adb.org/Myanmar/main.asp; _____ (nd). “East-West Economic Corridor (Executive Summary).” Retrieved on 

22 October 2010. URL: http://www.adb.org/GMS/Projects/1-flagship-summary-east-west.pdf; _____ (nd) “Fact Sheet (for Myanmar).” Retrieved 

on 22 October 2010. URL: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Fact_Sheets/MYA.pdf; Ethnic Community <strong>Development</strong> Forum (2008). “World <strong>Bank</strong> 

<strong>and</strong> ADB cautioned against increasing engagement with Burma's military regime following post-Nargis assessment.” URL: http://www.apwld. 

org/world_bank_adb_cautioned.html; Macan-Markar , Marwaan (2010). “Southeast <strong>Asian</strong> Highway Hits Roadblock in Burma.” Retrieved on 22 

October 2010. URL: http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=52671; <strong>and</strong> Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) (nd). “STOP ADB Support to 

Burma.” Retrieved on 22 October 2010. URL: http://www.shanwomen.org/pdf/ADB.pdf 

Meanwhile, the ADB was founded in 1966 with the 

goal of spurring development in post-war Asia. As 

its Charter states, the bank aimed at “foster[ing] 

economic growth <strong>and</strong> co-operation in the region 

of Asia <strong>and</strong> the Far East <strong>and</strong>…contribut[ing] 

to the acceleration of the process of economic 

development of the developing member countries 

in the region, collectively <strong>and</strong> individually.” 4 

ADB is primarily a Japanese creation. Although 

quite discredited after the Second World War, 

Japan has kept its vision of an Asia for <strong>Asian</strong>s, 

which had its revival with the rise of nation-states 

in the region in the 1950s <strong>and</strong> the 1960s. Thus, 

in the same fashion as the founding of the Inter- 

American <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> (IADB) <strong>and</strong> the 

African <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> (AfDB), Japan launched 

the <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> (ADB). Even as the 

United States (US) <strong>and</strong> members of the European 

Union tend to counterbalance Japan’s stake in the 

bank, the Japanese Finance Ministry has always 

nominated <strong>and</strong> appointed the ADB’s president. 

As Michael Wesley wrote in the American Review, 

“Its central metaphor is the ‘flying geese’ pattern 

of East <strong>Asian</strong> development, in which successively 

larger numbers of East <strong>Asian</strong> states adopt <strong>and</strong> 

adapt the developmental state model <strong>and</strong> follow 

its earliest founders along a rapid development 

path.” 5 

To a certain extent, ADB was born at the right 

moment, when Asia <strong>and</strong> the Pacific were exhausting 

its internal capacities <strong>and</strong> external resources, other 

than the International Monetary Fund (IMF) <strong>and</strong> 

the World <strong>Bank</strong>. But the bank rather tempered 


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its regional approach at the beginning. Thus in 

its 1967 Annual Report, it explained that “There 

were opportunities as well as complexities in a 

regionalized approach to financing operations but 

that financing of national development projects 

may in itself promote, in due course, the economic 

growth of the region as a whole.” 6 

Although ADB <strong>and</strong> <strong>ASEAN</strong> were born around the 

same time, it was only in 1976 when ADB took 

interest in <strong>ASEAN</strong>, following the latter’s first 

Summit in Bali, Indonesia. Back in the 1970s, ADB 

accounted a mere five per cent of the external 

resource flows into the five original <strong>ASEAN</strong> 

members. However it is telling that Asas early as 

the 1970s, ADB somehow knew that the strategic 

way to engage with <strong>ASEAN</strong> is to not to deal with 

it as a whole. 

As ADB’s Chief Economist Seiji Naya wrote in 

1982_, “Some businessmen [sic] in <strong>ASEAN</strong> have 

expressed impatience with the slow progress of 

the government-sponsored regional industrial 

projects, the preferential trade arrangements <strong>and</strong> 

the regional complementation schemes, <strong>and</strong> they 

have begun to advocate <strong>ASEAN</strong> joint ventures with 

support…In general, <strong>ASEAN</strong> countries have found 

it harder to promote economic cooperation among 

themselves than to present a common front on 

matters of common external interest.” 7 

Nonetheless ADB undertook regional engagements 

such as the <strong>Asian</strong> Agriculture Survey, which helped 

the bank as in mainstreaming the green revolution 

<strong>and</strong> in promoting large-scale projects in water <strong>and</strong> 

irrigation, energy <strong>and</strong> transportation sectors. ADB 

also supported the Regional Transport Survey, 

which was requested by Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, 

Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thail<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> 

Vietnam. 


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Of the 31 founding members of the ADB, eight 

are members of the <strong>ASEAN</strong>: Cambodia, Indonesia, 

Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam 

<strong>and</strong> Thail<strong>and</strong>. Much of ADB’s lending was also 

concentrated on this group during the bank’s 

formative years. Brunei Darussalam became a 

member in 2006, Vietnam returneding to ADB’s 

fold in 1993, <strong>and</strong> despite being in arrears, Burma 

was included in the Greater Mekong Subnregion 

(GMS) in 1992. Today, the cumulative shares of 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> members st<strong>and</strong> at 467,578 or almost 21 

per cent of the regional shares of 2,247,995 <strong>and</strong> 

13 per cent of the over-all shares of 3,546,311. 

Flying High <strong>and</strong> Plunging 

Low in the 1990s 

The <strong>ASEAN</strong> geese were indeed soaring in the 

1990s, with an unprecedented boom especially in 

real estate. Growth rates were high, particularly in 

Thail<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Indonesia from 1990 to 1995, which 

demonstrated an average of 7.4 <strong>and</strong> 6.2 per cent 

growth rates respectively. 

Talks were also ongoing on the <strong>ASEAN</strong> Free 

Trade Area (AFTA) which was envisioned to foster 

intraregional trading <strong>and</strong> attract more foreign 

investors. AFTA targets the integration of <strong>ASEAN</strong> 

markets by 2015 <strong>and</strong> ADB sees itself speeding 

up the process with its connectivity projects 

such as regional roads, railways <strong>and</strong> even power 

transmission. 8 But however multiple the products 

which are being stripped off tariffs under AFTA, 

AFTA has been overridden by bilateral trading <strong>and</strong> 

the increasing Chinese capital. 9 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> also exp<strong>and</strong>ed its membership, opening its 

doors to Brunei Darussalam, Burma <strong>and</strong> Vietnam. 

While this may be a welcome development, 


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Loans taken by <strong>ASEAN</strong> Members (1966-1970) 


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Year Country Project Amount 

(US$) 

1967 Malaysia Water supply scheme 

1967 Thail<strong>and</strong> Plant for the production of polyester fiber 

1968 Malaysia Penang State Water Supply 7,200,000 

1968 Thail<strong>and</strong> Industrial Corporation of Thail<strong>and</strong> 5,000,000 

1969 Indonesia Tadjum Irrigation 990,000 

1969 Indonesia Sawat Sebarang Oil Palm Estate 2,400,000 

1969 Malaysia Bukit Mendi <strong>and</strong> Bukit Goli Palm Oil Mills 2,800,000 

1969 Malaysia Kuching Port Extension 5,000,000 

1969 Malaysia Sarawak Electricity Supply 3,100,000 

1969 Philippines Relending to Private <strong>Development</strong> Corporation of the 5,000,000 

1969 Philippines 

Philippines for Financing Private Industrial <strong>and</strong> Other Productive 

Enterprises 

Cotabato Irrigation 2,500,000 

1969 Singapore Financing Manufacturing <strong>and</strong> Service Industries 10,000,000 

1969 Thail<strong>and</strong> Financing Industrial Enterprises 10,000,000 

1970 Cambodia Phnom-Penh High Voltage Transmission 1,670,000 

1970 Indonesia PUSRI Fertilizer Plant Expansion 10,000,000 

1970 Indonesia Ganbarsan – Pesanggrahan Irrigation Rehabilitation Project 2,700,000 

1970 Laos Tha Ngon Agricultural <strong>Development</strong> 973,000 

1970 Malaysia Besut Agricultural <strong>Development</strong> 900,000 

1970 Malaysia Besut Agricultural <strong>Development</strong> 3,300,000 

1970 Malaysia Malacca Water Supply 5,000,000 

1970 Malaysia Sibu Port Expansion 3,500,000 

1970 Philippines Second Relending to Private <strong>Development</strong> Corporation of the 

Philippines for Financing Private Industrial <strong>and</strong> Other Productive 

Enterprises 

15,000,000 

1970 Philippines Cotabato-Gen. Santos Road 10,600,000 

1970 Singapore Jurong Wharves Expansion 8,310,000 

1970 Singapore Singapore International Airport <strong>Development</strong> 20,500,000 

1970 Singapore Water Supply 8,300,000 

1970 Singapore Ngee Aun International College Expansion 3,000,000 

1970 Thail<strong>and</strong> Power Transmission <strong>and</strong> Substation Expansion 19,000,000 

1970 Thail<strong>and</strong> Fisheries <strong>Development</strong> 2,500,000 

Sources: ADB Annual Reports 1967 to 1970 


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Technical Assistance Availed by <strong>ASEAN</strong> Members (1966-1970) 


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Year Country Project Amount (US$) 

1966 Indonesia Program of rehabilitation <strong>and</strong> stabilization of food production 

1968 Indonesia Subsequent TA on a program of rehabilitation <strong>and</strong> stabilization 

of food production 

230,000 

1968 Laos Nam Ngum hydroelectric <strong>and</strong> irrigation project 221,000 

1968 Philippines Fisheries Port in Manila Bay 225,000 

1968 Vietnam <strong>Development</strong> Financing Institutions 89,000 

1969 Indonesia Feasibility Study on Sempor Dam Reconstruction 328,000 

1969 Indonesia Sawit Sebarang Oil Palm Estate 42,000 

1969 Malaysia Kuala Lumpur – KeraK Highway 192,000 

1969 Malaysia Oil Palm Products Marking 80,000 

1969 Philippines Water Management 102,000 

1969 Thail<strong>and</strong> Accelerated Rural <strong>Development</strong> Program 105,000 

1969 Thail<strong>and</strong> Agricultural <strong>Development</strong> Program in Nong Wai Pioneer 

Integrated 

180,000 

1970 Cambodia Phnom Penh High Voltage Transmission 80,000 

1970 Indonesia West Sumatra Electric Power Supply 185,000 

1970 Indonesia Java Teak 216,000 

1970 Indonesia Wampu River Flood Control 181,000 

1970 Indonesia <strong>Bank</strong> Rakjat Indonesia 75,000 

1970 Laos Than Ngon Agricultural <strong>Development</strong> 275,000 

1970 Philippines National Food <strong>and</strong> Agriculture Council 36,000 

1970 Thail<strong>and</strong> Accelerated Rural <strong>Development</strong> Program Extension 100,000 

1970 Thail<strong>and</strong> Industrial Evaluation System for the Board of Investment 140,000 

1970 Vietnam Rural <strong>Bank</strong>ing System 110,000 

1970 Vietnam Fisheries <strong>Development</strong> 68,000 



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Voting Power of <strong>ASEAN</strong> members in the ADB 

Country 

Year of 

Membership 

Subscribed Capital Voting Power 

No. of 

Shares 

Percent of 

Total 


No. of Votes Percent of 

Total 

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Paper 

Brunei 2006 12,462 0.351 25,694 0.580 0.891 

Burma 1973 19,270 0.543 32,502 0.733 1.127 

Cambodia 1966 1,750 0.049 14,982 0.338 0.52 

Indonesia 1966 192,700 5.434 205,932 4.646 7.143 

Laos 1966 492 0.014 13,724 0.310 0.476 

Malaysia 1966 96,350 2.717 109,582 2.472 3.801 

Philippines 1966 84,304 2.377 97,536 2.200 3.383 

Singapore 1966 12,040 0.34 25,272 0.570 0.877 

Thail<strong>and</strong> 1966 48,174 1.358 61,406 1.385 2.13 

Vietnam 1966 12,076 0.341 25,308 0.571 0.878 

Source: ADB 

eyebrows were raised on Burma, which had an 

illegitimate political regime <strong>and</strong> which was invited 

by Indonesian dictator Suharto. To a certain 

extent, this development demonstrates how much 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> also banked on strong personalities such as 

Suharto, Malaysia’s Mahathir <strong>and</strong> Singapore’s Lee 

Kwan Yew, among others. 

The bloc likewise attracted countries in East Asia, 

South Asia <strong>and</strong> the Pacific, forming <strong>ASEAN</strong> plus 3 

<strong>and</strong> <strong>ASEAN</strong> plus 6. <strong>ASEAN</strong> plus 3 includes China, 

Japan <strong>and</strong> Korea while <strong>ASEAN</strong> plus 6 includes 

Australia, India <strong>and</strong> New Zeal<strong>and</strong>. 

But of all the initiatives in the early 1990s that 

produced the most impact was the <strong>ASEAN</strong> Regional 

Forum (ARF). Created in 1994, ARF was meant 

to be a platform for dialogue <strong>and</strong> confidence 

building on political <strong>and</strong> security issues between 

<strong>and</strong> among <strong>ASEAN</strong> <strong>and</strong> the rest of the Asia-Pacific 

region. One of its key features is the inclusion of 

non-government organizations, constituting Track 

2 of ARF’s confidence building mechanism. 

Percent of 

R e g i o n a l 

Votes 

Despite its adherence to the “<strong>ASEAN</strong> Way,” the ARF 

has demonstrated transparency <strong>and</strong> openness that 

at some point it became the platform to collectively 

address China’s growing economy, the tensions in 

the Korean peninsula <strong>and</strong> the military interests 

of the US in the region. In fact the ARF became 

too effective that it constituted a threat to the US’ 

military position. 

In a paper right after the 1997 financial crisis, 

David Dickens reflects on the ARF, “Only <strong>ASEAN</strong> 

possessed the credibility to create a genuinely 

multilateral institution that had at that time 

any real chance of attracting broad regional 

participation. It is doubtful that either China or 

the United States would have joined a multilateral 

institution initiated by the other. East <strong>Asian</strong> states 

had objected to the Australian <strong>and</strong> Canadian 

proposals to transfer European models of security 

cooperation to an <strong>Asian</strong> context on the grounds 

that the region’s circumstances called for specially 

tailored responses.” 10 


August 2011

11 /28 

However the 1997 <strong>Asian</strong> financial crisis changed 

all this. By the mid-1990s, cracks were beginning 

to surface in what was beginning to be seen as 

the accelerated but unsustainable growth of the 

tiger economies . No sooner, what had been touted 

as the <strong>Asian</strong> economic miracle turned to be a 

mirage. The Thai baht collapsed, followed by the 

depreciation of other currencies with the massive 

capital flight. Governments came at the door steps 

of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bail- 

Economic growth rates in <strong>ASEAN</strong> countries 1990-2005 


Briefing 

Paper 

out. Meanwhile, ethnic riots ensued in Indonesia 

so violently that it did not take long before Suharto 

was forced to step down from power <strong>and</strong> East 

Timor broke free from the archipelago. 

From 1995 to 2000, Thail<strong>and</strong>’s economic growth 

was pegged at -0.6 per cent while Indonesia’s was 

at -0.7 per cent. The two most badly affected by 

the crisis have not quite recovered even after a 

decade. 

1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 

Brunei Darussalam -1.1 0.1 -0.2 

Burma 4.3 7.1 11.8 

Cambodia 3.1 4.8 7.2 

Indonesia 6.2 -0.7 3.3 

Lao PDR 3.5 3.9 4.6 

Malaysia 4.3 7.1 11.8 

Philippines -0.1 1.5 2.5 

Singapore 5.9 3.4 2.5 

Thail<strong>and</strong> 7.4 -0.6 4.3 

Vietnam 6.0 5.3 6.0 

Source: United Nations Economic <strong>and</strong> Social Commission for Asia Pacific (2007) 

GMS: ADB’s Likely 

Approach to <strong>ASEAN</strong> 

“On trade, a framework to unify free trade 

agreements could help link together fragmented 

markets for goods, services, <strong>and</strong> capital. It would 

be natural to look at <strong>ASEAN</strong> as a regional hub 

for an eventual <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3-wide FTA, or even an 

<strong>ASEAN</strong>+6 (or East <strong>Asian</strong>) FTA. Intraregional trade 

now accounts for close to 60% of total trade in East 

Asia. With China <strong>and</strong> India's continued economic 

expansion, this is likely to increase further, as 

production centers throughout the region seek 

raw materials <strong>and</strong> intermediate goods from more 

accessible markets within the region itself.”, Rajat 

Nag, Managing Director General of ADB said in a 

speech in Delhi in 2007. 

Although there was an opportunity to deal directly 

with <strong>ASEAN</strong>, ADB opted to recreate chunks of 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> through the Greater Mekong Subregion 


August 2011

12 /28 

(GMS),Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines 

– East Asia Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), <strong>and</strong> the 

Indonesia-Malaysia-Thail<strong>and</strong> - Growth Triangle 

(IMT-GT). 

Ten years after the 1997 <strong>Asian</strong> financial crisis, ADB 

President Haruhiko Kuroda described this measure 

as one that is more effective than <strong>ASEAN</strong>’s own 

processes: “A ‘multi-speed,’ ‘multi-track’ process of 

integration seems best, whereby a few countries 

start working together on selected common issues, 

with the option for other countries to join later, or 

appropriate new issues added. Our experience tells 

us that the logical way to move forward is to use 

subregional cooperation as the building block of 

an eventual wider <strong>and</strong> more broad-based regional 

integration.” 11 

Of all ADB’s subregional programs, the GMS 

program has been the most successful. The 

GMS program capitalized on the contiguity of its 

members <strong>and</strong> consequently invested on projects 

that would further link these members. It also 

pulled in China, the region’s biggest <strong>and</strong> fastest 

growing economy. The GMS program has also 

been a showcase of ADB’s capacity as a platform 

for confidence-building --- one which has been 

used as a rationale for ADB’s “coordinatorship” in 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> after the 1997 <strong>Asian</strong> financial crisis. 

As ADB’s 2006 paper, Regional Cooperation <strong>and</strong> 

Integration Strategy describes ADB’s milestone with 

the GMS, “Perhaps the greatest accomplishment of 

the GMS program has been building trust among 

countries <strong>and</strong> confidence in the countries, as well 

as a stronger community, all of which has driven 

the program <strong>and</strong> brought it to where it is today.” 12 

The GMS program was created in 1992. It counts 

among its members countries where the waters 

of the Mekong river system pass through: Burma, 

Cambodia, China, Laos, Vietnam <strong>and</strong> Thail<strong>and</strong>. 


Briefing 

Paper 

Much of its investments are focused on energy <strong>and</strong> 

transportation particularly hydropower projects, 

roads <strong>and</strong> railways. 

Since its creation, the program has facilitated more 

than 38 loans <strong>and</strong> scores of technical assistance 

for 44 projects, estimated at US$11 billion. 

Vietnam accounted for much of the loans, with 

US$2.023 billion. The country is followed by China, 

with almost US$1.6 billion, Laos, US$217 million, 

Cambodia, US$205.26 million <strong>and</strong> Thail<strong>and</strong>, 

US$128.4 million. 

The biggest of Vietnamese projects that are related 

to the GMS are the Ben Luc-Long Thanh Expressway 

Project which amounts to US$650 million <strong>and</strong> the 

Kunming-Hai Phong Transport Corridor-Noi Bai-Lao 

Cai Highway Project which costs a little over US$2 

billion. These projects are also among the first 

GMS projects to tap ADB’s multi-tranche financing 

facility (MFF) during its pilot phase. 

Mainstreamed in 2008, MFF works like a st<strong>and</strong>ard 

letter of credit where borrowers may package a 

series of projects, which are typically loans. Given 

the huge amount of money at stake under the MFF, 

this option has been limited to the public sector. 

Thus, for an MFF regional project to be approved 

at its pilot phase may speak of ADB’s confidence 

over the GMS <strong>and</strong> its general drive towards regional 

integration. 

Whether ADB’s GMS program has been a stellar 

success is a subject of further analysis. But it 

cannot be denied that the program’s progress 

owes much to ADB’s direct h<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the member 

states’ passive governance role. ADB’s has multiple 

<strong>and</strong> crucial roles. It acts as the secretariat <strong>and</strong> 

coordinator of the GMS program, convening the 

member states during the planning <strong>and</strong> updating 

of planned <strong>and</strong> existing projects, which ADB also 

finances. 


August 2011

13 /28 

ADB has worked closely with 

<strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 Finance Ministers 

dialog process <strong>and</strong> its meetings 

which have been held on the 

sidelines of ADB Annual 

Meetings. In 2006, cooperative 

arrangements between <strong>ASEAN</strong> 

<strong>and</strong> ADB were formalized 

through the signing of an 

institutional MOU which aims 

to “accelerate <strong>ASEAN</strong> regional 

cooperation <strong>and</strong> integration 

process in Asia” through the 

GMS, among other subregional 

programs. However, joint 

planning <strong>and</strong> involvement 

in joint activities continue to 

occur on a largely ad hoc basis, 

although there are indications 

that there may be more formal 

collaboration between the two 

bodies on infrastructure sectors 

in 2010. 

Whenever problems arise over these projects, it 

has been said that communities may either tap 

ADB’s own accountability mechanism or reach 

the Mekong River Commission (MRC). Yet the 

accountability mechanism is not independent 

enough to police ADB’s performance on the ground 


Briefing 

Paper 

while MRC will not take action unless a member 

state itself requests an intervention. Persons <strong>and</strong> 

organizations that are based outside affected 

communities <strong>and</strong> are not vulnerable to state 

sanctions cannot file cases before the MRC. 

As an Oxfam-sponsored study asserts, “MRC is 

driven by the national interests of its member 

governments which are officially represented 

through the National Mekong Committees (NMCs), 

but more commonly reflect the interest of other 

ministries that are more powerful <strong>and</strong> involved 

in national decision-making.” 13 Ninety percent 

of MRC’s budget also comes from international 

donors. 

The Lesser GMS: BIMP- 

EAGA <strong>and</strong> IMT-GT 

If the GMS matured to have merited a periodic 

assessment of its plans <strong>and</strong> the development of 

its core clusters, BIMP-EAGA <strong>and</strong> the IMT-GT have 

largely remained pet programs. Unlike GMS, BIMP- 

EAGA <strong>and</strong> the IMT-GT involved countries which are 

not contiguous to each other. BIMP-EAGA which 

has as members Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, 

Malaysia <strong>and</strong> the Philippines, is mostly archipelagic 

in geography. The same goes for the IMT-GT which 

includes Indonesia, Malaysia <strong>and</strong> Thail<strong>and</strong>. 

The bank’s senior employees see EAGA <strong>and</strong> 

IMT-GT as formations in the 1990s but these 

formations were thought of as early as the late 

1960s. Back then, economic growth quadrangles 

<strong>and</strong> triangles were envisioned to boost trade 

<strong>and</strong> tourism. However plans for such trading 

areas were overshadowed by the more political 

issues, including territorial disputes among <strong>ASEAN</strong> 

members. The idea was revived in 1989 <strong>and</strong> was 

mainstreamed in the early 1990s. 


August 2011

14 /28 

ADB’s BIMP-EAGA has three goals: increase intra- 

<strong>and</strong> extra-trade among EAGA focus areas by 10 per 

cent by 2010; increase investments in the EAGA 

subregion by 10 per cent by 2010; <strong>and</strong> increase 

tourism movement in the EAGA subregion by 20 

per cent by 2010. 

Since its formation in 1992, ADB’s initiatives in 

BIMP-EAGA have been largely limited to technical 

assistance. In fact, only one BIMP-EAGA TA, 

amounting to US$1.8 million was approved before 

the 1997 financial crisis. 

If BIMP-EAGA were in a state of inertia from 1992 to 

1997, it seems to have made a bouncing comeback 

in the next six years, from 1998 to 2003. During 

this period, seven technical assistance projects 

were approved, amounting to US$2.87 million. 

Majority of these dealt with the development of 

small <strong>and</strong> medium enterprises. Another seven TA 

projects were approved in the next six years, from 

2004 to 2009, costing US$8.35 million. These TA 

projects are more diverse, focusing on areas such 

as customs regulation, digital infrastructure <strong>and</strong> 

environment. In 2010, ADB has lined up three 

TAs worth US$17.9 million. The most expensive of 

these is the proposed Coastal <strong>and</strong> Marine Resources 

Management in the Coral Triangle Project, which 

amounts to US$13 million. 

ADB has also identified 12 priority projects, costing 

almost US$1 billion. The bulk of these projects is 

concentrated in Indonesia where the proposed 

projects are estimated at US$632.7 million. 

Meanwhile, ADB’s involvement in IMT-GT began in 

2007. Unlike its other subregional programs, the 

IMT-GT is different primarily because it is privatesector 

driven. In 2009, eight priority projects 

estimated at US$2.5 billion were endorsed during 

the 16 th IMT-GT Ministerial Meeting in Malaysia. 


Briefing 

Paper 

The IMT-GT program has five strategic thrusts: 

increased regional connectivity through 

infrastructure development; promotion of trade 

<strong>and</strong> investment; addressing human resource 

development <strong>and</strong> environment <strong>and</strong> natural resource 

management; sectoral growth in agriculture, 

agro-industry <strong>and</strong> tourism; <strong>and</strong> strengthening 

institutional capacities for coordinating <strong>and</strong> 

monitoring. It has also identified five economic 

connectivity corridors (ECCs): Extended Songkhla- 

Penang-Medan, Straits of Melaka, B<strong>and</strong>a Aceh- 

Medan-Pekanbaru-Palembang, Melaka-Dumai <strong>and</strong> 

Ranong-Phuket-Aceh. 

Although ADB’s involvement in IMT-GT is more 

recent, its regional cooperation arrangements are 

more predictable, hence its more consolidated 

plan. Unlike BIMP-EAGA whose coverage is more 

ambitious --- harmonizing transport, trade <strong>and</strong> 

tourism policies over nautical areas especially 

around the Southern <strong>and</strong> poorer parts of Indonesia 

<strong>and</strong> the Philippines, IMT-GT <strong>and</strong> its priorities 

are more contained. Its priority areas include 

agriculture, agro-industry, human resources, 

environment, tourism <strong>and</strong> public-private sector 

partnerships, among others. 

Financing BIMP-EAGA’s 

the Heart of Darkness 

BIMP-EAGA <strong>and</strong> IMT-GT indeed cover a vast 

expanse of rich natural resources. They include, 

for instance Palawan, which has been dubbed 

as Philippines’ “last frontier” <strong>and</strong> Indonesia’s 

Kalimantan forests. And among the initiatives 

which need to be closely monitored are the Heart 

of Borneo <strong>and</strong> the Coral Triangle. 

In February 2007, the governments of Brunei 

Darussalam, Indonesia <strong>and</strong> Malaysia agreed 


August 2011

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12 Priority Projects in BIMP-EAGA 

to conserve Borneo’s rainforests. Also in 2007, 

Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, East Timor, Papua 

New Guinea <strong>and</strong> the Solomon Isl<strong>and</strong>s created the 

so-called Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI). Both the 

Heart of Borneo <strong>and</strong> the CTI have been endorsed 

by regional bodies such as <strong>ASEAN</strong> <strong>and</strong> Asia Pacific 

Economic Cooperation (APEC). They are also 

supported by the ADB. 

Under its Heart of Borneo Initiative, ADB is 

tapping the Global Environment Fund (GEF) <strong>and</strong> 

the Climate Investment Fund (CIF) for Indonesia’s 

forest management <strong>and</strong> the promotion of the 

controversial reduced emissions from deforestation 

<strong>and</strong> degradation (REDD). 

At the moment, far more money has been mobilized 

for the CTI. During its first senior officials’ meeting 

(SOM) in 1997, CTI asked resources from GEF 

with ADB as the lead agency. This meeting was 

followed by a consultation that was attended by 

Senior Officials from Australia, the United States 

(US), GEF, ADB <strong>and</strong> some NGOs. As of March 


Briefing 

Paper 

Country Proposed Project <strong>and</strong> Year Estimated Cost 

Brunei Kuala Lurah Border Crossing Facility (2011) 

P<strong>and</strong>aruan Bridge (between Brunei <strong>and</strong> Malaysia) (2011) 

US$15.2 

Indonesia Tarakan-Serudong Road (2010) 

Sarawak-Kalimantan Power Interconnection (2010) 

Pontianak-Entikong Transport Link (2011) 

Enhancing the Manado-Bitung Link (2011) 

US$632.7 

Malaysia Sarawak-Kalimantan Power Interconnection (2010) 

Lahud Datu Palm Oil Industrial Cluster (2010) 

US$206 

Philippines Expansion of Mindanao Ports Program I (2010) 

Palawan Ports <strong>Development</strong> Program (2010) 

Expansion of Mindanao Ports Program II (2011) 

Rehabilitation of the Davao-General Santos Road (2011) 

US$101 

Total US$954.9 

Source: ADB 

2009, some US$400 million has been pledged 

for the CTI, according to the ADB. GEF provided 

US$63 million, the US, US$40 million while the 

six countries “are expected to contribute new 

financing in excess of $300 million.” 14 However 

in another report, following the World Ocean 

Conference (WOC) in May 2009, ADB announced 

that GEF <strong>and</strong> ADB would allocate US$12.3 million 

for Southeast Asia. Of this fugure, US$10 million 

would come from GEF while US$2.3 million would 

be from the ADB. The US$12.3 million would be 

divided among three countries, US$4.6 million for 

Indonesia, US$3.1 million for Malaysia <strong>and</strong> US$4.6 

million for the Philippines. 15 

But whatever the figures are, what is clear is that 

an enormous amount of resources is being poured 

into the CTI. Although GEF has provided grants, 

the projects have a loan component. The latter is 

still telling, especially as this is coming from the 

bank’s ordinary capital resources (OCR) whose 

terms are near commercial rates. 


August 2011

16 /28 

Take for example the Integrated Coastal Resources 

Management project in the Philippines. On 23 

January 2007, a grant from GEF, amounting to 

US$9 million was approved for the conversation 

activities in Cagayan, Cebu, Davao Oriental, 

Masbate, Romblon, Siquijor <strong>and</strong> Zambales. 16 But 

also on the same day, ADB approved a loan for the 

same project, amounting to US$33.8 million. Prior 

to this, the Philippines also availed of a TA that 

cost US$335,000. 

Although the funds are supposedly for the 

conservation of the resources within the Coral 

Triangle, the very design of the initiative was done 

without the necessary public consultation. As the 

Philippine-based NGOs for Fisheries Reform (NFR) 

asserted, “Another aspect that has to be clarified is 

the realization of CTI’s people-centeredness which 

necessitates the participation of fisher folk in all 

processes from planning, implementation <strong>and</strong> 

evaluation of programs.” 17 

It further added that, “Many fisher folks are 

apprehensive over CTI’s invitation to the private 

investors which may result to the widespread 

privatization of foreshore l<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> fishing grounds 

in the Philippines.” To some extent, the underlying 

motivation behind such conservation activities is 

still to facilitate trade in communities which largely 

depend on subsistence livelihood. When beach 

resorts are established, it is likely that fisher folks 

would be prohibited from working in their fishing 

grounds. 

Another cause for concern owing from the 

absence of genuine public consultation is that 

however laudable the conservation projects are, 

these projects tend to be so extensive that the 

communities have no capacity in owning these 

initiatives. The situation becomes more complicated 

once business infrastructures are in place. 


Briefing 

Paper 

Somehow an ethical issue also emerges since the 

NGOs that are involved in CTI <strong>and</strong> are working 

with the ADB are international NGOs such as 

Conservation International <strong>and</strong> World Wildlife 

Fund, rather than local <strong>and</strong> national organizations 

<strong>and</strong> networks which are more abreast of the 

communities’ needs <strong>and</strong> capacities. 

ADB as <strong>ASEAN</strong>’s 

Gatekeeper 

While ADB is behind the GMS <strong>and</strong> is becoming 

increasingly involved in BIMP-EAGA <strong>and</strong> IMT- 

GT, its bigger role in <strong>ASEAN</strong> lies elsewhere. It is 

interesting to note that while ADB covers all nine 

borrowing <strong>ASEAN</strong> members in three out of its four 

subregional programs, it has not yet launched a 

Southeast Asia Regional Cooperation Strategy 

Program (RCSP). But it has taken on the role of a 

gatekeeper supposedly in a bid to prevent another 

<strong>Asian</strong> financial crisis. 

In 1998, ADB was tapped as a partner in the 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> Surveillance Process , a mechanism for 

sharing <strong>and</strong> discussing economic <strong>and</strong> financial 

information. Although this is meant to function as 

an early warning system, the pieces of information 

that are exchanged are confidential by default. 

Nothing in the Terms of Underst<strong>and</strong>ing provides 

for the public’s access to financial information. Yet 

the document entrusts ADB to provide technical 

assistance <strong>and</strong> capacity-building. ADB has also 

began to play a more active role in the <strong>ASEAN</strong> plus 

3 Economic Review <strong>and</strong> Policy Dialogue (ERPD), 

the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) <strong>and</strong> the Asia Bond 

Markets Initiative (ABMI). 

But the ADB was not merely invited to play an 

active role following the 1997 <strong>Asian</strong> financial crisis. 

In fact, it institutionalized its interventions in <strong>ASEAN</strong> 


August 2011

17 /28 

within the bank’s operations. It established the 

Regional Economic Monitoring Unit (REMU) which 

in 2005 became the Office of Regional Economic 

Integration (OREI) that primarily supports the 

ARIC <strong>and</strong> the Asia Bonds Online. It also hired three 

advisors to the President on regional cooperation 

<strong>and</strong> integration (RCI). RCI has also been a key 

component of the bank’s master plan such as 

Strategy 2020, regional operations <strong>and</strong> even 

country strategies. 

ADB also facilitated the meetings of the finance 

ministers of <strong>ASEAN</strong>, <strong>ASEAN</strong> plus 3 <strong>and</strong> APEC. CMI, 

which was designed to host various bilateral swap 

agreements, was created by the finance ministers 

of <strong>ASEAN</strong> plus three during ADB’s Annual General 

Meeting in 2000. Eighty per cent of the pooled 

resources of the multilateralized CMI is coming 

from the plus three countries. 

Likewise, the bank has regularly sponsored 

capacity-building activities on the ABMI through 

training workshops <strong>and</strong> dialogues. In 2002, when 

the ABMI was endorsed by <strong>ASEAN</strong> plus 3, ADB 

began to roll out a series of Japan Special Fund 

(JSF)-grant technical assistance for credit rating 

agencies in the region, The three phases of the 

“Technical Assistance for Capacity Building of 

Selected Credit Rating Agencies in Asia” from 2002 

to 2004 cost US$600,000. Another JSF grant TA 

was approved in 2006 amounted to US$600,000. 

ADB also manages the ABMI’s information center, 

the Asia Bonds Online. 

There is an indication that ADB would like to take 

its role in a post-financial crisis <strong>ASEAN</strong> further. 

Although ADB has dubbed the GMS program 

as successful <strong>and</strong> even replicable, the program 

still has some untapped potentials. As its 2006 

report on RCI strategy suggests, “…activitybased 

arrangements tend to be fragmented, 


Briefing 

Paper 

<strong>and</strong> sometimes uncoordinated, because of a 

lack of a region-wide strategic perspective. It is 

therefore time for ADB to go beyond activity-based 

arrangements <strong>and</strong> develop a comprehensive RCI 

strategy.” 18 

However, the bank appears to backtrack against 

one of the four pillars of its RCI strategy, Trade <strong>and</strong> 

investment cooperation <strong>and</strong> integration --- which 

coincidentally has been one of the major causes 

of disparity <strong>and</strong> disunity within <strong>ASEAN</strong>. Hence ADB 

relegates itself in the area of research with respect 

to this pillar: “It is desirable that ADB assesses its 

important trend through [sic] a series of studies, 

<strong>and</strong> identifies the future course of actions required 

to maximize the net economic benefits of FTAs [free 

trade agreements] to DMCs [developing member 

countries].” 19 Consequently, ADB is assigning only 

one staff for this pillar. 

Yet the bank also boasts of regional connectivity 

projects which are said to respond to the <strong>ASEAN</strong> 

Economic Community (AEC) blueprint’s hey 

characteristics which include “a single market <strong>and</strong> 

production base.” ADB pegs its contribution to 

the AEC at US$5.358 billion out of the 11.6 billion 

worth of loans, TA <strong>and</strong> regional TAs in <strong>ASEAN</strong> as of 

31 March 2009. 20 Of the US$5.358 billion, US$5.2 

accounts for loans, US$75 million for TAs <strong>and</strong> 

US$44 million for regional TAs. 

The three other pillars of ADB’s RCI strategy are 

regional <strong>and</strong> subregional economic cooperation 

programs on cross-border infrastructure <strong>and</strong> related 

software; monetary <strong>and</strong> financial cooperation <strong>and</strong> 

integration; <strong>and</strong> cooperation in regional public 

goods (RGPs). The first entails infrastructure related 

to physical connectivity such as power plants, roads 

<strong>and</strong> railways as well as harmonization of regulatory 

regimes among countries. The second covers 

ADB’s role in <strong>ASEAN</strong> Surveillance Process, <strong>ASEAN</strong> 


August 2011

18 /28 

plus 3 ERPD <strong>and</strong> CMI, among others. In addition, 

this pillar seeks to harmonize accounting, reporting 

<strong>and</strong> regulatory st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> simply taxation <strong>and</strong> 

registration procedures, among others. The third 

deals with RPGs such as clean air, environmental 

protection, control of communicative diseases like 

HIV AIDS <strong>and</strong> management of natural disasters. 

Fifty staff is assigned for the first pillar <strong>and</strong> 10 for 

the two others. 

In a way, the ADB functions like ARF but with a 

purely economic m<strong>and</strong>ate <strong>and</strong> without a civil 

society component. 21 As one insider said, “<strong>ASEAN</strong> 

is a fulcrum” that facilitates those who have 

bigger interests. The bank is engaging <strong>ASEAN</strong> in 

t<strong>and</strong>em with China <strong>and</strong> the plus three <strong>and</strong> plus 

six countries, but conscious that <strong>ASEAN</strong> is not 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> of 10 countries but <strong>ASEAN</strong> minus. As one 

explained, “Some would have to move on ahead 

of others.” 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> in Big Business 

with Big Brother? 

Although the ADB has not dealt with <strong>ASEAN</strong> in 

the way that it has done with GMS, BIMP-EAGA 

<strong>and</strong> IMT-GT, it has nonetheless tagged <strong>ASEAN</strong> 

alongside the pursuit of the bank’s two agenda: 

to productively check the increasing influence of 

China <strong>and</strong> to exp<strong>and</strong> ADB’s financial resources 

primarily through partnerships with the private 

sector. 

In mid-2000, the ADB embarked on a Reform 

Agenda that at the outset aimed at reducing bottle 

necks in the processing of financial resources 

especially in the form of loans. This resulted to 

new financing instruments <strong>and</strong> modalities which 

offer more money <strong>and</strong> greater flexibility. Examples 

of these are the MFF, Non-sovereign Public Sector 

Financing (NSP) Facility, Refinancing Facility <strong>and</strong> 


Briefing 

Paper 

Local Currency Loans. But the subtext of this 

development lies in China’s aggressive posturing 

as a global financier that almost readily h<strong>and</strong>s out 

money to borrowing governments. Unlike the ADB, 

the Chinese financing firms lack a triple A credit 

rating <strong>and</strong> safeguard policies, which may prolong 

the processing of a loan <strong>and</strong> increase a project’s cost. 

Yet the ADB is also keen on the diminution of its 

role as a financier of projects while desiring an 

expansion of its financial resources. In Strategy 

2020, ADB expresses this vision succinctly: “ADB’s 

cofinanced lending will increase at a faster rate 

than ADB’s st<strong>and</strong>-alone financing operations, with 

a long term objective of having total annual direct 

co-financing exceed the value of ADB’s st<strong>and</strong>-alone 

project financing.” 22 In addition, “ADB will assume 

greater – but thoroughly assessed – risks <strong>and</strong> act 

as a catalyst for investments that the private sector 

might not otherwise be willing to make.” 23 

Possibly learning from its GMS experiment, ADB’s 

strategic approach to <strong>ASEAN</strong> has been through 

financing initiatives either through <strong>ASEAN</strong> plus 

3 or <strong>ASEAN</strong> China. The most recent initiative is 

the second phase of the <strong>ASEAN</strong> China Investment 

Fund (ACIF II), which was approved during the 

first quarter of 2010. 

Under this eight-year equity investment, the 

money is expected to grow <strong>and</strong> roll on, with 50 

per cent of the pool being tapped by <strong>ASEAN</strong>-based 

SMEs especially those in the Mekong <strong>and</strong> the 

Philippines while the other 50 per cent by Chinese 

SMEs. The fund may be spent on sectors such 

as energy, consumer services, consumer goods, 

industries, health care, materials, environment <strong>and</strong> 

technology. ADB is set to pour either US$25 million 

or 25 per cent of the fund’s total share capital, 

whichever is less. 


August 2011

19 /28 

It is expected that at the end of this scheme in 

2018, <strong>ASEAN</strong>-China trade would have increased by 

five per cent; at least US$1 billion of private equity 

funds would have been raised; <strong>and</strong> at least 500 

jobs would have been generated. 

The confidence over this scheme is premised on 

ADB’s triple A credit rating <strong>and</strong> safeguards policy, 

which can attract more entities to invest <strong>and</strong> 

borrow. It is also based on the supposed “success” 

of the first <strong>ASEAN</strong> China Investment Fund where 

ADB chipped in US$15 million. However, as of this 

writing, the basic documents of first phase are 

not available on the ADB website. The highlights 

of the first phase have also been excluded from 

the Report <strong>and</strong> Recommendation of the President 

(RRP) of the second phase. 

Although ADB clarifies that it will not be the “single 

largest investor” 24 <strong>and</strong> oversight bodies have been 

organized, the future of the fund is still in the 

h<strong>and</strong>s of a fund manager. The same fund manager 

is expected to observe due diligence procedures. 

Yet what the ADB could only guarantee is that it 

“has known the fund manager for over five years 

<strong>and</strong> has developed a close relationship with the 

team through this investment.” 

Moreover, while ADB may have a robust set of 

safeguard policies, it remains unclear whether these 

would be followed to the letter with reasonable 

transparency. This, considering that the entities 

that would be involved belong to the private 

sector, which to a large extent, is insulated from 

the bank’s disclosure policies. This early, ADB has 

chosen not to include important appendices to the 

RRP of the second phase. Aside from the ACIF I’s 

track record, the “fund structure <strong>and</strong> organizational 

relationships” <strong>and</strong> the “environmental <strong>and</strong> social 

governance improvements of ACIF I portfolio 

companies” are missing. 


Briefing 

Paper 

Way Forward: Shattering 

Secrets, Asserting 

Accountability 

In the last decade or so, ADB has indeed kicked 

start initiatives in <strong>ASEAN</strong> countries, which may not 

have been possible with <strong>ASEAN</strong> alone, even as we 

assume that the 1997 <strong>Asian</strong> financial crisis never 

happened. It also appears to have been a generous 

host of regional dialogues. ADB actually claims 

that its co-creations such as the multilateralized 

CMI <strong>and</strong> ABMI have been effective in cushioning 

the blow of the 2008 financial crisis to <strong>ASEAN</strong> 

members. 

But no matter how efficient the bank has been 

in forging regional cooperation <strong>and</strong> integration, it 

still shares the single biggest failure of <strong>ASEAN</strong>: It 

missed the communities. 

Although a public institution, ADB has become 

quite market-oriented that it could hardly be 

a multilateral platform that could engender 

<strong>ASEAN</strong>’s economic resiliency, much less its political 

credibility. After all, ADB is among the institutions 

that mired most <strong>ASEAN</strong> members in a perpetual 

state of underdevelopment. 

ADB’s engagement in <strong>ASEAN</strong> does not stop with 

the bank’s further entrenchment in the subregions 

within <strong>ASEAN</strong> nor in its involvement in <strong>ASEAN</strong>’s 

extended blocs especially <strong>ASEAN</strong> plus three. Given 

ADB’s equally constant advance in Central Asia 

<strong>and</strong> South Asia, the bank is not far from building 

a Pan-<strong>Asian</strong> Infrastructure Forum (PAIF) or even 

introducing a common currency. 25 

In ADB’s report, Infrastructure for a Seamless 

Asia, PAIF would not only coordinate <strong>and</strong> integrate 

infrastructure initiatives but also harmonize 


August 2011

20 /28 

regulatory <strong>and</strong> legal st<strong>and</strong>ards. The report also 

recommended an “<strong>Asian</strong> Infrastructure Fund” 

especially “bankable” regional infrastructure 

projects. 26 The report suggested that from 2010 

to 2020, Asia would need to invest around US$750 

billion per year on both national <strong>and</strong> regional 

infrastructure. Given the bank’s ambition as well 

as increasing reliance on the private sector, civil 

society must be all the more be vigilant. 

At the moment, the ADB has the Regional 

Cooperation <strong>and</strong> Integration Financing Partnership 

Facility (RCIFPF) which was established in 2007. 27 

Under this facility are two funding windows, 

the Regional Cooperation <strong>and</strong> Integration Fund 

(RCIF) <strong>and</strong> the Regional Cooperation <strong>and</strong> Trust 

Funds (RCITF) which have been designed to 

support regional technical assistance <strong>and</strong> grants 

respectively. The former is actually where ADB 

sources its funding for <strong>ASEAN</strong>-related meetings. 

Last September, ADB, along with Malaysia, made a 

pledge of US$150 million for the <strong>ASEAN</strong>-led <strong>ASEAN</strong> 

Infrastructure Fund, which was discussed on the 


Briefing 

Paper 

sidelines of ADB’s 43rd Annual General Meeting in 

May 2010 in Uzbekistan 28 

On the other end of the spectrum is <strong>ASEAN</strong>. Despite 

its new Charter, <strong>ASEAN</strong> has yet to progressively 

move beyond its principles of consensus <strong>and</strong> noninterference 

<strong>and</strong> proactively respond to thorny but 

burning issues democracy, human rights, trade, 

Burma, China, migration, disaster management 

<strong>and</strong> climate change, to name a few. While it is 

uncertain whether <strong>ASEAN</strong> would ever recover 

<strong>and</strong> sharpen its political st<strong>and</strong>ing, its multilateral 

character <strong>and</strong> function must be insisted. 

While <strong>ASEAN</strong> remains a largely governmentled 

process, its Charter nonetheless provides for 

new mechanisms that would inform the political, 

economic <strong>and</strong> socio-cultural pillars of the regional 

bloc. <strong>ASEAN</strong> somehow offers opportunities for 

new stakeholders to participate <strong>and</strong> hopefulness 

on a new politics --- one that begins with the 

transformation of <strong>ASEAN</strong>, the elite boys club into 

the <strong>ASEAN</strong>, the community. 

ENDNOTES: 

1 Aside from the GMS, BIMP-EAGA <strong>and</strong> IMT-GT, other growth areas were imagined for Asia, other than Central Asia Regional Economic 

Cooperation (CAREC). These were the Pearl River, Singapore-Johore-Rian <strong>and</strong> the Tumen River Delta Area. <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> (1996). East 

<strong>Asian</strong> Growth Area Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines Integrative Report, p.34. 

2 Micheal Vatikiotis (1996). Political Change in Southeast Asia (London:Routledge), p. 174 

3 

Yves-Kim Creac’h <strong>and</strong> Lilianne Fan (2008). “<strong>ASEAN</strong>’s role in the Cyclone Nargis response: implications, lessons <strong>and</strong> opportunities.” In the 

Humanitarian Exchange Magazine (Issue 41).Retrieved on 22 October 2010. URL: http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2965 

4 

<strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> (1966). “Agreement Establishing the <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong>.” Retrieved on 15 September 2010. URL: http://www.adb. 

org/documents/reports/charter/charter.pdf 

5 

Michael Wesley (2010). “Asia, America, Australia” in American Review: Global Perspectives in US Affairs. Retrieved on 15 September 2010, URL: 

http://americanreviewmag.com/articles/Asia-America-<strong>and</strong>-Australia 

6 <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> (1968). Annual Report 1967. (Manila: ADB), p.17. 

7 Seiji Naya (1982 ). <strong>ASEAN</strong> <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong>. (Manila: ADB), p. 7. 

8 See Barend Frielink <strong>and</strong> Mylene Buerano (2009). “The Contribution of ADB to the <strong>ASEAN</strong> Economic Blueprint” in Southeast Asia Working Paper 

Series (No.3). 


August 2011

21 /28 


Briefing 

Paper 

9 <strong>ASEAN</strong>’s Economic Community blueprint, by far the most advanced component all the pillars which make up the <strong>ASEAN</strong> Charter, targets the 

integration of <strong>ASEAN</strong> markets by 2015. Many think that integration will happen much faster. However, within the China <strong>ASEAN</strong> Free Trade Area, there 

is reason to believe that only would benefit from the initiative at the expense of <strong>ASEAN</strong> members who are now actively participating in CAFTA. This, 

especially with the inability of local produce to compete with its Chinese counterparts which are easily shipped. Walden Bello suggested that with 

China’s “Half Open Model” which means, “open or free trade on the export side <strong>and</strong> protectionism on the import side,” “Southeast Asia will be paying a 

big price for a bad deal.” Walden Bello (2010). “China Lassoes its Neighbors.” Retrieved on 15 September 2010. URL: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 

walden-bello/china-lassoes-its-neighbo_b_490001.html 

10 Dickens, David (1998). “Lessening the Desire for War: The <strong>ASEAN</strong> Regional Forum <strong>and</strong> Making of Asia Pacific Security” Retrieved on 15 

September 2010. URL: http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/Working_Papers/WP11.pdf 

11 ADB (2007). Keynote Speech of Haruhiko Kuroda during the International Symposium: Ten Years After the East <strong>Asian</strong> Crisis: Lessons <strong>and</strong> Future 

Economic Prospects on 6 October 2007. Retrieved on 15 September 2010. URL: http://www.jbic.go.jp/ja/about/topics/2007/1006-01/02.pdf 

12 <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> (2006). “Regional Cooperation <strong>and</strong> Integration Strategy.” Manila: ADB, p. 25. 

13 Oxfam Australia <strong>and</strong> University of Sydney (2009). Power <strong>and</strong> Responsibility: The Mekong River Commission <strong>and</strong> Lower Mekong Mainstream Dams. 

Retrieved on 15 September 2010. URL: http://www.oxfam.org.au/resources/filestore/originals/OAus-Power<strong>and</strong>ResponsibilityEnglish-1009.pdf 

14 <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> (13 March 2009). “Governments Plan to Save Coral Triangle.” RetrievedAccessed on 10 October 2010. URL: http://www. 

adb.org/media/articles/2009/12823-asian-environmental-protections/default.asp?p=timnews 

15 

Andi Haswidi (11 May 2009). “ADB, GEF to provide US$25.5m in funding for CTI.” RetrievedAccessed on 10 October 2010. URL: http://www. 

thejakartapost.com/news/2009/05/11/adb-gef-allocate-255m-cti.html 

16 

See ADB’s project information documents on 33276: Integrated Coastal Resources Management. Retrieved on 10 October 2010. URL: http://www. 

adb.org/Projects/project.asp?id=33276 

17 

NGOs for Fisheries Reform (2010). CTI Praymer. The primer is in Filipino. Translations within the main texts are by the author. 

18 <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> (2006). “Regional Cooperation <strong>and</strong> Integration Strategy.” Manila: ADB, p. 7. 

19 

Ibid, p.13. 

20 

Barend Frielink <strong>and</strong> Mylene Buerano (2009). “The Contribution of ADB to the <strong>ASEAN</strong> Economic Blueprint” in Southeast Asia Working Paper Series 

(No.3), p.6. 

21 

In the GMS program, for example, the ADB is not only treated as an equal partner in the ministerial. It also created a Business Forum, which has no 

civil society counterpart. 

22 <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> (2008). Strategy 2020: The Long Term Strategic Framework of the <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> 2008-2020. Manila: ADB, 

p.23. 

23 Ibid, p. 

24 <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> (2010). “<strong>ASEAN</strong> China Investment Fund II (Report <strong>and</strong> Recommendation to the President).” Retrieved on 15 September 

2010. URL: http://www.adb.org/projects/project.asp?id=43938 

25 See Srinivasa Madhur (2002). Cost <strong>and</strong> Benefits of a Common Currency for <strong>ASEAN</strong> (ERD Working Paper Series No.12). 

26 <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> Institute (2009). Infrastructure for Seamless Asia. Manila: ADB, p.10. 

27 <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> (2007). “Regional Cooperation <strong>and</strong> Integration Financing Partnership Facility: Establishment of the Regional Cooperation 

<strong>and</strong> Integration Fund, <strong>and</strong> Regional Cooperat ion <strong>and</strong> Integration Trust Funds.” Retrieved on 22 October 2010. URL: http://www.adb.org/Documents/ 

Others/Cofinancing/RegionalCooperation-<strong>and</strong>-IntegrationFinancing.pdf 

28 The Star Online (2010). “Malaysia, ADB pledge US$150mil each to Asean Infrastructure Fund.” Retrieved on 22 October 2010. URL: http://biz. 

thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/9/28/business/20100928164545&sec=business See also <strong>ASEAN</strong> (2010). “<strong>ASEAN</strong> approves setting up 

infrastructure fund.” Retrieved on 22 October 2010. URL: http://asean2010.vn/asean_en/news/36/2DA89A/<strong>ASEAN</strong>-approves-setting-up-infrastructurefund 


August 2011

22 /28 

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Appendix 1 

Loans <strong>and</strong> Technical Assistance Taken by <strong>ASEAN</strong> members (1966-1970) 

Year Description of Loans <strong>and</strong> Technical Assistance 

1966 Indonesia – TA on a program of rehabilitation <strong>and</strong> stabilization of food production 

1967 7 approved loans amounting to US$41.6 million included the following: 

Malaysia – A water supply scheme 

Thail<strong>and</strong> – A plant for the production of polyester fiber 

1968 Malaysia – Loan for Penang State Water Supply (US$7.2 million) 

Thail<strong>and</strong> – Loan for Industrial Corporation of Thail<strong>and</strong> (US$5 million) 


Briefing 

Paper 

Indonesia – subsequent TA on a program of rehabilitation <strong>and</strong> stabilization of food production 

(US$230,000) 

Laos – TA on Nam Ngum hydroelectric <strong>and</strong> irrigation project (US$221,000) 

Philippines – TA on Fisheries Port in Manila Bay (US$225,000) 

Vietnam – TA on <strong>Development</strong> Financing Institutions (US$89,000) 

Philippines – Grant for the National Irrigation Authority’s Irrigation Water Management 

(US$105,000) 

Regional TA: 

Regional Transport Survey – (Its cost was still subject for review until 1970) 


August 2011

25 /28 

Appendix 1 (contn) 


Indonesia – Tadjum Irrigation (US$0.99 million) 

Indonesia – Sawat Sebarang Oil Palm Estate (US$2.4 million) 

Malaysia – Bukit Mendi <strong>and</strong> Bukit Goli Palm Oil Mills (US$2.8 million) 

Malaysia – Kuching Port Extension (US$5 million) 

Malaysia – Sarawak Electricity Supply (US$3.1 million) 


Briefing 

Paper 

Philippines – Relending to Private <strong>Development</strong> Corporation of the Philippines for Financing 

Private Industrial <strong>and</strong> Other Productive Enterprises (US$5 million) 

Philippines – Cotabato Irrigation (US$2.5 million) 

Singapore – Financing Manufacturing <strong>and</strong> Service Industries (US$10 million) 

Thail<strong>and</strong> – Financing Industrial Enterprises (US$10 million) 

13 approved TAs amounting to US$3.44 million included the following: 

Indonesia – Feasibility Study on Sempor Dam Reconstruction (US$328,000) 

Indonesia – Sawit Sebarang Oil Palm Estate (US$42,000) 

Malaysia – Kuala Lumpur – KeraK Highway (US$192,000) 

Malaysia – Oil Palm Products Marking (US$80,000) 

Philippines – Water Management (US$102,000) 

Thail<strong>and</strong> – Accelerated Rural <strong>Development</strong> Program (US$105,000) 

Thail<strong>and</strong> – Agricultural <strong>Development</strong> Program in Nong Wai Pioneer Integrated Agriculture 

(US$180,000) 

Regional TAs: 

<strong>Asian</strong> Vegetable Research (US$300,000) 

Study of the SEA Economy in the 1970s (US$250,000) 


August 2011

26 /28 



Cambodia – Phnom-Penh High Voltage Transmission (US$1.670 million) 

Indonesia – PUSRI Fertilizer Plant Expansion (US$10 million) 


Briefing 

Paper 

Indonesia – Ganbarsan – Pesanggrahan Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (US$2.7 million) 

Laos – Tha Ngon Agricultural <strong>Development</strong> (US$.973 million) 

Malaysia – Besut Agricultural <strong>Development</strong> (US$.9 million <strong>and</strong> US$3.3 million) 

Malaysia – Malacca Water Supply (US$5 million) 

Malaysia – Sibu Port Expansion (US$3.5 million) 

Philippines – Second Relending to Private <strong>Development</strong> Corporation of the Philippines for 

Financing Private Industrial <strong>and</strong> Other Productive Enterprises (US$15 million) 

Philippines – Cotabato-Gen. Santos Road (US$10.6 million) 

Singapore – Jurong Wharves Expansion (US$8.310 million) 

Singapore – Singapore International Airport <strong>Development</strong> (US$20.50 million) 

Singapore – Water Supply (US$8.3 million) 

Singapore – Ngee Aun International College Expansion (US$3 million) 

Thail<strong>and</strong> – Power Transmission <strong>and</strong> Substation Expansion (US$19 million) 

Thail<strong>and</strong> – Fisheries <strong>Development</strong> (US$2.5 million) 

19 approved TAs amounting to US$2.9 million included the following: 

Cambodia – Phnom Penh High Voltage Transmission (US$80,000) 

Indonesia – West Sumatra Electric Power Supply (US$185,000) 

Indonesia – Java Teak (US$216,000) 

Indonesia – Wampu River Flood Control (US$181,000) 

Indonesia – <strong>Bank</strong> Rakjat Indonesia (US$75,000) 

Laos – Than Ngon Agricultural <strong>Development</strong> (US$275,000) 

Philippines – National Food <strong>and</strong> Agriculture Council (US$36,000) 

Thail<strong>and</strong> – Accelerated Rural <strong>Development</strong> Program Extension (US$100,000) 

Thail<strong>and</strong> – Industrial Evaluation System for the Board of Investment (US$140,000) 

Vietnam – Rural <strong>Bank</strong>ing System (US$110,000) 

Vietnam – Fisheries <strong>Development</strong> (US$68,000) 

Regional TA: 

Regional Transport Survey (US$2,903,000) 



August 2011

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Appendix 2 

<strong>ASEAN</strong>-Related Technical Assistance as of 18 October 2010 

Compiled by the <strong>Asian</strong> <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> 


Briefing 

Paper 

Project Number <strong>and</strong> Name Date of Approval Cost (US$) 

5827: Technical Training <strong>and</strong> Capacity Building in Support of the <strong>ASEAN</strong> 24 December 1998 

Economic Surveillance Process 

707,000 

5870: Capacity Building for the <strong>ASEAN</strong> Surveillance Coordination Unit 29 November 1999 

<strong>and</strong> Technical Support for the <strong>ASEAN</strong> Surveillance 

980,000 

5879: Capacity Building of Ministries of Finance in Selected DMCs for the 16 December 1999 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> Surveillance Process 

387,000 


<strong>ASEAN</strong> Surveillance Process (Phase II) 

300,000 

5985: Strengthening <strong>Asian</strong> Financial Markets 3 May 2001 750,000 

5986: An <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 Framework for the <strong>Development</strong> of Early Warning 3 July 2001 

Systems 

150,000 


<strong>ASEAN</strong> Surveillance Process (Part II of Phase I) 

300,000 


Economic Surveillance Process (Phase II) 

200,000 

6070: Capacity Building for Implementing Early Warning Systems in 13 December 2002 

<strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 Countries 

250,000 


Economic Surveillance Process, Phase III 

253,000 

6127: <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 Regional Guarantee Mechanism 27 October 2003 935,000 

6161: <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 Regional Settlement Linkage 19 December 2003 300,000 

6201: Technical Training <strong>and</strong> Capacity Building in Support of the <strong>ASEAN</strong> 26 November 2004 

Economic Surveillance Process, Phase IV 

310,000 

6244: <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 Regional Multicurrency Bond 3 June 2005 400,000 

6280: Strengthening Economic <strong>and</strong> Financial Monitoring in Selected 2 December 2005 

<strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 Countries 

600,000 

6298: Supporting Enhanced Cooperation Among Southeast <strong>Asian</strong> Equity 22 December 2005 

Markets 

500,000 

6338: Minimizing Foreign Exchange Settlement Risk in <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 25 August 2006 

Region 

700,000 

6341: <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 Regional Basket Currency Bonds 30 August 2006 650,000 

6342: Technical Training <strong>and</strong> Capacity Building for Selected <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 12 September 2006 

Countries on Regional Economic <strong>and</strong> Financial 

900,000 

6373: <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 Regional Guarantee <strong>and</strong> Investment Mechanism, Phase 18 December 2006 

2 

900,000 


August 2011

28 /28 


6452: Enhancing the Capacity of Selected <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 Countries for 

Assessing Financial Vulnerabilities 

6393: Strengthening the Capacity of the <strong>ASEAN</strong> Secretariat in 

Regional Economic Integration <strong>and</strong> Policy Dialogue 

6451: Capacity Building <strong>and</strong> Institutional Strengthening of the Free 

Trade Agreement Units of Selected <strong>ASEAN</strong> Member 

6453: Capacity Building for Bond Market <strong>Development</strong> in 

<strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 

6460:Bond Financing for Infrastructure Projects in the <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 

Region with supplementary 


Briefing 

Paper 

29 March 2007 600,000 

2 April 2007 600,000 

28 March 2008 500,000 

28 March 2008 500,000 

16 May 2008; 13 July 

2009 

1,040,000 

6469: Developing Securitization Markets in <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 Region 10 July 2008 700,000 

6509: Minimizing Foreign Exchange Settlement Risk in <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 16 December 2008 

Region: Support for Group of Experts 

850,000 

6514: Harmonization of Bond St<strong>and</strong>ards in <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 16 December 2008 950,000 

7249: Strengthening the Capacity of the <strong>ASEAN</strong> Secretariat in 9 March 2009 

Regional Economic Integration <strong>and</strong> Policy Dialogue, Phase 2 

1,200,000 

7455: Assessing Financial L<strong>and</strong>scape <strong>and</strong> Formulating Milestones 17 December 2009 

for Monetary <strong>and</strong> Financial Integration in <strong>ASEAN</strong> 

225,000 

7477: <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 Regional Guarantee <strong>and</strong> Investment Mechanism, 21 December 2009 

Phase 3 

1,370,000 

7497: Technical Training <strong>and</strong> Capacity Building for Selected <strong>Asian</strong> 12 February 2010 

Countries on Regional Economic <strong>and</strong> Financial Monitoring 

1,200,000 

7536: Improving Liquidity of Bond Markets in <strong>ASEAN</strong>+3 19 May 2010 1,250,000 

7584: Assessment of Impediments <strong>and</strong> Actions Required for 24 August 2010 

Achieving an <strong>ASEAN</strong> Economic Community by 2015 

500,000 

7268: Regional Public Goods for Health: Combatting Dengue in 7 April 2009 

<strong>ASEAN</strong> 

1,000,000 

6473: Strengthening Southeast <strong>Asian</strong> Financial Markets 5 August 2008 650,000 

7292: Competition Policy in Southeast Asia: A Stocktake of Recent 2 June 2009 

<strong>Development</strong>s 

220,000 

7576: Technical Assistance for Promoting an Interlinked <strong>ASEAN</strong> 9 August 2010 

Capital Market 

2,000,000 

7495: Support for the Association of Southeast <strong>Asian</strong> Nations Plus 4 February 2010 

Three Integrated Food Security Framework 

2,000,000 


August 2011

Asian Development Bank and ASEAN: Banking on a Bent Brotherhood

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