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Pressing Need to Reform Equalization - Fraser Institute

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<strong>Fraser</strong> Forum<br />

8 | <strong>Fraser</strong> Forum<br />

The <strong>Pressing</strong> <strong>Need</strong><br />

<strong>to</strong> <strong>Reform</strong><br />

<strong>Equalization</strong><br />

by Fred McMahon<br />

Canada’s regional programs<br />

are a mess. They make worse<br />

the very problems they are supposed <strong>to</strong><br />

solve. And equalization is part of that<br />

mess.<br />

Employment insurance is supposed <strong>to</strong><br />

provide a cushion for the unemployed.<br />

Instead, it increases unemployment (see<br />

box). Regional development programs<br />

are meant <strong>to</strong> spur economic growth.<br />

Instead, they dampen growth. <strong>Equalization</strong><br />

is supposed <strong>to</strong> provide equivalent<br />

services across the country. Instead, it<br />

leaves “have” provinces struggling <strong>to</strong><br />

provide services while government<br />

spending becomes a political <strong>to</strong>ol in<br />

poorer provinces.<br />

Along with a number of technical<br />

changes, Beyond <strong>Equalization</strong> (2007), a<br />

book edited by Jason Clemens and Niels<br />

Veldhuis, <strong>to</strong> which I contributed a<br />

chapter, recommends two fundamental<br />

reforms <strong>to</strong> eliminate the problem of<br />

“over-equalization” that creates government<br />

bloat in have-not provinces and<br />

exacerbates other problems with<br />

regional programs.<br />

Before discussing solutions, this article<br />

will look at the overall impact of fiscal<br />

federalism <strong>to</strong> explain why reform is so<br />

urgently needed. I am from Atlantic<br />

Canada, Nova Scotia <strong>to</strong> be precise, and<br />

the damage is greatest in the Atlantic<br />

region because the money flow is greatest<br />

there.<br />

Some numbers will provide an idea of<br />

the magnitude of the problem.<br />

Let’s compare Ontario with my home<br />

province of Nova Scotia. Government<br />

spending as a percent of GDP in<br />

Ontario in 2005/06 equalled 35 percent<br />

of the economy. It was 54 percent in<br />

Nova Scotia in the same period. Federal<br />

spending alone equalled about a quarter<br />

of Nova Scotia’s economy compared <strong>to</strong><br />

a tenth of the Ontario economy.<br />

You might think this discrepancy in federal<br />

spending in the two provinces is<br />

almost <strong>to</strong>tally due <strong>to</strong> equalization. Not<br />

so. Federal spending in Ontario is about<br />

$4,500 per person; in Nova Scotia it is<br />

Fred McMahon (fredm@fraserinstitute.ca) is Direc<strong>to</strong>r of the Centre for<br />

Globalization Studies at The <strong>Fraser</strong> <strong>Institute</strong>. He is co-author of the<br />

“Solutions <strong>to</strong> <strong>Equalization</strong>,” chapter in the recently-published <strong>Fraser</strong><br />

<strong>Institute</strong> book, Beyond <strong>Equalization</strong>: Examining Fiscal Transfers in a<br />

Broader Context.


almost $10,000 per person. And when<br />

you subtract equalization, it’s still about<br />

$8,000 per person. In other words,<br />

Ottawa spends nearly twice as much per<br />

person in Nova Scotia as Ontario not<br />

even counting equalization, and more<br />

than twice as much when equalization is<br />

counted.<br />

The damage done<br />

The great burst of spending in Atlantic<br />

Canada <strong>to</strong>ok off under Pierre Trudeau<br />

in the early 1970s, a time of minority<br />

government when buying seats in the<br />

region could make the difference between<br />

vic<strong>to</strong>ry and loss, minority or majority government.<br />

Federal spending has maintained<br />

its political edge ever since.<br />

Ottawa spends<br />

nearly twice as<br />

much per person<br />

in Nova Scotia as<br />

Ontario not<br />

counting<br />

equalization...<br />

Let’s take a look at how these transfers<br />

undermine economic growth, leave<br />

“have” provinces struggling <strong>to</strong> provide<br />

services, and result in government bloat<br />

in the have-not provinces.<br />

A study sponsored by the government<br />

of Nova Scotia and the Atlantic Canada<br />

Opportunities Agency, which was supposed<br />

<strong>to</strong> show that Nova Scotia businesses<br />

were competitive, instead found<br />

that the corrosive effects of government<br />

Regional Programs<br />

spending were undermining competitiveness.<br />

[A] significant proportion of the<br />

Nova Scotia firms visited were partially<br />

dependent either directly<br />

upon provincial or other forms of<br />

public purchasing or indirectly<br />

through subcontracting <strong>to</strong> larger<br />

firms which are in turn reliant<br />

upon government spending for<br />

their survival and profitability....<br />

Public policy appears inadvertently<br />

<strong>to</strong> have reinforced market failure <strong>to</strong><br />

some extent by cushioning profits<br />

via grants, subsidies and preferential<br />

purchasing thereby reducing the incentive<br />

<strong>to</strong> change.... The heavy reliance<br />

upon Federal transfers has<br />

indirectly promoted a dependency<br />

culture in the province...a culture,<br />

as one owner manager said of “a<br />

whole region being on the dole.”<br />

(O’Farrell, 1990, pp. 24-25. Emphasis<br />

in the original)<br />

Federal transfers <strong>to</strong> poorer provinces,<br />

including equalization, provide the<br />

money for these provinces <strong>to</strong> undermine<br />

the competitiveness of provincial<br />

businesses through subsidies and generous<br />

government contracts that leave<br />

businesses dependent on government.<br />

(See McMahon, 2000, chapter 5 for<br />

more details.)<br />

Meanwhile, Ontario struggles <strong>to</strong> provide<br />

health care (with 2.7 hospital beds<br />

per thousand population, below the<br />

national average of 3.6), while Nova<br />

Scotia boasts four beds per thousand<br />

and New Brunswick leads the pack at<br />

5.3. Even Alberta lags all “have-not”<br />

provinces except PEI (MacKinnon,<br />

2005, citing 2003 numbers).<br />

Solutions<br />

While there are strong arguments <strong>to</strong><br />

eliminate equalization, Beyond <strong>Equalization</strong><br />

limits itself <strong>to</strong> recommending<br />

Unemployment in the<br />

Maritimes<br />

Prior <strong>to</strong> the introduction of highly generous,<br />

regionally extended Unemployment<br />

Insurance in the early 1970s,<br />

every Maritime province had spent at<br />

least one year below the national unemployment<br />

rate and regional and national<br />

unemployment were converging.<br />

Afterwards, unemployment in the region<br />

soared <strong>to</strong> about 50 percent higher than<br />

the national average. UI became such a<br />

disincentive <strong>to</strong> work that in some<br />

months more than twice as many people<br />

collected UI as were officially unemployed.<br />

They didn’t count as officially<br />

unemployed because they s<strong>to</strong>pped looking<br />

for work while collecting UI.<br />

With a real unemployment rate of<br />

around 20 percent, both Statistics Canada<br />

and the Atlantic Provinces Economic<br />

Council reported labour<br />

shortages throughout the region after<br />

the creation of regionally extended UI.<br />

Business growth was frustrated because<br />

businesses, small business in particular,<br />

couldn’t compete against the UI system.<br />

(See McMahon, 2000, chapter 5 for a<br />

full discussion of these issues.)<br />

sensible reforms <strong>to</strong> the program in light<br />

of overall fiscal federalism. Unfortunately,<br />

other studies of equalization<br />

have failed <strong>to</strong> recommend fundamental<br />

reforms and typically recycle previous<br />

versions of the system.<br />

Respect the constitution<br />

The first task is a reform that goes well<br />

beyond the equalization debate but<br />

would solve many of the perversities in<br />

the equalization system. Ottawa should<br />

remove itself from areas of provincial<br />

jurisdiction, end its fiscal transfers in<br />

March 2007 | 9


these areas, and open an equivalent<br />

amount of tax room for the provinces.<br />

There are many reasons for this reform<br />

outside of the equalization context:<br />

respect for Canada’s constitution,<br />

replacing federal-provincial finger-pointing<br />

with accountability and<br />

transparency by making one level of<br />

government responsible for programs<br />

like health care, allowing provinces <strong>to</strong><br />

tailor programs <strong>to</strong> the unique needs of<br />

their people. (See Clemens, Veldhuis,<br />

and Palacios, 2006; and Harris and<br />

Manning, 2005a and 2005b for a fuller<br />

discussion of the need for these<br />

reforms.)<br />

At a stroke this would end a large part<br />

of the over-equalization problem. As the<br />

Expert Panel on <strong>Equalization</strong> and Terri<strong>to</strong>rial<br />

Financing Formula noted:<br />

As if the <strong>Equalization</strong> program<br />

isn’t complicated enough on its<br />

own, other federal transfer programs,<br />

particularly the Canada<br />

Health Transfer and the Canada<br />

Social Transfer, also include an<br />

equalizing component. …. The result<br />

is that wealthier provinces like<br />

Ontario and Alberta receive lower<br />

cash payments than other provinces.<br />

(2006, p. 47)<br />

Base equalization on costs<br />

The second key reform is <strong>to</strong> base equalization<br />

on the cost of providing services.<br />

Here it is important <strong>to</strong> remember the<br />

actual intent of the equalization program.<br />

The constitution does not require<br />

that provinces receive equal revenues<br />

but rather that they be able <strong>to</strong> provide<br />

reasonably comparable services at reasonably<br />

comparable levels of taxation.<br />

And here, reality bites. It simply costs<br />

more <strong>to</strong> provide services, or build hospitals,<br />

in Toron<strong>to</strong> or Vancouver than in<br />

New Glasgow, Nova Scotia, or<br />

10 | <strong>Fraser</strong> Forum<br />

Regional Programs<br />

Saska<strong>to</strong>on, Saskatchewan. And this<br />

needs <strong>to</strong> be recognized in equalization<br />

payments.<br />

Unless this is recognized in the equalization<br />

formula, then the intent of the constitution<br />

will be violated in that poorer<br />

provinces, with a lower cost of living,<br />

will always be able <strong>to</strong> provide better services<br />

than richer provinces at the same<br />

level of expenditure.<br />

<strong>Reform</strong>ing equalization by itself will not<br />

clean up the mess of fiscal federalism<br />

but, by keeping in view the larger picture,<br />

the recommended reforms will<br />

reduce some of the perversities of fiscal<br />

federalism. The two key reforms discussed<br />

here are only part of a broader<br />

package of reforms, many of them technical,<br />

discussed in Beyond <strong>Equalization</strong>.<br />

References<br />

Clemens, Jason, Niels Veldhuis, and<br />

Milagros Palacios (2006). “Fiscal Balance,<br />

the GST, and Decentralization: An<br />

Opportunity for <strong>Reform</strong>.” In Veldhuis<br />

and Clemens, eds. Beyond <strong>Equalization</strong>:<br />

Examining Fiscal Transfers in a Broader<br />

Context. Vancouver: The <strong>Fraser</strong> <strong>Institute</strong>.<br />

Clemens, Jason and Niels Veldhuis, eds.<br />

(2007). Beyond <strong>Equalization</strong>: Examining<br />

Fiscal Transfers in a Broader Context.<br />

Vancouver: The <strong>Fraser</strong> <strong>Institute</strong>.<br />

Council of the Federation. (2006). Reconciling<br />

the Irreconcilable. Ottawa. Digital<br />

document available at http://www.councilofthefederation.ca/pdfs/Report_Fiscalim_<br />

Mar3106.pdf.<br />

Expert Panel on <strong>Equalization</strong> and Terri<strong>to</strong>rial<br />

Financing Formula [EPETF] (2006).<br />

Achieving a National Purpose: Putting<br />

<strong>Equalization</strong> Back on Track (May 2006).<br />

Ottawa: Government of Canada, Department<br />

of Finance. Digital document available<br />

at www.eqtff-pfft.ca/.Harris, Mike<br />

and Pres<strong>to</strong>n Manning (2005a). A Canada<br />

Strong and Free. Vancouver: The <strong>Fraser</strong><br />

<strong>Institute</strong>.<br />

Harris, Mike and Pres<strong>to</strong>n Manning (2005b).<br />

Caring for Canadians in a Canada Strong<br />

and Free. Vancouver: The <strong>Fraser</strong> <strong>Institute</strong>.<br />

MacKinnon, David (2005). Fairness in Confederation—Fiscal<br />

Imbalance: A Roadmap<br />

<strong>to</strong> Recovery—Phase 2 Report. Toron<strong>to</strong>:<br />

Ontario Chamber of Commerce.<br />

McMahon, Fred (2000). Retreat from<br />

Growth: Atlantic Canada and the Negative<br />

Sum Economy. Halifax: Atlantic <strong>Institute</strong><br />

for Market Studies.<br />

O’Farrell, P.N. (1990). Small Manufacturing<br />

Competitiveness and Performance: An<br />

Analysis of Matched Pairs in Nova Scotia<br />

and New England. In association with<br />

Gardner Pinfold Consultants. Halifax:<br />

The Nova Scotia Department of Industry,<br />

Trade and Technology and the Atlantic<br />

Canada Opportunities Agency.

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