Introduction This thesis asserts that water is set to become the key ...

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Introduction
This thesis asserts that water is set to become the key strategic asset of the new
millenium, replacing oil and territory as the basic causes of conflict throughout the
Middle East. The crisis over water in the Middle East is escalating. Existing agreements,
dwindling resources-increasingly affected by pollution, and agricultural/industrial
initiatives, have elevated the strategic importance of water in the region. For Middle
Eastern nations, many already wavering on the edge of conflict, water is becoming a
catalyst for confrontation. It is an issue of national security and foreign policy as well as
domestic stability. Thus, given water’s growing ability to redefine interstate relations,
the success of future efforts to address water sharing and distribution will hinge upon
political and strategic approaches to this diminishing natural resource.
My thesis focus and analyses of water politics in the Middle East will be
developed in five sections. The first part of this study will describe the severity of the
problem of water in the Middle East and will show why this is such a compelling and
important issue. Furthermore, this section will introduce the main contention of this
study, that in the Middle East the problem of water is greatly complicated by the
inadequacy, ambiguity, and enforcement of international law. This is exacerbated by the
lack of correspondence between political and hydrological boundaries. The next three
sections will be divided into case studies that will look at this argument more closely and
consider the powerful or damaging role that international law and political, and
hydrological boundaries play in these particular situations. The case studies include three
disputed river basins in the Middle East: the Tigris-Euphrates basin, The Jordan River

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Basin, and West Bank groundwater, inequitably shared by Israel and Palestine. Finally, I
will describe some of the mechanisms, including international law that could be effective
in promoting a mutually satisfactory solution. With that being said, this study will also
note what seems to have worked in similar situations in the past, and what can work
under the sponsorship of water resources working groups.
Section I: The Problem
Global water resources are limited, and unevenly distributed worldwide.
Moreover, rivers and water sources are often shared by more than one country.
Disparities in access to drinkable water between countries are wide, and some states are
already faced with constraints in meeting domestic water demand owing to physical,
socioeconomic, and political factors. As a result, water and water supply systems may
well become the spark for political confrontation and the objectives of military operations
as the global populations and population needs expand. Water quality has also become a
crucial factor in the discussion of water availability, conflict, and cooperation. In many
countries, both developing and developed, current water use is not sustainable because
water is poorly allocated or managed. It is clear, both in terms of quality and quantity,
that water scarcity is and will be a major issue in several regions of the world. Agencies
such as the intelligence Agency of the US Department of Defense, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, the Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, and the
International Institute for Strategic Studies have especially mentioned concerns about this
issue in the Middle East.
Few regions on the planet offer a more varied or a richer mix of ethnicity religion,
language, society, culture, and politics than the Middle East. At the same time, no region

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of the globe presents its diverse aspects in such a mixture of conflicts and complexities.
Out of this mix, one issue emerges as the most conspicuous, trans-boundary, and
problematic, water. Its scarcity and rapidly dwindling stores are mostly felt in places
where there also happens to be some of the fiercest national animosities. River waters,
and access to them, in the Middle East are a determinant of both domestic and external
policies of the region’s principal actors. As water shortages occur and full utilization is
reached, policies tend to be framed more and more in zero-sum terms, adding to the
probability of disagreement. It would seem unavoidable that the severity of Middle
Eastern water problems will exacerbate into the future, unless addressed in a systematic
way.
As seen in the graph above, in the Middle East, water resources are plummeting.
While representing 5% of the total world population, the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region contains only 0.9% of global water resources (Berman and Wehbe, pg.
1). Per-capita water availability, in the MENA region has fallen by 62% since 1960 and
is expected to fall by another 50% in the next 30 years (Berman and Wehbe, pg.1).
Eighty-seven percent of all freshwater resources in the region are used in low value
agriculture. Water losses in municipal distribution systems often exceed 50% of the

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water supplied for urban use (Berman and Wehbe, pg. 1). The number of water-scarce
countries in the Middle East and North Africa has risen from 3 in 1955 (Bahrain, Jordan,
and Kuwait) to 11 by 1990 (with the inclusion of Algeria, Israel and the Occupied
Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and
Yemen)(Berman and Wehbe, pg.1). Another 7 are anticipated to join the list by 2025
(Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Oman, and Syria)(Berman and Wehbe, pg.1).
In Addition, other factors have sent this situation into a crisis. Population rates
are among the highest in the world, and countries in the Middle East are consuming water
at a much higher rate than can be replenished naturally. Rising populations, estimated to
reach 423 million by the turn of the century, and to double 25 years thereafter,
increasingly have affected water resources in the region (Berman and Wehbe, pg.2).
Also, in an area already critically short of water because of its geographical location,
water depletion has been compounded by domestic pollution, which has contributed to a
deterioration of usable resources and a general decline in the quality of available water.
Finally, expanding initiatives in agriculture and industry have further eroded regional
water availability (Berman and Wehbe, pg.2). Motivated by growing populations, many
nations have begun to over exploit their agricultural capabilities, resulting in the
reduction of arable land (Berman and Wehbe, pg.2). Since there is declining availability
and reductions of overall quality, crisis zones have begun to emerge along the major
rivers of the region. Examples of crisis zones are countries along the Tigris-Euphrates
and Jordan River Basins in the Middle East.
In the Middle East the problem with water is greatly complicated by the uneven
distribution of water resources and by the lack of correspondence between political and

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hydrological boundaries. Few agreements have been reached about how the water should
be shared and most of the agreements that are made are seen as being unjust. Upstream
countries believe that they should control the flow of rivers, taking what they like, if they
can get away with it. Most downstream countries challenge this assumption by arguing
that the river should be at a constant flow for all riparian states (i.e. states through which
the water flows). International law provides no real solution to this problem of shared
watercourses, rivers, or cross-border aquifers.
International Law
So far, two international legal codes have been drafted, though neither is yet
binding. The International Law Association, at its 52nd Conference, produced the first
protocol in 1966 (Dolatyar and Tim, pg. 38). It was called the Helsinki Rules on the Uses
of the Waters of International Rivers. The drafting of the Helsinki Rules represented a
systematic attempt to codify international water law. The rules included the notions of
the ‘reasonable’ and ‘equitable’ sharing of water resources and recognized the
‘international drainage basin’ as a basic concept for formulating international water law
(Dolatyar and Tim, pg.38). However, the contestability of the concepts of ‘reasonable’
and ‘equitable,’ and the controversy over the definition of an ‘international drainage
basin,’ has prevented the acceptance of the Helsinki Rules as the legal basis for dealing
with international watercourses (Dolatyar and Tim, pg.38).
The second legal code has been created by the International Law Commission
(ILC), which is a United Nations affiliated body, beginning in 1970 when the UN
General Assembly charged the commission with the task of “progressive development
and codification of the law on water courses for purposes other than navigation (Dolatyar

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and Tim, pg.38).” Recognizing the significance of international watercourses, after 11
years of consideration, the United Nations delegated the codification of international
water law to the ILC. After two decades of deliberation, the Commission concluded the
drafting and provisional adoption of 32 articles on the law of ‘the Non-navigational Uses
of International Watercourses.’ Among the suggested general principles were those of
equitable utilization, the obligation not to cause harm to other riparian nations, and the
obligation to exchange hydrologic and other relevant data and information on a regular
basis. Eventually, on May 21, 1997, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution,
with a vote of 103 in favor, 3 against (Turkey, Burundi, China), and 27 abstentions, to
which the Convention on the law of the Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses was annexed (Dolatyar and Tim, pg.39). This convention is a
comprehensive global code of law to govern the management of internationally shared
resources.
There are five distinct theories relating to the governing principles of water law
that can be identified in the United Nations Convention on the law of the Nonnavigational
Uses of International Watercourses. They are as follows: absolute territorial
sovereignty, absolute territorial integrity, community of property in waters, limited
territorial sovereignty, and optimal development of the river basin. The first, the doctrine
of absolute territorial sovereignty, is based on the theory that it is a sovereign right of
each state to make full utilization of all water resources flowing within its territory,
irrespective of the effects beyond its boundaries (Dolytar and Tim, pg.36-37). The
concept of absolute sovereignty is associated with the Harmon Doctrine, named after a
statement by US Attorney-General Harmon, relating to a dispute in 1895 between the

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USA and Mexico over the use of the Rio Grande (Dolytar and Tim, pgs.36-37). The
doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty has created a significant amount of tension in
the Middle East, and this will be introduced throughout section three of this study (case
studies).
The doctrine of absolute territorial integrity emphasizes the integrity of a
particular river basin. The concept of absolute territorial integrity establishes as a rule of
International Law that no state is allowed to alter the natural conditions of its own
territory to the disadvantage of the natural conditions of the territory of its neighboring
state (Dolytar and Tim, pgs. 36-37). For this reason, a state is not only forbidden to stop
or to divert the flow of a river which runs from its own to a neighboring state, but
likewise to make use of the water of the river as either causes danger to the neighboring
state or prevents a riparian from making proper use of the flow of the river. This doctrine
is of major concern in the Middle East, especially in dealing with the case of the Tigris-
Euphrates River involving Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, which will be discussed later.
The doctrine of community of property in the waters declares reasonable sharing
or equitable use by all riparians and, not causing unreasonable harm to any other riparian
(Dolytar and Tim, pgs.36-37). This doctrine argues that international watercourses are
the common property of all states through which they flow, and that no one state should
intervene to diminish the resource for others sharing it.
The doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty restricts state sovereignty and ties
the riparian states to share water resources according to such a criteria as historic use,
arable land, and population (Dolytar and Tim, pgs.36-37). According to this view, each
riparian state, regardless of whether an international watercourse originates in or traverses

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its territory, has a vote in deciding what measures are adopted within the watercourse as a
whole. However, the state that has been using the water the longest has some priority.
Finally, the doctrine of optimal development of the river basin envisages the
development of the basin without regard to national boundaries. This theory involves
contestable notions such as ‘optimal,’ ‘reasonable,’ and ‘equitable,’ over the choice of
allocational criteria. It also presupposes basin-wide institutions that may not exist (ILC,
1994).
Although riparians who make controversial claims over shared rivers rarely resort
to litigation in international courts of law, they always assert the particular legal theory
which best justifies their demands, using it more as a bargaining ploy than as an objective
legal argument. For example, downstream states reject the doctrine of absolute territorial
sovereignty because they do not want upstream states to fully utilize all of the water
sources that flow through the riparian states, while upstream states reject the doctrine of
absolute territorial integrity because they want to fully utilize all water sources flowing
within their territories. The basic problem in dealing with such differences is the absence
of binding treaties to govern the general and specific terms of shared waters, and the lack
of essential inter-riparian or international institutions to assure compliance among users.
The search for establishing legal rules to manage water use is not new. Without
appropriate legal channels and adequate rules, the potential for conflict over water
increases both at local and international levels. To avoid conflict where water resources
are shared, upstream and downstream users must agree on how water will be allocated. In
the Middle East, the parties involved in water use disputes are much more sensitive
towards any scheme that appears to change the status quo. Looking at the issue from a

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legal perspective, it seems that only with the formation of international agreements,
including, bilateral, multilateral and universal agreements can there be created an
adequate arrangement of effective legal instruments for preventing and solving disputes
that arise over shared water resources. In other words, law can be a major instrument in
finding and maintaining legitimate and sustainable solutions to this problem.
Researcher Tony Allen, in his work titled The Middle East Water Question
concurs with my argument about the inadequacies of international water law (Tony,
Allan, pg 292). But he raises several more problems that international water law causes.
Allen believes that legal principles are undoubtedly of great potential significance. He
believes that the problem with alien legal principles evolved in alien outsider institutions
(mainly Western societies) is that they have little appeal to Middle East politicians,
professionals and communities when they will disrupt existing practice and are not
founded on the cultural and religious conventions of the region. Allen makes a great
point in saying:
“Legal principles that derive from other areas of law which deal with static
property and transactions related thereto are of limited value in the realm of
water. Water is not the same as land. It is very dynamic; much more like finance
than land. Financial transactions function naturally in markets. Water does not.
Laws relating to water at all levels, and especially at the international level need
to be flexible. They need to deal with both regular and unpredictable fluctuations
of flow (Allan, Tony, pg. 292).”
Thoughts like these were apparent throughout Allen’s work and Allen and I concur about
the inadequacies of international water law in the Middle East.
Other researchers have voiced concerns on international water law in the Middle
East. Adel Darwish in a lecture at the Geneva Conference on Environment and Quality
of Life spoke about the non-clarity of international law. Darwish believes that this issue
is a huge matter for concern and states, “there are few, if any, precedents that the UN

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International Law Commission or the International Court of justice (Darwish, Adel, pgs.
4-5).”
Notably, Darwish raises the point that Muslim fundamentalist, who are currently
active in the region, have recently begun to include the water issue in their radical
literature as they interpret the laws of water-sharing with non-Muslims along Islamic
lines in a way designed to deploy water as another weapon to continue the ongoing
conflicts in the region.
For many analysts, including Darwish and Allen, the international water law issue
in the Middle East is the epitome of the Middle East Conflict. Almost all of the literature
in the field describes a grim picture of freshwater availability in the Middle East and
demonstrates that there is a big risk of upcoming conflicts and wars over water in the
region.
To date, international water law has not been effective in the Middle East region
in establishing rights, entitlements or obligations. Legal instruments do not yet secure
water for economies enduring water deficits. Many, including water lawyers, do not
understand why the apparent water crises do not focus the attention of legislators on the
potential of legal remedies to solve the problem. Law as stated above can be thought as
the big determinant in finding the solution to this major problem in the Middle East.
SECTION 2:Water Wars in the Middle East
In the Middle East region, the Euphrates and Tigris River basin conflict involving
Turkey, Syria and Iraq is considered one of the major water disputes in the region. The
other key conflicts involve the Jordan River basin, engaging Israel, Jordan, Syria, and the
Palestinians; and the tension over access to the West Bank groundwater between Israel

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and the Palestinians. All three of these intense disputes reveal the inadequacies of
international law in terms of solving international water disputes and all three will be
discussed throughout the “case studies” section of this paper.
The Tigris-Euphrates River Basin
Before looking into the arguments of the parties in dispute, it is important to have
a grasp on the geography of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin to have a clear view about what is
causing all the problems. Both the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers begin in the mountains of
eastern Turkey and join the sea at the head of the Persian Gulf. The Euphrates enters
Syrian territory at Karkamis, downstream from the Turkish town of Birecik (Republic of
Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p.1). It is joined by its major tributaries, the Balik
and Khabur, as it flows southeast across Syrian lands before entering Iraqi territory
(Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p.1). During its passage through Syria
(657km) and Iraq (around 1,200km), the Euphrates receives only a negligible amount of
water (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p.1). The Euphrates River only
has one-third the volume of the Nile River with the average flow of 32.5bcm2, but it is
the longest river in East Asia (2,700 km) (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, p.1). Although the longer of the two rivers, the Euphrates is smaller than the
Tigris river in volume.
TABLE 1: Water Potential of the Euphrates Basin

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COUNTRIES WATER
CONSUMPTION
POTENTIAL TARGET
TURKEY 31.58 ( 88.7%) 18.42 (51.80)
SYRIA 4.00 (11.3%) 11.30 (31.80%)
IRAQ 0.00 (0.00%) 23.00 (64.60%)
TOTAL 35.58 (100.00) 52.92
Source: " Water Issues Between Turkey, Syria and Iraq";
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dept. of Regional and Transboundary Waters, June 1996, Ankara, Turkey.
The Tigris River originates from Lake Hazar in Turkey and then becomes the
border between Turkey and Syria for 40km, and the border between Turkey and Iraq (7
km), as it flows into Iraq (Elver, Hilal, p.3). Its main tributaries are the Botan, Bamansu,
Karpansu, and the Greater Zap rivers emerging from Turkey (Elver, Hilal, p.3). The
tributaries, which emerge from Turkey but join the Tigris in Iraq, add a significant
amount of water to the Tigris below Baghdad (Elver, Hilal, p.3). The volume of the
Tigris River, like the Euphrates River, varies greatly from year to year, and season to
season (Elver, Hilal, p.3).
TABLE 2: WATER POTENTIAL OF THE TIGRIS BASIN
COUNTRIES WATER
POTENTIAL
TURKEY 25.24 (51.90%)
SYRIA 0.00 (0.00)
CONSUMPTION
TARGETS
6.87
(14.1%)
2.60
(5,4%)
IRAQ 23.43 (48.1%) 45.00 (92.5%)
TOTAL
48.67
(100.00%)
54.47
Source: "Water Issues Between Turkey, Syria and Iraq"
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 1996, Ankara, Turkey
In the Tigris- Euphrates Basin, the central problem is that the rivers begin in
Turkey and flow southward into Syria and then Iraq. The two downstream riparians are
highly dependent upon the river flow for agricultural development, while Turkey
upstream has become increasingly dependent upon the river since the mid-1960s by
virtue of the GAP (Southeast Anatolia Development) project, a massive water

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management scheme that includes dam-buildings and diversions (Hilal, Elver, pgs. 4-5).
In the absence of a basin-wide agreement that specifies who gets what from the river,
when and how; Turkey, as the upstream riparian and the strongest state in the basin, is
able to get away with projects such as the GAP project.
This 32 billion-dollar project, will, on completion, consist of 22 dams, 19
hydroelectric power plants, and an irrigation network for 1.7 million hectares of land
schemes of various scales in 13 different locations (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, p.3)). The following table that I prepared represents the collective
impacts of the GAP project that is going on in the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers:
PROJECT
AREA
INSTALLED
CAPACITY
ENERGY IRRIGATED PLANNED
PRODUCED LAND WORK
EUPHRATES 5304 MW 20 billion kWh 1million Ha.
TIGRIS 2172 MW 7 billion kWh 700.000 ha.
7 Projects
14 dams
11HPW
6 projects
8 dams
8 HPW
TOTAL 7476 MW 27 billion kWh 1.700.000 ha.
13 Projects
22 dams
19 HPW
The GAP project covers and area of 75,000 square kilometers in southeast Turkey, 9.5%
of the national land area (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p.2). When completed, the
project will achieve the full development of over 1.7 hectares of land through irrigation.
The ratio of irrigated land to the total GAP area will increase from a current 2.9% to
22.8% (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pg.2). When GAP is completed, it is
expected that the national average of energy use will more than double. For this reason
and others, the project creates a great deal of resentment from Syria and Iraq.
The impact of GAP on Syria and Iraq has been extensively covered in existing
literature. Turkey was very reluctant to ‘give in’ to its resentful neighbors and showed no
let up of GAP, which would affect its most important national development plan. Nor

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was Turkey ready to give Syria and Iraq a role in the GAP project. Since Turkey had
decided to pursue its own interest, Iraq and Syria took two types of precautionary
measures to safeguard their access to water resources. First, they embarked on their own
respective national plans with the aim of increasing their strategic storage capacity by
impounding the rivers’ water in gigantic reservoirs (Dolatyar and Tim, pgs.145-147).
Second, they initiated international diplomatic campaigns to prevent, modify, or delay the
unilateral upstream GAP project as much as possible (Dolytar and Tim, pgs. 145-147).
Although Syria and Iraq complained tremendously about the GAP project, Turkey
was not contractually bound to behave otherwise. The Turks claimed that since there was
no international regulation governing the rights of riparian states, nor any specific treaty,
which regulates the sharing or common exploitation of the Euphrates and Tigris, the
status quo was in Turkey’s favor (Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, p.4). However,
Iraq and Syria insisted on their right to share waters. Their major argument was that
international precedent, if not enforced law, warrants that the management and sharing of
international rivers be equally in the hands of all riparian countries involved (Dolatyar
and Tim, 145-147). Referring to their ancient ‘acquired rights,’ because they made ‘prior
use’ of the water resources, Iraq claimed 59% of all natural flow of the Euphrates at the
Syrian-Iraqi border and Syrian claimed 40% of the flow at the Turkish-Syrian border
(Dolytar and Tim, 150-152).
Turkey’s response to this consisted of four different but unique statements. First,
Turkey adopted the legal doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty. Turkish authorities
argued that the Euphrates and Tigris both originate on Turkish soil and are Turkish rivers
while they flow over Turkish territory, concluding that Turkey is not obliged to share its

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waters with its Arab neighbors (Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, pg. 4). Second,
Turkey claimed the Euphrates and Tigris as ‘transboundary’ rivers whereas Syria and
Iraq considered them to be ‘international (Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, pg.4).’
Third, Turkey maintained that the Euphrates and Tigris rivers must be considered
together as a single transboundary watercourse system (Embassy of the Republic of
Turkey, pg. 4). Fourth, Turkish officials declared that Turkey would agree to share
transboundary waters if they included the Orontes river, which flows through Lebanon,
Syria, and Southern Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea, as well as the Tigris river
(Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, pg.4). This position presented by Turkey put them
into a legal controversy at the regional and international level.
For instance, Turkey claimed an undisputed right to the use of water within its
territory without the permission of other riparians, in the same way the Arab states regard
oil as a natural resource which is subject only to their sovereignty. This Turkish attitude
was made very clear when former Turkish President Suleyman Demirel stated:
“Neither Syria or Iraq can lay claim to Turkey’s river any more than
Ankara could claim their oil; this is a matter of sovereignty, we have the
right to do anything we like. The water resources are Turkey’s, the oil
resources are theirs. We don’t say we share their oil resources, and they
cannot say they share our water resources (Dolytar and Tim, pg. 148).”
This controversial argument brought up the question of the legal status of water and the
legitimacy of drawing a parallel between the legal status of oil and water. There was a
firm response from Arab countries.
Egypt got involved by declaring that the position held by Turkey was contrary to
international law and justice and incompatible with good neighborliness and friendly
relations. They argued that it is illegal to deny the people of neighboring countries the

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water resources they have been using for centuries. Syria stuck with the doctrine of
limited territorial sovereignty and called for fair sharing of the Euphrates and Tigris
waters, stating that, “Nobody has the right to divert these rivers and subject Syrians to a
catastrophe; if every country started to divert rivers claiming they were on their lands
then the whole world would be subject to grave dangers (Dolytar and Tim, pgs.148-
149).” Iraq held to the doctrine of absolute territorial integrity, insisting on its ancient or
prior rights of usage of water from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. All three parties in
international arenas, especially in the process of codification of international law,
aggressively prosecuted these different points of view.
After much deliberation, Turkey realized that its adherence to the doctrine of
absolute territorial sovereignty was no longer acceptable under the body of international
law, which treats the river basin as an undivided unit. Turkey suggested that a clear
distinction be made between the concepts of an ‘international river’ as a river which has
its opposing banks under sovereignty of different countries, whereas the ‘transboundary
river’ is a river which crosses common political borders. Therefore, the Tigris and
Euphrates River must be considered transboundary rivers. Turkey then argued that the
riparian countries through the median line must share waters of international rivers while
waters of transboundary rivers have to be utilized in an equitable, reasonable, and optimal
manner. However, neither its downstream neighbors nor the main body of the
international community accepted this argument of the Tigris and Euphrates, presented
by Turkey.
This argument presented by Turkey can be clearly seen as a disagreement with the
definition of international river basins presented in Article 2 (b) of the United Nations

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Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses. Article 2 states,
“international watercourse, means a watercourse parts of which are situated in different
states (International Water Law, pg. 2).” Being that Turkey brought this issue to the
forefront of the controversy, the problem regarding the Tigris and Euphrates rivers turns
to a controversy over the range of the rights of each riparian state to the part of the basin
within its territory.
Regarding the controversy over the legal status of water during the codification of
the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, all parties recognized that the two extreme points of view, absolute
territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity, must be moderated by the
concepts of Articles 5 and 7. The articles propose ‘equitable and reasonable utilization’ of
transboundary rivers, with a view of attainting the optimal and sustainable utilization of
those waters, recognizing both the duty to cooperate in the protection of the watercourse
system, and the obligation of riparian countries ‘not to cause significant harm’ to each
other (Articles 5 and 7 of the Convention).
These considerations illustrate how the rules of international law can be helpful in
placing all riparian states on a basis of participation. The Convention can have some
restraining effects on upstream states and supports the downstream countries to present
their case against unilateral upstream developments. However, the principle of optimal
and sustainable utilization of the water resources and the duty of all parties to participate
in the development and protection of the water basin provides a ground for upstream
states to question the uses of water in downstream states. In addition, it asks for

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downstream contribution to the cost of upstream projects that are beneficial to all parties
and to the protection of the ecosystem.
Now the tricky part about all of this is coming up with proposals to meet on equal
grounds. It is here that Turkey has recently attempted to find a real solution to this
problem in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin. For its part, Turkey proposed a three-staged
plan for optimal, equitable, and reasonable utilization of the transboundary watercourse
of the Tigris-Euphrates River.
Turkey proposed a plan that would proceed in the following three stages (Provided by,
Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs):
• Stage One - Compiling an Inventory of Water Resources.
An inventory would be made covering the whole range of available data on the rivers and
their water, including evaporation, temperature, and rainfall levels. All measurements
would be carefully checked ().
• Stage Two - Compiling an Inventory of Land Resources
Information would then be pooled on land classification and drainage. Appropriate crops
and drainage conditions would be identified and corresponding irrigation and flowing
water requirements would be established on the basis of them.
• Stage Three - Analysis of Water and Land Resources
At this point, potential methods of irrigation would be established in the light of an
analysis of water and land resources. Care would be taken to ensure that the systems of
irrigation selected minimized water losses. Ways to modernize or upgrade existing
irrigation projects would also be considered. All three countries could thus be sure that
an equitable and optimal arrangement had been devised for the use of the river waters,
based on firm measures and their clearly identified needs ().

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The three-staged plan applies to the principle of equitable utilization, which is
under Article 5 of the charter (International Law Commission, p1). It also considers the
basin as a whole system underlying the interdependence of it elements, as required by the
UN Convention. Lastly, it allows an objective study to determine the equitable use of the
Tigris-Euphrates River so there can be no false claims. If the plan produced a
breakthrough in relations between Turkey and its southern neighbors on issues
concerning the Tigris and the Euphrates, the benefits would be far-reaching. All three
countries would find it much easier to cooperate on other issues. A significant regional
tension might disappear from the political map of the Middle East.
It can be said that as a result of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq have
recognized that they might have to shift their water disputes from contest of power to
considerations of each other. Now I am not saying that this prospect is 100%, but if the
convention could become a global code of law that could force countries to govern the
management of internationally shared water resources, and inherent its rules, the less the
likelihood of military action between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq becomes.
International Law cannot single handedly decide the allocation of waters in the
Tigris-Euphrates River. What international law can do is provide these countries with a
basis for negotiation. In terms of international law, Turkey seems to have brought the
best solution to the table. Turkey’s three-staged plan will not produce definitive solutions
and allocations, but will serve as a foundation for negotiation and cooperation. Although
Turkey still claims that it has a sovereign right to do what it pleases with the water, after
reading direct foreign policy publications, it appears that Turkey is the one who wants to

20
move towards an international watercourse agreement. It will be very interesting to see
what the future holds in this situation, but it might not be to long until we see more
fireworks in this part of the region, and this time the fighting will be about water.
The Jordan River Dispute
The Jordan River supplies Israel and Jordan with a vast majority of their water.
Despite its small size and its limited water, the Jordan River basin has been the focus of
intense international conflict during the last five decades. It is also the most frequently
cited case among all the water systems in the Middle East as a source of major conflicts
and the most likely of all to create a ‘water war.’
The Jordan originates in the mountains of eastern Lebanon. As the Jordan flows
south through the Great Syrian Rift Valley, it is fed from underground sources and small
streams at various points in Jordan, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon (Masahiro Murakami,
pg.1). The Jordan’s main sources are the Hasbani River, which flows from Lebanon to
Israel; the Banyas River, which flows from Syria to Israel; the Dan River, which begins
and flows inside Israel, and the Yarmouk River, which begins near the Golan Heights and
flows to the Jordan River (Masahiro Murakami, p.1). Following its flow into the Lake of
Galilee, the Jordan River runs southward into the center of the Jordan Valley, forming the
border between the western edge of Jordan and the eastern side of Israel including parts

21
of the occupied territories of Palestinians (Masahiro Murakami, p.3). The Jordan
continues flowing into the Dead Sea, and then, through a smaller stream, it flows
eventually into the Red Sea.
It is important to point out that although the Jordan River is a crucial and highly
contested river in the Middle East, it is actually a small river in international terms. The
Jordan flows in a very narrow valley; its average width is about 1200 meters, and in some
parts it is only 500 meters in width (Masahiro Murakami, pg, 4). The lower part of the
river between the Lake of Galilee and the Dead Sea is 105 km, and the flow distance is
223 km.
As stated above, the Jordan Basin includes Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, and
occupied Palestinian territories. Among these actors, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine are
suffering the most because of an accumulating water deficit, and they are the most
dependent riparians on the Jordan River’s waters. Some hydrologists have identified that
1000 cubic meters per person per year is a minimum water requirement for a wellorganized
industrialized nation. Inside Israel’s border, the availability of water per-capita
in 1990 was 470 cubic meters (Issar, Arie, pg 4). It is estimated that, by the year 2025,
this availability will be reduced to 310 cubic meters (Issar, Arie, pg.4). Israel as a
country depends on water supplies, which either come from rivers that originate outside
their borders, or from disputed lands. The Jordan River is the largest and longest river
that flows in Israel. Furthermore, it is the only river within Israel that has a permanent
flow year round. All other rivers in Israel dry up for periods of months and do not fill up
until the winter. The other major rivers in Israel are contaminated with agricultural and

22
industrial sewage. This leaves the Jordan River as the only natural and clean river in the
country.
The country of Jordan is considered to be one of the driest countries in the world.
The Jordan River supplies about 75% of its needs (Libiszewski, Stephen, p.3). In
contrast to Israel, only 36%of the total river flow originates outside the Jordanian border
(Libiszewski, Stephen, p.6). However, in terms of water availability for the year of 1990,
Jordan had only 260 cubic meters per capita, which is almost a quarter of the minimum
water requirement for an industrial nation (Libiszewski, Stephen, p.3). It is projected
that, by the year 2025, Jordan will only have 80 cubic meters per capita per year.
These figures demonstrate that, Jordan and Israel are very dependent on the
Jordan River. The need for water and the always-present hostilities between Israel and its
surrounding states have placed the Jordan River in a major role since Israel’s
establishment in 1948. The Israeli War of Independence was rooted in the fact that the
Arab countries considered the State of Israel to be unlawful. Connected to these stances,
the Arab states have persistently denounced the unilateral diversion of the Jordan River
as completely illegal. The Israeli response has been that the surrounding Arab nations
were never willing to let Israel exist in peace. These historical disagreements interweave
with the dispute between Israel and Jordan in which the Jordan River plays a major role.
In order to understand the core of the conflict between Israel and Jordan around
the Jordan River, it is important to look at the different perceptions of water between the
two countries during their history of arguing. Jordan, like most of the Arab world, saw
the problem of the Jordan River dispute as part of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore,
for the people of Jordan, water was always a matter of Arab national pride. For Israel, a

23
young country, water was an integral part of territory and a necessary resource for their
development.
Disputes between the two countries have mainly involved and are concerned with
the utilization of the Jordan River and one of its main sources, the Yarmouk River. These
rivers are the only noteworthy surface waters that cross the two countries. Disputes
began in the late 1940’s, when both countries started water development programs.
Israel kicked off first with its development of a water program called the National
Water Carrier. The National Water Carrier, which was completed in 1964, brought water
from the north and central regions of the Jordan River, through a network of giant pipes,
aqueducts, open canals, reservoirs, tunnels, dams and, pumping stations, to the country’s
urban centers and to agricultural settlements throughout the country (Internal Jordanian
Water Policy, pg.3). As a side note, the National Water Carrier is currently abstracting
90% or more of the flow from the upper Jordan River (Internal Jordanian Water Policy,
pg.11).
To the Arabs, Israel’s National Water Carrier became a symbol of expansionism,
and they responded with their own diversion plans. Israel’s perception of water was as a
strategic issue and it made its leaders consider the Arab project as a danger to their
national security. Israel decided to use all of their means, including military, to stop it.
This Israeli overreaction to the water issue led Arabs to presume that they had found a
weak spot of their enemy. It is not surprising then that the first military action of the
Palestinian Nation Liberation Movement (Al-Fatah) targeted the Israeli National Water
Carrier. Moreover, the Arab League decided to help Jordan, along with others, divert
headwaters of the Jordan River (Allan, Tony, pg.224). When Israel used its military to

24
hit some Syrian construction sites, a series of small fights broke out which eventually led
to war in June 1967 (Allan, Tony, pgs. 224-226). With emphasis on the security
dimension of the water issue, Israeli politicians believed that after its battle for existence
in 1948, it was time for Israel to fight to secure access to water (Allan, Tony, pg. 224).
After Israel achieved victory in the Six Day War between the Arabs and Israelis,
it was able to fulfill much of its strategy aimed at controlling the headwaters of the Jordan
River. At this point, Israel achieved supreme integration of its water resources into one
national system. Israel gained complete control over the Upper Jordan River and over a
longer portion of the northern shore of the Yarmouk, including the area facing the intake
of Jordan’s King Abdullah Canal (Libiszewski, Stephen, pg. 6). In addition, for Israel, the
West Bank Valley became a key water source because of its underground flow of water
and wells. Israel launched a determined plan of agricultural development through which
water for irrigation was heavily promoted and major national efforts were geared toward
increasing agricultural production.
In contrast, after the Six Days’ War, due to its downstream position on the Jordan
River and its weak strategic standing on the Yarmouk, Jordan has been greatly
disadvantaged in its water use opportunities. Since the late 1960’s, Israel has basically
dominated the waters of the Upper Jordan. The Jordanians’ plans to expand usage of the
river and its canal system had to be terminated at the end of the war. Jordan has been
totally excluded from tapping this source as well as the waters of the Yarmouk River. In
addition, Jordan suffered long-lasting obstruction from the Israelis against building a
storage system to improve water diversions into the King Abdullah Canal (Libiszewski,

25
Stephen, pg.7). Israel has, on repeated occasions, impeded Jordan from accomplishing
maintenance works at the intake of the King Abdullah Canal.
In the past twenty years, Israel and Jordan have searched for alternatives to make
the most of water. For Jordan, the main projects have been the rehabilitation of the East
Gohr Canal, the repair of the Yarmouk main canal tunnel, and the constructions of both
the Rock Hill Dam and King Talal Dam on the Zarque River (Internal Jordanian Water
Policy, pg.12). The economic benefits of these projects could be a great help to Jordan in
overcoming its major water problem.
For Israel, the story of the past twenty years in terms of searching for alternatives
is a little more complicated. Israel sought to exploit all accessible water resources;
however, by doing this they ran into some problems. Israel’s agriculture became ever
more dependent upon irrigation, and demands for water steadily increased. Irrigation in
Israel’s crop-producing region grew from 15% in 1950 to about 64.2% by the late 1980s
(Dolatyar, Mostafa, pg. 108). Water demand rose as more immigrants arrived, more land
was cultivated, and the population of the country grew. With the threat of water scarcity,
the high cost of desalination of the Red Sea and other unconventional methods of
supplying water (including plans of trying to drag an iceberg from Antarctica), and the
pollution of surface to ground waters, Israel needed other supplies for water.
With water scarcity reaching its pinnacle, Israel needed other supplies of water,
and Lebanon was the only neighboring country with a surplus of water resources. In
1982, Israel invaded Lebanon under the alleged reason of border threats and security (Bill
and Springborg, pgs. 262-263). Because of unexpected resistance it faced in Lebanon,
Israel was forced to withdraw its forces. However, Israelis need for water led to the

26
establishment of a security zone to secure access to the water of the Litani River. The
amount of water that Israel diverts from the Litani is a subject of controversy, but Israel’s
planners have concluded that the appropriation of the Litani waters, even to the extent of
adding 500 mcm to Israel’s water supplies, can be conceived as only a short-term
solution (Dolatyar and Tim, pg. 107).
The Jordanian and Israeli Peace Agreement
Each country tried to develop independent alternatives in order to provide fresh
water to their people, but did not get the results they needed to solve their water
problems. It became clear to Israel and to Jordan that any solution they developed would
be only a temporary answer to their water problems. In the beginning of the 1990’s,
water for both countries became an object for cooperation. In addition to the need for
cooperation around water, both Israel and Jordan have come to realize that water is a
resource that needs protection. As part of their new approach towards cooperation, Israel
and Jordan began to seek a peace settlement, which would include water agreements and
would take into consideration the relative economic ability of each country.
At the beginning of the peace negotiations, the Jordanian demand for regional
distribution of the regional water resources was among the most important issues in the
bilateral relations with Israel (Dolatyar and Tim, pg.109). Jordan criticized the uneven
allocation, as it had emerged from unequal geographical chances to tap the rivers and the
power ratio between the two countries (Dolatyar and Tim, pg. 110). Israel’s extractions
from the Yarmouk, and its obstruction of Jordan building its own dam on the same river
were viewed as a violation of Jordan’s vital interest. In 1990, at the peak of the drought
period, when disputes started over water allocations on the Yarmouk, King Hussein

27
stated in an interview that water was the only reason that could again bring Jordan to war
with Israel (External Jordanian Water Policy, pg. 24).
The Israeli-Jordan Common Agenda of September 1993, aimed at defining the
path for further talks, highlighted the supreme importance given to the water issue.
Article 3 of the Common Agenda explicitly names “securing the rightful water shares of
the two sides” as one of the four main components to be dealt with in negotiations
(Libiszewski, Stephen, pg. 3). This put the water problem on the same level with security
issues (named first), as well as the question of Palestinian refugees and minor border and
territorial matters (both named after the water issue).
With the water issue being cited as an extremely important issue, both sides began
to look into what could be done to solve the problem. On October 26, 1994, the Prime
Ministers of Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty to try to deal with the situation. This
peace agreement put an end to the state of war, which had lasted for almost 50 years
between the two countries (Libiszewski, Stephen, p.7). Some specific articles of the
agreement deal with the Jordan River. In the peace agreement Israel and Jordan agreed to
share the waters of the Jordan River. The parties also agreed to provide water to one
another. Furthermore, according to the treaty, the countries would establish a joint water
committee to oversee issues regarding the quality of the water.
While the peace treaty is a step in the right direction it has many flaws. For
example, while the treaty lays out an agreement of sharing and managing water
resources, it is not a basin-wide agreement. Not only are Syria, Lebanon and the
Palestinians not signatories of the agreement, there is absolutely no mention of them.

28
The signing of the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan is undoubtedly a big step,
but just in terms of Israel-Jordan relations.
Furthermore, the agreement has another serious flaw. It requires Israel to supply
water annually at a fixed rate, but did not take into account the possibility of a drought.
This was a grave omission since Israel is a semi-arid country that depends on the winter
rains to replenish its water supply. The rainfall last winter was 60% below the annual
average, and the Ministry of Agriculture officially declared a “drought year (Israel
Today, pg.1).” Israel is trying to cut its own water consumption by up to 40% to
compensate, so it informed Jordan that it would not be able to supply the full amount of
water called for in the agreement (Israel Today, pg.1).
The Israeli-Jordanian water dispute concerned allocation quotas and the building
of storage and diversion facilities on a shared river basin. It was basically a distribution
conflict, showing all the characteristics of a zero-sum game. Although the conflict was
long-standing and concerned considerable amounts of water in a context of severe
scarcity in both countries, it did not mix with other strategic interests. Within the frame
of comprehensive bilateral peace negotiations, the water issue could be addressed. Now
the problem is getting Israel to adhere to the peace agreement, and get Syria and Lebanon
involved in peace agreements.
Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese relations
These two countries relations of peace negotiations can be treated together
because they are related politically, and because the role water plays in the two situations
is similar. In both cases, the main points of dispute are territorial and security matters,
namely the question of sovereignty over the Golan Heights and conditions for an Israeli

29
withdrawal from the so called “security zone” in Southern Lebanon. Israeli-Syrian
relations are overshadowed by the bloody wars fought against each other in the past, the
persisting arms race between them, Syria’s support for radical groups opposing the peace
process, and by competition between the two countries concerning their influence over
Lebanon. Both countries have troops stationed in the latter country, justifying this by the
presence of the other. The Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese situations also belong
together because of Lebanon’s subordinate/dependent relation towards the Syrian regime
and the influence, which they both exercise over anti-Israeli militias acting from Southern
Lebanon. In both cases, the water conflict is seen more as a part of these primarily
security oriented concerns than a genuine issue by itself.
Conclusion
In this situation regarding the Jordan River, water disputes must be regarded as
part of the security dilemma impeding potential peace negotiations. As long as political
differences and the climate of mistrust between the parties persist, water will be
perceived as a potential ‘weapon.’ In turn, territorial claims resulting from that
perception complicate a resolution of the conflicts political core issues. In such a
situation, the Israeli pursuit of territory retention for its own hydrological goals causes
peace to be impeded by inadequate legal agreements. Past attempts to achieve a binding
water distribution regime in the Jordan-Basin region have been impeded by deep political
differences between riparians. Actually, achievement of an agreement is also
complicated by the fact that no legal rule of binding character exists which regulates the
non-navigational use of shared waters.

30
The Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, although a hopeful first step on the path to a
comprehensive solution of the water disputes in the Jordan Basin region, must be
complemented by further agreements with the remaining riparians. Or, even better, it
should be replaced by a basin-wide agreement encompassing all parties involved. The
fact is that any basin-wide and cooperative solution, depends on a fair resolution of the
situation in accordance with international law, whose cornerstone is the assumption that
the allocation of scarce resources requires legal means, rather than coercive force.
Technical formulas and mechanisms applied in the Israeli-Jordanian water agreement can
give important indications on how water disputes in other negotiation trails might be
settled. It is my belief that international law, although inadequate at the moment, can
play an influential role in bringing together a basin-wide agreement of the Jordan River.
International law can provide these countries with a basis for negotiation.
The Ground Water of the West Bank
In our newspapers and on our TV-screens, we can observe the events that take
place every day on the surface of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These reports from the
region west of the Jordan River barely mention the importance of water resources in this
clash between Israel and the Palestinian population living under Israeli occupation.

31
Nevertheless, water is one of the several stumbling blocks in the attempts to establish
peace in the region.
The inhabitants of Israel and the Palestinian territories share their main sources
for drinking water. The largest resource is the Jordan River. Due to the occupation of
the Jordan valley by the Israeli army, the Palestinian population on the West Bank is
unable to reach the river at all, and cannot use the water for irrigation or human
consumption. But even if they could, they would not find more than a salty muddy
stream. The former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres once declared that nowadays
one could find more history than water in the Jordan River (Isaac, Jad, pgs.2-3).
The other sources for potable water are the aquifers, underground geological
structures with the capacity to store water. The water from the aquifers comes in a
natural way to surface as a spring; the people living on top of the aquifer can also get
access to the water by drilling wells (Deconinck, Stefan, pg .2). This is a renewable
water resource, replenished by the yearly cycle of winter rains. Israel and Palestine share
two aquifer systems. The first one, the mountain aquifer, is located under the hills of the
West Bank and shared by Israelis and Palestinians as well as Jewish settlers on the West
Bank. Although the winter rains that mainly fall on West Bank territory replenish the
aquifer, a major quantity of the water flows underground across the ‘Green Line’ (the
settlement line that marks the Israeli borders between 1948 and 1967), which is outside
the West Bank, and moves gradually towards the slopes of the hills mainly within Israeli
territory (Deconinck, Stefan, pg. 2). There the water appears on the surface as natural
springs and sources, out of reach of the Palestinian population of the West Bank. The

32
second shared aquifer is located under the coastal zone, covering an area including the
Palestinian Gaza Strip.
On a local level, water conflicts between Palestinian and Jewish communities
over the utilization of single sources and wells dates back to the very beginning of Jewish
immigration to historical Palestine. However, as a bigger conflict, Israeli-Palestinian
water dispute came onto the political agenda following the formation of a Palestinian
nationalistic movement in the early 1960s and the Israeli occupation of territories
following the Six Days War of 1967 (Issar, Arie, pgs. 7-8). Almost immediately after the
war, Israeli water policies and establishments were extended into the Occupied
Territories. A series of military orders put exploitation of water resources under harsh
control of the Israeli administration, severely restricting Palestinian use. Several
examples of the military orders enacted after the war can be cited:
• Palestinian drilling of wells is forbidden without permission by the Israeli
authorities. Since occupation, permits have been granted for just 23 wells, mainly
to replace older wells, which had dried up. Only three of these permits concerned
wells for agricultural use (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pg.1).
• On the West Bank, Palestinians are only allowed to drill shallow wells of 60-140
meters; Mekorot, the contractor of Israel’s water authority supplying the Jewish
settlers, prefers to drill to depths of 300-400 meters, in order to get higher flow
rates and better water quality (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pg.1).
• Reforestation is prohibited in the recharge area of the aquifers, except on private
lots, in order to promote maximum run-off and thus recharging the aquifers
(Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pg.1).

33
In addition to these orders imposed after the war, Israeli military commanders
assumed the responsibility for being the authority of these Occupied Territories. A new
water regime was imposed and the resources became subject to Israeli water legislation.
Therefore, the water resources in the Occupied Territories became public property that
could be “destined for the requirements of its inhabitants and for the development of the
country,” quoting the Israeli water law (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pg.1).
Landowners could no longer claim any rights to the water of their property, and the
authority over the water resources in the Occupied Territories was transferred from
villages and local communities to the so-called Civil Administration. The military
commanders of the area, as heads of the Civil Administration, became responsible for
granting exploitation licenses for existing and new water installations.
By these measures, Israel is preventing the Palestinians from developing the
groundwater resources of the West Bank in accordance with their growing economic and
social needs. Since the aquifers are transboundary, this assures unaltered water flow into
the Israeli territory.
In the meantime, Israel built new Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories. At
present (2003) there are about 210,00 Jews living in the West Bank, a small number in
Gaza, and another 200,000 or so Jews living in areas of Jerusalem and surroundings
annexed in 1967 (Dolatyar and Tim, pg. 211). Since settlements are usually supplied
with water from local sources, they increased the burden on the limited water supply in
the Occupied Territories. Furthermore, to worsen tensions between settlers and the
Palestinian population, the settlers are systematically favored over their Palestinian
neighbors regarding water allocation, regularity of supply, and pricing.

34
The result of this water policy is that the growing Palestinian demand for water
was ignored and the necessary licenses were almost always denied. The use of more
powerful water installations and deeper wells in the Jewish settlements caused the older
Palestinian wells to dry out. The majority of the Palestinian wells are now out of
operation. Most Palestinians of the Palestinian villages are not connected to water works;
people have to rely on tank lorries, or women have to carry water from distant wells for
their very basic needs. The water shortage is particularly felt in West Bank communities
that are not connected to the water network. As of the summer of 2002, more than
200,000 Palestinians were living in more than 200 communities that do not have a water
network (B’Tselem, pg. 2). These Palestinians rely mostly on rainfall, which is usually
collected on roofs of the houses. This water source is generally sufficient for only a few
months (November to May). During the summer, they collect water through nearby
springs (where they exist), using plastic bottles or jerricans, and buy water at high prices
from private water tankers. The water they obtain in these ways is poor quality and this
is very detrimental to their health (B’Tselem, pg.2).
Since the beginning of the current intifada, which began during September 2000,
water supplied to private tankers has fallen sharply. The decline is a result of the various
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) restrictions on Palestinian movement in the West Bank. The
IDF reoccupation of the large cities in the West Bank several months ago greatly reduced
the water supply from tankers that refilled at stations located in areas under curfew
(discussed below). In addition, the Palestinians pay from three to five times more for
water from the tankers than for water from a water network. The price of water has

35
always been a heavy burden on families living in communities without a water network,
who are generally poor (B’Tselem, pg.4).
In a town called Beit Furik, which has approximately 8, 500 residents, the people are
totally dependent on water brought by tankers from nearby Nablus, which is under
curfew for most of the day (B’Tselem, pg.4). The IDF allows tankers to enter Beit Furik
only from 8 A.M. to 2 P.M (B’Tselem, pg. 4). As a result, each of the thirteen tankers
that supplies water to Beit Furik can only make one delivery a day, rather than four or
five that it made before the intifada began. Furthermore, the water shortage has severely
affected one of the principal sources of income of the local residents, raising, sheep,
cows, and chickens, which require large amounts of water (B’Tselem pg.3).
On the other side of the hill, Jewish settlements do not have to deal with these
restrictions. Settlers can enjoy themselves with the surroundings of green lawns and
refreshing swimming pools. Unsurprisingly, this adds a great deal of frustrations on the
Palestinian side, when they are going through so much hardship trying to obtain sufficient
water and then they look over a fence and see Israeli children swimming in swimming
pools.
The Israeli-Palestinian water conflict can be visualized when comparing figures of
distribution of the waters in the West Bank. Israel, including the settlers, is presently
utilizing nearly 80% of the shared waters of the West Bank, while Palestinians are left
with less than 20% (Deconinck, Stefan, pg. 3). Thus, the Israeli-Palestinian water dispute
seems to be a classic distribution conflict over shared resources of vital importance to
both sides. Under international law, the local water resources shared by Israel and the
Palestinians must be divided fairly according to need. From the Israeli perspective, one-

36
quarter of the country’s present water supply and even a greater part of its drinking water
is tapped from the aquifer underlying the West Bank and the adjacent Israeli territory
(Israeli Prime Ministry, 2003). Israeli authorities therefore view limiting Palestinian
consumption as a defensive measure of sorts. The fear is that any uncontrolled, extensive
groundwater development by Palestinians on the West Bank would threaten the yield of
Israel’s own wells. Furthermore, inappropriate management of the shared aquifer might
lead to irreversible damage by pollution (Israeli Prime Ministry, 2003).
The Palestinians object that the increasing control and integration of the Occupied
Territories’ water resources is done at their expense. They claim that more than 90% of
the flow of the western aquifer and 100% of the northeastern one are fed by rainfall over
the West Bank (Deconinck, Stefan, pg. 3). Therefore, water should primarily be
allocated for their use. This demand is no less pressing and legitimate than the Israeli
concerns, since water from the common aquifer is the only source of supply of the
Palestinians on the West Bank and the main source of the Occupied Territories as a
whole. An increase in their share of the groundwater is seen as essential for improving
the poor standard of living in the territories and their future economic development.
However, the Israeli-Palestinian water dispute is not just a distribution conflict, as it
appears on the surface. The difference from this case is that the competing parties in
question are not two formally equal sovereign states. Unlike the Israel-Jordan case, the
water dispute here is between an established and powerful state on one side, and a people
in search of statehood on the other. The chances to use common water resources are
therefore not determined by a mixture of geographical factors and power ratio, as in the
Tigris-Euphrates and Jordan Basins, but by political circumstances alone. Despite being

37
the lower riparian of the Mountain Aquifer, through its military occupation of the West
Bank, Israel is in the position to deliberately fix the allocation of water of its competitor,
the Palestinians. Given this situation, the dispute over water is essentially embedded into
the struggle over land and national identity at the core of the Palestinian question. When
speaking about the ongoing peace negotiations aimed at finding a solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, water directly touches all political and territorial main issues in
question, but it still has not been formally addressed.
In the Israeli-Palestinian case, disputes over water rights are basically interwoven
with the political core issues of the open Palestinian question. Disagreement on water in
this case has high political implications since it concerns the question whether powers
released to Palestine shall include just functional authority over the Arab residents on the
West Bank or also territorial authority over the area, including control of resources.
Existing literature has noted that this was the main obstacle to finding a peace agreement
in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. In addition, negotiation talks are usually
overshadowed by several terrorist attacks from the side of Palestinian extremist, violent
protest by Jewish settlers against the peace process, and disputes over the Palestinian
Authority’s extradition policy.
In terms of the role international law plays in this case, it is similar to the others.
International law, as I have noted several times, is hindered by its ambiguity. A further
weakness of international law is that it can be so easily be made powerless when a state
ignores the laws in question. The Israeli government claims that it has not displaced a
legitimate sovereign in either the West Bank or Gaza Strip. This argument is Israel’s way

38
of justifying the alteration of legal and administrative structures, and the exploitation and
degradation of resources, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
When researching this case I came across some literature that tried to justify Israel’s
water policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under international law. Several
researchers believed that since prior use supposedly establishes water rights, Israel has
honored prior use rights of the Palestinians’ allocated water before the Israeli conquest of
the West Bank and Gaza, but has appropriated all of the ground water that was still not
being exploited in 1967. This argument is, to say the least, false. This entire claim is
invalid because of the illegality of the occupation. It is also false to say that Israel has
honored prior rights of Palestinians, as stated above the military authorities have
confiscated wells belonging to runaway owners, as well as those within the boundaries of
confiscated Palestinian land. The argument sometimes raised that Israel merely inherited
water resources that had been under British Mandate control, is also untrue. Palestinians,
as the indigenous inhabitants of the region, are the party with historical prior use rights.
The obvious conclusion here is that Israel is flagrantly violating international water law.
Instead Israel is pursuing its own agenda, centered purely upon a perception of its own
“water security.”
Security is perhaps the central concept in Israeli dialogue. The slogan, “national
security” is frequently interwoven in terms of “environmental security,” “food security,”
and “water security.” It is this obsession with security that informs many of Israel’s
approaches towards solving the water crisis. Above all, Israel has felt a need to have
military or political control over its water supplies.

39
On September 13, 1993, The Declaration of Principles (DOP) provided the
framework for a five-year interim period, during which time Palestinians would be given
autonomy over certain spheres of control in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; this period
was envisioned as paving the way for a permanent settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict (Isaac, Jad, pg.12). The Declaration of Principles was to be the foundation on
which further, less ambiguous and more detailed agreements could be constructed. In
this sense, the DOP did live up to its expectations. It essentially established the Cairo
Agreement of 1994, which specified the terms of Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip
and Jericho, in accordance with the DOP (Isaac, Jad, pg.12). It also created the
Agreement of Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, which made
arrangements for Palestinian autonomy over various parts of the West Bank (Issac, Jad,
pg.12).
However, in the case of the DOP, the unequal power relationship between Israelis and
Palestinians is very dangerous. Israel, as the occupying power that is granting limited
autonomy to an occupied people, is in a position to apportion powers and responsibilities
as it sees fit, and in accordance with its interest. In addition, the DOP fails to make clear
the extent to which water should be under Palestinian control. It is not made explicit
whether autonomy includes limited control of water resources. Furthermore, the
framework set out in the Declaration of Principles provides no basis for an equitable
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian riparian dispute. Israel’s conception of its national
interest, a conception that recognizes Palestinian rights only when there is no conflict of
interest, makes it hard to perceive how an agreement will ever be reached. Israel needs to

40
be willing to make some sacrifices, for the sake of long-term interest of both Palestine
and Israel.
The water resources of the West Bank will play a crucial role in any plan for the
future of the Occupied Territories. Being a scarce resource in the West Bank and Gaza,
as it is in Israel, water is going to be the most difficult resource to divide and share. In
the present situation, it is not clear when a final solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
can be expected. The continuing Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory will not bring
peace in the area. Without a sustainable solution for the water conflict, Israel and
Palestine are heading for a disastrous water crisis in the first quarter of this century.
Water security must be achieved by a fundamental change in direction that involves
international law, integrating water resource management, and reconciling competing
claims on limited resources.
Diagnosis of Future Solutions
Facing historical, psychological, and political barriers that have impeded
cooperation and deadlocked diplomacy, nations in the Middle East region are sliding
toward conflict over water. Water’s growing role in the emerging hydropolitics of the
region has stressed the need for a new approach to safeguard this diminishing resource.
In light of the formidable barriers that have prevented agreement to date, new methods
have to be adopted to turn the tides of water politics in the Middle East.
Clearly the region must work towards schemes for shared responsibility of its water
resources. All of the case studies I analyzed involved water that crossed international
borders, thus, making their management and development subject to international
negotiation. One of the major stumbling blocks to joint management of water resources

41
will be the development of an agreement on allocation of water resources. While it is
recognized under international law that the water needs of all riparians must be taken into
account in the division of water resources, it is not being practiced.
It is clear that the possibility for conflict is present in this region. As such, all the
parties in the region should adopt certain principles of mediation and conflict resolution.
In particular, modern international law should be used as the basis to set parameters for
dispute resolution. The failure of most peace processes so far to address riparian
disputes, and the urgency of finding a solution to the conflict render some alternative
approaches necessary for finding peace in regards to water disputes.
Green Cross International GCI
On March 18, 2000 Green Cross International (GCI), in cooperation with UNESCO’s
International Hydrological Program, convened a one-day workshop in Paris called the
World Water Forum (Charrier, Bertrand, pg.3). Workshop objectives included building
networks of individuals and institutions, disseminating information, and identifying
possible directions for GCI’s water conflict resolution activities in the region.
Intergovernmental development organizations such as the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), funding institutions such as the World Bank and Global
Environmental Facility (GEF), and governmental agencies such as the Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation (SDC), also took part in the meeting (Charrier, Bertrand,
pg.3). During the first session of this meeting, participants suggested several general
methods for averting potential water conflict in the Middle East, including:
• Promotion of greater water-use efficiency (Charrier, Bertrand, pg.3).
• Decrease agricultural consumption by developing more efficient crops and
methodologies (Charrier, Bertrand, pg.3).

42
• Sustainable use and management of surface and ground water (Charrier,
Bertrand, pg.3).
• Promotion of education stressing water shortages are a common problem
requiring cooperative solutions (Charrier, Bertrand, pg.3).
• Improvement of communication among those who determine water policy
within and across watersheds (Charrier, Bertrand, pg.3).
• Consideration of decision-making at a regional level encompassing multiple
watersheds (Charrier, Bertrand, pg.3).
• Establishment of a regional commission to manage water jointly, and
(Charrier, Bertrand, pg.3).
• Greater use of strategic scenarios as management and education tolls
(Charrier, Bertrand, pg.3).
The second and third session included presentations by key experts on different
aspects of Middle East water issues. Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev spoke
about how all countries in the Middle East need to cooperate in order to alleviate the
chronic water problem in the region to avert a serious confrontation of water. Gorbachev,
who is president of Green Cross International (GCI), an organization bringing together
water experts, private sector representatives, and NGO’s working in the field of water
issues, said, “All the leaders (of the region) have said the same thing: unless we find a
solution to this problem in the next 10-15 years, we might see a conflict in the Middle
East that will be worse than the current conflict (General News Articles on water in the
Middle East, Jordan Times, pg.5).” In addition, Gorbachev believes that joint action on
water has the potential to lead to greater cooperation in the wider political arena, since
resolution of water problems may help key Middle East actors slowly build trust needed
to settle other issues that divide them.
Further Analysis
In my opinion, future efforts to normalize regional tensions over water will hinge
upon the equitable distribution of available resources, and the creation of security
frameworks to ensure security and stability. An integral part of water security is equity.

43
Equity has emerged as an important key element of water security due to the fact that
equitable sharing of environmental resources is proving to be both ethically and a legally
sustainable policy. In my opinion the two legal principles of “reasonable and equitable
utilization” of transboundary watercourses and “not causing appreciable harm” to
neighbors should be acknowledged, and reconciled by means of well-mediated technical
approaches. While downstream countries are naturally in favor of “not causing
appreciable (or significant) harm principle, the “equitable utilization principle” is
favorable for the upstream states.
Article 5 of the United Nations Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses deals with equitable, reasonable utilization, and participation 1 . When
comparing this article along with several others to the cases I analyzed throughout my
research I came to several conclusions.
For instance, resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute should be governed by
international law. When looking at the rules of international law in regards to this
situation I realized several things about Palestinian water rights. According to
international law, Palestinian water rights include:
• Absolute sovereignty over all the eastern aquifer resources, because this
aquifer is located underneath the West Bank and is not a communal
resource.
• Equitable water rights in the Western Aquifer and Northeastern Aquifer,
because these aquifers are recharged almost entirely from the West Bank.
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses can
be viewed online at www.internationalwaterlaw.org/IntlDocs/Watercourse_Conv.htm

44
• Equitable water rights in the Jordan River basin, because they are a
riparian to the Jordan River basin. The area of the Palestinian territories
is legally entitled to an equitable share of the river’s water resources.
Achieving these rights should be among the Palestinians’ main goals in negotiations.
In addition, I have come up with some key recommendations that can help along
the peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. First, a final agreement should be
based on the principles of equal utilization and joint management of water resources. All
of the water west of the Jordan River should be shared between, and managed by, Israelis
and Palestinians based on their respective populations. Second, Israel and the Palestinian
Authority should immediately adopt a holistic approach to the water conflict. Unless
water allocation and compensation are addressed immediately and properly through
international law, the Palestinians’ severe water crisis could undermine the sustainability
of the peace process. In addition, the future of Jewish settlements in the Occupied
Territories is obviously linked to the water dispute. Since the settlements are mainly
supplied with water from local sources, their consumption occurs directly at the expense
of Palestinians. As long as the settlements remain in the territories, this will always raise
the question from which sources and according to which standards they will be applied.
Finally, the Palestinian-Israeli water dispute should be resolved with an eye for justice
rather than military might.
As for the Tigris-Euphrates dispute, the greatest obstacle arises from the
differences in the approach taken by Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. Turkey supports a threestaged
plan to be realized through cooperation of the three parties, which basically
proposes the distribution of water according to the needs of each country, and

45
technological cooperation between the parties to promote rational use. The three riparian
countries, during the past two decades have engaged in aggressive political attacks upon
each other. For instance, a Turkish official has responded against Syria by saying, “we
will dry them up,” or “they need additional water to wash the blood of terrorism of their
hands (Elver, Hilal, pg. 6).” Syria has not hesitated to use the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK) and to give support to the Kurdish movement in Turkey. It has not done this for
the sake of humanitarian reasons, but only to show the Turkish state that it possesses a
negotiation chip so as to get more water from Turkey.
In the case of the Tigris-Euphrates river I see the only way peace can be
achieved in the near future is through a third party. In this case there has been minimal
input from the international community towards resolving this conflict. There have been
only a few very brief and fairly haphazard efforts made by third party involvement, and
to the best of my knowledge, none of significance since the mid-1970s. As opposed to
the Arab-Israeli delegations, which have agreed to the implementation of a number of
projects, overseen by the American, Canadian, and European delegations, this conflict
has not come to any type of solution.
The Jordan River basin is also clearly an area of water stress. All sides see close
linkages between water availability and national political and economic security. The
best approach may well be to treat quality over quantity issues together, and to recognize
that neither can be achieved without explicit recognition of mutually shared rights and
responsibilities for management. With the parallel and bilateral and multilateral tracks of
the current peace process we might be witnessing some progress.

46
Multi-lateral talks might be the best weapon for encouraging peace over water in
the Middle East because they provide a unique forum for low-risk communication.
Multi-lateral talks are divided into five working groups dealing with: 1.) management of
regional water sources, 2.) the refugees’ question, 3.) environmental problems, 4.)
regional economic development, 5.) arms control (Libiszewski, Stephen, pg.1). On one
hand these issues are themselves sources of tension and instability. On the other, they are
supposed to be potential fields for future regional cooperation.
Multi-lateral talks include numerous meetings with the different NGO’s, IGO’s,
and nations involved in various parts of the world. This includes potential donor
countries like the USA, the EU (discussed later), Japan, France, and others. These
meetings potentially increase the interaction and occasions for representatives of parties
to meet discretely without provoking extensive media coverage. Multi-lateral talks
helped Israel and Palestine to the signing of the Declaration of Principles and helped the
signing of the treaty between Israel and Jordan.
Furthermore, multi-lateral talks provide a frame for breaking long-standing
disputes or experimenting with new formulas, which can later be successful by bi-lateral
talks. For Israel, multilateral talks can be a means to achieve a form of softening in its
relations with the wider Arab world. Since some multi-lateral meetings can take place in
Arab capitals, this can provide the occasion for an Israeli delegate to visit them and
initiate a process of normalization.
A problem that multi-lateral talks pose to the peace process in my mind is the
political obstacles encountered during the talks. In the Jordan River case the multilateral
talks were boycotted by Syria and Lebanon, which argue that the Arab states should not

47
discuss functional matters prior to a settlement of political core issues at the bilateral
talks. This can also be seen by trying to get Turkey and Israel to cooperate with multilateral
talks. Turkey and Israel have the muscle and can afford to impose their political
will on other riparians of water in the area so they do so, which is not right. Getting these
two countries to participate and respect the rights of their neighbors will definitely be an
uphill battle.
The diverse and opposing nature of ethno-religious groups in the Middle East,
which includes Turks, Kurds, Arabs, and Israelis, makes the management of water a
shaky venture in diplomacy, and adds to the difficulty of achieving cooperation.
Furthermore, shortages of water, mismanagement of natural resources, and the notion of
sovereignty excerpt negative pressures on the foreign policy of the Middle Eastern
countries. Regional problems can be solved through common supranational approaches
because supranational solutions offer some prospect of sustainable conflict resolution.
The European Union’s (EU) approach to solve environmental conflicts in my mind is a
very positive model that is available at this point. The EU, on several occasions, has
attempted to facilitate solutions when its comes to water conflicts. The EU provides
pressure in the form of achieving resolutions as a precondition for their membership in
the EU. By observing this some countries become more eager to solve their disputes in
order to gain acceptance in the EU.
Besides supranational solutions, multi-lateral talks, and international law, there
are other strategies that have to be developed to reduce the intensity of conflict and the
danger of states competing for access to trans-national water resources in the Middle East
region. Confidence building measures and conflict resolution techniques will be needed

48
to address this urgent challenge. Preventive diplomacy, in international relations and
confidence building techniques are generally receiving greater attention in recent years.
Resource management diplomacy is one form of preventive that contains some very good
ideas. The idea is to argue upon sustainable uses of natural resources, to reach a sensitive
balance between economic development and environmental protection. It is a precondition
of arriving at stable solutions that mutual interest and benefits are taken into
consideration and realized. A good solution of such a deep conflict, as in the Middle
East, is to establish a good faith bridge between countries, relying on confidence building
and preventive diplomacy. In order to achieve this, these operations should be
accompanied by trying to get countries to consider prospects of economic growth through
a type of long-term sustainable management plan. This plan should take into account the
agricultural and environmental situations of countries, and specify reasonable
requirements for water. For this type of approach to succeed, upstream countries must,
become more helpful than in the past, which means making water available to
downstream countries, within the limits of fairness of course.
At the economic level, further stress needs to be exerted on water policies. Most
of the economies in the region are in a transitional state between public sector dominance
and on going privatization. The long history of water subsidies, which provide a base for
family economies, is difficult to change. An innovative economic tool should be
developed to safeguard social security while implementing strategies aimed at providing
a concrete base of water security for future generations by redefining the value of human
resources (i.e. water). Most countries in the region are performing economic
restructuring programs under the guidance of international monetary institutions.

49
Incorporating water and security as an economic dimension is essential in expanding the
domains of such programs and ensure its stability.
Conclusion
In the past-half century, and specifically in the past decade, the need to regulate
and maintain the use of international river basins has come to the forefront of
international concerns. While action and cooperation among states is necessary in areas
other than water; water stands to become a vehicle, which can enhance peaceful relations
between the parties and may even be helpful in diffusing some political tensions.
Governments, both national and local, hold the key responsibility. However, the private
sector, non-governmental organizations, international agencies, and national agencies can
play a major role as helpers, investors, and managers of utilities. The multi-dimensional
and multiphase controversy over water allocation rights with its complex relationship of
environmental, economic, cultural, political, and ethnic aspects, poses a severe threat to
peace and comprehensive security in the region.
The volatile political situation in the Middle East makes it vital that a consensus
between countries, on water resource management, be reached. With political
negotiations and emerging peace treaties providing hope for a sustainable future, the
water issue is the single biggest potential danger hindering most peace talks. This brings
out a collective responsibility for countries in the region to bridge the political and ‘trust’
gap between them in order to reach the required sense of stability and collaboration to
diffuse environmental and political threats that pertain to water. With so many political,
to social, ideological, and economic differences between countries in the region, only the
combination of international law, multi-lateral talks, supranational solutions, and

50
economic solutions will be able to support sustainable development in the new
millennium.

51
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