State v. Kendrick - Arizona Judicial Department

10 We reject the State’s argument that court-ordered
electronic monitoring by itself constitutes restraint and thus,
“custody” under A.R.S. § 13-2501(3).
In construing a statute,
our task is to “fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote
it.” State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 100, 854 P.2d 131, 133
(1993) (citations omitted). In our view, the State’s definition
of restraint goes beyond what the Legislature contemplated in
enacting the escape statutes.
A defendant placed on probation
is subject to a host of restrictions and limitations on his or
her freedom, all of which inhibit, and should inhibit, a
probationer’s conduct. Prohibitions on alcohol consumption,
drug testing requirements, and travel restrictions, to name a
few, come to mind.
Under the State’s expansive definition of
restraint -- which could include any probationary term
curtailing freedom or inhibiting conduct -- a probationer who
violated these or other similar probation terms could be charged
with escape.
11 Although we may consider dictionary definitions in
construing words in a statute in the absence of a specific
statutory definition, we must consider their common meaning and
ordinary usage in the context of the statutory scheme, and we
are not obligated to apply all possible definitions.
A.R.S.
§ 1-213 (2002) (directing that words in statutes “be construed
according to the common and approved use of the language”);
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