The Selfish Gene and The Evolution of Cooperation - Online.itp.ucsb ...

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If the number of games is finite and known, then both will choose BB But if the number of games is uncertain, things change If p = probability to play one more game, AA is stable if p > (T-R)/(T-P) = ½ (for our choice of parameters) IF END OF PLAY IS UNCERTAIN, COOPERTION IS THE BEST STRATEGY T>R>P>S, R>(T+S)/2 (R,R) (T,S) (S,T) (P,P)
1984, Robert Axelrod: 14 programs played Prisoner’s dilemma 200 times against each other. Winning Program was “TIT FOR TAT” ◦ Start by choosing A ◦ In each round, choose whatever the opponent chose in the previous round Repeating the contest with 62 programs gave same result, even though some were designed to do well against “TIT FOR TAT.”
Page 1 and 2: Gyan Bhanot Rutgers University and
Page 3 and 4: Why are we selfish? Why do we co-o
Page 5 and 6: Nature is dominated by selfish indi
Page 7 and 8: Meerkats (Kalahari) Share Baby sitt
Page 9 and 10: Like successful New York gangsters,
Page 11 and 12: This does not mean our morality is,
Page 13 and 14: Angler fish and lure leaf mimic fro
Page 15 and 16: In a group of altruists, there is a
Page 17 and 18: Gene Survival ◦ Kinship recogniti
Page 19 and 20: PROTOTYPE OF A REPLICATOR
Page 21 and 22: Replicator containing cells became
Page 23 and 24: Highest priorities: Survival and Re
Page 25 and 26: “Consciousness” may have appear
Page 27 and 28: Communication = When SMs can influe
Page 29 and 30: Honey bee grubs have a disease call
Page 31 and 32: Suppose I find 8 fruits each of val
Page 33 and 34: It is just a framework to organize
Page 35 and 36: Two prisoners are asked to confess
Page 37 and 38: ROSE COLIN A Don’t confess B Conf
Page 39 and 40: COLIN ROSE A Don’t confess B Conf
Page 41: • T > R > P > S (BB is Stable bec
Page 45 and 46: Player 2 Hawk Dove Player 1 Hawk (-
Page 47 and 48: Player 2 Player 1 scores: Hawk Dove
Page 49 and 50: Player 1 Player 2 Hawk Dove Bully R
Page 51 and 52: 1941- 1958 - 1943 -

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