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BEFORE THE <br />
FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION <br />
In the Matter of:<br />
COREAS TRANSPORTATION, INC.<br />
USDOT# 1862163<br />
and<br />
ALCIDES ALFARO dba<br />
COREA TRANSPORTATION<br />
USDOT# 2303177<br />
Docket No. FMCSA-2012-0438 1<br />
(Southern Service Center)<br />
Petitioner.<br />
FINAL DECISION ON PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF <br />
OPERATIONS OUT -OF -SERVICE AND <br />
RECORD CONSOLIDATION ORDER <br />
I. Procedural History<br />
On October 16, 2012, the Field Administrator for the Southern Service Center, <strong>Federal</strong><br />
<strong>Motor</strong> <strong>Carrier</strong> <strong>Safety</strong> <strong>Administration</strong> (FMCSA), served an Operations Out-Of-Service and<br />
Record Consolidation Order (the Order) against Coreas Transportation, Inc. (Coreas) and its<br />
alleged reincarnation, Alcides Alfaro dba Corea Transportation. FMCSA issued the Order under<br />
the provisions of 49 CFR 386.73 (Consolidation Proceedings). On or about November 19, 2012,<br />
Alcides Alfaro dba Corea Transportation (Petitioner or Corea) served a request for administrative<br />
review ofthe Order under 49 CFR 386.73(g). 2<br />
1<br />
The prior case number of this matter was NC-2012-9000-ROOSC.<br />
2<br />
See Petition. Petitioner originally filed its Petition on October 25, 2012. The U.S.<br />
Department of Transportation Dockets facility (Dockets) initially rejected Petitioner's filing<br />
because it failed to include a Certificate of Service as required by 49 CFR 386.6( c). Dockets<br />
notified Petitioner that it may re-submit its Petition within 20 days of the date of the notice with a<br />
proper certificate of service. On November 19, 2012, Petitioner "re-submitted" its Petition with<br />
a certificate of service within the time period specified by Dockets. Therefore, Petitioner's<br />
Petition was considered timely filed. See e.g. Gajda Trucking Company, FMCSA-2009-0276,
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 2 of20<br />
Under 49 CFR 386.73(g)(5), the Field Administrator "must serve written argument and<br />
supporting documentary evidence, if any, in defense of the disputed order no later than 15 days<br />
following the period in which petitioner may serve supplementary documentary evidence and/or<br />
written argument in support ofthe petition for administrative review." The Field Administrator<br />
was therefore required to serve his written argument and documentary evidence in defense of the<br />
Order no later than November 30, 2012. 3 The Field Administrator's submission however, was<br />
not served until December 10, 2012.<br />
On January 10, 2013, I issued an Interim Decision directing the Field Administrator to<br />
address the effect of his late filing on these proceedings. 4 The consequence ofthe untimely<br />
filing is intertwined with the issue of which party has the burden ofproof in these proceedings. 5<br />
Therefore, the Interim Decision also directed the parties to submit argument regarding the issue<br />
of respective burdens of production and proof in proceedings under 49 CFR 386.73.<br />
On January 21, 2013, the Field Administrator served his response to my Interim Order.<br />
Petitioner did not respond to my Interim Order. In his response, the Field Administrator moved<br />
for additional time to file his evidence and averred that his late filing should be accepted. With<br />
regard to the burden ofproof, the Field Administrator stated that the "petitioner therefore has the<br />
burden of identifying all factual and procedural errors made by FMCSA in issuing the order." 6<br />
Order Denying Petition for Reconsideration (Nov. 13, 2009).<br />
3<br />
This date is calculated as 30 days from the date ofthe service of the Order plus 15 days in <br />
accordance with 49 CFR 386.73(g)(4) and (5). <br />
4<br />
5<br />
Interim Order, January 10,2013. <br />
Interim Order, page 6. <br />
6<br />
Field Administrator's Reply to Interim Decision on Petition for Administrative Review of <br />
Operations Out-of-Service and Record Consolidation Order and Motion to Extend Time<br />
(Response to Interim Order), page 9.
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 3 of20<br />
II.<br />
Decision<br />
A. Burden of Proof<br />
The Consolidation Proceedings were established by the Agency under the statutory<br />
authority contained in 49 U.S.C. §31136 and 49 U.S.C. §31144 and effective on May 29,2012. 78<br />
Although placed within 49 CFR Part 386, which contains the Rules of Practice for <strong>Motor</strong><br />
<strong>Carrier</strong>, Intermodal, Equipment Provider, Broker, Freight Forwarder and Hazardous Materials<br />
Proceedings (Rules of Practice), the Agency rendered the majority ofthe Rules of Practice<br />
inapplicable to Consolidation Proceedings. 9 In so doing, the Agency removed any reference to<br />
the applicable burden of proof in Consolidation Proceedings. 10<br />
In the first two final decisions issued in Consolidation Proceedings, I stated that<br />
Petitioner had the burden of proving that the FMC SA erroneously issued the underlying record<br />
consolidation and operations out-of-service orders. 11<br />
My initial conclusion in those cases relied<br />
on the language in 49 CFR 386.73(g)(3) which requires a petitioner to "state all factual and<br />
procedural issues in dispute in its petition for administrative review" and 49 CFR 386.73(g)<br />
which states that a petition for administrative review that "does not identify factual or procedural<br />
7<br />
8<br />
77 Fed. Reg. 24864 (April26, 2012). <br />
77 Fed. Reg. 248643, 24864 (April26, 2012). <br />
9<br />
49 CFR 386.730). The only provisions of the Rules of Practice applicable to Consolidation <br />
Proceedings are Subpart A (Scope of Rules; Definitions and General Provisions) and 49 CFR<br />
386.67 (Judicial Review).<br />
10<br />
The burden of proof in enforcement cases and in cases arising under 49 CFR 391.47 is set<br />
forth in Subpart D (386.58). Subpart Dis not applicable to proceedings under 49 CFR 386.73.<br />
11<br />
All American, LLC, et al. FMCSA-2012-0252 (Decision on Petition for Review of Operations<br />
Out-of-Service Order and Order to Merge and Consolidate <strong>Motor</strong> <strong>Carrier</strong> Records (Sept. 10,<br />
2012); Wendell Kleen dba Blue Chip Transp., et. a!., FMCSA-2012-0307 (Final Decision on<br />
Petition for Review of Operations Out-of-Service Order and Order to Merge and Consolidate<br />
<strong>Motor</strong> <strong>Carrier</strong> Records (Oct. 25, 2012).
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 4 of20<br />
errors in the issuance of the order under review will be dismissed."<br />
However, upon further review, I determined that I had misapplied the burden of proof in<br />
those initial decisionsY In HP Distribution, I correctly noted that 49 CFR 386.73(g)(3)(ii) only<br />
requires that a petition include a statement of all factual and procedural issues in dispute and<br />
does not set forth a burden ofproof. 13 I therefore correctly placed the burden of proof on the<br />
Field Administrator as the proponent ofthe order. 14<br />
I also issued a final decision in the matter<br />
of Universe Bus under Section 386.73(g) and stated that the "FA must prove by a preponderance<br />
ofthe evidence that Petitioner was under common ownership and/or control with each ofthe<br />
other five motor carriers named in the RCO in order to avoid enforcement or other consequences<br />
associated with a negative compliance history." 15<br />
Subsequently, the Field Administrator for the Eastern Service Center (ESC) filed a<br />
motion requesting clarification of the Universe Bus decision. 16 In his motion, the ESC's Field<br />
12<br />
HP Distribution, LLP, FMCSA-2012-0362 (Decision on Petition for Administrative Review<br />
of Operations Out-of-Service and Record Consolidation Order, Dec. 17, 2012).<br />
13<br />
Id, footnote 7.<br />
14<br />
5 U.S.C. 556(d); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 335, 349 (D.C. Cir.<br />
198) (In administrative proceedings, the AP A provides a default rule for allocating proof burdens<br />
when regulatory statutes do not set forth separate rules."). In the legal basis section of 49 CFR<br />
386.73, the Agency points to two separate statutes as authority for 49 CFR 386.73. It states that<br />
the Secretary is authorized to "prescribe regulations ensuring that commercial motor vehicles<br />
(CMVs) are operated safely under 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(l) and to determine whether an owner or<br />
operator is fit to safely operate CMVs under 49 U.S.C. 31144." 77 Fed. Reg. 24863,24864.<br />
Both statutes are contained in subchapter III of Chapter 311 of Title 49. Violations of<br />
regulations promulgated under subchapter III of Chapter 311 of Title 49 are enforced under the<br />
provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 521(b).<br />
15<br />
Universe Bus, FMCSA-2012-0212, page 5 (Decision on Petition for Administrative Review<br />
of Operations Out-of-Service and Record Consolidation Order, Dec. 17, 2012).<br />
16<br />
Universe Bus, FMCSA-2012-0212, (Regional Field Administrator's Request for Clarification<br />
of the Assistant Administrator's December 17, 2012 Decision on Petition for Administrative<br />
Review, Jan. 7, 2013). There is no provision under 49 CFR 386.73 for the Field Administrator to
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 5 of20<br />
Administrator asked that I clarify the scope of administrative review under Section 3 86.73.<br />
While ESC's Field Administrator framed the issue as one ofthe appropriate standard ofreview,<br />
the underpinnings of his argument relate to the allocation ofthe burden of proof in Consolidation<br />
Proceedings. 17<br />
The burden ofproof relates to both the burden of producing evidence to go forward in a<br />
matter and the burden of persuasion. 18 Because Subpart D does not apply to these proceedings, 19<br />
I<br />
I<br />
the applicable burden ofproofmust be gleaned from the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). 20<br />
Under the APA, the proponent ofan order has the burden ofproof. 21 The Field Administrator is<br />
the proponent ofthe Order in this matter.<br />
The Field Administrator cites to 49 CFR 386.73(g) in support of his claim that the burden<br />
of proof in Consolidation Proceedings is on the petitioner to "identify all factual and procedural<br />
errors made by FMCSA in issuing the order." 22 The Field Administrator therefore interprets 49<br />
file a petition for reconsideration of a final decision under 386.73 as the provisions of subpart E<br />
(except 386.67) are not applicable to these proceedings. 49 CFR 386.730).<br />
17<br />
Id, page 5. The Field Administrator "therefore requests clarification of the basis for which<br />
the Decision extends beyond the scope of Petitioner's request for administrative review." The<br />
Field Administrator contends that "Petitioner has the burden of identifying all factual and<br />
procedural errors made by FMCSA in issuing the order" and contends that "there is no<br />
regulatory basis for reviewing an uncontested fact or procedure." Page 6. Therefore, although<br />
Respondent frames the issue as the appropriate standard of review, Respondent's argument<br />
relates to the burden ofproof rather than a standard of review.<br />
18<br />
Director, Office ofWorkers' Compensation Programs, Dept. ofLabor v. Greenwich<br />
Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 278 (1994).<br />
19<br />
49 CFR 386.730).<br />
20<br />
5. U.S.C. § 556; Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 335,349 (D.C. Cir.<br />
1989) ("In administrative proceedings, the APA provides a default rule for allocating proof<br />
burdens when regulatory statutes do not set forth separate rules.").<br />
21<br />
22<br />
5. U.S.C. § 556.<br />
Response to Interim Order, page 9.
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 6 of20<br />
CPR 386.73(g) to shift the burden ofproof from the Field Administrator, the proponent ofthe<br />
Order, to Petitioner. 23 The Field Administrator contends that "review ofmatters for which no<br />
error was alleged is outside ofthe scope ofreview under 49 CPR 386.73." 24<br />
The principles ofstatutory construction are fully transferable to the construction of<br />
regulations? 5 A court is required to interpret a regulation so that "ifit can be prevented, no<br />
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant. " 26 The Field<br />
Administrator's construction impermissibly embraces one portion of Section 386.73(g) while<br />
disregarding the remainder ofthe Section. 27<br />
The plain language of49 CPR 386.73(g) does not establish a standard ofproofin<br />
Consolidation Proceedings. Instead, when read in its entirety, Section 386.73(g) appears<br />
intended to distinguish administrative review from corrective action proceedings:<br />
A motor carrier .. .issued an order under this section may petition for administrative<br />
review ofthe order. A petition for administrative review is limited to contesting factual<br />
or procedural errors in the issuance ofthe order under review and may not be submitted<br />
to demonstrate corrective action. A petition for administrative review that does not<br />
identify factual or procedural errors in the issuance ofthe order under review will be<br />
dismissed. Petitioners seeking to demonstrate corrective action may do so by<br />
submitting a Petition for Rescission under paragraph (h) of this section. 28<br />
23<br />
24<br />
49 U.S.C. § 556. <br />
Response to Interim Order, page 10. <br />
25<br />
Morales v. Sociedad Espanola De Auxilio Mutuo Y Beneficenia, 524 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. <br />
2008). <br />
26<br />
TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 <br />
(2001). <br />
27<br />
"It is an elementary rule ofconstruction that effect must be given, ifpossible, to every word,<br />
clause and sentence ofa statute." US. v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538 (1955).<br />
28<br />
The highlighted language identifies the portions of the regulation omitted from the Field<br />
Administrator's interpretation.
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 7 of20<br />
The Field Administrator's interpretation, which attempts to transform Section 386.73(g)<br />
into a standard ofproof by ignoring the majority ofthe regulatory text, is an unreasonable<br />
interpretation. 29 I must therefore tum to the plain language of the regulation. 30 Under 49 CFR<br />
386.73(g), a petition for administrative review that requests review based on corrective action<br />
and does not identify factual or procedural errors in the issuance ofthe order will be dismissed.<br />
The Field Administrator's contention that Section 386.73(g) limits review to those allegations of<br />
error identified by a petitioner in its petition for administrative review is not supported by a plain<br />
reading of the Section. 31 So long as a petition for review is timely served; contains a statement<br />
of all factual and procedural issues in dispute; and does not request review based on corrective<br />
action, the petition will not be dismissed. Section 386.73(g) does not alter the burden of proof<br />
otherwise applicable to these proceedings. The burden of proof is therefore on the Field<br />
Administrator to prove that an order issued under Section 386.73 was properly issued.<br />
The Field Administrator's reliance on 49 CFR 386.73(g)(3) to shift the burden of proof to<br />
Petitioner is also an unreasonable interpretation. 32 Section 386.73(g)(3) establishes the content<br />
requirements for a petition for administrative review and requires that the petition contain a<br />
statement of "all factual and procedural issues in dispute. " 33 There is no language from which I<br />
29<br />
30<br />
US. v. Menasche, at 538 (1955); Aspenwood at 1261.<br />
Aspenwood Investment Co. v. HUD, 355 F.3d 1256, 1261 (lOth Cir. 2004).<br />
31<br />
49 CFR 386.73(g) requires petitioner to set forth all factual and procedural issues in dispute.<br />
Section 386.73(g)( 4) does not permit petitioner to expand the issues on review in any<br />
supplemental filing. Therefore, Section 386.73(g) when read with 386.73(g)(4) does not permit<br />
petitioner to assert new allegations of error after its initial petition for review.<br />
32<br />
33<br />
Reiter v. Sanotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979).<br />
This requirement is similar to those set forth for a notice of claim under 3 86.11 (c).
could infer that Section 386.73(g)(3) addresses the burden ofproof in Consolidation<br />
Proceedings. 34<br />
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 8 of20<br />
49 CFR 3 86.73 (g)( 4) also supports a construction that places the burden ofproof on the<br />
Field Administrator. Section 386.73(g)(4) permits, but does not require, the petitioner to<br />
supplement its petition with argument and documentary evidence. 35 While petitioner may not<br />
expand the issues with supplemental evidence, it is not required to address every issue identified<br />
in the petition? 6 Thus, a petitioner is not required to submit any evidence in support of its<br />
petition requesting administrative review of an order issued under 386.73. If Petitioner had the<br />
burden of proof in Consolidation Proceedings, it would be required to submit evidence in support<br />
ofits petition. 37<br />
Finally, the Field Administrator's interpretation completely disregards 49 CFR<br />
386.73(g)(5), 38 which states that the Field Administrator "must serve written argument and,<br />
supporting documentary evidence, if any, in defense ofthe disputed order" no later than 15 days<br />
34<br />
35<br />
36<br />
5 U.S.C. § 556; Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d at 349.<br />
Petitioner however, may not expand the allegations of error by supplemental filing.<br />
49 CFR 385.73(g)(4).<br />
37<br />
In contrast, for safety rating appeals under 49 CFR 385.15 petitioner bears the burden to<br />
demonstrate that the Agency committed error. Thus, a petitioner under 385.15(b) is required to<br />
submit any information and documents that support its argument. AA Logistic, Inc. flk/a P & A<br />
Transport, FMCSA-2012-0206 (Final Decision on Review, Aug. 13, 2012). Similarly,"<br />
hazardous materials safety permit appeals are also subject to a different burden ofproof in that,<br />
under Section 5 56( d) of the AP A, safety permit applicants bear the burden of showing that the<br />
application was improperly denied. Under 49 CFR 385.423, the petitioner must submit "all<br />
information, evidence and arguments upon which it relies" to support its request for<br />
administrative review. Lynden Transport, Inc., FMCSA-2005-20910 (Recommended Decision<br />
of Chief Administrative Law Judge, July 1, 2005) adopted as final order in (Final Order on<br />
Review, Aug. 24, 2005).<br />
38<br />
US. v. McCord, 33 F.3d 1434, 1444 (3rd Cir. 1994). The Field Administrator fails to refer to<br />
49 CFR 386.73(g)(5) in his response to the Interim Order.
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 9 of20<br />
following the period in which petitioner may serve its supplemental evidence. Requiring the<br />
Field Administrator to file written argument, and supporting documentary evidence, if any, is<br />
consistent with the Field Administrator bearing the burden ofproof in these proceedings. 39<br />
Therefore, once the petitioner has timely served a petition identifying factual and procedural<br />
issues in dispute, to sustain his burden of proof, the Field Administrator must thereafter produce<br />
evidence in defense of the order and bears the burden of demonstrating that the order was<br />
properly issued.<br />
The Field Administrator argues that the "proceedings were intended to be limited and<br />
efficient." 40 He further contends that the regulations "do not authorize, or even contemplate, de<br />
novo or general review of an order issued under Section 386.73, the determinations ofthe Field<br />
Administrator in establishing the enforcement purpose for issuing the order, or the basis for<br />
issuing the order." 41 Such argument mistakenly views the Assistant Administrator as an<br />
appellate reviewer rather than the agency decisionmaker who issues a final decision in these<br />
proceedings. 42 Thus, the issue to be addressed is the standard ofproof to be applied by the<br />
agency decisionmaker in Consolidation Proceedings rather than the scope ofreview. Because<br />
the Field Administrator bears the burden of proof, he is required to produce argument and<br />
documentary evidence, if any, in defense of the order and to prove by a preponderance ofthe<br />
evidence that the order was properly issued. 43 The Assistant Administrator reviews the Field<br />
39<br />
40<br />
41<br />
42<br />
See supra Footnote 37.<br />
Response to Interim Order, Page 9.<br />
!d., Page 10.<br />
49 CFR 386.2.<br />
43<br />
The words "if any" refer to the documentary evidence. Because the petitioner is required to<br />
submit a copy ofthe order with its petition, it is possible that the evidence in support of the order<br />
may already be contained as attachments to the order. Thus, the Field Administrator would not
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 10 of20<br />
Administrator's submission and determines whether the order was properly issued and evaluates<br />
any allegations of error raised by the petitioner. 44<br />
The Field Administrator correctly notes that the procedures outlined in 49 CFR 386.73(g)<br />
are limited and efficient. Section 386.73(g) does not permit discovery, a hearing, or any other<br />
administrative proceeding before the order goes into effect 45 although the Assistant<br />
Administrator may ask the parties to attend a conference or submit additional evidence. 46 The<br />
time periods for petitioning for review, serving supplemental evidence, serving the Field<br />
Administrator's evidence, and for my decision are extremely brief. 47 The only opportunity for an<br />
administrative review before the order goes into effect is the petition for administrative review<br />
before the Assistant Administrator. Like other proceedings under 49 CFR Part 3 86, the<br />
proceedings under Section 386.73(g)(l) are initiated by notice pleading, i.e., the order is only<br />
required to "provide notice of the factual and legal basis of the order" it is not required to contain<br />
any evidence. 48<br />
be required to submit any additional evidence ifthe evidence in defense ofthe order is contained<br />
within the order and has already been submitted with the petition for administrative review.<br />
44<br />
In evaluating whether an order was properly issued the Assistant Administrator will look to<br />
the provisions of 49 CFR 386.73(c).<br />
45<br />
49 CFR 386.73(j). If a petition for administrative review is timely served, a disputed record<br />
consolidation and out of service order is automatically stayed pending the Assistant<br />
Administrator's review. 49 CFR 386.73(8). The automatic stay may be removed in accordance<br />
with the procedures set forth in 49 CFR 386.73(i).<br />
46<br />
47<br />
48<br />
49 CFR 386.73(g)(6).<br />
49 CFR 386.73(g)(2); (g)(4); (g)(5); (g)(7).<br />
49 CFR 386.73(f). See infra footnote 37.
My conclusion that the Field Administrator bears the burden ofproof in these<br />
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 11 of20<br />
proceedings is based on the plain meaning of the provisions of Section 386.73(g). 49 Recognizing<br />
that the Field Administrator bears the burden of proof in these proceedings will not alter the time<br />
frames for any ofthe administrative procedures and thus, there is no real danger that requiring<br />
the Field Administrator to bear the burden ofproof will affect the efficient or limited nature of<br />
these proceedings. 50<br />
B. Timeliness of the Field Administrator's Evidence<br />
Having determined that the Field Administrator bears the burden ofproof in these<br />
proceedings, I must determine what effect, if any, the Field Administrator's late filing has on<br />
these proceedings. In his response to the Interim Order, the Field Administrator moves for an<br />
extension oftime to file his evidence under 49 CFR 3 86.5 and notes that his evidence was filed<br />
only 10 days after the deadline. 5 1 The Field Administrator cites to the <strong>Federal</strong> Rules of Civil<br />
Procedure as guidance regarding whether the Field Administrator's untimely filing should be<br />
accepted. 52 The Field Administrator also argues that there has been no prejudice to Petitioner<br />
and that the automatic stay imposed by 49 CFR 386.73(g)(8) means that the Petitioner has not<br />
49<br />
Gardenbring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988) (While deference is required if regulation<br />
is ambiguous, a court need not defer to the Agency's interpretation where an alternate reading is<br />
compelled by the regulation's plain language.)<br />
50<br />
I would also note that in all prior proceedings under 386.73, the Field Administrator has<br />
submitted evidence in defense ofthe order. See e.g. All American, LLC, et al. FMCSA-2012<br />
0252 (Decision on Petition for Review of Operations Out-of-Service Order and Order to Merge<br />
and Consolidate <strong>Motor</strong> <strong>Carrier</strong> Records (Sept. 10, 2012); Wendell Kleen dba Blue Chip Transp.,<br />
et. al., FMCSA-2012-0307 (Final Decision on Petition for Review of Operations Out-of-Service<br />
Order and Order to Merge and Consolidate <strong>Motor</strong> <strong>Carrier</strong> Records (Oct. 25, 2012).<br />
51<br />
52<br />
Response to Interim Order, page 2.<br />
!d. at page 4.
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 12 of20<br />
been subject to any negative consequences as a result ofthe delayed filing. 5 3 In fact, the Field<br />
Administrator argues that dismissal of the Order would have a negative impact on safety and<br />
would be tantamount to a default judgment. 54 Petitioner did not respond to the Field<br />
Administrator's motion for extension of time. 5 5<br />
49 CFR 386.5(±) governs requests for extensions oftime in Consolidation Proceedings.<br />
Under Section 386.5(±), only those requests showing good cause will be granted. Requests for<br />
extension of time are routinely granted in administrative enforcement proceedings and safety<br />
rating proceedings. 56 The Field Administrator avers that his late filing was caused by the<br />
confusion regarding the calculation ofthe due date for his submission. 57 The Field<br />
Administrator avers that this confusion was compounded by the fact that Petitioner's petition<br />
was initially rejected by Dockets and subsequently re-filed. 58<br />
The Field Administrator's argument that Petitioner's filing led to confusion regarding the<br />
due date for his submission does not demonstrate good cause for the late filing ofhis evidence.<br />
The calculation ofthe due date for the Field Administrator's evidence is not based on when the<br />
Petitioner files his petition for administrative review but rather is calculated from the service date<br />
53<br />
54<br />
Id at page 4.<br />
Id at page 6.<br />
55<br />
Because the Field Administrator's motion was combined with its Response to the Interim<br />
Order, Petitioner may not have realized that it could respond to the Field Administrator's motion.<br />
Although the request for extension of time was preserved in Consolidation Proceedings, the<br />
corollary motion regulation (386.34) was not. Thus, there are no procedural regulations<br />
governing motions practice under Consolidation Proceedings.<br />
56<br />
Stricklin Trucking Co., Inc., FMCSA-2012-0144, Page 2 (Order Granting Respondent's<br />
Request for Extension ofTime, June 2, 2012); Thomas Hammond, FMCSA-2003-15980 (Order,<br />
Sept. 24, 2003).<br />
57<br />
Field Administrator's Response to Interim Order, Page 6.<br />
58<br />
Id at page 6.
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 13 of20<br />
of the order by the Field Administrator. Thus, whether the Petitioner was required tore-file its<br />
petition for administrative review is irrelevant to determining the due date under 49 CFR<br />
386.73(g)(5).<br />
Nevertheless, I agree that the procedures for calculating the Field Administrator's due<br />
date are cumbersome and that the Field Administrator clearly intended to participate in the<br />
proceedings.5 9 Moreover, the short delay in filing did not prejudice Petitioner in any way<br />
because the Field Administrator has acknowledged that the automatic stay provision of 49 CFR<br />
386.73(g)(8) remained in place to defer any consequences flowing from the issuance of the<br />
Order. Thus, I find that the Field Administrator has demonstrated good cause for granting an<br />
extension oftime to file his evidence and his motion for extension oftime is granted. 60<br />
C. Filing Requirements for Petition for Administrative Review<br />
In my Interim Decision, I also asked the Field Administrator to clarify the service and<br />
filing requirements for a petition for administrative review under 49 CFR 386.73(g). According<br />
to the Field Administrator, a petitioner must serve its petition on the Field Administrator or<br />
Director who issued the order and also on the Assistant Administrator. 61 Further, under 49 CFR<br />
386.7, the petitioner must also file a copy of its petition for administrative review with Dockets.<br />
I agree with the Field Administrator's interpretation of the regulations applicable to<br />
Consolidation Proceedings. Nevertheless, I note that the Order did not inform the Petitioner of<br />
the requirement to file a copy of its petition for administrative review with Dockets. 62 Therefore,<br />
59<br />
60<br />
61<br />
62<br />
Id, page 5-6; 49 CFR 386.73(g)(5). <br />
Thomas Hammond, FMCSA-2003-15980 (Order, Sept. 24, 2003). <br />
49 CFR 386.73(g)(l). <br />
Field Administrator's Submission, Exhibit 1.
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 14 of20<br />
the Field Administrator should consider revising future orders to note that the petitioner is<br />
required to file a copy of its petition for administrative review with Dockets.<br />
D. Merits of Petition for Administrative Review<br />
Having determined that the Field Administrator bears the burden ofproof in these<br />
proceedings, I now turn to the merits of Petitioner's petition for administrative review. The Field<br />
Administrator's Order asserts that Corea Transportation (Corea) is a mere continuation of Coreas<br />
Transportation, Inc. (Coreas) 63 Petitioner contends that Coreas and Corea "are not the sarne." 64<br />
In support ofits Petition, Petitioner attempted to explain the similarities between the two<br />
companies and provided copies ofFactoring Services agreements in support ofits contention. 65<br />
The Field Administrator submitted documentary evidence and argument in defense ofthe Order.<br />
A motor carrier is reincarnated ifthere is substantial continuity between the entities such<br />
that one is merely a continuation ofthe other. 66 Moreover, the Field Administrator must<br />
demonstrate that the motor carrier operated or attempted to operate under a new identity to avoid<br />
complying with a statutory or regulatory requirement; avoid paying a civil penalty; avoid<br />
responding to an enforcement action; or avoid being linked with a negative compliance history. 67<br />
The following factors may be considered in this determination: 1) whether the new or affiliated<br />
entity was created for purpose of evading statutory or regulatory requirements, an FMCSA order,<br />
enforcement action, or negative compliance history; 2) the previous entity's safety performance<br />
history, including safety violations and enforcement actions; 3) consideration exchanged for<br />
63 Id.<br />
64<br />
Petition for Administrative Review.<br />
65 !d.<br />
66<br />
49 CFR 386.73(c).<br />
67<br />
49 CFR 386.73(a) and 386.73(b).
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 15 of20<br />
assets purchased or transferred; 4) dates ofcreation and dissolution or cessation of operations; 5)<br />
commonality of ownership among the entities; 6) commonality of officers and management<br />
personnel; 7) identity ofphysical or mailing addresses, telephone, fax numbers, or email<br />
addresses; 8) identity of motor vehicle equipment; 9) continuity of liability insurance policies or<br />
commonality of coverage under such policies; 1 0) commonality ofdrivers and other employees;<br />
11) continuation of carrier facilities and other physical assets; 12) continuity or commonality of<br />
nature and scope of operations, including customers; and 13) advertising, corporate name, or<br />
other actions through which the company holds itself out to the public. 68 The Field<br />
Administrator or Director may also examine the company management structures, financial<br />
records, corporate filing records, asset purchase or transfer and title history, employee records,<br />
insurance records, and any other information related to the general operations of the entities<br />
involved. 69 The Field Administrator's determination will be "based on consideration of all<br />
relevant information, and one factor or potential source of evidence is not necessarily more<br />
significant than another. Where the greater weight of the evidence shows that a motor carrier<br />
created a new identity or shifted its operations to another, commonly owned and controlled,<br />
entity to avoid FMCSA authority or negative safety performance history, the motor carrier will<br />
be placed out of service and/or have its records consolidated with the records ofthe preexisting<br />
or affiliated entity." 70<br />
The Field Administrator's documentary evidence and argument demonstrates that Corea<br />
Transportation is a reincarnation of Coreas Transportation, Inc. Petitioner's evidence failed to<br />
demonstrate any error in the issuance of the Order. Coreas is owned by Alcides E. Alfaro Corea.<br />
68<br />
49 CFR 386.73(c)(l)- (13).<br />
69<br />
49 CFR 386.73(d).<br />
70<br />
77 Fed. Reg. 24863, 24867 (April26, 2012).
Corea is owned by Alcides Alfaro, Mr. Coreas' father. 71<br />
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 16 of20<br />
Coreas was subject to a compliance<br />
review on March 7, 2012 which resulted in an Unsatisfactory safety rating. 72 On March 12,<br />
2012, the Agency served Coreas with notice that its Unsatisfactory safety rating would become<br />
effective on May 12, 2012. 73<br />
On March 27, 2012, FMCSA's North Carolina Division<br />
Administrator issued a Notice of Claim for violations discovered during the compliance review<br />
seeking $6,320 in civil penalties. 74 On May 16, 2012, because Coreas failed to respond to the<br />
Notice of Claim, the Field Administrator issued a Notice of Default and Final Agency Order. 75<br />
On August 7, 2012, Coreas was placed out of service and ordered to cease all interstate<br />
transportation for failure to pay the civil penalty. 76 This order remains in effect. 77<br />
On May 7, 2012, just five days before the Unsatisfactory rating was scheduled to become<br />
effective, Mr. Alfaro applied for a U.S. DOT number for Corea. 78 Petitioner 79 contends that<br />
Corea was formed by Mr. Corea's father because "he knew that something like this was going<br />
to happen." 80 Mr. Corea also claims he did not know his father was starting the business. Mr.<br />
71<br />
72<br />
73<br />
74<br />
75<br />
76<br />
77<br />
78<br />
Field Administrator's Submission, Declaration ofLesley Wooddy; Petition, Page 1. <br />
!d., Exhibit 2. <br />
!d., Exhibit 3. <br />
!d., Exhibit 5. <br />
!d., Exhibit 6. <br />
!d., Exhibit 8. <br />
Id., Declaration of Lesley, Wooddy, page 3. <br />
!d., Exhibit 9. <br />
79<br />
Although the Petition was filed by Corea, the filing was clearly prepared and signed by <br />
Alcides E. Alfaro Corea.<br />
80<br />
Petition, paragraph 3.
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 17 of20<br />
Corea explains that his father opened the new company because most ofthe trucks that were<br />
operating under Coreas were owned by his father and leased to him and thus his father needed<br />
to continue to operate after Coreas was ordered to cease operations. 81<br />
I find Petitioner's explanation ofthe circumstances surrounding the formation of Corea to<br />
be unpersuasive in light ofthe timing of the formation of Corea relative to the Unsatisfactory<br />
safety rating and pending civil penalty proceedings against Coreas at the time offormation. I<br />
find that Corea was formed solely to avoid the effect ofthe Unsatisfactory safety rating and<br />
pending 82 civil penalty proceedings against Coreas.<br />
Corea is therefore a mere continuation of Coreas. Having found that Corea was formed<br />
solely to evade the effect ofthe Unsatisfactory safety rating and a pending civil penalty<br />
proceeding against Coreas, I will also evaluate the remainder ofthe factors presented by the<br />
Field Administrator support a finding that Corea is a mere continuation of Coreas. 83 The Field<br />
Administrator submitted ample evidence indicating a commonality ofownership and control<br />
among the owners and operators of Corea and Coreas. 84 The evidence demonstrates that the<br />
telephone number, facsimile number, and mailing address were the same; 85 that both companies<br />
used the same rental lot to park their commercial motor vehicles; 86 that Corea used at least 12 of<br />
the 16 commercial motor vehicles previously operated by Coreas and that no lease agreements<br />
81<br />
Petition, paragraphs 3, 7, 9. <br />
82<br />
Although the civil penalty was not final at the time ofthe formation of Corea, Coreas knew <br />
that the penalty had been proposed. A default was issued for the civil penalty just 10 days after <br />
the formation of Corea. <br />
83<br />
84<br />
85<br />
77 Fed; Reg. 24863, 24867 (April26, 2012). <br />
Field Administrator's Submission, Declaration ofLesley Wooddy, Exhibit 9. <br />
Field Administrator's Submission, Declaration ofLesley Wooddy. <br />
86 d ~.
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 18 of20<br />
existed for the vehicles between the two companies; 87 that 12 ofthe 14 drivers previously used<br />
by Coreas were used by Corea and that the drivers were notre-qualified by Corea; 88 and that<br />
both companies' operations were similar in that they obtain loads from online brokers and used<br />
the same factoring company to process freight transactions and deposit funds into the same bank<br />
89<br />
account.<br />
Petitioner admitted that both companies used the same phone number but claimed that it<br />
was because there was a contract with the phone company that would have required Coreas to<br />
pay an early termination fee. 90 Petitioner also acknowledged that it used the same commercial<br />
motor vehicles, but asserted that the vehicles belonged to Mr. Alfaro in the first instance. 91<br />
Petitioner claimed that Mr. Alfaro did not take over Coreas but that he was merely using some of<br />
the services until he was ready to get his "own services later when he was ready for the<br />
changes." 92 Finally, Petitioner attached copies of two Factoring Services agreements with<br />
TransAm Financial Services, Inc. 93 Petitioner's explanations do not rebut the evidence<br />
submitted by the Field Administrator in support of a finding that Corea is a mere continuation of<br />
Coreas. Even if the commercial motor vehicles were originally owned by Mr. Alfaro, ownership<br />
ofthe vehicles is not necessarily probative because Petitioner admitted that Coreas previously<br />
used the vehicles in its business. Moreover, Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the<br />
87<br />
88<br />
Id, Declaration of Lesley Wooddy; Exhibits 12, 13, and 14. <br />
Id, Declaration of Lesley Wooddy. <br />
89 Id <br />
90<br />
91<br />
92<br />
93<br />
Petition, paragraph 4. <br />
Id, paragraph 7. <br />
Id, paragraph 5. <br />
Petition, Factoring Services agreements.
FMCSA-2012-0438<br />
Page 19 of20<br />
vehicles were previously owned by Mr. Alfaro or that the vehicles had previously been used<br />
under a lease agreement.<br />
Further, the Factoring Services agreements are not persuasive on the issue ofwhether<br />
Corea is a mere continuation of Coreas. While there is a separate Factoring Service agreement<br />
for each company, the agreement for Corea was not signed until October 12, 2012, after Coreas<br />
was placed out of service for failure to pay the civil penalty. Thus, the existence ofthe separate<br />
Factoring Services agreements does not rebut the evidence produced by the Field Administrator<br />
in defense of the Order.<br />
Accordingly, It Is Hereby Ordered, that the petition for administrative review is denied.<br />
Assistant Administrator<br />
<strong>Federal</strong> <strong>Motor</strong> <strong>Carrier</strong> <strong>Safety</strong> <strong>Administration</strong><br />
3/11113<br />
Date
FMCSA-2012-0362<br />
Page 20 of20<br />
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE<br />
This is to certify that on this \2- day of ~ , 2013, the<br />
undersigned mailed or delivered, as specified, the designated number of copies of the<br />
foregoing document to the persons listed below.<br />
Alcides Alfaro<br />
Corea Transportation<br />
1320 Gretna Green Lane<br />
Charlotte, NC 28217<br />
One Copy<br />
U.S. Mail<br />
Deborah A. Stanziano<br />
Office of Chief Counsel<br />
<strong>Federal</strong> <strong>Motor</strong> <strong>Carrier</strong> <strong>Safety</strong> <strong>Administration</strong><br />
Southern Service Center<br />
1800 Century Blvd., NE<br />
Suite 1700<br />
Atlanta, GA 30345<br />
Field Administrator's Attorney<br />
One Copy<br />
U.S. Mail<br />
U.S. Department ofTransportation<br />
Docket Operations, M-30<br />
West Building Ground Floor<br />
Room Wl2-140<br />
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE<br />
Washington, DC 20590<br />
Original<br />
Personal Delivery