H-Diplo Roundtable on Martin Thomas. Violence and ... - H-Net

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H-<strong>Diplo</strong> <strong>Roundtable</strong> Reviews, Vol. XV, No. 5 (2013) Introduction by Mary Dewhurst Lewis, Harvard University A ny teacher of European imperial history probably has given some version of a lecture suggesting that World War II contributed to the end of empire. The argument goes something like this: the Allied victory over the Nazis delegitimized racist empire as a form of governance. Moreover, because Japan had occupied much of the British, Dutch, and French Empires in Southeast Asia during the war, colonized subjects realized that the racial hierarchies buttressing European imperialism could be upended; this encouraged them to push back against European reconquest after Japan’s retreat. Finally, there was the fiscal question: European imperial powers after the war were totally broke, and to spend money on shoring up the empire at a time when citizens in the metropole still faced rationing of key foodstuffs was politically risky. As a result, European governments – especially Britain and France – cut loose their imperial holdings in some places and, in others, sought to remake empire by creating ‘commonwealths’ intended to bind colonial subjects to the metropole in a looser form of imperial control. In his new book, Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the European Colonial Empires, 1918-1940, Martin Thomas suggests that empire ended a different way. First, he changes our chronology, arguing that the Great Depression catalyzed imperial change before the war did. Second, like Frederick Cooper, whose magisterial Decolonization and African Society showed how the combination of political and economic demands of African laborers after the Second World War made empire in Africa too expensive to maintain for Britain and France alike, 1 Thomas suggests that political economy, rather than political ideology, lay at the heart of the end of empire. The economic crisis was important because it laid bare the extractive underpinnings upon which almost all European imperial endeavors were based. As is well known, the Depression began as an agricultural crisis and then spread to other sectors of the economy. Colonial economies were profoundly affected by the Depression because they were driven, to a very great extent, by the extraction of primary resources such as minerals and oil or the cultivation of agricultural products such as rubber plants or groundnuts. With commodity prices falling and markets shrinking, colonial enterprises – which had always engaged in coercive labor practices – ratcheted up the level of coercion and control while squeezing wages. Colonial police, who formally worked for the state but who saw a connection between colonial enterprise and the future of that state, frequently were called in as the hand-maidens of imperial capitalist enterprise. (But they were also caught between a rock and hard place because colonial state leaders often understood that labor reform was essential to maintaining colonial peace; Thomas illustrates this paradox nicely). In Thomas’s account, repression of workers was often quite brutal and sometimes fueled anti-colonial nationalism, which in turn was repressed with still more violence. But nationalism, for Thomas, is not the main story. 1 Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
H-<strong>Diplo</strong> <strong>Roundtable</strong> Reviews, Vol. XV, No. 5 (2013) The reviewers take different lessons from this conclusion: Raphaëlle Branche finds that “one of the major contributions of Thomas’s work lies in clearly identifying the turning points where, in order to survive, the colonial orders had to become more flexible and the police had to adapt.” It is interesting that Branche, a historian of the illegal torture tactics that were deployed by the French army in Algeria between 1954 and 1962 (hardly an instance of policing becoming more flexible), 2 interprets Violence and Colonial Order this way, while Talbot Imlay concludes that the “economic crisis … made it clear that as a political-economic system, European imperialism was unviable.” Could it be reformed or was it doomed to fail? These differing interpretations point, I think, to the sheer volume of examples Thomas provides, not all of which lend themselves to the same conclusions. In some places, intensive policing helped increase profits; in others, it backfired. Thomas might have done more to explain when and why police brutality achieved its goals or became “routine” (100) and why it was counterproductive in others. As Imlay asks, “were some colonial police forces more active or complicit in the repression of worker unrest than others?” Thomas offers a clue in his subtle treatment of Michelin’s power in colonial Vietnam, as he deftly analyzes the growing estrangement between the colonial state and the rubber tire business; but this nuance is not brought to every example. How could it be? As this forum’s reviewers have observed, Violence and Colonial Order is immense in its scope and erudition. Thomas ably compares and contrasts cases as different as oil fields in Tobago and rubber plantations in Indochina. The work is driven by original empirical research but also demonstrates an impressive grasp of the relevant secondary literature. Coming just five years after his superb analysis of colonial intelligence gathering, Empires of Intelligence (2007), one cannot help but marvel at how he has managed to produce another ambitious and original work at such a clip. Surely it is the hallmark of a provocative work that each of the reviewers wanted more: Matthew Stanard wonders what the story would have looked like with British India or the Soviet land empire in the mix, though he calls his question “facetious” since he recognizes the feat Thomas has pulled off. David Edgerton, observing that police got involved in industrial disputes in metropolitan centers, too, wants to know more about how “management, work organization, and internal policing differ[ed] between the colonial and rich worlds.” Branche speculates that a “closer analysis of the gestures of violence that were ordered, selected, and ultimately carried out” might nuance Thomas’s argument about the police as “outsiders.” Imlay wonders what would happen if one compared Thomas’s case studies to the very repressive and yet “successful” empires (in terms of longevity), such as the Portuguese empire in Africa. I myself wondered why he had not included Kenya, where exploitation of wage labor in the 1920s and 1930s set the stage for the later Mau Mau uprising. 3 Thomas’s analysis also leaves one wondering why the most egregious acts of 2001). 2 Raphaëlle Branche, La Torture et l’armée pendant la guerre d’Algérie, 1954-1962 (Paris: Gallimard, 3 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (New York: Norton, 2005); Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry Holt, 2004). 3 | P age
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