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H-Diplo Roundtables, Vol. XIV, No. 29 (2013) - H-Net

H-Diplo Roundtables, Vol. XIV, No. 29 (2013) - H-Net

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H-<strong>Diplo</strong> Roundtable Reviews, <strong>Vol</strong>. <strong>XIV</strong>, <strong>No</strong>. <strong>29</strong> (<strong>2013</strong>)<br />

in what the United States did than in how U.S. observers might better have understood<br />

Laos. For his project, a deep explication of Lao history and culture is not necessary. But the<br />

question remains: why did Americans seem to react so vehemently to the perceived<br />

“indolence” in Laos? Unless the Lao really were more indolent than others, what about<br />

Laos or about the United States in Laos prompted this unrelentingly judgment? We have<br />

seen in other studies of race and U.S. foreign relations that racial attitudes are highly<br />

malleable. The most dramatic examples come from Japan, as so convincingly explored by<br />

John Dower and Naoko Shibusawa, but Tim Borstelmann, Mark Bradley, Jason Colby, Carol<br />

Anderson, and Paul Kramer, among others, have teased out the ways that race can have<br />

different meanings at different times, can be put to different purposes, can evolve. 3 Jacobs<br />

draws our attention to the ways race and religion are intertwined, and the disdain most<br />

Americans had for Buddhism, but does less to explore the broader context of how<br />

Americans perceived Buddhism, whether there was specificity or malleability to the racial<br />

constructs Americans made for Laos, and in general how race operated to shape U.S. policy<br />

in Laos.<br />

We learn how racial judgments informed U.S. policy in Laos, and how easy and apparently<br />

universal acceptance in U.S. official circles of those judgments narrowed the options<br />

policymakers perceived for Laos. We learn as well how restrictive the Cold War proved to<br />

be for the United States: for a statesman, especially perhaps a Lao statesman, to pursue<br />

neutralism was sufficient to get labeled weak, naïve, and unreliable by U.S. officials. This<br />

stance left little room for creative solutions in places like Laos.<br />

The Universe Unraveling succeeds in explaining how American cultural misunderstandings<br />

of Laos doomed U.S. policy efforts there, and how those failures paradoxically prompted<br />

U.S. officials to redouble the commitment to South Vietnam. Finally, Jacobs adds to the<br />

story of the ubiquity of U.S. power and influence, even when informed by ignorance, in the<br />

late 1950s and early 1960s.<br />

3 John Dower’s classic War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York:Pantheon,<br />

1987) is the starting point for thinking about this issue. See also Naoko Shibusawa, America’s Geisha Ally:<br />

Reimagining the Japanese Enemy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), Thomas Borstelmann, The<br />

Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University<br />

Press, 2001), Mark P. Bradley, Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam (Chapel<br />

Hill: University of <strong>No</strong>rth Carolina Press, 2000), Jason Colby, The Business of Empire: United Fruit, Race, and U.S.<br />

Expansion in Central America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), Carol Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize: The<br />

United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955 (Cambridge: Cambridge<br />

University Press, 2003), Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the<br />

Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of <strong>No</strong>rth Carolina Press, 2006).<br />

16 | P age

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