Human Rights: Hostage To the State's Regression - Helsinki ...

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
attempt to discredit the tribunal in The Hague and the international law it
emanates. 3
Apart from the judiciary, “special services” hinder constitution of
Serbia’s political scene. Hooked up with more or less tycoon-owned media,
they systematically fabricate scandals that almost never have epilogues in
courts of law. This is how they attempt to discredit not only political factors
but also all “hotbeds of resistance” such as some NGOs and small political
parties like the Liberal-Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Union and the
Civic Alliance of Serbia. Smearing campaigns in the media and earmarking of
“patriotic” NGOs that closely cooperate with the regime and enjoy the
Church’s strong support follow in the footsteps of the fear of liberally-minded
organizations and parties. As “services” are strongly backed by the Church it is
only logical that the fundamentalism of the Eastern Orthodoxy resists
globalization and liberalism.
Kosovo is Serbia’s central issue, both domestic and foreign. And this is
where anti-reformist and reformist Serbia collide again. The new Constitution
was also passed in the shadow of the Kosovo question – to unify Serbia on the
one hand, and to seek compensation for Kosovo on the other. Rather than
looking for a compromise, Serbia opted for confrontation with the US and the
EU, and for reliance on Russia. Serbian elites kept invoking historical right to
Kosovo but what they actually had an eye on were partition of Kosovo and
access to its natural resources. The whetted confrontation with the West was
only in the function of maximalist demands. What domestic elite ignores is
that Kosovo was placed on the international agenda because of Serbian
authorities’ misgovernment in the province throughout the 20 th century. The
great majority of citizens are aware that Kosovo is a lost case but the Serbian
elite still takes it can play on blackmail in the finals. All in all, the resolution of
the Kosovo status can only contribute to regional stability and that’s why
Ahtisaari’s plan was placed on the Security Council’s agenda. Unless the issue
of status is settled neither Serbia nor Kosovo stand a chance for EU integration,
which is crucial for their economic growths and mutual reconciliation, says
Morton Abramowitz, former US Ambassador and member of the International
Crisis Group. 4
While Premier Kostunica takes the new Constitution has solved the
Kosovo problem, President Tadic announces, “It’s more probable that Kosovo
would be independent than an autonomy within Serbia.” Nevertheless he
insists that Serbia would never accept Kosovo’s independence. Svetozar
Stojanovic, one of key strategists, says, “By comparison with the Albanian
question the Serbian question exceeds Kosovo itself.” “Serbia’s significance is
once again disproportionate with her actual strength,” says Stojanovic
3 Milorad Ekmecic, “Power Knows No Law,” NIN, December 14, 2006.
4 Newsweek International, March 18, 2007.
Human Rights: Hostage To the State's Regression
referring to Russia’s role in the Contact Group and, above all, to special
relations between Serbia and Russia. 5 According to him, the West has wasted
much time on the illusion about some difference between President Tadic and
Premier Kostunica – for, there is no difference at all when it comes to
patriotism. 6
Centralism Slobodan Milosevic launched on the thesis of Serbia’s
unity is one of Serbia’s key problems. 7 Vojislav Kostunica just continued to
fortify the regime’s vertical. However, ever stronger local initiatives resist such
trend. Only 42 percent of citizens of Vojvodina voted for the new Constitution
that notably chokes its autonomy. The constitutional referendum also
mobilized Vojvodina for the elections – the Coalition led by the Liberal
Democratic Party passed the electoral threshold (won 6.1 percent of the vote)
and entered the republican parliament.
Though the situation in Sandzak is still delicate no major inter-ethnic
incidents were registered in 2006. However, one cannot but be concerned with
perpetual clashes between two key political leaders in the region and the
attitude of Serbian authorities and informal centers of power that
instrumentalize those conflicts to slow down, obstruct and practically block
major processes within the Bosniak community: firstly, the process of its
integration (opened with the adoption of the term Bosniak denoting it);
secondly, the process of the community’s constitution into a modern nation
(which implies the establishment of an infrastructure crucial for building of
national identity and articulation of its interests); and, finally, the process of
the community’s overall modernization (secularization, emancipation and
economic progress). Apart from hindering political actors in Sandzak to reach
consensus on key issues of the Bosniak minority, the official Belgrade
deliberately creates conditions for the emergence of Vehabits. With the
emergence of Vehabits all those processes are further delayed while the
existing splits grow deeper and deeper and transform into religious schisms.
The Islamic Religious Community is thus placed in the limelight and its
activities are additionally politicized. The regime uses Vehabits and their
public aggressiveness not only to radicalize Bosniaks’ mutually opposing
political options but also to widen the gap between two major ethnic
communities in the region. This indirectly fuels the prejudice about Sandzak as
the region endogenously prone to various forms of radicalism (political and
5 Politika, June 17, 2006.
6 Politika, “Rivalry of Small Differences,” March 9, 2007.
7 State borders and ethnic homogenization are singled out as Serbs’ primary
interests. As it turned out in the decade of Milosevic’s rule, Serbia leans on a patriarchalauthoritarian,
strongly monistic political culture the inside of which implies
collectivism, egalitarianism and intolerance of differences, while the outside ethnic
nationalism and warring tradition.
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