Human Rights: Hostage To the State's Regression - Helsinki ...

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Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Krajina” facing charges before the International Tribunal for War Crimes Committed in Former Yugoslavia. That list also included the names of indictees at large: Vlastimir Djordjević, Stojan Župljanin, Radovan Karadžić, Ratko Mladić, Zdravko Tolimir and Goran Hadžić”. 50 Appeals chamber of the Hague Tribunal sentenced the former general of the Army of Republika Srpska, Stanislav Galić to life imprisonment for his shelling of Sarajevo in 1992-1994 period. That was the harshest sentence passed by the Hague Tribunal to date. Galić was found guilty of terrorizing civilian population, killings of and inhumane acts against civilians in Sarajevo. On 5 December 2003 he had received the first-degree 20-year imprisonment sentence. Both the convicted and the prosecutor's offices appealed against that sentence. Galić was arrested on 20 December 1999, nine months after indictment had been filed against him. Conclusion: By its failure to hand-over any war crimes indictee, the government of Serbia in the year 2006 in fact suspended its co-operation with the Hague Tribunal. Consequently it failed to honor the international commitment, which it had taken on, during the signing of the Dayton Accord, on 14 October 1995. The Dayton Accord bears the signature of Slobodan Milosevic. Even eleven years on, the state of Serbia failed to fulfill its international commitment towards the International Tribunal for War Crimes Committed in Former Yugoslavia. After a decade-long delay Kostunica-led government admitted that the army, allegedly only until 2002, protected the Hague Tribunal indictee, Ratko Mladic. The Serb government is yet to disclose facts relating to the police role in aforementioned “protection campaign.” Hague commitments in Serbia are still exclusively linked to resumption of negotiations with the European Union, and not to commission of war crimes. That leaves room for retrograde, nationalistic forces to spread hatred towards other peoples in territory of former Yugoslavia, thus impairing neighborly relations, and to glorify war criminals from the 90's of the past century as national war heroes. By its noncooperation with the Hague Tribunal the government of Serbia directly impacted the shaping of an anti-Hague Tribunal mood across the country. Not only the government of Serbia showed no interest in the arrest of the Hague Tribunal indictees, but it also failed to demonstrate minimal readiness to submit to the Hague the requested military documentation and facilitate the Tribunal’s access to witnesses. Suspension of co-operation with the Hague Tribunal and attempt of Prime Minister Kostunica and his close aides to deceive by false promises about an imminent arrest of Ratko Mladic the international community and Human Rights: Hostage To the State's Regression thus ensure resumption of negotiations on stabilization and association, have tainted an already fragile credibility of Serbia. When in late 2006 it became clear that the indictee Mladic would not be sent to the Hague, Prime Minister Kostunica made an indeed unusual if not altogether brazen step by accusing European Union of undermining Serbia's stability and foiling completion of Serbia's co-operation with the Hague Tribunal by its suspension of stabilization and association negotiations. Arrest of Mladic is uncertain. Distanced from European values, it declaratively advocates and upholds, Serbia is still weighed down by powerful vestiges of Radical-Milosevic models, whose tactic of mock-patriotism, lies, and protection of war criminals, was taken on by the incumbent Prime Minister and his Democratic Party of Serbia. It is quite certain that the new, incoming government would have to face the Hague problem that is nonfulfillment of Serbia's international commitments. It is obvious that in that regard Serbia shall have to make an U turn. For the time being, as co-operation with the Hague Tribunal is concerned, the Serbia authorities have to ponder another European Union offer, that is: to at least demonstrate that they are working intensely on the arrest of the Hague indictees and prove that the most wanted Hague indictee is not hiding in the territory of Serbia. 50 Politika, 2 July 2006 98 99
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia MILOSEVIC DIES: COLLECTIVE DENIAL Slobodan Milosevic’s death was a major catalyst for Serbia’s mindset. The manner in which the Kostunica cabinet reacted to it clearly demonstrated how close to the Premier’s heart, policy and ideology Milosevic’s regime had been. It also disclosed how much the Premier leaned on the Socialist Party of Serbia’s support and how unwilling he was to distance himself from Milosevic’s policy. However, reactions to Milosevic’s death brought to the fore something much deeper – genuine devotion to the program that had been given plebiscitary support, including Kostunica’s and all his coalition partners’. Serbia was saying “the last goodbye” to the man she adored and hated at the same time because she had looked up to him for things impossible. Milosevic’s regime and he himself were thus blamed for all dashed hopes. By denying their own responsibility, individuals and groups have renounced all values and criteria. It was only logical that the criteria of good and evil were relativized. Therefore, Milosevic’s extradition to The Hague – and the ensuing four-year trial that laid bare his policy of crime and evil – triggered off almost the entire community’s mechanism – collective denial. It was his death that best mirrored that mechanism. For appeasement, guilty conscience needs a new model of exclusiveness – this time it seized for simplification and one-sided interpretation of Milosevic and his era. Milosevic’s conduct during the trial indicated that such denouement would be only logical. Once his defense strategy of underrating and discrediting the court failed, as if he wanted by “staging his own death” to place the burden of responsibility for it on the international community. Judging by numerous reports publicized after his death one cannot but conclude that he and his closest associates “had provoked cardiovascular complications, disseminated obviously false information about malpractice, and stirred the feelings of both progressive and reactionary publics” and that Milosevic, “fearing retaliation, kept playing until he overplayed his hand and lost the game.” William Montgomery, former American ambassador to Serbia- Montenegro, says about the same, “I strongly believe that for Milosevic the worst alternative was a trial ending in unavoidable life sentence, far from home and far from public eye. His widow Mira Markovic actually predicted his death at a meeting in my Belgrade residence in 2003.” Metropolitan Amfilohije begged Milosevic, while the latter was still in the Belgrade Central Human Rights: Hostage To the State's Regression Prison, to commit suicide. Actually, both radical and “genuine” Serbian nationalists had invoked his death in the name of national interests. Judging by reactions, both nationalists and the entire society were ambivalent about Milosevic’s death. First and foremost, the fact that death had outstripped the sentence took a load of everyone’s mind. The trial of Milosevic was nearing its end, while he himself had lost the battle long ago. His defense was unconvincing and unprofessional. His opting for a political defense found an echo only in Serbia and anti-globalist circles worldwide. Even some legal experts perceived his death as his final victory. Lawyer Toma Fila said, “Everything that took place at the trial to Milosevic is legally invalid, and depositions in favor of the prosecution would have to be rerun in every new case.” Milosevic’s wife Mirjana Markovic said, among other things, “The Hague found itself in deep waters and that’s why they decided it would be best should he physically disappear.” “For them, that was an elegant solution,” she concluded. For their part, Serbian nationalists seized the opportunity to build up anti-Hague campaign, question the position of the detained Serbs and, above all, object extradition of Ratko Mladic. Scores of “patriotic” newspapers run headlines that maximally exploited the suspicion the official Belgrade had skillfully launched – Milosevic was poisoned because the Tribunal with insufficient evidence against him had been deadlocked. The media played a major role in picturing Milosevic as a statesman and ex-president of Yugoslavia. Just few of them reminded of the victims of his policy in the neighborhood and in Serbia proper. He was referred to as a hero, a man of competence and a historic figure. Tabloids and pro-governmental media spoke the same language, while electronic media broadcast live the arrival of his coffin at the Belgrade Airport, the homage paid to him in the Museum of Revolution, the memorial held in front of the federal parliament and, finally, his burial in Pozarevac. Little footage was given to those who spoke critically about Milosevic’s life. Day in day out, the media kept suggesting that Milosevic was killed in The Hague. Front pages bombarded the readership with headlines such as “Killed” (Kurir), “He Was about To Win out the Tribunal” (Kurir), “Dacic: Milosevic Is Murdered” (Politika), “The Hague Tribunal Murders Him” (Vecernje Novosti), “Milosevic Is Poisoned” (Glas Javnosti), “The Hague Kills Milosevic” (Glas Javnosti). Bylined commentaries propounded that “The Hague got its biggest sacrifice so far and probably kissed goodbye to its very existence.” Under the pressure from the European Serbia and Europe on the one hand, and the frustrated, majority Serbia terrified by the looming responsibility, the government opted for a middle way: it did not partake in the memorial service but provided all necessary logistic support. Milosevic was, therefore, given a para-state burial. And not only because his Socialist 100 101
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