human security in an uufinished state - Helsinki Committee for ...

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
youngsters and all those who embrace the Third Way, without infliction of
additional wounds to an already traumatized Serb society. 7
In confrontation between the two, allegedly equally radical tacks (of
part of NGO sector on the one hand, and the Serb Radical Party, the far-right
groupings, notably Justin Popović, Dveri, Svetozar Mileitć, Nacionalni stroj, and
numerous refugee organizations on the other hand) "the Tird Way" fits into the
state policy, that is in the line toed by Kostunica-led government. After a yearlong
break, under pressure of the international community Vojislav Koštunica
had to resume his co-operation with the ICTY, which he re-defined as
"voluntary surrender" 8 . In line with that formula he handed over to the Hague
Tribunal 15 Hague indictees, whilst their departure was presented to the
domestic public as a heroic decision and "sacrifice for national interests of
Serbia and the Serb people". 9 Their "surrender" was conditioned by hefty
financial guarantees aimed at provoding subsitence to indictees’ families, in
fact allocations from the republican budget, and also by financial support of
tycoons. That kind of "guarantee" resulted from the relevant decision of the
"informal coalition" between Democratic Party of Serbia and Socialist Party, for
the minority government of Vojislav Koštunica could not survie without the
backing of the latter.
Through both the print and electronic media "the Third Way" is being
presented and marketed as the most rational way. A negative tack, that is an
absolute denial of the Hague Tribunal is ascribed to the Milosevic era, though
it is currently backed by part of political forces (Soscialist Party of Serbia and
Serb Radical Party), and by part of elite identified as so-called patriotic block.
The other, positive stance, is attributed to Western governments and their
embassies in Belgrade, international organizations, and some domestic
protagonists, rallied in some NGO. Such a stance is perceived as a radical one,
for it espouses the thesis of an absolute guilt of Milosevic and the Serbs side for
war waging, aggression against Croatia and Bosnia dn Croatia, planning and
7 CNPS, Review of Work of NGOs since December 2005.
8 Editorialist Ljubodrag Stojadinović, Hajduk Myth, Politika, 21November 2005
says: “This government tends to treat more tenderly the Hague indictees. If they
surrender they fly to the North on special flights and are guarantees some benefits and
amenities”.
9 Zoran Lončar, Minister for State Administration and Local Self-Rule, and
member of the National Council for Co-operation with the ICTY, thus spoke about his
impressions at the departure: “While bidding them farewell at the airport, as the custom
implies, I gave to each of them assurances that this country called Serbia and this
government, shall assist them maximally because of their heroic decision and
consequently their support for this country and government”. Danas, 31 December 2005
– 3 January 2006.
Human Security in an Unfinished State
execution of genocide in Srebrenica, planned mass ethnic cleansing and mass
crimes in Kosovo… 10
The third position, that is the ‘third way’, qualified as a pragmatic one
by nationalists, is a response to the two previous extreme positions and
represents "the only possible way for the least detrimental settlement of the
Hague problem and preservation of internal stability" 11 . Part of that strategy is
Kostunica-pursued policy of co-operation with the the Hague Tribunal
through ‘voluntary surrender’. However, nationalists think that said strategy
was upset by the "Srebrenica anniversary", for that "unfortunate story was
terribly manipulated and used as the pretext to pile both external and internal
pressure on Serbia and Serbs in general". Declaration on Srebrenica, which 8
NGOs submitted to the Serb Parliament, demanded Serbia’s assumption for
Srebrenica massacre. However Serb elites interpreted that Declaration as a
pressure on Serbia to "accept its responsibility for Srebrenica…to accept the
Western strategy of turning Srebrenica into a symbol and by airing the
Skorpioni related-film shocking domestic public and making it experience a
strong catharsis." 12 Deft manipulation of such a schematic tack to co-operation
with the Hague Tribunal (for the Third Way is identical to the first one, though
under pressure of evidence it tries to effect "damage control’), serves to
indicate an alleged threat of the second stance "a negative one…which paves
the way for a political ascent of extreme, isolation-minded forces" 13 . In order to
minimize the importance of NGO sector and notably of "those unfortunate
women 14 which someone is constantly trying to impose as objective and
indefatigable fighters for truth", the thesis that "professionals researchers for
‘truth’ should be given space equal to their genuine representative strength in
the society – that is minimal space" is being launched. For that is the condition
for ending the story about the Hague Tribunal, and moving forward." 15
Along with the promoion of the "Third Way" a campaign against
NGOs, notably those dealing with the recent past is being mounted. Those
NGOs are vilified as "promoters of a new, genuinely new and vulgarinterpretative
politicking, in which they have freely been engaged for the past
decade in the Serb public scene." Those NGOs are also media-bashed for
"arrogance and extreme stances, their strategy of doctoring and their ideology
of anti-Serb nationalism and racism." It is said that those NGOs have
"deservedly earned the reputation of being a malignant growth on an already
destroyed social issue of Serbia". It is though that activities of those NGOs
could be curbed by their outright ban, that is through "regulation of that
10 Misa Djurkovic, Resolution of Vital Issues, Politika, 28 July 2005
11 Ibid
12 Ibid
13 Ibid
14 Relating to Biljana Kovačevič. Nataša Kandić and Sonja Biserko
15 idem
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