Study of Board of Immigration Appeals Procedural Reforms - ILW.com
Study of Board of Immigration Appeals Procedural Reforms - ILW.com
Study of Board of Immigration Appeals Procedural Reforms - ILW.com
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the reviewing court to analyze whether such a determination is appropriate under the regulations<br />
in any given case. The Attorney General responds that the BIA member need give no reasons for<br />
the decision to decide a case summarily because that decision to decide summarily is <strong>com</strong>pletely<br />
within the agency’s discretion.<br />
The APA establishes a “presumption <strong>of</strong> judicial review” for those adversely affected by<br />
agency actions. As discussed above, however, the APA does not allow judicial review where the<br />
action is “<strong>com</strong>mitted to agency discretion by law.” 218 While the Supreme Court has cautioned<br />
that this is a “very narrow exception” to the presumption <strong>of</strong> reviewability, 219 it has traditionally<br />
considered certain categories <strong>of</strong> administrative decisions to be <strong>com</strong>mitted to agency discretion,<br />
including: the decision whether to institute proceedings; the decision whether to grant<br />
reconsideration <strong>of</strong> an action because <strong>of</strong> material error; and the decision to terminate an employee<br />
in the interest <strong>of</strong> national security. 220 The Attorney General argues that the decision to decide an<br />
administrative appeal summarily falls within this line <strong>of</strong> cases and is indistinguishable from an<br />
agency decision whether to grant reconsideration.<br />
In ICC v. Lo<strong>com</strong>otive Engineers, 221 the Supreme Court concluded that refusal <strong>of</strong> a<br />
request for reconsideration because <strong>of</strong> material error was the type <strong>of</strong> agency decision<br />
traditionally <strong>com</strong>mitted to agency discretion. 222 In so holding, the Court relied on “the<br />
impossibility <strong>of</strong> devising an adequate standard <strong>of</strong> review for such agency action.” 223 The Court<br />
also reasoned:<br />
[W]here no new data but only “material error” has been put<br />
forward as the basis for reopening, an appeal places before the<br />
court precisely the same substance that could have been brought<br />
there by appeal from the original order – but asks them to review it<br />
on the strange, one-step-removed basis <strong>of</strong> whether the agency<br />
decision is not only unlawful, but so unlawful that the refusal to<br />
reconsider it is an abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion. 224<br />
This type <strong>of</strong> review, the Court held, would “serve no purpose.” 225<br />
The BIA decision whether to decide summarily appears materially distinct from the<br />
ICC’s decision whether to reconsider, in several important respects. Unlike the situation in ICC,<br />
the courts <strong>of</strong> appeals have frequently overturned BIA determinations <strong>of</strong> harmless error. 226 In<br />
addition, in order to decide a case summarily, a <strong>Board</strong> member must determine not only that any<br />
errors by the <strong>Immigration</strong> Judge were harmless, but also either that: (a) the issue on appeal is<br />
218 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 701(a)(2); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985).<br />
219 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830 (quoting Abbott Labs, 387 U.S. at 141).<br />
220 Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993).<br />
221 482 U.S. 270 (1987).<br />
222 Id. at 282.<br />
223 Id.<br />
224 Id. at 279 (emphasis in original).<br />
225 Id.<br />
226 See, e.g., Colemenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); Podio v. INS, 153 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 1998); Bui v. INS, 76 F.3d 268,<br />
270 (9th Cir. 1996); Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 670 n.7 (3d Cir. 1990).<br />
38