Presentation - International Rail Safety Conference

Organisation and Cultural Impacts
25th – 27th October 2004
IRSC 2004, Perth, Australia
ENSURING SECURE CROSS-BORDER
OPERATION WITHOUT COMPROMISING
SAFETY
Johnny Restrup-Sørensen
Director Of Infrastructure
Øresundsbro Konsortiet
Denmark & Sweden

Øresund fixed Link alignment

The Øresund bridge

Tunnel portal

Tunnel cross section

Bridge cross section

Two countries – two technologies
Main differences between Swedish and Danish systems:
• Safety regulations
• Signaling
• Automatic train protection
• Catenary's voltage and frequency
• Rail inclination
• Train radio systems
Other problems:
• Different languages

Railway language
Long term:
Short term:
International railway language
Danish & Swedish
Important words: Swedish in Sweden and vice versa
Simple words: Danish or Swedish
Words to be pronounced distinctly and close to the
way they are spelled
Codes will be used e.g. To identify modes of operation
of traction power

Cross-border train operation, the language
Klart för
avgång
Færdigmelding
“Ready for departure”

Signaling aspects
Differences between Danish and Swedish signaling systems
Denmark Sweden Norway
Stop Stop Stop
Proceed and expect Proceed with Drive from/to
Stop at next signal high speed divergent track
(low speed)
Proceed and expect Proceed with Drive from/to
1 green at next signal max. 40 km/h main track
(high speed)

Two countries – two technologies
System border
Changes in one “point” (on the artificial island):
• Signaling
• Traffic management
• Regulations
• Radio system
• Automatic train protection
• Remote control of catenaries system

Interlocking Systems on the Fixed Link
Concentrators
DSB 1990
Relay interface
STLV85
Danish Coast
Peberholm
Swedish Coast
System border

Operating experience
• Overall safety target met in full
• No accidents or potentially dangerous situations
• 81 incidents in 2001 versus 70 in 2002 and 71 in 2003
‣ errors relating to rolling stock, e.g. trains with an
erroneous intercommunication system or faulty
mobile ATP-equipment
‣ incorrect or inadequate safety reports between
Danish and Swedish remote control centres or
between the remote control centre and engine
drivers
‣ infrastructure errors, primarily signalling errors

The Øresund Safety Management System
• Senior management commitment
• Safety culture, policy & safety goals
• Safety information
• Hazard identification and risk management
• Establishing a safety reporting system
• Safety assessment/audit
• Accident and incident reporting and investigation
• Recurrent training

The basic safety process

Hazard identification techniques
• Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
• Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
• Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
• Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)
• Risk Screening (Hazid sessions)

The four Ps of safety management
Philosophy:
Recognizing that there will always be threats to safety;
setting the organization’s standards; and confirming that safety is
everyone’s responsibility
Policy:
Clear statements of responsibility, authority, and accountability;
development of organizational processes and structures to
incorporate safety goals into every aspect of the operation; and
development of the skills and knowledge necessary to do the job

Procedures:
Clear direction to all staff; means for planning, organizing,
and controlling; and means for monitoring and assessing
safety status and processes
Practices:
Following well designed, effective procedures; avoiding the
shortcuts that can detract from safety; and taking appropriate
action when a safety concern is identified

Human factors in Cross-border operation
Variations in
• Language, communications, culture and social conditions
• Training, selection and assessment of competence
• Infrastructure technology and systems
• Rules, procedures and standards
• Information environment
• Geographical/topographical conditions

Cross-border safety rules and standards
Danish legislation
Banestyrelsens norms & rules
Swedish legislation
Banverkets norms & rules
Area 3 Area 2
Area 1
Danish legislation
and Danish traffic
management
Danish legislation
and Swedish traffic
management
Swedish legislation
and Swedish traffic
management
Ownership
Border
System
Border
Territorial
Border
Ownership
Border
Kastrup Peperholm Lernacken
Supplementary, more rigorous and deviating rules

Radio Systems
Train radio systems
Sweden:
Denmark:
GSM-R
MSR-3
Radio coverage
GSM-R on the entire link
MSR-3 in the tunnel and on the artificial island

Measures introduced so far to support
interoperability
• Documentation of the Infrastructure in Danish,
Swedish and English versions
• Infrastructure Register with reference to the TSIs
• Simplification of rules and procedures
• Developing an “Access Guide” for new and
potential new operators
• Harmonising Health and Safety requirement to
Railway personal in Denmark, Sweden and
Norway

Future measures to support
interoperability
• Abandon all-national rules that prevents new or
potential new operators on the Øresund Fixed
Link
• Working for common safety targets, methods
and indicators
• Harmonising the Danish and Swedish rules
and norms related to cross-border traffic
• Seeking influence through NIM (Nordic
Infrastructure Managers)

Lessons learned
1. possible to create a framework for efficient and safe crossborder
rail traffic between Denmark and Sweden
2. Extensive training in safety regulations and competence
development in Danish and Swedish language and culture
have very likely eliminated possible misunderstandings
3. The hazard identification and risk management processes
provide the information needed to control risk at
acceptable levels
4. The final report for the HUSARE project “Managing the
Human Factor in Multicultural and Multilingual Rail
Environments” has shown to be an useful tool

Thank you for your attention
Johnny Restrup-Sørensen
Jrs@oeresundsbron.com