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Sydney Water Operational Audit 2011/2 - IPART - NSW Government

Sydney Water Operational Audit 2011/2 - IPART - NSW Government

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maintenance request developed. This listing is reviewed by the site manager and appropriate<br />

work orders generated and passed to the most appropriate party for implementation.<br />

The open access of the system to all operators is a positive way of ensuring everyone is<br />

empowered to report concerns.<br />

With the impending outsourcing of maintenance activities <strong>Sydney</strong> <strong>Water</strong> will need to develop a<br />

process that enables the Operators to continue to report concerns, associated with a robust,<br />

internal prioritisation process for unplanned maintenance requests.<br />

The plant is fed by two long rising mains. The residence time means that the sewage can be<br />

very septic when it is discharged at the plant inlet works. <strong>Sydney</strong> <strong>Water</strong> reported that there has<br />

been a history of damage from hydrogen sulphide and remedial works have been required to<br />

the concrete structures in the past. In an attempt to mitigate the septicity the network is dosed<br />

with ferric, which is said to have had some success. It was noted that adjacent catchments are<br />

dosed with magnesium; experience related during the site visit indicated that the latter is more<br />

successful in controlling septicity, especially when chlorides from seawater ingress may be a<br />

contributing factor. No empirical evidence was provided during the site visit however the verbal<br />

advice of the difference in outcomes from the dosing suggests that there may be benefit in<br />

revisiting the business case for magnesium over ferric dosing.<br />

3.5.2 Woronora<br />

It was observed during the site visit that Veolia, the operators at Woronora, maintain a<br />

completely separate asset database on a different platform to <strong>Sydney</strong> <strong>Water</strong>, which has no copy<br />

of this asset record, or the planned maintenance. A superficial explanation of the contract<br />

between the two parties was given (the printed content remains unsighted) and the relationship<br />

between <strong>Sydney</strong> <strong>Water</strong> and Veolia appeared to be satisfactory. The risks to <strong>Sydney</strong> <strong>Water</strong><br />

associated with asset management are probably minimised due to a contract condition which<br />

gives <strong>Sydney</strong> <strong>Water</strong> the option to purchase the plant at the end of the agreement, at a fair price.<br />

A number of other BOO contracts are in place and can be expected to have different<br />

agreements to those discussed at Woronora. No details of the negotiations/extensions of other<br />

BOO contracts were provided.<br />

With reference to specific elements of the asset management framework, namely 3.1.2 (b)<br />

“consistent processes, practices and programs to ensure…regulatory requirements”, (v)<br />

“management of service provision, including contracts” and; (viii) “operations”, a potential<br />

difference in philosophy between an owner and a BOO was observed; that of the policy for<br />

signage and entry to confined spaces. During the site visit to Wollongong it was noted that no<br />

signage for confined spaces was visible. The policy at the plant was quoted to be that only<br />

external contractors with specific training may carry out work in such locations. No <strong>Sydney</strong><br />

<strong>Water</strong> staff are allowed to enter any such spaces, unless they are under the control of the<br />

external contractor (and are qualified to do so). Alternatively Veolia at Woronora did have<br />

confined spaces sign posted and staff on-site are expected to carry out duties in such spaces.<br />

(It should be noted that <strong>Sydney</strong> <strong>Water</strong> reservoir site 151 that was visited also displayed confined<br />

space signage, with an understanding that <strong>Sydney</strong> <strong>Water</strong> staff and contractors would enter,<br />

using the correct procedures).<br />

Of themselves these variations in policy positions are not in direct conflict. The fact that three<br />

different facilities are involved (water treatment, sewage treatment, potable water storage) is<br />

immaterial. This example demonstrates a very practical difference in approach to determining a<br />

safe system of work, which may be exacerbated and result in safety concerns when planned<br />

maintenance is further outsourced by <strong>Sydney</strong> <strong>Water</strong>, for example:<br />

16 | GHD | Report for Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal - <strong>Operational</strong> <strong>Audit</strong> of <strong>Sydney</strong> <strong>Water</strong> Corporation, 23/14602

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