Download searchable scanned PDF file for Volume 1 1970

- i -
CONTENTS ro~ms
i .
EDITORIAL NOT~ NOTE
11 i1
MEANIN(}. MEANING'. FOR 1-lHOM?
-~lROM?
-~1R0M?
Paul Reelas, Heelaa, Heelas, Institute of Social Anthropology 1
AFRICAN l1ITCHCRAFT l"lITCHCRAFT lITTCHCRAFT BELIEFS: THE DDFINITIOI~
DDFINITIOn D.cFINITIOn PROBLEM
PROBLEr~
Roma Standfd3r, Stand&i8r, StandeiBr, Queen ~een Elizabeth House
II
TEE ANALYTICAL .AND FBENOMENOLOGIC.AL FBENOM2iNOLOGICilL FHENQM;I;NOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE TEE
SOCIAL
John Clammer, Department Dep~rtment of Ethnology 18
MODEL .AND STRUCTURE IN C. LEVI-3TRAUSS'S LEVI-STRA.USS·S LEVI-S'l'RAU3S'S STRUCTURAL
.AlrrEROPOLOOY
AHTBROPOLOGY
AlrrHROPOLOOY
Barri.%Jgton BarriDgton Barrington JODeS, Jones, Department of Philosophy 22
IS LEVI-STRAUSS A J&\JISH JEHISH MYSTIC?
Horriet Harriet Lyons, , Institute' of Social Anthropology 25
HIERARCHY l1ND lillD llND POWER.: POWER:
REFLECTIOlfS REFLECTIONS OF A BLIND 11ATERIALIST
UA.TffiIALIST
r.iATffillLIST
Jairus Banaji, Ballaji, Institute of Social Anthropology 28
El-lOTION E~lOTION EllOTION .AND MEANING
Michael Kenny, Institute of Social Anthropology 32
STEREOTIPES STEREOTYPES Ili III SCIENCE SCIlliNCE SCIBNCE ..lllD MID AND LITERATURE
Brian V. Street, Institute.. of Social Anthropology '5 35

.. -1i~ -ii~ 11 ~
·0·
EDITORIAL EDITORllL EDITORill NOTE
The idea for this collection of essays in anthropology has cane
from the graduate stu.dents students of the Sub-Faculty of Anthropology at
O::::ford: O:ford: in particular from those of the Institute of Social .Anthropology
and the Department of Ethnology.
Papers given at graduate seminars,
semiDars,
and preliminary ideas arising from work for the Diplomas and higher
degrees, very often merit wider circulation and discussion, without
necessarily being ready for formal fomalpublication fOl'mal in professional journals.
There is a need for some intermediate form of exchange. The Oxford
University Anthropological Society has agreed to act as publisher for
this venture and has bas established estab~ished a Journal Sub-Committee Sub~ommittee for the
purpose. The Dditors are grateful to the Radcliffe-Brol

In
-1- -1­
lWNING l.wNING lmANING FOR './HCM? h1HCM?
~dHCM?
'Philosophy does not leave everything everytlling just as it is, but hOl'1 hot.,. h01'1 it is iD going GOing to leave
things is a matter of delicate historical prophecy rather than a priori deductions
from pre-established philosophical vie\,1points.' vie~1points.' viel'lpoints.' 1
'ile 'rTe We can add - and hOlf h01'1 how does everything leave .Philosophy? Rather than attempting
to present systematically '\'That uhat '"That is lllvolved involved in philosophiccl philosophic~l philosophice..l as opposed to other
.
foms of understandjng, understanding, I discuss instead various anthropologically-based
issues. Issues which suggest that an understanding of certain aspects of
philosophy is as imperative ilnperative to the anthropologist as is ia knowledge to the field­
fieldwork
situation, literary understanding and ability to apply various scientific
procedures and theories. Some of these issues ~1ill \1ill involve us in speaking in
'relevance of' terms; this is largely an organisational organis3tional organis~tional
device'and device" should not
reflect a maginot line mentali~J
in any- unnecessazy unnecessar,y sense.
lfork First, that any f-orm form of anthropological understanding involves philosophical
pre-suppositions. This· . involves disputing an inference which can be dravm. dra1'm dra~m
from
Vico's I s viel'r vie~"1 viall ('Philosophy contemplates reason, ,'rhence 1'1hence comes knoll1edge knouledge of the true;
philology" philology' philology·' (science) o~serves
the autllority authority of human choice, l'l'hence l'rhence uhence comes consciousness
of th,e th~ certain')
to the effect that there necessarily need to bQ be a tension
in anthropology betueen betvleen these two supposedly disparate modes of understanding.
Traditionally, no such di~tinction distinction existed - philosophy contributed to the
understanding of particular matters of fact; scientific and philosopllical philosophical explanations
were blurred in that. tha.t philosophyllSS nas uas env:i.saged envisaged as though it 1'1ere 't'lere l'rere the queen
of sciences. :Jith ~Jith ~1ith the increasing autonomy of the sciences, the empiricists and
rationalists differently re-eonceived re-conceived the role of philosophy.
TIle The 18th century
empiricists empiriCists remained, rema:ined, at least in part, scientists: HUL.J.e Hums Hume and his Scottish school
attempted to found philosophical tlleories ti~eories about man and society on an empirical
science of man, attempting to re-integrate society lTith 11i l1ith nature through the
reductive analysis of l1uman. human. phenome~ phenomena, phenomenB, in order to ascertain the tIle necessary foundation
of society. Bume Hume himself wrote the first comparative study of religion.
",,\ A strong tendency in the work of the tIle school was to react against t earlier philo­
philOsophical
theories of society ,"lhich which ~rhich
were seen to be charters for political
action; as myths.
And so began the long history of variot1.s various 10giBtlll5; logiSUl.e; logi~; attempts, that· is, to
contribute to the philosophical understanding of human nature through scientific
endeavour.
Such is the basis of Comtets Comte's positive philosophy, of Durkheim's
sociologism, of the psycologism of Levi-5trauss Levi-3trauss Levi-Strauss and Chomsky.
.ADd finally, of
the comprehensive attempts atte]j1pts atte~ptB of both Cassirer and Sebag to analyse the mind through
its linguistic expression in various forms of discourse.
Against this auareness alrareness of the relevance of philosophical spec'l.llation speculation about·
human nature, stands the other dominant strand. strand, ofantbro·pological anthropological thought.
A
variety which combines a sociological interest with 'phrasing ':phrasing the problem of
anthropology, and the conceptual schemes it has adopted., adopted, according to the
patterns llhich l'lhich ~lhich
belong to the scientific tradition of llestern l1estern civilization of
the past century.'3 century.,3 3 The tendency was to envisage scientific ific explanation as a
sui-generis sphere of operation, oper~tion,
falling fall~ out of any philosophical framework.
framel'1ork.
frameli'ork.
Observation and inductive procedures.(the hope that in some lfay way the facts lIould 'IIould vould
constitute and so explain themselves), left no room for speculation.
~'1hat -::1bat ~1hat
arguments can be brought to bear against these varieties of scientism?
Or, more graphically, who is the greater -~ Radcliffe-Brown or Levi-3trauss? L8vi-Strauss? ~vi-Strauss?
Both
have been criticised, but. that directed against the former fonner authorities scientism
Bcientism
and all its associated narrowness, is surely Burely of a more 1\mdamental fundamental nature than
that t entailed by those who criticise L~vi-Strauss L&vi-3trauss on the grounds that his dictum)
dictum,
truth is of reason rather than of fact, has led him into a vQlNo v/llt4o Vll!t4o a·prio.rism.
a priorism.
I list a series of observations, each set of which presents different
reasons for the advisability of retaining a philosophical philosoPhical perspective.
(a) That despite the methodological autonomy autonomw of science itself, its
basis is inherently speculative. speculative•. ' > In the sense that no knoliled.ge kno~iledge kno'tfledge is absolute,
science is founded on as many myths as is liter8r'J lital'ar'J literar"J criticism. Popper 4
.

-2-
~2-
especially arguea argues that sc1entili~-understandingis, sc1enti!ic-~standing tiiio--understanding is, fundam.en fundamentally, based on" the
same inborn expectations aa as is any o~ of-knowledge. or-knowledge. Heisenberg 5
is in broad agreement: science is founded in the fundamentals of our existence;
'the object of research is no longer nature itself, but rather nature exposed
to man's suestionB, suestions, questions, and to this extent man here also meets himself.' Finally,
both Har~ Harre and Collingwood6 have traced the extent to which natural phenomena
have beenre-interpreted during recent European history, according to the
conceptual blue print applied.
(b) The cultural neutrali~ neutrality of the social sciences is even mor~ more suspect ­
-
Bryson7 writes that comprehensive philosophical ideas 'are tare to be seen as the
"gep.eralised "generalised ancestors" of particular social theories' t
(she concludes that the
chief chie.£ theoretical background of the modern social sciences lies in 18th century
Scotland). SCQ.tland). More specifically, Leach8 has traced the foundation of Malinowski's
s
body of theory to the pragmatic philosophy of William James, to suggest that
Malinowski's non-critical application of this philosophy is a characteristic
he shares with Radcliffe-Brown's equally non-critical application of the
philosophy of J.S. Mill. ·On 'On a broader scale, Honigsheim9 suggests an fication of the various philosophical orientations which have served to distin­
distinidenti­
. guish American from European anthropology.
(c)
And finally, in so far as Winch's view that 'any worthwhile study of
society must be philosophical in character and any worthwhile philosophy must be
concerned with the nature of human society',lO ,10 is correct, it is apparent
that even if we discount Winch's view and admit scientific explanation as valuable,
such explanatioD explanation cannot be divorced from the neo-philosophical task of conceptual
understanding. and the philosophical issues this entails (for instance - the
. extent to which understanding in terms of reasons is .incompatible wi.th with e~lanation
explanation
in terms of causes, which in turn raises the rules-of-prdCedure rules-of-prdbedure problem.lI ll )
,"For now it suffices to say that almost any problem if pursued far enough,
exposes a philosophical nature. For instance Belli writes writea that if the subject
matter of SOCiology sociology is meaningful behaviour, then the social scientist must
necessarily get involved 'in the knotty problem of the relation of thought to action.
J.
In attempting to expose the extent to which both science and philosophy are,
although althOUgh to very differing degrees, both speculative and so not absolutely
culturally neutral, it has not been my intention to argue for such extreme
positions as presented, for instance, by Gellner and Goldmann (Gellner12 - that
anthropology is, at least implicitly, 'a classification and evaluation eValuation of
societies,' and Goldmann'sl' Goldmann'sl~ view that social philosophy is today much as it
was when Hume critised it. For although there might ~ be a certain degree.. degree.of degree_of truth
in such tontentions,14 it seems to me that the greatest danger lies not in the
influence of one's vested interests, but through forgetting that theories and
viewpoints are not in any sense absolute and~. It is for this reason that
Leach wrote Rethinking AnthropologY.
But what, I suggest, he did not sufficiently
stress is that a philosophical perspective affords an 'objective' stance from
which to argue for and against theories, discuss the structure of concepts and
the nature of what we are studying; stUdying; in sum a critical perspective to help us
"avoid the 'infection'15 tinfectiont15 of blindscientism. .
However, it must be stressed that social theorising is inseparable from
philosophical speculation. Lukes16 traces the extent to Which which the very
different interpretations of nineteenth century industrial European society
. given by bJ' Harx Marx and Durkheimcan be attributed to their fundamentally different
hypotheses about the nature of man and society-. , And so, how their interpretations
reflect renect their moral and ideal.ist idealist aspirations. Also in the nineteenth century,'f
century,~ century,'r
it is possible to discern the extent to which popular scientific paradigms
reflected renected and innuenced influenced mass value systems -.hence the scientist, SCientist, social
scientist and public met in their respective theorising about evolution,
other peoples, and race.
I do not think that such considerations, despite what the Marxist would argue,
bear so heavily today.
But the point still remains that at least on certain
issues, the anthropologist faces a moral decision in deciding between certain
basic theories of man and society. To perpetuate the system through non-eritical
non-critical
involvement? To allow a fellow anthropologist who is scientifically convinced
of a racist theory to remain a teaching member of the profession? And finally,

- ; -
-;­- 3 -
hOlf hO~f hOtf can Sartre ('Freedom 18 is iD the irreducibility of the cultural to the natural
order') view Marvin Harris?
* '* * *
Given the fact that philosophy is speculative, arguing only to conclusions
of an irrefutable status as opposed to the tIle nature of scientific proof, in l'1hat what uhat
sense se:use can anthropology be enVisaged envisaged as constituting the empirical branch of
philosophy? Ayer17 takes a typical stand against comprehensive empirical
evidence, arguing in his article that a priori discussion relying on examples .
drawn from common experience, ·is an adequate basis from 'tlhich l-lhich uhich to 'solve' various
problems belonging to the social socia.l sciences. Else'tr-lhere, Else'l

-4 ..
Thus lJ1horf's ltThorf's lJThorf's tlork l'lork on the cultural nature of time is only weakly philosophical as
compared with the way v.:.riol!S v:u-ious v.1.l'ious Americal1 American philosopllers philosop!lers have re~'1or~ed re'.lor:":ed re~Tor~ed
his material•
material. •
.And that although Evans-Pr1tchard Evans~ritchard and 'Jittgenstein 'ilittgenstein i1ittgenstein have much in common (both
stressed meaning as a function ftmction of, relative to, various language gatles gaI:les gaces and not
as 0. a function of reality in a:ny any 'ideal language' sense)27~
Evans-Pritchard
Evans-l'ritchard
aima aime aims to understand a form of l1£e, life, whereas ":Jittgenstein -}ittgenstein -Jittgenstein \ \to Gellner's12 Gellner'a disgust)
accepts. _ too the form of life. as given. Ris His interests a;re ~ ~.re basically in social
issueS. issues.
To conclude, the divergencies within philosophy ph:i.losophy as to the relevance of
scientifically based research is considerable (compare, for instance, flinch ilinch ~linch "ith llith uith
.Ayer's Ayerts position). Ev"'en Ev-en Ev--sn Winch, however, hOli9ver, avoids empirical research. Soalthough
philosophy philOSOphy largely escapes anyt!ling anytl1ing anyt:ling anthropology CBoJ.'"1
ca.."1 offer, ant."1ropology anthropology ant.'1ropology can
never escape philosophical insigl1t insight and speculation. The s,mmetry symmetry of the
speculation/observation specul~tian/Observationsynthesis synthesis is loaded in one direction.
'* * * * *
Turning from wbat what philosophy means for antllropologists,28 anthropologists,28 antl~opologists,28 I 1 attempt now to
discern certain problems in the question 'meaning for whom?' wham?' as referred to
understanding unders.lcanding other societies.
The field-work situation represents the simplest case; to a l[';l'gf3 l~ge extent
this spell is charo.ctarised charact"arised characterised by a growing synthesis between "mat uhat the n.3.tive Il

- 5 -
In direct opposit~on opposition to this stands 1·linch. 1Jinch. 1;linch.
He considers that under-
lmderstandinstandi.ng
another society consists only in making explicit \That l1hat uhat is already implicit,
so rejecting any a:ny form 'of scientific explanation. The reasons lihy lilly ~'lhy ilinch v/inch takes this
view are complex.
Footnote (11) and Clammer's Clammerls article (see. below) cover the
basic points. }1aclntyre :t-1aclntyre's ~Iaclntyre's t s criticism of l"linch Winch l:Tinch in his 1967 article (Aristotelian
Society) combined ~dth uith Banaji's article (see below) belovr) beloir) indicate other disadvwrtages
disadvantages
associated l1ith with the making tile ~le the implicit/explicit theo~. theory.
Instead of developing tllese tilese these criticisms, critiCisms, I liant 'tiant l'/'ant to argue that both Nadel's
and :1inch's ~linch's
~linchts
ideas about how to make a primitive society intelligible are extreme.
The former's I s in that meaning mea.niIJg for the native is obscured, the latter in that 1"iinch l-Tinch llinch
does not appear to realise that iranslation 'translation necessarily involves tlleorising. theorising. He
admits that trUl1s1ation translation trallslation must involve tIle the addition of concepts alien to the native
system of meaninG', meaning, but fails to realise toot thlt our concepts are often aften oftell of a higll1J highly r
theoretical order.
Since translation involves re-classification of native criteria of identity
and judgment into terms of our criteria, it is, I feel, essential. for anthropologistpolog'ists
to o.ttewpt attewpt to understand 't'lhat "lhat "That ia involved in the logic of tra;:lSlation.
transla/cion.
tralwlation.
tmder­
1"linch llinch gives ~ves us no criteria to help us either in relating various native lrords 'tfords l'lords
to oUr theories and concepts. concepts, or in terms of tlle tile the problem of organizing native
words lfords into the greatly increased intelligibility uhich which rrhich follows tl1rough through tl1rou~
relating
them structurally. His idea of a social science is only a fil"St first step even if'
we tle do not add scientific criteria of' intellig'ibility.
intelligibility.
intellig~bility.
from:
Historically, anthropologists anthropoloGists ~thropoloeists have approached the problem of translation
translaticm
(a) the ethnocentric point of Viel'l vie'l'T - particularly colillllon common in the nineteenth
century, \Then llhen ~rhen attertpts atteMpts atteI'lpts liere 'fere ~fere made to elevate notions dralln drawn from particular language
games to the level of universal applicability in ol"de;r ol"'de;t' orde~ to fulfill the needs of
comparison. Pitkin and Leach (Rethinking Anthropo.logy) Anthropology) relate this to inductive
procedures. It is unlikely that this is a useful approach from .-mich 't-mich l·lhich to
develop dev:elop universal semantics.
lifot I~ot Not only does it vacillate Delong along a 10Hest lO't"Test louest common cOllllIlon
denominator and highest common factor spectrum, but other societies are interpreted,
constituted through our conceptual blinkers. The words sacred,
incest, mana at·c. etc. belong to this category. Do l-Te ue ,Te in fact require universally
applicable (in what sens(f) sensEi) sens~)
definitions for, say, the family? IJIurdock Burdock seems
to think so - yet look at all the obvious failings faUings of his Social Structure.
(b) Structural approach -
it is, I think, possible to envisage a spectrum
of concepts -
(approximate).
FOIDiffiL FOID-1A.L FOR11AL
ETHNOCEETRIC/RELi\TlVE
ETHNOCENTRIC/RELld'IVE
ETHNOCENTRIC/RELllTIVE
Lo"ic Logic Lo"J.-c hierarchy natural
~ b pure
e
sacred
structure
priest
analytical concepts duality cultural impure profane
belief
incest
descriptive concepts
Moving from left to right, righ't, the sci.entific scientific status of concepts devoid. of
cultural content declines gradually as too the component of langUage game' specificity
36
6
increases. And. so the advisability of atteiJpting attempting atteiilpting definitive definitions decreases.;
dacreases. 3
The extent to which descriptive concepts concepta can be given structural definitions
varies. At oneertreme extreme it is almost impossible - for such notions as belief and.
the psychological verbs~
~
the criteria of application are almost totally culturally
bound.. At an intermediary inteI'lilediary level lfefind we find suCh sueb:concepts suC~ as pure or impure. These
are culturally bound in a way in l-lhich ~rhich uhich the more {see (see however· (6» (6)) scientifically
based oppositions oppoaitionssuch such as nature/Culture are not. But, as Dumont demonstrates,
in selecting the main articulation points of the pure/impure oppositicm opposition (i.e. ~7
~
relating the term structurally, strtlcturally, to other otller concepts' related by the various logics,::'
7
of polarity, analogy etc.), structuralisation and so a relatively neutral trans- translation
can be effected. ile ife We can tlliIlk thiIlk think also of ll0W how Van Gennep translated trBJ.lslated the cultural
specificity of Rites de passage'}and passage)and passagejand Levi-5trauss' Levi-Strauss' Levi-Strauss· totemism:ia:ln totemism:la:ln mm neutral terms.
Or of the manner in which Wllich apparently meaningless meaniDgless (for us) nati.ve nat~ve
associations
can be made intelligible (to us). And finally, at the opposite e extreme, a
native classification of, say trees, can be given definite structu:rsl structurel .
definitions

- 6- 6·..
in that j£ if this classification classific~tion
is only based on certain objective criteria
(tall, tmd, hard, ~d, edible etc.) there is no need to abstract abstr~ct
the structures in the
same way as is necessary when the tams: tarms are involved in complex language games.
(c) The cuIturnl cultural relativists' t position - lie l-re we have seen that whereas the
logic of hierarchy is culturally neutral, r
priests are not. Ani). Anc). Anll that a structural
definition, being relatively devoid of meaning in native terI!lS, te:rns, terms, cannot express
native meaning as adequately as a translation (or eo so ~linch
~Jinch
hopes) of that thnt actual
native meaning. Since Sinc'e such translation is imperfect, impel'fect, the position of relativism
is unavoid:ablo. unavoidablo. The extent to which ;!Htgenstein ~!ittgenstein' ~'!i·~tgenstein's 's s vie~~ vie~e vie~§
support his
is I think, more debatable deba.table than 1'linch ,'[inch ~linch allows. !lielsen, llielsen, nielsen, ufor one, :J.rGUes argues arGUes tha.t that
11ittgenstein l1ittgenstein's Uittgenstein's 1 s position does not necessarily entail relativism. HO\leVer, Houever, from
,Bam .Bam broughI brough' s39 a39 6 presentation of ''1ittgenstein's \1i \'1i s 'Family resemblances' theory of
universals and how it dissolves the problems as formulated by the realists and
nominalists, 'I'le '\'le 'trIe con can c:m readily discern tlle the extent to whicll which a viell viel1 vieu claiming toot that
all thJ.t that games have in canmon is that they are games is attractive to a
'Jinchian 'Tinchian ~Jinchian
variety fideist.
11incll, l'linch, l'1inch, in reaotion reaction to"a a Durkheimian position of treating social facts as
·things and other forms foms of scientism, is surely correct in stressing that tllat 'M'Ug'le
'Mugue
is M~~let Mue-;ue'. Mue.~le'. • Presumably though he would have to translate trans1ate Uugl'le lIugl-le nugl1e as 'Priest' -­
tlhich \'1hich \,lhich 't'lauld l'lould would involve theory in (a) discerning a critical element out of the tbe v:lrious
v~rious vc:.rious
language games in which tlle the various instanc,es instances of the family called .+Mugwe'is .fMugwe'is
,·M~e ma:n.ifested manifested in terms of meaning, (b) in approXimating approximating this eritical critical \mit, unit, meaning, meaning.
11ith uith (0) (c) a similar critical element in the home voca.bulary.
vocabulary.
This can only be a
nomi..Y1alistic nOmil'lalistic nominalistic definition lrhen uhen ~~hen ·;lords ".-rords -.'lords such as priest are concerned; so 1-1ittgenstein's
1Httgenstein's
tlittgenstein's
'solution' is not followed.
But through combining a family resemblance approach, linguistic liDt,""Uistic ~"1listic analysis
with (a) not translating certain critical terlUS teI".JlS terms in any critical sense (:''vans­
(:'~a:ns­
(~'vans­
Pritchard never defines ~ as God) am. (b) a structural approach, allo'l'Ting allol'Ting allol-ling in
some sense the semantic patterns to speak for" tb.emselves tllemselves tl:Lemselves with (c) the hypothesing
of structures." structures.,J ... both the pitfalls of relativism and ethnocentrism can in part be
a-.zoided. a1roided. avoided.
The relativists' t argument can, hO\'1ever, ho't'1ever, hOliever, be present edin a much more extreme
form (see_ note 30). Extreme in the sense that although structural understanding
(for' us) is not directly threatened, it is indirectly il1.d.il~ectly" insofar as since
Ye~ve we have ~o to understand understaud other cultures semantically sema.ntically (for themselves) before
structures can be discerned, if this semantic intelligibility intelligibilit.y intelligibili~ is not possible,
nothing much else can follow.
, ,
Although ;linch ~linch
writes 'the concepts we have settle for us the experiences
we~ve of the world' and 'there is no norm for intelligibility in general' he
does not suggest that inter-social conoepts concepts are in any sense incommensurable.
In fact, r he supports Vico's view that 'tllere 'there must be in the nature of man a
mental language common to all nations which uniformly grasps @.TaBPS the tIle substance of
things feasible in human social life lii'e li:fe and expresses it llith lTith as many man;v diverse
modifications as ·these same things may have diverse aspects'. The theories we
now present do not stop at this cultural relativism but introduce the idea of
mental relativism. •.
'
First, First. the Sapir/Yhorf hypothesis; that basic linguistiC linguistic categories are
derived from social organisation, so that the universal constants in language
1fou~d would necessarily refiect reflect .only certain empirical empirica.l wiformities uniformities in social life
end e-.nd the conditional necessitiesot of human communication.
For Sapir, since
societies live in differxat differmt d1ffe2'l8t worlds, worlds. c:J.tegoriso.tions c:ltegoriso.tions categorisations of experience G%perienceis is in terms of
unlike prime categories. !rhe The ~ degree of incommensurability all but makes
comparison impossible. To a much greater degree than in Boas's theory of limited. limited,
relativism, relativism. natural logic {that (that the cognitive processes of all men have something
iIi in: commo~is commo~1s as severely sevel"ely threatened as in the work of Levy-Bruhl or Cassirer.
In Iil Durkheim's t s case, although he also was arguing arguinG ago.1nst against s:tJy e:ny SZJy a priori basis of
morality and logic in suggesting tbat tllat categories are founded in the 8ocial, social,
r
commensurability is stressod to a much greater extent; as seen, for instance, instance.
in his usage of the word 'sacred'. 'sacredI • •
These theories suffer, suffer. fortunc..tely fort~1tely
.... tely for &n!FP0100, an4fropology, an1il'Opology, DOt not only from ~ the
fact that they are ill-formulated and unproven,
but in that alternative hypothesis,
I
I
I
I

- -7~
7 .;.
of much greater power, have been recently developed.
The work li'ork ''I'ork of men as
diverse as Levi-Strauss, Levi-5trauss, lleedham Needham and Chomsky, has suggested that language" language,
together ili uith certain aspects of socia-cultura.l socio-cultural life, lif~.· 'mirrors
certain
universal properties of the mind.
'such \1ie8el. Cognitive psyChologists psychologists as Vygotsky,
Bruner, Piaget, Hubel and Uiesel.42 \1iesel. From another point of vie'1, viel-T, vie,'I', philosophers
such as Clarke, Nielson, Rees and various philosophers of education (such as
Hirst) have also argued that various modes of thought do not stand in relationships
of a.bsolute absolute autonomy.
Needham43 1vrites 'tn'ites urites that 'the more ne.arly nearly a cultural phenomenon approaches
.the universal, the more necessary it is to explain it in terms of the general
psychic character of man.' I
Here then is a slightly different dif'ferent basis ,on 1'1hich l1hich '·lhich
to base a transcultural language, a language with properties sufficient to avoid
gross misinterpretation; forit belongs to 11hat ,fhat ,'That it interprets. , I
Such a language,
more fundamentally even than the varieties of structuralism we have so far discussed,
can be termed theoretical realism. For instance, as a hypothesis it
is arguable that the fundamental nature of the mind accords to such processes
as .. we i'le re term dualism, polarity, metaphor; or, at a larger scale, as the various
mentalities -
religious, symbolic, theocratic etc. As univ.ersals, universals, these terms
belong to native thought, yet make it intelligible i.,'rJ.telligible i."'l.telligible to us 11ho ,rho llho can only truly
understand, 'for instance, informal logic, if 'tfe '·le rle stand outside it. it, in the formal
realm.
S.uch Such a basis v10uld would vlould seen to me to De be more adequate tban than other attempts to
found 'ideal languages' t
(in both senses of the ilord, uord, that is, as a 'third
language' or language as various logical. positivists pOSitivists conceived it). Briefly,
Gellner, Lounsbury, ~Iurdock, Nurdock, Herton, r~Ierton, Feuer, Redfield, Jung and various phenomenologists
of religion have all attempted to discern. disceDQ other universal features
on 't'l'mch ''1hich l'1hich to base transcultural intelligibility. These range from the biology of
kinship (Gellner, and Lounsbury's30 s30 componential analysis of kinship) to a basis
in supposedly universal existential iforld Iforld world states (Feuer,44 1-lurcock Murcock Hurcock but is this
not also implied. in Van.Gennep's.and Gennepis and Hertz's theories?)t theories?), or in universal psychic
psy~~ic
states in Jungian style.
It seems clear then that there are several bases for universal commonality
and so universal intelligibility. But llhat uhat happens if 'lfe \'1e ,fe ask - holl hO"l hon can commonality
be discerned vlhen when vnlen concepts such as belief are concerned? Ueedham Needham ,-rri ~~ites45 \·tri anthropology is 'primarily the empirical investigation of human understanding by
means of the comparative study of cultural categories' t
(not of experience itself),
so it is essential that problems associated 't"lith ~dth i-rith 'universal semantics' be faced.46
The problem in brief, is meaning for whom? vlhom? ~lhom?
and in' terms of 11hose whose uhose criteria of
intelligibility? Whose language games?
*'* *' * *'
A true conclusion to this paper is impossible, for I have only begun to
approach approacll the more difficult problems.
In general, vIe rTe i'le have been discussing the
contribution philosophical speculation can make in assessing the extent to which
uhich
understanding of cultures as our various subjects sub,jects sub.jects is incompatible 1vith 't"li ,·Ti the anthropologist
constituting ·theIn· theIll them as obj ob.jects uithin rtithin ~lithin an I 'objective' sphere' of discourse.
It could be objected, ho'tfever, however, that the philosopher has little to contribute;
after all, he has never gone into the field. llho lJho is 1JinCh '"linch'that Uinch tmt he can say that
Levi-Strauss's Levi-5trauss I s Savage IJind Hind is philosophically unsound in terms of 1'linch' 1"linch' tlinch' s idea
of a social science? Or that to translate God speaking to Job through the
clouds into scientific language is inexcusable? .
Although I might be retracting from the general position which I presented,
I think as'Nietzche47 that it is strongly arguable that philosophers such and
Popper48 have more to offer than many of the philosophers we have discussed.
But their contributions, and Vittgensyein's, Wittgensyein's, ~fittgensjTein's,
Hume's etc. are.largely . undiscussable
in any comprehensive sense for they do not t 'theorise' theorise· systematically about our
concerns.
Instead ,'le k"le ,·le have to select salect their' insights.
Finally, and this also goes against the tenor of muoh of vThat \'lhat uhat I have be·en
been
saying, rJIax Nax Black sugeests that translation problems are more akin to problems
of a literary literar~ order than to those of philosophy.
Against this position I quote
Lounsbury:­
Lounsbury:-

- 8 ...
-
'Partiality to one or,another .another of these views vie~lS vie'l'rs (degree of relativity) may ma.y
considerably influence both one's field observations and one's interpretation of
data, and thus one's I s conclusions ••• '
t.
and llinch \linch
'the sociologists liho who ''lho misinterpret alien cultures are like .philosophers
getting into difficulties over the use of their mm Olm concepts.' I
In the last l.'esort, l'esort, resort, the style of ,anthropology llritten uritten is governed by
lfhat .'rhat ,ihat 'meaning' t is relative to; is .the interpretation in philosophical terms?
scientific, literary or as through throu&h native meaning? ~1here, ~lhere, in fact, is our
supposed objectivity? Our ability, I argue, to balance these various modes
of meaning, is not only intuitively based; philosophical awareness a1tareness is also
desirable, if not essential.
Paul Heelas
References
1. Bell, The Idea of a Social Science, Aristotelian Society Soci.ety 1967.
2. Quoted in Pocock,. Social Anthropology, 1961
3. ' Benedict, Anthropology a.~d a.'"ld a.."ld the- Humanities, American .Anthropologist, AnthropoloGist, 1948.
4. Popper! Popper. POREet. CoIijectures CoAjgctures Cotijgctures ond and Refutations, 196;. 1963.
5. Heisenberg, The Representation of l\Tature Nature in Contemporan Contemporary Physics, Daedalus,
1958. See also Hume, quoted by 1iinch, 1-linch, ~iinch~ The Tb,e Idea of a Social Science,
1958 - 'all the sciences have a relation, ••• to human nature ••• ~ they
"rill "till will return back (to it).by one passage 0 or r another.'
f r
6. Harre, Illatter I·latter Hatter and l-iethod, I-lethod, r·1ethod, 1964.
Collingwood, The Idea of lJature, Nature, 1945.
7. Bryson, Man andSociety- and. Society. - The Scottish Inquiry of the 18th century, 1945.
- 8. Leach, In Hari IvIan Han and Culture, edit. Firth 1957. See also Sebag and Scholte
on the implicit philosophical premises of L~vi-Strauss·. Levi-Strauss. •.' ­
9. Honigsheim, The Philosophical Background of European Anthropology, Antb.ropolop;y, American
Anthropologist, 1942.
10. • 1r/inch", lUnch, \finch, Ope op. cit., 1;., t 1958.
; 11. I do not attempt to summarise s1.1l!llllarise sUl!llllarise the long debate ·as to't'111ether ,-thether .'rhether scientific
s~ientific
explanation is -~na:pplicable ina~plicable
inapplicable to the understanding of social sc;>cial phenomena.
Clammer C1ammer.(see below) poi~~s poi~ts
to certain of the issues. Other references
include IvIacIntyre, HacIntyre, Maclntyre, fA Histake ~listake about Causality', Philosophy. Philosophy, Politics
and Society, Vol. If· I, 1967 and a.nd The Idea of a Social SodAl Science, Aristotelian
Society, Societ.y, , 1967.
The second reference includes a good criticism cism of 0 f
1-linch's l/inch's I s thesis that since meaningful behaviour is only intelligible
in terms of nati_ve native ideas, the- student ~tudent must follOlrl follou folloW the tIle rules of their
criteria of judgment, not the rules of procedure of science.
12. l~. Gellner, Gellne~, Thought and Change, 1964.
13. Goldmann, The Human Sciences and Philosophy, 1969.·
14. .As is born out, for instance, in tIle the popular argument that, that. Durkheim' t s
s
classification of suicide exposes his conservatism.
!
I
I

- 9 ­-
15. See De''1ey Dewey De~'1ey as quoted by. Bryson, Ope cit.
c~t.
16. Lukes, 'Alienation tA~ienation and Anomie', , ,Philosophy, Politics and Society, Vol. 11,
II,
1967.
17. Ayer, Tran Iran Man as a Subject Sub.ject for Science, 1994. 1964.
18. Ayer, Problem of knolTledge. knmTledge. knouledge.
19. Hampshire, Thought and Action, 1965.
20. \le ITe Ue think, for instance, of the possible res~ts res1,1l results of applying Levy~Bruhlts
Levy-Bruhl's s
theory to Loclce' Locke's s classification of lenowledge. Imollledge. Imouledge.
21. Kurtz, On Culturlogism. Ct.1.1turlogism. In Language and Philosophy, edit. Hook 1969.
22. See, for instance, Pitkin and others, in Ho.ok, Hook, Ope cit.
23. See Encyclopaedia Britannica 'Theory of !(now-le'dge' Knowledge' Know'ledge' for the different
approaches of. the P"hilosopher P'hilosopher p"hilosopher and scientist to the stUdy study .of
belief.
24. Richards, , 'African System of T:Q.ought', Thought', flan i-1an 1967, shows ShOl'1S shmfs the extent to
tc
which for fcr many British Anthropologists this is no~ not in fact true; they
tend to 'sociologise' the~itive.
~tive. .
25. Haines, 'Philosophy as Social Philosophy', Philqsophy', Philosophy, 1967.
26. ilittgenstein, 'iJi Wittgenstein,Philosophical Investigations, 1968.
27. These similarities can be traced in much greater detail. See, for instance,
Pocock, Ope cit., p. 72 and Hartnack's Wittgenstein.
llittgenstein.
28. Or rather, should mean. Barrington's paper (see belorl) below) suggests, t for
example that L~vi~Strauss Ikvi L-evi ... is too muCh much a philosopher 'in intent but
teo little in practice.
29. Levi-Strauss, Scope of Social Sccial Anthropology, 1967.
30. Following Follcwing Lounsbury's meaning .of the term. See Hook, cp. Ope op. cit.
31. J. Hick edit. Faith and the Philosophers, 19'64. 1964. "rvIacl~tyre 'IwIacI~tyre 'r-IacI~tyre (2) p. 115.
32. Lonergan, Theology Theolcgy and Understanding, Gregorianium 1954 (see Barden
Darden
'The Symbclic Symbolic Mentality' ?hilcscphical ?hi1osophical ?hilosophicnl Studies, 1966J 1966) 1966}
Ti1lich, Tillich, in edit. Beattis, The Phenomenology of Religion.
'linch, ilinch, \Iinch, cp. Ope op • cit.
33. Gellner and r·~acIntyre r·lacIntyre r~aclntyre both apply this tc to anthropclogy. anthropology. See Gellnerts Gellner's
Concepts Ccncepts and SOCiety, Society, Scciety, 1962 and f:IacIntyre f.TacIntyre r·Iaclntyre cF. Ope cit t (2) ("There (uhere he
relates the issue to Leach's and Evans-Pritchard's differing
positions. pcsiticns.
34. lTadel, Nadel, Understanding Primitive Pecples, Peoples, Oceania, 1955-6.
35. Hampshire suggests that rationali~ rationality is the opposite of disconnectedness,
others have argued that objectivity, in the sense that w'e '

- 10 ­
-
38. Nielson, Wittgensteinian Uittgensteinian \'Iittgensteinian Fideism, Philosophy, 1967.
39. Bambrough, Bacbrough, Baobrough, 'Universals and Family Resemblances' in ~littgenstein, ~Iittgenstein, j[ittgenstein, edit.
Pitcher 1968.
Bacbrough Bar:! Daobrough also mentions oentions the infinite regress
argument vrhich which i'Thich can be applied against t a 101"lest lowest lot-rest common denominator
.~
approach· at a descriptive/inductive level., level.. Thus, given 1:Ialino't'JStD!s
Halino1'2ti;i!s
lIalinovS:ii!s
definition of the sacred in terms of religion and oagic, magic, 1'1e I'le \'Te can
continue to ask -
and ho'" hot-r hOli can these terms terns be, tllen then definitely defined'? defined3
.md ...:\nd .4.nd so on.
40. vIe lIe argued that there is 'a fa pragmatic connection betvleen bet't-leen bebreen phenomena of
experience, their mental representations and their .linguistic classification'.
See Lounsbury in Hoole, Hook, Ope cit.
41. lIax l:iax Max Black in Hook Hoo~ Ope op. cit.
t •
42. Vygotsk;y, Thought and Language.
Bruner in lJ1achamer MachDJller r-iachomer Recent ,,,ork l'1ork ,{ork on Perception, American. Philosophical
Quarterly,. 1970.
Piaget in Richmond An Introduction· to Piaget, Piaget~ 1970.
Hubel and 11iesel Tohesel ~fiesel - see The Listener, 19th Feb. 1970 - hOi'1 how hOvl theories of
perception and Chomsky's innate schema. are being brought to bear
on each other. Together r 1dth 1'1i ~'lith
Brunelfs BruneI's Brunel's recent 1l0rk, llork, \lork, these tlleories theories
afford an empirical test tes·t for the degree of validity "lhich which uhich the
Sapir-11horf Sapir-1lhorf Sapir-llhorf hypothesis processes.
43. I\feedham, Needham, edham , fPe.rcussion 'Percussion and Transition', f ~ Nan V'ol. Vol. 2, 1967.
44. Hoijer edit. Language in Culture, Culture., 1954. 1954~ See especially Fearing's
paper.
45.
Needham, e dham. , Terminology and Alliance, Sociologies, .1966.
4Ei. 4~ 46. ,e.. :. ,~homsl~ Chomsky, t :l,a.."1guage .1J8..L"'1guage I,a..."'1guage and Hind, IUnd, r~Iind, 1968 (11h~re (uhere 11e he imp1ief? implies that' he·'is 1-1e11· ~lell \·rell a,"are at-rare aw'are
(, (le lJ:- < "::11:e "'::b,e -+';~e problems this field presents; difficulties ."hich lih'ich tfhich have remained
rem.ained
r c t:'.solved.'s:lnce .. _solved since .they :Vlere ~-jere
~-rere
last fully .discus discussed sed in. mediaeval days).
47. Nietzscl~, Hietzsche, Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, 1956.
48.
Popper, Ope cit. For example, the trial and error basis of science is a
universal procedure.

Turner is not entirely accurate in making the above statement hmrever. hmlever. hmtever.
1·lost 1·1ost nost Africanists base their distinction bet~leen betueen the tl'TO tl'10 on the one :nade made by Evans­
, I
Pritchard for the Azande, despite the fact that many systems of belief do not
easily fall into the polar opposites oppositea Characteristic characteristic cha:racterist~c of the "Azande .system.
Evans-Pritchard states:
.. -11-
­
AFRICAN ilITCHCRAFT UITCHCRAFT \"lITCHCRAFT BELIZFS: BELII:FS: BELIEFS:
1
TEE THE DEFIIUTIONAL DEFllUTIONAL DEFINITIONAL PROBLEl!I PROBLEl'I PROBLEH l
In any comparative study stu~ the initial problem to be faced by the analyst
is that of defining tile tlle phenomena he has selected for examination.
This is
rarely an easy task. lJhether I1hether Whetl1er one focusses on totemism totez:ri.sm (Goldenweiser (Golden1treiser (Goldemreiser 1910;
Levi-Strauss 1964), marriage (Leacll (Leach 1961), incest (Fox 1967), ma;erilineal ma:erilineal descent
(Richards 1990),' ancestor cults (Kopytoff 1968), 1968). t or age sets (Eisenstadt 1956),
usually one of the first things to be found by tlle tile analyst is the fact that t11at a
single term te~ has been used to cover a number of often .ridely llidely widely varying, although
related phenomena.
'I1hen llhen this .happens one may 't-lell I·rell ~lell be tempted to invent a number
of nevI nevT ne~1
terms to cover all 'the possible p'ossible refractiol1s refractions and ma.nifestations manifestations cif of the
phenomena· being studied, but as Leach has so \iell w'ell well demonstrated, this can only
lead to the excessive-development of terminological classifications, an effort
that he has so aptly termed 'Butterfly collecting' (1961:2).
He strongly
suggests that 'tie we ~ie
must seek other met110ds methods of organizing and defining our phenomena.
Needham has indicated an awareness of this problem as 1'lell, Hell, uell, and has pointed
out that:
•••social anthropology is in a state of conceptual confusion
confl~ion
expressed in proliferating technical taxonomies taxonornies and definitional
exercises, each nel'T ne~T ne"T field study offering enough t features
to lead to yet more typological typolOgical and methodological pronouncements.
(1963: xli).
It "1ould would ~1ould
probably be a fair statement statecent to say that the tackling of definitional
problems is one of the most basic tasks to be faced in our discipline
toclay. today.
Real advances in our understanding of social phenomena can onl~T onl:,' onl~r' be made
thr01."!.c;h throuch thr01.lc;h intensive comparative analysis aimed at establishing 110rkable ,rorkable workable definitions
as ,iell Hell as the essential features arid and range of. variability of the particular
phel".or.J.ena phe~ooena phel".of.1ena being examined.
The stwly s·h~.rly
s·h~.'ly
of .ri 'toritchcraft ui tchcraft belief~ beliefs is one particular example of a field of
stud;:r stud.~r
stud~f th:::t t~-:,::.-!;
tb.:~t 1,.:' L..:"' . :';11ffered :-:uffered ?;11ffered from a lack lacl{ of adequate definition. Although ue do not
find fil'!.d. i:: i2: L-~ ',:' ".J,'l ',;"t~:; " . ~~;!".~rature _>,rature _,;,;rature on 11i l1itchcraft ~iitchcraft beliefs that they are divided into 0 'Hain t1 'Nain lain
i
ty}?oO\ ty;;n tY})o .• •• It·J , o 3uJ··~~r·cJe 3U~i··¥,t:;~pe••• 3u~;,-::;:;·pe Sub-sub-type', (Leach 1961: 3) the ,my I'Tay Tvlay sooe some SOlJe social phenomena
ha,YG"bAen}· haYG h.~vG ;y,"::m, bAcm} there is, nevertheless, a certain cmount of conceptual confusion about
't"lb.o:t i'Tho.t uhnt ~;.,.tt";hc~~-s.ft
~;_.-t,;nc"'::£t
.':;: ,;h(''' 2i't really is, and the grounds upon 'TtThich vThich it may usefully be guished frum f:cuLl L:0@ sorcery.
distingt,ished
sorce~.
Turner (1964:322), in a review revie~1 reviel'!' of i'litchcraft Witchcraft iiitchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa
(},Iiddleton (Hiddleton (Niddleton and 1iinter ~linter 1963), refers to the rterminological tterminological 1-TOod ~10od l-TOod (or jungle)' jungle') I '
one encounters in reading profes~ional professional accounts of 't'ritchcraft" uitchcraft beliefs. After
surveying the literature lite~atu~ on ui witchcraft beliefs in' a number of Af'rican African societies,
he concludes, 'It 110uld uould seem, therefore, from the various usages 1ihich 't'lhich l"1hich I have
discussed that there is little general agreement on the criteria \'1hich l"1hich distinguish
sorcery from vIitchcraft. vdtchcraft.' ' (1964:322). • _ - "'
. ,Azande AZa.l1de believe that some SODe people are witches uitches and can injure ~nJure tllem
them
in virtue of an inherent quality. A llitch uitch performs no rite, utters
no spell, and possesses no medicines.
An act of "Ti vIi witchcraft is a psychic
act. They believe also that sorcerers may do tllem them ill by performing
magic rites ,nth l"1ith ~nth bad medicines. Azande distinguish clearly betlieen· betl'leen
be~'Teen
witches uitches nitches and sorcerers. (1937:21). . .'
Although Altliough Evans-Pritchard EVrulS-Pri tchard. does -not indicate indic.ate in the Azande tTork nork uork that the
1"1i witch-sorcerer distinction has any ~rider wider \1ider application beyond Azande society, socie~, the
I
distinction has, has. been rudely "ddely vTidely adopted by Africanists. Ex~t1ples EX~t1ples
Ex~mples of its use can
I I
I

- 12 -~,'
be found in the "ork work ~lork of Scha.pera Schapera (1934a:293-4, 1934b:43); Hunter (1936:275);
1Iilson ililson (1951:307-8); Gluckman (1955:87); I'iitcheil Iviitcheil N:itcheil (1956: 1'53); 153); Bea:ttie Bea~tie Beaj;tie (1963:
29-30); Douglas (1963:220); Har'liick Marwick Mar\'/'ick (1963a: 7.-8, 7-8, 1963b:264, 1965a:69, 1965b:2l-5
1965b:21-5~
1967: 232); l~liddleton r,liddleton and 1'linter Uinter (1963: 2); Reynolds (1963:14) and Hair I~Iair (1969:21-3).
(1969:21-3~.
Careful research and analysis analys~s ..,ill will uill ShOH show shoH that in many r:lany cases the use of
Evans-Pritchard's. Evans-Pritchard'~.distinction distinction has, ho\,/,ever, how'ever, hOl'1eVer, been highly inappropriate. Although
many ~lriters vlriters vTriters do appear to appreciate the fact that their material' r:laterial ~ay may not easily
.'. , fit into the Azande frame'liork frame\'I'ork frameliork (see for example Schapera 1934a:294, and IJIarvTic~
Harvdck
1963a: 7-8), they nevertheless feel they must adopt the terminology, and ,if a
uitch in tlleir their society uses medicines, they tend to 'fall into in~o line' as Douglas
(1967:72) has put it, and the 'Intchbecomes \'I'i witch ,becomes te.rmed t~~ed tarmed a 'sorcerer'. Exam:ples Exam~les of
this usage of terms can be found in studies of the Cewa (Iilanlick (HanTick (Hanlick 1965a), and
Yao (Mitchell 1956) as 'Iiell \'/'ell well as Douglas's s o'l'm o~m ethnography of the Lele (1963).
, Douglas states, that 'Evans-Pritchard••• vigorously disavowed the intention
of foisting a terminological straight-jacket on future generations.' (1967:72)
This has, ho't'lever, houever, hOvTever, been the effect eff.ect of his diatinction. dis.tinction. Use of the .Azande model
has imposed a straight-jacket of thought which has 'blinded people for many years
and k~pt
kept them from seeing "That what uhat the essential characteristics of ",i ,d witchcraft
beliefs are.
Implicit in this criticism of the use lihich which has been made of Evans-Pritchard's
distinction, is the conviction that it is the image, of the lntch 'Intch \n that is important
for definitional purposes, not the use or non-use of medicines, or
unconscious use of evil pO"Ter. po't'ler. povler. 1ilhen Hhen wlhen we ask ourselves 't'lhat uhat VThat it is that many of
the African systems of b'e1ief belief have in common, 't"Ie ne ue find the ''Iitch 'Iii \dtch image occurring
in a large number of. cases - combined cOl:lbined 'VTith vTith uith the use of medicines as 'fell well as the
possession of innate mystical ability to cause l1arm. harm.
Audrey Richards, , in a revie,\f revie\'1 review of ilitchcraft Uitchcraft Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa, Africa.
has commented on the fact that 'The similarity of the "dtoo in vd tch image in all these
societies is striking.' (1964:188)
She points out tl1at: that:
im~
tllat:
Essay after essay describes illlaginary i1Ilaginary i:maginary figures, usually vTi uith
~Ti hereditary attributes, thought to be able to fly by night, to produce
a glorT glovT glO'Vl in the sky, to eat corpses or the th·e entrails ,?f of human beings, to
be accom.panied acconl.::panied accom~nnied
by familiars and to act contrary to all moral rules.
The similarity of these images is not of course limited to East
Africa. (1964:188).
t
I.
It is somewhat remarkable to note however, hOliever, hOl'Tever, that in all the African
literature" on s"ocieties s'ocieties s·ocieties 'tfith ,'/'ith liith vTitchcraft vlitchcraft vd t and so'rcery sorcery beliefs· beliefs' beliefs" (of 'l'lhich ~lhich uhich there are
at least l~ast sixty':'five sixty':'£ive sixty~£ive available accounts), acc.ounts), not one 'I'Triter ifri ,·r.riter has ever thought to
focus on this image as the defining character~stic characteristic o,f of ,·Titchcraft.
'I,d l·Titchcraft. Unfortunately,
it does not appear to.have .been ,been as clearly evident as 'it might have been that
the features' featut'esassociated assocl.ated associated 'tiith 'In th this image ~age themselves themselv~s form a cp.tegory c~tegory cfl,tegory of symbolic symbolib symboli"c
phenomena worthy of investigation.- ", ' Once the pattern had been set by Evans- Evans­
P Pritchard, , it i'/'as was all too easy for others oth'ers oth"ers to follo,'r follow follm'T what "rhilt rih.at had. become established
categories of classification, despite the all too obvious fact that ~4e
~he
categories
were i'/'ere \Vere often inappropriate.
"
'
It is' not possible to define witchcraft uitchcraft until it is recognized that the
definitional problem prob19l:l is a problem in symbolic classification. llitchcraft Witchcraft IIitchcraft
beliefs form a special category of classification claSSification to 'l'lhich which uhich a great many varying
elements or components may be assigned. The solution to the definitional
problem is implicit in the literature; the problem has not been soIved solved because
no one has ever thought to ask the right Cluestions. questions.
question~.
The main question Cluestion .. ile ue must
ask ourselves is "Thy vThy does the image of the 1'1itch vTi I'Ti take the form it does from
society to society throue;hout throughout t~oughout Africa and indeed throughout the 'Iiorld. i'/'orld. world.
FollO'ldng Follolfing FollOidng that, vIe ue must a~lc a~k
ourselves vrhy vThy does this image imag~ occur so univ~rsally.
universally.
"~I
The solution to the first question 'I'ras lTas uas found by John }'Iidd1eton Hiddleton and its
earliest statement can be fou,nd found in tvlO tvro hro articles, 'Some Social Aspects of
Lugbara Itlyth' I'Iyth' I\'Iyth' (1954), and 'The Concept of Bel1itching Beui Be'tfitching in Lugbara'. (1955), (195'5). (1955).

- 13 ­
-
In analyzing Lugba±a mythology, :Mid.dleton l-liddleton ~Ud.dleton
found that t 'one of the general
characteristics of Lugbara myth is the inverted character of its actors.
and events'. (1963:195). 195) • . .
The theme of inversion is found not only in mythology, but in 1Ii witchcraft uitchcraft
beliefs as l'1ell. ''1ell. vTell.
To tIle the Lugbara the normal is 'good' and the abnormal is 'bad',
and this dichotomy is related to the distinction they make bebreen betvteen bet'l-leen ;That vlhat uhat is
social. and .. l-That what is anti-social. The difference bebTeen between betlleen the tHO two tuo is expressed
in terms of inversion. The iI:lage image wage of the Lugbara"t'1itch Lugbara\'ritch i'litch is that of a being
characterized by inverted attributes.
A 'i'l'itch witch Id has the characteristics of an abnormal person.
His face is grey and dratffi, dralm, 1 'like' 'like· .a a co·rpse', corpse', he may have red
eyes or a squint, he may vomit blood, he 1'1alks i1Ulks walks at night, and is
associated' ,nth ldth I'Tith night·creatures. (1955:258).· .
A .. witch l'litch ritch is also associated l1itll I-Tith uith incest, cannibalism and filthy behaviour
(Ihddleton (Middleton (Hiddleton 19601248), 1960?248), and 'may be visible as a light on tile the top of a hut, or as
a light moving rapidly across fields.' (1955:255).
1'lhat "That ~'lhat
is most inverted about. 1·d vIi \'Ti tcl}es t~es tcl!es hOl'l'ever, hm'1ever, hOt'1ever, is the fact f~ct that tbat they have
perverted noroal normal norcal kinship and authority·relations. relations. Middleton states;
states:
••• a lritch l1itch uitch is the embodiment of those' attributes that are in
direct contrast to those ideally pqssessed by b~r
elders or senior
kin. Senior kinsmen••• should be 'sl01'1", 'slo,,', ISI01'1', understanding, gentle,
generous, angry only uhen t!hen the interests inte~ests of their family fmnilyclusters 'clusters
are concerned and not on account of their Olm OlIn O1-m personal pride. A
1U ldtch witc~ behaves in a diametrically opposite manner. (1960:244-4)
From the above we can see' that l1i uitchcraft ~litchcraft for the Lugbara is a conceptual
category, J
one tbD. thatis tis t bound up liitll tiith l'lith the anti-social. It tends tIlerefore therefore to
find expression in inverted'symbols .symbols that are opposed to 1'111at vrhat \-lhat the society values
and considers nomal. normal.
Knowing this provides an element of predictability. "
11e Ue 110uld uould expect that other elements associated 1'1ith uith 't'litchcraft l'U I·d tchcraft by the Lugbara
"Tould l'Tould ~1ould besomew'hat 'someli'hat SOmel'1hat abnormal or unusual. The following follouing follolling confirms this suspicion,
Certain animals are associated li'ith "Tith '-Ti 1utches; uitches; IU they are both
omens of ldtchcraft t'l'itchcraft uitchcraft and may be vellicles vehicles for witches, and they
are als"O als-o als~ used as ingredients in sorcery-poisons. They include the
jackal, the leopard-cat, tIle the bat, the screech s'creech monkey, snakes, the
ol'll 0111 01'11 and several other 0 birds, the 1'1ater lfater l'1ater tortOise, tortoise, if it i t leaves its·
riverine home and comes to the compounds, and. certain frogs and
. toads. All these creatures are 'like i1itches l-Titches ~1itches I 1 t
and are much feared.
If a man sees them at night, and especially in a dream, he is seeing a
,utch l1itch ldtch or the tbe soul of a ,utch. 'tiitch. ldtch. All are night. creatures or, lik!e like' the
water-tortoise, out of their normal habitat. Indeed any allY al~ anima.l animal away
from its usual home may be suspected of being something to do .. with
11th
;'litchcraft. Id witchcraft. (Middleton (}I1ddleton (~liddleton 1960:241).
•
All of the above is somelmat some'illhat somelllhat reminiscent of·'Chapter Three of Purity and
Danger, 'The Abominations of Leviticus' (Douglas 1966:41-57). Douglas is
able to demonstrate that Hebrew dietary dieta~ laws lal'ls stem from a system of sYmbolic symbolic
classification. Traditionally Jewish Jevlish Jeuish people have considered certain animals
to be either 'clean', 'clean!, and therefore edible, or 'unclean' and therefore unfit
for human consumption.
The usual rational has been that certain animals such
as pigs, lobsters and other shellfish. 'tere uere scavengers, and therefore tunclean'. 'unclean'.
By looking at the relevant selections from Leviticus and Deuteronomy in
a ne,'1 nel'1 1-ray, "lTaY, lray, houever, Douglas was able to offer a completely nevr new' and highly
satisfactory interpretation, one that is expressed in terms of symbolic
classification. classification~
She finds that 'Any class of creatures l1hich uhich is not equipped
for the right 'kind of locomotion in its element is contrary to holiness.'
(1966:55) Therefore anything in the llater \later uater that does not have fins or scales
is unclean, or four-footed creatures capable of flying are unclean. unclean;and uncl:ean~and and so on.

- 14 ­-
The above example demonstra.tes demonstrates that analysis of ethnographically puzzling
practices "'in terms of symbolic classification can sometimes be extremely extrenely
illuminating, or as Needham might put it, be successful in terins terms of 'rendering
many aspects of social life intelligible.' (1963:xliii) Needham has demonstrated
in severE:1l sever~l papers that tIns this tl1is can be an effective analytical teclUlique
teclmique
~articularly
particularly in 'The Left Ho..Tld Hand Hu.TJ.d of the T-Iugt'1e' Hugt'l'e' H1lg'\1e' (1960), and 'Shiva's tShiva's Earings'
(1966). \1966).•
.
Use of the concept of symbolic classification can' also be an effecti~
. technique for one attempting to understand and define· llitchcraft uitchcraft belie:tTs. beliefs. belie:fi's.
If VTe 1tie ~re
adopt the symbolic approach in attempt:ing i.ng to define 't"litchcraft, I'ritchcraft, Nitchcraft, ;le He v'le find
that the category ~ can be expressed as the follolling: follouing: following:
A llitch uitch is an individual thought capable of harming others
super-naturally through the use of innate mystical po"rer, power, pOl-1er, medicines
mediCines
or familiars, and ;rho uho who is associated with ~li inverted characteristics that
area a reversal of social and physical noms. norms. nor.ms.
Adoption of such a definition immediately rids us.of one difficulty, that
of attempting to clas·aify. classify the inverted. being uho 't'1ho consciously makes use of
medicines. As ~'1ell, l'I'ell, ~1ell, it explains the image of the 1"itch, w'itch, ~1itch, an image w'hich uhich consists
of characteristics the.t that are inverted, reversals of the harm, horm, or simply
things that are defined by a particular society as bad, harmful, unusual or
abnormal. lIi llitchcraft t beliefs form a category of classification in which vThich vlhich a
great many varying elements or components may be found.
Turne.r Turner has sholm shmm shmffi an
appreciation of this point. He states:
. Many.African societies recognize the ,same range of components:
'innate', 'acquired'; tacquired'* 'acquired'~ ilearnt', 'learnt', 'inherited' t i skills to harm and
kill; pOlfer pOvler p01ier to. kill immediately and. pOl-rer pOi'Ter pOl-ler created by medicines·; medicines; the
use of familiars, visible and invisible;.the magical introjection of
objects into enemies; nocturnal and diurnal hostile magic; invocation of
ghosts by a curse; and. so on.
But as between bet1'leen societies, SOCieties, and often in
different situati6ns in a Single single society, SOCiety, these components are varyingly
clustered and separated.., separated~ (1964:324)
.
He suggests that 'Clues to their clusterings and. segregations mB¥ may be found
if societies are an3.1~rzed an:lljrzed a~:ll~rzed in terms of process-theory'. (1964:324) 1!hat Uhat l.lhat he
fails to realize h011ever, hOliever, hOl'l'ever, is that these components are always found combined
in a particular pattern, and that it is more useful to analyse their symbolic
elements than it is to look at them in terms of process-theory. If i're ."le l-Te
concentrate
on the symbolic appro·ach approach it is impossible to find a ,'lorkable l'1orlmble i'1orkable definition
for the term te~ I 'witchcraft', 'Witchcraft', I, and find our l"my way 'tTay out of the 'terminological I .. wood I'TOod lood (or
jungle' Turner has. indicated.
t
vlhile Uhile it. ~t. may be said that vIe vTe are determining uhat 'V1itchcraft vTitchcraft ~litchcraft
is 'by
definition'., I .,. _. the point is that 1'1'e '\'1e we ca.n can find a large number r of examples ~f the
phenomena so defined throughout the 't'lorld. 'forld. uorld. These phenomena form an interesting
category of associated elements element~ that I're lTe may study quite usefully and profitably.
The definition of witchcraft beliefs that has been offered is applicable to a
wide number of cases both vTithin within and outside of Africa and it can certainly
be applied to European 'tn.t ui tchcraft beliefs as 11el1. \lell. uell.
If the tIle form of ili uitchcraft t beliefs is deterx:ri.nedby determined .by the fact that' tOOy they are
a reversal of social and physical norms, it is only to be expected that certain
features of this form liill 'iill l'1'ill vary from society to society. Tllere There is one constant
hO't'Iever: hOl'Tever: houever: the uitch i·d. is aluays allTays thought to do ,{hat ''lha lihat t is most abhorred by other
.
members of too the society.. The witch is the ultimate anti-social being, a fact
llhich IIhich uhich is symbolized by the inverted attributes attributers making up the image of tIle the uitch.
This latter point provides the anal-Ter ansl-Ter answer to our second question, 'v!hy '~1hy
'~lhy does the
image of the "Titch .,Titch witch occur so universally?'
In concluding, it should be mentioned that one of the too reasons many lrriters 't'Triters lTriters
have l1ave given for separating uitchcraft from sorcery on the basis of use or nonuse
of medicine (for exaople example exaIlple 1iilson 11ilson Ililson 1951:308, and lIair lIuir Hair 1969:23), is the fact

- 15 -­
that sorcery is something 11hich which ,'rhich can actually be practiced ~Thereas whereas l-Thereas lvitchcraft witchcraft
(at least as it has usually been defined), cannot. Mair feeis feels that the fact
that:
••• the sorcerer uses material objects and the vli vIi ~ri tch does not•••
is by no means insignificant, since it is possible to' find evidence
of sorcery, and indeed many objects used for' that purpose have been
found when people are accused... •••
But there can never be evidence of
1"1itchcraft, ,d lvi and so accusations of 't"Ti rri ui tchcraft tchcruft can only be pursued
by means as mystical as. the t~e supposed offence. (1969:23)
Wilson I'lilson Ililson stresses the~ distinction as well and says ~t: it:
••• is an important importa:q.t one; for sorcery, as I have defined it, is
practiced, that is people use medicines (WhiCh (which (whiCh are sometimes poisons)
.'rith with ~ri the object of harming others, .thile while ~Thile fe,', few felv anthropologists ;iould would ,'Tould
admit the reality of ,Titchcraft uitchcraft -
the exercise of an innate power
to harm others directly. (1951:308).
'
1:lhile Hhile \1hile it 'is true that tllat the distinction may have some importance legally,
as ::leynolds aeynolds Reynolds (1963:14) 14) for example, example; has shOrTn, shorln, shmln, this is an -importance that may
ultimately be significant only to Europeans - and ll21 ~ not to the people concerned.
It does not really essentially matter that one may be practiced and the tlw otlwr
otl~r
not, ,\'That 'tihat l1hat does matter is that ~ both are thought to exist and be practiced. 11e' '.le ~re
have no right to presume that just because something may matter to us legally,
that it has any relevance whatsoever for the members of an African tribe.
~lis Tnis ~nis is, in effect, imposing impOSing our own categories of classification upon those
of the people lie we are studying, a far cry from the cultural cultUral relativity and unprejudiced
accuracy of repo~ing reporting and interpretation interpretat~o~.whichis vThich vthich is supposed. to be
the hallmark of anthropological research. "le itle We must lceep keep i'llw.t 't"ll111t t'11illt matters to us legally,
separate from those things whiCh which matter to the people themselves.
It is only
by looking at the latter that we 1;1111 ,fill l'1'i11 be aided in the task of understanding how
. they do in fact order their universe and conceptual categories. Once l'1e ,'le have
done this tIl.is it becomes clear what a witch and witchcraft witChcraft are.
Roma Standefer
References
1. I wish to express my gratitude to the Canada Council for the support it
has given to my doctoral programme. Miss Anne lu.eeroyd Akeroyd and Mr. T. S. s.
Murty read drafts of tllis this manuscript, and I lam 'am grateful grate'ful to them t11em for
their t11eir helpful suggestions. I am also grateful to liIr. £lIre £IIr. and Mrs. E. i,i. i:f.
Ardener and Miss Akeroyd for l1elpiJig helping me to refine ~Y mY definition of
witchcraft.
.
Bibliography
Beattie, Jolm, Jop, JoPn, 1963, Sorcery in Bun-,oro Bun-;yoro BunJlOro in\'litchcraft \'1itchcraft Uitchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa,
ed. J. ~Iiddleton I>1iddleton and E. H•. H. W'i.llter, Winter, pp. 27-55.
Routledge and !{egan Kegan Paul,
London.
Douglas, Mary, 1963, The Lele of the Kasai, Oxford University Press, London.
__----, ______ , 1966, Purity and Danger, Routledge and Kagan Kegan Paul, London.
______,, 1967, vTitch vlitch Beliefs in Central Africa, Africa 37:72-80.
Eisenstadt, s. S. N., 1956, From Generation to Generation, The Free Press,
Glencoe, Illinois.
Evans-Pritchard, :G. E. E., 1937, i'litchcraft. vlitchcraft, vfitchcraft. Oracles and Magic Among the Azande,
Oxford University Press, London.

- 16 ­-
Fox, FOx, Robin, 1967, Kinship and 11arriage, Harriage, r1arriage, Pelican Anthropology Library, Penguin
Books, Baltimore.
Gluckman, Hax, Max, 1955, Custom and Conflict in Africa, Basil Blac~vell, BlacIDiell, Blackt'1ell, Oxford.
Goldenweiser, A. A., 1910, Totemism, an 1U1alytical Al1alytical Analytical study, Study, Journal of American
Folklore, 23: 179-293.
". .,
Hunter, M., H., 1936, fteaction Feaction Jteaction to Conquest, Oxford University Uniyersity Press, London.
Kopytoff, Igor, 1968, A£ri~an African "Ancestor Cults" llithout ,Ancestors?, Bulletins
of the American Anthropological Association, September 1968, Abstracts,
67th .Annual Meeting. Heeting.
Leach, E. R., 1961, Rethinking Anthropologv, Anthropology, University" of London, The Athlone
Ath10ne
Press, London.
Levi-3trauss, Levi-5trauss, Levi-Strauss, C., 1964, Totemism, Translated by Rodney Needham, Ueedham, I:Ierlin Herlin Press,
London.
l-'Iair, I>Iair, ~iair, Lucy, 1969, 1'litchcraft·, 1'litchcraft, 1litchcraft, l,Iorld ~'lorld
University Libra.ry, Library, IlcGrall r.'IcGrau HcGrau Hill Book Co.,
Nevl New Neli York. Yorlt.
lla.r"Ticl:, tlar't'lick, Ha.r~licl:, Ir. li.G., II.· 1963a, The Sociology of Sorcery in a Central African Tribe,
African Studies 22:1-21.
___ -=--:-__ , 1963b, Ilitchcraft as a Social Strain-Gauge, Australian Jourmi.l of
__---:~-_,, 1963b, llitchcraft ITitchcraft as a Social Strain-Gauge, Strain-Gauee, i~ustralian Australia.n Journal of
---S-c-i-e-n-c-e, Science· Science' 26:263-8.
:··263-8.
_______ ______, , 1965a, Sorcery in its Social Setting, Hanchester IIanchester IIancbester University Press,
l1anchester.
I-1anchester.
______, ~=-_=-' --:=-_:::--' 1965b 'Jitchcraft ilitchcraft Uitchcraft and a.nd SorcerJ, SorceI"J, SorceI"'J, in African Systems of Thought, Thou{:Jlt, pp.21­ pp.21_ pp.21-
27. Preface by M. Fortes and G. Dieterlen, Oxford Universi~ University Press, London.
____--...~,, 1967. The Stud.y Stud.Y of 1/itchcraft Ifitchcraft IIitchcraft in The Craft of Social Anthropology,
------~p~p~.~2~3~1-244, -----:p::"::p::-.~21"::!3:'rI-244,
pp. 231-244, &d. 00. A. L. Epstein, Bpstein, Tavistock PUbhcahons, Publ~cations, PUbl~cat~ons, London.
1-1ayer, 1·1ayer, IJIayer, P. 1954, llitches, l-Titches, Inaugural Lecture delivered at Rhodes University, Graham·­
Grahamtown.
IUddleton, Middleton, rUddleton, J., 1954, Some Social Aspects of o~ Lugbara Myth, Hyth, I1yth, Africa 24: 189-99.
______, _______ , 1955, The Concept of "Bewitching" "BeWitching" in Lugbara., Lugbara, Africa 25:252-60.
____________, , 1960, Lugbara Religion; Oxford University Press, London.
______, -,-__ ...,...~_,, 1963, 1963~ and 8. E. H. 1tlinter llinter (eds.) 11itchcraft 1Jitchcraft 1,1itchcraft and Sorcery in East
Africa, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
~litcllell, Nitchell, Clyde, 1956, The Yao rao Village, !~Ianchester Nanchester Manchester University Press, lTanchester.
IJanchester.
Needham, Rodney, 1960, The Left Hand. of the ~Iug11e, I>Iugue, Nugue, Africa 30:20-33.
_________, ......._.,..-____ ..,--____-,, 1963, Introducti.on Introduct:i,on Introduct.~on to: Primitive Classification by E Durkheim
and 11. H. IvI. !1auss, rIauss, Hauos, pp. vii-xlviii, vii....:xlviii, Cohen COJ:1en and TJest, \Test, Uest, London.
_______,, 1966, Shiva's Earings, Lecture delivered at Institute of Social
----~-~
Anthropology, 0?C!0rd. O;ford. 0?d'0rd.
Reynolds, Barrie, 1963, Ig63, ·r-1agic, '11agic, 'r-iagic, Diviniation Divinia.tion and 1:1itchcraft i:litchcraft T:litchcraft Among the Barotse of
Northern northern Rhodesia, Chatto and llindus, Windus, London. .
'
l{ichards, Richards, Hichards, A. 1., I., 1950, SOI:le Some Types of Family structure Structure Amongst the Central Bantu,
in African Systems of lCinsh:i,p lCinsh~p Kinsh:i,p and I-'Iarriage, ~larriage,pp~ I>iarriage, pp. 207-251, eds. A. R.
Radcliffe-BrolTn Radcliffe-Broun Radcliffe-Brol1n and D. Forde, Oxford University Press, London.

.. - 17 ... ....
Richards, .A. I., 1964, Review of }litChcraft Uitchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa, f
eds.
J J. .• Midd1eton Middleton and E. H. Winter, Ilinter, ~finter, ~ 64: 187-188.
Schapera, I., 1934a, Oral Sorcery Among the 1.'Tatives Natives of Bechuanaland in Essays
presented to C. G. Seligman, pp~ pp. 293-305 eds. ads. E. E. E~ Evans-Pritc11a.rd Evans-Pritchard et ale al. a.l.
Kagan Kegan Paul,Trench, ·Trench, Trubner and Co. London.
•.
___ ~~_, , 1934b, Sorcery and 11itchcraft \Jitchcraft in Bechuanaland, Bechuana1and, African Affairs:
......-----~-
51:41-52.
51:41-52.
Tumer, Turner,V•. V. ~j~, il~, if~,
1964, 1964. i1itchcraft i-Titchcraft ~-ritchcra.ft and Sorcery, Taxonomy vs. Dynamics, Africa
34:314-324.
v/ilson; vTilson; 'trlilson; r.lonica, rvlonica, 1951, lritch vlitch viitch Beliefs and. Social Structure, structure, .American Journal of
Sociology, 56:307-13.

- 18 ..
-
TEE THE !u'I\IALYTICAL fJ1ALYTICAL f~A1YTICA1
AND PEENOMENOLOGICAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE SOCI.AL SOCIAL
Methodologically speaking one might distinguish tvTO tvro two broad traditions of
philosophising about.the the content and procedures of tIle the social sciences. On tIle the
one hand there is the 'analytical' • tanalytical' , tradition tllat that has descended' from logical
positivism via, in particular, ivittgenstein, Wittgenstein, ~vittgenstein, contemporary :R.hilosophers Rhilosophers SUCll such as
llinch l1inch Vlincll and 1-iclntyre, McIntyre, and uhich vl11ich is characterized by its concentration on language.
On the tIle other 11and hand there is the tradition 'of what 1s is commonly commollly called on. the
European continent 'philosophical anthropology' 1'lhich 'l'lhich \"Thich has descend.ed, desc91lded, descended, particularly
from Kant, Kallt, Krult, to become absorbed in the movement of phenomenological plwnomenological philosophy,
the influence of which is steadily increasillg increasing as it expands beyond its European
sources, and as it finds its T;ray tray 1~lay
from the original descriptive analysis anal¥sis of the
immediate data of consciousness (conceived of in a purely mental sense) to the
analysis of 1-rider ldder w'ider fields, such as aesthetics and the social sciences. In the
. contemporary philosophical climate in this country, particularly, these h'o t'tiO t1VO
approaches are seen as not merely contrasting philosophical methods, but as
mutua.lly mutually exclusive. Tllis This attitude reaclles reaciles reaches to tIle the extent that t11at eacll each school dellies denies
or at least questions, f
tha.t that the otller other is indeed a 'philosophy'. 11y r:Iy r:ly thesis in
this paper will be to argue that, on" the contrary, and at least in tIle the social
sciences these two methods have not only o~ arrived at essentially the same conclUsion
vis-a-vis the 'scientific' status of social sciences, but also that the
recommendation recowuendation recownendation that they imply for the practical methodoloroT methodology of the social
sciences come to exactly tIle the same thing. To illustrate this I l"ri11 uill t"ill take a sentative of each 'school' I and examine tl~
the reasons they offer for the conclusions
they reaell. reach. For the Analytical SCl100l School I \'1i1l Ifill l'1i11 take Peter lJinch lUnch ~"lincIl as my example,
and for Phenomenology Alfred Schutz, although I will refer to others of each
persuasion 1fhere l'1here itlhere tlley they illuminate a point.
repre­
The Phenomenology School
It is ltiOrtl1 wortll l,Thereby vrhereby the
subject endous endow's endolTs JGhe the 't'lorld 'l'10rld vlorld vr.i. ;-d vd th specific senses and meanings.
Essentially descriptive, its method is confined to the
description and classification of the various sense-g1ving
sense-giving
structures of consciousness or types of project (perceptual,·
cognitive, emotional, etc.) as these are displayed'tdthin lri tuthin thin the
self-body-world uni~l
.
There are a nt1Dlber ntunber nt1D1ber of important theses l1ere, here, notably (a) tl1at that the method is
descriptive, descri:ptive, (b) the notion of the lived-world or 'Lebensllett' '1ebensuett' 'Lebensuett' of tIle the actors,
and ·(c) the question of the ascription of ttieaning aieaning to aspects of the t'1orld. w·orld. tforld.
Each of these tl1ese raises a host of problems in its ,-Take, wa1.--e, wa1.'"9, "out Out b~lt
we may l'13mOVe l"9move l"emove some of
them by explicating more mOl~ mo~~
fully tl1ese these points.
Firstly description must not be taken taleen in the naive sense in "l'rhich l'lhich which one
:
nowadays denigrates descriptive ethnography 'for Ifor its lack laCk of theoretical
rigour'. The TIle very point of a phenomenological analysis a:L1alysis is to expose 't"lllat what ~That l!: .!i!: ~
posteriori allows allOW's a theoretical structure to be erected, . '. ",(, .",(" ~~
.. . and this can only be done by rejecting presuppositions
and describing uhat l1hat is there. tllere. TIle The Tlw status of sociology SOCiology and
social anthropology allthropology as sciences is itself here obviously in question, for,
as Merleau-Ponty Merleau-Panty ~1erleau-Ponty says,
if we 'l'lant want ''lant to subject science itself to rigorous scrutinJr scrutiny and arrive at
a preCise precise assesSillent assessment assessme11t of its meaning and. scope, 11e l'1'e must begin by reawakening
the tIle basic experience 1'1orld of the 110rld world of which science in the
second-order expression2 2
~ .

- 19 ­-
a notion "I-rhich ''I"h1ch whicll Schutz endorses by noting that:
the constructs const:ructs of the tIle, social. social, sciences are, so ·to speak, constructs
of tIle the second degree, namely, cOl1stru.cts COilStructs co:astructs of the cOlls·tructs constructs made by the
actors on the social scene, 1"1hose "Those whose behaviour the social scientist has
to observe and explain in accordance .d witll t11 the pl'Ocedural procedural rules of tIle
the
science.) science.3 science." ,.
Winch, ~inc~, in ~ his ~ long ~ong critique critiq~e of Mill makes in eff:ct effectpre~isely the t~e same ~ame.point
point
in J.D. distinguishing distl.nguJ.ShJ.Dg the social socl.a.l from the· natural sciences.
SCl.ences. . Description Descrl.ption is l.S thus
reintroduced as an approach 1'lhicl1 .. ~1hich mich is fundamental to accurate understanding understallding of
"l'1hat vlhat is happening in the vlorld.•
Secondly,' the tile tlle notion of the 'life"-w'orld' 'life-world' ... of, the actor or actors in question
occupies an important place in' phenomenological literature, as the tIle lif'e life iiTorld VTorld uorld
is the tIle viel'rpoint Viel"1]?oint ol;" or o:r;- context from''I"hiah 't1hich .-rhich an individual sees hirllself himself in relation to
other individuals, to the physical world and to social institutions. The TIle raising
of the life· 'project' to the status of a phenomenon of philosophical concern
'lull 'tall will be' a a. matter familiar to the reader of" the Existentialist literature, and
its significance in phenomenology lies in .its being bothtl1e the POUlt point of delJal'ture
departure
frora from lihich l-rhich lihicll analyses of individual individtlal as'pects aspects of the actors' life-l1orIds life-lforlds life-l,/,orlds are made,
and the tIle point 1'lhich 'l'Thich vThich is returned to lihen l-rhen the social liorld 'tforld 'I'lorld has been 'constituted'
or explicated by phenomenological methods.
The T.he most critical question fro:m from our point of viall vie'li elf is tmdoubtedly undoubtedly the third:
the tIle assertion that the 'sociological' t 'sociological~
function of phenomenology is to explicate
tIle the meanil1gful meaningful behaviour of actors in a social context and thereby understand
the specific senses 'l'Tith ~Tith
which the social world is endo'trTed endovTed endo"l'Ted by its inhabitants.
The crucial idea here l~re I~re
is obviously that tIle the role ot of the social science is to
understand the meanings that people give tlleir their social behaviour and institutions,
and social science itself is tan 'an objective contexto! of meaning constructed out
of and referring to subjective contexts of meaning.'5 o~ Or. in other words:
In sum, the purpose of the t~ phenomenological approach to the
study of social behaviour is. to make explicit what vn1at 'l'mat is implicit
ill the social action of the members of a ne"l'1 new community....
the,
"lihole l'lhole whole point of tlle the investigation is to reveal TTllat ,That lThat it
act9r·t act'ion 6
precisely is that makes the actor's t s action intelligible.6 6
This is a very bold statement of the phenomenologis"ts' phenomenologists' ' conclusions, and the com­
COlllplexity
of the arguments leading to them need. only' be .mentiOlled. mentioned.
Schutz's
I s
Phenomenology of the Social 14'orld' World' is basica.lly basically entirely directed to demonstrating
the last quotation. To phenomenology phenomenolo~J "l'le vTe ~le lrlill vdll ~Til1
return trlh.en·' trrhen t-Ihen considering
demon~
the precise methodological postulates of tllis this tilis view and. hOlT they in practice "l'lou1d 'tfould ,'lould
effect· the social sciences.
The Analytical School
Peter lUnch WinCh Winch in his The Idea of a Social Science starts from completely
different premises: his frame of reference is tIE tlE tl~
philosophy of 1'littgenstein
tlittgenstein
and his method is that of the analytic school. 6011001. sohool.From ,From a considera.tion consideration of the nature
of philosophy and of the cent;ral central role of epistemology, ~Iinch
~!Iinch ~Jinch
moves to a consideration
of how an ~ understandillg understanding of reality is possible and concludes that:
To anSl-tar austrer ansuer this tilis tllis cluestioni c.:.uestion ·it t is necessarJ to ShOlf ShOl'/' tIle the centrai central role
that the concept of understanding plays in the activities· which
.are characteristic ic of human societies. In this vlay v/ay vtay the discussion
of lThat what an underst&lding understrulding understaJ.lding of reality consists in merges into tIle
the
discussian discussion of the difference the possession of such an understanding
may be expected expect mSD.:p and this again il1volves involves
a consideration of the general nature of a human society, an analysis
that is, of tlle tIle concept of a human society.7
The TIle key concept here, of course, is ~l1at tInt tl1at of 'lll1derstandlng, understandWg, understanding, and this approacll approach to
.
society :"inch ~Iinch ~"inch contrasts explicitly ,'1i li'ith with tha.t that expounded by Durkheim.
Tllis This thesis

-20­ -20- -2Qis
elevated to major philosophical importance when one sees it in the light of
1,1/i \n Wittgenstein's s dictum thag 'lfuat '~~t g 'Ifuat has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could
say - the forms of life': the specialized branches of philosophy e.g. of science,
art, etc. have the function of 'elucidating the peculiar natures of these forras forms
of life, called "science", "art", etc! ete! while 'epistemology will try to elucidate
what i~ involved in the notion of a form of life as such. '9
The notion of a 'form of life' has, if one examines it, a remarkable
similarity to many aspects of the phenomenologist's 'life-world' itself, while the
specialized phenomenologies, of art etc. explore their 10 respective 'projects'
or aspects of the general life-world of their subject.IQ The purpose of the
specialized philosophy of ·social science (and of its phenomenological counter­
·part) thus becomes the- exploration and elucidation of meaningful behaviour, a. a
subject subj,ect to which l-linch VJinch v/inch devotes some spacell spacel1 to examining, and to which Schutz
devotes his entire time.
For reasons much too lengthy to discuss here Winch
also rejects the idea of the social studies and science, sCience, as conceived by Mill.
(pp. 66-94),12 on-the basis of logical arguments: '1 tIwant to show that the
notion of a human society involves a scheme of concepts which is logically
incompatible with the kinds of explanation offered in the natural sciences,'12
sCiences,,12
and that motive explanations are not a species of causal explanations on the
model, of those of the natural sciences,13 sCiences,13 an argument which also applies to the
investigation of regularities in the social sciences:
so to investigate the type of regularity stUdied studied in a given kind
of enquiry is to examine the nature of the rule according to which
jUdgements judgements of identity are made in that enquiry.
Such judgements
are intelligible only relatively relat~velY
behaviour
l
to a given mode of human governed by its own rules.l
14
Avoiding the trap of complete cultural relativity (and relativity between different
modes of discourse, e.g. aesthetic, religious, scientific), which is clearly
not proven either way, the postulate of this is clearly that the social scientists
role is to penetrate the scheme of concepts held by the society he is studying, stUdying,
to map their inter-relationships in that particular society and to explicate
the social relationships which maintain or are maintained by this scheme of
concepts.
This can only be done by explicating the attitude of, the actors
towards their own actions, as Goldstein points out in the quote given above.
GOldstein's Goldstein's fallacy is to assume that the phenomenologist proceeds merely by
describing his own reactions to the behaviour he is stUdying: studying: in the social
sciences of course the object of study is for the investigator -to get the
actors to explicate, explicate.. explicate~their
their own actions to him or in such a· a way that he can
understand what form of behaviour is occuring.
Concll4sions
Concl14sions
Conclcsions
Thus in many respects phenomenology and Winchian ~linchian
analysj,s analY6~s analys~s
are identical
in the methodological postulates they generate. ·Both are anti-reductionist,
Winch because motive explanations (and therefore social explanations) cannot
be reduced to physiological explanations,15 and phenomenology. because its aim
is to examine the data of consciousness at the level of consciousness, so
reduction to a supposedly 'more. basic' t .category of. _explanations is irrelevant.
It also follows from WinCh's Winch's nssertion that an activity (social, religious,
or whatever) can only be understood in terms of criteria internal to that activity
that the relation of the investigator cannot be simply that of observer to observed:
he must be a participant to some degree in the activity in questione
question.
Phenomenologically of course there is no other form of approach.
This postulate
also requires that one approaches an alien culture without any fixed presuppositions:
there can be no a priori approach to the social. If we look back
a.t at a~ the initial definition of phenomenology it will be seen· that this has always
been a fundamental tenet of that approach, regardless regard1ess of the specific SUbject subject
matter, and to arrive at the same conclusion from the opposite end of the
philosophical spectrum is an achievement indeed.
Several more general points are also implied.
It follows that statistical
data can never themselves make sociology' or anthropology: they become so only

- 21 -
­
. .
when they are interpreted i'lithin w'ithin i'Tithin a sociological frame1·rork.
frame't"lork.
frame~·rork. Simple counting or
correlating is not doing social sciGnee science until such procedures contribute to an
act of, understanding: they tlley are only preliminaries, or in certaL~ certa:L."1 certai..."1. situations,
conditions, conditiona, for such an act. This is also presumably the tIle gel1eral general pO:L.it poil1t point be11ind behind
Dilthey's Dilthe~rls
idea that the social sciences, sCiences, SCiences, as a generalizing and public activity,
provide not the ~ of society, but rather ratller- the frarnelforks framelforks iraraetforks llithin uithin 11hichhuman
l1hich uhich human
institutions may-be understood.
understood•
•t\ll All these conclusions folloil follou follo~T Quite quite naturally,- or so· it seems in retrospect,
from the nature of the material of tIle the social studies t'lhich ul1'lich vThich have, as it
were, lfere, w'ere, forced social theorists to become a"Tare awa~e avla:i.'e that this material is not the
sttlff stuff of science in the tIle usual sense of tIle the term. tel"IIl. teJ."Il1.
There is alvrays al"rays a danger of
losing the W'orld vor1d of phenomena that a methodology metllodology is set up to ex!,lore, explore, and
phenomenology and the 1:1inchian Vlinchian liinchian philosophy both meet on the common ground of
agr.eeing agreeing that this l1as has bas happened vn.th vdt110ther ~dth other approaches approaclles to the social sciences,
bU.t but tilat that tllata a mutually agreeable methodology can be formulated, the postulates
of which, whic11, 1'1hether 1'11letl1er whether one is a phenomenologist or analyst,. coincide. Botl1 Both the
·SC11001s 'schools agree that society is an object of philosopllical philosophical enquiry, enqv..iry,· and quite
necessarily so if one's onets approach is to be valid, and &Jed a.."1.d this, from a slightly
different point- of view, vie~~
adds great weight_ to IJ1arcuse's Harcuse's contention C011tention' that
sociology SOCiology should be a 'critical philosophy' .16 Many of the detailed contentions
of the two :philosophical Ilhilosophical schools are still in need of further clarification,-
but "cllere there is still the danger that the preoccupation with VIi methodology
COl1.tentiollS
1'1i11 dll vlill lead to lack of application apnlication of that metl10dology methodology to the data... To para­
paraphrase
a saying by I'Iarx: Harx: IJlarx: the :flhilosophers philosophers llave have described the l"lorld world of methodology;
the point, hOlfever, hOl"lever, of methodoloGY metllodologyj
methodology j is to change tIle the 'fIlorld vTorld. v(orld-. •
.r John J"ohn Clammer
C Ref,erences
Ref.erences
1. I. 1:[. Alexander, Hhat is,Phenomenologv?, p. 3, Journal of the British
Society for Phenomenology, Vol. If I, l\fo. No. 1, J"an. Jan. 1970.
1. I. lt1. ~I. Alexander, vlhat ~Ihat ,is, tis, Phenomenology?, p. 3, Journal of the tha British
2. Ill. H. r!I. 1I1erleau-Ptmty* Merleau-Pbnty* ~1erle~u"Pbnty, The Phenomenologv PhenomenologY Phenomenology of Perception, p•.viii. p p. ,viii. Englis11 English
edition, London 1962.
3. A. Schutz, Concept concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences, reprinted
p. 385 of Readings in Existel1tial Existential Phenomenology, E. O. Lal-Trance La1'Trence La'l'lrence and
O'Connor, 0' 0 1 Englel'10od Engle\,10od Engle\,Tood Cliffs, CliffS, 1967.
4. P. "l"linch, I'linch, 'flinch, The Idea of a Social Science, SCience, pp. ·86-91, L011don, London, 1958.
5. G. I·lalsh, Walsh, tlalsh, Introduction to A. Schutz The Phenomenology PhenomenologY PhenOmel'lologv of tIle the Social llorld Uorld
p. :xxviii, 1967.
6. L. J. J". Goldstein, The Phenomenological and }Taturalistic J)Taturalistic ~raturalistic Approaches to the
Social: in r·lethods, tvIethods, l\Iethods, 14, 1961. Reprinted, p p. .. ,101 of l'Irumer lJIamer lImmer
TheorY Theory in Anthropology, AnthropolOgy, Antl1ropologv, .London 1968.
7. P. vlinch,..ill,S;, vlincll,~, pp. 22-2;. 22-23.
8. L. vlittgenstein, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 37: 11,xi, ll,xi, p. 226,
Oxford 1953.
9-. 9. P. 1-Jinch, lJinch, ~'linch, ~., p. 41.
10. See for e.g. Russerl, Husserl, Ueditations r,feditations cartesiennes, Paris 1931.
11. P. vlinch Winch, t ~, j.lli, pp'~ pp~ 45-51.
11. P. vfinch, .il2i9., pp~ 45-51.
12. ~., Ibid., pp. 66-94. 13. Ope cit., p. 83-86. 14. ~., pp. 83-4.
15. ~., p. 78.

- 22 ­-
lfODEL I,10DEL lmDEL AND STRUCTURE IN C. LEVI-STRAUSS'S IS "STRUCTUR.AL "STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY"
This paper is concerned solely sol~ly "dth -vTith 1~th a question S].uestion of metllodology.
methodology.
It does
not attempt to assess tIle the ad.equacy adequacy or interpretation of the ethnograpllic ethnographic etlmographic material
brougl1t brought to bear by Levi-Strauss. I should shoul~
imagine that some. some, at the least, of
the remarks made in the follo't'lin(! follo"Tin~
follol'.in~ pages are already familiar to anthropologists;
an-'~l1.ropologists;
if they are a.re too familiar, I apologise in advance. The paper is based exclusively
on the author's au"tIlor's Structural structural Anthropology, particularly cll..apters c}1..a.pters c}1..apters II to V and XY XV ](V
to XVI.
These chapters seem. to provide a clear enougll enough picture of tIle the methodology
and arid presuppositions of the structural method.
The follolring follol.ing seems s'eems to be the approach in outline.' outline.· On the basi's basis of
The follo"ring seems to be the approach iD. outline. On the basis of
observed facts, tIle the structural anthropologist builds a model to explain those
facts (cf. p. 280). Correlated ~rith ~dth this model is a structure strv.cture str'\.lcture in reality, and
this is .That TrIhat ~Ihat the tIle model maps, or represents.
"The structuralist's task••• is
to recognize and al1.d isolate levels of reality which have strategic value from his
point of view, view~ namely, which admit of representation as models, wllatever whatever tlleir
their
tYJ.)e type" n
(p. 284). _ Equally, EqUally,. certain practices ina a people, insofar as the;y the¥ the~ can
be brot~ht brottght under the concept of communication (pp. 48, 61, 83, 296 etc.), can
be reckoned as a semantic system, or language. _As SUcll, such, it is a mapping on tIle the
social.level of a. a structure found in the human unconsciousness (cf. p. 281).
Considered as a mapping, the particular social practice in question is an
arbitrary symbolization s~!1llbolization of that process. Thus, TllUS, "a Ita ldnship kinship system does not consist
in the objective ties of descent or consanguinity betvieen betvTeen betTr.een individuals. It exists
only in human consciousness:
it is an arbitrary system of representations, not
the tIle spontaneous development of a real situation" situationlf ll (P. (p. 50). ROliever, Hot'l'ever, H01fever, though thougll tile
the
symbols are arbitrar'J arbitrar"J arbitraI"J from this point of viell, vielT, viel", from otl1er other points pOints of vielT vietol viet'l tlley they
may have an inherent inherellt value. Indeed certaiil certain elements elemenJcs elemenJ.;s in the mapping can never
be reduced as a matter of fact to mere symbols.
For 'instance the 1"TOmen .Tomen "v'Tomen tllat that
are used as counters in the communication system comprised by marriage "as nas lIas
~roducers
producers of signs... signs••• can never be reduced reduce~. to the status of symbols' symbols· Is· or tokens"
{p. (P. (p. 61; of. cf. pp. 91-94.) .. -"
The major question one asks llere here is "Uhat ullhat IIUbat is the theoretical tlleOre"cical and methodological
effect of the postulation of a real, strttcture structure B.ns't'Ter1ng axunTering B.nsTrTertng to a model,
'VIhet11er vThether whether the modal model be tIle the one constructed construct-ad by the anthropologist or a conscious
model of the particular group?" group?1t groUp?1I
Prime attention obviously attaches to the
anthropologist's model, ratller rather than tllan any conscious coriscious model.
"For lIFor conscious cious models, t
llhich vlhich are usually known us Q.S u.s "norms", If , are ar~ by definition very poor ones, since they
are not intended to explain the tIle phenomena but to perpetuate them? them" il - (1'- (p. 281).
Equally, the anthropologist's t s model- is, or OUgllt ought to be, superior to tIle the model
that is a particular practice, 'since the former model is designed to explain a
greater range of arbitrary mappings than the arbitraI"J arbitrar"J arbitr~J mapping that is the latter:
for instance, instancetone. model constructed by the antllrop'ologist anthrop'ologist can explain the' various
models constituted by b J r kinship, kinship; mythology and art.
One important characteristic of the anthropologist's t s model is that it is
analytic, in the technical teo~ical sense, whereby any proposed counter~xample
to tIle,. the
model in questiol1 question by the ,very fact'that if accepted it~fould
'~fould would. be a counterexample
is if irSO so facto mal-formed, either simply simp~ false or embo~LJg embodyLig emboqyL~ a misinterpretation.This
is, stric~ly
speaking, a consequence of analyticity of course.)
It is equally the case that any of the sub-models, whether vlhethor ~rhethor
conscious models or
rituals, artistic practices and myths, are analytic .. ~lithin uithin rithin their olm't-erms,
own ·terms,
~'dthin vlithin vrithin the scope of the tIle rang~ range_ of phenomena to llh;ch wh~ch ~lh;ch
they axe are applicable, but
the anthropoloGist's anthropologist's model, rangil'lg ranging - over· a nder vIidar vTidere:rea, -a'rea, area, is more absolutely
analytic. For it is ex hYpothesi h:ypothesi hypotheSi tIle the most pO'tferful'model powerful pmferful 'model available.
At the same time, because of tlle tile the postulation of a real' real- stmcture structure corresponding
to the tl~
model, it has the appearance of an empirically verifiable, 'scientific'
• model.
For the underlying structure· is, in ill theOI"J theo~J theory at any rate, stwceptible susceptible to
empirical investigation, the processes of scientific and, in the present context,
psychological, verification or refutation. However,' Iloli'ever,' R01fever,' even if some one specific
structure strtlcture that might be postulated should sh:ould be sho'tin shown sholm either to be non-existent or
not of the type required reqttired by the theory, the analY.,tic a:llali:tic character chc1racter chc'lracter of the model 'l'Ti11 vIiIl vdll
"Tin 'l'Tin ~rin through; in that it can be held to be the case tbat, that, even if this one structure

- 23 ­-
does not meet the requirements, still there ~ be ~ structuI'e structure answering to
the model i1hich ~'lhich uhich tIle the model maps.
In this way, the strtlctural structural approach approacl1 hovers
rather disconcertingly bett'leen bettreen bet"t'reen the tIle analytic and the syn"chetic. synthetiC. syn·chetic.
This same point can be expressed in the follmring fallen-ring follOi'ling way:
such an approacll approach
cannot be counted as a synthetiC synthetic approaCh approach unless there is some metll0d method of determining
what is to count as a structure appropriate to a particular model other
than the metllod, method, or any method, formulated in torms of, or presupposing presupposinG' the
terms of, the model itself. itself'.
vlhat v/hat Vlha.t is tIle the cause of this situation? Levi-Straus s constantly dral1s ara1'Ts draws a
parallel betlleen bett-Teen betl'1'een the structural method' in· anthropology-and and structural linguistics,
and it seems to ine me that both metllods methods share the. difficulty that witll with relation to
semantic systems they cannot explain in a. a non-tautologous fashion fasllion '-Thy l'1'hy lvhy it is that
any system describable by the theory- is significant. Since linguistics starts
from a significant system, 'Vlhicll vlhich vthich it analyses into the constituent elements of
that system (that (tllut is, phonemes as opposed to pllones) phones) alld and has, basically, to
identify morphemes and the mi.1'1imum ndL~um mL~um units of significant discourse of tllat that system,
it i t just cannot be the case tllat that lTithin vIithin vri such a theoretical framellork frame"i'lork framework it can explain
hon hou it is that the marks and sound-traves sound-'t"laves in question cluestion do have significance.
Similarly, philosophers have argued tllat that tllere ~lere
can be no criterion for truth.
They .presu..ppose presuppose a theory of meaningfulness 1'rhareby 't'lllereby "/hareby the tIle meaningfulness of any
declarative sentence seiltence in a language is exllausted exhausted by tlle the ranG'S ranG'e of states of affairs
in lihich uhich that sentence is true or false. Therefore, in that th2.t any proposed criterion
of truth is,ex hypotheSi, hypothesi, meaniIlGful meaniIlG'ful meaningful it must be that, "ti l-lithin 'I'd the framel'1'ork fram.elfork framet-Tork of
suCh such a theory, a: precondition for understanding the criterion is knDi'l"ledge knoliledge Imouledge af of
1'rl11at vrhat vthat it is for a sentence of "che ·i;he ·che language langun.ge langu.:'lgeto ·to be true and false. Thus any criterion
fora a notiol1 notion expressed within lfitllin the range of a theory tl1eory in l'thich uhich tllat that notion has been
used, .. uhether ~'lhetl1er mether explicitly or implicitly, in order to formulate the theory is
necessarily trivially tautological.
Hence, if one takes a 818tam system 'Vlhicll vlhich vrhich is a 'language' t t
insofar as it can be
described as a system of communication, it cannot be the case tllat that 1d.tl'lin within such
a theory one. can explain 1-my "i'lhy vmy it is sig-.aificant, significant, 1'1hy 'I'fhy ;-Thy it is a semantic system: for
that it is a semantic seraantic system is already presUPIJOsed presUP1)Osed presupposed for the theory to be applied
to it. Therefore, Tllerefore, to say tha.t that it is a semantic system because it mal)s maps an underlying
structure is to say J ' no more than that it is 'a °a ea semantic system, and this
muc11 mucll is alread.y already guaranteed by the fact that it is a system of communication.
, .
,
Yet there does seem to be a need to postulate a structure, struct~-e,
or something
that tllat 1'J'111 nill uill fulfill the same role, to underly tIle the model.
For .Len-Strauss,
Le.n-Strauss,
follo'l'Ting follol"dng follovTing Jakobson and the majority of structu..ral structural li~"Uists, lino"1lists, represellts represents a
'language' tlallo"1lage' tlaDc~ager
as a set of spatio-temporally bound phenomena, .:l.rbitrary arbitrary in fom fonD. form
(Sound-lfaves, (Sound-l1aves, (Sound-l'1aves, kinship, relations etc.) 1"Thich vlhich which are significant only insofar as
there is something designated by each of the tams. tems. Even in the tIle case of the
associated 'valuest, 'values', it is clearly the case that a token taken cannot ac11ieve achieve a value
unless it is already significant, that is, in the terms of tIle the theory in
question, designates something. Here the situation is different from that
suggested above. For it .could _could be maintained that the present preeupposition
presupposition
as to the conditions of meaningfulness. belol1gS belongs to a more pOl1erful potrerful pOl'/'erful theory than.
than,
that embodying structural descriptions. The latter proceeds from a consideration
of actual phenomena, actual lane,llages, laneuages, lane~ages,
actual kinShip kinship systems, 'wIlereas
whereas
the fOImer former expresses a necessary condition for the possibility of these actual
phenomena having the character that tlley they do have, it expresses a necessary condition
for the tIle possibility of significance. Thus tIle the structuralist's postula­
postUlation
of an underlyiJ.Jg underlyh;g underlyhLg structure st~~cture
can be presented not as a trivial tautology tautOlogy but
as an instance of a basic requirement of a yet more powerful tlleory theory 'ti'hich lihich vlhicll any o:n.y e:ny
structural model J?l'esupposes.
presupposes. The postulation of a structure to underly a
pexticular paxticular model 1'Till ..... will rill still be a priori, but no longer tautologous.
H01fever, HOtieVer, HOt'lever, it is simply not the tIle case tllut thut that in order for a symbol to be ingful iIlt,nf'ul i~ai'ul there must be something !tin "in reality" realityll desioouated designated by that symbol.
If'
Llean­
mean­
that \tlere 'I'rere .. so it ,"10uld vlould vrould be simply impossible ever to il1telligibly intelligibly deny that
something somethil1g existed. Nor would one be able (with (t-Tith any ease or plausibility) to
explain the meaningfulness of false sentences. 1·1uch r,luCh r,Tuch more than these considerations
1ilould llrould ~rould be required to shol"1 Sl10l1 shol1 that tb.at far from it being the case tInt tbat tba.t a pre­ pra-
I
I
f:

·- - 24 ­
-
condition for meaningfulness i? i~
that there be sometlling something designated it is ablays always alt1ays
the case that a precondition for the possibility of something same being designated,
is that tl1.a.t the term designating (or being used to designate) be already sig.aificant.
sig-.aificant.
si~aificant.
It is, hO~"1ever, hOl1ever, houever, sufficient for our purposes to observe tllut that it is impossible for
it· to be' necessarily the case that ever~y-
ever~l eve~-
significant term designates something.
Here again it l1as has been suggested (notably by )littgenstein). ~littgenstein).that that a theOl"1J
theo~J theory
of meaning construed in terms of designation needs to be supplelilented suppleI'lented by
criteria for the identification of deSignata designata other tl~ that formulated by the
theo~ theory in question.
This is as far as space permits tllese these questions being taken.' It ,{ould 'tiould ,vould
h01:1eVer houever be of great interest to investigate the tlleoretical theoretical point of the tIle introduction
of the tIle notion of 'value' I
into the tIle theory in rela'cion relation to the cllaraoteriza­
characterization
of language in terms of communication, conmnm.ication, and to examine th.e the plausibility plausibilit,v of
the assumption that there is a single, determinate set of facts to be observed
and described on the observational level (p. 280) and tIle the interrelation betlleen betvreen betueen
tllis this thesis tllesis and L~vi-Straussts L~vi-Strauss's
suggestion that there is a basic structuring of
the mind COillIllon COillID.on to everyone. evexyone.
1"lhat Wl1at l-/hat has been done in tllis this ·paper is to suggest, not t11at that a structul'alist
s structu:ralist
tructuJ;'alist
approcl.ch approacll to explanation is incorrect, but· that the postulation of st'ructures structures
in the tIle real 't'1orld I"lorld \"lorld co:crelated vIi ~1ith uith their Llodels is either tautoloGous tautolOGOUS or, at the
least, dubious.
Barrington Jones
St. JohnS
JohIis
Reference
c. C. Levi-Strauss, structural Structural Anthropology, 1965.

- 25 -­
IS LEVI-STRAUSS LEVI-8TRAUSS LEVI...STPL1~USS A .m'rISE JE7!ISH JE~IISH 1IlYSTIC? lJIYSTIC?
The TIle Cluestion question llhich l1hich uhich I have chosen as a title for this essay is not concerned
l1ith llith uith tlle the accident of birth "l'Thich "l'lhich w·hich made Levi-Strauss L~vi-Strauss
a Je'tl;'llhet11er Jeu;vlhether Jeu;lIhether or
not this fact has influenced il1fluenced his vl0rk nork VTork is a LJatter Datter watter outside my concern. Nor do
I intend (at least directly) to take up Leach's recent (1970: p. 18 and passiIrl)
passim)
hints that Levi-8trauss's Levi-Strauss1s later vTork Hork uork has crossed the tIle boundary be~leen betvreen betlleen science
and metaphysics. Ratller Rather I propose to suggest certain features of the literature
of Jelfish mysticism which are so amenable to structur,a1analysis structural analysis tlut toot tmt at
times they give tIle the impression that tIle the texts themselves tllemselves have beer~ been beel1, invented by
a structuralist structt1.ralist manufacturing a prototype mythology for a..."1alysis.
~lalysis.
B.J.~alysis.
Since this
is .!!21 ~ not the tIle case, I intend to adduce tIle the existence of the tIle Jewish Jeuish mystic material
as evidence for the tIle usefulness of the structural met110d method in the tIle analysis of material
from 'higher' as "l'Tell "l'lell vIell as I 'primitive' t
religions. I shall also illquire illCluire inquire (though
necessarily in a limited 1'1ay) lTay) uay) into the tIle question que,stion Cluestion of lTI1ether uhetber uhether the usefulness of
similar tecl1niques techniClues techniques in investigatiI3ti investigating prisitive priHi pri~li and civilized reI religions indicates
a similarity sufficient sufficiellt to make the comparative study of religious sys"l:;ems systems a
simpler (or at least more rewarding) project than might otl1enTise otlE~lise otl1enlise be the case.
Analysis of Jevlish JewiSh Jellish religious forms I'lithin within l"1ithin the tradition stretching from
the sociology of Durkheim to current currellt structuralism is, of course, not unheal'd unlleard unheard
of. Durkheim, Dur!:heim, Durld1eim, r,1auss, r,1a.uss, and Hertz all cited eXaillples examples from JUdaism Judaism (and Hinduism
and Christianity, CIU'istianity, for that tllat IDatter) matter) 1'Tith 1'litIl 1'lith no hint that it 1ms 1'1aS ~'1aS
necessary to Viel'l vielf vie"\'l
these examples in B.II\Y aDiY any different light from examples dralm dralnl dra,'lIl from primitive tribes.
:Jitllin :ii-l;hin :li-cllin a, a. very different comparative tradition, Frazer did the tile !same thing. Among
tIle the modern structuralists, L'each Leach (1969) and IvIary Nary Douglas (1966) llave have produced
Significant significant applications of the structural method to the understB.l1.ding underst8.l1ding understanding of
aspects of the Old Testament. Yet Leach, unlike Dm-kheim, Durkheim, has been forced farced to
explain and jusi;ify justify jus1;ify his use of Judaic JUdaic material. A good deal of the opposition
to Leach's use of Old Testament Testauent texts as sources seems to stem from his dis­
disregard
for chronologjT.
chronology.
As Leach points out (1969: p. 28), 'tlJIyth 'lJlyth 'Myth proper lacks
a chronology in any strict sense, for the beginnil~ beginnil'lg and e~d the end must be apprehended
simultaneously: significance is to be discerned only in the relatiol1s
relations
between the component parts of the tl~
story; sequence seClusnce is simply a persistent rearrangement
of elements which are present from too the start.' t
Lea-ell Leach anticipatas
es
(and receives) objections to this view from those l1ho who uho believe the Bible to
represent, in SOhle SOLle SOJile sense, 'true' t
history. This is a matter of faith, nhich l'rhich llhich it
is not the tIle province of an anthropologist to question (luestion (lusstion and which is', is, by and large,
irrelevant to theoretical considerations. There is, houever, hOl'IeVer, a seemingly less
emotional case. sometimes made for a fundame11tal' fundamental difference be~1een betl'leen betl'1een the concepts
of history and of time implicit ~plicit in Judaism and Christianity and those found in
primitive religion. Eliade, particularly, particulm"ly, has observed such a crucial difference
between bet~leen
1{hat wbat what 11e he calls the I·cyclical' 'cyclical' time of t 'arcllaic' archaic' religion and the
I 'irreversible' • , time of Judaism.
The l1I'ath lrrath lTrath expressed by God at the fall of
Samaria, he says, is not tIle the 'same "l'Trath' In.-atIlt lrrath' expressed 1'1hen 't"lhen I"Then Jerusalem falls (1961:
1'P. pp. 110-111). As to Eliade's Eliade1s first point, tllere there is a good case to be made out
for a strong 'cyclical' t element in Je"l'1ish Jel'rish Jet-lish concepts of time. Judaism, like any
other religion has a ritual calendar 11hich "tlhichis l'lhich is repeated ,year after year, and llhich
~Thich vlhich
l1a~ has survived amazingly unchanged through ce~turies centuries of the most cataclysmic upheavals
in the circumstances of the tIle Jel'lish Je,\,1ish Jellish people. lIoreover, Iioreover, l-ioreover, tIle the ongoing cl'lronicle chronicle
of the Jel'ls Je~ls ,fas ''las 't18S never conceived, as leading eventually to a total I1B.lt. halt. The
IoJIessiah, I1essiah, rJlessiah, after all, would bring llitll uith him a lle1rl ne"l'T nell era of peace, justice, and
felicity and (since the Diaspora) a return of the tIle JelTs JellS to 'tIle the promised land.
One is tempted to say that, just as the tIle Biblica~ Biblica:J. Biblical narrative begins in a state of
paradise, it is in SUCll such a sta-t;e state tllat that it conceives its eventual end.
Surely
this aspect of Hebrew Messianism can be termed, in some sense, a 'reversal' 're~ersal'
of
time. Moreover, Mbreover, Leach himself has argued, Cluite quite convincingly, conVincingly, tIle the case for a a,
fundamental tension between linear and cyclical ti,rae time ill in all types of religious
systems (1961: pp. 124-136.).
Eliade, hOvlever, hovrever, covers himself against tJ1is this objection by the second
half of his statement, in which t-Thich uhich he sees a lack of •sameness' 'sameness' between betlfeen comparable
but not identical Biclical episodes. If 'same' tsame t
is to be interpreted in so
strict a uay, nay, one is immediately tempted to inCluire inquire hO"t'l how hOl'1 'same' f t
are similar
episodes, or even repetitions of episodes in primitive bodies of myth.
Although

- 26 ­-
El:i.ade Eliade has not been involved. involv~4 in the controversy con~roversy over Leach's Old Testament
Testamen~
analyses, such an all insistence upon identity betl'1een bet'l'1een betw'een episodes upon lTllose uhose tIhose comparability
structural analysis depends ,iQuld liould \'l'Ould serve, once and for all, to put
paid to all such analysis, not only that rel~ting rel~tiDG'
to Biblical materials.
Absolute' Absolu-'tje" Absolute- equivalence in mytil myth is by nature an unprovable. unprovable~
HOvTever, HOv1ever, neither Leacll
Leach
nor any other otller structuralist makes SUCll such an extrem.e extreme claim for tlleir comparisons.
The juxtaposition of mythical episodes is justified. only if one call, Call, can, thereby, tl1ereb:}T,
discover a level upon 11hich l'1hich l1hich they exhibit, in ill some respect or otller, other, a l1itherto hitherto
unsuspected similarity. 1fuether ~fuetiler ~'1hether tIle the metllods methods used to discern such suell simila:dties
simila:'cities
similal'ities
is in sufficiently close toucll touch 1·dth .'dth vdth the tile tlle contents of tIle the myths tIlemselves themselves iJ',
i§,
of course, an important aspect of tIre tIle tlre argument be~'1een betlfeen be~1een pro and anti-structuralists,
even tnlen uhen structuralists are perverse enough to call tIremselves themselves functionalists
(Leach, 1970: p. 9). TIle The argument rac-es raees- races l'fhether whether vnlether the material is t~~n ta1.-en taL~n
from
primitive or from Biblical sources, source-s, and alld one can, in! in~ tIle the last resort, only fall
back upon one's OHn Olm mm satisfactioll satisfaction .nth ,nth witll :the results reSUlts-produced, or lack thereof, in
deciding one's onets own Olm side of the tIle fence.
One 000 of tIle the features of Jeliisl1. Je,dsh Jel'fish mysticism
't'111ich ,'1hich which particularly attracted me to its study is that i-'c it seems to offer sometlling something
approachillg approaching a resolution of this t~s dilemma, or at least an instance lihere where tIle the facts
themselves are so incontrovertibly co-terminal co-tel~nal "t'Tith with 'I'1ith the system (to-paraphrase
Dumezil) that tIle the most extreme doubters oft~J.e t;Je validity of tIle the structu:ral structural metllod method
'\"Iill, "\'Ti11, l1ill, at least, be forced to do some quick thinking to explain a1fay a11ay al,/,ay this example.
In Jewish Jel

- 27 -­
all, the object cbject of myth) is ·likely to proceed, ,Thether ~nlether uhether or not this is immediately
eviclent evic1.ent evident to the tIle observer. Or has bas the great man been secretly poring
over his grandfather's books?
Hariet' Lyons
Bibliography
Douglas, liIaI"lJ,
Douglas, Nary,
11~J,
1966, Purity and Danger (London: Routledge,. Kagan, Kegan, Patll).
Paul).
Eliade, £.'Iircea, Hircea, 1961, The Sacred and tIle the Profane (Hew (frew York: Harper and Row).
Leach, Edmund,' 1961, Rethinldng Rethinking Antllrop~ology Anthrop.oloe.;v AnthropDloe.;v and other otl1er Essavs, Essays, revised edition
(London: Athlone Press).,
------,
1969, GenesiS Genesis as !J[yth' rJIyth" rl[yth' and Other Essays (London: Jonathal1 Jonathan Jonathrul Cape).
,
1970, Levi-8trauss L~vi-Strauss L~i-Strauss (London: Fonta.na./Collins).
Fontana/Collins).
The edition of the ~ Zohar used is tIle the English tralls1ation translation by Simon, Spar Sperling alld and
Le,rertoff Levertoff published in Net'1 Neli' Nelof York and 'London by tIle the Sonoma Soncino Press a.t 0. at t various
dates d.:?tes betlleen betl'l'een betueen 1932 and 1934.
~
I I'
r

- 28­
-
HIERARCHY HIERiffiCHY AJ.IJD Ai'ID AJ.\j]) POIlER: FOUER: PO\IER:
REFLECTIONS OF A BLIND BLTND rJrATERI.A.LIST
HATERlli.1IST
rJATERI.A.LIST
Beidelman on the .iajmani jajmani systeroi systemi systeJU
The jajmani system is a feudalistic system of prescribed
hereditary obliga.tions obligations of payment and of occupational and ceremonial
duties bet1ieen bet1'leen bett'l'een two or more specific families of different cas·tes cast;es castes in
the same locality... locality••• Position in the 'system rests upon a person's
relation to the land.... By his land-based po\,trer pOll,er pow'er a .iajman .ia.iman ,ia,jman may
coerce ooerce other otller castes as,tenants .tenants or. labourers; he may .coerce ~coerce
them
by his control of farm implements audoxen, and'oxen, carts, seed, food,
pasture, forage, and sometimes ~~e~imes even ev.en e1T,e~ house
sites and

- 29 .;.' -
labour, that Hinduism Hindu:Lsm elaborately rationalises' and· congeals tl1.e the ti~e
fundamental
distinction between betw'een those who uho possess land and those I'lho "l'lho who do not.
2. Dumont, on the- other hand, asks, 'Do IDo we have to believe 'that "ritual"
theory rationalises the "exploitation of the Charmars?"5' Charmars?,,5 ' HOl"T HOl'l HO~1
then does Dumont
conceptualise the relationship? He insists emphatically· that the specificity
of caste societies resides precisely in the absolute disjunction, t 'in tin principle',
,
between the ritual~ideologicaland and economic-political structures.
TIle The priest, the Brallman, Brahman, is llighest highest -in status even when wIlen ';lhen he is
poor and materially dependent.
In the oldest texts referring to
the vanna va~ order, priesthood is set above, that is, it encompasses
rulershipi· rulership;. and at the same time, these "tl'lin 1I~lin
forces" together
encompass all the rest (1967, 34).
encompass all· the rest (1967, 34).
In the tl1e essay on 'Caste, Racism and Stratification,6 he elaborates tIns this point:
It is necessary to distinguish dis·tinguish between two'Tery twover.J different things:
the scale sca.le of statuses (called "religious·") "religious") 11 reI ) which I o.all call c.all hierarchy
and llhich uhich is absolutely distinct from the fact of pO~ler pOller pOl'Ter on the one
hand, and on the other the tIle distribu.tion distribution of pOl-Tar, pOller, pOt-Ter, economic and
political, which is very important in prac-tice, practice, but is distinct
from, and subordinate subOI'dinate to, the hierarchy_ hierarcllY. hierarchy. It l'dll will rlill be asked then
ho'ti' hOi'l' how' pOlrer pO~'rer poner and ond hierarchy are articulated_ articulated. Precisely, Indian society
answers this question in a very explicit manner••• vlhile ~lhile while tlle tile the Brahman
is spiritually or absolutely supreL1e, supreme, he is materially dependent;
1'rhile while ~lhile
the king is m~ter1ally m~terially the master, he is spiritually subordinate.
In this concelltion conce:ption the distribution of pOl1er p01fer pO''ler (that (tilat (tllat structure "lhich l'J'hich ~'lhich
Beidelman
sees as determinant) determi.:l1ant) is distinct from, and subordinate to, hierarchy. vJhat 'ilhat is
still problematic is the. status of this relationship of 'subordination' •subordination' - at
11hat \1That what level, and in what 1iay, 1-Tay, way, is lJowersubordinate power to hierarchy (ritual. status)?
tIn 'In everJ sooiety society one aspect. of social s.ocial life receives a primar-J primar-j" primarJ value stress .and
simultaneously is made to encompass all others and express them as far as it can.7
As the tile basic value of caste societies status or hierarchy both 'encompasses'
and 'expresses' all·other aspects, including tIle the structure st1~cture
of social and political
relationships. Dumont corroborates tllis this in his own word$: vfO.rdJ3: wo~:
There is in Swat Sllat Sl"rat no fundamental fUndamental distinction be~leen betl'reen between status and
pm'ler: pom~r: pOlfer:
the '!Priests" ''Priests'' '~riests" are inferior to the dominant group (Paldltun), (Pakhtun),
and the religiOUS religious quality of the "Saillts" "Saints" expresses i itself tsel£ in terms
of dominance instead of dominance
of the Kshatri a etc. bein
obliged to express itself in.terms iri~terms of religion ibid, 35 - my emphasis).
Hierarchy,.. then is the mode of erpression ereression of power. TlJ:e T~e structure of
politicalrelntionships politicalrelat.ionships relationships and economic po~rer pOl'Ter pOlTer expresses itself in the religious
idiom of hierarchy. Religion is the language l~~ge of power pOl'rer relationships
(and ult:imately ult.imately ultimately of the relations of production) in a caste society.
This, in fact, is what Dumont says in so many ~'Tords: rTords: \"rords: 'the t "religious" ureligiQua r~ .is here the
universal mode of expression, and this is perfectly coherent given that the global
orientation ori~ntation is religious, religiOUS, tl1B.t that ~lat tIle the religious language is that of hierarchy.tS
18 t8
And finally, fin~lly, 'Hierarchy marks tIle the conceptual integration 'of a whole, w~ole, it· is, so
to speak, its intellect1..1al intellectual cement.'S cement.'9
The structure of political and economic relationships ('power') (tpot'ler ('pouer') I) is
'subordinate to' hierarchy in the sense that these relationships are expressed
in religious. terms-, tenas, tenns, in the language of hierarchy, "Ihich lrhich t-lhich constitutes the global
principle prinCiple of caste societies. I have quoted at length from Dumont's work because
I wish to make- the tile point that (i) nothing Dumont Dumon"t says refutes 13eidelman, Beidelman, and
(ii) there is i.s no necessary opposition between their respective conceptualisations
of the tile tIle relationship betlfeen be~feen power and rittlal rittUll ritttal in the Indian village.
This may seem strange since Beidelman s·ubordinates subordinates ritual (status) to
pOlfer pOlofer (relations of production), and Dumont, conversely, pOvTsr po,rer po-vrer to ritual. Yet
tllis this apparent contradiction contradict~on evaporates once it is realised that thierarchy', 'hierarchy', in
Dumont's view, t
'marks the·.conceptual integrat.ion integration of the tl~ vlhole, ",hole,' vThole, , t that pot-Ter pOlier pOlfer is

I,
- 30 ­-
subordinate to hierarchy at the conceptual level, that is, vdtllin within the domain
of the ideology itself.
The 'essential' t t function of hierarchy is that it canstitutes constitutes the tile conceptual
or symbolic, ~ not· material m~terial
(Dumont stresses the antithesis), unity of caste
societies.' ''Hierarchy 'Hierarchy integrates the tIle society by reference to its values.' In
other 'l'lords, vTords, vl0rds, what 1rle vie we are dealing l1ith ~'I'i ~1i is a conscious model, a mode of conceptualisation
of the social and cosmological universe. An ideology is precisely such
a conceptualisation -
it defines !lived 'lived experience' that is, the ";Tay vlay in 1"lhicl1 ";lhich .. lhicll "men
live their conditions of existence.lO
existence.10_
But the crucial point is this: an
ideology is not visible to the t11e agents themselves.
tllemselves.
Because it 'is their ve'ry very mode
of conscious existence man men do not normally establish tl1at that psychic distance from
it which is the essential precondition of scienc~~
scienc~..
scienc~,. That is to say, and this is
the paradoxical point which Dumont fails, to grasp, the conscious model is profoundly
unconscious of itself.
This means that tllat an ideology of course - as hierarchy - is not simply a
mode of conceptualisation of the universe, a ",ay way vray ;in which whiCh men consciously
experience their tlleirs-ocial social relationships, relatiollships, it is also, also. itself a structure s.tructure of whicll
which
the agents are quite unconscious.
As such it is defined by its own o~ln specific
'tftme"tions' 'fellctions' (like Dumont I use the l'lord 't'10rd ~lord
reluctantly - cf. HH HR '318), of ,"/'hich w'hich "lhich
the age1'lts ageRts have _~o
no imnu:idiate immediate knowledge.
To reformulate the original origi.nal problem of tIle the mode of articulation of ritual
{status} (status) and pOl-Ter pOrTer pO~ler - how :LS is the ideological structure implicit in mall's men's conceptual
image of their universe related to the actual structure structul~ of the relations
of production into WIlich which they enter? Dumont asked, 'Must ,'le we believet11at
that
"ritual" n tI theory theor.? theo~r rationalises ratiollalises the tIle "exploitation" "exploitatioll n ion ll of the Chamars?' TIle The answer, of
course, is 'no'. I I • 'Rationalise' t I
implies that the tlle conceptu.alisation conceptualisatiOl1 conceptualisation embodied elnbodied in
tIle the dominant dominal1t motifs and themes of the hierarchical ideology (purity/impurity etc.)
is a consciously planned and deliberate exercise. Yet Beidelman's vie,"/, view viG~f toTaS lolas was that
ritual (meaning by this that gradation of statuses ~lhich uhich rlhich is t~1e
the concrete cOllcrete form.
of hierarchy) 'supports and reaffirms' the coercive integration of'caste society.
Beidelman then, was not referring to some conscious process of mystification,
but to an objective function of the hierarchical principle. That is to say,
the conscious model (hierarchy) is unconscious of its own ob,jective objective ob~ective
functions.
Beidelmmlts Beidelmrul's Beidelman's weakness is that he nowhe~e nowhere specifies in a clear and explicit erplicit fashion
what these 'functions' 1 are or indeed even hOvT hO~T
the ideology embodied in ritual
fmlctions functions fUl1ctions in such a way as to 'support and reaffirm' tile existing social relation­
Sllips. ships.
For our purposes i it t is sufficient to focus' on two of tllese these functions. The
first was understood by Dumont.· Dumont., e'
An ideology 'cements·' 'cements' -,
a society socie"cy' on tIle the conceptual
plane.
It is a mode of conceptual integration. As Dumont says in a beautifully
lucid phrase: phras'e: 'Hierarchy integrates the· the, society by reference to its values.' I
But ,"/'hile ~fhile while putting emphasiS' emphasis· on this aspect Dumont scarcely mentions the .second.
Because no ideology ever reflects'the reflectstlw tlw existing eXisting social SOCial universe in a clear and
precise fashion (or \.,hat what 1'10uld 1"10uld would be tlw the function of science?) it inevitably distorts,
to some degree, the social perception of reality. This is precisely the
deeper meaning of the hierarchical principle~
principle'~ prinCiple.. For what, after all, is hierarchy?
D1.llllont Dumont Dl4Jllont stresses that it is a matter l)urely purely of 'religious values.ll values.I1 .11
'If "re we vle are
to·generalise, 'generalise, it can' be supposed suppos'ad t11a that t hierarchy, .in the sense 'that i;hat we are using
the VTord vlord \rTord here, and alld in accord ,nth ldth tdth its etymQlogy, etymQl~, never attaches itself to pot"ler pow'er pOl'Ter
as SUCll, such, but always ahlays al'U'lays to relitgious religious functions,.12 t • In otIler other ,fords, l'lords, words, tIle the ideology ideo~ogy ideoJ,ogy encoded
in tIle the structure of ritual ~itual relationships is an ideology 1"/'hich 't'1hic.h whiCh focuses
predominantly on religious functions.
I would uould maintain tilat that this focus by its
very nature ignores that sector of reality reali~ 1"/'hich which ,fhich consists in specifically economic
functions,- that is, the tIle field of tIle the relations of prod~ction, production, tIE the structure of
'pow'er 'power' 'pouer' t
as opposed to 'status'. In allort, short, caste ideology excludes the dominant
structure· structure-of social life "from tl~e
the field of social perception. In this T:lay I'ray ~Tay
it
necessarily distorts that perception.
I have f'ound found in Dumont's rs IS Homo ·Hierarchicus only one passage 11hore lll'lcre uhcre he more
or less explicitly erplicitly erglicitly reco@lises reco~lises recogllises tllis this function of tIle the principle prin

- 31­
-
distribu.tion distribution of pOl'1er, potter, but then you might ask,. if that is the
case, should it not at least reflect···tl1at reflect'that that distribution distribtttion in some 1:Tay, way, "f:Tay,
s since mce in ill practice it never attaches attac11es itself to po~·,er? pOl-Ter? pOtTer?
Generally
speaking, spe~dLng, an ideqlogy ideology orientates or orders reality ~eality rather than
reprOdtlCing reproducing it, and the act of awareness atiareness al'lareness (uprise (lIprise ("prise de conscience")
11 )
is always in'~act fact a choice of o~ one dimension in preference to others:
it is impossible to focus on certain relationships tdthout ,"lithout ~jithout
completely
ignoring (use (IIse (lIse rendant aveugle all) an) others•••13,
In this remarkable passage Dumont grape graps the essential point that an ideology
is not· Simply simply a conceptilll:l conceptual 'integration', and 'intellectual cenlent', cement', but also
an unconscious distortion of the social'uiliverse; universe; ·that the l1ierarcllical hierarchical ideology
necessarily distorts reality by conceal~the structure of 'pOlfer'. 'power'. This
function is as 'essential' as the otller. other. .
To' conclude - we might say' that l'rhile while pOller power is 'subordinate to' ritual
ritt~l rittal
(status) at the conceptual-ideological level, the relationship is reversed ~eversed
at
the level of the total mode of articulation of these structures (status, power),
and that this~versal :reversal is precisely a consequence conseque11ce of the hierarchical principle.
As a 'blind 'blilld 'blil.ld and doctrinaire' matGrialist materialist I am certainly not committed to the
nonsensical view Dumont attributes to 'blind and doctrinaire' mat~rialists,
viz. tl'lat that 'hierarchy means "exploitation"'. , t. •
Jairus Banaji
References
·1. . Thomas O. Beidelman, A Comparative Apalysis Analysis of the Jajmani Ja.jmani System (1959),
6; 74; 75.
6; 74; 75.
2. Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus Hiergrchicus (i966), (1966), 136.
3. , in Caste Cgste Ca.ste and Race (ed. (ad. de Reuck alld and Knigllt, Kni@lt, Knight, 1967), p. 34.
4. Gould, S. W. J., 14 (1958). Cf. Gough JIt.U JRAI 89 (1959) "Like all the l1igher higher
Hindu castes of India, (The Nayars) based their belief in the tIle moral
rightness of the caste system in part upon a racist ideology••• ... 1I n
5. Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus, 137.
6•. Contributions to Indian Sociology 5 (1961); Homo··Hierarchicus Hierarchicus 317;.
Social Inegualities, Inequalities, ad. ed. Betei11e, Beteille, p.353.
7.· 7.' Dumont in Caste and Race (1967), p. 33.
8. _,, Homo Hierarchicus,' Hierarchicus,. p. 141.,
•.
9. ~, p. 318.
9. .ll12:, p. 318.
10. See N. Poulantzas Pouvoir Politigue tique et at Classes Sociales· Sociales' (1968), 223 f.
11. Dumont, Homo Ifierarcllicus, Hierarchicus, 93•. 93.
12. .mg" .lli!!, ~, 318.
13. 1..2il!, .Il2iS., D19., p. 106.
•
14. The relationship betvleen betl-Teen between hierarchy and power is to some extent homologous
homoloG~us
to the tIle (much (mucl1 more problematic) relationship betl-Teen betlTeen bett1gen the visible
symmetry (dualism) (dualis~) and concealed asymmetry (class structt~)
struct1..U'e) structure) of
social formations in Central and Eastern Brazil - Levi-Strauss
American Anthropolo,gist Anthropolo,g;:i.st Anthropologist 46 (1944) and, aDo uDo Dual Organisations Exist?"

-32 -"32- -­
EMOTIon EMOTION AND llJEil1ITIifG
~IlE.luITl\fG NEAIITNQ.
The study-of ·of human emotionality emo·ti.onality has been a part of the subject matter of
social anthropology antlu-opology since tIle the beginning. beginning•. It is perfectly obvious tllat that [nen, men,
in some sense 1Ihich "rhich which I think , would. ~-rou1.d. .. be understood by all, are not affectively
neutral towards the 1'lorld 'ilorld ~1orld and their fello\fs fe110l1s; fello~fs; j this fact has been seized tlpOn upon by
field-v10rkers field-Tt10rkers and theorists in veT'J ve~J very many different ways.
It seems that, more' I
often than not emotion is seen as a speci.flc specific motivation for -action; and theories
in \fhich ~1hich ~fhich emotion emotioll is seen as a specific motivation for bellaviour behaviour have a tendency
to be of an impressionistic or ad hoc character. This is not necessarily a
point against motivation tl~ories; tl\eories; there are probably reasonable grounds for
saying that eV?T'J eV2~J evsr.J person has some kind of intu.itive intLlitive intuitive grasp of tIle the affective life
of every other person regardless 'of culture. But,· 't'rhile l1hile ~-Thile
one might be ready to
admit the generality of phenomena 1'1hich 1I1hiOO irlhich could be categorized as fear, hate, joy,
love, etc., it 1fould would ~'lould
be impossible to establish a priori i-That '-That rdlat would be the
specific occasions for such outbursts.
Emotionality can be seen as part of the symbolic system of a culture,
and inappropl'iate inappropriate emotionali~, emotionality, as our own psychiat~ psychiatry shows, shollfs, can be classified
as mad.
Before a reasol18..ble reasonable use'may be made of "ell1o~ion emotion as an analytic cOl1cept concept
it is clearly necessary for one to have a grasp of the idiom in ltlhich· TtThich ltIhich the tIle phenomenom
meno~ described as emotion occurs., occurs.. As Durkheim Durklleim recogluzed recognized reco~1ized
in The Th.e Elementary
L11ementary:
Dlementary
'. L9~, l.o~, Forms, the ptl-blic p-qblic p~blic expression erl?ression eX"pression of emotion emotio11 may have a highly conventionalized
-;~7ct; as:.)8ct'; .• ect; eLlotionalHy ellotionalHy emotionali-cy mayor "may nC)t not be "true" emotionality hOlfever hOl'lever passionate
seerriDg seening seeraing its m.anifestation.
manifestation.
manifesta.tion.
But for all its use in anthropological discourse, it striltes strikes me that, on
the i'lhole, whole, remarkably little of interest has been said about the social nature
of emotions. Yet .emotionality is a critical experience of ·life and it has been
possible for some to say that it is virtually life itself, or so essential to
life that tllat it would lfould tIould be impossible to :im.agine imagine its absence; cudous curious that tha.t th,lt so little
Sl10uld should be knorm knO'tffi knol'm of it ,\-Then ~-T11en .. deductive considerations .indicate tl1at that its nature natt.1.re
must be profoundly profotmdly social. Here I "dll lo.11 'frlill indicate some possible ap:i?roaches approaches to
its study; for this purpose I llill "dll lIill briefly examine 'Jilliam ~lilliam ~rilliam .Jq.mes .James' _James' I
opinions
on the subject.
James' theory was physiologically based; he believed that every different
"emotion had· a different physical manifestation:
"Here "'Jere "~lere we to go through the 1fhole 't"1hole whole
list of emotions lfhich which have been named by men, and study their organic manifestatiOnsfestations,
11e l'le we should but ring·the ring'the changes on the elements... ••• ~ • Rigidity of this
muscle, relaxation of that, constriction of the arteries here, dilation there •••
etc., etc., etc.·, " (James' Principles of P·sychology: Psychology: 447).· 447).". - He finds this tedious
and proceeds on to a'genera.l a general formulation.
"Our natural vlay vray way of tl1inking thinkil~ thinking about •••
emotions is that ~hat
the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection
called the tIle emotion, and aJ.ld a.'1d that this tllis latter state ·of mind gives rise tOo to the bodily
expression. My theory, on the contrru;-y, contraJ;7, contra:r;-y, is that the bodily changes follow follo1il follo"1
directly the perception of the exciting fact, --and "and that. that" our feeling of ·the
same changes as they occur IS tIle the emotion" (449). Emotion in short, is a
reflex in much the same way as is the jerking of an arm unexpectedly lJut put on
an open flame.
There are many possible objections to this tlleory; theory; I lfill 1fill will fonTard fOr'lTard fonTarcl one of
potential potelltial interest to social anthropology. We ~ve ~

·- .-,33 - ­-
ostention -
'that is a knife'I'that knife'/ttha.t '/'that ~t; ~'; hurts'; and tl'lis this is follo't"led follOl-led follm-1ed by increasing
ability to deal with abstraction a.bs,tract.io~ ·and to' use the generative rules of langu.age
language
'lTith v1ith ui faci!ity. facility. Emotion is a part of pr:i,mi prj,mitive, .exPerience exiierience experience in' much the same l'1SY TtTay ~-lay
that language is, but with the difference .that'emotion is internally generated;
however this tIlls can make no essential difference; diffe~ance; theenotional. theemotional theE!llotional respnse response to an
external event is as much a part of the meaning of this event as are the external
sensory data which gave vTord word Vlord of it; in fact it mi@lt might be said that tIle the effective
response is really the only tIling thing tiling in terms of which the event can be evaluated.
But emotion vTi11 vlill viiI I only be evoked under some circumstances, and many objects
of eXl'erience experience lull will to a large degree be affectively neutral. Language 'Per uer per ~
mayor may not be associated li-1ith with affect-arousing situations &Ld 8J.i.d aL1.d I think that
it· is a valid assumption that language and emotion are theoretically separable
though thougll not necessarily alvlays alTtTays separate. l'U1B.t Hl1B.t tnlat this tllis seems to ~o,
mean is that. that, lTOrdS
HOrdS
and linguistic rules have no necessary sway over the experiencing of events of
great subjective importance. It further seems .to. imply that experiences may
occur for 'tfhicl1 which there is, is.no ready categorical slot within the . person experiencing
them.
This idea is of relevance to pSJTchopatl1010gy psychopathology and °co to the crosscultural
study of emotion; -i;he 'I;he the fonner can' be illustrated through the follo1'ling follo"Ting follo't'd11g
quotation from Karl Jasperts Jasper's General Psychopatllo1ogy Psychopathology (113):
TIle The elementary break-t1u'ough break-through of experiences, "1hich li-rhich which are not ·understandable
in tlleir their genesis, is manifested in unattached feelings. If they t11ey are to become
meaniD0~ul
meaninc~ul meanin&-ful to the,subject, the.subject, these tilese feelings must first search for an object or
try to create one. one~
For instance; instance, unattached anxiety is very common in
depressivestat'es, stat'es, so is a contentless euphoria in manic states ••• so are
tIle the feelings roused at the start of a pregnancy and in tIle tI~
early states of a
psychosis. Driven by an almost inescapable need to give some content to such
feelings, patients l'1ill 'tiill will often supply some content of their Ol'm o~m o~rn
(delusions).
This Tllis refers to persons of more or less our Olm own culture. It is possible
that, where other oth.er. cultures can interpret theirenotional experiences in Jcerms
terms
of spirits, multiple souls, witcllcraft, witchcraft, etc., 'tve l'1e we are only offered the tIle option of
going mad.
It should be noted at tllis this point that I have avoided any definition of
emotion.
Psychologists I1ave have increasingly come to believe tl1at that emotion
cannot be defined in verms terms ~erms
of those stirrings rings which are commonsensically held
to be emotions; vfith w'ith uith each addition to a catalogue, of tllis this nature, any
technical usefulness for tbe the iford i-lord word 'emotion' temotion' t
steadily decreases. •. It uould nould seem
far more useful to define emotion in a developmental and behaviouristic
manner.
This in fact is the way in ill 'ttlhich "rhich l'rhich it lfould l'1ould would have to be defined, if I
am to consider emotion a part of language in tIle the broad sense; it is absurd to
talk of an infant feeling pride, or any sophisticated affective perception
at all, and equally suspect -'co to suppose that such feelings as pride come int 0
being as such auch at some definable developmental stage. 'ile Tife ~fe
must begin witIl i'li vd th primeval
affective responses, and observe them as they differentiate, perhaps fran from a
simple predisposition to activity, Jcbrough through the tIle avoidance and approach
responses associated fTith tlith uith pleasure and pain, etc..
This is surely not to
imply that tIle the problem is likely to be a Simple simple one; hOvlever hOilever hmiever I am given 110pe
hope
by the psychologists 11ho 1111.0 l1ho find that complex affective states may be built out
of simpler elements.
I
If emotions and language are inctllcated inculcated in the same way, and to some
extent in conjunction, then tl1en it soems scems evident tI.at that there should be significant
•
differences be~1een be~feen
be~'1een
tile emotional aspects of the symbolic systems of different
cultures. But tllere there nonetheless all'1ays always remains rema:iJls tIle the fact til8.t tilat t1lat these tllese systems
are inculcated anel'l anew in each individual, and that tilat gross differences may exist
•
betueen betlfeen behTeen individuals of the same culture as a result of different handling•
handling. •
And given that an individual learns a symbolic system directly, as built
out of his oun OlIn own experience, it is at the tIle same time true tllat that thll. t a symbol system is
enforced on him, and tIns tlus this system in~ludes includes manifestations of enlotionality,
emotionality,

- 34;..
~
publically enjoi:ned enjoined as SUCll such or implicitly in 't116 '-;;11e '-(;he behaviour belluviour :patterns ~atterns of others.
Ego sees others acting emotionally (as we w'e lIould would uould describe it) in certain
contexts, and. learns 110l'1 hO,"1 hOl'1 to do so himself if not called Sllort; short. short;- this fact
introduces a real complication into a:ny any empirical study of emotion.
Just 110lT hOlT hon
does the indiVidual individual come tobellave behave as he doe,S? does? And l'lhat, what, ~lhat, after all, does
this mean to him?
Kenny
~lichael ~'lichael
~'Iicllael Kenny
Bibliography
,
Durkheim, E., Elementary Elementazy Forms ForillS ForlllS of the Religious' Life
James, ij., ~J.,
Principles of Psychology.
Jasper, K., General Psychopatholofgv.
Psychopathology.

I
- 35 -­
STEREOTYPES UT. Ill. IN LITmtATURE LITBP..,ATUP..E LI'rnP..ATURE MID AIID AND SCIIDrCE SCI:JNCE
SCIIill'~JCE
Every society societ~T has. a number of images of itself and of .othe other r societies.
These images correspond to the anthropologist's conception of a 'model', the
device by 1'7hich 1"1hich 't'lhich order is made ~de of chaos, discontinuity out of continuity, contint1.ity, so that
the tIle 'myriad impressions' impressions.- 1i'ith ''lith ,'lith whicll which ,re 'tfe ire are 'bombarded', tIle the 'flyx tf1yx 'fIr: of sensations', t,
can be selected, discriminated and therefore made intelliGible.
intellic;ible.
Tllis This model is
a heuristic device/and ,and . its basis, t
if 1'le ":Te we are to accept Levi'-Strauss' Levr~trausst Levi'-3trauss' conception
of mind, lies in tile the veI'J'''' very- velj- categories of the l1uman human conscioUsness consciousness 1'1hich 'l'rhich uhich provides
the· possibility for a fundamental taxonomy for classifying the universe. Thus
the ~he
model involves a process of selection from experience rather than reproduction
of it,l so in the very ve~ nature of a cross-eultural cross-cultural 'image' lie the
seeds of its distortion of 'reality'.
Tllis This image, then, is to be seen as part of the total system of classification
of a people..
And it is thus important to understand the criteria by
uhich tlle the classification is made in order to understand fully 110vl hO'\'l hO'l'1 it operates
on the ground.
Mary Douglas, in her analysis of Judaic classification,2 sho":ls Sl10vlS ShOllS
ho1'7 how the criteria are not merely related to economic, 'functional' aspects of
life but are to be explained in terms of tIl the total cosmology; the pig is forbidden
because it is an anomaly in the tIle system, not because pork is harmful hamful in
hot climates. Levi-Strauss3 Levi-3trauss3 adds some more examples to those cited by Durklleim
Dur~leim Durldleim
and }:Iauss4 Nauss4 in explaining the same principle, and c.md adds that tlley they are 'evidence
'evic1.ence
of thought thot~ht thol~ht
which ~ihich is experienced in all the exercises of specUlation speculation and resembles
I
that tl1at of the tIle naturalists and alchemists of antiq,uity antiquity and the middle ages. a.ges. I
And
11e he provides an example 1fhich 'fhich ~fhich
leads us directly into our present concern, lti.th 11i l1ith
that aspect of the classification system by 11hich 'tlhich i~'hich
members of other htlll1an human Groups groups e;roups
are pigeon-holed; 'The Omaha Indians', he 'frites ifntea iconsider 'consider one of tIle the main differences
betlreen betueen themselves and the wllites whites to be that "Indians ,IIndians tllndians never pick flowers", flOlrers flovlers il it , ! I
that is, never picked piclced them for ·pleasure' pleasure'.5
.. 5
The reason for this .criterion being beint; applied apIJlied aplJlied is that 'plants have sacred
uses lmown known (only) to the secret o'tmers· m~erst mrners t I 'and thus tIle the use of them defines those
T;Tithin ~1ithin ~'litllin
the culture, who have b.ave access to partioular particular plants, and those l'Iithout 't'litll0Ut ~Tithout w'110 who uho
have no such restrictions. restrictions~ Among tIle the Lugbara &1 all an important criterion is distance ­-
those more thana a certain distance from the tIle home culture are conceived of as upside
doun; do~m; down; tI1US thus 'l'lhite tillite uhite people in tlleir their oun own m-m lands 't"lalk ualk on their tl1eir heads.6
And
Evans-Pritchard provides a diagram in !'Teur l-Teur Neur :rt.eligion ::leligion ~eligion
which shows sho1'7s SllOWS the Nuer at the
centre of a series. of concentric circles by 't'lhich which the farther one moves out the
mOi~ mO:L"e mo~~ people are regarded

- 36 -
­
childishness, predilection to anarchy etc. is assumed ass1..uned to derive from the
exigencies of exploitation, from a need to justify the tlle domination of 'che "Glla oche black
man by the white. Trrhite.
~-rhite. These political and economic considerations obviously played
a large part in the dissemination and accepta...J.ce accepta.l1Ce acceptance of the image, but they t11ey do not
account for the origin and nature of the image imaGe itself; it is the tIle object of -cIrls this
article to go beyond tIlese these .. l'lell-uorlted well-uorked rell-Horked tllemes themes to posit t1rl0 hro two further fUl"tller furthar ele1l1ents elements in
the tIle formation forma. of the image of. the 'savage'; (a) SCience, Scie11ce, Science, 1ilhich v1hich w11ich gave the image ima.ge
authority ty al1d and provided the fra.roeuork fra.meuork frarae~Tork of the tIle model.
(b) Literature, "lhich which ~Thicll gave
tIle the image popul

- 37 ­-
;lassupported Ivassupported lvas ;supported by tIle the ve'rJT ve;ry vi;;ry nature natu.re of Victorian class-eonscious class-conscious society.15 TIle
The
un~t unit adopted for pigeon-holing pigeon-l1oling men in this hierarchy vIas ~ias ~ras t11at that of race '"7hich, ';rhich, ~'jhic11,
as
1:e 1~e ue have seen, sGen,leant itself to etlmocentric ethnocentric yalue-judgements. value-judgements. And .-dth with uith tIle the dil­
clilelllLla
of 1'101'1 1101'1 11.01'T tIle the supposed SUP1JOsed. SUPIJOsed equality of man could be reconciled recollcil·ed 1'Ii uith 1That "t'That uha t seeJjled seeJJled seeHed
obvious evidence of the inferiority of sor,lemen, sorJemen, SOfJe ·men, the hierarchy 1'TaS uas rTas SUbStlmed
subsumed
beneath an evolutionary frame.vork framework frame;'1orl:: that "laS was reinforced by the discoveries of
biology and of Darwin.
It could tllUS thus be SCientifically scientifically sCientifically asserted that, llhile w'hile uhile all
emma
men uere were l'Tere ultimately eClual, equal, eCiual, some '\Tere were uere below belou others on tl~
the evolutionaI"'J evolutiona~J evolutionary tree so
had to be looked after by their tlleir superior sttperior st~erior brethren until they had progressed
further. fur.tIler.
TIle The taxnomy of race, the acceptance of both botl1' 'internal' '"internal t
and 'external' 'extemal' t as
criteria of classificdionand classification 'and features fea.tures of lleredity heredity and the hierarchical,
evolutionary framework in lThich which uhich the Ullit unit was race, provided scientists, politicians,
travellers and priests 1'1ith 1'1itl'l l'1ith a model in 't'lhich >-[mch i'ihich tlleir their Ol~nl Olm mm 1vhims wIllms 'Id1ims aJ.ld and vested
interests could receive the tIle validD.t'ion validution validation of science. 'rIle 'fhe politician could claim
that those in an earlier stage of developraent development needed guidance from above, and
.,hile while Vlhile some used the scheme for deliberate delibe:riate delibel'iate exploitation, others genuinely believed
in 'the white w'llit e man's t s burden'; burdent; the tIle anthropologists could classify races according
to hOvl hO'iT hovl friendly 11e he found tllem them to be, hOl'" hOfT hOtT reliGious, religious, intelligelct, intelligeut, industrious,
clean, moral, honest etc.; repressed menbers of Victorian socie~ society could 'project'
their sublimated desires, restricted by a strict code of morals, onto tIle the members
·-of-··otlier"cultures;16 of-'othercultures;16 and idealists and ro.mantics-couldsee rO.mantics···could romantics·couldsee ... see ill in tIle the nee.mass nee.rness nec:'rlleSS of
primitive man to hUlUanity's huraa.ni.ty's humani~ts primeval origins ori{;i.ns scientific proof of the. 'noble
savaG~' savaG'"6' savab~I tl~e!ile. theme. The model ,vas was w'as everything everytl1ing to everyman; and to look for the explanation
of the tl~ tIle phenomenon of Victorian racism only in tlle the particular political
and aJ:ld economic forces of the day is to miss the basis of the phenomenon, 'Iillich 11hich lJ'hicll lies
in a science tllat that provided proyided both the a'Lltl10rity authority for the model and U11d mld Jche the frarael'10rk frame'iTorl:: framework
of the tlw tl~ model itself.
The man in· tl~
the sJcreet, street, hovTever, how'ever, houever, did not read the treatises of Blumenbach
or de Gobineau, though he may 't"lell liell well have heard, or read in his newspapers, what
"TaS lIas uas made of t~.lem t'.leJll by Knox and later Hunt.. TIle The model, J though, percolated perColated through througll
and along with vTith it the teChniques techniques for its application and a.nd tlw tl~
authority for such
usage. ,And the medium for the dissemination of scie11tific scientific views .. vlas vTas TaS tIle the mass
media; tilis this may include il~lud.e
sermons from tIle the pulpit, pUlpit, such news'l'Torthy nells!rl0rthy .. lorthy events as the
ape versus angel controversJr controversy at Oxford, the tIle repercussions of tIle the Jamaica ·uprising,
the Great Exhibition and the tIle tlw travels of 1ivin:sstone. LivinGstone.
Livin~stone.
But the partictl.lar particular feature
,·vle ",e vTe
are concerned with here is popular fiction, which whicil \'Te 'toTe l'le can use from our 20th
century vantage point as an index for what t1le the 'man in the street' thOUgllt thought at
that tl1at time.
A A'spate of novels about Britain's overseas territories and the activities
. of travelliers &ld mld ru1d colonists arose in tl~ tlw 1880's t s to replace the introverted
domestic 'novel with tales of dramatic dr~atic
open-air events in exotic lands. And
this literature, literature', provided bJ by T suell such "Triters 'l'Triters l"lriters as lCipling, Kipling, Rider IIaggard, IIliggard, Haggard, John Buchan,
Bertram lIitford, IIitford, Nitford, Edgar lfallace VTallace ~'lallace and Conan Doyle, many of. 1i1hom ,·Thom tlhom had spent some time
in the tIle countries they dramatised provided 'the public vIith "li 'iIi t>eir t~)eir
t.~).eir 'knowledge' 'lmOl'Tledge' I of
the peoples of these tl~se exotic lands.17 But the iiterature literature itself, for all its' .
-
indiVidual individual variations from author to author,had--inherited author,had··inheri autllor" J .had····inherited a traditional frame­
"ork lTork of its olm, o'm, o11n, and ,'las 't1as tiaS SUbject subject to certain conventions and techniques which
lihich
further served to delimit the ethnography according to English concepts and
values.
The noble savage tradition took a I1ard hard blo'l'l blovI blo1tl 1vhen l1hen l'1hen travellers began to bring
back; tales of savagery but it never died entirely and the tIle literature of tIle
the
period revolves around the debate between 'primitivism' and 'progress', ~lhich· trlhich'
~lhich'
10is Lois 11hitney Uhitney \Hri.tney has .traced back to the 18th century.18 cent~Je18
cent~J.18
Given tIle the .framework of the
discussion and the tIle criterion of 'progress' romantic ",riters writers vlri-ters could transfer their
traditional tradiJ~io11al themes into contemporary jargon.' In Some some cases a reconciliation reconciliaJcion is
attel:..1pted attel:..rpted atteL...1Pted by presenting the llhite uhite mn· LJan' asa .a a noble savage, as in tIle the Tarzan
stories;19 in ma11y matty many the framel'10rk tramel-lork frame~,ork
of tIle the journey to a lost lane}. lanq. enables tIle the gap
bet1-reen betl'leen be~leen advances, &ld and 'pritlitive' 'prinitive 'primitive'to t to be represented in· vivid, imagindtive
imagin~,tive
symbols, huge mountaill mountain ranges, sun-blistered deserts and gaping chasms, far
more memorable than tI1an the tIle scientific treatises that 1"Tere 1:-lere tTere making the saLle sane point;
the tIle old chivalric tradihon tradition tradi"c.ion lived on to. pr~~enJc
pre~ent prel?ent tIle the exotic land as a dream
d1~eam
.. vTorld, vlorld, ,orld, ,a .a faery land in '"lInch uhich trlri.ch the traveller~ travellers are. al~e s~l1g'knights shining and the in- in­

0
- 38.-
--- "" ---...._..- ....­
.. -- ~ -.-~
- 38.- 38~habitants
strange, grotesque, il1l1uriian inhur.ian lll.huriian figures vIllose vIhose vThose disturbing •foreigness 'foreigness 'foreign8ss f t is
further emphasised by tIle the Gothic style in ll11icb. uhich rla;.w ])la~1"':.r Pla;.w of th~~:h~ th\;;da th\;isa novels "Tere tIera I'rere
trritten. l-rritten. ~-Tritten. The T}~.e. vcry very nature of such fiction, fiction. tl:~c -ccco "i;~'G crea,;;'on cree_:,.i.on cree":J~on of flat, one-dimensional
figures ,"}~03e
1~~0se
lll~.ose
character can be inferred from tlleir their physical appearance, fits all
too neatly J
r
the scientific confusion of internal and external characteristics. 5.':ld ,:l.:ld }~ld
the tIle noble savage tradition, in'Vlhich i'Thich i'lhich shepherds, 'natives', I, ::md and childre:i111era children ,-Tere ,-rere all
attributed similar qualities, likewise fits the scientific sc~entific theory that primitive
men, being earlier earli~r stages in tbe tl1e tIle evolutionary development of illuropeall J!]uropean liiuropean man, m.an, could
be seen as children lihere where the European races were I-Tere i-rere adult.
Thus tIle the traditional traditiolla1 techniques of the medium lrlhich vThich vlhich disselllinated disseruinated disseminated ·elle the scientific
!mowledge know'ledge knotiledge of the age to a .. vrider Tider public contributed to tb.e the frametlork frammlOrk frammTork of tll0ught thoubht thou,;-ht
in which Wllich other cultures vlere were considered; science vIas lras strallled strained througll tl1rougll the sieve of
fiction. Any A:ay AIry future futw.'e fut~~e travellers vTould would vrould see exotic lands through the spectacles
provided by science and literature and bring home further repol'ts repo~ts of. tile the 'savagery'
and 'primitiveness' t primitivel1ess I of other cultures cultux·es to add to the. body of 'proof' t validating a
framevlork framevlOrk framev;ork that tllat vTas vIas thus tllUS self-sufficient.
The extentto which political and economic and religious motivations motivatiOl1s motivatioll8 served to
further furtller reiaforce rei:nforce reinforce the tIle image, and to fill out its content, must thus tllUS be considered
in the light of these tvlO two important elements vnlich vrhich which provided such a considerable
cOl1Siderable
consid.erable
part of the tJle model then, and to a disturbingly large extent,· extent,' - continue COlltinue to do so
today. today_ 1nlile :fllile ~nlile the anthropological ideas have been subject to tIle the rigou..l"S riGours riGov~s of
academic scllo1arship scholarship and llave have radically chang'ed changed chanG~d since tIle the 19th celltt:lr~r, century, centt~y. the literature
'JThich which vlhich first presented such views Viel'lS vievls to a .dder ~iider inder p~blic public continues to be :read ~ead J;'ead and
tat~ht
tal~ht in schools today and has thus fossilizedumllY fossilized.mal~ many outdated academic ideas in
a vivid, memol'able memo:Lable memo~able ... ,fay lla3r that IJrovides provides tIle the 'proof' tproof' as 1"Ie11 well ';Jell as the framewol'l: framellorl: framelTol'l: for
many current prejudices.
Brian v. street
References
1.
V. v. Woolf, The Common Reader, 1928; her criticism of the 'naturalistic' school
of I'Triting vTriting' vrritillg was that 11e >Te can only knOll !movT knovT experience through throtlgh selection, ~'le ;ie we
cannot hope to reproduce it.
2. lYl. M. Douglas, Purity and Dang8r, Danger, Ch. ell. 3, 1966.
, -
°
3. Levi-Strauss, G., C., The Savagel1ind, Ilind, llind, London 1966, , p. 42.
4.
Durkheim, Durldleim, E. and l~Tauss, r-1auss, r-'Iauss, E., II' H., t Primitive Classification. Classification, trans. tral1s. Needllam Needham 1963.
5... Levi-Strauss, Levi-Btrauss, Ope op. ere. cit, p. 43.
6.
Middleton, Luabara Lu~bara Religion, 1956.
7. Evans-Pritchard, Evans-Pritchnrd, Evans-Pritcbard, E., Nuer Religion, 1956.
8. Burridge, K., NevI Ne"T NelT Heaven, Heaven. Neii Net'1 Ne,,/" Earth, 1969.
9. The TIle Bible itself viaS iIIasnot Vias .not necessarily 1 disproved' disprovedt by Dartlfinism; Darwinism; ICingsley Kingsley amongst
others, publicly shoued sholled hO"1 hOlf 110~1 tlle3; the~r they could be reconciled; but tIle the public believed
the tIle Bible had lost lo~t its aut110rity authority ty and ..tCl1is this is· 'tthat l"lhat what mattered. But cf. of.
10. These ,-Tords words HOrdS are appropriate since there are elements in the 19th century cent~ dOvrn dOvm of values of tIle the 'cargo cult' phenomenon ,-rhich l'1hich l"lhich Burridge claims involves
're-integration',
fre-integration'". '.
11. Bendyshe, The lU1thropolorrica1. AnthropoloPjical Anthropological Treatises of· Blumenbach, 1865.
12. 1J21.q. ~. Introduction.
13. e.e. ff8 de Gobineau, l'i.J11ID.on l~unon, t Lapouge, Cuvier, Lamarck, Pricl1ard Prichal~ (though l1e he dis... distil1t,~ishetino

CONTENTS
EDITORIAL NOTE • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
IEVY-BRUHL'S IEVY-ERUHL'S 'r!iEORY 'rHEORY OF PRIMITIVE riJENTALITY
Professor E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Evans-Pritchard. Institute of Social
Anthropology, Oxford.
39
UNDERSTANDING IN PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
AllanHanson. Assistant Professor,i'h;Universi:l;y Professor. Th;University of
Kansas
A DEFENCE OF WINCH 71
Paul Heelas, Heelas. Institute of Social Anthropology~
Oxford.
61
REPLY TO HEELAS
.ATI.an Arran Hanson
78
ARE "PRIMITIVES" NECESSARY?
Wendy James, Institute of Social Anthropology, Oxford. 82
THE ''FREE COMPETITION OF THOUGHTtI THOUGHT" - A CRITIQUE
Mike Maguire, Institute of Social Anthropology ,Oxford. 84
THE GENESIS OF SCIENTIFIC RACISM
Andrew Lyons, Institute of Social Anthropology, Oxford. 91
BOOK REVIEWS:
Mary Douglas by S. Milburn
Ernest Gellner:by py Mary Douglas 101
NOTES:,rilm ;Film for 'the Revelation of Society, by David Seddon. '102
' ;'.
;"
";'-.
,"
,.;.' ,
.:.-.~ ..
,:,',~ , .

- i ­
-
.---...... '---......
EDITORIAL NOTE
!:~..: !:~;.: - t;.f:·/;~·-:: );.f:·/;\;·'::
The :i~ea for this co'llection of es~ys i, i -, _. 'hropology has come "': ""
from the graduate students of the Sub-Faculty If ~ Anthropology at
Oxford:
in particular from those of the Inst±tute of Social Anthropology
. , and the Department of Ethnology:. Papers given at.graduate ,graduate seminars l
and preliminary ideas arising ariSing from work for the Diplomas and higher
degrees, l very often merit wider circulation and discussion, l without
necessarily being ready for formal ~ublication
in professional journal~.
There is a need for some intermediate form of exchange.
The Oxford
University Anthropological Society SOCiety l~s
agreed to act as pUblisher publisher for
this venture and has established a Journal Sub-Committee for the
purpose.
The Editors are grateful to the Radcliffe-Brown Memorial
Fund for a subsidy to help with the initial cost.
It is hoped to produce at least one issue per term.
Articles will
be welcomed from Diploma, B.Litt. and D. Phil. students in social and
other branches of anthropology, and from people in related disciplines
interested in social an~hropology.
Letters, comments, reviews, and
similar material, as well as contributions from tutors, will also be
welcome.
It is hoped that these essays in anthropology will prOVide provide a
a
focus for the discussion of work being done at Oxford.
It will make
it easier for research students to avoid any tendency to become
isolated. isolated, and for Diploma students to enter into discussion across
tutorial boundaries.
For the present, it is preferred that the main
emphasis should be upon analytical discussion rather than on
description or ethnography.
Professor E. Eavns-Pritchard Eavns-Pritcherd is retiring at the end of this term after
a distinguished period of 24 years as Professor at the Institute of Social
Anthropo~gq AnthroPO~9'q in Oxford. '.
He has ldndly ',¥J.owe~';~:'to ',¥lowe~';~:' re-publish his impoJ'tant.
impoJ'tant,
essay on (!Levy l!Levy Bruhl's s Theory of Prirnitive Me#:taiity", MeJteaii tyU, and the extra cost
of this has been met by subscription from thoS~
students and staff who wish
to express their gratitude to E...P. EyP. for his help and inspiration over the
years.
x x x x x
There are still a number of copies of Vol. I. r. No.1. available
and if anyone would like to purchase some would they please write to
the editors, enclosing 3/- per copy (to cover post and packing).
FORMAT
Papers should be as short as is necessary to get point over.
As a general rule l
they should not exceed 4,000 words, but a wide
range of shorter contributions will be welcome.
For future issues,
papers should be submitted following the conventions for citations,
notes, and references used in the ASA monographs. Communications
should be addressed to the Editors at the Oxford University UniverSity Institute
of Social Anthropology, 51 Banbury Road, Oxford.

-39­
-39-
,
.LEVY-BRUHL' . S 3 THEORY OF PRIMITIVEMENTALI'lY *
L
This essay is a continuation of my paper on "The Intellectuallst 1
.(Enclish) (EnGlish) Interpretation of Magic" in the last number of our Bulletin.
In that paper I gave an account, and made a critical analysis of the
theories of Tylor and Frazer about primitive thought, especially thought
relating to magical practices.-
These theories were severely criticised
from two camps.
Marett and a number of subsequent writers attacked
them for paying attention exclusively to the cognitive processes of
primitive thought and neglecting the affective states which give rise
to them.
Durkheim and his School 3chool attaoked them for trying to explain
orimitive thought in terms of individual psychology and totally
~eglecting its social character. On its critical side Levy-Bruhl's
tevy-Bruhl's
theory of primitive mentality is Similar similar to that of the Annee
Sociologigue group of writers but on its constructive si~'has a
character of its i ow~ and has had wide enough' influence to merit
seoarate treatment. .
• - I
In France and Germany LBvy-Bruhl's ~iews
have been extensively
examined and critioised and it is difficult to understand Why why they have
met with so great neglect and derision among English anthropologists.
Their reception is perhaps partly due to the key expressions expreSSions used by
ISvy-Bruhl Levy-Bruhl in his writings, writings. such as "prelogique", "representations
collectives", "mystique", "participations", and so forth.
Doubtless
it is also due in part to the uncritical manne~
in which IevnJ-Bruhl
teV'J-Bruhl
handled his material which' was often of a poor quality in any case.
But responsibility must be shared by his critics who made little effort
to grasp the ideas which lay behind the cumbrous terminology in which
they were frequently expressed and who were far too easily contented to
pick holes1n the detail of his arguments without mastering his main
thesis. Too TOO often they merely repeated his views under the impression
that they were refuting them.
In this essay Levy-Bruhl's. main thesis
is examined. and is tested in its application to the facts of magic.
Its application to other departments of social life, e.g. language
and systems of numeration. is not considered.
Like Durkheim Levy-~ defines sooial facts by their generality,
by their transmission from generation to generation, and by their
compulsive cotripulsive character.
The English SChool School make the mistake of trying
to explain social facts by processes of individual thought, and, worse
still, still. by analogy with' their.own patterns of thought which are the
produot of different environmental oonditions from those which have
moulded the minds which they seek to understand.
"Les "!.es 'explicationsr r de l' I'ecole anthropologique angla1se.. n'etant
Jamais que vraisemblables~
restenttouJoursaffectees d'un coefficient
de doute, doute. variable selo11 les cas.
Elles 'prennent pour accorde que les
voies qui nous paraissent, a nous, conduire naturellement a certaines
" , ~
croyances et a certaines pratiques, sont precisement celles par ou
"
ont passe les membres des societes ou se manifestentces croyances
et ces pratiques.· Rien de plus hasardeux que ce postulat, qui ne se
verifierait peut-etre pas einq fois sur cent".} .
The mental content ·of the ind1vidual is derived from, and explained
by, by. the collective representations of his society.
An explanation of
the social content of thought in terms of individual psychology is '
disastrous.
How oan we understand belief in spirits merely by saying,
as Tylor does, that they arise from an intellectual need to account for
phenomena?
Why should there be a need to explain the phenomena. of
dreams when this need makes itself so little felt about other phenomena?
Rather should we try to explain such notions as belief in spirits by .
stressing the fact that they are collective notions and are imposed on
the individual from without and, therefore, are a product in his mind
* Extract from the Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Vol. 11, II, Part I.

- 40 -­
of faith and not of reason.
Levy-Bruhl LevY-Bruhl then develops his own point of view.
Collective
representations explain individual thought and these collective
representations are functioIlS functloIlS" "of.institutions# # so that we may suppose
as social structures vari vary the collective 'representations 'representat1ons wIll show
concomitant variations.
"Les illes series de faits sociaux sont solidaires les unes ('}s autres, autres#
et elles se conditionnent reciproquement.
Un tYPe t~ de societe delini, delini#
qui qUi a
ses institutions et ses moeurs propres, aura dono done aussi, aussi#
necessairement# sa mentalite propre.
A des types sociaux differents
d1fferents
oorrespondront des mentalites mentalltes differentes. differentes# d'autant plus que les
institutions et les moeurs memes ne sont au fond qu'un certain aspect
des representations collectives# que ces representations# pour ainsi
dire, dire# considerees objectivement.
On se trouve ainsi conduit a concevoir que
l'etude comparative des differents types de societes humaines ne se "
separe pas de l'etude comparative des representations collectives et des
liaisons de ces representations qui qUi dominent dans ces societies".4
Nevertheless it may be said at the outset that Levy-Bruhl Levy-Brubl in his works
does not attempt to correlate the beliefs which he describes with the
social structures of the peoples among whom they have been recorded.
He
makes no effort to prove the determinist assumption set forth in the
above quotation nor to explain why we find similar beliefs in two
societies with quite qUite different structures.
He contents himself with
the broad generalization that all primitive peoples present uniform "
patterns of thought when contrasted with ourselves.
We are logically orientated# or; as one might say# scientifically
orientated# in our thought.
Normal+y we seek the causes of phenomena
in natural processes and even when we face a phenomenon whioh we cannot
account for SCientifically scientifically we assume that it appears mysterious to us
only because our knowledge is as yet insuffici~nt to explain it. While
to primitive minds there is only one world in which causation is normally
attributed to mystical influences, even those among us who accept theological
teachings teaohings distinbruish distiIl{"ruish a world subject to sensory impressions impreSSions from a
spiritual world which is invisible and intangible.
We either believe
entirely in natural laws or if we admit mystical influences we do not
think that they interfere in the workings of an ordered universe.
"Ainsi# la nature au milieu de laquelle nouS vivona vivons est# pour
a1nsi dire. intellectualisee d'avance.
Elle est ordre et raison#
comme l'esprit qui la pens&; et qui s'y mente
ment.
Notre activite aotivite quotidienne,
quotidienne.
jusque dans ses'plus humbles details# implique une tranquille et parfaite
confiance dans l'invariabilitedes lois naturelles".5
Primitive peoples on the other hand are mystically mystioally orientated in
their thought# that is to"say their thought is orientated towards the
supernatural.
They normally seek the causes qfphenomena in supernatural
processes and they refer'any new or unusUal occurrence"to one or other of
their supernatural categories.
"Bien d1fterente d1f(erente (from oUrs) est 1 l' ' attitude de l'esprit du primitif•
tU •
Ia La nature au milieu de laquelle il vit se present~ a i lui sous un tout
autre aspect.
Tous les objets obJets et toUS" les ;tres y sont imp1iques dana
dans
un reseau de participations et d'exclusions mystiques:
c'est elles qui
en font la contexture et l'ordre.
C'est donc elles qui s'imposeront
stimposeront
d'abord dtabord a son attention et qui. qUi. seules, le retiendront.
S'il est
interesse par un phenomene# .. s'il ne se borne pas-a pa's'i le percevoir# pour
ainsi ainsl dire passivement et sans reagir# reagir. i1 songera aussitot. aussitot'# comme par
une sorte de reflexe mental, a i uge pUissance puissanoe occulte ooculte et invisible d9nt ce
phenomene est la manifestation".
leVy-Bruhl LeVy-Bruhl asks why primitive peoples do not inquire into causal
connections which are not self-eVident.
self-evident.
In his opinion it is useless to
reply that it is because they do not take the trouble to inquire inqUire into

- 41 ­
-
them for we are left~'with' th' the further question, why they do not take this
trouble.
The correct answer is that savages are prevented from pursuing
enquiries into the workings of nature by their collective representations.
These formalised patterns of thought, feeling, and behaviour, inhibit
any cognitive,affective, o~ motor, activities whioh conflict with them.
For example, when a savage is killed by a buffalo, he'often heorten enough refers
the occurrence to 5upernaturalcauses, normally to the action of witchcraft.
In his sooiety death is' due to witchcraft and witchcraft is
proved by death.
There is obviously no opening for a purely scientific
explanation of how death has occurred for it is a~cluded ~J social
doctrines.
This does not riot mean that· the savage is incapable of rational
observation.
He is' well aware that the dead man was killed by a buffalo
but he believes that the buffalo' would not have killed him unless
supernatural foroeshad also operated.
ritvy-Bruhl's ~vy-Bruhl's
point of view is perhaps best set forth by giving a
a
couple of examples from his works of the type of thought which he
'oharacterises as primitive and prelogical.
Thus he quotes Miss
Kingsley about the belief of West African Negroes that they will suatain
an injury if they lost their shadows.
Miss Kingsley writes:­
writes:-
"It strikes one as strange to see men who have been walking, say,
thrOUgh through forest or grassland, on a blazing hot morning quite happily, on
arrival at a piece of clear ground or a village square, most carefully
go round it, not ac~oss,
and you will soon notice that they only do this
at noontime, and learn that they fear losing their shadow.
I asked
some Bakwire I once came ac~oss who we~e partioularly particularly careful in this
matter, Why why they were not anxious about losing their shadows when night
·came ,came down and they disappeared in the surrounding darkness, and was
told that was alright; because at night all·shadows lay down in the
shadow of the Great God, and so got stronger. Had, Had. I not seen, seen. how
strong and how long a shadow, be it of man or trr or of o£ the great
mountain itself, was in the early morning time?"
It is evident from Miss Kingsley's account that tha't the West African
idea of a shadow is qUite different from ours and that, indeed, it
exoludes ours since a man cannot both hold our idea of a shadow as a
a
negation of light and at the same time believe that a man so partioipates
participates
in his shadow that,if he cannot See it he has lost it ,and will beoome
ill in oonsequence.
The seoond example, from New GUinea, illustrates
in the Sattle same manner the incompatibility of our View view of the universe with
that held by savages:­
savages:-
"A man returning from hunting or fishing is disappointed at his
empty game-bag, or canoe, and turns over in his mind how to disoover discover who
would be likely to have bawitched bewitched his nets.
He perhaps raises his eyes an
-and - sees a member of a neighbouring friendly village on his way to pay
a visit.
It at once ooours occurs to him that this man is the sorcerer and
watching his opportunity, he suddenly attaoks attacks him'and kills him".s
him".B
Responsibility for failure, failure· is- known beforehand and the socially
determined' cause excl.udes excludes any endeavour to discover the natural cause of
absenoeof fish or game or inability inabi1.1ty to catch them.
From many hundreds of examples of the kind .Just ,Just cited emerge the
'two propositiona propositions which together form Levy-Bruhl's s thesis: that there
are two distinct types of thought,9 mystical thought and logical thought;
and. that of these two types of thought the mystical type is charaoteristic
characteristic
of primitive sooieties and the logioal type is characteristic of
oivilized sooieties.
These two propositions are stated Qy Levy-Bruhl
in his Herbert Spenoer Lecture as follows:- fol.lows:­
"I. "1. Il II existe une 'mentalite primitive', caracterisee par son
orientation mystique, par un certain membre d'habitudes mentales, et
speoialement par la loi de participation~
participation, qui y coexiste coex1ste avec les
lea
prinoipes logiques.
Elle est remarquablement constante dans les
societas d1tes inferieures.

- 42 ­
-
2. Elle se dlstingue nettement de la notre, mals elle n'en est
pas separee par une sorte de fosse. Au contraire~ l dans les societes
societas
les plus I 'civilisees
I
'
on en e.n apercoit sans peine des traces et plus que
des traces. Dans nos campagnes~ l et jusque.dans jusquedans nos grandes villes~ l on
n'aurait pas a chercherloin pour rencontrer des gens qui pensent~
l
sentent,
et meme mame agissent commedes primitifs.
Peut-etre faut-il aller plus
loin encore, et reconnaftre reconna!tre que dans tout esprit humain. l
quel qu'en
soit le Ie d.eveloppement intellectuell subsiste un fond indBr~cinable
de
mentalite primitive ••• "10 lila
As often happens when an author has to sif'tagreat I)'laSS I)1aSS of material
of uneven range and qualitYI quality~
Levy-Bruhl has sometimes handled his
material carelessly and he has been much criticised on this score. scorel the
works contra Levy-Bruhl being by this time almost as numerous as his own.
Insofar as these works ll are more than mere criticism of detail, detail. they aim
·at 'at proving that savages have a body of practical knowledge;
that they
think logioally and are capable of sustained interest and effort; that
the mystical thOUght thought we find in primitive societies can be paralleled in
our own;
and that many of the ideas regarded by Levy-Bruhl as mystical
may not be so lacking in objective foundations as he imagines.
In my
opinion most of this criticism is very ineffective, disproving what noone
holds to be proved.
It seldom touches Levy-Bruhl's main propositions.
His theory of primitive mentality may distort savage thought but it would
seem better to correct the distortion than to dismiss the theory
completely.
I ·shall 'shall not repeat here all the charges which have been brought
against Levy-Bruhl·but shall draw attention only to the more serious
methodological deficiencies of his work.
These obvious deficiencies
are as follows:
firstly~he I makes savage thought far more mystical than
it is; is.; secondlyI
secondly~ he makes civilised thought thol..lght far more rational than it
is; third!YI third1y~
he treats. all sagage cultures as though they were uniform
and writes of civilised cultures without regard to their historical
development.
(1) Levy-Bruhl relies on biased accounts of primitive mentality.
Most of his facts are taken from missionary and travel reports and he
uses uncritically inferences of untrained observers.
We have to bear
in mind that these observers were dominated by the representations
collectives of their own culture which often prevented them from seeinG
the admirable logic of savage critics, critics. thereby attributing to savages
impermeability to experience which in some matters might with greater
justice be ascribed to themselves.
Whom is one to accuse of 'prelogical
mentality', mentality'. the South African missionaries miSSionaries or the Negroes of whom they
record that "they only believe what they see" and that "in the midst of
the laughter and applause of the populace~
I
the heathen enquirer is heard
saying 'Can the God of the' the· white men be se~n \'Tith \'11 our eyes
•••••••••••
and if Morimo (God) is absolutely invisible inviSible how can a reasonable being
worship a hidden ·thiJ?g?' ,thiJ?g?' "~ ..
. Who, in this instance disp],ays "a de9ided dis.taste dis-taste for, for. reasoning?".
reasoning?lI.
These Negroes belieyed in their ,own invisible beings' beings· butoonsidered
ridiculous the invisible beings of the missionaries.
The m1ssionaries~ l
on their Side,' side l ' believed' believed· in the invisible beings of their own culture
but rejected with scorn the invisible beings of the Negroes who~ l
they
concluded, were impermeable to experience.
Both missionaries and Negroes
alike were dominated by the collective representations of their cultures.
Both were alike oritical when their thought was not determined by social
doctrines.
It is also necessary to bear in mind, when assessing the value of
reports on savage custom and belief. l
that Europeans are inclined to
record the peculiar in savage cultures rather than the commonplace.
Missionaries M1ssionaries~ l moreover, I naturally show a keener interest in ideas
expressed by savages about the supernatural than in their more mundane
thoughts and activities, I
and consequently they have stressed religious
and magical belief to the disadvantage of other aspects of social life.

.. 43 ­
-
Levy-Bruhl's thesis is weakened not only by uoeritical use of
authorities, but also by the comparative method which he us

.. 44 -­
But; whilst he tells us what missionaries, traders, pol~tical
officers, and explorers, say about savage thought, he does not inform us
what philosophers, logicians, and psychologists, ancient and modern, say
about civilised thought. This procedure is inadmissible.' Clearly it
is necessary to describe the colle'ctJ.ve collective representations of Englishmen
and Frenchmen with the same iJripartiali impartiality ty and minuteness with which
anthropologists describe the' collective representations of Polynesians,
Melanesians, and the aborigines of Central and Northern Australia, if we
are to make a comparison between the two.
Moreover, in describing the
thought of Europeans it is desirable to distinguish between social and
occupational strata.
If ~VY-BrUhl ~VY-BrUh1 had stated that when he spoke of civilised mentality
he referred to the type of thought found among the better educated classes
of Europe in the twentieth century he would have exposed himself less to
the criticism that it is possible to produce a parallel belief among
European peasants to almost every belief instanced by him as typical of
primitive mentality.
This criticism would then have been irrelevant
because such beliefs are regarded as superstitious by the educated
classes.
Levy-Bruhl admits that there are many evidences of primitive
mentality in civilised countries, even among educat~d
people, so that my
criticism of Frazer for comparing the European scientist with the savage
magician instead of comparing ritual with scientific behaviour in the
same culture. either savage or civilised, is also pertinent to Levy­
Bruhl's r s writings.
To this point I return later.
(3) Like many other writers L6vy-Bruhl u{vy-Bruhl treats all peoples whom we
regard as savages or barbarians as though they were culturally uniform.
If patterns of thought are functions of institutions, as he himself
asserts, we might reasonably demand that a classification of institutior.a.l
institutior~l
types should precede a study'of ideational types.
There are grave
objections to illustrating primitive mentality by taking examples from
Polynesians, Africans, Chinese, and North American Indians and treating
these examples as of equivalent eqUivalent significance, for even in contrast with
European culture the cultures of these peoples present little uniformity.
In the same way he writes of European culture in vague terms as though it
also were uniform.
I,have already mentioned his failure to distingUish
between social and occupational strata.
Also Europeans peoples have
not an identical culture.
But from this point of view the most damag:j.ng
damag:!.ng
criticism of r..evy-Bruhl Levy-Bruhl is that he makes no effort to distinguish betw~en
beb/E?en
prevalent modes of thought in Europe at different historical periods.
Mystical and scientific thought can best be compared, as suggested above,
as normative ideational types in the same society, or their historical
development in relation to one another can be traced over a long period
of history in a single culture.
I.e-;ty-Bruhl argues that mystical
thought is distinctive of primitive cultures and scientific thought is
distinctive 'of civilised cultures.
If this is :i.s correct then it'ought
to be possible to show how we who at the present tim~ ar~ civilised
changed our collective representations on our emergePce from barbarism.
Do the English of the 12th century'exemplify exemplHy civilised Civilised mentality or
primitive mentality? , This question is not only relevant but it is
imperative that we should know LeVy-Bruhl's anSwer to it if we are to,
consent to his views.
But he neglects the issue.
If we are to regard English thought in the early Middle Ages as
Pre'iogique, Pr~logique, and it is difficult to see how we can avoid doing so when
such peoples as the Chinese furnish Ievy-Bruhl Levy-Bruhl with many of his examples
of primitive mentality, .. then it is desirable to trace the history of
the development of scientific thought in England and to investigate the,
sociological conditions that have allowed its emergence and"growth.
Moreover, if an author compares civilised with primitive mentality and
illustrates these from the cultures of different peoples, one expects
a clear definition of 'civilisation' and 'primitiveness' so that one may
test his theory historically.
The criticisms of Levy-Bruhl's theories which I have already
mentioned, and I have by no means exhausted the objections to his views,
are so obvious and so forcible that only books of exceptional brilliance

- 45 ­
-
and originality could have survived them.
Yet each year fresh polemics
appear to contest his writings and pay tribute to their vi~d.lity.
I
suggest that the reason for his writings, in spite of their methodological
deficiencies, still exercising a powerful powerfUl influence on anthropological
anthropologIcal
thought is due to the facts that he perceived a scientific problem of ,
.
cardinal importance and that he approached this problem along soOiological
lines inste~ of contentiDg himself' witl;1 the, the· usual psychological platitudes.
We must not, therefore, dismiss his writings with contempt, as many
anthropologists do, but must try to discover what in them will stand
the test of criticism and may at th~'
same, time be considered an original
contribution to science. , We can best Undertake this task by asking
ourselves the following questionS:
(a) Are primitive modes of thought
So different from modes of thought current among educated. Europeans that
the need arises to define wherein the difference lies and to explain it?
(b) What does Levy-Bruhl is
t I.evy-Bruhl mean when he says that primitive thought 'prelogical'??
(c) What does he mean by tcollective 'collective representations'?
(d) What does he mean by 'mystical'? t ?
(e) What does he mean by
part1cipations participations'?
t ?
(a) In his writings I.evy-Bruhl levy-Bruhl cites the observations of dozens
of educated Europeans on primitive custom and belief and shows that 'they
frequently found savage ideas incompatible with their way of thinking.
MaDy of these Europeans ~lere
observers who had ,long . experience of
savages and were of the highest integrity.
Thus no one knew the Maori
better than Elsdon Best who wrote of them:
"The tiThe mentality of the Maori ,is of an intensely mystical nature ••••
•••••We • • hear of many singular theories about Maori beliefs and Maori
thought, but the truth is that we do not understand either, and, what
is more, we never shall.
We shall never know the inwardness of the
native mind.
For that would mean retracing our steps for many
centuries, back into the dim past, far back to the time when we also
'possessed the mind of ~rimitive man. And the gates have long closed
on that hidden road".l rOad".l
'
.
Miss Kingsley is recognised to have been an incomparable observer
of the life of the West African Negro of whom she wrote:
"The African mind naturally approaches all things from a spiritual
point of view •••••• things happen because of the action of spirit upon
spirit".15
However, in order to meet the possible objeotion that these
Europeans were not trained anthropologists and were unused to striotly
scientific methods of investigation, I will quote passages from the .
.
recent writings of three anthropologists who have had Wide wide fieldwork
experience as further evidence that this incompatibility between savage
and civilised modes of thought really ~ists and was not imagined by
Levy-Bruhl.
I.evy-Bruhl.
Prof. and Mrs. Seligmariwrlteofthe Seligmeulwrlteofthe tribes. tribes, of o.f the Pagan
Sudan,:' , . ',. '., .. ., .
'
"On this subject (of magic) the black man and the white regard.
regard,
each other with amazement;
each considers the behaviour of the other.
other,
incomprehensible, totally unrelated. to everyday exgerience, and entirely
disregarding the known laws of cause and effect".1
Mr. Fortune writes of the Dobuans:
"Behind this ritual idiom there stands a most rigid and never­
naverquestioned
dogma, learnt by every child in infancy, and forCed home by
countless instances of everyday usage based upon it and. meaningless
without Without it or in its despite.
This dogma., dogma, in general, is that effects
are secured by incantation, and that without incantation such effects
oannot aome come to pass ••••• In brief, there is no natural theory of yam
growth, of the powers of canoe lashings of fish nets" nets, of gift exchange
in strange places plaoes overseas, of disease and death, of wind and rain, of

- 46 ­
-
love between man and woman.
All these things oannot possibly exist in
their own right.
All are supernatural]; supernatural]:r oreated by the ritual of
inoantation with the help of the appropriate technologioal lJ:cooesses in
agrioulturel canoe makingl fishing preparation, and with the help of more
mqre
mundane wooing in overseas gift exchange and in love-makingl but without
any suoh extra work in making wind. and rainl disease and death or in
their counteracting (apart only from the practice of bleeding the patient
in some oaSes of illness). This latter tJ~e of unaided incantation
expresses truly the attitude of the native towards incantation throughout.
It is the really important factor in producing an effeot".17
(b) Cb)
These modes of thought which appear so true to the savage and
so absurd to the European I.evy-Bruhl Levy-Bruhl calls 'prelo~ical'. By'prelogioal'
he appears to mean something quite different to what many of his oritios
attribute to him.
He asserts simply that primitive beliefs when tested
by the rules of thought laid down by logioians are found to contravene
these rules.
This does not mean that savages are incapable of thinking
aoherentlyI cioherentlYI a proposition whioh LeV1T-Bruhl teV1T-Bruhl would be the last to defend~
but it means that if we examine patterns of belief in savage cultures
we shall find they often run counter to a scientific view of the universe
and Qontainl moreoverI I what a logioian would oall inherent contradiotiQns.
Man;i Maoni' of r.evy-Bruhl's oritics seem to imagine that he implies oerebral
inferiority when he speaks of savages as prelogioal -and think that if
they can show that savages perform oognitive prooesses of a more
elaborate type than mere peroeption of sensations they will have
contraverted him.
Of oriticisms of this type he writes:
"Mais beaucoup d'entre elles proviennent d'un ma.lentendul et
s'adressent a une tt.leorie trleorie dont personnel Je je pensel ne voudrait prendre
la responsabilitel et selon laquelle il y aurait deux espeoes d'esprits
humains:
les unsl les notresl pensant confOrniement aux principes de la
logiquel et les autresl les esprits des primitifsl d'ou oes principes
seraient absents.
Mais l qui pourrait soutenir serieusement une pareille
these?' Comment mettre en doute un seul instantI I que la struoture
fondamentale de l'esprit ne soit partout la meme.
Ceux en qui elle
serait autre ne seraient plus des honnnes hommes l de meme que nous n'appelerions
pas non plus de ce nom des etres quine presenteraient pas la meme
structure anatomique et lesmemes fonctions physiologiques que nous".18
Far from suggesting'that suggesting~that
the savage is intellectually inferior to
civilised manl Levy-Bruhl admits that primitive peoples show great
intelligenoe when their interest is stimulated and tl>at tl.at their children
show themselves as capable of learning as the ohildren of civilised
peoples.
Indeed his problem·is 'is why peoples who show such great
intelligence intelligenoe support beliefs whioh are so obviously absurd.
In view
of the opinions so often attributed to Levy-Bruhll I may quote a single
passage selected seleoted from many like p~sages
in his works:
"Ce. rt' est Ras inoapac i t'e 'ou impuissanoe I ,puisque ceux memes' qui
"Ce, Ii'est Ras inoapaci t'e 'ou impUissanceI ,puisque ceux memes' qui
nous font connaitre oonnaitre cette disposition de lainentalit6 la~entalit6 primitive ajoutent
aJoutent
expreSS$ment qu'il se trouve la 'des esprits aussi capables oapables des Sciences
que le Ie sont ceux oeux des Europeens'l I puisque nous voyons les enfants
'australlensl ~australlensl
melanesiensl etc' eto' l apprendre aussi ais6ment que les lea enfants
franqais ou anglais ce oe que le Ie missionnaire leur enseigne.
Ce n'est
pas non plUS la consequence d'une torpeur intelleotuelle profondeI profondel d'un
u'un
~ngourdissement et comme d'un sommeil invincibleI I oar ces oes m~mes m~rnes primitifs
a qUi qui la moindre mOindre pensee abstraite semble un effort insupportableI I et qui
ne paraissent pas se soucier souoier de raisonner jamaisl se montrentl ·,au o.ontraire..
..
penetrantsI I Judicieuxl adroitsl habilesl subtils memel quand un objet.
obJet '
les interesse, I
et surtout des qulil qU'il s'agit d'atteindre une qu'ils
qulils
desirent ardemment".19
In spite of such olear statements Levy-Bruhl has, has· often been acoused
aooused
of denying to savages the oapaoity of making observations and inferences.
inferenoes.
To take a single example frOin among his critics; oritios; . my friend Mr. Driberg
attributes to I.evy-Bruhl Levy-Bruhl the thesis that the savage" savage'· is "incapable "inoapable of
reasoning logioallYI that he 1'SI to use the technical terml prelogical".20
prelogioal".20
Mr. Driberg is easily able to refute a thesis so obviously absurd yetI

'-".,
-4.'7--- " -- ...-......
though he is unaware of it, I
he brings the fullwe!ght of h~ .Deat
. .Ereat
African experienoe not against, but in support of, of" I..evy--.Bruhll~
~ll~
contentions.
Mr. Driberg asks what it is which differentiates one
culture cUlture from another and answers that it is lithe categories or
assumptions on which belief is based ll ,
I
and. he gives an example to explain
what he means by categories or assumptionss
"Why, IIWhy" for instance,' instance,,' should a man be afraid to tell a stranger his
name?
Why should he believe that it would prejudice his life to do so?
BecauSe names have an intimate connection with'his his personality, and
knowledge of his name would give the stranger a magical power over him".2l
IVIr. Mr~ Driberg irt it" th~
above quotations merely calls categories or
assumptions what Levy-Bruhl calls representations collectives and speaks
of intimate connection where ~vy-Bruhl speaks of participation mystique.
The sense is the same; only the words differ. Levy-Bruhl might have'
written Mr. Driberg's conclusion:
"But between them (savage cultures) and. our more developed
cultures oultures there is no bridge, because Without without our more scientific
knowledge they oannot share our oivilisation 'or' adjust their outlook to
ours.
They approaoh the manifestations of our oulture through categories
which are not able to cope with them".22
. '
-4.7--- .'
. .
I have chosen passages from Mr. Driberg's book, because they sum up
ooncisely the usual forms of criticism direoted against Levy-Bruhl.
This fOnD of criticism is by no means peculiar to Mr. Driberg.23 2 3
, I have quoted at length from the writings of Levy-Bruhl and his
critics to show to what oonfusion the use of a word like 'prelogique'
can lead. '
It is 'a a pity that Levy-Bruhl did not use the expression
'unscientifio' 'unscient.ifio' or even 'uncritical' for many of his readers 'are
apparently ignorant that when a philosQl)her speaks of 'logic' he mea~
a scientific discipline and technique2~-whereastheytranslate translate the word
into some such phrase as 'ability to think clearly'.
olearly'.
L6'vy-Bruhl is
himself mainly responsible for the misund~standing which had led his
oritios critios to judge him so harshly since he nOWhere nO~ere makes a clear statement
of what he means by I prelogique' ' ~
In his latest discussion of the
subject he says that. ·by 'prelogique' he does not mean:
"que les esp~t.s esp~ts des primitifs soi~nt etrangers aux ~rinc~pes
10giquesJ
logiques;
conceptLon dont l'absurdit.e l'absurdite eolate au moment merne mame ou on la
fo~e. rre1-2s.~)! .ne pe vent dirs, ~!.C?~_;9.~1 ~!.

- 48 ­
-
uses the word 'logical' in this sense of 'scientific' and for a clearer
cl.earer
presentation of his views I prefer to substitute 'unscientific' for
'prelogical'.
As Ievy-Bruhl Levy-Bruhl has seen, primitive thought is eminently coherent,
perhaps over-coherent.
One mystical idea follows another in the: same
way as one scientific idea in our own society engenders another.
Beliefs
are co-ordinated with other beliefs and with behaviour into an organised
system.
Hence it happens that when an anthropologist has resided for
many months among a savage people he can forseehow they will speak and
act in any given situation.
I have tested this fact again and again
in Central Africa where I found that my questions to the peoples among
whom I carried out ethnological research eventually even~lly became more and
more formalities since I was able to supply the answers to my questions
before I asked them. them, often in almost the identical phraseology in'which
the replies were afterwards given~
For once we have understood wherein
lie the interests of a primitive people we can easily guess the direction
which their thinking will take.~or
it presents the same intel~ectual
characters as our own thinking.
(c)
Besides misunderstanding what ~vY-Bruhl meant by 'prelogical'
his critics have also misrepresented the meaning he attaches to the word
'thought' • According to them Levy-Bruhl I.evy-Bruhl contends that savages think '
illogically whereas I understand him to say that savage thought is mainly
unscientific and also mystical.
In my opinion he refers to the content
of thoUght thought while in their view he is speaking of the psycho-physical
functions of thought.27
The one is mainly a social fact while the other
is an individual physiological phYSiological process.
To say that a person thinks
scientifically is like saying that his heart beats and his blood
circulates scientifically.
Levy-Bruhl on the contrary is speaking of
patterns or modes of thought which.. after eliminating individual
variations. are the sarne same among all members of a primitive community and
are what we call their beliefs.
These modes or patterns of thought are
transmitted from generation to generation either by organised teaching
or more usually by participation in their ritual expression. as in
initiation ceremonies. etc.
Every individual is compelled to adopt
these beliefs by pressure of social circumstances.
These 'patterns of thought' are the' 'representations collectives'
of LeVy-Bruhl's writings.
A collective representation is an ideational
pattern. which may be assooiated with emotional states. and which is
generally expressed not only by Language but also by ritual action.
When Levy-Bruhl says that ~
representation is collective he means that it
is a socially determined mode of thought and is therefore common to all
members of a society or of III ~ social segment. It will w.ill be readily understood
that these 'collective representati~ns'
or 'patterns of thought'
or 'like ideas' are 'collective' or 'patterns' or' 'like' because they are
functions of institutions. that is to saY. they are constantly associated
with uniform modes of behaviour.
,If -If the mystical thought of a savage is ,socially determined so also
is the scientific thought of a civilised person.,,' person.", Ther~fore. any ,
evaluation between the savage's capacity for 'logical thinking' and the
civilised man's.oapacity for 'logical thinking' iS,irrelevant to the
question at issue which is whether patterns of thought are oriehtated
mystically in primitive societies and orientated scientifically in
civilised societies.
As a matter of fact Levy-Bruhl does no~ introduce
notions of value so that there is no need for his critics to defend the
savage so vigourously since no-one attacks him.
The fact that we attribute rain to meteorological causes alone
while savages believe that Gods or ghosts or magic can influence the
rainfall is no evidence that our brains function differently from their
brains.
It does not show that we 'think more logically' than savages.
at least not if this expression suggests some kind of hereditary psychic
superiority.
It is no sign of superior intelligence on my part that I
attribute rain to physic~ causes.
I did not come to this conclusion
myself by observation and inference and have.. in fact. little ~owledge

- 49 ~
of the meteorological processes that lead to rain.
I merely accept
what everybody else in my sooiety accepts, namely that rain is due to
natural causes.
This particular idea formed part of my culture long
before I was born into it and little more was required of me than
sufficient linguistic ability to learn it.
Likewise a savage who
, ' ,I
believes that under suitable, natural and ritual conditions the rainfall
can be influenced by use of appropriate magic is not ort aocount of this
belief' to be considered of'inferior intelligence.
He did not build up
this belief from his own observations and inferences but adopted it in
the, same way as he adopted the- rest of his cultural heritage. namely, by
~'ing born into it.
He and I are ,both'thinking thinking in patterns of thought
provided for us by the societies 1n which we live,.
l' .•
It would be absurd to say that th~
$avage is thinking :'mystically
and that we S+'e a+'e thinking thinkiilg scientificallY' about rainfall.
In either case
like mental prooesses are involved and~mor.eover, mor,eover, the content of thought
is similarly derived.
derivect.
But we' can say that the sooial oontent of our
thought about rainfall is scientific, is in accord with objective facts,
whereas the social oontent of savage thought is unscientific sinoe it is
not in accord with reality and may also be mystical where it assumes the
existence of supra-sensible forces.
lIlhat we are asked to accept is that
a man who is born into a community of savages acquires as a consequence
notions about reality whioh differ remarkably from the notions he would
have aoquired had he been born into a community of civilised people. and
that the difference between these two sets of notions lies partlr partly in the
degree of scientific accuracy they express and partly in the importance
they attach to mystical causation.
(d) We have seen that !ivy-Bruhl Iivy-Bruhl commonly speaks about savage
thought as 'mystique'.
This is another term which has done much to
alienate English anthropologists from his theories.
Yet he means no
more by this term than is meant by English writers when they speak of
be.lief in the supernatural which they often divide into magic, religion,
and mythology.
It must be remembered, however, that in Levy-Bruhl's
s
view there is no 'natural' to the savage and therefore no 'supernatural'.28
Hence we may say that mystical beliefs are what we would call beliefs in
supernatural beings and forces or the endowment of natural objects with
supernatural powers and relations with manldnd maIlltind and each other, but that
to the savage, who has no notion of the natural as distinot from the
supernatural. these beings and forces and powers and relations are
merely supra.-sensible.
In his own words:
"J'emploierai oe teme, terme, faute d'un Meilleur, meilleur, non pas par allusion au
, ,mystioisme religieux de nos sooietes, qui est quelque chose d'assez
different, mais dans

- 50 -­
the shadow is the belief and the savage cannQt cannot be oonsoious of his
shadow without being oonscious of the belief.
In the same way a savage
does not perceive a leopard and believe that it is his totem-brother.
He does' not perceive a leopard at all as we'perceive it but he peroeives
his totem-brother.
We see the physical qualities of the leopard and our
perception of it in the higher oognitive processes is limited to these
physical qualities but in savage oonsciousness these same physical
qualities become merely a part of the mystical representation implied
by the word I tbtem' and are in fact subordinated to it.
The following passages from Les fonctions mentales will show that
I have ~ot
done I.evy-Bruhl Levy-Bruhl an inSustiae injustiaeInmy·-aoo."iyS'lS···of his theory of
mystical peroeption.
"En d'autres termes, termes. ·la °la realite ou'se ouse meuvent les primitifs est
elle-meme mystique.
Pas un etre, etre. pas un objet. obJet, pas un phEmomene naturel
n'est dans leurs representations collectives oe qulil nous parait etre
Ii a nous.
Presque tout oe que nous y voyons leur echappe. echappe, au ou leur est
indiff'erent. indifterent.
En revanche, revanche. ils y voient beaucoup de chases dont nous
ne nous doutons pas".30
"Quel que soit l'objet qui se presente, presente. a eux, eux. il implique des
proprietes mystiquesqui qui en sont inseparables, inseparables. et l'esprit. l'esprit, du primitif
ne les en separe pas, pas. en effet, effet. quand il Ie le par90it.
per90it.
Pour lUi. lUi, il nl~
~. ~ pas de fait proprement physique, physique. au sens que nous donnons a oe mot" mat" .)1
In committing himself to the statement that primitives do not
distinguish between the supra-sensible world and the sensible world and
that the former is just as real. to them as the latter owing to th~ir
inability to perceive obJeots objeots apart from their mystical values. Isvy­
Bruhl has, in my. opinion, opinion. not been careful enpugh to define his terms.
It is diffioult to state his point of view because one is not certain
how one ought to interpret such expressions as 'distinguish'. 'distinguish', 'real'.
'real',
and 'peroeption'.
Nevertheless I will attempt to explain his point of
view as I understand Understand it. :uavy-Bruhl ~vy-Bruhl is in danger of the accusation
that he does preoisely what he .0bJects obJects to others doing. doing, namely. namely, using
psychologioal terms where they do not apply.
We may leave to the
psychologists to determine to what extent perception is influenced by
emotional states and by sooially standardised representations,
Thought
becomes beoomes data for the sociologist as soon as. as, and only when. when, it is
expressed in speech and action.
We cannot.know what people think in
any other way than by listening to what they say and observing what they
do. Once thought is expressed in words it is sooialised. Hence what
. applies to savage perception in this respect applies also to civilised
peroeption.
If the savage expresses in speech and aotion the mystical
qualities of an object so also does oivilised man express in speech speeoh and
action stereotyped representations of objects which. which, thoughmystlcal
properties may not be attributed to them_ them. are none the less social or
collective colleotive representations.
The very fact that an object is named
shows its social indication.
As James;, Rignano32 and others, have shdwn, any sound. or sight may
reaoh the brain of a person without entering into his oonsoiousness.We 'We
may say that he 'hears'or 'sees' it but does not lnotioe' 'notice' it.
In a
stream of sense impressions only a few beoome consc"ious' impressions and
these are selected on aooount of their greater affeotiV1ty.
affeotiV1~y.
A man's
interests are the seleotive agents and these are to a great eJttent
~tent
sooially socially determined for it is generall.y generaUy the value attaohed to an obJeot
by all members of a sooial social group tha\ Qireots c;lireots the attention of an
individual towards it. ' .
It is, is. therefore,' therefore.' a mistake to say that. that, savages peroeive mystioally
or that 'their perception is mystical.
On the other hand we may say that
savages pay attention to phenomena on aQc.ount of the mystioal properties
with whioh their sooiety has endowed them. thelll. and that often their interest·
in phenomena is mainly, mainly. even exclusively. que, to these mystic properties.
It is a mistake to say that savages percei'\lEl percei'll8;.- a plant mystioe.lly or that
thei%' perception of it is mystioal, butJlle we Ii" rrl_ y that asavage~s'

- 51 ­
-
peroeption of, in the sense of noticing, or paying attention to, or being
interested in, a plant is due to its mystical properties.
In emphasizing that attention is largely determined by collective
representations and that it is they which control selective interests,
~vy-~ has stressed a sociological fact of the greatest importance.
It is evident that the Bakwiri, mentioned by Miss Kingsley, Klngsley, pay attention
to their shadows because in their society shadows have a mystical
significance.
Educated Europeans, on the other hand, do not notice
their shadows unless influenced to do so by desire to disoover discover the points
of the compass "Ir ~r by some aesthetic interest. It is not so much that
perception of a shadow causes the belief to enter into consciousness but
it is rather the belief which oaUSes the savage to pay attention to his
shadow.
It is the belief which translates purely psychological
sensations into i~to conscious images. ,A.shadow is seen by us in the sense
that we"'z,eoeive "a visual sensation of it but 'we may not oonsoiously
perceive it since we are not'interested in shado\'ls.
shadol'ls.
In the same way,
when a savage sees a beast or a bird or a tree he pays attention to
them beoause they are totems 'or spirits or possess magioal potency.
We may also pay attention to them but, if we do so, it is for a
different reason.
Our interests in phenomena are not the same as
savage interests in them because our collective representations differ
widely from theirs.
A restatement of rS"vy-Bruhl ~VY-Bruhl!s l s main oontentions about the mystical
thought of savages is contained in the two following, propositions both
of ~hioh ~hich appear to me to be acceptable:
(1) Attention to phenomena depends upon affective choice and this
selective interest is oontrolled to a very large extent by the values
given to phenomena by sooiety society and lind these values are expressed in patterns
o~,thought
and behaviour (collective representations)•
representations).
."-.
"'-.
-.....
-- (2)' fSince patterns of thought and behaviour differ widely between
savages and edUCated Europeans their selective interests also differ
Widely widely and, therefore, the degree ot: of attention they pay to phenomena. and
the reasons for their attention are also different.
,.I
(e) When ~y..Bruh1 Bruhl speaks of mystiaal participations he means that'
things are often connected in savage thought so that what affects one is
believed also to affect the others, not obJeotively obJectively but by a mystical
action.
(The savage, however, does not distinguish between obJeotive
action aotion and mystical action).
Savages, indeed, are often more concerned
about these mystical relations 'between things than about their obJective
,relations.
This mystical dependence of one thing on another, ',usually
a reoiprocaldependence between man and something in nature, is best
explained'by~examples.
Several good illustrations of mystical participation
have already been quoted in this paper.
Thus the Bakwiri might
be said to participate in their shadows so that what affects their
shadows likewise affects them.
Hence were a man to lost his shadow it
would be a calamity.
We have seen also that savages often participate
in their names so that if you can discover a mants name you will have
not only it but its owner also in your power.
Among many savage
peoples it is necessary for the parents of an unborn child to observe a
whole series of taboos because it is thought that what happens to the
tather and mother during this period will affect also their child.
This
participation between child and parents may continue after birth as
among the Boro;;os of Brazil where if the child ohild is ill the father drinks
the medicine.:.7
medicine.:~
In our analysis of Frazer's Frazerts theory of magic we were
. , examining a typical form of mystical participation under the title of
Sympathetic Magic MagiC in which things are held to influence one another in
a ritual situation in virtue of their similar~ty
or contiguity.
These participations form a network in which the savage lives.
The sum total of his participations .are his social personality.
There
is a mystical partioipation between a man ~ and the land on which he dwells,
between a tribe and its chief, ohief, between a man and his totem, between a

- 52 -­
man and his kin, and so on,
L{vy-Bruhl's exposition of mystical participation is abundantly
defined by the examples which he cites in his books and does not stand
in need of explanatory comment.
What I have said in the preceding
seotion of this essay in criticism of his conception of 'mystical'
applies equally to his conception of 'participation'.
This paper attempts to be explanatory rather than critical and any
adequate criticism of ~VY-Bruhl's
conception of primitive thought wou+d
involve a detailed analysis based. based_ on my own and other ethnological
researches too lengthy for the present communication.
In this essay I
will do little more than enumerate headings under which criticism can be
arranged.
It is not in fact true that the whole of nature and social life is
permeated with mystical beliefs.
In the greater part of his social
contacts and in his exploitation of nature the savage acts and speaks in
an empirical manner without attributing to persons and things supernatural
powers.
An impression is erroneously gained that everything in which
savages are interested has always a mystical value for them by presenting
a composite and hypothetical primitive culture, as L§vy-Bruhl has done,
consisting of a selection of customs from many different oultures.
Since it is possible to find among some tribe a belief which attributes
mystical significance to almost every phenomenon one may, by selecting
examples from a great number of tribes show that in primitive mentality
every phenomenon is regarded as a repository of mystical power.
It may be said that in societies where we find such amorphous and
ubiquitous notions as those of the witchcraft---sorcery type or those
of the mana-wakanda type almost any object may on occasions be assooiated
associated
with mystical thought.
It is, therefore, necessary to investigate
the situations in social life which evoke patterns of mystical thOUght
thought
towards objects whioh at other times evoke no such ideas.
It is probable that when a savage pays attention to objects which
have for him an exclusively mystical value, a pattern of mystical thought
is easily e'Toked evoked since his sole interest in these objects is in their
mystical powers.
There are many· plants in the bush which have no
utilitarian value but which, insofar as they are used by man, are used for
ritual purposes alone.
Such also are the objects which are fashioned
to be used as ritual implements and have no other functions, the bullroarer,
the decorated Jaw-bone jaw-bone of a dead king,' oracular rubbing-boards,
and so forth.
But even when objects are essentially ritual obJeots objeots I have observed
that savage attention is directed towards them on occasions by interests
quite qUite other than interest in their sacredness.
I suppose that all fieldworkers
have been struck· by the casual manner m!3-nner in which savages s.avages frequently
speak of and even handle sacred objects.
. I L have often noticed Azande
lean their spears up against, or hang baskets on" on, the shrines they build
for the spirits of their ancestors in the centre'of their homesteads,
and as far as it is possible to Judge judge from their behaviour" behaviour, they have no
other interest in the shrine than'as than-as a convenient post or peg.
At
religious oeremonies their attitude is very different.
Among the
Ingassana of the Tabi hills God is the sun and on occasions they pray to
it but, but" as far as I could Judge, in ordinary situations they looked upon
the sun very muoh as I did, as a convenient means of telling the time,
as the cause of intense heat at midday, and Soon.
If one were not
present at some religious ceremony on a special occasion, one would remain
ignorant that the sun is God.
Mystical thought is a function of
particular partiCUlar situations.
I think that Levy-Bruhl made a serious error in failing to understand
this point.
His error is understandable because he was not really
comparing what savages think with what Europeans think but the systematized
ideology of savage cultures with the content of individual minds in
Europe.
His authorities had collected all the information they could
..

.. - 53 .. ­
get about the mystical beliefs held by a community of savages about some
phenomenon and pieced them together into a co-ordinated ideological /'
~'
structure.
These beliefs. like the myths which Europeans also reoord,.-/'
reoord~
may have been collected over a long period of time and from dozens pi
pf
informants.
The resulting pattern of belief may be a-fiction a sipae sipoe it
may never be actually present in a man's I s conSciousness at any t;iJtie tjme and
may not even be known to him in its entirety.
This fact would have
emerged if records of everything a savage does and says throughout a
single day were recorded for then we would be able to compare our own
thoughts more adequately with the real thoughts of savages instead of
with an abstraotion pieced together from persistent enquiries conducted
in an atmosphere quite unlike that of the savage's ordinary milieu and
in which it is the European who evokes the beliefs by his questions
rather than the objects with which they are assooiated.
It would also
have emerged had Levy-Bruhl attempted to contrast the formalised beliefs
of Europe with those of savages. had he. for instance. attempted to .
-
contrast the formal doctrine of Christianity with the formal doctrines
of savage religions.
What he has done. in fact. is to take the
formalised doctrines of savage religions as though they were identical
with the actual mental experience of individuals. It is easy to see·
-
that it would never do to regard as identical the thoughts of a Christian
with Christian thought.
Moreover. primitive thought as pieoed together
in this manner by European observers is full of contradictions which
do not arise in real ~ife
because the bits of belief are evoked in
different situations.
./ .
-
Moreover. these same observers upon whom Levy-Bruhl relied often
neglected to inform their readers whether objects associated with
mystical t~ought do not also f1~ure fi~ure in other contexts in which they
have no mystical values.
So Ievy-Bruhl considered. and. as I· I believe.
incorrectly considered. that the sensations produced by an object and
the mystical doctrines associated with it were interdependent to suoh
an extent that the object would not be perceived by savages if it were
not evoked by mystical interests and that the elementary sensations
produced in consciol,lSness conscio~ness
by its objective properties are inevitably ineVitably
and always blended with collective representations of a mystical kind.
We have already notioed that this error is likewise to be found in
Frazer's writings on magic where he suggests that the mystical relationship
between objects which are similar or have once been in contact with
one another is invariable.
He does not see that they are assooiated
only in particular situations.
r.tv observations on this point may.
therefore. be compared With with those I made on the gold-Jaundioe .. association
of Greek peasants in the last number of our bulletin. But in Iidvy ~vy­
..
Bruhl's writings the error goes muoh deeper and obscures obsoures his lengthy
discussion of mystical participations.
He will not admit that when
the elementary sensations produced by the sight of an object reach
consciousness any other images can be evoked to oombine with them in
perception than- ~. those of its mystical qualities even if these qualities
are irrelevant to a pa~icular particular :ntuation.
~tuation.
It would appear from his
/thesis _,thesis that if the object objeot is to be perceived at all these images cannot
be exclUded.
excluded.
That different ideas are evoked by objects in different situations
can be shown in other ways.
It can be shown that· -many of the most
sacred objects of primitive cult only become sacred when man deliberately
endows them with mystic powers which they did not possess before.
Thus
the fetish and idol are repositaries of mystical foroe because man after
having made them infuses this force f'orce into them by ritual..
tual._
As we have
already seen magic is always man-made.
It is the rite itself which
gives virtue to ~ia mediQ~
and often only for the duration of the
rite. .
-
Or again it can be shown that mystical notions about nature are
part of culture and. therefore. have to be acquired by every individual.
They are learnt slOWly slowly throughout the years.
Hence there are periods
in the life history of every individual ...then mystic notions oannot be
evoked in perceptions peroeptions to complete elementary sensations because the
mystic notions are unknown to the person who experiences the sensations.
Also many objects have a mystical value for some members of a SOCiety society
but not for others.
A plant has mystical value for the person who

.. 54 ..
knows its ritual uses but riot for those \'lho ignorant of them.
An animal
has a totemio relationship with members of a single clan while members
of other olans· eat it with relish.
From many man;y points of view. therefore, it would be easy to demonstrate
that the interests whioh savages have in obJects are not always of a
a
mystical type;
that often they are entirely utilitarian and empirical;
and that the same objects may at different times or in different
situations evoke different ideas.
Savage thought has not the fixed
inevitable construotion that ~vy-Bruhl gives it.
The very contradictions which according to Levy-Bruhl characterise
prelogical thO~lt and distinguish it from our thought. are to be
aocounted for by the fact that a single elementary sensation may evoke
in different situations different images in percep~ion.
perception.
An object may
be perceived in different ways aocording to different affective interests.
interests which in their turn are evoked by different situations.
Hence it comes about that a savage can be both himself and a bird, that
a shadow can be both a shadow and a soul, that a plant can be both a
plant· and a magioal substance, substance# and so on.
As suggested above. the
contradiction only becomes glaring when European observers try to piece
together ideas evoked in different s~tuations
into a consistent ideological
structure. .
When a particular situation evokes one set of ideas other ideas are
inhibited. especially if they contradict those evoked, at any rate as far
as speech speeoh a~ action. are concerned.
But it is a mistake to suppose
that because· a savage attributes some happening to a mystical cause that
he does not also observe the natural cause even if no particular attention
is paid to it in formalised belief and traditional behaviour.
Thus I
have ample evidence from my own researoh in Central Africa that while
death is attributed to witchcraft people are not oblivious obliVious to the natural
cause of death whether it be the spear of an enemy. the claws or horns
of a beast~ beast, or disease. They fully recognise these causes but they are
socially irrelevant.
Their irrelevancy arises from thesooial social action
which follows death, namely vengeance.
It is evident that of the natural
and mystical causes of death the mystical cause is usually the only one
which allows any intervention (exoept when a man is murdered by a fellowtribesman)
and when it is a social rule that death must be avenged it is
clearly the only cause towards which social action can oan be directed.
The other cause whilst perfectly well known to the people is socially
irrelevant and, and# therefore, excluded as far as the' persons directly
. involved (the kin) are con(lerned conQerned though it' may be more readily admitted
by others.
The same' same· mixture of sound knowledge with mystical notions
is found. in primitive ideas of causation in procreation, in disease. etc.
As I· intend to deal with this subJ!,!ct. in. a forthcoming publication, I
will.not discuss it further here.34 I may add, however, that the .
selective interest which directs attention to. one oause rather than to
another, to the mystioal cause than to the natural one. one, may be derived
from an individual and psyohological. situation, e.g. sometimes a savage
attributes his misfortune to witchcraft witohcraft while his neighbours attribute
it to incompetence or to some other cause.
Patterns of thought of a mystioal kind are never exclusively
mystical.
mystioal.
They are never fantastic for they are bound by limits imposed
by psychological and biological. requirements.
At the core of mystical
thought we find recognition recogndtionof of natural causation and other scientific
scientifio
observations which lie, as it were, dormant,. known yet socially inhibited
because they are irrelevant to the particular Situation situation which evokes the
pattern of thought or because they contradict it.
If this were not the
case it would be diffioult to understand how scientific thought could
ever have emerged.
Since it is the case, it is easy to understand how
social change involving reorientation of interests has directed attention
to elements in a chain of causation or to the objective properties of
things which had hitherto been known but socially unemphasised.
We may now consid~r
shortly the theories of. ~vy-Bruhl and: of Tylor
and Frazer in relation to eaoh other.
If the theories of Frazer and
/

- 55 -
Tylor about magic have concentrated too exclusively on some, qualities of
magioalritual but have neglected other qualities, of equal, if not
greater importance, this dis,tortion di~tortion should be evident when we compare
them \'lith \,lith the writings of I..evy-Bruhl whose focus of interest was quite qUite
different.
I
Tylor, Frazer and Levy-Bruhl, r.evy-Bruhl, are in agreement that magical practices
are typical of primitive societies and tend to disappear and to be
regarded as superstitions in societies of higher cultural development.
This is most strikingly seen if \'le compare, as te'vy-Bruhl has done,
the thought of savage cultures with 'ideas current among educated Europeans
of the 20th century.'
~vy-Bruhl
is totally uninterested in distinctions drawn by scholars
between magic and religion and therefore his theories do not bear upon'
the lengthy arguments devoted by Frazer and so many other writers to
devising ritual categories.35
L§vY-Bruhl seeks to understand the
characteristics of mystical thought and to define these qualities and
to compare them with the qualities of scientific thought.
Since magic
and religion, religion. as separated by Frazer, Frazer. have, have. from the point of view of '
Levy-Bruhl's investigation, investigation. the same mystical character, character. there is no need
to maintain this particular distinction, distinction. nor, nor. indeed, indeed. any distinction"
distinction.,
between them.
The sharp division which Frazer has insisted. on ,in The
Golden Bough milst must appear quite arbitrary, arbitrary. and even futile, futile. to !ilvy-Bruhl.
U!vy-Bruhl.
But it is in their analyses of the ideology of magic that the English
and French Schools are at greatest variance.
To Tylor and Frazer the
savage believes in magic because he reasons incorrectly from his perception
of similarities and contiguities.
Tb Levy-Bruhl the savage'reasons
incorrectly because he believes in magic.
magi~.
Now there can be no doubt that
if we study the manner in which any individual acquires a magical belief
in a savage society we shall have to admit the accuracy of I.evy-Bruhl's
Levy-Bruhl's
contention.
An individual does not note similarities between objects
and. then come to the conclusion that in consequence of these similarities
the objects are mystically connected.
He simply learns the pattern of
thought in which this mystical connection is socially established.
establiShed.
Nevertheless. Levy-Bruhl has not paid sufficient regard to the fact that
oollective representations have an intellectual structure and indeed must
have for mnemonic rsasons.
Unless there is a mutual dependence between
ideas we ca~ot speak of thought at all. Thought requires, in order to
be thought, notions of similarity and contiguity.
For when we speak of
thought we mean ooherent thought and without these notions magic would be
chaotic and could not possibly persist.
perSist.
Tylor and Frazer have shown us
the intellectual character of magic.
r,e'vy-Bruhl has shown us its sooial
character.' ,
LOoking woking at magic from this point of view of its ideational or
intellectual structure, structure. Tylor and Frazer felt that tqey were called upon
to account for savages not observing that magical rites do not achieve
the end they aim at achieving.
Since savages reason, observe similarities
and contiguities,-anq. contiguities,-ang. make inferences~
even V incorreot iQ.correot ones, ones. from
their observations how is it that they do not apply these intellectual
powers to discovering whether magic really produces 'the resuits it is
supposed to produce.
This was the problem that confronted Tylor and
(
Frazer and in their attempts to solve it they did not sufficiently
suffiCiently
appreciate the difference between ratiocination and. scientific reasoning,
reasoning.
between intellectual operations and logic.
Men may reason brilliantly
in defence of the most absurd theses; their arguments may. may-display
great intellectual ability and yet be illogical.
To prove this we need
not go further than the writings of our metaphysicians.
The intellectual
operations of the mind are subordinated to affective interests and.
are above all subservient to collective representations.
representatiOns.
We know what
happens to people whose intellectual operations lead them to conclusions
which contradiot social doctrines. Levy-Bruhl tevy-Bruhl therefore saw no need
to ask why savages do not ob3erve haw baseless are'their beliefs and
why they do not pay attention to the oontradiotions they embody, for in
his opinion savages are inextricably enmeshed in a network of mystical

- 56 ­
-
part.ic1patlons· and CQ!IlP1e-tely CQ!IIP1etely dominated 'by ooJ.l..1i1~ ool.l .. t1~ representations.
There is no room for doubt or scepticism.
There is not even need to avoid
oontradiotions.
But a representation is not acceptable to the mind merely beca~se
it is oolleotive.
oollective.
It must also accord with individual experienc~b
and if it does not do so then the representation must contain an explanation
of its failure to do so.
Uo doubt in purely transoendental transcendental thought
contradiotipns do not matter, matter. as theology amply illustrates. illustrates, but thought
which whioh directs direots experience must not contradict it.
A pattern of thought
which decrees that a man may puthls his hand in the fire with immunity has
little chance chanoe of persisting. lIBgical Magical thought whioh claims that a man who
eats certain medicines will never die or that agriculture and hunting can
Qan
be carried on by magical procedure alone will not prove acoeptable to
individual minds in·any SOCiety. society.
Even mystioal thought is conditioned
by experienoe and this is the reason for many secondary elaborations of
doctrine whioh acoount for discrepancies, failures. failures, contradiotions. contradiotions, an4
so on, for mystioal thought must. like scientific thought, be intelleotually
consistent, even if it is not logically consistent.
The scientific
and mystical notions that are so often found fourid side by side in a pattern·
of thought must be harmonised either by situational selection or by some
explanatory link.
Tylor's Tylor1s brilliant analysis of the factors which keep
mystical thought in touch with reality or which whioh explain its failure to
do so is therefore needed to oomplete complete ~vy-Bruhlls ~vy-Bruhl's description desoription of
oolle.otive colle~tive representations.
To sum up: My MY exposition of :U;~-Bruhlls ~Vy-Bruhl's theories has been a task
of great diffioulty.
His vlritings are extensive and his thought often
tortuous.
So vague are many of the terms· he uses and so inconstant is
the meaning he attaohes to them that I I. have sometimes had to select.
between several possible interpretations.
It may even be charged
against me that I have given a sense to his words which others might fail
to derive from them.
I would answer that a book gains its value not only
from the ideas which an author puts into it but also from the ideas to
which it gives rise in the mind of the reader.
In order to grasp Levy­
r.evy­
Bruhlts Bruhl's views I have had to reformulate them in my own language.
. /
Contrary to the Judgment of most English anthropologists I find 1.J:,vy­
"I..Bvy­
Bruhlts Bruhl's writings a great stimulus to formulation of new problems and I
consider the influence he has had not only on anthropological theory but
also in direoting the attention of fieldworkers to a new set of problems
to have been most· fruitful.
For when in disagreement with his opinions
we must acknowledse acknowledge that they are not the usual faoile explanatipns explanations of
soc;1al soc~al anthropologists which obstruct all thought by their futility and
finality and turn out to be no mar-ethan more a restatement in other terms of
the problem to be solved. u!vy-Bruhl ~vy-Bruhl does not, not. in faot. attempt to
explain mystical thought.
. He is content oontent to show its characters charaoters of
generality and oompulsion compulsion or, in other· words, to demonstrate that individuals
aot act and speak in ways that are socially sooially determiped.
determ1p.ed.
In stressing
streSSing
the social character oharacter of patterns of thought he.has performed a great
serv;lce serv;loe to social sooial anthropology and in oUretfort~. to understand magic we
have to st~ by recognising the social charaoter of its thought.
This
is obvious as soon as·1t it is stated. but it has first to be stated .and then
it, it. becomes obvious.
Besides emphasizing the sooial charaoterof charaoter· of thought Levy-Bruhl has
tried to olassify olassif.1 types of thought and to· ·show that their interrelations
with one another and with behaviour can be studied.
It is true that his
two oategories of soientific and. mystical are defined in the rough and
without. precise analysis ·and that he takes no account of thought which
lies outside both categories.
oategories.
The innnense immense scope soope of his work and the
voluminousaata which he handled made .this inevitable and it is left for
other students to enquire with more detailed analysis analYSis into the gradations
and blend.1ngs of thought-types and their variations as. functions of
different situations, if indeed. it is found desirable upon oloser
scrutiny to maintain his olassification.
Perhaps r.e:.jy-Bruhl' LS~-Bruhlts s most important contribution oontribution to sociology is to

- 57 -­
have shown that ignorance, ignoranco. like knowledge, is often socially determined
and that primitive thOUght thought is unScientific because it is mystical and not
mystical because of an inherent incapacity to reason logically.
He
demonstrates that the images which are evoked to combine with elementary
sensations to complete perception are evoked by selective interests which
in their turn are directed by collective representations towards the
mys~ical
qualities of things rather than to their objective qualities.
Moreover, Moreover. contrary to the usual opinion, opinion. L6'vy-Btuhl t s .writings . show
clearly how primitive mystical thought is organized into a coherent system
with a logic of its own. . ' He recognises the eXistential existential value of mystical
thought.
No primitive society is able to maintain its 'equilibrium without
the mystical beliefs which link together its activities by ideological
bonds.
Thus. for example. the belief that witchcraft is the cause of
death has existential value in a society in whioh the kinship group is
also a blood-revenge group.
Beyond. this he does not" not. and. indeed cannot go, go. for the method of
comparative analysis that he employed imposes effective limits to deeper
research.
ay By comparing savage thought with civilised thought !6vy­ ~vy­
Bruhl was able to disclose certain general correlations between the degree
of technological development and the development of soientific thought.
But at this point he was unable to make malte any further progress as is shown shotim
clearly in his later writings which oarry his researches'into the nature
of thought no further. than his earliest \'l!'itings.
A programme of research which will lead us to a more oomprehensive
and exact knowledge of mystical thought. indeed of all types of thought.
must await a later communication.
Professor E.E. Evans-l'ritabard.
References
1. liThe Intellectualist (English) Interpretation of Magio". ll • Bulleti~
of the Faoulty of Arts. vol. 1. 1" Part 2. 1933.
2. LBvy-Bruhl's revy-Bruhl f s theory of-primitive 01'- t i mentality mental! ty is complete in his first
volume on the subject. Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Societes
Inf~ieures. 1st ed. 1910. An authorised translation of this book
b

­
- 58 -
4.
F.M.~
p. 19 (E.T., pp. 27-28)•.
5.
6.
M.P .. p. 17.
M.P., .. pp. 17-18.
7. Mary Kings1ey Kingsley~ ~
tV'est ''lest African Studies. Studies, p.176, p quoted in F.M.,
F p. 50 (E.T., (ES., p. 54)•.
8.
Guise, GUise, Wa.ne:ela Wangela River, New Guinea, J.A.I., xxviii~ p. 2l2~ quoted
in F.M., p. 73 (E.T., p. 73).
TYPes Types of thought must not be confused with types of mind classified
by some writers as "synthetio" and "ana1ytio", "intUitive" "intuitive" and
."logical", "extravert1t and "intravert",. "romantic" and "classic",
and so on.
10.
H.S.L.~ p. 26.
li.
The most ambitious critical work on the so-called theory thedry of
pre10gisme is 01ivier Olivier Leroy1s LeroyI s Ia La Raison primitive, Essa! Essai de'
~efutation de la theorie de Pre1ogisme, Paris, 1927.
Besides
other writings mentioned in this paper I may mention the critical
but laudatory summary of ~vy-Bruhl' ~vy-Bruh1's s theories in Dr. Go1denweiser's,
Early civilization, 1921, and the not unfriendly criticism
oontained in G. Van Leeuw's, Ia La Structure de 1a la Mentalite
Menta1ite
pr~!I!~tive,
pr~~~tive, extra::l.t extra~t de Ia La Revue d'histolre d'h1stoire et de philosophi~
re1igieuse, 1928.
The best account of Levy-Bruhl's theories is
by Davy in the 4th part, pp. 193-305, of his Sociologues Socio10gues d'hier et
~'auJourd'hui, Paris, 1931. See also: Durkheim, Annee sociologique,
socio10gique,
t.XII, p. 35~
and d.nd Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse,
re1igieuse,
IS"· IS'· .~, pp. 336-342; Mauss, :Ell,1U~t~n~Ll,LSocie~_~.)J::an~Jse de
~l).1l0sOP~"~.! ~1).ilosOP~.!.!...J923; ... Raoul.AUier, Raoul.Allier, Les non-oivillSes non-oivilises et nallS, nous, 1928.
D. Essertier ~hi10sophes ~hilosophes et Savants' fran~l!lis fran~~is du JQ('sieo~~, XX'sieo~~, I.a.
La
Sooiolog1e, Sooiologle, PariS, Paris, 1930.
12.
!'fissions ~ssions ~v:4!e1iqUeS'XXIII'
E!v:4!eliques,XXIII, 1848, p. 82 (Schrump).
M.P., pp. 3 •
Quoted in
13.
F.M., p. 21 (E.T., 29-30).
14.
Elsdon Best, Maori Medical Lore, Journal of the'Polynesian
thePo1yneslan
Society, XIII, p. 219 (1904). (1904)•. " Quoted in F.M., p. 69 (E.T., p. 70).
15.
Miss Kings1ey, Kingsley, West '\fest African Studies, StUdies, p. 330.
Quoted in F.M..
F.M.,
p. 65 (E.T., p. f)7). . '.'
16.
Pagan Tribes of the Nllotic Milotic Sudan, by C.G. and B.Z. Seligman, Sel1gman, 1932,
p p•. 25. - .'
Soroerers of Debu, Dobu, by R.F. FortUne,1932~
FortUne~1932~ pp. 97:.J)8.
97J)8.
H.S.L. pp. 1a-li•.
M.P., p. 12.
20.
~e ':['he Savage as he Really is, byJ.H. by-J.H. Driberg, london, London, 1929, 1929. p. 4.
21.
The Savage as"he as'he R~a11y R~ally is, by J.H. Driberg~IDndon, Driberg,London, 1929, 1929~ pp. 12-13.
22.
Idem, Idem~ p. 18.
Prof. Mal1nowski Malinowski writes "Professor" "Professor'Levy-Briml tells us, to put it in
a nutshell, nutshe11~that that primitive man has no sober moods at all, a11~ that he
is hopelessly and completely immersed in a mystical frame of mind.
InCapable ot at dispassionate and consistent observation~ observation, devoid of
the power of abstraotion, abstraction~ ~ered hainpered by 'a decided aversion towards
, I I
I,
I

- 59 ­
-
reasoning', he is unable to drat'/' draw any benefit from experience, to
construct or cbinprehend coinprehend even the most elementary laws of nature",
etc. (Magic Science SCience and Religion, published in Scienoe,·Religion
and Reality, 1925, p. 28).
other authorities could be quoted to
the-same--etfect. .
24. Or, perhaps, one ought to say that this is what he may mean for
philosophers give to the word many different meanings (see
Lalande, Vocabulaire technique at et critique de la Philosophie,
art. "IDgique). It is a great pi~y, therefore, that levy-Bruhl
I.evy-Bruhl
introduces the term without Without stating precisely the meaning he
attaches to it.
In this paper I distinguish between scientific
logic which is the technique of the sciences and which tests not
only inferences and the interdependence between ideas but also the
validity'of premises, and logic which" in n6 way concerns itself
with the validity of premises but only with the coherent structure
of thought.
25. H.S.L., p. 21.
26. It is essential to understand that thought which is totally
unscientific and even which contradicts experience may yet be
entirely coherent in that there is a reoiprocal dependence between
its ideas.
Thus I may instance the writings of mediaeval divines
and political controversialists as examples of mystical thought
which far from being chaotic suffers from a too rigid application of
syllogistic rules.
Also the thought of many insane persons
(monomaniacs, paranoiacs) presents a perfectly organised system
of interdependent ideas.
Perhaps the only thouc;ht that we can
class as incoherent is that of certain types of insanity (mania
and Dementia Praecox) and that of dreams but even in these cases
it is probably more correct to say that the principle of coherence
is unknown to us.
Has not Freud shown how very logical and
coherent our dreams can be?
27. As a matter of fact tevy-Bruhl Levy-Bruhl is hardly consistent in his usage of
words like 'esprit' and 'mentalite' for he sometimes suggests the
psyohological process of thinking and at other times the social
content of thought.
It is largely his own fault that his opinions
opiniOns
are misrepresented.
28. "L'homme superstitieux, souvent aussi l'homme religieux de notre
societe, croit a deux ordres de realites, les unes visibles
et tangibles, soumises aux lois necessaires du lspirituelles l mouvement, les
autres invisibles, impalpables, 'spirituelles',, formant comme une
sphere mystique qui enveloppe les premieres.
Mais, pour la
mentalite des societes inferieures, il n'y a pas ainsi deux mondes
au contact l'un de l'autre, distincts et solidaires, se penetrant
plus ou moins l'un llun 11 l'autre. Il nly n'y en a qu'un. Toute realite
est mystique comme toute action, et par consequent aussi toute
perception". F.M., F.M.. p. 67 (E.T., p. 68).
29. F.M., p. 30 (E.T., p. 38).
30. F.M., pp. 30-31 (E.T., p. 38).
31. F.M., pp. 37-38 (E.T., p. 43).
32. William James, ~e principles of psychology, 1901. Eugenio
Rignano, The psychology of reasoning, English translation, 1923.
33. K. von Den Steinen, U eden e Naturvolkern Zentralbrasiliens,
pp. 289-294.
Quoted in F.M., p. 300 (E.T., p. 259 •
34. I may, however, refer to papers in which I have given special
attention to these problems:
"Witchcraft (mangu) among the Azande",
Azande".
Sudan Notes and Records, 1929;
"Heredity and Gestation as the
Azande see them", Sociolo~, 1932; "Zande Therapeutics" in Essays
~esented Eesented to C. G. Seligman to appear this year.

- 6() -­
35. See what he has to say on this point; F.r··1' F.r··,." 1 pp. 341-345 (E.T.,
pp. 293-296).
36. LeVy-Bruhl" r..eVy-Bruhl l it is only fair to say" saYI realises that mystical thought
is bound to coinoide" coinoidel at any rate to some extent, with experience
for pragmatic reasons.
Thus he writes "Toutefois" "Toutefoisl meme pour cette
mentalite (primitive mentality), les representations relatives aux
mortSI morts" et les prat1ques qui sly rattachent" rattachentl se distinguent par un
caractere prelogique plus marque.
Si S1 mystiques que soient les
autres representat10ns collectives" I relatives'aux relatives·aux donnees des sens"
senal
si s1 mystiques que so1ent aussi les pratiques qui s'yrapportent
(ohasse" (ohassel pecha" pechel guerI'e" guerl'el maladie" maladiel divination,' divinationl' etc.)" etc')1 encore faut-ill faut-il"
pour que 18. la fin desiree sait soit atteinte" atteintel pour que l'ennemi soit vainou,
le Ie gibier pris ••••• , que les'representations ooincident en quelques
points essentiels avec la realite obJeotive, obJeotive" et que les pratiques
soient, a un certain motVent" mo~entl
effectivement adaptees aux fins
poursuivies.
Par la Ia se trouve garant1 un minimum d'ordre,
d'objectivite, et de coherence dans ces representations".
F.M., pp.
354-355 (E.T., (E.T." p. 303).

_ 61 _
_
UNDERSTANDING IN PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
.,
This paper is concerned with how we can understand other philosophies.
My MY method is first to offer an analysis of an aspeot of African thought.
Then I shall use that analysis as a vehicle for discussing some
theoretical and methodological problems in the study of other thought
systems. especially problems raised by Peter Winch.
I
A puzzling feature of African thought is that general propositions
seem seldom to be evaluated in the light of contrary empirical eVidence.
evidence.
If events do not proceed according to expectations stemming from general
beliefs. Afrioans do not on this basis question the validity of those
beUefs. belj,efs. Instead. they produce Itsecondary elaborations" lt (Horton 1967:
167~): : rationalizations accounting for the divergence between events
and expectations in particular circumstances while leaving the general
belief or ass4mption which produced the expectation intact.
Horton (1967)·treats this phenomenon as a general characteristic
of African traditional thought.
To list a few examples. Dinka do not
ponder the efficacy of sacrifice in general becaus,e particular sacrifices
are not followed by the deSired desired events.
One explanation for failure is
ls
that Divinity DiVinity refused to respond to that particular sacrifice.
Another
is that the specific Power responsible for the difficulty which the
sacrifice aimed to remove was wrongly identified. identified, rendering the sacrifice
ineffective because misdirected (Lienhardt 1961: 291).
This characteristic
of African thought is copiously dooumented for the'Azande.
That
a man admits he maybe may.be a Witch witch although he does not act with malicious
irttent nor in concert with other witches does not shake his belief that
witches do act in these ways.
It only leads him to conclude that he is
nqt an ordinary witoh (Evans-Pritchard 1937: 119-20).
If a witchdootor
fails in his cure the explanation maybe that this particular
witchdoctor is a fraud. but never that witchdoctors in general have no
power (Evans-Pritohard 1937: 19').
Failure of oracles may be attributed
to causes, ' like corruption of the poison by Witchcraft witchcraft or mere hunger
of the termites rather than attendance to the questions put to them;
thapoasibility the poesibility that oracles in general are futile is never raised (Evans..
(Evans~
Prito'hard PritO'hard 1937: 337-41).
~ question. question, then. is: Why do Africans refrain from questioning
their g~l beliefs in the light 'of '01' contrary evidence?
Speaking
speaificaJiy spea1ficaJiy of the Az8.ncle. Az8.nde, Evans;'Pritchard argues that, they do not do
so bt3cause their thought is a closed system which accounts for its own
failures. .'
Azande see as well as we that the failure of their oracle
to prophesy truly calls for explanation, but so entangled
are they in mystical notions that they must make use of'
them to account for the failure.
The contradiction
between experience and one mystical notion is explained
by reference' to another mystical notion (Evans-Pritchard
1937: 339). .'
Again,
The failure of any rite is accounted for in advance by a
a
variety of mystical notions - e.g. Witchcraft. witchcraft, soroery.
soroery,
and taboo., Hence the perception of' error in one mysti­
oal notion in a particular situation merely proves the
correctness of another and equally mystical notion '(Evans­
Pritchard. tcbard. 1937: 476).

- 6z -­
In his book on the Azande Evans-Pritchard takes the position that
Zande notions apout witchcraft, Witchcraft, magic and oracles are "mystical Itmystical lr ,
that
they are not in accord with objective reality as this is apprehended
by the observations and logic of scientific thought (1937: 12, 476-78,
494). Winch criticizes this approach. maintaining that concepts of
reality are themselves given in language and culture, and therefore that
no culture-free concept of objective reality can exist.
We thus have
the options of viewing another system of thought in terms of our concepts
of reality or in terms of its own concepts of reality.
Winch insists on
the latter course, and for that reason finds Evans-Pritchard's later
analysis of Nuer religion (1956) preferable to his treatment of Zande
thought (Winch 1964: 3W-15).
Much of the next section will be devoted to a critique of Winch's
ideas.
Here, however, I wish to point out what strikes me as an
advantage in the approach he advocates.
If we do evaluate another
philosophy, it is likely that we will find a great deal of error in the
alien philosophy.
We may then be led to wonder how that philosophy can
persist when much of it is wrong, and our analysis may bean attempt to
answer this question.l
Consider Robin Horton's answer to the question
raised in this paper.
He argues that traditional African thought
systems admit no alternatives to their basic.theories and postulates.
The African either believes that the world is ordered as his received
philosophy fiays ~ays
it is, or he must believe that the world is not ordered
at all.
Therefore, the African does not question his basic assumptions
in the light of contrary evidence because of his anxiety that, were those
assumptions found false, he would be driven to. the psychologically
unsettling conclusion that the· the' world is chaotic (Horton 1967 t 167-69).
One may read Horton's analysis as taking it for granted that to
assess general beliefs gccording to empirical experience is a natural or
proper epistemological procedure for all men, and that Africans would
employ it if only their lack of alternative theories did not prevent them
from doing so with psychological security.
Adopting Winch's prescription
of viewing a philosophy in its own terms, one's attention would be
directed to precisely those things which Horton appears to take for
granted.
Instead of wondering how the failure to assess general
beliefs in the light of contrary evidence can persist in African thought,
one would ask what it is about African ontology and epistemology which
renders it unnecessary or irrational within that system of thought to
evaluate beliefs in this way.
The analysis I offer attempts to answer
this question.
I think we will be in the best position to understand why Africans
do not evaluate their general beliefs in the light of empirical evidence
if we first consider why Why we of the West often do evaluate our beliefs
in this way.
My point can be made most cleariY' on the basis of that
part of Western thought in which this mode of evaluation is most
rigorously developed, so this brief disoussion of the West will be.
limited to natural science.
In science, the procedure of evaluating
beliefs (or assumptions or theories) according to empirical evidence is
the experimental methOd. method.
This method rests, I think, on two basic
postulates of Western metaphysics - postUlates seen perhaps most clearly
inCompteanPositive philosophy.
The first is that empirical events are
subject to unseen prinCiples principles or laws;
the second is that these principles
or laws operate with mechanical regularity.
In our epistemology, the
first postulate postUlate leads us to think that empirical events are relevant to
our knowledge of the unseen principles or laws.
The second postulate assures us that empirical events are a reliable
means of evaluating our assumptions or theories about those principles
or laws.
The postulate that the laws of nature operate with mechanical
regularity is essential to the. experimental method..
It assures us that
variables can be controlled in an experiment:
that some iaws will not
operate, or at least will not operate in an unpredictable fashion, in
the experiment.
And this assurance in turn is necessary if we are to
think that the result of an experiment is due to the particular law

- 63 ­
-
whose operation that experiment was desisnedto designed reveal.
Unless these,
oriteria are met, it is irrational to think that the experimental-method
could· oould· be utilized tQ evaluate our theories about any law of nature.
With oertain modifioations, our first Western postulate - that
empirioal events are subject to unseen prinoiples'or principles laws - would appear
to be valid also for Afrioah metaphysics.
The word "law" IIlaw ll is espeoially
inappropriate for Afrioan thought.
Let us adopt Father Tempels' wording
and rephrase the postulate'to to read "empirical events are subJeot sUbJeot to
unseen foroes or powers".
Among these foroes or powers are what have
been termed, Spirit and refractions of Spirit' for the Nuer, (Evans-Pritchard
1956), Divinity and divinities for the Dinka (Uenhardt 1961), ghosts, and
witohoraft for the Anuak (Lienhardt (IJ.enhardt 1962),. witohoraft, oracles, and magic
for the Azande (Evans-Pritcbard 1937), ~
the Supreme Being, Being. and ancestors,
men, and literally all being for the Baluba (Tempels 1945). ,certainly
,Certainly
there are many differenoes between these concepts, but they are not
important for the very general point I wish to make:
that all of these
things, in the African view, are forces whioh may influence events in
the world.
But oomparing African _thou/Ylt _
with our second Western postulate we
find a sharp differenoe.
Africans do not think that these forces act
with mechanioal regularity, Many ~ .of ,of them are thought to have volition,
. as is seen in the Dinka idea that Divinity mayor may no,t respond to a
partioular sacrifice (Lienhardt (Uenhardt 1961: 291).
In Baluba philosophy the
forces are intimately interconnected so that the operation of one force
depends on a great many others.
On a particular occasion a given force
may remain inactive or may act in 801 ofa number. of ways and with any
of a a: number of results, depending on the disposition of a multitude of
variables (other forces) on that occasion (Tempels'l945: '1945: 40-1, 57, 57. 87-89).
Zande oracles (Evans-Pritchard 1937) revealolearly the idea' of the
irregular aotion of foroes, and show how Africans use this concept in a
positive way.,
way.'
The Azancle administer poison to a fowl, asking the poison
to kill the fowl if a certain statement (e.g. a prediotion 9f e,>f the future
or the oause of an illness or death) is true.
Then they ask the oracle
to confirm its answer by sparing a second fowl if the first one died, or
_ by killing the second. if the first survived.
Essentially this is an
experiment, experiment~
run tWice, with the aim of confirming a "hypothesis" - that
hypothesis being the prediotion or other statement put to the oracle.
The interesting thing is that the Azande accept the hypothesis, as proven
or disproven'only only if the experiment has different results eaoh time it
is run - if one fowl dies and, and· the other survives.
This procedure is '
completely unintelligible in Western scientific thought, Where where an
experiment is valid for oonfirming or disproving a hypothesis only if
the result is the ~ eaohtime each the experiment is run.
, 'l'lie Azande think that the poison laoks lacks pOtency in itself, i ~ that the
potenc,y potency emerges only when a question is put j;o the oracle (Evans-Pritchard
1937: 1937f '315).
It' thus appears that the Azande oonoeive conoeive of the poison
oracle much as the Baluba conceive of medicinal plants.
Their curing
power does not operate automatically;
it mayor may not act depending on
the state of a number of forces external to the plants themselves
,~, (Tempels 1945: 62-}). For the zande Zande poison oracle, the main external
foroe force which stimulates the poison to kill or to spare is the truth or
falsity of the "hypothesisII ll put to it.
Here is a case where Afrioans
utilize their conception of the irregularity of the forces of nature to
regulate their lives. They ~ley oonstruct an experimental situation where
a force foroe is asked to aot act irregularly (killing one fowl, fowl. sparing another)
and they endow the particular form of irregularity (which fowl was
killed, and which spared?) with meaning.
And, of oourse, oO'UrSe, given their
assumption that the forces of nature do act irregularly and under .the
influence of many other forces, if an apparently valid oracular prediction
fails to materialize, mater1alize~
it is logical to suppose that some other foroe,
foroe~
such as witchcraft, influenced the oracle.
It may appear that the thought I have attributed to Afrioans is not

- 64 ­
-
fundamentally different from Western science.
r have suggested that~
for Africans~
the forces of nature are not thought to act regularly
because the action of any force is influenced by many other forces.
But
this could be taken to mean simply that Africans consider a great many
variables to impinge upon events, events~
and that what I have called their conception
of the irregular action of the forces of nature is nothing more than
their recognition that they do not fully understand all the variables
affecting any particular event.
From. this point of view one might
attribute to them the ideas that the forces of nature do act with mechanical
regularity and that they could predict the events resulting from their
operation if only they coiii'd"Control co~ontrol all the variables.
In this view the
Africans emerge as possessing a scientific mentality but without enough
knowledge to take it very far.
The problem with this position is that~
given our idea that the laws
of nature operate with mechanical regularity~
when we talk about "controlling
variables" we mean the ability to predict if and how variables will act
in particular circumstances.·
Such prediction is. is~ I think, think~ impossible in
African thought.
The variables we are discussing are the forces of nature~
and most of them (the Supreme Being, Being~
nature sprites, sprites~ witches, witches~ ghosts~
etc.)
have volition.
Therefore, Therefore~ the African has no way of predicting if they
will act in a particular situation.
Neither are they conceived with the
functional specificity that characterizes variables in the Western view.
There are many ways, ways~
for example, example~in which a witch or malevolent ghost
can do mischief.
Therefore. Therefore~ even if the African conception of variables
(forces) would allow them to predict that certain variables will act in a
particular Situation, situation~ that conception renders it impossible to predict
how they will act.
Therefore, Therefore~ I maintain that the postulate that the
fOrces of nature do not operate with mechanical regularity is validly
attributable to Afrioan thought.2
Their ontological charaoter
(especially volition and functional diffuseness) is incompatible with
any idea of pred1ctable~ predictable, mechani~l regularity of action.
My answer to the quee~1on of why Africans do not question their
general beliefs on the basis of contrary evidence should now be clear.
General beliefs or assumptions can be evaluated in terms of empirical
experience only if one is certain that the experience is relevant to the
assumption, assumption~ that no other factors oontributed to the course of the
experience beyond those embodied in the belief or assumption.
The
variables affecting the experience must be controlled.
But the
African postulate that the forces of nature do not operate in a
mechanically regular way means that in their view the variables
affecting experience cannot be controlled. They canno~ rationally
attribute a given event to a given force because they cannot be certain
if that force in fact operated on that· occasion.
Nor can they be
certain if (and if so, so~
how) the outcome was affected by the action of
other forces.
Therefore, Therefore~ I suggest that Africans do not question their
general beliefs-in the light of contrary evidence· evidencebecause~
~ithin their
system of thought. thought~ this is not rational.
From their metaphysical point
of view such evaluation cannot. be a reliable epistemological procedure~
procedure.-
II
Having offered the preceding analysis of an aspect of African thought,
I should now like to view that analysis analysiS as data against which we may
consider some problems in the study of other philosophies.
Peter Winch would have us understand another culture or historical
period in its own terms.
As I understand his reasoning in its relevance
to anthropology. anthropology~ a people's thought and behaviour a~e
intelligible only
in terms of the concepts of reality held by that people.
These concepts
of reality are given in language and in the "form of lifel' in general.
Since languages and "forms of life" vary, vary~
concepts of reality and the
resulting modes of apprehending meaning in ideas and behaviour also vary.
Further, Further~ since there can be no· concepts apart from a language and a
"form of life", life"~
there is no common denominator in terms of which different
conoepts of reality and modes of intelligibility can be understood.

- 95 ­
-
Each "form of 11fe"l life". with its languagel language. phllosophyl philosophy. and system of social
relations is a self-contained entity which can be understood only in its
own terms (Winch 19581 see especially pp. 11-151 22.231 40-441 121-133).
own terms (Winch 1958. see especially pp. 11-15. 22.23. 40-44. 121-133).
I must confess uncertainty as to exactly how far Winch wishes to
press the point that a culture must be understood in its own terms.
The
train of logic summarized above and many'of his remarks (e.g. 1958:
129-32) imply that we,"mu,st we'''llIU,S't strive, to approachI approach. as closely as possible. I
the goal of understanding as the native understands.
But MacIntyre
Maclntyre
(19(7) interprets Winch as arguing that understanding from within is
just a starting point for analysis. I and Winch t s statement (1964: 319)
that "the lithe sort of understanding we seek requires that we see the Zande
category categol"J in relation to our own already understood categories" lends
credence to this pOint. point.
Whichever Winch espousesl espouses. he has not to,my
knowledge given close consideration to the problems involved in understanding
another culture in its own terms.
These are the problems
which I propose to discuss here.
My analysis of why Africans do not question their general beliefs on
the basis of contrary evidence may appear to qualify qualifY as an example of
understanding another culture in its own terms.
There was no
evaluation of the validity of African concepts from a Western point of
'view.
Nor was African thought referred to as a "closed system" or as
"lacking alternatives". alternatives"l and both of these characterizations imply an
external perspective.
Instead. Insteadl the analysis considered the problem
in terms of concepts of, , reality attributed to the Africans. I
and
concluded that within these concepts such a uDde u.ode of evaluating beliefs
would not be rational.
Yet I do not claim that this analysis provides
unders~anding of African thought in its own terms; still less do I
claim that in thinking through the conclusions' of this analysis analysiS we are
thinking like Africans think.
I doubt that either of these claims
is true. truel for a number of reasons.
First. Firstl since concepts of reality and intelligibility are imbedded
in language and a "form of life". I
understanding a philosophy in its own
terms presupposes int1mat~
int1m8:t~ knOWledge knOwledge of the language and culture.
Hence the analysis offered above ,is 'is disqualified at the outsetl outset. for I
know no African language. I
have never studied first-hand an African
society. societyI
am in no Sense an Africanist and have never even been to Africa.
noubtless an anthropologist with all these qualifications could devise
~n analysis of our problem superior to the one I have offered. But
'one wonders if even his analysis would represent understanding of
African philosophy in its own terms.
Would not the fact that he of
necessity learned that philosophy in terms of his own culture's
philosophy while the natives learned it from infancy mean that he must
understand it differently than they do?
And are there any criterial
criteria.
beyond intuition. intuitionl by which he could oould know that he understands it as the
natives do?
Even if he could gain SU'C'h SUC'h understandingI understanding. and could know
he has it. itl surely it is incommunicable to anyone who lacks the language
and first-hand contact. I
since when he tries ',to explain it in another
language and according to different concepts of reality it is clearly
not being treated in its own terms.
Secondly. SecondlYI if we are to Understand understand another philosophy entirely in
its, its- own terms. termsl we should be limited to thinking only about those
problems which arise within that philosophy.
This would bar us from
asking. askingl among many others. I the question raised in this paper.
If it
does not occur to the African to question his general beliefs on the
basis of contrary' contrary-evidenoe-.---it evidenoe. ... ,., it -- ,. is,diffioult isdiffioul t to imagine him wrestling
with the problem of ~ he does not.
Clearly the. question emerges
when African thought is viewed from the perspective of Western thought.
We of the West often do question our general beliefs in this mannerI
manner.
and it is preoisely the'differenoe the-differenoe we perceive between ourselves and
Africans which leads' us to ask this question and to be interested in its
answer. 3 Moreover. Moreoverl our analysis concerns not all of Afrioan thought
but a class of it: the class manifested in cases where general beliefs
are not qUestioned questioned on the basis of contrary evidence.
But I have
just argued that the observation that general beliefs are not questioned
in this way stems from Western thought rather than African thought.

- g() -­
Were we viewing African thought in its own termsl l
we would not be
justified in thinking that those cases form a class at all.
There
would probably be no conunon charaot.eristic which relates them and
sets them off from other aspects of thought; thOUght;
certainly not the
characteristic we have recognized.
Thus even before it gets startedI
I
at the point of framing the problem~
the analysis offered here cannot
be a study of African thought in its own terms.
terms,
Furthermorel l
a comparative perspective has chaPaoterized my entire
anal~,.~is.
analJ~is.
I found it easiest to think about whi'Africans wni' do not
eval~'"te
their assumptions on the basis of empirical evidence by
thtnking first about why Western scientists do. 1'ItY l'ItY analysis proceeded
from a pair of postulates which I think are attributable to African
philosophy. philosophyl but these postulates were introduced and discussed in
contrast with their opposite numbers from the West.
The same method
of contrasts was followed in the discussion of how experiments could
be r")n r~n and variables controlled in terms of the Western and African
post'llates.
1lates. The very concepts "experiment" 1 and "variable". I crucial to
my analysis. a1'1alysisl were of course derived from Western rather than African
thought.
Considering all this. thisl the analysis I have offered must be
very remote from understanding African philosophy in its own terms.
The most important reason I have for why my analysis does not
reveal African philosophy in its own terms is that the epistemological
structure of that analysis itself is Western rather than African.
My MY aim was to explain why Why Africans do not evaluate their general
beliefs according to contrary·evidenoe. -evidenoel and my meth()d method of explanation was
to posit two postulates of African philosophy andl l
by reasoning from
those postulates. I
to argue that it is not rational within African
philosophy to evaluate general beliefs in this way.
This method itself
stems from Western philosophy.
It is based on the first Western
postulate I offered~ ~
that empirical events are subject to unseen
principles or laws.
In this case the "empirical events" are observations
that Africans do not evaluate their general beliefs according to
contrary evidence.
The "unseen principles or laws" are the two
postulates I posited for African philosophy.
In Western thought the
epistemological correlate to the postulate that empirical. events are
subject to unseen principles or laws is that empirical events are
intelligible in terms of those principles or laws. By ay explaining
African thought in terms of my two postulates of African philosophyI
philosophy. my
analysis has followed this directive of W~stern w~stern epistemology;
it is
Western rather than African in structure. - . .
Moreover. Moreoverl the notion of intelligibility which underlies my analysis
is Western and not African.
When I conceived of analyZing analyzing our problem
in terms of the two postulates I have posited for African philosophyl
philosophy.
I evaluated those postUlates by asking "Do they work?"
In carrying
out this evaluation I Juxtaposed the postUlates against various
particular cases where Africans do not question their general beliefs
in terms of contrary evidence. evidenceI
and determined whether each of those
cases could be understood in terms of the postulates.
In such an
evaluation. evaluationl each case which can be so understood oonstitutes "proof"
or supporting evidence for the postulates. I
while cases which could not
be understood in terms of the postulates would disprove them and
therefore would necessitate revision or dismissal of the postulates.
postUlates.
Furthermorel l
I think a critic would evaluate my analysis and its
postUlates postulates of Afrioan philosophy in precisely the same way.
Although
not attaining the rigor found in natural sciencel science. this mode of
evaluation is essentially the experimental method.
It stems from the
second Western postulate mentioned earlier: that unseen principles or
laws act with mechanical regularity.
In my analysis the postulates of
African philosophy represent "unseen principles or laws"'of African
thought.
It is rational for us to insist that they render eve!::
eveEZ
relevant case intelligible only if we first assume that those
principles or laws operate with mechanical regularity. Thereforel Therefore. the
way in which both I and a critic ju~e whether or not my analysis makes
the African thought in question intelligible is a Western way,
way.
And
especially insofar as t~is way inco~rates experimental thinkingI I it

.. - 67 ..
-
is !lOt ~t an African way.
For it will be recalled that the very problem
we set out to explain is why Africans do not evaluate general beliefs
on the basis of contrary eVidence, i.e., why db Africans AfricanS not think
experimentally?
Since both I and a critic understand my analysis and
the African thought it treats aaaording to notions of intelligibility
quite alien to African thought, it clearly cannot be said that this
analysis provides understanding of African thought in its own terms.
And I think that this point holds with equal force for any analysis we
make of another philosophy.
To sum up. when we seek to .understand. another system of thought, not
one but two philosophies are in 'play.
There is of course native
philosophy, since it, it.is is the natives who do the thinking we wish to
understand.
But our own philosophy is intrinsically involved as well,
since it is we who do the understanding.
Understanding itself varies
among cultures.
Northrop has devoted a great deal of hard thought to
this point (1946, 1960, 1964), and a few differences between Western and
African epistemologies (such as the role of experimental exp.erimental thinking in
understanding) have been discussed in this paper.' (See also Tempels TempeIs
1945 for a discussion of African epistemology.) .,When we understand.
another philosophy, then, we understand it acco~ng to what properly
constitutes understanding for us.
Very likely this would not qualify as
understanding from the native point of View, nor would the native's "
'.
understanding of his own philosophy count as proper understanding forus.5
Therefore, I think it is extremely unlikely - !fnot if impossible .. that we
could ever understand another philosophy in its own terms.
This would
require, require. operating entirely within the metaphysical and epistemological
concepts and procedures of that philosophy, while I maintain that another
philosophy, like everything else in the universe, can be intelligible to
us only in terms of our own metaphysics and. epistemology"
/-(Curiously, my reasoning here is very close to that of Winch, and
yet we end up at opposite poles.
I agree with his point that a people's
ideas and behavior are intelligible only in terms of their concepts of
reality.
But I think that the logic requires another step: since we
are people too, another CUlture's concepts of are intelligible
to us only in terms of our own concepts of reality.)1
reality.)~
From this point of view, any analysis we make must have an "as if"
quality about it.
I do not mean to suggest in this paper, for example,
that Afrioans subscribe either consciously, consCiously, unconsciously, implicitly or
in any other way to the postulates that empirical events are SUbject subject to
unseen forces, and that these forces do not aot With with meohanical
regularity.
I do suggest, however, that oertain puzzling aspects of
African thought become intelligible to us if we regard the Africans
as if they subsoribed to these postulates.
This is similar to the
procedures of natural science.
Horton has pOinted p6intedout that scientific
theories are often constructed on the model of familiar phenomena, as for
example the planetary theory of the atom (Horton 1964:98. 1967:67-8).
Now the thoughtful scientist would not say that atoms really are
constructed like the solar system, but only that a number of things about
atoms become intelligible to us when we view them as if they were (see
Northrop 1946: 194).
This leads to my final point.
Winch argues that understanding in
social science is different from understanding in natural science, and
that therefore social scientists should not attempt to operate like
natural scientists (1958:1-2, 127-28, 132-33).
His main points seem
to be that intelligibility in naturalsc1ence science 'depends on theory. that
natural phenomena can meaningfully be said to be related only in terms
of the theory which posits that relationship.
One cannot understand
the relationship without first understanding the theory.
In contrast,
social phenomena are intelligible only in terms of the language and
culture in whioh they exist.
Their relationships must be underst90d
from within.
Therefore one cannot understand social theories or laws
without a prior understanding. of the social situations to which they
apply (Winch 1958: 133-36). . ,
apply (Winch 1958: 133-36). . .
--""-'-..""'-_._--_..........._- ""'-_._--_ ............ _- ..---,"'-~~-~,~~' ---,"'-~~-~.~~'--~--~-~---,.~.
--~--~-----,.~.

- 68 ­
-
The burden of this paper has been that we cannot understand social
situations (other than those 1n which we participate as thoughtful
natives) frour-mthln...---.In.-my--view, frour-1d-thin.r----.In--my--view, we understand them very much as
Winch describes understanding in natural science.
Winch argues that
in natural science understanding of a theory preoedes understanding of
the phenomena explained by that theory, while social phenomena must be
understood 1n themselves before we can understand theories purporting
to explain them. But consider once again the analysis of African f; ~
thought offered in this paper.
We began with a characteristic of
African thought which was unintelligible to us.
We explained it in
terms of a theory: two postulates and certain deductions from them.
Contra Winch, I do not think that one need understand the elements of
African thought this theory p~orts purports to explain before one can understand
the theory. (Indeed, (Indeed. I do not think he can understand those elements
- of thought apart !!:.2!!!. the theory. ~ or some other theory). To be sure,
sure.
I devised_ devised. the theory while puzzling over those aspects aspeots of African thought.
just as a natural scientist builds theory not in a vacuum but with
reference to problems.
But I see no reason why someone else of the
West could not grasp the postulates I advanced for African thought and
my reasoning from them, them. even if he had never heard of Dinka sacrifice
or zande Zande oracles or the rest of it. .
Another facet of Winch's point is that in natural science connections
between phenomena are intelligible only in terms of theory. theory~ while
connections between social pheno~ena
are given in the social situation
in which those phenomena exist.
But our analysis advanoed a connection
between the African practice of not questioning general beliefs on the
basis of contrary evidence and Zande thought with reference to the normal
and prOper operation of oraoles (see pp. 5-6 above).
Again contra
Winch. Winch~
I submit that this connection is not "given" in the social
situation.
Rather, as Winch says with reference to intelligibility in
natural science, "It is only !a terms 2!. 2
theory that one can speak
of the events being thus 'connectedi 'cormeoted i ••• ; i the only way to grasp the
connection is to learn the theory" (1958: 134. l34~
Winch's emphasis).
Finally, I have argued that we do not understand other cultures
oultures
in their own terms, terms. but according to what for us constitutes proper
understanding.
This mode of understanding itself is a theory - a a
theory of knowledge or an epistemology.
I do not think our analyses
of social phenomena are likely to be intelligible to anyone who does
not have a prior familiarity with that epistemology.
Within our
epistemology, which Northrop (1964) has termed "logical realism",
puzzling observable phenomena are made intelligible by viewing them as
if they conform to invariable principles or laws which we devise and
label "theories".
We then Judge a theory experimentally: by
determining whether other observable phenomena which fall within the
domain of the theory also behave as if they conform to the principles
prinCiples
or laws it ~stulates.
pqstulates. AlthOUgh Although there are olearly differences in rigor
of experimentation, I submit that this means of understanding character­
izes the social sciences as much as the natural scienoes.
F. Allan Hanson.
References
1.' MacIntyrs (1962:6i~3) explicitly advocates this procedure.
2. It is probably quite qUite awkward to attribute to African philosophy
the negative postulate that the forces of nattire natUre do not act aot with
mechanical meohanical regUlarity.
The more elegant way would be to say that
the postUlate that the forces of nature aot with meohanioal
': , I
.. l .. . ._'i:''-_. __ ..

- 69 -­
regularity cannot be attributed to African philosophy.
However I
beg leave to continue with the former formulation, as this seems
to give me something more tangible to work with as I construct my
analysis and (in Section II) as I analyse.:that analysis.
3. It may be protested that I have phrased the question ethnocentrically,
and that it could properly ·beaskedwithin ·beasked.within the context of
African philosophy in the neutral form "What·· is the relation
between general propositions and particular events?"
I agree
that the question is better stated in this form, as the analysis
above demonstrates. Bu~ I maintain the point that we are led to
ask' even this question because the relation seems different for
Africans than it does for ·us.
When a Z2ndetells Zandetells us that his
foot is cut because he struck it on a rock we do not spin theories
of Z2nde Zande causation.
It is only when he begins' to speculate over
what witchcraft Caused his foot to strike the rock that we become
interested.
I submit that no matter how. carefully and neutrally
we frame our questions and pursue our investigations, we always
conceive of those questions and investigations from the perspective
of our own thought.
It is "difficult uifficult to imagine how we could do
otherwise.
4. . One might argue that since my first African postulate (that
empirical events are'subJect subject to t·o unseen -powers or forces) is
similar to the first Western postulate, the method of explanation
adopted in my analysis may not be totally alien to African thought.
On the basis of what has been said thus far I agree with this,
although quite striAing divergences will appear in a moment.
At
any rate, I would maintain that the method of analysis derives
from Western rather than African philosophy, and that any
similarity to a possible African method of analysis is due to
coincidental resemblances between the two philosophies, not to
the possibility that I have been able to analyze African thought
in its own terms.
5. This is not to say that we cannot understand what for the native
constitutes proper understanding.
We can and should study native
epistemology.
But our understanding of native epistemology
will not be the same as the native's understanding of it.
To be
intelligible to us it must be cast in the concepts of Western
epistemology, not native epistemology.
Bibliography
Evans-Pritchard, E.E.. .. , 1937, Wit.chcrat't....ara.c.les.Jmd.JIl~g1(Lamongthe
. .Ql'a.c.l.es.Jmd.JJl~g1(Lamongthe
Azand-e.
Azande. OXford: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
OXford:
Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Horton, Robin, 1964, Ritual man in Africa.
A.t'tica 34: 85-1Qll..
85-1Q11..
.­
..
1967, African traditional thought and Western soience.
------ AM.Q~ 37: 50-71, 155-187•
•
L1enhardt, Godfrey, 1961, DJJc..1,nity and. ~PJ~~ience;
the religion '0 f
the Dinka. OXford: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1962, The situation of death: an aspect of Anuak
philosophy. ~Ql2.Q1Q!Q...Q.~~~:bY35:
~Ql2.QlQ!Q...Q.~~~~y 74-85.
Macintyre, Alasdair, Alasda1r, 1962, A mistake about causality in social science.
!!l PWJ..qruwp'x4_.RQlitic.l!...and PWJ..~p.x4_.RQlitic.l!..andsoc+~_1!.l,
soc+~_1!.l'
second
series (Peter Iaslett Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds.).
Olcford:
Basil Blackwell.

-70...
Macintyre, Alasdair, 1967, The Idea of Social Science.
The
Aristotelian Society! Supplementary Volume 41:
95-114.
Northrop, F. S. c., C., 1946, The Meeting Heeting of East and West.
V.Jest.
Macmillan.
New York:
1960, Philosophical Anthropology and Practical
.politics. . New York: Macmillan.
1964, Toward a deductively formulated and
operationally verifiable comparative cultural
anthropology.
In Cross-cultural Understanding:
E istemolo in Anthro 010 (F.S.C. Northrop and
Helen H. Livingston, eds • New York: Harper and Row.
Tempels, R. P. Placide, 1945, La Philosophie Bantoue (traduit du
Neerlandais par A. RUbbens).
Rubbens).
Paris: Collection
Presence Afridaine.
Winch, v/inch, Peter, 1958, The Ic..ba Id~a of a Social Science.
London: Routledge
and "K;;ga-;' Paul.
1964, Understanding a Primitive Society. American
Philosophical Quarterly 1: 307-324.

- 71 ­
-
A DEFENCE OF WINCH
----
"Everything tlEverything is what it is and not another thingtl ll -
(Butler).
Understanding, making intelligible, modes of discourse other than those
with which one is familiar (and so which do not have to be 'understood'
in quite such the same way) must somehowfaca face this fact.
This note
attempts to show that the course suggested by Hanson is not the best of
the alternatives.
This does not mean that I altogether support the
Hinchian procedure, but that .
(i) Hanson's s criticismof Winch do not stand if
(11) it is measured against what I take vlinch to be really saying.,
•.
In other words, although Winch can perhaps to criticised as by, bYJ for
example, Nielsen (1967) and MacIntyre (Hick 1964), Hanson' I s attempts are
at least partially invalidated by the fact that they are not properly
directed against Winch.
Further, I attempt to show that the procedure
suggested by Hanson .Jould .lould have to face relatively severe criticism if it
is to stand in its present form.
Since I am limiting this d18cussion d1ficussion to toJinch t.Jinch and Hanson, I should
like to begin by briefly briefl1 indicating the broader p~rspective
within which
this debate should be viewed. To suggest, that loS, ~s,
how Winch can be
located within a broader sphere of academic en~eavour.
If we say, following Hartin, that the notion 'God' may be used in
either of two ways (as a proper name referring to a particular baing being or
as a descriptive term) then it can be shown that using it in both ways
at once leads to a contradiction.
Hughes replies that this argument to
establish the contradictory nature of Christian belief is wrong, for God
is not thought of as a particular thing 'on the lips of believers.'
(Hughes 1962).
Which then is the correct course for meta-theology'Z
meta-theology1
To characterise religious belief in terms of the patterns of usage and
sensa senso within actual religious discourse~
Or to apply such
organisational devices as proper names and descriptive phrases, when
these have been developed to expose the 'logic' ot discourse not of
'God' t but of particular til!ings?
tillings? When there is incommensurability
between our criteria of characterisation and the criteria, either
explicit expliCit or not, of judgment within other modes of discourse, then which
stands? Or can a meta-level meta-leve1 of mutual relevance be established? "\vhich
"Which
of these programmes is preferable is perhaps the most important question
for meta-theology meta-theo10gy (even, mutatis mutandis, for all meta-theorising)"
meta-theorising)lI
(Hughes 1962).
Theologians and Philosophers of Religion have had to grapple with
this problem for what is at stake is the nature of balief belief in God: the
role of reason in religious understanding and in unders~anding
religion.
But anthropologists, in the main, appear to be more concerriad with
retaining, in a laZy fashion, the· the' absolute' and. immutable relevance of
those concepts and organisational devices belonging to their tradition.
But what is at stake is as important, at least for the atheist, as those
issues which Theologians'have have written so much about (Gill 1966, Alston,
Hepburn 1963, Coburn 1963, loIacquame J.Iacquame 1967, Ramsey 1959).
That is, how
to best characterise and so understand other modes of discourse.
So,
in following through the arguments advocated by Hinch and Hanson as to
how we can bast best characterise other modes of thought (in such terms, for
example, as - incoherent, meaningless, instrumental,.axpressive,
instrumental,.expressive,
paradoxical, mystical), it should be borne continually in mind that the
!llOre more . sophisticated arguments and organisational devices (such as,
non-assertive, intentional, factual,quasi-attitudinal factual,. etc.) have been
developed by Theologians and Philosophers of Religion.
And that such
problems as whether religious language is autonomous, unique and so
independent of external, logical analysis (l.lcPherson 1955) or whether we
can treat religious language as though it ware were empirical status (Ramsay 59)

- 72 ­
-
are of precisely the same variety that face Anthropologists in many of
the more interesting fields of their work.
Malinowsld., according to Leach (Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences, pp.339 - 334) "sought to evade the difficulties raised by
simple trait comparisons by blandly affirming that every social event is
uniquoly defined by its total context lt and that if this 'Wera ~hecase
"all cross-cultural comparison would be futile".
It seems to me that
Hanson is attributing a very similar view to vlinch (my emphasis):­
emphasis):'
''\flinch would have us understand another culture in its own terms" for
"a people I s thought and behaviour are intelligible only in terms o:f o£ the
concepts of reality held by that people".
Such concepts of reality
vary from context to context, and since there are t!2 concepts
independent of their context, then various forms of life cannot be
equated and so mutually understood through the application of such
common denominators.
If this 'Were true, that Hinch V1inch was reallY saying that each fom of
life "is lIis a self-contained entity ",hich can be understood only in its own
terms" then Hanson "'ould be justified in continuing to assart that lUnch \-linch
is clearly c1earl~l striving "to approach, as closely as possible, the goal of
understanding 'as -as the native understands". ll • TI.'lrR TI.'lrS in turn 'Would involve
vlinch in the fatal, neo-Malinowsldan either/or situation which Hanson
suggests is the case for Hinch Hincb - ''we thus have the options of viewing
vie'Wing
another system of thought in terms of our concepts of reality or in
terms of its' its" own concepts of reality," reality,1I vIinch \-linch himself supposedly
insisting on the latter course. El~ewhere in his article, Hanson
makes this either/or all the more so -
their tbought now comes to be
intelligible either "only in terms of their concepts of reality" (1) or
intelligible 1I0nly "only in terms of our concepts of reality. It (2)
From tbis this basis Hanson proceeds to suggest that although
"Adopting lUnch's Hinch's prescription of viewing a philosophy. in its ow.
terms", another logical step is necessary - for their concepts of
reality are "intelligible to' us 2n1Y: in terms of our ow. concepts of
reaLityD.
It can-be".aaan. can-be- ~ JiPat the phrases "in terms ofII, of", "in its own
terms" ll and "onlylt 'lonly''' are not used-very-consistently.
At ona ana stage
Hanson is suggesting that we (a) follow "Hinch 'Hinch when this is position '(1)
and that (b) we' we- add position .(2). This is clearly logically.impossible;
,impossible ;
the second step can only hold if it is taken that 'What we understand is
not ~ in their OWn terms.
It would \-Iould seem that the logic of understanding other modes of
discourse is indeed wonderous, and that "Hinch 'lUnch is even more mysterious.
Hanson's Olm position becomes even more confounded when we follow
through his adoption of "I-linch's lUnch's prescription (an adoption,which,
significantly enough, does not involve the 'Word "only").
"onlylt).
For, on
completion of his analysis, ~rsis, Hanson qualifies this stance
_ liMy
''My
analysis ••• may appear to quality as anex-amp1e or 01" tmderstanding
tmderstariding
another culture in its CMl own terms" and arid then, most :\.mportantly "that the
analysis' considered the problem in terms of concepts of reality
attributed to the Africans", or again .'II uI do not claim that this analysis a.na1ysis
provides underst,anding ~f African thought in its ot-m Otom terms;"
terms;' still less'
do I claim that in thinldhg through the conclusions of this analysis analySis we
are thinking like Africans think". . .
,
Can Winch be refuted refUted in this way?
First though, the reasons
Hanson H~son gives for the refutation of Winch which this last quotation
implies, might help us to" to'understand his train of thought.
He makes
the following points "
'
\a) that understanding understandiDg a philosophy in its own terms presupposes
an intimate lcrlowledge lmowledge of, their lanIDlage and culture.
Since·
bis own analysis was wGS made 'Wi without tbout sucb a Imowledge, knowledge, Hanson
Hansbn
suggests that their own terms need not be well known.

- 73 ­
-
b} that even if their terms were relatively 'Well Imow, Imo'Wll, they could
never be undara-tood as. the natives understand them,
c} and even 1£ if' such an understanding could be acquired, "when he
tries to explain it in another language' and according to
different concepts of reality it is clearly not being treated
in its atom mm tems terms". ll •
d} That 1£ if' another philosopQy is to be understood entirely in its
own terms, then tben such useful questions as those posed by Hanson
could not be so asked,- asked" and finally; perhaps most importantly,
e} that at least in terms of the analysis followed cr,y by Hanson,
African philosophy is not revealed !nits own terms.
Instead,
the procedure must be in terms of our criteria: 'When we
understand another philosophy, we understand' it according to
what properly constitutes understanding for '1m.
'!m.
In eacb of these arguments, Hanson is rejecting that view which
holds that other pb:11osophies pb:Uosophies should be' understood in their own tenns.
Thus be is contradicting his own adoption of ~Jinch
and so is not adding
another logical ste:p(which we have seen is impossiblo, but 'Which
'Whicb
Hanson claims to do), but is developing an altogethor altogeth~r different
procedure.
I do not disagree that this "in lIin terms of" procedure is not
valid, but it is precisely this procedure which Hanson himself makes
invalid by quote (l) when he implies that 'tiincb liincb is saying ~ in terms
of tbeir concopts.
Wbat then are \>1

- 74 ­
-
. meaning of social behaviour and ideas cannot be settled by experiment.
For example, whereas wheraas the· temperature at ,~hich "later ",ater freezes can be
settled experimentally, such a procedure is not possible when what is
to be decided is how many grains. of wheat have to be added together
bofore one has a heapR heap" (p.73).
It follmlS' that insofar as the social
scientist is dealing with meanings, it. is misleading to follow the
scientific procedure of applying theories' which themselves establish
connections.
Instead, since "all behaviour which is meaningful is
ipso-facto rule-governed" (p.52) our concepts of social phenomena or
act·s must be co-extensive with that of meaningf'ul meaning:f'ul. acts and notions.
From'linowledge of whatit :isto :lato follow a rule, analysis can proceed by
"examining the natura of the rules according to "lhich "/hich judgments of
identity are made" (p.S3) ,when "such judglilants jUdglilants are intelligible only
relativel.Y relativebY to a given mode of human behaviour behaviOur governed by its ow.
own
rulesII.' 11.'

- 75 ­
-
meaning with use (1964p.3l6); to, as in the case of Philosophers of
Religion, "elucidate" n (- make explicit exp.licit that which whicb is ioplicit) the
peculiar natures of· those forms of life called religion (1958 p.41).
Admittedly, it could still be maintained that this 'Observet'
'obS8r'I7Qt'
'theory' of meaning, which allows reporting back, cannot grasp all that
the participant shares - so vrincn vlincli elsel-Jhere else"lhere writes "if the judgments of
identity of the sociologists of religion rest on criteria taken from
religion, then his relation to the performers of· religious activity
cannot be just of the observer to the obserwd ll and "the lithe sociologist of
religion must himself have ~ religious feeling if he is to make
sense of the religious movement he is studying". studyingll.
But the underlined
words show that he is still ta11d.ng talld.ng about the observer who attempts to
gain maximal fideism.
In any case, it could be held that to grasp the
real nature of religious belief' is not really part of the sociologist's
job•
•
.What . follows from this is that vlinch cannot be classed, as Nielson
1967 does, as one '''ho who claims that in order to fully fUl1y understand
religious disco.urse one must have a participant's understanding of a
. belief and acceptance nature. Instead, his 'the.ory' of meatiing
escapes such 'participant's relativism' and allows allo",s \-linch to do what
Hanson suggests he does not - fully face the problem of how ho", "to bring
another society's conception of intelligibility (to them) into
(intelligible!) relation with our own conception of intelligibility
(to US)II uS)lI (1964 p.31?).
p.3l7).
Or "to lito present an account of them that will
someho", somehow sati.sfy the criteria of intelligibility demanded by the culture
to which he and his readers belong" ~
(1964 p.307).
Where 'lIinch vIinch is a relativist is that such a sociological
interpretation as constituted by the tbe discerned logic and 'point-of-iless'
'point-of-Hess'
must involve "extending our conception of intelligibility as to· make it
possible for us to see "'hat wha.t intelligibility amounts to in the life of
the society "'13 we are investigating".
vIe must extend our 'own' 'O\oln' way of
looldng looking at things. - not impose our boundaries, classifications etc.
(p.3l8). . It is for this reason that Laach'< Encylopaedia of Social .
Sciances) argues along Hincbian Hinchian lines to criticise amongst others,
Hurdoch's Procedure. (See also vrinch vlinch p.3l9). Thus, in a style
reminiscent of Waisu:an; Winch is suggesting that the ~t of discerning
maximal commonality (relativism of this style does not stress
uniqUEJlesSl) might ",ell well involve a considerable rethinking aDd realignment
of our traditional categories. (Sae (Soe VIinch 1964 p.32J p.323 and 1958 p.S7 p.87 for
examples of what is involved.)
Only in such a way can I sciencecentricism'
be avoided - HacIntyre, Haclntyre, the logical positivists and Levy-
Bruhl
can be included amongst those who have imposed ellen diEm criteria
so obscuring those judgments that the sociologist should be making
(1964 p.320, 321). .
.
Returning to Hanson's five cl'iticism,s, critici~s,
bearing in mind that
understanding for Winch vlinch is equated "'itb witb the exposure of social logic in
terms tarms 6£ relevant/rela.tive relevant/relative. organisational devices ",!thin, within, or extendad
from, our culture, then
(i) Hanson's either/or formulation does not apply
(il) (ll) criticism (a) ianot relevant - for not only does it rest on
an· 'in. its own term!J' term!,,' Winch, but l!inch's Hinch's own analysis was
based on a brilliaritethno~apby'
brilliaritethno~apby"
of "'hich which !l2. himself did not
have deep knowledge.· kno",ledge.· And. Alld. in .FJnycase- . anycase- all ",ould would agree, the
deeper the lmowledga knowledge the better.
(iii) Criticism (b) fares little better ... "'6 we have seen that Hinch Winch
says that such an understanding is impossible (for,. in the
same sense, I can claim that I can never 'lmow' what any
sentence 'means' for anyone else). •..

- 76 ­
-
(iv) Criticism (0) is rendered of dubious value in that Hinch r!inch is
suggesting that although it is inevitable that different
concepts are involved, they should, if possible, only be
different in so far as translation itself is involved.
He
. would not dispute that aince~ eince~ understand, it cannot be in
their terms;
what matters is degree of fidiesm, which his
'theory' ~heory'
of meaning maximises.
(v) Point (d) is also misleading, misleading" for Winch would stress that we,
with our perspective (critical in this sense) should ask as
many questions as possible in order to discern which of our
many organisational devices are most relevant/relative to the
alien'mode of thought.
Thus Hinch (1964 p.3l9) "lrites that
since "the onus is on us to extend our understanding" 'WEI
must
seek a foothold". (p.3l0. Sea also p.320).
Finally, criticism (e) - the argument which is the king-pin of
Hanson's paper.
Hanson suggests that within our dominant epistemology,
at least since Comte, "puzzling observablepcenomena observablepce:nomena are made /
intelligible by viewing them ~ they conform to invariable
principals or laws which we devise and label 'theories'.
So, in order
to make intelligible other modes of discourse (and so their 'internal'
~nternall
intelligibility) Hanson says that they must be treated I'aS, ''as. if"'such
if"lsuch
prin6ipals or laws· operate ,dthin them.
This 'as if"application of the
theory in Hanson's own analysis. analysis, is claimed to refute· Winch in that
relationshipSare established as in the natural sciences, and that
intelligibility only follows 2n this establishment.
I do not think that because we \1e cannot understand (and report back)
mere11fromwithin, that· that' (a) when ,~aparticipate,
as field workers, we
understand asa scientist does and (b) that organisational devices are
applied in such 'an experimental way.
I do not think that Hanson could
possibly have done what he claims to have. - How, kow, to meet the strong
objections raised by Winch in his"heap" " analogy, does Hanson verify and
falsif'y falsii"y (procedures of the essence of the experimental approach) his
theory?
If he does not effect these operations, how can it be called a
theory']
Another objection (perhaps not so strong) - how can it be
applied unless something is first understood~ understood'l
}1acIntyra MacIntyre 19(U.p.1l8 1964p.118
shows that this argument can be used to refute Levy-Bruhl
Lavy-Bruhl
and the more
extrema logical positivists in their form of understanding religious
discourse. Finally, such comments as - ve understand other societies
''according to "lhat for us constitutes proper understanding" when this
mode of understanding is limited to the theories of logical realism, has
all the ear-marks of that arbitariness and a priorism
that once
characterised such rigid theories of meaning as logieal logical positivism.
A
narrotmess l

- 77 ­
-
are necessary conditions for communication, and even tbough' they might
be conceptualised differently, they are, in a sense, universally the
same.
For example, Levi tevi Strauss(1966p.10 il) ll) sqs that we can "most
easily' begin to understand forms of thought which seem very strange to
us" by appealing to the fact that they are ~ founded on tbis demand
for oi'derll.
• Clarke (Hick p.136) writes "although there is no common
expressible formula for intelligibility among all man, there is at
least a common basic exigency of rationality in a wider sense".
Winch, v.1inch,
besides making. similar assertions (including quoting R. Rhees to the
effect that language games are not self-contained) self-conta:inad) suggests that
universal intelligibility could also be based on such 'limiting
conceyts' conce,Pts' as death, war, sex etc, and on the necessary real/unreal,
true/false conditions.
That theZ'El criteria are implicit (as if) in alien expression can
readily be demonstrated- Flatcher( See Levi Strauss strauss 1966 p.10) "All IIUl
sacred things must have their pla.ce" - native informant.
Or can \ole,
\oIe,
for example, imagine myths which do not, in soma sense or another,
express existential 'limiting' I notions?
It is interesting in this
context to see how close l1inch l-linch is to such theologians as Bultmann,
theologians with a considerable vested interest in retaining I 'the .
meaning' but also in making it intelligible in terms of other rules of
intelligibility, other language games •
So, returning to Hanson's analysis, what he has really done is to
appeal to such criteria.
Thus his answer involves only exposing what
is entailed by the rules of African beliefs.
It does not SOem to Ilie
me
that he has appealed appea.lad to any of the fullest expressions of logical
realism but only to logical realism, in the vary weak sense that it can
be said to be gm: 2E!: particular expression oxpression of order (for tQe tqe !zande Azande can
predict [in his sound-sense sphere ]and many advanced physical
scientists no longer base intelligibility on such prediction).
If
Hanson had appealed to the more sophisticated criteria of logical
realism, ha he could easily have ended up as l-1acIntyra lolacIntyra does (See llineh
lIineh
1964 p.320) and as it is, Hanson is led, UDllecessarily Ullllecessarily I feel, into a
position \-1here \-there he has to say the. Zande thought is not of a pseudo­
pseudoscientific
nature. .
Perhaps logical positivism is just around the corner.
But as it
.'
.. is, Hanson really only engages in the art of hindsight of relativism
., (why else would he adopt Father Tempel's s formulation).At all costs
a priorism's should not be applied to. what is essentially an art - a:-:.art
of ot argument, not of experiment .. "the lithe sociologists \olho \oIho misinterpret
alien cultures are like philosophers getting into difficulties· over the,
use of their own .concapts(~958 p.114). II tI '. .. .
v.lhether \-lhether or not, for example, lIineh Hinch is correct that we cannot
criticise ~en rules withoutknc~heirmeaning (which we presumably
have already grasped in order to criticise them) inj~stice
is another
~tter - .. a mat.ter mat.tar which rests on thatmo;3t elusive of all orgmiisatiotUU
. devices -contradiction. But the notion of the 'science of
understandirtgl understandirtg' appears to rest'on tho the weakest of grounds•.

- 78 -­
liston, Alston, W.
Religious Language, in, The EncyloPa.edia of Philosophy.
Coburn,R.C. 1963.
A neglected use of Religious Language Mind.
Gill, J .H. March, 1966.
Talk about Religious talk: various approaches
to tbe tpe Nature of' RaligiousLanguage Scottish Journal of
TheologY- TheologY.
Hepburn, R.I-I.. 1963.
From vlorld to God Hind.
Hughes, G.E. August, 1962.'Hartin's 1962.'Hartin'a Religious Belief', Australasian
Journal of Philosophy vol.40, vol.4Q, p.211-19.
Levi- Strauss. 1966. Savage Mind. Notice that Levi-Strauss speaks of
lithe unconscious apprehension of the truth of determinism.
deteminism.
Hanson argues against applying the "lOrd \-lOrd unconscious.
NacIntyre, NacIntyra, A. in Hick, J. (edit,) (edit.) 1964.
Macmillan & Co. Ltd.
Faith and the Philosophers
Macquame, J. 1967.
God Talk.
McPherson, T. 1955.
Religion as the Inexpressiblein Ne'W Ne", Essays EssaYS in
Philosophical .Theology" .Theology,. - edit. Flew, A.G.N. and
HacIn Haclntyra, tyre, A. C.
Nielsen, K. 1967, July. UHtgensteinian Uittgensteinian Fideism.
Philosophy.
Ramsey, LT. 1959. :Paradox in Religion. Aristotelian Society
Winch, P. 1958.
____ 1964.
The Idea of a Social Science
Understanding a Primitive Society, _A.!OOr~lm.1'.h;'lQ§,Qp.l1ical
_A.!OOr~Im.1'.h;'lQ§,Qp.l1ical
~~~~~ Vol.l, Volel, Number 4.
REPLY TO HEELAS
F. Allan Hanson
Hanaon
First let me counter a few statements in Heelas' critique. He lists as one
of my points "that understanding a philosphy in its own terms' presupposes an
intimate knowledge of their language and culture.
Since his,own analysis was
made without such a knowledge, Hanson suggests that their ~own
terms need not be
well known".
But this is by no means my suggestion. It is rather that since I
lack intimate first-hand acquaintance with African cultures, the analysiS I
offered cannot be expected to reveal African thought in its own terms. As for
his question of how my theory is to be verified or falsified, see the ninth
paragraph of Part, II and the paper t slast paragraph.
Reela,s also bbjects'to bbje~ts' to the logic,of,the'paper, logic.of,the'paper, apparently thinking that I
do such confusing'or or contradictory thingsaa as both
adopting and'rejectingWinch,
and urging understand.?-ng of anothe'r philosophy only in its own termS and, also
only in our terms.
I agree that my use of the word "only" was o~casiopally
o~casiopa1ly
lax, and I regret any obscurity this may have caused.
I suggest·, however,
that what Heelas takes as logical confusion or contradiction is really the
progression of argument. In Part I some advantages which would a~crue from
understanding another philosophy in its own terms were mentioned, 'and I offered
what might appear to be this kind of analysis of an aspect of Afriqan thought.
Part II asked Whether the analysis of Part I really dpes provide understanding
of African thought in its own terms, and a series of arguments were offered that
it does not. Extending this,one conclusion of the paper was that we cannot
expect to understand alien modes of thought in their own terms. Therefore
the reasoning of the paper ended with the unequivocal assertions that we
understand alien modes of thought in our terms, and that Winch (who (~o in the
paper was taken as advocating that we understand them in their own terms)
is wrong.

- 79 ­
-
Probably-· Proba~·Heelas. Hee1.as. main objection is that- tha~my paper misrepresents the
position of oi lUnch.
l-Jilich.
I agree'with Healas on this point, am grateful to
him for ior pointing out. my error and glad for ior this ~pportunit,y ~pportunity
to recant.
I now agree with Heelas that Winch would have us "extend lIextend our 'own' "18.Y
'18.Y
of oi looking at things", ll , or "develop IIdevelop a meta-level of oi organis&.tional
devices which are of oi UDiversal applicability" applicabilityll rather than understand
native thought in its own terms.
Hore will be said of oi l-linch,as l-Jinch,as I now
tmderstand him, in a moDiant.
moment.
By now the isstias stia s at' stake in all this must be badly obscured, and
certainly I have added' to the confUsion confusion through my misrepresentation of
oi
Winch.
I tbink these issues, are important, so in the hope of
oi
c1arif"ying them I shall attempt to set out the essence of oi what I
currently understand this whole discussion to be ba about.
It all begins with a train of oi thought which I am ~ here abstracting
from irom Nielsen, and which he says derives ultimately' from irom Wittgenstein
and/or his disciples (Nielsen 1967:192-193).
For present purposes the
following iollowing points are enough: the meaning of oi wOl-ds wOl'ds is fotmd iotmd in their
usage in a given mode of discourse (religious mods of oi discourse,
scientific mode of oi discourse.,: discourse~: etc.).
A mode of or discourse contains its
own concepts of oi reality, rationality and intelligibility.
One should
therefore thereiore tmderstand tho the meaning of oi a word in terms of oi the concepts of
rationality, reality and intelligibilityoi of the mode of oi discourse in
\~bich
that word is used, ~ according to sucb concepts drawn from irom some
other mode of oi discourse.
Finally, we must be contant content simply with
identifying the ooncepts of oi rationalit,y, rationality, reality and intelligibilit,y intelligibility of.
oi.
a mode of oi discourse.
Since there tbare simply are no other, "higher-order"
nhigher-orderll
concepts against which these ooncepts can be assessed, here the process
of oi understanding in terms of oi something' else must cease.
Now, assume that the words and their meanings which we wish to
understand belong to a mode of oi discourse in a language and culture other
than our own.
Tile .reasoning summarized above might be t8kel1to.direct
tekellto.direct
us to identify the conceptsoi of rationality,reality rationality,realit,y and intelligibility
intrinsic to that· alien mode of oidiscourse and tound.erstand understand the words
and meanings in question in terms of oi those concepts.
I take this to
mean understanding the alien mode of oi discoursoin its own terms.
The
argument in Part II of oi my paper was that "tIe do not and probably cannot
achieve that.. kind' kiner oftmderstanding.· I still assert ~hat argument.
But that argument does not refute Winch, for ior he does not ask that
we tmde·rstand an alien mode of: oi: discourse· in its own terms.'
Let me try
to explain \-linch's position as I now understand it.
Consider again the
last point of oi the ''\-Iittgansteinianll ''\-I1ttgansteinian'' reasoning summarized above"';' above"";' that
there are no "higher-order" IIhigber-orderll concepts in terms of which the concepts of
realit,y, reality, rationality and intelligibility of a given mode of oi discourse
can be assessed.
This may be taken to imply tbat each mode of
oi
discourse is hermetioally sealed, that there is noway of relating one
mode of oi discourse to another.
'Nie1sen calls this the
"compartmentallzation IIcompartmentalization thesis" and he, attributes it to Whch Winch (Nialsen'
1967:201, 2CJ7). Mistakenly, I think, for ior W:tnch writes (approvingly):
(approVingly):
Mr. Rush Rhees points out that to try to account tor the .' ..
meaningf'u1ness mean1ngf'ulness of oi language solely' in terms of'isolated
language games is to omit the important fact· tbat wqs of
. speaking are not insulated from each other in mutually
exclusive systems of rules.
Vlhat Uhat can be said: in one
" context by tile ~ use of oi a certain expression depends for
ior
.its sense on the uses of oi that expression in other
contexts (different (d11'ierent language games) (Uinch 1964:321).
So \-linch clearlyracognises that meanings in different difierent modes' of
oi
.discoursa . can be related. And tllis holds even wbenthe modes ·oi ·of
discourse stem from irom different.languagEis and cultures: "certainly "Certainly the sort

- 80 ­
-
of understanding we seek requires that we see the Zande category in
relation to our own already understood categories" (lUnch 1964:319).
But this relation is not to be achieved simply by fitting our
categories into theirs, nor theirs into ours.
vIe are not seeld.ng seeking a state in which things will appear to us
just as they do to members of S another society societ,r , and
perhaps such a state is unattainable anyway.
a.nyway.
But we E:!
seeking a way of looking at things which goes s beyond our
previous way in that it has in some way taken account of and
incorporated the other way that members of S have of looking loold.ng
at things.
Seriously to studiY' another way of life is
necessarily to extend our ·own-not 'own-not simply to bring the other
way within the already eXisting existing boundaries of our own,
because the point about the latter in their present form, fs
is
that they ex hypothesi exclude tha.t other (Hinch 1964:317­
1964:317-
318, see also vlinch vIinch 1958:89-90).
So .t·~cN1mderstand
.t·~cN1lllderstand Winch to argue that ,.e '-le should understand another
systemof·thought in terms of a ~ mode of discourse or "way of looking
at things", an extension of ours which in-cQqlcrates native concepts of
rationality,realj.ty t,r ,rea1j.ty and' and· intelligibility t,r as wel+ well as our own.
I am.in far greater agreement with this position than with that r.­ ~
thought vrinch held when I \.roto ,~roto my paper. However, I think his. IInew"
ll
position (new to me 1) requires certain qualifications.' qualifications.· It ~Ji1l
~Jill
be seen
that these stem from the same line of thinking as I worked out in
Part II of my paper.
Presumably the new, extended mode of discourse we construct for
understanding another culture, like any mode of discourse, has its own
concepts of reality, rationality and intelligibility.
Consider just
its concept of intelligibility. Is this simply a given? Are there no
other concepts of intelligibility against which we can.assess it,
rendering it impossible for us to c:Diticize the way in which the
extended mode of discourse makes another culture intelligible? I do not
Imow how lUnch Hinch would answer this.l
But ,.zhen 'olhen Winch tries to make Zande
magical rites intelligible by relating them to "a na sense of the
significance signif'icance of human life ll (1964:320-321), or when I try to make them
(and certain other aspects of African thought and·~b6tuer.t.DU:')
and·~b6tucr.t.Q1U:')
intelligible in tarms of two metaphysical postulates, we shall propably
want to reserve the right of criticism.
Therefore, whether or not
Winch Vlinch would think we legitimately can criticize the intelligibility intelligibilit,r of a
mode of discourse advanced for understanding another culture, it seems
clear that we constantly S2. make such criticisms.· . And I think we make
them legitimately.
When we encounter alternative "ways "wayS of loo~gat things" thingsll or modes
of discourse which provide different ways of making the same elements of
lang~ge
usage and patterned behavior intelligible, we often compare
them ;critically to determine which way of making these .things.
iJitelligible i%itelligible is preferable.
He: could ·notdo ·this .if' . if· eaqh niode uiode ·of 'of
discourse had its own primitive, unassailable concept of intelligibility,
intelligibilit,r,
for there would be no external' external· criteria in: terms of which to make a
judgment of preferability. BUt Blit there obviously are such external
criteria ·and 'and we do make use of them.
One criterion is parsimony:
which of the alternative modes of discourse makes the phenomena in
question intelligible in the simplest and most economical way?
Furthermore, to repeat a point made in my paper, since it is we who make
judgments between different 'Jays ~ays -of ~f looking at the' same things, I
submit that we do it in terms of ~ own concepts of what constitutes
proper understanding or intelligibility, intelligibilit,r, for example, in terms of a
logically realistic epistemology.
I do not !mow lmow how much .of this
vlinch "tol>u1d accept,' accept,· but I want to be ba clear on my own position.
It is
that the concepts of intelligibility imbedded in an extended mode of

- 81 ­
-
discourse which we advance for understanding another culture are not
simply II 11 givenII 11 and beyond criticism-. They araultiinately subject to
~ ~ concepts of intelligibilit,r.
intelligibilit.1.
I continue to disagree witn tll Winch that understanding in social
science is radically different from understanding in natural science.
My argument remains as set out in my paper, so liere Iiere I shall just
rephrase one part of it.
For Hinch, in natural science a theory
Ilestablishes lIestablishes" u connections between events: ."It -"It is only in ~ of the
theory that one can speak of the events being thus I 'connected' I laS ras .'
opposed to a simple spatio-temporal connection) ;
the only way to'
grasp the connection is to learn the theoryll (Hinch (lIinch 1958:134, Hinch's
emphasis).
Social phenomena, on the other hand, are related
internally. "Social nSocial relations fall into the same logical category as
do relations betwoen ideas", 11 ,
and "each system of ideas, its component
elements baing being interrelated internally, has to be understood in and for
itself" itselfll (Hinch 1958:133).
Sociological laws may be useful for
bringing out features which might otnerwise otllerwise have baen been ovarlooked, overlooked, but
the nature oftha relations between the phenomena in question is in the
pllenomena phenomena themselves, not in the la'lr' la", or theory (Hinch (lUnch 1958:135-136).
Hinch Hincll says that we should .understand ,understand other cultures in terms of an
extended mode of discourse or we:y way of looking at things.
tllings.
As I have said
above, alternative ways of looldng at the same things can be advanced.
Om of the differences between such sucll alternative ways is that tllat they may
lead,us to see different kinds of connections between the things in
question.
(Consider the various ways of looking at totemism, or at the
relation between Protestantism and capitalism.)
Therefore it seems
claar clear that too the connections we see between social phenomena are not
necessarily necessari~ intrinsic to the phenomena pbenomena themselves.
As in natural
science, at least some of those connections are functions of our
theories or ways of looking at things.
To sum up, I agree with \linch that we should understand another
culture in terms of an extended mode of discourse or way of looking at
things.' But I think tbink that such a mode of discourse is ultimately
subject to concepts of intelligibility which derive £rom our'own own .
culture, and that this tbis way of understanding is not fundamentally
:f'undamental~
different from that of natural scienc!3., scienc!3.. .
li2h
1. . One might think he would rep~ affirmatively, on too basis of
·passages like lithe notion of intelligibility is systematical~ ambiguous
(in Professor Byle's sense of the phrase) in its use in tllose contexts:
that is, its sense varies systematically accordin~
to the particular
context in which it is being used" (ltlincb 1958:18) and IIcriteria of
logic ••• are only intelligible in the context ot ways of living or modes
of social life.
It follows that one cannot apply criteria of logic to
inodes of social life as sucb.
For instance, science is one such mode
and religion is another;
and each has criteria of intelligibility
peculiar to itself" (\lIinch 1958:100).
On the other band, one migllt
imagine him rep~ negati ve~ if pna reasons from a statement already
quoted: IIwbat can be said in one context by the use of a certain
expression depends for its sense on tile use of tbat exPression in other
contexts (different language games)" (t-linch 1964:321).
.'
References cited
Nielsen, Kai, 1967, Wittgenateinian Fideism.
Philosophy' 42: 191-209.,
•.
Winch, Pete~,1958,
The IdeA of a Social Science, London., London~Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
1964, Understanding a primitive society. American
Philosophical Quarterly 1:307-324.

- 82 ­
-
ARE "PRIlJ1ITIVES" "PRIl4ITIVES" NECESSARY?
There have been several recent attempts to draw anthropological
material into the wider discourse of comparative religion and
philosophy, and to formulate general terms of discussion in this field.
For example, Burridge (1969) uses "traditional" material to develop a
general framework for dealing with millenial movements; Turner (1969)
ranges from the Ndembu to St~ Francis and Bob ~Jlan in his exploration
of the possibilities of liminality-, liminalitYI "oommunitas" and anti-structure as
general"terms of comparison;
and Leach, in the Introduction to the
Cambridge volume of essays on "practical religion" (1968) states
explicitly his formula for the integration of tribal material with
comparative religion:
"At one time"anthropologists time·anthropologists studied savages in
contrast to civilized men;
we now find ourselves
studying stUdying the thought processes of practical,
ordinarY people as distinct from those of teohnioal
professionals.
Among 'civilized' practioal
people the distinction between primitive and
sophisticated largely disappears ••• the ."
similarities are more remarkable than the contrasts"•
•
••• "The kind of cross-linkage cross-linkae;e which th,is collection
establiSheS establishes-between between so~alled
'higher religions'
and so-Called 'primitive religions' marks a
fundamental step forward in the dtudy lttudy of comparative
religion".
'
Whether or not one argrees with the partiCUlar particular methods ot of these
authors, most people welcome their efforts to overcome the primitive/
modern diohotomy" diohotomy, and to break through the parochial boundaries of
anthropology•
•
It is, therefore. therefore, curious that in Mary Douglas' recent and highly
influential Purity and'Danser (1966), (1966)" a central chapter is devoted to a
re-instatement of the concept "primitive" in relation to systems of
thought (Ch. 5).
Those who avoid the term are accused of "squeamishness"
and secret convictions of superiority.
Mary Douglas maintains that
our difficulty diffiCUlty in understanding, for example, the notion of cosmic
pollution is due partly to our "long tradition of playing down the
difference between our own point of vantage and that of primitive
cultures.
The very real differences between 'us' and 'them' are
made little of, and even the word 'primitive' is rarely used."
She concludes that we 'must attempt to phrase an objective. objective, verifiable
distinction between the two types of culture. culture, primitive and modern".
mOdern",
and proceeds to" to· do so in terms closely related to those of Levy-Bruhl.
She sees progress as "differentiation". "differentiation", and in relation to tho~t.
tho~t,
the relevant differentiation is that "based Qn'the Kantianprinciple
that thought can only advance by freeing itself of its own subjective
conditions". The primitive world is therefore a pre-Copernican world. world, ."
a subjective personal world in which the univers~
is turned 'in upon
man, man. and which lacks "self-awareness Itself-awareness andconsc~ous
reaching for
objectivityll.She objectivityl'.
asks.,; asks,,; "What is the obJecti6n to saying that a
personal. personal, anthropocentric~
Undifferentiated world-view worlci-v1ew characterizes
a primitive culture?"
I will not attempt attenipt to give a full answer 'to· this ethriocentric
question here. here, eXQept to suggest that it would include a rejection of
the holistic concept of "a culture". culture", of the assumption that "modern
culture" is not in many ways personal aild anthropocentric. anthropocentric, and of the
assumption that objectivity and,differentiation are not foUnd beyond the
industrial world;
arid also a rejection of the accompanying theory
that in "primitive cultures" thought is socially determined:
"The
primitive world-view ~~'.' •. has evolved as an appanage":of appanage'·:of social institutions
••• it is produ¢ed produeed indirectly". ." ,

What I would like to suggest in this short note is that the rather
extreme position held in the fifth chapter of Purity and Danger is
an isolated statement. not only in relation to other contemporary
writiogs tings i,n social anthropology. but also in relation to the bulk of
Mary Douglas' own work.
It is not even consistent with the main
argument of the book in whiah which it appears. whioh is after, all an attempt
to eluoidate oertain universal principles of symbolic association.
In
a recent article in New Society (1970a.) (1970a) Dr. Douglas appears to undermine
her own defence of the "primitive":
"If it be accepted that tribal societies display as much
variety as ~e
in their religious propensities. the
reallY,interesting questionS arise •••
They. too.
will have had their protestant ethic., their shakers
and quakers and,anti-sacerdotal and' anti-sacerdotal movements.
They
will also have had their periods of scepticism
and secularism.
Why not? 'A modern study of
comparative religion must do away eqUally with
the Y'.otlon of the global primitive and with the
notion of the fixity of tribal beliefs."
And in her latest book (l97Ob)i (l97Ob)J she claims to be concerned with
"a Ita formula for class1fYing olassifying relations which oan be applied. equally
to the smallest band of hunters and gatherers as to the most industrialised
nations" (p. vi1i)and vi11) compares the philosophical position of
Congo pygmies and Dutch Dutoh bishops (p. 49).
She asserts that she has
"dared to compare Christian ritUal ''11th ,'11th ma~ic
and primitive notions of
taboo."
In Natural 5mbola Svnbola Mary Douglas is explicitly explioitly attempting to
f(\rmulate fC\rmulate a general framework for comparative stUdies:
studies:
"If' we oannot
bring the argtunent back from pygmy to ourselves. there is Iittle
little
point 1n starting 1t it at all" (p. 63).
We are exhorted to "break
through the spiky. verbal hedges that arbitrarily arb1trarily insulate one set of
human experience (our~)
from another set (theirs)."
How are we to reconcile this position with the earlier arguments
of Purity and Danger for the resurrection of "the primitive world"?
The social and political context of anthropology is ohanging;
changing;
why
should it be necessary to reaffirm the oolonial colonial boundaries of its
thought?
Surely the best contemporary writing. inclUding including some of
Mary Douglas' own. removes the necessity for the word "primitive".
which whiohhas has after all obscured more issues than it has clarified in
the history of our subJeot. sUbJeot.
Wendy J8!lles.
, ' '
Bibl1ograp&
Burridge. K.O.L•• '1969. z;(ew z;[ew Heaven. New Earth. Blackw~il:
OXford.
Oxford.
,1'
Douglas. M. 1966. Purity and Danger. Danger, Routledgeand Kegan Paul. rondon.
Iondon.
'1970a. "Piety:
Heathen and Mode't1l". New SocietZi
Societz.
,12 Maroh 1970.
197Ob. Natural SymbolS. Barne and Rookliff: The Cresset
Press. IDndon.
!each. E.R. (Ed.). 1968. Dialectio in Practioal Practical Religion, Cambridge.
Tqrner. v.':~u
V.':~.. 1969. The Ritual Process. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
IDndon. London.

- 84 ­
-
THE IIFREE COMPETITI ON OF THOUGHT II
- A CRITIQUE
, "The liThe truth of philosophy - what philosophy really is - is discovered
in politics.
Philosophical ideas • - views of the w:orld, of society, and
of man elaborated by philosophers • lIl
- have' always been related in some way
to political issues and goals. 1I1
Henri lefebvre's Lefebvre's challenging statement takes us beyond the scope of
most of what was written in the previous issue of this magazine.
I
would agree with much that P. Heelas'has t9 say in his exposition of
the problems of "comprehendingll societies and IItranslatingll IItranslating" between
one oulture and another.
However, only once does he touch upon what I
believe to be a ~uestion of prime importance in the social scienoes
today.
He writes:
"At least on 'certain issue'S, the anthropologist faces
a moral decision in deciding between basic theories
of~and society. 112," '. " , ,
And even this sentence is qualified:
"I III do not think that Such such considerations ••• bear so
heavily today. "3 II)
Here I am at odds with him, and more so with statements such as
the followirut: followi~ by Winch and Wittgenstein respectively:
"Philosophy is unconunitted enquiry."
"Philosophy leaves everything as it was." II
Winch takes the extreme position ~f the uninvolved academic:
"It IIIt is not (philosophy's) business to' a~~';d
prizes
to science, religion or anything else."
1I
The implications of such a view are that scholarly writing becomes
another "game" • - a sort of art for art's sake ·'with ··with no responsibility
to the rest of the world, and. of no more social relevance than a game '
of chess.
Yet what must be questioned here is whether a subject of
such potentially explosive subject-matter as sociology or social
anthropology can abstract itself to this degree.
Maybe archaeology
or botany can be safely left to the eccentric. eccentric, and perhaps even a
professional profeSSional philosopher can do little harm.
But any theory of
society. society, and even the most innocent ethnography, contains elements that
may have a practical effect. effect, outside the' the" urllversity urliversity walls either in
action or in ideology.
This effect.· effect" of course. course, may not be intended.
• ....... 4.". 4.", -. .... . . . _.' t.~. to~' ~_"... ~_",.. .... .• •• . • I ••• .'
let Let us now. now,take a few,examples., few' examples" from diffel:len,t.pe:riods"and diffe~ent,pe~iods •. see
how two particular problems apply. ...... ""'r"sruil1."l~b~1"·..them:t r·sruill .. 1~b~1'· .. for conv'eriience
(a) moral ~~d pol;~~cal.1mpl1cat:!-ons.and pol;~~cal,lmplicat~ons, and (~);
(~} disto~ionprocesses.
One of the earliest "comparative ~soci~logists". ~soci~logists",
Montesquieu, came
up against ethical problems in a si(Ji'ik1ng si(J;'ik1ng manner.
ijis main thesis is
a sort of ecological determinism.5 :-::I4rge' :-::I4rge" countries. countries, hot clima:tes,the
existence of navigable rivers, the supply of domestic animals - all
these conditiop. what he calls the "esprit-general" ofa nation (e.g. hot
weather makes people' either'lazY-'or"exoltable. lazy-'or'exoitable, and thus unamenable to
demoeracyas as a political system.).
Fora religion or a form of social
organisation to take root, a certaln'''cara

- 85 ..
"Des que le Ie to~ est donne et re9ue, c'est o'est lui seul
qui gouverne."
And more important, he claims that we must in many cases ,accept the
status quo, even perfect it.
For example, the Chinese being by nature
a lewd race, there is no point in attempting to introduce Christianity
with its emphasis on chastityl
chastity!
However, his problem is that he oannot maintain this moral
relativity. Christianity for him is the 'true religion. Slavery is
repugnant to him, as is the Spanish Inquisition.
He begins to retract.
His final position is an uneasy compromise.
There are some regions,
he claims, where true morality (Christian, of course) can combat
physically-determined morality (e.g. in Ethiopia).
Some races,
because of their "lachete", will always remain slaves, but in intermediate
cases, perhaps slow moral pressures can change the general spirit.
His
final position on slavery is summed up iri the sentence:
"n "Il faut borner la servitude a de certains w s •,,8
• Thus, even in a man who was continually claiming a disinterested
scientific objectivity ("Je n'ai point tire mes principes de mes
prejuges, mais de la nature des choses"9), and who himself avoided any
political involvement, preferring his librar,y in Bordeaux to a position
of power (conferred by his t~tle),
we still find the inescapable need
to make (political, moral, 'practical) Judgments and reconnnenclations.
recommendations.
The same applies to the "phllosophes" who followed him - Diderot,
Voltaire, d'Holbaoh, Maupertuis, d'Alembert, Condorcet,eto.
Condorcet,'eto.
'In some waysJI luokily for them,' most did not live to see the
French Revolution, when to write meant to take sides.
Many, in fact,
factJl
were either nobles or comfortably off, and ultimately, one could say,
they represented a leisured class playing with philosophy - there is
the famous story of Voltaire's dinner party, where he cautioned his
companions, "Ssh, not in front of the servants!"
Nevertheless, this
secret society atmosphere - for philosophers only - had its advantages,
in that they had nearly a oentury in which to experiment fairly harmlessly.
Views ranging from those of Montesquieu to those of de Sade
found expression, but had little innnediate immediate effect on society.
The difference today, though, is that the "servants" do hear what
the philosophers say, and so do the politicians.
With priVileged
isolation no longer the case, academics must now rethink their position
vis-a-vis the real world. To demonstrate this, Jl let us take our seoond
example from a post-warsocial anthropologist/psychologist.
I refer here to Dr. O~ Mannoni's book, "Ia. Psychologie15e la .'
Colonisation" (first pUblished published in 1948, translated in 1956,
reprinted
in 1964).
His theory is interesting and much of what he says about
colonials rings true.
Yet I would condemn the book as ethnocentric,
(virtually raoialist), in tone,' and, worse, an excellent weapon for
interested parties in Madagascar.'
To take, the first criticism first
(this is.mr ,mr (s) moral and political implications'from p.l.):
h
The assumption underlying the whole theory Is' that, western man
has escaped from the "pre-logioal" or "primitive" (the fact that he
puts these terms between quotation-marks does not remove the valuejudgement)
and has entered the "maturity" of the "scientific spirit".
Phrases like "heroio attitUde", attitude"JI experimental spirit"JI"more advanced",
"oivilised", etc., abound, contrasted with "regressive", "infantile",
"primitive", "primitiveI', "fetishism", and so on.
In a nutshell:
"The characteristics,of the scientific approach to
reality are in fact the same as those of democrati~
society and of the highlX-developed personaHtl. personaHtl' "1 ill
His main regret is that colonials "revert" to a primitive fatherchild
relationship once in contact with an "un-scientific" "un-SCientific" people

- 86 ­
-
(here the Malagasies).
He has the vague. idealistic hope that the
colonials. and ultimately the Malagasies. will be weaned to his sort of
liberal wisdom.
Yet in 1964 he confesses:
..."The administrators. military offic~rs and even
. missionaries who dealt with praptical problems
of colonial life. adopted the boo~ in' in· order to
exploit it. and extracted from it methods and
gimmicks to use in the pursuit of their own ends ­
-
a development it." I might have forestalled had I
expected it.,,12
I doubt it.
The whele whole tener tenor of this book is .ready-made for racist
propaganda.
What hypocrisy to write. for example:
"It weuld·perhaps would'perhaps be better for the authorities to
remain in ignorance and for disinterested research
to continue"..13 (c.f. Voltaire?)
and then oontinue ·te·enderse·new ·to·endorse·new editions of this'big'~sel1it1g this·big·~sellit1g
book!
It seems to me that Mannoni simply wishes to cover himself against
legitimate criticism. For instance. and I noticed this only by chance ­
-
the Introduction (p.34. 1964) emphasises that this is only a personal.
document:
"r "I" became preol,;oupied with my search for an understanding
of my own self ••• my study of"social.relationships
lati ens coincided with my research into my own personal
prcblems", problems" ..
and yet.. 29 pages earlier. in a small footnote. fcotnote. we find:
"The end. of the Intrcducticn Introduction from frcm the bottom bcttcm .of page
33 tc to the bcttcm bottom .of page 34 has been reWl'itten for
fcr
the English edition. ticn. " II
We can relate this te to an admissicn, admission. in the 1956 preface:
"I rashly employed certain theoretical thecretical concepts which
needed more careful handling than I realized at the
time.
I must frankly admit that I am now ncw disturbed
by the cbvicus obvious weaknesses .of the book bcck in this
respect •••• On the whole. what I regret is not nct so
sc
much these weaknesses in my book bock as the fact that
I have not prcduced produced a -much more mcre personal perscnal study. It
Clearly. then. he has felt- guilty about abeut the impact .of his book.. beek yet
has net not the ceurage courage tc to withdraw his main thesis.
Instead he tries
weakly tc to proclaim that at the time he was indulging indulg:1,ng mainly in selfexaminaticexam1natio~
This is nonsense. The book boek itself is .dogmatically
.degmatically
and ".objectively" "objectively" written. as if these psychological psychclegical,ccnditicns ,conditions are
given reality. This then is another very good geed exampl~ .of jmoral jmcral and
pclitillal politi6al issue clcuding. clouding.
In his chapt~~.~eaded chapt~~,~eaded "y/ha:t; "ylha:t; can b~ done?"
dcne?"
he scunds sounds libeI'al. but is virtually saying that the French have a duty
tc to remain.
This is clear frcm from sentences like:
l.ike:
"If the .once-subject pecples peoples were to te revertt.o to pol!tical
pclitical
systems .of which we disappreved. disapproved. we should sheuld feel.
unccmfcrtabl uncomfortabl respcnsible responsible for fer letting this regression
take place." It 14 . .
At the risk of a cliche. I weuld would compare this to te American
raticnalisatiens rationalisations for remaining in Vietnam.. the Dominican Republic.
Guatemala, Guatemala.. and se so on.· on.' 'Yet tt"fellews it"follows closely clesely upon upen an insistence that
"all pecples. peoples. even the'mcst the'most igncrant ignorant and backward. backward, are capable ofgcverningoverning
themselves. prcvided provided of course.. ceurse, that they are left to tc choose
cheese
their .own metheds." methods."

- 87 ­
-
Mannoni cannot have it all ways.
He has an empirically-based
theory which he later claims is a "personal" document~
and a jU.:>tification
ju.:;;tlfication
of French presence mixed with a wish to see enlightened self-government.
"The Comrnun1sts~" he laments~ "denounced the book as an obfusoation".
And~ in this case ~ they are absolutely right.!
My third example is the most·modem.
modern.
In two leading articles
in February thisyear~ this'year~ the Sunday Times .examin~d the views of Professor
Jensen of the University of California.
These are based upon an
investigation of the relative I.Q.s of racial groups within the United
States, and the implications are~ very strorigly, strorigly~ that Negroes~ Indians
and Puerto Ricans have an inherited intelligence lower than that of the
average white child. ohild.
To oover himself (I quote the SUnday Sunday Times
writer~
Bryan Silco~k):
"Jensen acknowledged that the eVidence evidence upon which he
was working was not strong.' Nev~rtheless~ ~ he did
s~y that the possibility that the intelligence gap
derived from inheritanoe was 'worthy of further
consideration'."
consideration'.11
Silcock continues:
"And within days of. publication~
his paper was being
cited in law-courts law-eourts by white Southerners battling against
racial integration of the schools."
I hope no further comment is required here.
I do not. see how
Jensen can possibly escape the charge of playing his part in the
segregationalist cause.
Another example from America Amerioa is a book called "Race and Reason"
published by the "Public Affairs Pressll~ Press"~ Washington D.C. (196l)~ (1961)~ endorsed
by two leading le8.cl1ng Senators and a host of academics.
It quite openly
argues that the Negro is lIuncivilisable" ~ and~ unlike Jensen~ is
absolutely sure of its "evidence".
ll • The preface proudly proclaims:
"There is logic and cornmon";sense in these pages: there
is also inescapable scientific validity."
My reason for quoting this is not to suggest that. such openly
expressed poison is widespread~
but that the idea is by no means dead
that the social sciences can pr.oduce incontrovertible empiricallybased
"scientificlJ "scientific" theories on the old model of the natural sciences.
The high prestige of academic theories outside Universities haS'~
I
th1nk~ much to do with this belief~ still alive within them. . Although
Kuhn~ Heisenberg~ and others have challenged even chemistry and physics
as purely empirioal sciences~inthe in sense of eluoidations elucidations of a
given reality ("••• When examining normal soience~ .••• we shall want
finally to describe that research as a strenuoUs and devoted attempt
to force na~e ·.into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional
eduoation." , ~ in the social sciences the ~raditlon of Comte~ Radcliffe­
Bro"m~ Merton~ Parsons~eto.~ Parsons~etc.~ remains.·difficult to combat. B. V.
Street (last issue) discussed the way in which academic theories filter
(via popular works. works~
fiction. fiction~ newspapers~ newspapers, etc.) into the general
conciousnesa.
oonciousness.
(He is interested. chiefly in the IIscientifio" "scientific" myth
behind. rac.ial. racial.stereotypesin in the nineteenth century).
It is also true
that the politicians take note of the reports prepared by scholars~
partioularly if accompanied by impressive statistics SUbstantiating
substantiating
them.·
An obvious example of this is the present concern with "immigrant
birth-rates".
ll • What is forgotten is that our books and essays are no
more than inspired guesses - "models" in the current terminology - and
no matt'er whether the original writer pays lip-servioe lip-service to this
(c.f. Mannoni's "personal IIpersonalII lJ examination~ Jensen's IIweak "weak evidence") ll ) or
whether he (like Mbntesquieu Montesquieu and Putnam) himself claims scientific
validity for his ideas~ ideas. in the present climate of statistics-worship
the chances of more weight being put upon a work than it deserves are
very great.

- 88 ­
-
I use, 'then, Mannoni' s chapter heading: What can be dorie?
First
of all, I believe we can do something about my problem (a) the moral
and political implications of a theory.
The more individual\,i':'-·J,:~3
individual\,~':'-'J,:~3
question all assumptions f1 fl , ll behind their own works, the better. Boof.~
on flsocial cohesion fl , social change", "culture contact", , IIcohesion ll might include
a clear statement of whether or not the "COhesion" entails suffering,
whether the author ll approves of the direction the change is taking,
whether "contact" is a euphemism, and so on.
I am in favour of some
,form of self analysis by the writer, and possibly of more personal
anecdotes in ethnographies. (If"for (If,. for instance, the anthropologist
intervened in'native politics at all, he should ~ell us.) Again, other
writers should not hesitate to apoly "sociology IIsociology of knowledge" 11
techniques
when criticising works. That is·to say~'to'put the use of certain
types of model and the employment of key words into a historical
framework, to see to which main theory it explicitly or implicitly
subscribes, and to bring out the social, ideological, and political
implications of that theory.
Marxists, of course, have been doing
this for a longtime, although too often spoiling their credibility
by overgeneralisation and crude jargon.
Liberal academics have been
late to see the importance of such study, and even then, tend to miss
the political point.
In 1929, Clarence Irving lewis took at leaSt
some steps in this direction.
"I III suppose it must be admitted, in the last analysis,
analysiS,
that there can be no more fundamental fgund than the
pragmatic for a truth of any sort ..... II
"
••• "Any IIAny set of basic concepts has vested interests in
the whole body of truth expressed in terms of them,
and the social practices based o~ them.
The
advantage of any change must be oonsiderable and,
fairly clear to overcome human inertia 1I1 and the
. presti~e of old habits of thought. "177
However, he', like Kuhn 18 tends to think more IIknowledpie ll in terms of academic
pragmatism in vacUo and the needs of flknowledpie", , rather than considering
the social and political theories-and interests involved.
Although
no ,doubt some scholars are relatively unaffected by events outside the
university, univerSity, it is·virtually is'virtually ll impossible to avoid the influence of
dominant "schools",, wnich,.,partic1l1arly wl:lich,.,partic1l1arly in social studies, can hardly
help being concerned with what are generally seen as the main problems
of the time.
Sociology delves into IIjuvenile IIdevianoe ll "juvenile delinquency" ll (already a
passe term - subsumed by "devianoe" or "social conflict"), "race IIrace
relations" ("ethnicity"?), (lIethnicity"?), "education", lIeducation", "business IIbusiness management" 11
and so on
- presented, as it were, by society (or, maybe, by a oertain group
ideology within that society) with an object of study, which it then
takes as real.
The same applies, perhaps IIkinshipll, IIreligion ll less obvious:g, to
anthropology, where "kinship", "religion",, lIequilibrium ll
ll and studies
• IIpl societies ll in "equilibrium"
have given way to "social change". "plural SOCieties", , "classification",
IIclassificationll,
and, of course, moves towards other disciplines..
disciplines.,
The origins of the
first two concerns are fairly IIprimitive ll clear, and the last reflects the idea
(fact?) that "primitive" societies are on the way out.'
"Classification" ll
(Douglas, Needham, Beattie, leach, etc.) is more ,difficult to explain,
but no doubt an historical :for-, explanation could be- made :for','the ,present
interest in this field. 1 9 -­
If it then be lI ll
lI£acts ll convincingly suggested to e.g. an."empiricist"
,collecting "facts" on ori "ethnicity" lIethnicityll that "the 'the reality he is dealing with
has been,defined for him by a certain, ,temporarily powerful ideology,
one can hope at least for are-questioning a qf hi~ assumptions. This
may be the scientists. only effective way to attack certain American political
sCientists. 20 who have persuaSive defenses, if questi

- 89 ­
-
particular experimentation conducted depends upon
the value-orientation of the experimenter, what was
once 'objeotive' may no longer b& taken as such
(e.g. witches, phlogiston, aether)•••H1story
determines faots, not facts history. "21
Does not this make nonsense of the unreal1sable unrealisable ideal whioh Popper~
in a highly revealing phrase, calls the "free competition of thought,,?2
Surely the notion of free individuals competing in a free market of ideas
involves the same sort of errors and omissions as those made by the
proponents of the pure laissez-faire capitalism model!
So much for the theoretical implioations of individual works.
Finally, however, we have to consider how to deal with (b), what I
called "distortion processes".
It is arguable how much effect academios
have upon, for example, the formation of officiar-1deoLOgies ofticiar-ideoLOgies or the
formulation of policy, but we must still face the question:
how is it
possible to avoid use being made of one's worit wortk which utterly distorts
its original purpose?
Mannoni could deplore' "a development I could
have forestalled had I expected it", but he does not tell us how.
Jensen finds himself quoted by segregationists.
The original proponents
of the American Dream, Dream. the theoreticians Who influenced Robespierre, Robespierre. the
lovers of the German State, from Hegel to Spengler, - most would have
been horrified at the reality into which their'ideas ideas were incorporated.
There are no doubt western writers on Nigeria, Nigeria. who have witnessed the
same sort of process.
Or, on a different tack, what of the detailed
ethnography which provides excellent information in, say, a subsequent
war or an eager business enterprise?
Several analyses of "primitive
economy", for example, have indicated precisely where an entrepreneur
could make a fortune (e.g. Earth Barth on the Darfur, Epstein on the Tola! TOlai of
New Britain).23
Anthropological knowledge can be useful, too, for
proJeots such as "settling" nomads or l'ass1milating" l'ass1mllating" rebellious groups.
I am not arguing the paranoid case for ceasing to write anything
in case "they" get hold of. it! (although in sciences like genetics, this
is indeed the oonolusion oonclusion that one or two men have been forced into )24.
In fact, anthropology may one day be in the reverse posltion, of being
denied access to information.
Several ex-eolonial ex-oolonial countries, coun~ies, with a
perfectly Justified dislike for whLte anthropologists, have refused
entry visas to ethnographers - indicating that I am not alone in my
fears. Wh"t Wh~t steps can we then take. to avoid such a situation? First,
we can enoourage encourage a healthy mistrust of words like "pacification",
"integrat;1on","assimilation", "aid"" and "development" in general, as
well as a rel~ctanceto work as an anthropologist for any government,
without very careful thought. .',Secondly, , there might be more' study
devoted to understanding the main ways in-which 'which academic pronouncements
influence ideas and events.
The development general",
of ideologies in general".
is an important subject which few but Marxists 25 have tackled (a
notable exoeption being Leach's Political Systems of, of. Highland Burma).
However. in the end I am sure that predictionoould not be acourate
accurate
beyond very general level.
Ultimately I do not think there is much
one can do about misuse. exoept to denounce it as such.
In fact. fact, if
anthropologists fail to make their motives and allegiances (or lack of
allegiances) olear. olear, it may not be long before so many countries will
be closed to them that they will have to either J01nthe professional
sociologists or return to the armchair and rework Mal1nowski.
Malinowski.
E. M. W. Maguire.

..._.~._ ..­
,"""" •• ... M •• ,
­
- 90 -
References:
1. H. :Lefebvre, Iefebvre, Th~_ ..§Qciolog.y of Marx; Allen AlIen lAne, The Penguin Press,
1968.
2. P. Heelas, "Meaning for Whom"; ~o~~nal 9.~~_ t\.J:'l~1.:J..rg1?().J:9.gi~al
t\.J:'l~l.:1.rgl?"-!9.gi~al
s.~c~:..t]L~~~~_~! s.~c~:.."tJL~~~~_~! March, 1970.
3. Ibid.
4. P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science;
1958.
5.
5. 1748.
6. .!.~~, 111,11.
7. De la Politique, 1728.
8. ,~,:Espr~!-ci~.J:!?:i,S, ,~,:Espr~~ci~.J:!?:i,S, XXY, XYN, VII.
9. I.5'~d, I.5>~d, preface.
10. ,~o~~!!,~_li~; Praeger, New York, 1956.
11. Mannoni; 1964, p. 195.
12. ~~~, J;Ef.9-, preface to 2nd. edition.
13. I~~~, I!?~.

.. - 91 ­
-
THE GENESIS OF SCIENTIFIC SCIENTtFIC RACISM, INCLUDING
SOME THOUGHTS ON SCHOIARLY WORKS PRODUCED IN
THE YEARS 1774-1712
THE YEARS 1714-1712
I
Many modern soholars believe t~t soientifio raoism is a discrete
historioal phenomenon, phenomenon. that its birth ocourred somewhere around the last
part of the eighteenth oentury, and that it became an important foroe
in the middle of the nineteenth oentury (See Banton, 1967, p. 12;
Poliakov, 1967, pp. 223-7; and Van den Berghe, 1967, pp. 11..18).
18).
Margaret Hodgen has also remarked (1964, p. 213) that racialism was'
virtually non-existent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries:
'In setting out upon an analysis analYSis of the problem
of cultural diversity, as its solution was undertaken
by sixteenth and seventeenth century oentury inqUiry,
it should be said. at once that "oultural" divisions
were never assooiated with "raoial" divisions.
Any attempt to distinguish the "races" of mankind
on either anatomical, anatomioal. physiological, physiologioal. or cultural
grounds was relatively negligible. Racialism
Raoialism
in the familiar nineteenth and twentieth century
sense of the term was all but non-existent.'
But what was 'scientific 'soientific racism?'
raoism?'
Is there anything about
scientific racism raoism that makes it· it'worthy of study for the sooiologist and
social sooial historian?
I do not propose, myself, to give any definition of scientific
soientifio
racism, raoism, because beoause I have not, as yet, yet. evolved or produced produoed a perfect perfeot one.
I should'rather beg the reader to pomer ponder upon the following definition
by Van den Berghe (1967, p. 11):
'Racism 'Raoism is any set of beliefs that organic, ,
genetioally transmitted differences (whether real
or imagined) between human groups are intrinsically
assooiated with the presence or the absence absenoe of
certain oertain socially sooially relevant abilities Or character­
oharacteristios,
henoe that such"differences are a legitimate
basis of invidious distinctions between groups
socially defined as raoes.'
For my part, I would delete froni from this definition the word 'invidious'
and insert at the end 'or varieties,' so that the last part of the
definition would read:
read;
, ' •• ~
hence that suoh differences are a legitimate
basis of distinctions between groups sooially
defined as races or varieties.'
The sooiologist and the sooial historian must ask themselves
whether soientific racism has a distinctlveidentity" distinctlveidentity, ..in other words,
whether ,or not it is· is, analytioally separable from.notionssuoh'as from,notionssuch'as 'olass·,
'class·,
'prejudice', 'prejudioe', or r 'ethnooentrism'.
• Secondly, Seoondly" one must ask whether the
ooncept conoept of soientifio racism is pertinent to the study of the history of
the sooial sciences and the politics pal1 tios of the last ~o centuries.
It
is useful to consider certain oertain approaches that have been made to the
problem of scientifioraoism.
scientific racism. RegretfuJ.ly, Regretfully, orie has to state that most
of the afProaches afProaohes whioh which I now list are Simplistic, although none, bar
Benedict Bened10t s, is absolutely incorrect.
inoorrect.

- 92 ­
-
(1) Racism equals ethnocentrism. The supporters of this
argument clearly do not see scientific racism as a discrete social
phenomenon that has appeared during the last 200 years.
'''Racism. 1I
1t
asserts Dr. Benedict. "is essentially
a pretentious way of saying that 'I' belong to
the BestPeoplei" BestPeoplei·· The formula 'I belong to the
Elect' has a far longer history than.modern.·
'
racism.
These are fighting ·words among the
simplest naked savages'" (Cox. 1948. p. 478.
quoting Benedict. Race Science and Politics.
1943. pp. 154-155):--- ,­
.---
As Cox correctly remarks. 'Ethnocentrism is a social constant in
group association. hence it cannot explain variations in collective
behavior', (ibid.).
Benedict's error proceeds from her failure to
develop a sOC:LOlogical approach.
Identifying racism with ethnocentrism.
she defines both as a ~ used by one ethnic group to Justify
persecution of another.
She is engaged in a psychological investigation
of beliefs.
(2) ,~Idealist .~ approach. The historian of ideas is often more
interested in constants which survive changes in the social climate
than in the mere ephemera that are the social facts of any society at
a fixed point in history. Arthur u:>vejoy (1960) and J~ C. Greene
(1959) are both more interested in the intellectual pedigree of ra.c.ist
ideas than in their social background~
The social scientist is also
interested in the intellectual pedigree. but he is hardly willing to
ignore the social background.
(3 ) ~ VUlijar Marxist approach. This approach can take two
forms (See Van den Berghe. 1967. p. 17).
First of all. all, racism is an
epi-phenomenon of capitalism. an attempt to justify oolonialist
exploitation.
Secondly. racism is a device employed by the ruling
class to apply in their treatment of the working classes the axiom
'divide !l impera'. • Both of these statements ar~ correct. They both
describe social facts. but neither is a full explanation.
One must
explain why scientific racism did not appear with the first discovery
and exploitation of non-European races.
It is true that before the
appearance of scientific racism the myth of Ham's curse was occasionally
used as a Justification of racial exploitation. but one must add
a cautionary note:
'When 'the storY of Ham's curse did become
relatively common in the seventeenth century.
it was utilized almost entirely as an explanation
of oolor. color. rather than as Justification for Negro
slavery. and as such it was probably denied more
often than affirmed' (Jordan. -1968. '1968, pp.l~-19).
'18,-19).
., .
,
., For a hundred years colonialist debaseme~t and exploitatiop
existed without a suitable ideology.
Even when an ideology apPeared,
it took eighty years before it was. was, popularly utilized.
I shall
suggest later that the solutions to 1;his ~his problem may ~~~'
~;l~.
in the
scientific debates and social conflicts of ottpe tJ1e eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
(4) ) ~ ~Romanticist approach. . ' Theophile S1mar S1.mar (author of Etude
Critigue ~ 1!. formation ~ 1!. doctrine ~ races, races. Brussels 1922""';-­
r;--­
viewed raoismas a produot product of romanticism.
Romanticism endowed
nations and groups with a personality and a will.' Thus far. far, I think
Simar is not incorrect. •.' However,' However.' S1mar pays much attention to the
struggle between the bourgeoisie bourgeoiSie and aristooracy in sixteenth to
nineteenth century France in the f+rst one hundred pages of his study.
out of this struggle. aocording according to Simar. came racism from romanticism.
In fact. racist ideas were formulated elsewhere earlier.
A

- 93 ­
-
product of oolonial oolomal settlement, exploration, and exploitation, racism
was a model which proved eminently adaptable to the dynamics of class
. warfare 1n in Europe.
A valid account of scientific racism must relate both to social baokground
and to scientific ideas, however difficult the task.
Winthrop
Jordan's book, White over Black (1968), a remarkable scholarly achievement,
is the best atte'iiiiYtsO'far:--
att~sO'far:--
Scientific racism was a product of the Enlightenment era.
Its origins
11e lie in that series of myths which were developed by the natural. philosophers
of the eighteenth century to explain man's place in Nature.
Certain off o~those
myths were employed by those who sought to defend the system of slaver~'?;
which was based in mercantile capitalism, against the fury of the nascent
abolitionist movement.
In its early years, scientific racism was a defensive
ideology, but myths~ myths" as social facts, have a power of their own, and in the
latter years of the nineteenth century, racial determinism assumed an
aggressive note.
II
Before commencing; my main account of raoism racism in the years 1774-75, I must
add a few words conoerning certain soientific notions.
This brief account
is little more than a glossary.
Detailed accounts of these ideas are given
py Greene and IDveJoy.The reader is also referred to Slotkin's sourcebook,
ReadingS ~eadings !!l Early Anthropolofg Anthropol0fg (1965).
. . .
The discoveries of Gallileo, Copernicus, and Newton, and the philosophy
of Descartes, disturbed the peaceful world of Providence.
'Give me
~xtension and movement and I will remake the world,' said Descartes, .. the
first prophet of mechanistic Deism. John Ray, in his Wisdom 2!~ ~
Manifested !!l ~ ~~ ~ 2£., Creation, 1701, made a valiant attempt to defend
~he doctrine of final causes. The universe was seen as a perfect,
4nchanging, whole. In it existed every conceivable variety of thing. It
~s a plenum formarum, and nothing in its perfection was without purpose;
even the rocks and stones had their uses.
In the twelfth century Peter
Abelard advanced the doctrine that IDveJoy calls 'the d6~trine
of sufficient
reason', and that doctrine remained in currency for five 'hundred years.
'l:'he the doctrine was that everything was generated by some necessary' neaessar,{ cause 'for
nothing ~othing comes into being except there be some due cause a.nd and reason anteQ6d.ent
anteoedent
~o it' (Abelard). Such perfection was the expression of the goodness of the
Creator. Crea.tor.
One consequence of these doctrines was that speoies were seen to
Be eternal.
To talk of fresh oreation or of extension would be to imply
inadequacy in the Creator's plans.
This complex of ideas was attacked and eroded by mechanism l:!oS l:!.S the
~ighteenth century progressed.
Later on, the new geology, paleontology,
and, finally, Darwinism, destroyed teleology, but it was a protracted
~attle, and Providence took long to surrender (See Gillispie, 1951). The
mechanists saw God Gbd as somewhat distant; they believed in Gbd, God, if at all, as
a first oause, rather than in the do,ctr1ne do,ctrine of final' causes.
Their leaders
included the 'wicked' Baron d'Holbach and the cowardly and charming Buffon,
who quest10ned questioned revelation but recanted"at double speed when ordered. so to do
by the Sorbo.nne (1751). ..
Throughout the eighteenth century meohariism arid final cause were engaged
ina perpetual tug of war.
Many eighteenth century works are inconsistent
tn their adherence to either.
Furthermore, in view of the social
pressures of the time, whether of Protestant conformism or of the Holy
Inquisition and its zealous allies, the modern reader has often to read
between the lines.
One idea often associated with the ideas of sufficient reason and
plenitude was the doctrine which is commonly known as the doctrine of the.
Great Chain of Being.
At the turn of the eighteenth century it was
embellished by Le1bniz Isibniz and Spinoza.
I.ater Later in the century it was
popularised by Pope in his Essay on Man (1732-1734) and by Charles Bonnet
in his Contemplation de la Nature-r1763 Naturel1763 and 1769).
A oontinuous unbroken

- 94 ­
-
chain stretched from the smallest inanimate object, through all forms
of life, leading to man, culminating in the angels at the P€2,}-
pe?,}" of
creation.
There were no gaps in the chain, because the creator had
produced everything that could be produced.
The chain was hierarchical,
stretching from highest to lowest.
The doctrine of ~ Grande Echelle
des Etres flourished during the last quarter of the eighteenth century
and deCITned deCi'fned during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, so
soon after it reached its peak.
The notion of the Great Chain of Being was not consistent with the
notion of,species, which was being developed by Linnaeus Unnaeusand 'and the
systematizers of the eighteenth century~
Linnaeus Unnaeus viewed species as
determinate bodies of morphologically similar beings.
The classification
of species was seen as a natural one, although orders and genuses were
artificial concepts.
Buffon (See odom, 1967, pp. lO-ll) found the idea
of determinate natural species inconsistent with the idea of continuity
in the Great Chain of Being.
'Nature proceeds by unknown graC:,tions, graC;,tions,
and consequently
does not yield totally to divisions:'
'Species fade
into species and often genus into genus
by impreceptible
nuances.'
Later Buffonmodified his position and adopted his own notion of
species, which was based on the criterion of mutual fertility.
If two
varieties of animal or plant prOduce fertile hybrids, they were of the
same species.
Species were held to be distinct from varieties, which
were the subdivisions of species, often permanently distinct
morphologically in minor details, but interfertile.
Varieties were
generally regarded as degenerations from the species prototype.
The notion of degeneration is crucial to the understanding of
eighteenth century taxonomy.
Through some comprehension of the
taxonomy, one becomes awa.re aWare that.accounts of degeneration into varieties
are not accounts of evolution of species, for such an error has
frequently been made.
III
MAN'S PlACE PIACE IN NATURE
In 1735 Unnaeus, Linnaeus~
in the first edition of his Systema Naturae,
classed man as part of the Class Quadrupaedia.
Man was divided into
four varieties according to colour: European, American, Asiatic, ASiatic. and
African.
Linnaeus's Unnaeus work was significant in that the author not only
linked man to the animal creation but assigned him to a part of it.
In
Linnaeus's Unnaetis's tenth edition, edition~
1758, his pupil, Hoppius, is believed to have
added the much-famed satyrs and Trogledytes, Trogled,ytes, including Homo Sylvestris
orang-utang.
The ignorance of Europe's best informed natUralist
indicates both the curiosity of the time alld the gaps in human knowledge. •
. , Reports from the coasts of Africa by voyagers and slave traders, and
.also 'also from the' East Indies, and the opening' of America, had led to some
increase-in increase"in knowledge, in ~rrors" ~rrors~
and in speculations concerning the
varieties of mankind and of human cultures.
Diverse reports had
arrived concerning strange, man-like creatures.
Some Qf 'of these creatures
we can, with hind..sight, hindsight, identify as chimpanzees, orang-ut~s,
and
gorillas, but between 1760 and 1780, the evidence was sparse, the
olassifications unclear.
In'pictures and illustrations that were
widely circulated" circulated~
the manlike qualities of the anthropoid apes were
greatly exaggerated (See Greene, 1959. 1959" p. 188).
One can, therefore,
forgive lord Monboddo for his theory Of the humanity of the orang-utang
(Monboddo, 1774).
Round these accounts and classifications were built new theories
concerning man's natural role.
They were constricted, in the main, by
the need to conform to the Biblical account.
Man was of one species
and of one origin.
It was heresy to contradict the theory of
monogenesis.
It was possible to say·that mankind had degenerated into

- 95 ­
-
} ..
several varieties; . it was not permissible to say that he wu.s originally
created as several distinct~.
Just a few sceptics, fanatics,
fanatics~
and eccentrics dared to counter orthodoxy and advance a pol;a;enist
pol~enist
argument. arg~em. .
The monogenist theory of the eighteenth century was dominated by
environmentalism.
This is well known to many as the doctrine advanced
in Montesquieu's L"Esprit ~ wis.
lois.
The physical and moral constitu-··
tion of the human species was affected by.such ,such factors as climate,
ecology, diet# and. mode of life.
The role of climate was of peculiar
importance.
Climate accounted for the oolour of the skin: the heat
of the sun aoted upon the skin, and caused it to darken.
(Various
mechanisms were suggested as the reason for the darkening of the skin,
including the secretion of excess bile.) Climate also affected ..·.,,:,.;,
·
... stature., stature.. Diet and mode of life had a subsidiary effect upon colo~?~~re
, , ' ..... ~.
and physique.
The degenerations from the original type which were---,','·\
wera" .,'"j
induced by the enVironment environment were gradual.
Changes took place over
several generations, and the environmentalists were always hard put to
explain how they could have taken place in the short span of years
allowed by Biblical texts.
The multi-talented. George louis ~clerc~ I.eclerc, Comte de Buffon~ Buffon, Superintendant
of the Jardin du Roi~
ROi, was a leading environmentallstand
environmentalist and
monogenist.
He believed that dark colour in the skin was produced
both by extreme cold and by extreme heat.
However produced~ produced, it was a
misfortune (See Buffon, Buffon~ 1791, l79l~ pp. 203-2

- 90 ­
-
mode of life, manner, and customs have been
excessively different from their own.
They have
never considered~
that when the Tartar tames his
horse, or the Indian erects his wigwam, he exhibits
the same ingenuity which an European general does
in manoeuvering his army or Inigo Jones in
building a palace'.
building a palace'.
In 1775, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach published the first edition of
~ De Generis Humani Varietate. This work was a brilliant defenoe of the
monogenist position.
The human species had degenerated into disparate
d1sparate
varieties, of which he lists four:
(1) European and Asian west of Ganges
(2) Asian east. east, of Ganges and Australian
(3) African
(4 ( American, American. apart from the far north.
In his second edition (1781) Blumenbaoh was to distinguish between
the Malayan and Mongolian, acoordingly replacing his fourfold with
a fivefold classifioation.
In this edition, also, he introduced a new
classificatory' term, Caucasian.
Blumenbach, who classified mankind in
an order of its own, bimana, was no believer in the Great Chain of
Being.
Man, devoid of instincts, was protected by the 'developing germ'
of reason, which was dependant upon society and education.
He was
distinguished further by his unique b~ain brain and his erect position.
Even
the fiercest nations of mankind possessed the power of speech.
The
hymen and menstrual flux were also possibly unique (See Blumenbach,
1775, pp. 82-90). Unlike many of his contemporaries, 13lumenbach .
exhibited a healthy scepticism with regard to wild children, Albinos,
and men with tails (See Blumenbach, 1775, pp. 129-145).
In the year 1774, which saw the publication of Hunter's Dissertatio
Inauguralis Inaugural1s and the preparation of Blumenbach's s thesis, which was
completed the next year, two major polygenist works appeared, the one
by Henry Home, IDrd Lord Kames, a Scottish Judge of Sessions, SeSSions, the other by
Edward IDng, Long, a former Jamaioan jUdge judge and member of the Jamaican
plantocracy.
The two works were alike insofar as they criticised certain flaws
~."l ~.'l the environmentalist case. In other respects they were very
different. IDng's Long's work antioipated the racial determinism of the
mid-nineteenth oentury. He seemed to care little for the Bible. Per
contra, Kames's work was guilty, self-conscious heresy.
It looked
back to de I.a Peyrere's Praeadamitae (1655), not forward to Knox, Nott,
and Hunt. In his Sketches Sketohes 2!. 2. History 2!!:!!m (1774, Vol. 1,
pp. 38-43), Kames notes that all evidence seems to indicate that the
Breator had originally produoed many pairs of the human race, that is
to say, separate human species. But Moses said otherwise. 'Though
we cannot doubt of the authority of Moses, yet his account of the
creation of man is.not ,not a little puzzling, as it seems to contradict
every one of the facts faots DlElntioned mentioned above'. . An inspiration offered
itself: mankind, formerly of one species, had been diversified by
some great catastrophe, imposed by the Greator as punishment.
This
catastrophe was the fall of the tower of Babel:
'Thus, had not men wildly attempted to build a
tower whose top might reach to heaven, all men would
-,
not only have spoken the same language:. language;, but would
have made the same progress toward maturity of
knowledge and civilization.
ciVilization.
That deplorable
event reversed all nature: by scattering soattering men
over the face of all the earth, it deprived them
·of ,of society, and rendered them savages.
From that.
state of degeneracy, they ha're have been emerging
gradually.
Some nations, stimulated by their own
nature, or by their climate, have made a rapid
progress;
some have proceeded -
more slowly, and
some continue savages ••• ' (Ibid~)

- 97 ­
-
In a somewhat more rational vein, vein. Kames (Vol. I, p ..
5) criticized
Buffon's use of the fertility criterion in the definition of species.
Could Buffon explain the production of fertile hybrids by sheep and
goats?
Elsewhere (pp. 10-14) he criticizes environmental1sttheory.
environmentalist theory,
and its main proponent in natural philosophy, Buffon~
'There have
been four complete generations of Negroes in Pennsylvania without any
visible change of colOur••• "
'If the European oomplexion be proof against a
hot olimate for a thousand years, years. I pronounce that
it will never yield to climate.
. In the suburbs
of Coohin. Coohin, a·town in Malabar, there is a colony of
industrious Jews of the same complexion as they
have in Europe.
They pretend that they were
established there during the atrocity of Babylon:
Baby-lon:
it is unquestionable that they have been many
86es intha"t tha't oountry'. . (~., (~.. p. 13).
Although Kames was impelled by his oOnSideration of the physical
Although Kames was impelled by his conSideration of the physical
oharacter of the Negro to oonsider him a separate speoies, he viewed
the Negro's 'inferiority of understanding' as a product of environmental
deprivation:
'A·ma.n man never ripens in Judgment nor in prudenoe
bUt by exercising these poWers.
At home the
negroes have little oooasion to exercise either
of tthem:
them:
they live upon fruits and roots., whioh
grow without oulture; they need little clothing;
and they ereot houses without trouble or art.
Abroad, Abroad. they are miserable slaves, slaves. having no
enoouragement to think or act'. (Ibid., •• pp. 31-32).
Kames's essentially benign polygenesis contrasts sharply with the
malign utterances of Jamaica I s historian, historian. Edward long.
MERCANTIIE CAPITAUSM, CAPITAUSM. SIAVERY, SIAVERY. AND RACIS~1:
THE WORK OF EDWARD LONG
In retrospeot it seems inevitable and tidy that Edward Long's
History 2!. Jamaioa, Jamaioa. a work that in so many ways foreshadowed and so
greatly influenoed influenced later soientific racism, should have appeared when
it did (1774) and from so appr'opriate a source.
Edward long had
recently come to EIlglaIld from Jamaica, where he had been a planter and
a Judge. His family w~re prominent citizens of the island: .
'Also connected with Jamaioa were the longs.
Charles long, Long. at his death, death. lett left property in
Suffolk, a house in Bloomsbury, Bloomsbury. london, Iondon. and
total property in Jamaioa comprising 14,000
acres.
He enjoyed a verY great income, by
. far the largest of any Jamaioan Jamaican proprietor
of that period, period. and wasacoordirigly wasaccordirigly entitled
to live in splendor.
His grandson, a Jamaican
planter, planter. wrote a w.el.1-known llistory nistory of the
·island' • (Williams, (Williams. 1944, •..p. 89). .
.. Jamaioa, Jamaica, the great sugar island·was the hub of the system of
mercantile capitalism which Britain dominated through her naval
strength and control of the Asiento.
The slave trade made BritaiIi
'great I
and the port of o.f Liverpool burgeoned from its prof1't:s (See.
Williams, Williams. 1944. 1944, pp. 29-106). 29-1(6).
In the year 1771, 190 British ships
transported 47,000 47.000 slaves. Furthermore, Furthermore. 'The Importation into
Jamaica from 1700 to 1786 was 610,000, and it has been estimated that
the total import of slaves into all the British colonies between 1680
and 1786 was over two million'. (~., p. 33).
I do not propose to enter lnto into the controversyooncerning concerning the
merits or evils of Anglo-Amerioan Anglo-American as compared with Latin Amerioan
American
slavery (summarized in Foner and Genovese, 1969).
I think it would

- 98 ­
-
be generally agreed that Jamaica was one of the most VJ.C:!.'"l11~,
vici'11)~,
if not
the most vicious. vicious, of the slave-owning colonies, having an advanced
plantation system. system, controlled by a powerful planter interest, many of
whom lived as rich, ostentatious absentees in Britain.
At the time long Long Wl;'ote wrote his history, the island was still most
prosperous, but storm clouds were looming•. , ' The Liverpool traders were
beginning to lose money (Williams, (Wi11iams, 1944, p. 38).
The abolitionists
under Granville Granvi11e Sharp were launching their first major attack. TWo
years earlier. earlier, they had obtained a decision from lord Lord Mansfield, Mansfie1d, in the
course of which he had remarked that the case, which involved one James
Somersett. Somersett, a slave who was about to be returned by his owner to Jamaica,
was one which was not 'allowed or approved by the Law raw of England.'
' The
decision in no way affected the slave trade. trade, but it greatly perturbed
long Long (See long. Long, 1772).
In the Introduction to his History of Jamaica, long Long defends the
institution of 'servitude' against its detraotors, detractors. particularly Messrs.
Sharp and ·Godwyn. 'Godwyn.
'Wherever circumstances make it inevitable.
"servitude" is a happy institution. provided only that the slave-owners
are truly free men'.
The gist of longi Long's s argument concerning the Negro is contained in
some thirty pages of the second volume of his history (long. (Long. 1774, Vol.
II, Book III. III" Chap. 1 1i i pp. 351-379).
First of all, he remarks that the
colour of the Negro skin is not affected by change of climate.
He
remarks upon their 'covering of wool, like the bestial f1eeoe. instead
ot hair,' some bodily peculiarities, including inclUding 'the gener~l
large size
of the female nipples. as if adapted by nature to the pecu1iarconformations
of their children's mouths', mouths'. 'the black colour of the lice which
infest their bodies' (p. 352). and 'their bestial or fetid sme11'(p. 382).
The Negro, according to long. Long, is not merely physically revolting, but
mentally much the inferior of the white man:
'In general, they are void of genius, geniUS, and seem almost
incapable of making any progress in civility or science.
They have no plan or system of morality among them.
Their barbarity to their children debases their nature
even below that of brutes.
They have no ho moral
sensations, no taste but for women, gormandizing and
drinking to excess. excess" no wish but to be idle. 'Their
children, from the tenderest years, are suffereq to
deliver themselves up to all that nature' suggests
to them'.
'
After such invective, Iong'sconc1usi'on Long'sconc1usi'on (p. 356). 356), is anti-climactic:
'When we reflect on the nature of these men. and
their dissimilarity to the rest of'mankind', must
we not conclude that' they are a different species
of the same g~nus?' ' ,
Having established that the Negro 1s is a di~tinct s~9ies. s~9ies, long
Long
decided that he must establish' th'e Negro t s place itl" in" Naturf;l.
Natur(;!.
He
expounds the doctrine of the Great Chain of Being and the :principle
of continuity.
The Negro. according to long Long (PP. 356-370) occupies a
place in the chain between the orang and the rest of humanity.
In
order to cover any gaps in the chain. long.. Long" having dehumanized the
Negro, equips the orang with human attributes:
'For my m;v own part, I conceive that probability favours
the opinion. that human organs were not given him
for nothing:
that this raoe have some language by
which their meanil1g meaning is cormnunicated••• communicated nor for what
hitherto appears, do they seem at all inferior in
.the intellectual faculties to many of .:the Negro
race, with some of whom, it is credible that they
have the 'most intimate.,connex1on .. connexion and Qortsanguinity.
ty.
, "

- 99 ­
-
The amorous intercourse between them may be frequent;
Negroes themselves bear testimony tha~such that· intercourses
actually happen; and it is certain that both
races agree perfectly well iq lasciviousness of
disposition' •
It is interesting to note that the links of the Great Chain of
Being were stretched in similar fashion by the authors of Personal
Slavery Established ~ 2 Suffrages 2! Custom ~ Right Reason. Being
!. ~ Anst-ler Aost'ler :E. ~ Gloomy !!!! Visionary Reveries 2.f. 8ll. ~ Fanatical
~Enthusiastical Writers 2!l 2ll that Subject. an anonymous work. which
appeared in Pt~ladelphia
in 1773 (the year before the publication of
Long's book). and which was, was. as its title implies. directed against the
abolitionist movement.
My MY attention was drawn to the latter work by
\UnthropJordan. Winthrop who remarked how apt a tool was the Great Chain of
Being for the scientific racist who sought to, to. defend slavery against
fresh a.ttacks:
f •••the popularity of the concept conoept of the Chain in
the eighteenth century derived in large measure from
its capacity to universalize the principle of
hierarohy.
It was no accident that the Chain of
Being should have been most popular at a time when
_the hiera.rchical arrangement of society sooiety was being
challenged.
No' 'idea'. no matter how abstraot
or intricately structured, structured. exists in isolation
from the society in which it flourishes' (1968. p. 228).
The concept of the Great Chain of Being disappeared in the first
quarter of the nineteenth century.
But Long's ideas survived that
disappearance.
His description of the peculiarities of the Negro. his
tenor of argument. is repeated in parrot fashion by many later racists.
including the American School. Knox Khox and Hunt.
CONCWSIONS.
I have tried to do that most difficult of things. to describe the
genesis ofa myth.
And scientific racism most certainly is a myth.
It offered a'resolution of two paradoxes in natural and moral
philosophy:
the antithesis of the evident disparity bett'leen human
physiques and oultures cultures of different peoples and the old belief in the
unity of the human species under God;
and the paradox of Mankind.
newly peroeived to be part of the animal creation. creation, yet thought to be
unique in its possession of a soul and the developed power of reason.
Further, Further. it resolved from some the conflict between the doctrine of
Natural·Rights and the existence of slavery 1n ln a society of free men.
The pressures of the nascent abolitionist movement upon the defenders
of slavery may have acted as a oatalyst.
Once established. the myth of scientific scientifio racism grew at first
slowly. and th~n flourished. creating a momentum of its own. It was
to affeot not Just an intelleotual elite.' elite." but an administrative and a
literary elite.
In the end it was to act ao"t as a corrupting agent upon
popular movements.
Andrew P. Iqona.
Biblioe;,raphy
Banton. Michael, Race Relatio~~ Relati0nl:l.l wndon. London. 1967. 1967, Tavistook.
Benediot. Ruth. ~oe Soience ancl and. Politics. Politics, New York. 1943.
Van Den Berghe. Pierre L L••..~ce ""~ce and Racimu. New York. Wiley. 1967.

- 100 -
Blumenbach. Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich (Tr. Bendyshe) •• De Oeneris Generis Humani
Varietate. rat rst edit•• 1775 and 1776.
Published in 'The Anthropological Tr'r~!.~
. of Johann Jahann Fr:l~~:i,.cjLBlumeI}ba£h. Fr:l~~:i,.cjLBlumeI}ba£h, etc••
Iondon:
Publications of the Anthropological
Society of Iondon. Iondon. 1865.
Buffon. Histoire Naturell~.. Naturell~J 3rd Edit.. (trans. Smellie). L::>~.don. 1791.
Foner. Iaura and
§.!~yery in ·~..J'I?.~~_d: J\I?.~~_d: A Reader in
Genouese. Genouese, EV'eene Eveene D.
Comparative History. !listC~T. New Jersey. Prentice
HalI.1969.·· Hall. " . . ... ,.,
Greene. J .C.. The Qeath of Adam. Iowa 1959. Ne'tol Ne't'l York. New American
Library (Mentor). (Mentor), 1961.
Hodeen. Hodeen, Margaret. Margaret, Early Anthropology in The Sixteenth and Seve:'1teenth
Seve~teenth
.ceritU~ Geriru~ Phlladelphia; unIversityof"-­
unIversitY-of"-­
Pennsylvania Press. Press, 1964.
Hunter. Hunter, John. John, Dissertatio Inauguralis. Inauguralis, 1774. 1774, Published in 'The
'.1'he
A,nthropolol'!;ical A,nthropoloi!;ical Treatises of Johann Friedrich
Biume'ribach':::::- Biume'nbach'::-::-; and the inaugural .._- -- .
.- . - dissertatIOn of John Hunter M.D. t
Iondon: Publications of the Anthropological
Society of Iondon. 1865.
Jordan. Jordan, Winthrop D., D•• WPl:te over Bla9Jt. Bla9]t, Chapel Hill. Hill, 1968, Baltimore. Baltimore, 1969~
Kames. Kames, Henry Home. Home, Iord Kames. Kames, S!t.!'l~~2..f t~e H1sto~2f..l~. H1sto~2f.,l~, 1774.
de Ia Peyrere. Peyrere, Iaac. Iaac, ~e~da.mitae.. ~~~da.mi Amsterdam 1655.
Linnaeus. Linnaeus, Carl Von Linne. Linne, Systema Naturae. Naturae, 1st edit., edit•• leyden. I.eyden, 1735.
1735,
loth" ~ edft'~'~--Stookholm. edIt'~'~--St"ookholm, 1758.
Iong. Iong, Edward. Edward, History of J~~ca. J~~ca, Iondon. Iondon, 1774.
Iovejoy. Iovejoy, Arthur 0., 0•• The Great Chain of Being. Being, Cambridge. Cambridge, Mass. 1936.
1936,
"HarVardUnivers1ty -HarVardUnivers1ty Press.
Monboddo, .. James Burnett. Burnett, Iord Monboddo. Monboddo, Q!_~~.. QL~~,_o.:.fe. o.::fe. _e.nd-lr.o,gr~~s.9f
_e.nd....lr..o.sr~~s.9f
I.aJ:1.g;~~! I..aJ:1.g;~~! 2nd edit.. edit., Edinburgh. Edinburgh, 1774.
Odom. Odom, Herbert H.. H., Generalizations on Race in NinetE:~:"'t:l-century Ninete~:"t:l-century Physical
PhySical
Antijrop6io~~~tsis5"8;'1961.-' PP-'- pp-,- 5-19-.-' 5-1'9-.-' -.--------.
-,--------.
Poliakou. Po11a.k.ou. L•• L., Racism in Europe Article in Caste and Race. Race, pp. 223-233.
223-233,
IDndon. IDndon, Churchill. ChurChill, '1967.
Pope. Pope, AleXander. Alexander, Essay on, on. Man!. 1732-34.,
•.
Simar. Simar, Theophile. Theoph1le, Etude Critique sur la Formation de la Doctrine
---- .. --aes~~.~;~~'sels. -"aes~~.~;~~·sels, 1922':'--- 1922-:---- - . '" .'...,..'.-
-_
' .-
Slotk~. J .S•• ~ng~ in ?arly...A~P.£~9.@:! IDndon. Methuen. 1965.
Slotk~, J .S., ~ng~ in ?arly, .. A~P'£~9.@:! IDndon, Methuen, 1965.
. -_ ...._-_...
. -_ _-_ .... ...
Williams.. Will1ams, Eric.. Eric, Capitalism and S)~very. S)~very, Chapel Hill, Hill.. 1944.

BOOK REVIE\oIS
- 101 -­
NATURAL SYMBOLS - Barrie and Craessil (19'70) (1970)
by Mary M8.ry Douglas
Mary Douglas' I
new book Natural Symbols grew out of a series of lectures and.
some of the needling tone apparently necessary to rouse the slumbering anthropologist
has come through. From the evidence of this book it seems that a spirit
of unadventurousness is abroad and if she succeeds in defeatingit it she is to be
congratulated. At the posing of questions, and it is reasonable to say that
practically every statement in the book is a challenge, Dr. Douglas is excellent.
Perhaps the sermonising on the Friday mass might have been less obvious but the·
emphasis on the eXtensions of the body is welcome.
Although I have no desi:te des1:te to
criticise the more worked out ideas in the book. since I believe the reader will·
make up his own mind on the value of Bernstein's. Bernstein's:codes and :the ~he
author's desire
to correlate conceptual and social organization I feel that the grid-group
notion ought not to be passed over because .it is symptomatic of a too common
reductionism. This matrix is an analytic model and by imposing a given vocabulary
on the material it gives the impression that data drawn from differing
cultures are being discussed whereas it is the model which is discussed. For
a further example of this circularity consider .loan lOan Lewis' views mentioned on p.83.
May we suggest· that the passing of structural-functionalism has left a feeling of
insecurity? But the abandonment of intellectual security ought to be a fact of
anthropological life. The Grid-group matrix does no justice to the complexities
of the material even when modified, see p. 143, and this is the more regrettable
as Purity and Danger was a remarkably good book just because Dr. Douglas' inside!
inside/
outside division was presented as a synthetic not analytic proposition.
S. Milburn.
SAINTS OF THE ATLAS - Weidenfeld & 8c Nicholson:
by Ernest Gellner.
An election is a kind of holiness rat-race. Each leader puts lis party
forward as the more faithful to vows, more pious, more generous to the poor and
•the • weak,· more defiant towards tyrants. In an English general election the role
of political saint is complicated by being combined with the other roles, military,
.financial and judicial. A leader claims clailll$ to be capable of authority in all spheres.
Gellner's study of Moroccan Berbers, with subtle political insight, shows a people
who have divided up the various polltical roles. A saint is entered in the sanetity
sanctity
'stakes, very rewarding in themselves, but quite different from the competition
between chiefs. Lay tribes provide chiefs; hereditary saintly tribes provide
official arbitrators. The lay tribes combine into groups which vote annually
for a single chief. Coalition theory will find· here a classical instance of.
of,
polyarchy. Each tribe takes a turn to provide· the annual chief, but· while it is
offering a candidate for election, it may not vote. Chiefship rotates between
tribes tribe's and the victory always goes to the man whose reputation for nUllity nullity ensures
the voting tribes that his own tribe will not benafit benefit unduly during his term of
office. With this perfect formula for weak government, the' fierce Berbers still
need a system of arbitration. Hence the role 'of hereditary saints, who are pledged
to pacifism and to Islam. Gellner shrewdly observes how- a member of the saintly
lineage rises to the heights of. sanctity by playing his role of mouthpiece of God
more successfully than his fellow saints by birth. He must be laVishly generous and
$ow no concern for material wealth. He III\lst do it in such a '4y as to ensure a
rich and steady 1'low of WEr:i weith into his house .. or he WiUhave nothing to
distribute to his clients. He watches at his window and runs out to welcome an
obviously properous traveller, leaving less well-heeled visitors to the hospitality
tall ty
of his rtvals. The first law of sociology is: to him who hath bath shall be given.
This is a description of a generative cycle which sends some men up and up, with
every successful arbitration they perform guaranteeing that the next will. be taken
seriously and so be effective too. Other saints spiral downwards in public esteem.
Inevitably the saintly lineages multiply, but the demand for their services is fixed
by the pattern of disputes. Consequently. there is a trend to shed poor relations
by labelling them with seco,nd seco.nd degree sanctity.For anthropologists this book illuminates
many problems of political and religious interest, far outside the scope of
Berber studies. It will also be significant for historians of many period of Europem
history. Who has not wondered in his school days about the apparent injustice of the
Anglo-Saxon oath taking procedures? Here the same system o£ of:· proving innocence by
getting a larger number of co-swearers than your rival is shown to be full of political
td:;;dom t.n.:;;dom and practical justice. Similarly fol' religious sociology - to understand
how miracles were attributed attribUted to particular shrines or saints we need to assimilate
this vital contribution to anthropology which is more than just a trilJa]:amo~ograph.
Mary Dpuglas.

NarES
- 102 -
FIrM FOR THE REVEIATIONOF SOCIE'lY
An unknown but by all indications fairly large number of people in
social science departments in Great Britain are interested in the making
and use of sociological and ethnographic films.
Until recently, reoently, however,
film-making and the use of film for educational purposes within the
social sciences has been a matter of individual enterprise, carried out
in relative isolation.
isolatio~
Certain efforts are now being made to co-ordinate
and organise these activities, as well as to promote actual aotual film-making
and to encourage discussion of the whole field of Ifilm 'film for the revelation
of society'. societyl.
Whatever any one of us may feel about the kind of films
that should be made, and whatever personal contacts and abilities each
one of us may have, there 1s is little doubt that the greater awareness of
the availability of resources and of the extent of present interests and
activities in sociologioal film making, that some sort of organized
exohange exchange of information would produoe, produce, will result in the improvement
and expansion of such facilities as do exist and the film making
activities associated with them. the~
The Royal Anthropologioal Anthropological Institute in London has established
.,
"
a Film Committee which is at present forming an ethnographic film library,
and hopes to be able, 10 in the future, to promote the making of new films.
In March this year David Seddon organised a meeting of social scientists
and professional film makers under the slogan IFilm 'Film for the revelation
of society' societyI in order to place ethnographic film making in its wider
context.
Discussion at this meeting, held at the School of Qr:oiental Oriental and
African Studies, centred around the problem of distribution facilities.
It was noted that television was unsatisfactory in several ways (e.g.
the inevitable removal of film from the control of the film maker
responsible in order to edit for short programmes of popular appeal),
and that, in any case, it was not likely to prOVide provide an expanding field
of distribution.
University oircuits, cirCUits, on the other hand, already
developed in North America, seemed more promising, promiSing, and the showing of
film for generally educative purposes in schools, colleges and such
institutions as the Voluntary Service Overseas was felt by some to be a
real possibility.
Another major area of discussion concerned the need
for training and special eqUipment.
The sooial scientists present
took film directing and producing to be a special oompetenoe oompetence that
reqUires extensive training; whereas at least one of the professional
film makers stressed that adequate films could be made with relatively
simple equipment and very little training.
The meeting agreed that
further steps should be taken to collect oollect more information on these, and
other related, subjects; to sound out interest both in educational
and professional oircles, and to oo-ordinateactivities co-ordinate activities and discussion.
diSCUSSion.
Since March 1970 David Saddon Seddon has been joined by Stephan
Feuohtwang, Feuohtwang.l also of the Anthropology and Sooiology Department of the
School of Oriental Qr:oiental and African Studies at the University of London,
in starting a newsletter.
neWSletter.
It is, is. likely that the service servioe provided
by this newsletter will be oontinued by' by,the Royal Anthropologioal
Institute Film 'Committee in 1971..The ,The first issue appears in June and
contains a questionnaire, regarding the use made' 'of films, the existence
of proJeots involving film making, the presence of ~ohn1cal eqUipment,
and of training facilities in the sooial science departments of all
British universities.
The results of the questionnaire and any other
information gathered will appear in subsequent newsletters.
Contributions in the form of announcements, short articles, comments
and suggestions, as well as enquiries, are welcome and should be sent
to Film Newsletter, David Saddon Seddon and Stephan Feuchtwang, Feuohtwang, Department
of Anthropology and Sooiology, S.O.A.S., University of London, W.C.l:.
David Seddon.
CORRIGENDA - Page 3', footnote, should read Extract from the Bulletin
,. of the Faculty of Arts, (Cairo), 1933, Vol. II, Il, Part I.

-. _. i
The idea for this Journal Journn.l has cone froD the craduate
students of the Sub-Faculty of .l...nthropoloGY J~thropoloGY at Oxford: in
particular fron those at the Institute of Social lJlthropoloi.:;"y.
l',nthropoloG,"y.
Papers Given at graduate se~inars,
ser.~inars,
and prelirxinary prelirlinary ideas
arising arisinG fron work for the DiploOQS Diploons and hicher hie::her decrees, deGrees, very
often ofton nerit wider circulation and discussion, without
necessarily beine ready for foroDl publication in professional
journe~s.
There is a need for sone internediate forn of
exchange. The Oxford University JUlthropological jUlthropological Society has
agreed to act as publisher for this venture and has established
a Journal Sub-Conr..ittee Sub-Corr~ttee for this purpose.
lie hope to produce one issue per tern. ll.rticlos will
be welconed fron students in social and other brtmches bTt'.nches of
anthropolOGY, and froD people in other disciplines intor­
interested
in social anthropolOGY. Letters, coonents,and reviews
will also be welcone. It is ,hoped _hoped that these essays in
anthropology will· provide a fonusfor ,for the discussion of
work beinG dono donc at Oxford.
For the present, it is preferred
that the nain enphasis should be upon analytical discussion
rather than on description or ethnography.
We have been extrcnely extronely Gratified ~atified by the interest
shown in the Journal so far. We have, have·as as yet not recouped all aJ.l
the expenses of the first two issues and have therefore been
obliGed to adopt a sonewhat,less sonewhnt.less oxpensive fornat for this
present issue. We ask indulGence for this and elso apolOGize
to those subscribers in ether other universities uniVersities who have, in the
past, been kept waitinG for their copies.
There are still' a nunber,of nurilier.of Vol.l nos 1 and 2
available. Those Wishing to purchase :e~y back issu~s should
write to the Editors enclosing 3/- for no 1 and 4/3 for no 2.
Papers should be as short as is necessary to Get the
point over. 1 ~s .. s a General t~eneral rule, they should not exceed 4,000
words. For future. issues, papers shoulcl be subnitted followinG
the conventions co:nventions for citations, notes an~
references used in
the ASA nonograph~.
Conounications Connunications should be addressed to the Editors
at the Institute of So~iel ~U1thropoloG"Y, ~U1thropoloG"y, 51 Banbury Road,
Oxford.

ii
CONTENTS
EDITORI~:.L NOTE ••••••••••..••.. ~ ••••.•.•.•• \ • • • • • i
SOCI/.L SOCI/.1 .L;'UTIffiOPOLOGY ~"'T OXFORD . 103
E.E. Evans-Pritchard,Professor Eneritus,
Eneritu8,
Institute tuto of Social SociaJ. i...nthro]? IJlthro]?olo[~..
01 0 [;y • '
DESCRIPTION, D-IEll.NING D-IEll,NING LNDSOCL~L SCIBNCE 110
Jaims Je.irus Banaji, Bane.ji, Inst~tutc tutc of S"ocioJ.
S'ocioJ.
i...nthropo1oGY·
1~thropo1oGY .
WINCH 1..ND lJID THE SOCIAL SOCI1:..L DBTEillUNLTION DBTERl-1IN~TION OF TRUTH 113
Ross Bowrlen,Institute of Social
Socinl
.L.nthro]?o10 ,L.n.thro]?o10c;y C;y •
G.LLILEO I..ND THE TOPOLOGIC.....L "..L SPLCE 125
Edwin .L:rdener, l.rdener, Institute of Social
Socia.l
!:..nthropoloGY.
.e. s. d. V:.1fNl.. V:.F.Nl ..
., 132 13JL
Grant McCnll, MoCnll, Institute of Social
Lnthro]?oloc.;Y.
L.FRICl..N MEDICl..L TLXONOMY: with special reference, 1.37
to'nontal illness.
John Orley, Werncford Wernoford Hospit?~.

- 103 ­
-
SOCI,L,L SOCI.L,L 1..NTHROPOLOGY l..NTHROPOLOGY l~T OXFORD
Introduction
These notes Day be of interest to past, present and future
students at the Institute of Social Anthropol.ogy. l~thropology. Further
details will be found in the following articles and
oeDoranda, neDoranda, froD froo which oost nost of the facts cited have been
taken~
1. E.E. Evans-Pritchard
'The Institute of Social
ialthropology', JUlthropology', The Oxford
Magazine, April 26, 1951.
2.
'The Teaching of Sdci[lJ.
Sdci~l
Anthropology at Oxford',
~,1959, 180.
3. iUlthropologyat Oxford;Holywell Press, 1953.
Menorandun Meoorandun to the General Board on 'the Professorship
of Social .tnthropology' suboitt9~
sUboitt9~ by re£fesontatives
re£fesentatives
of the Faculty Board of l..nthropolegY i..nthropolegy and Geography,1969.
4. Proposed new Honour School of i..nthropology:
iUlthrOpology:
·.Connunication ',Connunication fron froD the General Board, Board. 1949. '
Position in the university.'
Without going into the conplicated structurc'ofthe
structure the .
'
university - Convocation, Congregation, General Board and
all that - this note should suffice. When Tylor lectured
he presunably did so (as Keeper of, of· the University Museum)
to the few who were interested int.orested enough to attend, Dostly nostly
ladies. ~rhen ~lhen
Marett becaneReader' becane' in Social IUlthropology
Anthropology
in 1910 I suppose he lectured in that capacity to those
who registered for the Diploon Diplorm in i..nthropology, ~~thropology, the.
,
University having given its recognition of the existence
of the SUbject subj eC.t by the setting up of the Diplooain 1905
. · (the first exanination was held in the acadenic year
'
. 1907-08) under. under, a CorElittee COr1nittae for .fulthropology. knthropology. This was'the
first course in Anthropology in a British university. In
1914 Social l..nthropology was waS recognized as 'the Departncnt
Depnrtncnt
of Social l:..nthropology l~thropology' , with adninistrative and financial
autonony.Radcliffe-Brown changed, I think to no purpose,
its title ,to 'the Institute of Soc1all:.nthropology' Soc1all..nthropology' by so
heading its notepf1.per. notepaper. So w,e arc an Institute in nanc, nane, but
I suppose that' that· ive iye are in reality' a Departnent of the
., Faculty of l..nthropology i..nthropology and Geography. .
'
In 1938 the Conoittee Connittee for l:.nthropology i:..nthropology c~d
the Board
of Studies for Geography (together with tho the Conoittee Connittee for
Geography) were joined together to forn anew a'new Faculty, the
Faculty of :..nthropology and Geography'.
Geography·.
This seens to have
beon done for amlinistrative 'convenience 'rather than for
acndenicree.sons, for tho the only !lcadenic o.cndenic associntion has
boen thc'lt Ethnology is 8.n optional prip

- 104 -
Onc Ono or the other of our two representatives on the Board, or
both, is, or are, on the Il.pplioations ~pplioations COI"l.!,1i CO;~1ittoe ttee of the Board
which oeets neets before the Board sits and advises the Board on
adnissions adrJissions and on the appbintneht apPbintoeht Of of exanihers. exar.uhers.
There are two Sub-Faculties of the Faculty, those of
Lnthropology and Geography, end everybody teaohing'i;he'one teaohing'the'one or
the other subjeot (Il~thropology'
('l~thropology' in the sense as given above)
belongl:! belong~ to the respective Sub-Fn.culty~· Sub-Fnculty~'Thesc These are prioexily
prinfl.rily
oonsultative Bodies to whiohthe Board refers certain natters
for consideration and guidancej guidancoi though I suppose that there is
nothing to prevent a Sub-Faculty initiating a discussion on
any natter. Nornally the Sub-Faculty of l~thropology neets
once a tern.
". ,,- Since 1969 student consultative connittees have been
set up for the four cotip'6nent conponent departnents of the Sub-Faculty
of l~thropology.
The coonittee for sooia+ anthropology at
present includes three research students at the Institute,
elected by their fellow students, and representatives of this
cODDi conoittee attend oeetingsof neetings of the Sub-Faculty for the discussiorr
discussion'
of curricular and other natters nattars relating to the runni~ of the
......
Institute.
.
'
l'i.cconnodation
Tylor taught ,at, the Pitt-Riv~rs
MuseurJ. Marett taught first
at Exeter College and then fron1914 .. in the adjacent 'Barnett
IBarnett
House' at the corner of the Broad and the Turl.In 1922 he
noved the Departnent Departoent across the .Broad to 'Acland IAcland House', a
building next to Blackwell's ~bO'okshop.
It was there that I
joined it. Then in 1937, when IAcland 'Acland House' was pulled
down in the ·denolitionsto 'denolitionsto naker~on for the New Bodleian,we
were housed with,~heSchoolof ,the . of Geography at the corner of
Mansfield and Jowett Jowet~ Walk.
The Geographers soon needed the
whole building for thenselves 'and we were also craoped, cranped, so in
1948 we nigrated 'once 'onoe Dore,' nore, - this tine to Museun House, Tylor' IS' s­
"old .. hone, .-in South Parks Road.
Museun House was :pulled down
in the acadenicyeex'of yee.r'of 1951-,52 1951-.52 to allow an oxtension for
Inorganic Chenistry CherJistry and we noved toll ·11 Keble', Keble~Road, once the
hone of Spooner, the arch-eneny, according to Tylor of
anthropology. By this tine, however, staff and students had
so increased in nunbers that, we' had to ask for nore Dore space and
in 1966 were allotted ,our present abode, 51 and ~3
Banbury Road.
Teaching Staff
'''hat What is no~ known 'as Social,l.nthropology Social.J~thropology was taught at Oxford
.-under the gen,eral gen~ra1 title tiile of l:.n:thr,opology l~thropology b~ bj< Tylor fron 1883.
On his, re'tirenerit re'tireoerit in 1908 his work. was" continued by Marett
(later Rector of Exeter ,College), .College), ,who .who iron fron 1910 held a'
University Readership' 1ri SociaLJJlthropology.' SociaLIJlthropology., On his
retirenent a Univer131ty verl31 Chair in Social l:.ntl1ropology l~thropology was
instituted through the.generosity ,generosity of .All Souls, to which
College the Chair was attached.
Radcliffe-Brown was elected
to it in 1937. (He was absent in Brazil fran fron 1942 to 1944).
I succeeded hir,l hin in 1946 and I I:vacate the Chair this year(1970)
L.s far as social anthropology is concerned, Marett taught
single-handed till I joined, hin in a rather insecure post of
Research-Lecturer in Afric'an AEric,an Sociology at a salary of £300
in 1935. When I was' able'to get out of the arny in 1945 I
took up a Readership ,at Canbridge for a year and Fortes took
ay ny place at Oxford with a Lectureship (and the personal titleof
Reader); so when I took the Chair the staff consisted of
nyself, Fortes and aSecrettiry-Librarian (Miss P.H. Puckle).
In 1947 we. we,were were joined by Glucknan ~luckoan and in 1948 by Srinivas.
In 1949 Glucknan was elected ,to the Chair at Marichester and
was replaced by Perist:iany.Iu'1949 R.G .. Lienhardt was

- 105 ­
-
appointed to a Lectureship in the Institute, both Srinivas'
and his appointr:'.ents beingnade bcingnade by the Oriental Studios Board.
In 'the sane year, since it was no longer possible for one .
person to act as both secretary and Librarian we obtained the
services of a part-tine Librarian (Mrs M. Sloss). In 1950
Fo!'tes Fo~tes
was elected to the Chair at Canbridge and Steiner took
his place. L.t thesal'J.e tine Miss, Tew (now Professor Mary
Douglas) was appointed to a. a LectUreship (under the then
Corrrlittee for Colonial StUdies).
Studies).
So in 1951 the staff were
Evans-Pritchard, Peristiany, ~riniva.s,
~rinivas,
Lienhardt, Steiner
and Tew. .
In 1951 Srinivas left to take a Chair at the University
of,Baroda and Dunont took his place. Miss Tew. also left (to
get narried)" narried)' and Bohannan took her place.
In 1953 we
suffered. a great los'~ los~
in Steiner's s death. His place was taken
by Beattie. In 1955 Dunont resigned to take a Chair in Paris
and Pocook Pocock took his place.
In 1956 Bohannan left us to take a
.. ., Chair in U.S •.:.... .... and was succeeded by Needhari. In 1961, a:fter
nany years of devoted service to the Institute, Miss Puckle
retired as secretary' and was replaced by Miss Edned, who left
in the following year.
Miss ~llawayjoined us as secretary
to the Institute in 1962.
In 1963 Peristiany resigned to take
up the Directorship of the Social Sciences Centre in Athens.
Ardener took his place.
In the sane year P.A. P .1... Lienhardt was
appointod to a Faculty Lectureship in Middle Eastern Sociology
{an appointnent appointment nade jointly by the University and St. Imtony's
l.iJltony's
College) in which capacity he becrole becaT.1e a nenber TJenber of our Institute.
After·neny·years of notable service Mrs. Slossresigned as
librarian.· In 1966 Pocock resigned to becone becoDe Reader in
Social Anthropology at the.Universityof the.University.of Sussex. Jain took
his place. FroD.·that Fronthat tine to now nCiw the,teaching staff has
renained the S&'"1e. S&"1e. Our present Librarian, Miss Anderson,
Andcrson,
joined us in 1968.
The Library
Tho The library began with Tylor's perSOnal col~ection
of books
presented in 1911 and added to by his widow in ~9l7.
It has
constantly been added to and the total library-now conprises
sone 7,500 volunes.
Included in this estinatc is the Skeat
collection-of Indonesian b09ks and nanuscripts. There are
valuable runs of nany j journals oumals and a large l~~ge
nunber of offprints
and.brochures·based and.brochuresbased on the Soligoan SOligna.n ~ol1ection. ~ollection.
The
care and naintenance of a library of this size is too IJUch
for one librariRn libra.riRn and we really need an assistant, or at any
rate a part-tine part-tioe assistant librarian. Lsbcfits a largely
research Institute, the books are all on open shelves and we
have sustained ,losses.
It is difficult to know how these can
. be avoided without detrinEmt dotrinant to research. On the' wholo the
Tylor Library, and the Balfour Library of the Pitt ~ivors
~ivers
MUS9UDsuppJ..enent Mus¥UDsuppJ..enent rathcrthari rather than duplicate, each 'other.,
NUober N'Iiober of Students
Before the second European war there were never nore Dore than
about· 10 students,and often fewer than ten. ii. few figures
will showh6w considero.bly considerably the nunber has inc~eased inc:reased since.
For the years 1946' 1946·to 1951 there was· an average averago annual total
of just under 43. Betwoen Between 1946 and 1958 the annual average
of students who sat for the Diplooa Diplona in l~thropology was 8,
for the degree of B. Litt. and B.Sc. B.So. 18, and for the degree
of D. Phil. PhiL 15, givi~ a total averago average of 42 (excluding­
'recognized students'). During the period 1961 to 1968
there were 185 cruldidates c~didates for the tho Diplooa. Diplona. Since 1949 .
.
143 students at the Institute have been awarded the degree
of B. Litt. or B.Sc., and during tho the sane period 83
dissertations for the degre~of D. Phil. have bean b.ean success­
fully submitted. I should add that it is not ju~t that the
nu.ober nUnbor of students has increaSed but that, in ny estioation,
their intellectual and scholarly standard has, on the whole,
risen also.

- 106 ­
-
For various reasons the University has had to restrict
its int2':ke of students, and Boards, Colleges and Institutes .
.
(like ours) have been told, thattheynBy they ne.y not take in ,Dore
,nore
students th8J). th8Jl the Cluota q,uota allotted to then.' We have about a 30
intake, tlloug,h. tl1oug,h. we can go up to 36.l1s it is very exceptional'
exceptionalfor
UE;lto pernit a new 'student to register for a B.Litt.
(or"B.Sc.) (o~,B.Sc.) or D. Phil. Phll. without having first takon the Diplona
Dip'lona
this neans that tho Cluota q,uota is nore r:J.ore or less for the Diplona•
•
.
Distribution of Students ,
Having in oind that we should contribute not dnly to Oxford
but also to. ,scholarship "in a wider., world we have always
welcoDcd students fron foreign countrics and a fair nunber
'have cone COrle to us fron Europe, the,~~oricas, the,i~oricas,' .tisia, Asia, iifrica,
i~rica,
Canada, l..ustralin l ,an~ New Zealand.
The prov.entmceof
prov,enanceof
candidates for the Diplonain Sbbial l~thropology
in the
years 1961 ... - 1968 was Oxford 45; other British Universities
44;,U.S.i~~ 3~; other Overseas Univers;i.ties Univers;ities 46; ,others llbaimllY
llbaimIJ.Y
total 185'. The 4.5 who too~
their degrees degree's 'at' Oxford were Ifron
/fron
the hunanitics or l;l,eni-hunariities, ~,eni-hunan:i ,and, this has been the
~ase
since the. Diplon0 DiploD?- waS first instituted.
Courses and degrees d'egrees '
We.are a a. p.ostgraduate departtlent, so all students who cone to us
have already a degree in one or other subject.v.Te advise all
students, whatever their acadenic background, to take the
Diplona in Social SOCial Anthropology ... - a year's course (though
occasionally a nan will take, two years over it). i.t). 'Sone stop
at this point. Others spend a second year in working for the
degree. of B.'Litt. or B.Sc.~,(our Board pernits a Dan nan to
work for either)fron liter8xy liter8..ry sources, and this is So'connon SO'COillJOn
that we are inclined in,clined to regard, the Diplona Diplon8 year and the B.Litt.
(or B.Sc.) year as a single two year course. The B.Litt.
requirenents are a thesis and a written paper based on the
thesis. Those who wish to continue, with theintent~on intent=!-on of
rJaking a ce.reer ~n~30cial, ~nsocial, anthropology, then work for a D.
Phil. (legree, (iegree, usually ~based
on field-research, which
generally entails 2 years in the field and a further year
for writing a thesis for the Doctorship. Thus, a professional
, training takes about 5 yearS~ ,_ ' , ,
Fron tine to tine we have what are'called 'Recognized
Students'. These are persons of senior status who reside in
the university for a 'short tine title and are not registered for a
degree degre,e but are pernitted to attend'lectures, use libraries,
and so forth, as thou,gp;,.they thou,gp;,_they w~re.
'
. . '.
,Tylor had tried to' get 8. a degree ex~ination for
anthropology b~t b'1~t
his project was',: wa~:rejecte~ rejectec;l. by the University,
nuch to his chagri~.
I~d o"j;hez.s, o , spent 'four' years in
drawing up a syllabus for an honoul".School, honour,School, b~~ b\1:t in 1949 the
proposal was rejected again, this tine' 8JJ10st 8Js10st nen. nen, con.by
the General Board.
I nust confess that I was ouch Duch relieved
when it was turned down.
I believe that we are 'the best,
and best-known, postgraduate school in the world and I think
we can be happy if we can renainso. It is possible that the
new Honour School in the.Hunan Sciences will develop into
sooething sonething like a School of L.nthropology. ,It -It is well, however,
that we are going to participate in i.t ~t withou:!: withou~ loss of our
autonony.'
a.u t • '
Diplonas
-- .
Until recently 'the Diplona Dlplona was a conbined course of Social
i~thropology with Physical Anthropology, Ethnology,
Conparative Tecnnology Tecl'l.nology and ;Prehistoric ~rehistoric Archaeology. l~chaeology. The
exanination papers, papers. were however hen.v1'1y weighted"in in favour of
Social .iillthropo~ogy
(three papers on Social imthropology, one
general paper on all subjects, , a aprescr~bed prescr;i.bed area' area~paper

- 107 ­
-
(mainly Social 1l.nthropology), .ll.nthropology), en Gm essay, a practical ( in
technology) and a viva voce); and the great uajority of
students have aJ..o.ost always··be~n
always"be~n
prinarily interested in
that subject. sUbject. As each and all. of these subjects expanded it
became oqviousthat they could' not continue to be coobined
conbined
in a one year's Diplona course save on a very superficial
level. So in 1965 we were split up, though still under the
general title of 'Anthropology :and :an.d Prehistoric Archaeology',
into four separat~'Dip'lonas:
HuoanBiology, Prehistoric
Archaeology, Ethnology and Soci.al. Anthropology. 'fhis was not
entirely what we wante.d but it· wa€3 all that could be' obtained
at the tine and was a nove in'the right direction.
The papers in the Socie~
Anthropology Diplooa Diplona exanination
now are: (1) History, Theory "and R'elation to other Disciplines,
(2) Ecology, Economics, and .Technology, . (3) KinshiJ?, Kinshil';', Descent
and Marriage, (4) Political Polit;icaJ. and: .JUXal ReIntions . (5) Ritual
andSynbolisn, '(6) . P~escribed Area or Topic, (7~ Essay•.
. There is also a viva voce.. . .
Supervision ..
The Institute practises the tutorial systsn systan traditional in
the university, that is to say that each of th~
Diplonastudents
writes an essay for 'his'tutor ' (now called his 'supervisor')
once a week and receives individual instruction in what used
to be called a I privat.e hour' • The teaching staff have always
divided up'the Diplona'students Diplooa'students between thea,and and since the
load of teaching is heavy (added to by 'one of the staff being
usually absent ina sabbatical year) the Professor. has taken
his share of instruction. Each tutor decides forhioself for.hinself what
lectures he shall. advertise in the University Gazette. There
is no atteopt at planning,. but it.worksQut out that we moro mora or
less cover the Diplona topics. During the·first two terns
seninars seoinars are held, and we usually get anthropologists from
outside to give the papers.
B.Litt., B.Li.tt., B.Sc., and D.Phil. students receive such guidance
. as .they require and ask for, on their reading and in the
writing of' theses for exanination. eXa.n1natipn. They are divided. among the
.-teaching staff in accordance w~th wi,th their special interests.
Scholarships
We are not very well off for these. The oldest is theColtart
Scholarship, in Anthropology whi.ch which is in the gift of Exeter
College, of which the successful candidate beconesamenbor.
It isawe..rded fora year in ..the first instance but can be
extended. It is ,worth. about £150.
The BagbyBequest, Bequest, which
coces' under the Faculty Board, is for research in urban,
literate cultureS in accordance with anthropological
principles and methods. It, is worth about £750 a year and is
renewable up to three yeara in ~~1.
~~l.
Lastly, the Iona
Evans-Pritchard Scholarship.is" Scholarship.is·. (in.consultation with the
Professor' of' Social Anthropology,) Anthropology·) in the 'gift of st~
St~ Anne's
s
College. It is for a wonan wonen conducting research in the field
of African studies and working for an Oxford degree, and it
is at present advertised at £400 a yoar,.and like the other
scholarships is renewable.
The only other university
resource we have to help a student stUdent is our. Graduate Assistant­
ship· worth £500 a year. This post in the Institute requires
certain duties to be perfor~ed, perforned, but nay be regarded oore. core. or
less as a scholarshil';'. scholarshiJ? .....
Another scholarship (worth about £3,000) which should,be
nentioned·here is the Swan.Fellowship.awarded Swan.Fe11owship.awarded by the Curator
of the Pitt Rivers Museun in consultationw1th 'the Professor
of Social -i\nthropology and'the Reader in .Physicallmthropology,
. for Studies in COnIlcxion'with connGxion'with the Batwa, whi.ch is to say for
research anong the pygoy ond pigmoid peoples. Since this.
scholarship was accepted by the University in 1955 it has
been given to ethno-archaeologists and not to students of
existing peoples.

- 108 ­
-
The Social. Science Research Counc~l
has ten subject
committees, one of which is for social anthropology. Candidates
for the, Diploma and the B.Lit·t. 'are eligible for quota. and
pool awards. In 1968.. twelve awards were made but only ten
were taken up, ·In1969 eleven awards were made.
Publications
The only' official University series (coming ~de~ un,de~
the
direction of the Faculty Board) is Oxford Monographs on.SociaJ.
Anthropology. This was s.tarted in 1957 and is restricted to
theses of unusual merit.
So far six volumes havD'been
havD·been
published and there are a number awaiting publication. 1,fuat \v.nat
might be called a semi...official series, since it is. pUblished
published
.'by by' the Clarendon(University)Press, , and is in effect run by
our Institute,' ,is ·the Oxford Library of African Literature.
The first 'volurje in the se.ries s~ries wa~ published in 1964; 15
volUmes volumes have since appeared.·There are others on their way.
I night add that though there is 'no direct institutional
relationship between the Institute of Social Anthropology
and the Clarendon Press there has always been a close
p~rsonal p'ersonal relationship relationsnip betweennembers oithe of Institute and the
Press, both as publishers and as friends. Under this heading
I I!IU.st must also mention nention the recent venture ofsooe of our students,
the J'ournal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford . ..
It should also bementionedthut bemention'edthat ·the Professor began in the
academic acadeoie year of 1946-47 to Subm.t'to SUbrrl.t'to the University a brief
ar~~ual
report on the activities of the Institute and this is
now expected of hlll bin and is, published at the end of Trinity
Term in the University Gazette.
Relations with other disciplines
I think I may say that we are now, after some sooe strained periods,
on good terms, both acadenic academe and personal, , with our colleagues
at the Pitt Rivers Museum (Ethnology and Prehistoric
.Archaeology).
Co-operation I!1ight might be' closer'if close~if the Museum Museuin had
a new bUilding building in which it could display its magnificent
nagnificent
collections to better purpose. We are also al.so on good terns'with
teros'with
tha the. Professor of Race Relations and the Reader in Physical
Anthropology, and also with our colleagues at the School of
Geography.
Our Institute and its' members nembers have 'a long record of cooperation
with other hunanedisciplines, and several of us
have supervised postgraduate students working under the
direction of other Boards, Boards', e.g. Theology, Litt. Hun.; History
and Social Studies.
In the .past we had h~d much nuch to do with the
teaching of Cadets and Officers in the Sudan and Co+.onial
Co~onial
Services.
This stream'has dTied up, but sonething perhaps
. more important iI:J.portant has takenits ts place., S'ocial fulthropology is
a conpulsory' paper in .the B~ Phil.· Phtl.· 'in Indian' Studies. It. It, is
a scheduled subject in the' B.Phil. in Latin-iUJerican Studies.
In the. proposals for the B.Phil-. in'Modem.South Modern. Asian
Studies. the schedule of subjects includes Social ,Anthropology.
f~thropology.
Social. llll:thropology l:..nthropology is a subject .in . the schedule of the
proposed B.Phil. B•Phil. in Africap. Afric~ Studies. As earlier. earlier, mentioned it
will also participate in the new, Honour School in the
Hunan Sciences•.
Lectures
The Frazer Lecture on S9me some social anthropology subject is
delivered at Oxford every four years (atCaobridge, Glasgow
and Liverpool in the other o'ther years).
The Vice-Chancellor has
always consulted me, ne, in effect asked me, ne, to nominate the
Lecturer. The Marett Lecture on some social anthropology
subject is del.ivered at EJl;eter' EJ!;eter' Oollege every third year (in
the intervening years i itisd~livered on a philosophical or
archaeological SUbject). subject). I. have'usually been c'Jnsulted by the
Rector of the College.
The annual Myres My-res Memorial Menorial Lecture is
given in rotation on a subject within the'field of encient
history, European and Near Eastern archaeology, historical
geography and ethnology, with special reference to

-109 -
-
Mediterranean Mediterrane~ lands. The lecture is delivered every e~ry other
year.
I suppose that a social anthropologist could-bG,1.nvited
could-ba'~nvited
to lecture under the title of 'ethnology' but so far no one
has been asked to do so.
The Professor is nat not ex-officio a
menber of the Board of Managenent, though he, or any of his
colleagues,could could be appointed by the Faculty Board to serve
on it, as the Faculty Board nominates~two nOI:linates'two of its nenbers.
Stipendary Fellowships and Hon;. \ Degrees
1l.ll All Souls College now advertises each year Visiting Fellowships
for a year or six months', as those selected wish.
The
Professor, as a Fellow of the College, nay put forward a nane,
but the conpetition is severe.
There is no restriction with
regard to nationality~
So far'the only social anthropologist
to have been appointed is Prof. Fred Eggan (1970). The College
also from tine time to tine advertises Research Fellowships and one
of the subjects 'listed in the advertiseuent advertiseoent is social
anthropology.
So far no social anthropologist has been
awarded one of these Fellowships.
Other' col-leges' col'leges' sorletines
advertise Research Fellowships for whi'ch an anthropologist
night be' eligible. The advertisenents advertiseoents appear in the University
Gazette (and sOrletines elsewhere).
Four'such appointnents
have recently been made rlade (at-St. (at· Catherine's, St~
Hugh's, New
College and Marton). Merton).
Council decides who are "to be given Hon.
degrees.- degrees.' So far the only social anthropologist who has been
honoured is Prof. Claude L~vi-Strauss.
These degrees are
sparintsly sparin~ly given, and any proposal has to be strongly backed
Extra-Institute Activities
Closely associated with w1ththe the Institute is the Oxford
University Universiiy Anthropological Society'.. SOCiety'..
It wasfornally
constituted at a neeting in Exeter College in January 1909
and held its'500th neeting on Wednesday; 25th February,1953.
It is thus one of the oldest University societies. It holds
, about 10 neetings a year at which lectures are given. It
has recently (Hilary Tern,l970) brought out'the f:Lrst nunber
of the Journal of the 4nthropologica.lSociety 4nthropologiCalSociety of Oxford, the
editors of which are students at the In~titute.
Appoimments
All I have to say on this topic is'tha.t' that 'since I have taught
at Oxford no student who endured the fu:u course of his
~cadenic
career has failed to obtain' obtain- a good post in a
de~rtnent
ina University, were he so ,ninded. I think that
these favourable circunstances~til.lpersist.Duririg'the
past'20 years 179 s"tUdents st-udents have been., been" awardedp-ost-graduate
,post-graduate
degrees' in Social-Anthropology. Of these, over' 20 now hold
appointnents at full prof'essorial professorial levaiarid level' arid well over' a
, further 100 hold Readerships or Lectureships. Between then
"-, they have" published, pUblished.nore ,than. 70 books, as well as ,
innunerable, articles, on a wide range of subjects in Social
Anthropology. ' '
E. E. Evans-Pritchard.
\

-110 ­
-
Description. Me811ingand Meaning Social Science
, I woul'd ,like to. to, iso'late and refute,briefly,
sone of ,:the '~he
gross, rusconceptions nisconceptions advanced I?dvanced byClaoner in his
'essay "Tho liTho lillalyticnl Jillalyticnl ['.lld [>.lld, Phenonenological Approaches to the'
,Social ll (J.ASO (J,ASO 1.1 Hilary 1970). The following three are on the
whole repr'esentati repr~sentativeof the tenor of his argunent:
argW~ent:
1. Description (in SODe sane sense which phenonenology
attributes to, this t~:t"D). t~:t"n). ~s ','fundaJ:Jental'to ','fundaJ:Jcntal'to accurate
understari.·d~ng understari:d~ng
of ,what is happening ,in the worldII.
11 •
2. The role of the social sciences is to understand
the neanings'that'people ,'that' give their social
behaviour.
'
3.. Societ;9" is the object Cbj "of ,of philosophical en~tiiry.
, , ' , Merkeau":,,Ponty has advf'..nced the
phenooenological standpoint in sinple unequivocal terns.
Phenonenology is P; p; tiat1ier of, describing, according to hin,
not of explaining or ana~ysing~
When Husserl recoDrJended the
return to, the "things flthings theoselves", ll ,
he \-TaB \-TaS rejecting science
at the very start. The dcrland dcnand for pure description excludes
equally the procedure (i) of analytical reflection and'
\md'
(ii) that of scientific explanation. eXplanation. The anooaticbnsis nxiooatic basis of
this positiqn pcsi can be put' as follows: the, ,world, is there
before any possible !;1llaJ,.ysi,S ~a~ysi~ of nin~.
Looking for the world's
essence is not looking for what it is as e..Il P..Il idea once it has
been reduced to a,thene of discourse; it is looking for what
it is -as a fact for us, before nny'thenatization.
nny'thebatization.
In short, phenoneholagy' phenoneholo'gy' assunes that
thnt
n theo:t"Y-independent description of the world is possible
and 2nd advocates a return to such description. But can there
be such a, thing naa nsa theory-independent description in
either the natural or ,the social sciences? Kuhn has argued,
quite plausibly, that the "facts" ll of natural science are only
deternined as facts within a pregiven theoretical fr&~ework,
frru~ework,
a paradign paradigo (Bachele..rd's tern is "probleoatic"). "No
lnnguage Innguage restricted to r.eporting ,::1
world fully known in
advance .'can 'produce"nore neutral and objective reports on
'the given'" (Kuhn:126). Thus the "scientist who sees a
swinging stone can have no experience that is'in prinoiple
prinqiple
nore elenentary elenentory than seeing a penduluo. The alternative is not
sone hypotnetical. "fixed" Vision', but vision through
another paradigo, one which nakes the SWinging swinging stone
sonething else" such as constrained fall. If this argunent
is valid (and Clanr..ler Clanr.J.er docs dOGS not show whyit t isn't), what
woul,d a phenooenological description 1:)e? 'be? f Describing whe.t
there is' is,' does not seen seeD to correspond to,' any known
experience or procedure,: procedure.: in, the pr9-ctice of natural science.
, " , Now this 'argm-1erit" 'argw.-1erit" applies a fo~tiori to
the social sciences.
If thenatui'al natural sciences 'know what Co
"scientific'fact" is, the sccia1.:sciences soc1a1.:sciences do not':' ,at least
not at theoonent. thenonent. ilo.s ll>.s
in the natural sciences, so in our
experience of the social, our porceptions are fixed in
advance, stru~tured
by nodels which we have each internalized
unconsciously. The difference is that in tho the fomer forner tho
the
scientist's perceptions are deternined by paradigns, paradigos, that is,
uodels which have been rigorously constructed as part of a
scientific practice and which the whole scientific COTIQunity
accepts for a given epoch; in the latter ~ perceptions are
deternined by non-rigorous I1odels, uodels, and there is no single
nodel accepted unDninously by the entire connunity: these
"nodels" are not paradigns in the strict sense; they are
closer to whet Ma.rx M8..rx calls "ideology" and Levi-Strauss
"conscious II nodels".
This radical difference between the
two Situations, situations, that of the natural scientist and that of the
SOCi2~
sciontist, sCiontist, explains why in the second it is oore nore

-lll ­
-
difficult - and has hitherto .proved inpossible ~ to e.J..aboro.te
e.J..a.boro.te
a coherent uniforn concept of a .uscientific .lIscientific fact."
I'
So SO far ~he
argunent has asserted two separate theses:
(1) that neither in the social nor in the natural sciences are
there such entities as "pure facts", because in both cases our
experience is theory-dependent~
In neither case are pure
descriptions ever possible~ '(2) that the kind of "theory" which
deterninesperception·in the one and in the other diverges
radically. Thus it would be difficult to find in the social
sciences any honologue of the following fact ofchenistry: that
a nolecule of water is made up of two atons of hydrogen and
one of oxygen. oxygen,. .
Clanner's first propDsition is therefore based on a
a
radical niscQnceptionof the structure of experience. It could
only oake sense for.a world in which the· Itdata of. experience"
"\

:.i ..
-112
If phenonenology were identical identicc.l. wit~ witp. the totalizatio.n' which
is science, neither historical nnterialisn, psychomIalysis
psychmmalysis
nor struc.t:ural anthropology' would be possible, or, at any rate,
not as sciences.If sciences.lf they are not sCientific, scientific, and this is what
CltUJlJ.er Cln.nner is arguing, he. does not show: why.
It is difficult to see what the last of the three
pro~ositionsoenns'beyond
pro~ositionsnemIs'beyondsaying saying what has ·aiready been said
in.. (i) or (ii). If by "philosophicru. "philosophicaJ. enCluiry" we are to
understand "phenonenological enCluiry", enCluiryll, then the argunents.
against this have already been proposed above•. If the. enCluiry
is . "philosophical" for a related reason, , natlely th~t .it resorts
to "notive" explanations rather .than casuru. casuBJ. ones l
"then the
argunents against (ii) are valid against (ii1.). It is however,
worth caking naking the point by a different. different, route.
, .
The idea tha.t only "notive" explanations are valid in
. ···>.e ·">.e social sciences spxings sPTings frOD fron a fundanentally idealist
conception of society. And' this·precisely 'precisely is the re-.
~ctionary
and inept conception Winch offers us 'in "in his little
book.
We are told, for exanple, that "social relations are
expressions of ideas about reality" '.
(Winch, 23). There are two
concepts involved here and it would:he would:be worth separating then
for a nonent. .
'.
"
. . ..
First,. there is' the' notion of "so9ial reiatiqns". These
to Winch are the'p'articular.relationshi~s
the'particularrelationshifs which are established,
by sets of rul.es, between roles. Winchs concept is therefore
the traditional one ohe fani.1:iar, for exanple, fronfunctionalist
anthropology. It refers to a core nore or less inrlediately inoediately percep~ible
world of social ihteractions.Nextthereis the notion of
"reality". This, however, seeDS seeris to be 'onlyanore
'o~y D.oore
conprehensive ~er.o ~erp which includes' social relationships .
as, one conponent and everything else as the other.
So the
proposition seens to anount to the circularity: "social. relations
are expre'ssions of ideas about (social relatiotrs)W relations) II' i.e. ,social
relations ~ what nen think they are. Who. are these "nen"
however? They include coriks conks and workers -. _. to quote two of
Winch's WinCh'S exanples.
So the social relationship's i:nto' which workers
enter ~ .tl:le tne relationships into whieh they think they enter.
'What happens however, if two groups of workers conceptualize
. their relationships indiaoetrically indianetrically opposed terns? Ifsone
If. workers believe that. that, they are'~he
objects' of .exploitation, 'that
-that
a fraction of theirlabo1.lX theirlabo~ is stolen fron then by the boss ­
-
while another group, thinks that by their·work.they are
benefittin~ the "national" econooy" - that as' n.eobers n.etlbers of a .'
"country" .( rather, thim than say as oenbers' nenbers' of a.c.1ass class ) it' is, their
~ut¥, to work, as hard as

,~, --... ­
,~, --....
-1l3 ­
-
Clanper's synthesis would E9-t the" social sciencss.-back sciencss-llack thr'Eile
hundred years , successively.' successively,'elit1inating elitlinating the work, work. of Montesquieu,
Marx, Freud, Durkhein, Levi-Strauss•••Perhaps this work'is the
product of an overactiveioagination overactiveinagination prone to netaphysics? oetaphysics? In
.w1:).ich oo.se thisinteresiiing"View thisinteresting"View should be justif,1ed justif.1ed at greater
length. Wllat,i Wnat'i for., for.. exanJ,>le, eXarlJ,>le, does Claooer think about ,the ·the following
pal;lsage froo fron ·Durkhein 'Durkhein (quoted in Winch: 23-). as.~ ~ exanp1.e exanpl.e of a
viewwhioh whiohoonf1icts oonf1icts with his own: .
ItI oonsider extrenely extreoely fruitful.the ,the idea that. social
life should be explained not by the notions of those
who particip-ate ~xtici~ate
in it; but by ooreprofound noreprofound causes
which are unperceived by consoiousness.,••• consoiousness.· "?
Clancer 1970
KubIi 1968.' J.968.·
\vinch \'linch 1958
J'airus Jairus Banaji.
Bibliography
Journal of the' Anthropological. Society
Society: of Oxford. Vol. 1. No J...
l.
'The Struoture.of Scientific Revolutions
The Idea of A Sooial Soienceanci Scienceanci its
Relation to Philosophy
Winch and the Socie~ Deteroination of Truth
The ~he
issues I want to raise here can be 'regarded .as . a
direct follow on froo fron sooe sone that have been raisea in piJ:"evious'
pi["evious'
issues. Basically the issue at stake is how do we understand
an. an, alien· belief systen. •.. This I want to suggest cones very
close to the question of o£ how do we understand another language
at all.
. . The way I. shall npproa~h,this npproa~h. question is through
sone purely fo;rnaJ.· considerations' relating,t,o reiating ·t.O the "possibility
'. of alternative logics.:. My oaintask 'WU1 'Wil1 be to r~;tect
what
oight night be cw.l.ed c~2ed a Winchian approa~h to SODe of these issues.
. - t . . .
A wide range of writers has: been attracted to the 1
idea that truth and logic. are' cu.lture culture' 'or context dependent.
Sociologists of knowledge knOWledge suoh' suoh· as' Mannhem, Mannhein, aJid, and, DurkheiD and'
Mauss agree that the genesis ofa of· a Propnsition tioD is not under all
circuostances irrelevant to i.ts'trut-h. i.ts· truth •.'For Far Mannhein the task
for the sociologist of knowledgeis.-to·. knowledgeis.-t6'. analyse ;the tlperspectives"
associated with different social. positions,· positions,' the'''or:i.entations"
the·"or:i.entations"
towards certain certa:i.n neantngs oeantngs and values which inhere in a given
social p:ositionwhere an individUal individual .','out1ook"and .'.' outlook" "attitude"
is conditionedbythecollactive conditionedbytheco~lective
purposes of the group, and to
study the concrete· reasons for the different perspectives which.
the sane sarle situation presents to the different ~ogitions p-oS'itions in Lt.
His·interest is·J.n is·:i.n situa.tions where,socials-tructurescooe where.socialstructurescooe to
express thense1 thenselves in the strl:.ctures· stl'l:.ctures· of'· of" assertions, .and . in wha~·
sense theforoer concretely dete~e the latter.(Mannhed.D:l93o).
(Mannhed.o:193o).

\
. ;., .
':"'U4
':"'ll4
:..
i 'In Prioitive Prinitive Classification Durkhein and Mauss argue
that originally there is" a casual', genetic relation, between' the
categories in different. languages' (such' (such· as space, tine, quantity)
and logical relations (such 'as deductive.validity) and that
society's social relations. "Thus logical heirarchy (Le. of
exclusion and inclusion) i~
only anotheraspect'of·social
heirarchy." 'Again'logical relations between things are based
on the social relations of nen.
"Logical reJJations;" they
argue, "are thus, i~
a sense, donestic dODestic relations." {Durkhein (Durkhein
and Mauss: 1969}. . .
This view is also'shared shared by sooe,philosophically­
sone, ninded-social anthropologists and philosophers interested in
the social sciences.
Levy-Bruhl suggests that "prinitive thought
ninded'social . _ violates our nost deeply rooted nental. habits." (Levy-Bruh1:l922:
(Levy-Bruhl:1922:
48). It is prelogical in that it is "indifferent nost of
the tine to contradiction" and connitted to a. a, view of casuality
"of a type other than that fanillar f8.nillar to us." (ibid:85)
Winch,. argues to a conclusion very siDilar. to that of Durkheio
and Mauss at, th,e th.e san~
tine attenptingto attenpt1ngto give his arguD.cmt a
general philosophical. justification. For Winch, "our idea of
what belongs tio, the, realo of .reality ,reality is given for us in the
language that 'we lise." use." (Winch: 1958:15).
SiDilarly "criteria
of logic •••• arise out of and are ,only intelligible in the
context coritext of ways of liVing or' bodes: 'of sociaJ.. sociru.. life" (ibid;lOO)
to the extent that "logical relations between propositions
theDselves depend on social relations between Den."(ibid:12.6).
For Winch, standards of rationali~~ rationali.~\W between societies do not
elways coincide.
Indeed rationality itself in the end CODes
down to "confornity to noms". (Winch:1964:318).
(Winch:1964:31.8).
Whorf has also clained that what counts as true' and/or
what counts as valid reasoning is relative to particular groups.
"When anyone, as a natural logician, is taJ.king taJ.k1ng about reason,
logia and the laws of correct thinking, he is apt to be
oarching narching in step with purely graooaticaL facts that have sooe­
sonewhat·a
a background: character in his . own language or faoily· faoily, of
languages but one by no Deans universal in all. languages and
in no sense a cormon' substratuo of reason. II
1I
(Whorf :1956': 211) •
For Whorf, then, logic and ontology literally- recapitulate
philology-. philology. .
, . Also phiiosophers of'science such as Kulm (1:fLukes
is 1;0"be 1;0. 'be believed he.re) he,re) have been teopted by this view• • For
Kuhn, 'When scientific paradigos change, in an inportant sense,
worlds change too.
After Lavoisier discovered oxygen not only
was the.world ,world seen diffe~ently, but it was di~~erent. Accord­
Accord-
'ingly-, KUhn KUhh suggests, there is 'aneed to revise the traditional
episteoological episteoologicoJ.. VieWpoint vieWpoint of Western philosophy 'that changes
in scientific pnradigns carry usclo~er and closer tq the
truth. (Kuhn:1964:l25);' (Kuhn:1964:l25);" '. ...,
.."
, Sinilarly log:lc18Ils logfcj.811s hav8spelt t out in :;300e eone detail.
what. alternative logical systens systeos night l.ook like in purely
abstract terns.,. IntUitionists' objections to the traditional
propositi·onaJ:.calculus ti'onBl.calculus have led to the developoent developr:ient of a
prop:ositiona1.·calculus.that·~either propositionalcalculus,that~either ~ontains.the ~ontainsthe law of excluded
Diddle niddle :p.or adDits of its' its· subsequent insertion•.'And ' in logics
based on· quantuo n:e"chanics n:s·chanics the dis·tributive dis'tributiv9 law breaks ~own.
In the. article Are there Alternative' Logics?' .
,
(Waisnann: 1968), Waissna.rm! suggests we.ys we_ys in which i't is
possible to construct :I.anguages to which' our faniliar
faoiliar
Aristotelian two-valued 10gic'dges logic'dges not apply, that is, a
language in which a proposition: is not always true or false. .
~In
fact, WaiSD8nn argues the possibility of ~ti-va~ued logics,
logiCS,
"which involve i.i1volve relinquis~ what o.i-ght be regarded as'
intuitively obvious logical axions oodons such as excluded Diddle,
niddle,

-1l5 ­
-
non-contradiction and. so on is' already inplicit ioplicit in ordinary
language.
Ordinary English, e,g. he suggests is IT loose
conglooeration congloneration in which fragnents of different logical. systens
systeos
are discernable.·A logic, he sUGgests, is always an .
idealisation of the conditions we aeetin neetin a given language, just
as Datheoatical oatheoatical Geooetry' 5eooetry, (e.g. a Euclideangeooetry of threedioensionadinensional
space) is a refinenent of the rough date obtained
by oeasuring neasuring' solids. And as the existence of non-Euclidean
geooetries geooctries denonstrates,just . as observations obtained iri ill this
way' can in principle be built into various geooetries, so the
conditions we find in a given language allow of an idealisation
in oore Dore than one direction. In other words the process that
leads to. too.. a. different logic is not uniquely deterninedby deterr.1:ined· actual
usage.
!
I now want· to consider specifically Winoh I s" position.
His argunents arguoents have been rehearsed sufficiently in earlier
editions of this journal to oake repitition rep1tition here. unnecessary.
Let ne start by assurJing Winch is arguing far an'extreoe forn
foro
of logical relativisu. relativiso.
Consider. the different. ways in which a belief or set
.of beliefs could be said to be prinafacie irrationaJ.~
irrationaJ..~
(A. belief
for convenienc.e. can· be. 'characterised' as a a. .proposition prop-osi accepted
as true) .' .
"
Beliefs a.resaid are to be irrational
a) if they are inconsistent or seli':...contradictory
b) if they are partiall.y partially or wholly false·
c) if they are nonsensical
. d) ~f they' are situationally' sp'ecific orad hoc. is ie not
und.versalised 'becnuse boUnd to particular oocasions
e)" e}-
if the· ways in'which they cone to be held or the
Danner in which.they are held· are seen as deficient
in sone respeot. For exanple' (i) thebellefs .nay . be·'
be··
based on irrelevant considerations (ii) insufficent
.evidence' (iii) ~ey nay Day beheld uncriticaJ.ly tically or
unrefleQti unre:flcQtiv~ly. • . ... . . '. .' ."
Now I think;. with Lukes, one can' give good a priori
reasons for regarding sonecriteria., sooecriteria. of truth' and: Validity validity (or
oore nore generaJ..l.y generally criteria. of rationality -
and by criteria of.
,rationality I oean Dean rules spec.ifying speaifying what· would count as a
reason' for belieVing sooeth1ng sonething (or' acting) ). as universal, as:
relevantly applicable to all beliefs in a;ny context while
others are context-dependent, that iSi iS1 are to be disoovered discovered by
investigating. the context, and.areori1.yrelevantly and· are ori1.yrelevrul"Hy applicable
to beliefs in that context. oontext. And I she~l argue (with Lukes .'
against· Winch). that e.ll e~l
beli.efs beliefs can and rmstbeevaluated rlUstbeevaluated by
both conte.xt-dependent·and context-indep'endent criteria.
In any seto·f of beliefs. in society '3 one can ~sk
two
dift:erent types of· question:
1) What for 3 are the crii;eria cri~eriaof rationality in
general' .
2) What are the. . appr'opriate ori~·eria.to apply appiy to a
a;
given· given' class of beliefs in S.· . " .' ..' .
1) Now as Lukes has rightly put it, insofar as Winch
seens.to be saying that the an,swer to. the first.questionis
culture-dependent., .he [lUst rmst pe wrong,.. or l'J,t I'J.t least we could
never 1mow Imow if he were right; indeed we could not conceive what
it would be for hioto hinto be right. (Lukes:1967:260)•. '
For in the 'first plac~the
existence of a cotmon
connon
. reality is a necessaryprecondition .of . our coning to understand
SIS s language at all. This does not Dean that I and nenbers of
S are going to agree on all the facts. As Whorf put it
"language dissects nature in different ways". "What oust be' the
case is that 3 DUst have our distinction between truth and
.. ~aJ.isty if we are. to understand its language, for if per

.. - 116 ­
-
' ..
mpossible it did not.,' we' would be unable to agree about whe.t
whet
counts as ·the successf'uJ.. identification of public (spatio:­
tenporally locnted) objects." Sinilarly if S is'to is·to engage in'
successful prediction it DUst presuppose a. ~ given reality of
events s which are predicte.ble. II I1 Both Bcith prinitive and nodernnen
.nen
predict in roughlY. the sane ways.; also' they C8.n learn each
other's I s languages.
Thus they' each assur.1e aSSULle an independ,ent.
indepen~ent
realit·y: ty: which they ·share. " . , ­
This arguoent, and I have been following Lukes'
'
statenent of' of· it here;' is put fairly rapidly.
The oain nain poi~s
p'oimlis
can be nade clearer in the fo~low1nb fo~low1nG' way. In The Linits Litli of
Irrationality Hollis- Hollis' spel~s
out this ar,gur.lent as follows;
.'attributing what have been called universal criteria of
rationality ty to·· S: is not· a natter of enpirical discovery, but
is presupposed by the very. process of coning to understand
Sls SIS language.
To understand utterances in SIS s language lanf,.ru.age Hollis
suggests the translator' [lUst relate then to another and to the
world.
"To translate then,into then· English he needs to' relate
sone of then to the world, since in relating an utterance to
others he does not learn what it neans unless he already knows
what the· others nean.
Ultinately he needs a class of
utterances whose situations of use h~
can specify. Now these
can be spe~ified
either as he' hinself sees: then or as his
imornant infornant seestheo. then.
But this,seeos this,seens .to suggest, suggest. the specifications
night be different~"
But.if ,if this'could be possible
.he couldn't begin at-all. at·al;L.
"For his. only acce.ss to native
perceptions and specifications speCifications is by translatinb.what they say
about what· they perceive•. He would therefore have to translate
before discovering what they p'erceive perceive and to know. what they
perceive before' translating. There would the.refore be no
way into the circle. . The class of utterances ut.terances which forn the
bridgehead of his advance DUst be -one for which his
specification end his infomant's cciincide."(Hollis:lg67:266).
ThP.t That is. there are :two critical: critica~,assunptions .assunptions which are
oade nade in the very act of coning to understand, understand. S'S. language viz·
~) that the infornant p~rceives p:erceives nore or. less what he perceives
,and 2) .that they will. .say ,say nore or less the sane about it.
That these are assunptions aSffilllptions is denonstrated ?-n- ~ the following
way.
Supp'ose the translator gets his bridgehead by
pinning down the,native the.native counterpart to the ~nglish sentence
'Yes, this is a brown cow".' There are no c'ounterparts 'to
pin. down unless the native pereeivesbrciwn c'ows·; ~ows'~.nd I:'.lld asserts
that he does.
For since these are the conditions. for truthfully'
asserting-the the a'bove in Eilgiish Engiish they are'also the.,
..
conditions for truthi'ully truthfully assert·ing the above in S~
.'No:t.l, No:t.1· this:,
as Hollis suggests,. sugges·ts is ba:nal b~al enough.
But it·is not a
hypothesis that anthropolOGists share certain percepts and
concepts,hypothesis which later success in translating contims.
confims.
For this hypothesis would be irr,efutnble•. In order to
question the perceptual. and conceptual basis 'of the bridgehead,
the trmlslator would have to ask his infornant wlkq,t wlk,q,t he
perceived when confronted. with a brown cow and· whether his
utterance'was to be construed as an' assertion. Also he would
have to understand his answer.
But he can neither ask nor
underst8nd' Unless he has a bridgehead.
Consequeptly he cannot
refute the hypothesis by establishing a rival one. ,At nost he
can draw a blank and fail. to produce a translation at all.
But even this would not justify. the tran~lator
in.nttributing
attributing
idiosyncratic linguistic linguistiC or perceptual p~ocesses pTocesses to nenbers
ofS. of' It would only s,?rve s~rve to suggest they had no lnnguage language at
all.

\
- 117
. Nor is the hypotheses. confirmed w1th u1th success. The
translator has discovered (roughly) what native sentence to
pair with the original; but he has not discovered that the
natives Jl-erceive ~~rceive a brewn brown, cow cew when they utter the sentence. For
Fer
if that were in doubt seweuld so would the pairing be. iUld, JUld, as has
been argued already, if bot.h are in doubt, there is no ne way
into the· circle. Similarly, altp.ough alt~ough it is an empd.rical emp2rical matter
to. discover how hew the informant infermant signals the difference between
assertion and denial, 'yes t I
and 'no' t no',' " I true' and 'falseI, and
by implication implicatien our notion netien ef of verification, verificatien, it is net not a
hypothesis hypethesis that they.have such dis.tinctions. "Fer "For to. check: su~h
an hypothesis hypethesis the translator translater would weuld have. to. establish the,
meanings ef of utterances in the bridgehead independently of
whether they were used to. correct cerrect what was taken to be true.
But this cannot cannet be done dene as their translation depends on what
linguistic function they are·taken toperforri. teperferri. Oonsequently
Oensequently
the only alternative to. finding an everlap' overlap' in concepts and
percepts is to. find nothing at all.". (ibid:266).
If this is right then the assertion comprising cemprising the
bridgehead will have to be'coherent be'ceherent and indeed true. Again
it leeks looks as if notions netiens ef of ceherence coherence and. trUth truth in S need net not
coincide with thetranslater translator's. IS. But if this is taken t.aken· as a
hypothesis hypethesis another anether vicious circle' is generat.ed. "For the only
way to. find terms (in S) fer for relations relatiens among utterances is to.
translate the utterances and then to. interpret in-terpret the linking
tr.,,:,r.J.s se so that the utterances are. linked coherently. ceherently. Equally EqUally
the only enJ.y way t.o t.e find the native sign ef of assent is to translate
the utterances and then to. inte~pretwhatever inte~pret.whatever
sign accompanies
accempanies
mest most ef of the true ones as assertion. asserti6n. But this makes it
impossible impessible fer for alternative concepts cencepts ef of coherence ceherence and truth to.
show shew up. If these cencepts concepts wereiri deubt, doubt, the .translater translator would
have to. knew know what they were, before befere he could translate the
utterances which they linked, andweuld would have to. translate the
utter~ces
in erder order to. f.ind how hew they were linked. Again. there
would weuld be'no be'ne ws:y into. the·circle." (ibid:267). .
I should'add sheuld . here that although.these these arguments seem
to. me to. be valid r·think Hollis's acce1int'ef accoUnt 'of the notion: netien: ef of
'bridgehead' is rather misleading. . ClearlY ene one do de esn' t t decide
that 'Yes, this is a brewn brown cew'is cow'is true by fiat, 130. /30 to. speak,
and then go. en on using that as a point peint ef of leverage into. the
language.
Any trans·lation trans·latien ef' of'a a nat;i.ve native utterance is always
hypotlietical hypetl1etical and epen open to. confirmation cenfirmatien errevisien. or revision. Rather it
is the. specific.ation specific.atien ef of tile .situati.on in which the: translator
translater
elicits the na.tive sentence and which has to. be'cemmen common to.
translator translater and inforraant if translation'is translatien' is to get going geing at nll
tb,at :i,s is not net epen open to. conjecture cenj ~d refutation refutatien or. er> c.onf,irmp,tion.
c.onf,irmp,tien.
. My argument so far then has .been that in erderte order to
attribute a 18.n.biUageto lall.biUageto S at 'alJ.they must possess pessess eur our goncept
gencept
of Yerification,negation Yerificatien,negatien and affirmation.as as appli!3d' to. •.
assertions- assertiqns" abeuji abou~ a-COmDon a, celIlD.on reality. . .
. . It r.lay r.1ay 'beebjected objected that ~there is· nothing' here that
Winch. woUld weUJ.d:1nfact 'in deny.·Welleven even 'if ·thisis istheoase case it is
certainly not net clear from frem what Winch himself says'.
says~
. .
. Now Quine (Quine:1969J has taken this argument abeut about
.the . inevitable grafting graft1ngef of the translatorts:logico~to.the
translaterts:legice~te"the
languag.eef languag.e·of the inforrila:nt inferrila.rit a step' further'· further" (and. aJ. a;Lthoughft theughft is
. not net strictly speaking relevant to. riy argument bere' I think
he rais~asome central,questionsfor central.questiensfer translation transla.tien th~ory).
..' Quine's Qu.ine's argument can be out'lh1ed eut'11l1ed simply as fellews. follows.
Picture the anthropologist anthrepelegist in the proverbial preverbiaJ. jungle situatien situation
starting froD freD scratch when le!ll"ning le~ing a native 19n9uage 18llorruage (the .
.
pres,ence er or absence ef of an interpreter oakes, nakes, no ne difference to.
to..
the.philosophical the.philesephical point). peint). ·Suppose ·Suppese a ra~bit·
runs by pnd the

..:.... :
.... llS··- U8··­
np."tive n~tive utters 'Gavagai'.
'Gave:.gai'. Theant~opologist The,ant~opologist duly ciuly notes down
I Rabbit , in his notebook, subject of course to further confirn­
'ation. But although this is the necessary' starting point of any
'process of trenslation {end (end by inplication, any underste~ding .
af ef the (lino"1listic (l~r.uistic
utterances of a person using even the S2l"le seJ".le
lunG'1lC:.ge).
It is also the starting point for problens in'
tre.nslation tr2~slation theory, at least, for the onthropolo€;l.st anthropolo~st sensitive
t9 the. possibilitY.,of. ty.,of. ~danent.al ~danent,aJ.
differences betwekn conceptu?~
systems of the '\fuorfinn ifuorfinn kind. " .
,
. " ' '.,' ',,' Quine illustrates this in the following ··way. '·way. "StinuJ..us
synonyny of the sentences. 'Gavagai" e..nd 2~d 'Rabbit' ' (stinulus
cynonyny Deans the stinulus Gonditions qonditions that proDpt the two
scntencesgavagai and rabbit are exe the sane), does not even
fuarrortee ruarroItee that 'gavagai' and ' rabbit" are coexstensive terns
( Le. i~e. terns true of the sane things.) Theinfornant's s sentence
I lGavagai' coul

- 119 -­
translations of te~ns,
from occurrence to occurrence, so to
sidestep: contradiction.
Le'ach protested but provided no clear
solution for the issue. And as quine remarks, it is understand-'
able that the alternative of blaming the translation of conjunctions,
cupulas or other logical particles is nowhere
considered, for any .considerable complexity on the part of the
English correlates of such vtords words would of course present the
working·translator working' 'o1i with forbidding practical difficulties.
difficuJ.. . .
The maxim underlying Quine's logical and methodological
charity then is that one's interlocutor's silliness is less
likely than bad translation. For translation theory, as Quine
puts it,' "banal sentences are the breath of lifeII 11 •
Behind all this is Quine's QUine's main point that all
translation proceeds only by means of a number of analytic
hypotheses which extend the limits of translation beyo~d where
independent independen.t evidence can exist.
Such analytic hypotheses' of the translator, for
example , involve.. segIIl,enting heard. utterances into conveniently
short recurrent parts thus enabling the translator to compile
.a 'a list of words.
Various of.these he hypothetically· h;n>othetica11y· equates
to English words and phrases in such a Vi,-,-:! w

,
·
- 1.20
But as Lukes points, out, ,this is merely" a msleading n:1.s1eading way o~
saying that it is the content of propositions, not the logical
relations between then that is dependent on social relations
between -men. (19'67: 262).
, ,It follows,that it' S has 'a language ,it must minimally
possess criteria of truth Cas correspondence to reality) and
logic which we share with it and which simply- simply" are criteria of
rationality, ty, in,that they, constitute the formal conditions, for
the possibility of understanding: understandin~utterances utterances by members of S.
So far I have been concerned with fairly fe~rly formal
objections to the most extreme interpretations of Winchis
pluralistic social solipsism.
Now I do, not want to deny that members of. S might not,
against a background of universal criteria of trUth and logic,
adhere to beliefs which systematically violate these criteria.
This in fact seems-to be typical of the ethnographic situation.
v/hat What I do want to argue however is tho,.t th~t these' contextdependent
criteria are in Lukes' phrase 'parasitic' on non­
non.­
context-dependent criteria. That is where there are second
, order beliefs about what counts, as true [\,,:'1 [(:v'rl Valid, those beliefs
can only be rendered fully intel~igible
as operating against
a background of such criteria, criteria. '
, Consider the following exanple exaople from Gellner's Saints
of the' Atlas ,(Gellner:1970). " ' _
_
According to Gellner the concept of 'barakar 'baraka' possessed
possGssed
by Moroccan Berbers which means variously' 'enough', t, 'blessedness'
and 'plenitude',and is believed to be manifested amongst BLlOngst other
things in prosperity and in'the power to qause prosperity in
'others by supernatural means has the interesting character of
violating three of the most advertised categorical distinctions
favoured by contenporary contemporary linguistic philosophers. '
1) It is an evaluative terI!l, but it 'is used'as,though
it were ,a descriptive one; possessors of baraka are thought of
as possessing en objective characteristic which is eopirically
empirically
discoverable
2) In as far as it is treated as en objective
characteristic of people manifest in their conduct it could
only be a dispositional one - but it is treated as though it
were the name of. some 'stuff' (e.g. it can be transmitted
between persons by neans of spitting into tho the 'mouth),
3) ) its attribution is reap real+y'a .. a case cal3e of' a perform­
ative use of language - people become possessors of baraka
by being treated as though they were posses'sors possessors of it- it, - but
,it is also treated as :.:though ,,:though :1, its possession were a matter
natter
wholly independent of the ~l.ition ~J..ition 6fthose who at~ribute it.
This is. is, essential to the working of the Berber political.
life. ,Two cOI!lI!lents can be riade here:
1) Concepts which like the concept of 'baraka'
conSistently consistently ride roughshod over the performative and
descriptive use of language would only be socially (and indeed
logically) poss~ble
against a background of social behaviour
where the logic of perfornatives was not confused systemat­
ically with the logic of description.
Social behaviour behaviOur such
as making promises or economic. contracts would be inconveivable
unless in general the social implications ioplications of performatives
were clearly seen and adhered to.
'.' ..
'
Wow all this raises the general question of'what 'what
understanding in this sort of situation will consist in. To
say with Winch that use is meaning is justification sinply
seems unhelpful. v/hat v{hat is added in the way of comprehension

- 121 J.21
by saying that as far as Herber political concepts go the
Berbers Bcrbers always live, as it were, in a conceptual dincnsion of )
)
their mm o,v.n in which our categorical. boundaries do not apply? But
as Gellner rightly suggests, we can. sonetines only make sense
of the beliefs in question by seeing how the manipulation of
concepts and the violation of categorical boundaries helps it
work. It is precisely the logical inconsistency of 'barnka' 'barakar
which enables it to be applied according to social need and to
endow what is social need with the appearance of external,
given and indeed authoritative ree~ity.
. . My third objection, then, is the. one Lukes nakes
although in a slightly different context. Repaints He-points out that
·it 'it is only by assuming non-context.dependent criteria of
rationality r?.tionality that one can "raise questions about the social role
of ideology and false consciousness."(I,ukes:1970). And he
'quotes the Soviet historian Joravsky as saying that the only
way to prove which beliefs have performed-what functions in
the social process is to study stUdy the beliefs and social processes
from the vantage point of genuine knowledge.
knowledge,
Consider the
belief, Joravsky suggests, that was mandatory in Soviet Russia
during the thirties: that land belongs to the people and therefore
collectivefamers hold their land rent free. This
presents a specific verifiable verif'ia.ble statement "1,S ~s
u logical
consequence of a vague but.stirring principle, But the
historian of Soviet.ideology ,ideology in his effort to discern the social
fWlctions of various tyPes of thought should begin his
analysis with the observation that rent has existed in the
Soviet Union, whetherot or not Soviet. leaders. have been awe.re awe..re of
it. Sinilarly we can add that the student of Berber political
ideology should begin with the observation that 'bE'.raka,' 'bE'..raka.' is:
an ideological construct of Berber Barber political inagination.
Gellner makes roughly the same point when he suggests that
Winch's extrencfoI'TJ of logical charity blinds one to at least
one socially significant phenonenon phenooenon viz the social role.of
absurdity•.
Winch however howevetdoes have sOIJething to say on this point,
in criticising i'leber's iveber's account of sociological underste.nding.
As ''linch 'vinch interprets it this consists on tho the one hand of,
of·
'interpretive understanding' of the meaning of a piece of
behaviour which is basically a psychological technique, a
case of inaginatively putting oneself in the other fellow's
position,· and on the other hand.providinga ,providing a casual .
-
explanation of what :brought the behaviour about.' about.· Casual
explanation for "'leber involves foroulating statistical. le.ws
based on observing what happens, thus enabling the observer
to predict what'the agent will do on a. future' future· occasion. Now
Winch disagrees with the latter p8~t part of this when he suggests
'understanding' a piece of beh~vi6ur
or utterances is quite
differentfron differenttron f orr:mlating o rr:ruJ. statistical luws la.ws about the llleely
occurrenoe of those sane .words in the future. "A nan who
understands Chinese is' 'not n.ot ,a .0. man who has a fim firo grasp of the
statistical sta.tisticalproba.bilities probabilities for the occurrence of the various
words in the Chinese language Olinch:1958:l5) .,Understanding
.·Understanding
rather consists in "gras1?,ing "grasl?,ing the r f point' I or r 'meaning' I of what
is being done or said." (ibid:115). .
-
But although \V'inch.:gives \vinch.:gi no further examples exomples of what
he neanshere I think one can fairly' easily provide one. To
understand why a Nuerholds his fighting spear in his right
hand is not to be able to predict that on certain occasions
in the·,future the·future he will hold it in his right hand, but is rather,
as Evans-Pritchard docs does in his chapter on,spear on· synbolisn,
to spell out the symbolic significance of the right hand for
the Ntier, how it stands for nasculinity, Virtue, the
patriline and so on.
And as~inch rightly suggests, the notion
of nenning neaning here should be carefully distinguished froD ~t

- 122 -­
of function (although of course this does nothing to refute
Gellner's or Joravsky's point).
My fourth objection can now he put in this 'way: Vfinch's l s
rather. ratheraoorphous anorphous notion of a forn foro of l.i£e l~fe
provides no means of.
ofdeciding
what is relevant to understanding a belief systeo.
Does understanding a belief belicf,systelJ systen cdnsistonly in elucidating
what the informants norJ:1..9.l1y norJ:1..9.1ly say a ,set of beliefs nean? I can
illustrate very sinplywhat I nean mean with the tho following example:
In Twins ,Birds'- ,Birds" and Vegetables (Firth:1966) Firth found
sufficient s~ficient evidence in extraneous, ~verbali~ed -unverbali~ed bits of Nuer
behaviour, both in and outside Evans-Pritchard's s pexticular
pe.rticular
volune, to cast considerable doubt on what Evans-Pritchard and
Levi-Strauss'interpreted the twins = birds. fornula to [lean. nean.
So, how, even in a aninibal niniiJ.al sense, are we to construe what the
equation signifies for the Nuer? It is worth'adding worth'addinG here that
~uer E'71ir{ion E'7lir{ion is: the one work of Evans-Pritchard I s that \vinch
recoITC0nds f.or accurately applying a Winchian methodology. My
, _ ~~~~~. here -is 'isthat there is.in in fact no such nethodology in
My fifth objection concerns a second kind of issue that
can only be raised by assuning non-context-dependent criteria
of rationality, 1. i.e.,. e.,- why certain beliefs continue to be
believed or cease to be held. For it is 0nly by means of the
application of rational ste~dards
of truth or.validity ,validity that
the nechk~isms
nechanisms and secondary elaborations that protect
il~onsistent
or unverified beliefs against predictive failure
and falsification can be identified; this would apply both
to the working of Azande nagic end, 2nd, according to Kuhn, the
practice of 'nor8al 'normal science'.
This point relates generally to the question of
social change. It seems that if, as Winch argues, that truth
and validitY. -as 'as applied to belief systens is entirely internal
to then why do people abe.ndon religion or magical beliefs or
scientific paradigns in the face of intolerable anoI!k~ies
which
as Lukes points out clearly cannot be internal to the paradiGms.
paradibms.
This applies not, _ only to the rejection ection of n set of beliefs. by
rational criticiso but where, as Durkhein observes, conflicts
arise not between a. a, society's notion of the ideal and the
rationally discernable real but between two different ·(possibly
equally irrational) ideals ..; such as when a cargo cult replaces
therrlssionary's Victorian Christianity. Winch either
seens to be offeriIlG' a view of society as a perfectly integrated
systeo system in the old extrene extreme functionalist sense or else must be
regarded as hnving nothing to S~~
on this at all.
, _
(The next point'I take straight from Lukes' The Social
Determination of Truth.) -, .'
.'. ,',
-~ .
en.1.y ~LY by' by;assttming asswaing the existence· of non-c.ontext';"
non-~ontext~
dependent,c~teria
of rationality can one'raise questions
about the discrepancy between, gay, the conscious nodel
model
of a n tribe's tribetso~iagesysten otl.:rt'iage systen and its actual structure. The
issue here is not j'll.St j'l.l.St one of the differenc·es differenc,es between an
unverbalised and a ve:rbalised ve~balised
structure (e.g. the Iatoul
Iatou.l
work with several principles for deternining the preferred
spouse, although as Francis Korn has suggested not all of
these·will ,will be given equal verbal. verbal, enphasis) emphasis) but,where but.where the
stated :ruJ.es rules confli~t
with actual practice. I take an
exaople fron Lukes.,
•.
Marx's description of the 18th century
.ideas ,ideas of society as beingconposed beingcooposed of abstracted and isolated
'natural! individuals as 'insipid illusions' presupposed the
verifiability of the further claio clain that it is in the 18th
century, the very period· period'in in which the view of tho,j.aolnted
tho·j.aolated
individual becane became prevalent, that the interre~a~1ons
of
society have historically'reached reached thQ~r h1ghes~ statc of
developncnt.

'-l23­
My seventh obj,ection concerns the, 'reason' versus
'cause' controvorsywhich controversy is clearly central to Winch's
vlinch' s
thesis.
My only point hero here is that this soens to be a rather
sterile
explanato~y opposition at least in the way Winch ~linch puts
it.
, Levi-Strauss's structural analysis of totenisn or
say Needhan's p~alysis
of left-hand/right-hand synbolis~
demonstrate clearly a nethod of conceptualising concepturQising social relations
by using natural concepts possessing the requisite logical
powers in terns of opposition colld e~d assinilation. ir.rilation. This is done
by showing how sone part of nature isusodas used a nodel nodc,l for
certain social relations and groupings.
The model is not a
purely abstract one but a concrete one which is enployed
both as a 0. logical matrix and' as us concrete' concreteane~ogy.
'
Now Bell,', (Bell:1967) who has Llnde unde the sane sano point,
rightly suggests sonething is gnined in understanding by the
revelation of the structur8~ StruCtur8~
analogies in synbolic systens.
systeos.
Yet such understanding is not assinilated either to casual
explanation or explanation in terns of reasons.
Rather it is
based on structural and hencefornal analogies between
enpirically discernable realities and a systen of concepts
enployed to conounicate about sone of thr~e
realities. It is
this notion of 'structural analogy that needs to be introduced
"into vlinch's discussions of, sociological expl£'~ation. exple~ation.
For
e.,-onple e.,-o.nple diachronic change at the level of demography, denography, such as
that involved in Riviere's discussion of the uneven dis­
dis-
,tribution and rate of acceptance of' different types of .
instrunents for hunting DIlOng anong sono' sorio' :Sbuth Aoerican, Indians can
con
be understood in' torrJS tQrns of the preservation of formal relationships
in a'conceptua.l systen systeo althoUgh they now becoI1e'
relations between different contents. But thestructurnl structural
analysis of diachronlcchange, diachronicchnnge, hardly seens seeos to fit with
. SOCiological sociological understanding as Winch represents it, for iUnch' s
philosophical argunent a:i:'gi.w.ent based on what constitutesneaningful
action operates e.t C'.t a,level far higher than that' of the
,sociologist". ~he sort of, explanation which Winch' uxpressesas
the central core of sociologionJ. sociologioru. explanation expl8nation msses the'
point of structural. explanation and also, incidentally, seens
to ,coDDit him to Q.. Q"
radical conservatism, in SOCiological
sociological
explanation,as as Bell rightly observes.
obsorves.
I an now in a position
to answer the second seoond. of two quostions I raised earlier,viz,
what are the appropriate criteria oriteria to apply to a given class
of beliefs within a society. For any or 'e~l
of a class of
beliefs there are already I) context-dependent contoxt-dependent criteria o'f
rationality which specify for exanple which whioh beliefs nay
acceptably go together;
2) there are also contextually
provide,d criteria ot truth'-it is these which oake nake 'twins are
birds' true for the Nuer; 3) there are nre obviously contextually
prov~ded prov;ided criteria of neaning"
neaning~ These last two po~ts po;Lnts seen to
ne to sun SUD upelJ.that upeJ.J..that Winch is rea+ly rca;Lly at in·hislg64 in-hislg64 article•
article.
. ", . :
It is 'one,thing to say (and'this is sPtlethiilg with
whi.ch whi,ch I wouldn't argue), that in order to di!3cover di!3oover what for
,exanple the physicist phySicist Beans by'neutrine "and- 'nass' 'Dass' in the
assertion 'neutrines lack nass' we have to see how these
notions operate within the language of physics, which includes
observing thephysicists.criteria ,criteria for identifying and reidentifyinid~ntifying
abstract ,entities such as neutrines and the
conditions under which he applies or does doe,S not apply the tero
tern
'mass' • But it is another" thing_t'o thing_too suppose that·it, thnt'i t, follows
fron this that there thero is no way of evaluating the truth of
clains that occur within such a systen or evaluating the truth
of the theory itself. In fact the history of science scienoe shows
there are a fairly clear set" set,- of criteria' criteria·,for .6·valuating ,e'valuatiIIg rivaJ.
theories and hence the truth ofclo.ims which whioh 'arise within a
theory.
Therear.e' are· suohconsiderations such as thoelegance of a
theory, its sinplicity, siL1plicity, predictive success and ontological
eponooy.
econooy.
Certainly the notion of 'truth' here hero is nota
not'a
\.

"~."';_. ­
.~."';-' -
124-­
124--
sinple natter of correspo"'tjonce correspo~1onc~ to an enpirically eD.pirically discovcrnble
fact;. fac.t;. but we do llnve Good a priori and. 1"ractical
reasons for preferring a Gorn theo·ry of disease ,to 'to witchcraft
tchcrnft
explanations.
And this thi.s holds even it all truth is, as ns Winch
vlinch
sutmests, sucmests, ultinately the'ory-dependent.· 5) There are also .
contextu~~ly-provided
contoxtu~~ly-provided
criteria which specify the best way to
arrive at and ho14 beliefs. 6)
Inceneral there are contextually
provided Qriteria; lfhich which specify· specifywhatco~ts what' co:unts as a good
J;'enson for holding £'. 2. b~lief. 4 . ,
. .' .". , .:. ":. '. ". ."
, Sonetines context-independent criteria,of criteria.of ration­
rationality
will not take ,the , , ,an~ysis
an~YSis
of' religious beliefs very
fcirin ,in .the forB of relations between botween beliefs that are to be
explicated interns of ~provides a'reason a for" as Fuller for
exanple shows.
But this does not ,as Winchseens to foagine
ioagine
oean Dean they are dispensible.' Both would seen to be necessary
for f.or tho understanding of a belief systen, the explane.tion of
why they are held~
how they operate and'what their social
conseCluences arc.·
Ross
Bowden.
Note~.
1. I am run borrowing substantially fron from Stephen Lukes' sunmaries
sur.unaries
.of sane sorne of these positions that. occur in On The Social
Deternination of Truth.
2. I e.fl following fairly o,losel;1 o,losely Luke's' Luke'si stateneni: of this in
Sone Problems about Rationality, p'. 259.
3. In following Lukes' statement here I don't want to give
the impression that I agreew1th with everything in his two
articles. In On the SociaL Deternination of Tru!n, Tru1h, there
seem to be eight separate argunents, or Dore nore accurately
four argunents and four crucial "sorts of Cluestions" that
can only be raised for the sociology of belief if the four
argunents argtlDents are axe valid. Only one of these argunen"is argumen~s ("ihe
(~he
two parts of which I reproduce here e~s
r:J.Y f,irst two
objections) seens seons to be valid and the possibility of
raising only these (although I only nention two) of the
crucial questiops questio,ns seens seeos to follow follOW given the validity of
Lukes' central ~rguflent.
4. Lukes summarises these points in Sone Problems about
Rationality, p. 263. .
BlbJ.;iography•.
Durkhein, E.& MaUl:l~"M.,Prir1iti:veCl?rssiiication,Cohen Mau~~"M.,Prir1iti:veCl?rssiiication,
CQhen & West,
: ' 1969
Firth,R. Twins. Birds. and Vegetables.
JRAI, 1966'.
Gellner,E. Gallner,E. ~Conc~pts "Conc~pts
and Society' in iri Emmet EI!llJ1et & MacIntyre (eds) •
. 1970" Social' Social, Theory and Philosophical Analysis ,1970.
Hollis, M. The Linits of Irrationality. British Journal of
Sociology, 1967.
Kuhn, Ku.hn, T'.S. ~Stru.ctur'e The Structur'e of Scientific Rev0J.utions.Chicago,1964.
Revo.1;.u~ions.Chicago,1964.
,
Levy-Bruhl,.L> La Mentalit~ Prinitive•. Alcan, AJ.can, Paris, 1922.
Lukes, S. Sone Problens about Rntionality. European Journal of
S9ciology, 1967.
On the SOcial'Deternination of Truth. (unpublished)
, ,

-l.25 -:1.25 ­
-
EDrlet,D. EDrletID. & MacIntyre,A.
Sociological Theory and Philosophical
Analysis. 1970
Mannhein, K. Ideology and Utopia. (1936), Routledge, London,1960.
Quine,W•. W
van O. Word and Object. TheMIT Press, 1969.
Waisne.nn,. F. "Are there Alternative Logics?" in How I See
.' Philosoph.y.r.1acnillan, 1968. .
.
Whorf, B.J.L. Language. Lan~ai3el
Thou;f!ht Thoup;ht and Reality (1956) • MIT Press,
paperback edition, editiCm, 1964.
Winch, P. The Idea of a Social Science. Routledge,1958.
Understanding Understandin~
a Prinitive Society. Anerican
II
11 11
" Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 1, No 4, Oct.ober 1964.
Galileo and the Topulogiba.lSpace
TORologibal· Space.
In the intellectue~
history of a discipline.conbinations
conbinations
of ideas appear alnost de nov~, E\lld Md yet upon closer·exaninationthey
they nay turn out to have been p~xt pert of the connon COIJ!J.on stor~
of thought for sooe thIe. tine. The search for fo~ Galileo and the idea
of the topological space are thanes thenes which nay" seen to· have little
or no n.ecesse.ry connexion.
Their·appenre.nce as two notifs in
. Leach '(1961) 'produceda paper of great analyticnJ. effect. Its
title Rethinking Anthropology Anthropolo5Y was of'striking synbolic ve~U:e:
the date of its publicfl.tion, publicf'.tion, or perhaps the ep.rlier. date of the
public 'address (1959) upon which it was based,. nark in retrospect
a boundary tine between the innediate post-Mp~inowakian
period :in British so.ciaJ. so.ci::tl. anthropology, r-m.d that phase (however
it be character1zed)..inwhich it is now.
The content of that
paper nay be assessed, a decade 'afterwards, .in . different ways,
but its SYl'1b01ic:quality synb01ic:quality still renains. Rethinking Anthropology
is now PlU't PArt of the nyth.-drean.
It is surely not ultinately
conprehensible in all its pe~ts pexts to those o?ny undergraduate
and graduate students who have read it line' by ·line, with so
ouch apprehension and hape? No nore perhaps than it was to its
first [>,udience e,udience in London in. 1959.' But a nessage was received
then, and a r.essaGe is still receivedtiow, novelly encoded
although it is. However [mch its argunent be dissected, with
its nadden1ng naddening sene..nticjunps sel'1e..nticjunps and ellipses,tho synbolic
Rethinking Anthropology rom=dns romdns iJJoune to purely logical analysis.
Yet it cane into existence· froncoDDon frOj~CODDOn olenents anongwhich
;werethe·two ;werethe-two I have .already . r:~entioned:: j>he' search for Ge~ileo ~
.and . rtheidea of the topological space' I
•.:' Suitab1y Wagnerian
ootifs to· accoopp...nythis,' accoopp...nythis,. undoubte,dly oneaf the nost. .
neoorable and influential. of thosetepisodes in polenical,
socio-anthropolog;ical t:ourneys in which the'contestants,astride
their concel?tur~
systens, canter aciJoss·the sparse enpiric
fialJf.•••• ' (Derek Freenan,1962:l25). .
.
The Search for Galileo
The conpl?xison cOT:1pl?~ison
of the state oftha the social. sciences with
that of the natural nat:ural s~iences
et sone earlier period haabecone
hasbecone
connonplace. r-1:orepref'isely,there .there has been the expectation of
a revolution in which a figure of the stature of one of the'
sreat great innovators will appear: appGur: t twe are told this revolution has
not yet taken place in the social sciences; or at least it is
only: onlY-now now in process of taking place. Perhaps social socinl science has
not yet found foUlid its Newton but tho' the' conditions are being created
in which such a genius could arise.' (Winch 1958:1).

. ~ .:'~.'" .:'~.." '" '., ..
. - 126,·­
In 1937, RadcJ.iffe-Brown nade fI. characteristic state­
-nent . . fo~
social·anthrbpoloG7:.
social'anthrbpoloG7:.
'The whole of [lodernnechenics rJodernnechenics did not becone possible
unt:i,l, as a result of the wor~ of ..Willian of Ockhan and his
followers and of Galileo, Newton was to foroul~te
the concept
of n~ss.~ n~ss~ 2. a fairly sinple and.obvious t:Q.ing·- thing- but no·one no-one of
Newton's tine had thought of it, no one had begun to think of it.
Only after this concept had been thought out, aevelopedand
€1.eveloped·and
clcfined"scientifically did we begin. to geta·science of neohanics.
I ru'1 ru~
suggesting that we have not yet thought of ef the inportant
.concepts forso(}iru.sc.ience.. forso

-127 ­
-
has doninated DC'.theI1atics. In physics c..
siailnr
devclopnent occurred at the tine" of Galileo. Biology
tried to take a najor 'step in this direction vThen the
systen of Linnee was superseded by that of Darwin. '
(Lewin, 1942/1952:61).. '. '. .
Althou~,;h
the Galilean inage thus in one forn enters
social anthropoloGY fron froil social psycho1ob"Y,'the ·,the nainstrean of
its nore analogical use is better illustrated by.Popper ,Popper (1944-45
and 1957:1):' 1957:1):· •.. • . . .. ' ... "
'Scientific interest intorest in social r.nd r~d political questions
is hardly hexdly less old than, scientific interest in
cosnology and physics; and there, were w:ere periods in
antiquity antiqUity (I have Plato's political. theory in nind,and
Aristotle's collection of constitutions) when the
science of society niGht have seened to have advnnced
further than" than'the the s.ci-ence of nature. But with
Galileo and Newton, physics, becnoe successful
beyond expectation, .f['.I' .f[>X sur.passing sur.pnssing all the other
sciences; and since the tine tll~e of o~ Pasteur, the Galileo
. of biology,the biological sciences have been alnost
eque.lly equ?~ly success.ful.
success~ul. But the social sciences do not
as yet seen to have found thoir Gc..lileo._~
He specifically opposes this analogy with Galileo to Ginsberg's
Ginsbergts
nnalogy with Newton in the p~~sqGe
(op.oit.:59-60):
'My point, a'-~outthe a~outthe
technolOGical e.pproach 2.pproach night
perhaps b'e tmde by saying that· sociolOgy (and perhaps
even tho social sciences ingener?~)
should look, not
indeed for"its Newton or its De..rwin" Dexwin n
but rather for
" • '. '.. ~. . ,., ." t
.---1t:!!Gallleo; .---1t:!!Ga1.lleo; Clr d:i::' ita Pasteur.'..
..
He Ho asser.ts:
asser.ts!
'It I r.1Ustbe r.1U.stbo adnitted, ., however, that, that. the success of'
nathenatical econonics shows that the.t one social science
at least ha.s gone through its Newtonie.n revolution."
With the full energence eneX'gence of the i.:"1age of Galileo, cones
naturally the contr?xy contr?.ry inage of the Ptolenaic: Ptoleoaic·. systen. syston. Leach
(196l:~6-:27) hiI1selfnow says:. " • . ,that it was wrong but
. . rThe r trouble with Pto1enp,ic astronoJ.:1Y was notlthat· not}that· it
, was sterile .- there could be no real develop!J.ent. develop!J.ont. until
Galileo'wasprepared to abandon the basic premss that
celestial bodies nu'stot nU'sto! necessity'nove necessitY'nove in perfect.
circles with the earth at the centre oftha the universe••
v1e vie an-thropologi·sts an:thropologi'sts likewise tlU,st nu,st re-exanine re-exanina basic
preniSses and realise that' that· EnClish3:-anc,"'l;U"\_ge EnGlish~ari6"'1.lE.be
patterns
'of thought. are not a neQessary rlodel for the whole of
., hun.an hUIJ.an sQci~ty.' . "' .. : . .
lie says: 'Of such cycles and ep~cycles
there if:!": hr no end' (p. 26 ) •
He repeats (1962: 240) : " '. "
'
.
.'.'The . IThe Ptolenaic systenof systen.of astronony which finally
crunbled Under the onslauGhts of Copernicus and
Galileo was just such a 0. nodel' of ideal types•••Sone types" Sane of
oy anthropological colleau~es appear to believe in a.
sinilar siLrllar way.that certain traditionally trnditionally accepted
o.ccepted
SociblogicalconforrmtioIls sociologicalconforrmtioIls are e.i "law' of naturel!. 1
We nay conpare this with Wiener (1948., 2nd, 2nd. edition 1961:viii):
:1 When I cru::.le cru::.1e to M. I.T•. T around 1920,. 1920t. the General node of
'putting thequestionsconcerni~gnon-lin~ar questionsconcerniIlg non-linear apparatus
.was . wns to look for a diroct extension of the notion of
inpedance which could cover linenr'as linenr·as well as non~
linear systens. The result was that the ·study of nonlinear
electrical engineerinG was getting into a state
conparable with that of the last stages of the ptolenaic
ptoleno.ic
.' systen of. astronony, in which· epicycle was piled on

128' ­-
epicycle, correct.ion upon correction, until a VF,St
VF.St
. 'patchwork, str','-;i:.':.X'e str·,'-;"t.':.X'e ultio2.tely broke dmID under its
own weight. Jus't as the Copernican sys~ ";~1 ~.r()se out
of the overstrained ptolenaic systel'l, with 2. sinple
si1"1ple
and natural heliocentric description of the notions of
the heavenly bodies instead of the conplic2.ted conplice..ted and
unperspicuous Pto;LeD!'.ic Pto~eDE.ic Geoc~ntric systen, systeIl, so t11,e t~e study
of non-linear non-linee~, structures 2.ndsystoDs, 2.nd· systOf.1S, whether electric,
•
or neckanical, whether natural or artificial, artificial., has needed
2. ~ ~resh and independent point of connencenent.'
Wiener acknowledGes usef.uldiscussions with Dr •• K. Lewin.
"'.
In the two 'such different worlds of non-linear
electrical, engineering and of unilineal unilinoal descent systens systems the
18.!lcuage la.ncuage of. crisis looked back to' the destruction of classical
'astronony.
'astronoDY.
It is not necessary to add to such quotations quotntions to
show that the search for Galileo, (or Newton, or Darwin or
Pasteur) and the perception· of out-of-date Ptol·enaic systens
crunbling crw:lbling Md nnd tottering, were pe~t
pe.rt of a widespread node of
expression in.nany disciplines - already e.nalocical e.nal0Gical in its
preciser usages: notaphorical netaphorical or rhetorical in other applications.
The TopoloGical space
Kurt Lewin- was ~esponsible
for the first inportant
discussion of topoloGY in relation to social studies so it is
worth citing Citing hin hiD at sone.length. sODe.length. His najor work was the
Principles of Topolo{"5ical Topolo{'5ical Psycholoo;y Psycholoo:y (N. Y. 1936). Elsewhere he
has this to say about the concept of the topological space in
IJsychology psychology and e~d socioloGY:
sociolo/3Y:
'Psychology has to, d~al with a r~titude
of coexisting
facts which cxe c~e
interrelatGd and have a relative position to
each other; in nathen2.tical terns, it has to deal with a "space".
'Mathenatics knows a vr.riety v2.riety of different types of
spaces. It is an enpirical question as tO'what to'what kind of
geonetry is best suited to represent the dynanic dynmJic inter- .
dep~ndence
of that realn of facts which is treated in
a particu18~ particulex science.
Since Einstein it has bean known
. that Euclidean geonetry, which previously. was the only
geonetry applied in physics, is not best fitted for
regresenting the enpirical physical space. For
psychology, a recently developed non-quantitative
geolJ.etry, called 'topolo,G'Y', can be used satisfactorily
in ,dealing with proble6s probleris of structure and position in
a psychological field. This space.pernits represontation
of the position inside or ou'iside ou~side .o! ,o,f a certain
region, the relation between parts and whole, and a
great (~eat nunber riunber o·f 'structurru." 'structurnJ.·· ch~~cter;istics. 1'...11 of
this is done tn anathonatically a Dathen8,tically exact way but does not
presuppose the'quatit·itatiV'e tati VG de1;;erninatiop. of size,
which is generally not possible in-a~8ychological
in'a~sychological
field... ,.. ,.- ..' - ,
'It is~
I suppose, beyond question that'sociology,
too, deals with'a "nul.titude of coexistent interdependent
facts" - in other words with the "enpirical
space"'.' The sociologists sociol.ogists -and. psychologi'sts should
recognize what has been long known', that the
enpirical spaceisn6thing nothing other.: than eo. nul.titude tude of
facts existing at a given tine and showing certain
types of interpendence•••Better insight into the
neaninG,of neaning,of space in nathenatics and physics should
readily lead t.othe t.pthe understanding that the social field'
is actually an'. er.il?irical space, which· which' is as "real" as
a physical 'one.;' CLewin 1939, reprinted in 1952 :150­
:150-
151). ':' ':.' . ' '.' ...
. .

129 ­
-
He goes on:
-', '", .
'For in socioloGY, sociology, as in psychology, one is frequently
ablato ablo'to deternine relations of parts and whole and
changes in distance or direction without being able to
deter.:line dete~rlne quantitative relations of si,ze, s~ze,
distance,
or e~le.
In addition, these geonetries seeD seen to be
.. ,.particul.arly suitable fer represen;ting represeIl;ting the. peculiar
conbina;'ion conbina;lion of "cognitive" t~ve"
and Ildynanic" I1dynanic" factors which
is characteristic of psychological and social fields,
as well as a nunber.of nurlber ,of other fundanental properties of
the social-psychological dynaoic:'(p.152).
dynanic:'(p.152).
., Levi-Strnuss, Levi-Strauss, in the sane essay in which he specifically
uses ~e:win's
~e:Win's
'Galilean' concept, (1953,1964:283), refers to
topology as one of the fields in which it has been possible 'to
develop aric;orolls ariGorotis approach toproblens which do no adnit of a
I10trical solution.' He also says'that 'social structure nay
have to d"Cal d~al with prehistory, archaeology, and diffusion
processes as. well as with psychological to~olOgy,
such as that
. initiated by Lewin or Merino's socionetry't1953:532; socioDetry'(1953:532; 1963:290;
.'cf~ also Nadel 1957:145).. "
when Leach(196l) Leach(1961) introduyes a topplogical topOlogical analoGY e,naloGY into
his RethinkinsAnthropology, it is therofore surprising that he
does not refer to Lewin, whose well known systen illustrates the
cooplexity conplexity (and even the dangers) of a topological nodel. In
this connexion it is worth recalling Braithwaite's criticisn
criticiso
.that .' to be profite.blethe systen systeD nust be representable by a
oalculus in which forrmlae forrmJ.ae are genuinely derived, according to
the rules ,of the calculus,fron calculus,fr6n other fornulae'. In referring
to Kurt L,ewin Lewin's IS Principles of TopoloGical Topolor;ical Psychology Psycholo{iY he says:
'the flere translation of, tendency statenents into nathenatical
languaGe is not sufficient 'to flake a quasi-deductive systen
systeo
out of then. The essence of nnthenat.l.cs nnthenatics is not its slbolisn,
sJbolisn,
but its nethodsof cleduction.' Braithwaite,1953,19 0:3
note;
ay ny enphasis.)
There is absolutely no reason why social e~thropoloGists
should not exp'lore explore these· ,fields. A sinple statenent of the basic
nathenaticaJ. nathenatical concepts involved nay be cited fron one of the nost
DOSt
elenentaryworks: works:·;
. -, 'f
' t'
'In General ciny set of objects is called a topological
space if n. n collection of its subsetS'are subsets'are singled out
so that the collection has the three vroperties we
found in the open sets on the line: "1) The whole space
end and the enpty set belong to ,the collection; 2) The union
of any nunber of, sets, in the collection is also in the
collection; 3) The intersection 'of any two sets in the
collection is Rlso in the: collection. ~ihen
~/hen
these three
conditions are satisfied~
the sets in the collection are
called iihe '''open sets" of the "space"'. "spaoe"'. 'Under this
definition, any collection of obj.ects can be converted
into a topologicaJ. topological space,. usuallY usua.lly in [lore nore than th811 one way.'
(Adler,1958,1960: 120). ,
.
Le~ch's Leach's presentation of topology through the rubber­
sheet analogy was possibly the nore Dore evocative one to use to
introduce the natter to a grQUP group of functionalist funotionalist anthropologists
anthropolOGists
in·1959. '1959. .'It flay Day be expressed' so: '
.
'vie 'We say s~y
that two topological spaces are essentially the
snne sane or are hooeor.1orphic honeoDorphicif if thGreis ~
q. one~to-one
correspondence betweEm then that preserves the
topological structures eflbodied in.the systen of interlocking
open sets.,' sets.' (Adler op.cit. :123).
As is well-known the topologioal topological space can thus be approached
fron set-theory or fron fran georlotry; geonotry; froD the latter Euler1s
Euler's
Theoren is an illustration.

,~cience
'- 130 ­
-
nnd Myth
Galileo and the topological space were wore notifs united by
Lewin in the tho thirties. They were ,united again by Leach in 19591
1961. Levi-Strauss lies sonewhere at the heart of the tre.ns­
tre.ns-
LUssi'on. mssi'on. Lewin's Lew-in's applicf1.tion ofthenaturC"'.1 scientific anDJ.ogy
anru.ogy
was, as we saw, serious enough to be s~'erri.ly
rejected by
Braithwa.ite. thwo.i te. Thetenptation Thetonp,tation to do the sar.1e. sar,1e. for Leach should
perhaps be resisted~ Strangely enouGh we should, ;" I in these
less positivistic days, even be prep8~e~to prep£t.re,Q., say: 'the I essence of
rm,therJatics M, its synbolisn' (by a twisting of Braithwni.te' te' s
s
use dftha dfthe tern 'synbolisD').' 'synbolisD').· ."
,"
The forT:1~
forn~ systens. of science 'a..nd' the inages inf'.ges of science
seen to forn co-existent and interrelated semiotics. Tho The search
seA.rch
·for fer a new synthesis, synthesis" and for fo'r 8. ~ non-nensurational non-nensurc.tional view of
systenatic systEmntic relation.~hips, relp..tio:n.~hips,could
be 8-l)prehonded apprehonded onl;w- onl~ synbolically
synbolica1.ly
in the fifties by nost socia+n.nthropologists, socia+anthropologists, given the
characteristic charn.cteristic ,bases of their training. Leach's paper, e.s f'.S he no
doubt would be~he ,~he
first 'to Etb!'ee, EtbI'ee, is bril1.iant bril1.io.nt nyth rather rnther than
nathenatics.' Yet' the great interest of nathenaticians in
topoloGY is itself pnrt of the'general the" intellectual !"10Venent ~ovenent of
our tine, of which the structuralist or 'neo~8..nthropoloGiaalt
'neo~8..nthropoloGiaal'
trends in social anthropology anthropolo&y axe e~e
another exprossion. TopoloGY
TopoloGY'
w:?s for Leach as the phonene was for'·Levi-Strauss for',Levi-Strnuss - sonething
Good ~o th.ink th.il'1k with. . ,"', ,...,
We vIe Day nay finally.note finallY,note that Galileo was chosen by Popper,
for one, to synbolize the awaited new era for social science
because of the essentially experinente.J. experinent2~ and, technological break­
through associated with the invention of the teles'cope. This sort
of expectation is generally less appealing apporu.ing nowadays; the
conputer once appeared to enbody' it; but wesh2~1 weshe~l probably need
. , a Newton after all. cl.l., At least we already aJ.ready have Et few Keplers about.
Edl-lin Ardener. .
'
Bibliography
.iillLER, jU)LER, I. 1958. The New l-bthenatics. Mathenatics. New York
BR.:..ITHWAITE; R.B."i960. R.B."'i960. Scientific Exple..m'.tion. Explc
Canbric1ge.
FREEMtJi, FREEM/Ji, D., 1962 Review of Rethinking iJlthropology IJlthropology in ~,vol.LXlJ
LEACH, E.R.' B.R.' 1961. RethinkinG l.nthropology._ London.
" 1962'. Cle.ssificntion in S0cie.l Socie.l An;thropol0 An:thropol 0 S'"Y • Lslib
: PrncoedinGs Prr)coedinGs 14 (8): 239-242.
LEWIN, K~
1935. A Dynanic Dynan1c .Theory . of Persone.lity. New York.
1.936, 1,936, Principles of Topolorjic::'.l Topolo(jic::'..l Psycholor;y. PsycholoGY. London.
1952. Field Theory in'Socicl. 'Social Science. London.
LEVl-SlfMtiSS LEVI-S~RAffgS,C.
, 1953. Soci~l ci2:.l Structure. iJlthropoloc5Y IJlthropology Today
(ed. Kroeber). CPicago. Cp,iCf'..go. (~eealso S,ee 2.lso Structural
Structur1?l
l.nthropolor;y l.nthropoloc;v 1963.), ',
' ,
lYU...LINOWSKI, B. 1944.1.. Soi.entific So:i.entific Theory of CUlture.t,J'niversity of
North Cf1.rolina.
Cf1.rolinf'...
NAOEL, S.F. 1957.
The The 0 r'y' r"y' of Social Structure. London.
POPPER, K.R. 1957. The Poverty ~f HistoricisD.(OriGine~ly
published 1944-5;paperb:~cklg6l). 1944-5;papcrb:~cklg6l). London.

RJillCLIFFE-BROWN, A.R.195~.
~'J.3il:. -
R1J)CLIFFE-BROWN, A.R.195'7 • .A Natural Science of Society. r-1 . ncoe.
A Natural Science of Society.01'ncoe.
WIENER, N. 1948. Cybernetics. (2nd Gd. 1961). New York.'
WINCH, P. 1958. The Ide~
of a Social Science and its R~~qtion
to Philosophy. London. --­
---
£. s.d. varna
In what wp.s- wp.s· both ['.. theoretical e.nd [>. nethodological
note, the French SOCioloGist socioloGist and indoloGist, Louis Dunont nade
the followinG sugGestion:
I
The tine hasperh[>.ps perhc.ps cone when the nirror which enthropologists
anthropologists
direct at other societiesshou:Ldbe societiesshou:I.dbe turned. back bW' then on
ourselves, when we should try. and fornul~te
our own institutions
in conparative cOf:1pare.ti lanG1lage, lanG~age,
1. i.e. ina P. langu['.ge lanf~age I10dified Dodified by what we
hp.ve l'earnt of -different 'different societi'Os,' however incooplete inconplete it still
is.' (Dunont: 77) •
JQong lQong this line of thinkinG, thinking, we night develop further
the coonent by the Indian sociologist, socioloGist, G.S. Ghurye that the.t of all
the social sociEQ systens,he has studied in the world, 'it is' the
classical English estate systen that· nost resenble.s the Hindu
varna schone of cnste custe inter-relationships.
Using the varna schene of Shudra, Vaiysha, Kshatriya
.and . Brahnin, I intend to apply this to an analysis of t;raditional
British society as it is reflected in the currency
systen and in certain drinking habits P.S as a systen of siens
(Bexthes) t?ncibly t?.IlGibly representing attitudes in the fornation
of their socipl socip.l structure. At the end oftho analysis, cnalysis, it
will bG be shown how these systens relE'.te relp.te and ond how tlle forthconing
D-Day (15 Februnry,197l) February,197l) synbolizes recent chenGGs che.ngos in
the traditionnl trc.ditionnl social socic.l corrlng structure.
The systen of orGanizing units of noaey into a fourtiered
syst'en, related in unequal unitsis unique in the world.
The three tiered units of currency is usual because becnuse those
unitsare unrelated by any cor.~on· divider. I p~op.ose_the
.. following a1ir;rioen~:
cJ..ir';rinen~:
; .'
Shudra••••• ~ •••.•.•Pe.noe
Vaiysha•• Vaiysha~ ............ r •••••••••shiilings
Shillings
Kshatriya••••••••••Pounds·sterling
Pounds'sterling
Br~~•••• ~ •••••••Guineas
The lowest of the E~3lish
estates was the peasant
fc.rner f~ler and he conducted nost of his daily business in pence.
The urban proletariat also used this as their prinary oediun
nediun
of exchpnge. exchp.nge. There is ouch historical evidence to show that the
food and"luxury itens" (i.e. tobacco and alcoholic beveraGes)
purchased in previous tines by this lowest TUnG runG of the social
ladder in both India and Britain was calculatGd c?lculatGd in pence since
the next unit up, the shilling, was a large sun of noney at
one tine. The Tho British Shudra rarely saw shillinGs.
The Vaiysha or Tlerch::nt nerch::.nt class are often referred to
by the Fr2ncophile Fr2.Ilcophile (reluctantly) British as "those of the
town" by Co French terrl torrl - the Bourgeoisie. These Theso traders dealt
in l?~ger
anounts and required larGer larGor units for their CODnerce.

-l'~ -
Th.::; resulted in the s:.ill:i.ne which wascEt~cu.l..c-ted,<
wascEt~cu.l.c:ted.< ,,-f'tor.the
,,-f'tcr
.. the
Conquest, Conquest~ to consist of twelve Shudra units. TG this d~y,
day, itens
approprin appropriate to this nerchant cle.ss, cless, 'such es 2S books, nre still
quoted in shillings. .
The' Indian KshatriYf1. Kshatriya varna of warriors and rulers finds
its equiv!:'J.ent in the urben "civil servant" of Britain. This
STOUp, well-paid and dealinc with the affairs of governnent,
governoent,
required a larGer unit of currency with which to conduct their
affairs and this resul1xdin resul~din the construction of a currency tier
equal to twenty Vaiysha units.
These differential enounts nay be explained as sib~s
of separation. The threat of Shudra to Vaiysha was low and so
the anount between theu theD sliCht, _, while Vr'.iysha anbitions towarcls
the Kshatriya wore greater arid' so a greater difference was
requirod. It is still not uncODIJ.on uncODI:lon for British Vaiysha to attenpt
atteopt
to boost their social socia..l prestige by attenpting'to ·to find Kshatriyas
in their ancestry. .
The hereditary and spiritual heads of British society,
SOCiety,
the aristocracy, are. Brahnin Bralu:1in and would have liked to ha:we put
as ouch differentiation between thenselves and the disliked but
necessary Kshatriya.
But, the' Kshatriya,as oilitary. oilitnryfi{~es
fit';ures
and powerful civil servants were· too influential. ·,All ,.till that was
possible w!:'.sto, was c'onstruct construct a fourth tier in the seventeenth
century ce..lled ce~led
the GUinea, only being equnl equal to one ono Kahatriya
Kshatriya
E'.nd one Va1ysha Vaiysha unit. However, as the Enpire grew and
end
Kshatriy8. power increased, the Guinea was driven out as a
t£l.ngible unit of currency and, was last ninted' in 181.3. l8l}. 'rhe
Ksh['.triyn Ksh['..triyn h~.d, h~.d. triW"lphed. in the area of· their Greatest, _ conpetence
e.nd power -
the fornal running of civil governnont governnent. •. J3ut, ]3ut, in
areas of ritual, ritUal, the Brahbin were still doninnnt and until this
day have naintained the usage of the tho Guinea when referrinG to
the prioes prices of prestige articles such ns D.S
the price of paintinGS,
prestige holidays, or other articles of quality ritually sanctioned
by the Br.ahnin.
In the latter part of the twentieth century, tho
the
Ksh."l.triyn Ks~~triya have becone aore nore and no.re nore inport~.nt·.
ioport~.nt~
The national.
Panchayat, which fornn.lly was., was.. riGidly clivided into Brahnin
(Lords) and Kshatriya (Cannons) (Connons) consultative function is lInOW to
all intents and purposes,a sinGle practical; body, with th?
BrahrJins boinG beinG reduced to oerely ritual functions •
.
With thecor4ng theco¢ng of the chc.nge in: the nonetary Ilonetary systen
systeo
to a systeo. of decioals, decinals, the last ubiquitous ritue..l tue~
power of
the Bra.hr.u.ns Brarnxlns is being 'threatened.
The Kshatriyaunit, t, the
Pound sterling, is the basis of the newsysteo. The old synbol
of Vaiysha subservi£'.nce, subservi~.nce,
tho the shilling, is to disappear altogether
and reflocts their rising inpo,r.t,a.nc.e,•. The .new penny, synbol of
the Shudra, is to be ~rev.alued
by two hundred and forty peroent
to r~ake
it a vie:.blesepe..ration viablesepE'..ration ,between Kshatriya and the Shudra
as it never was before. The ~uinQa,withits Guin,e.a, its dependence for
synnetry upon both the shilling and the pound, will be nade to
look ridiculous, 8;S recent publications, on decinalization
suggest.
.
'
A significant point here-is ,is that there were, fron the
Viaysha, suc:".;estions sUG~estions that it w:.ould w.ould be 1:!.ore nore practical for
business affairs to base the new currency on the "new pouncP,
or .' "oldII 11 It ten shillinGs. The battle for synbolic doninance was
brief but even thOUGh a. vestiGe of·· .the .tho Vaiysha (the sixpence)
will reneinfor a short, unspecified tine, the Kshatriva
victory was conplcte. conplete. It nay be renenbered that in other sterling
area countries of the Connonwealth" Connonwealth,. where the Vaiysha tend to ­
-
doninate, their unit of currency has been retained in the forn
of a "dollar" -
the.t, is, the shillinG shillins basc, base, but without tho the nano.

-,133 ­
-
Now, we Day nay shift to another inportant locus of
8.tt nttcntion in British 8" ::i. :::i. r , "iy \y -
tho pub. Endless nctivitics
ties
circulp..te circul~to exound e.rounc1 it, [lJ1c1 and the British will nru{o nrum any excuse to
enter it and tcl{erofresbLlont.
refreshnont. Thoro Thero Day nay be sonothinc sonethinc; to the
sharp division betweon between Public' -and Saloon when applied to t:J,G
schene above, but it is thevariousdifforent drinks served in
thQSO two sections which carry Dore lUGgage as a'systen a'systeD of siS~s.
This nost chare,ctoristic of 'institutions, .where
,where
behaviour is 'rituF'lly prescribed ',and '_and circunscribed in 8. variety
of· ways 'has its own internal coherence or "boisonlegique". IIboisonlegique". By
c2.refully assiGIlinG certain Characteristic characteristic beverQ.Ges to the
afore-nentioncd afore-nentioned fout groups an obvious anelytic paradign (merg,es €merg.es
. , " Shlidra Shtic1ra., ..•••'••Beer . ' (Scotch) .
,
Vaiysha •••••Cyder (Wine)
Kshatriya•••••Scotch Kshatriy8. (Beer)
Br~mJin
.••••• ••••••Wine (Cyder)
Processed
Wine
Femented
Fomented
Culture
V
Nature
Scotch
K
B(SE)' .
'
The first chart nru1es n~les v~ious
classes in British
society and postUla'es the drinks characteristic and alternative
(in parenthesis) for theD~
The second d1.ac;rar1 diaGrru~ interprets
their inte;t"-relE'.tionships or, .1I1es ,lIles structures eienentaires e1enento..ires de
la'parenthese." .
,
. ' TheShudra The' workincclass workinG, class identifies itself Ttli with the
nation's beer, but also latently enjoys the prestiGe of Scotch.
The T;he Viaysha tlercharits bercharits (especially of the che.racteristic chE'xo..cteristic southwestern
Enclish) tak:eoyder takeoyder as their daily drink, but aspire to
lithe better thinCs in life, 11 Ttlith th wino as its synbol. The
Kshatriya civil servant is a firn firD scotqhdrinker, but will often
take a pint of beer at his local. Lastly the Brahr,lin' Brahr,1in' e.ristocrat
2.ristocrat
has wine as his synbol, s~'lbol,
but for a sort of rustic sensibility
will often drink draught or even bottled cyder.
The second diaGrmJ diacrruJ shows the inter-relationships
(arnatures and axes) of the schene in the first diaGro..n. diaGro.n. 1!Jino
1!Jine
and scotch. scotch, exe e.re on the "strong and expensive" ll axis (SE axis),
and reach their a~ie in the Brahnin, whereascyder and beer
are on tho "weak and cheal)1I cheal)1t axis (WC axis)" The oppositions
of scotch to wino wine and beer to wine are based upon both societal
and 2nd digostive diGostive criteria. Cyder and wine enjoy'the affinity, B1finity,
on the other hand, of being at once fruit products and alSO
the result of sinple siDple fementation, while beer and scotch are
J?rocessed.
This derives clerives an "F" IIF" axis (Fernented) and a "P"
(Processed) tProcessed) l"..xis l"...xis ,respectively. •.. .
,
. , Further,itnust Further,itnilst be pointed out that there is a con­
,~~'ce
in M "R" "RI! (for ReGional) axis botween between cyder Md
scotch, whereas beer beor and wino ~e uade in Dany De~y places. A
fuller statenent, in r'.ore riGorous fe,shion of these relationships,is
as follows:
Faxis
SE jtxis
C=\'[ C = VI
sllw
C::W:Bi::
S (F eF + Faxis)
B- I I W' C·.. B:' • II w' ~ C ' •• S
Faxis)
•. ••
P l..xis
WC B, :: W (B + )
~xis ..
-.
-,
B' =S
= S
C II B
It is clear that the Shudra hELve an affinity for tho
the
Kshatriya and they swap beveraGes ,to 'to synbolize this. They nay
also exchange wonen hypert;nT.101.l.S1y', hyperCo.I.101.l.S1y"
while the Vaiysha look to
the Brahnins in a siI'.ilar siI:'.ilar nanner.This nay be synbolized as:

- 1.34 :­
~
w/b : S/k ~ s
"'. :,.k :.. k : 'V w :: k exchange
In ter~s
of class origin, this is predictable and is
what I would tern the principle of alternntive alternative oPPcGition.
0ppcoition.
~here is in the socioloGical literature (Cohen, 8iu~el)
8:l.I1.~el) r~0:.
rlli.0.!.' ,
1-.0 to show that ermity exists between closely conpeting groups in
a society and though traditionally the estate systen in Britain
nay have functioned as a systen syston of inter~relationships,
con:flie.t
nay havebecone greater in recent years due to, to· influences fron
the West (principally the United States). While this ennity nay
be less noticeable in the urban British centres, where the
systen ceased to exist as a viable unit sone years ago, it
shows appalingly in village Britain. Therefore, to understand
the operation of British social structure, it is to villaGe
Britain we Dust turn rather than the highly Westernized urban
centres.
Our second figure can also tell us about attitudinal
and stereotypic features of the social structure. As we saw,
thero is a WC axis centering on the Shudra. WC jokos, as
DOSt know, are of "low" character and are considered "dirty",
which is preCisely precisely the popular stereotype of the Shudra. This
lios in opposition to the SE axis of strength culninatinc in
the tho BrahDins - the strongest Group in the society~
The'a
axis reflects the regionality of the groups froD their
characteristic drinks - the nostregional products' (sc,otch (sc.otch and
cyder) are representative of Vaiysha and Kshatriyawho,
oppositionally, are the nost nobile group in Britain, whereas
the least reGional regional products on the R axis (Wine and beer) are
characteristic of Shudra and Brahnin Groups groups nost tied to the
land in a particular reGion.
The Faxis,not yet nentioned,
repres~nted
represented the relationship of the drinks to food and oentres
on the Vaiysha ,who, .who, as the society's nerchants, are nost
tied to this function as suppliers of sustenance to the social
order.
o~der.
' . '
I an, no, of course, not the first to show congruences
between eastrononic preferences preferencos and social structure. (soe
(seo
Levi-Strauss: 4;1..1).,
' .
_
In order to see better botter how this works out in terrls of
social doninance I)atterns, I)attorns, I have drawn-up a "triangle
boisonaire" fron froD the previous data: .
-
SubserVience Raw NATURE
Roasted
( ) (~17ne) ( .. )
Air/~ater,
C :a
( + ) ". , Snoked Boiled ' ' ,( . ( + )
: Cooked Rotted
, DOMINl:..NCE (Scotch) (B'Oor-Cyder) (BGer-Cyder) CULTURE
At the peak of the triangle'is is the wine-drinking­
Brelmin.
He drinks a beverage which is nade fron a raw fruit
which is not allowed to rot fully, as is the case with vTith cyder.
The "roasted" oust be taken oetaphorically oetaphoricaJ.ly as this refers to
the carefully prepared and refined technique of the food of
this group, but nay also have sonething to do with a wine once
characteristic of this group which is, in effect, roasted ­
-
Madeira.
At l..t angleB, are the beer drinking Shudra and the
cyder drinking Vaiysha.
Beer is boiled in its preparation,
while cyder is the product of rotting fruit. The fact that
these two groups are found here should not be surprising as
they cane historically fron the SaDe sane low rank and have only
recently (the niddle ages, perhaps) been differentiated.

- 1.35 ;..
... I'
,­
,-
At anclo ancle C, are the SJotch drinkinG Kshatriya, whose beverace
. is slowly cooked· in larGo larGe vats and ofton often pou:rod into sl:lokod
,casks for curine. Sic;nificantly, Sic;n.ificantly, air (often (ofton 'sI::oked 'sl-::oked e.nd 2..nd cooked,
therefore 4ot) is the OnlYSU~.a.ratio.n between the Kshntriya
.nd ,nd the Brahnin" Brabnin" whilo while wator water (', a fJore nora solid and thorofare thorefore :-.iorc
:-.iore
r,rohibitirig aGcnt) aGent) separates the lo~er le~er Vai.ysha/Shudra Vaiysha/Shudra fron tho
the
higher Brahnin.. . .' ". ", .
.
Le to trianGle bo1F3'onairooff,ersthe bo1F3'onaireoff,ersthe final confirnation
for tho the hypothesis that the doninant caste, followingSrinavas,
anonG. anonG_ the 'British, is tho the Kshatriya" as thoy they are in the nost
favour.ed and strongest part ,of the triangle, enjoying a conplete
plus doninance -ovor -over the wine drinking Brcllrrln, BrahLtin, who are,
'r(3spectively, 'r(3spoctively, the "cultur£'..1" tur£'..l" and. the nat\:i.rnl nat't:i.rnl rulers of Britain•
•
. It is also clear that the Kshatriyn Kshatriya understand the si~nificance
of such a construction as they jealously h08~d
their
strengthening beverage 'to thonselves' thenselves' by a hiGh tnx. The
rolq.t:ivo:J,.y rolq,t:ivol.y lower tax inposed on beer p.nd cyder insures it for
thonnsses, thonasses, while Brahoin ritu£'..1 ritu£'..l power obfuscates the understnndinstnndine;
ond use of wine by otho~s.
othe~s.
It is clear, thorefore,
therefore,
that while hiCher cultures organise thcir their lives on the basis of
proforences.oftaste preferences.oftaste anq. reason, "chez los snuvages" of
Britnin, thines arc are clone "to protect the purity of their beinGS."
(Levi-Strauss: (Lcvi-Strauss: 419). . ."
Further, analysis of,Britain
Brita.in re~ea1s
obsessLoIT obsessi.on' with congruent pr~~itlve prj.lJ.i re~eals
classifications a continuing
based upon
the four-gart ScheDe:
Scheoe:
Land, Land. Divisions
Rad,io
Entertainnerrt
. Shudra . , Ireland
Radio I
Television
Vaiysha
Wales
Radio II
Cinena
Kshatriy'a . '
Scotland '
Radio III
Theatre
ErahI:dJl, BrahI:1Ul. ' Engla.nd~.
,!tadio jtadio IV
Concepts Conc~rts and Opera
Pe'is
Transportl
Shudra BUdgies Budgies
Public
Vaiysha
Dog
Taxi
"Kshatriya, ., Cat
Private cars (papked)
(pa~ked)
Brahnin
Spec. pets
Private cars
(unparked)
Two points ought to be nade rmde with respect to any
jUdgenen~ judgenen~
of, the ideas and analysis contained in this paper.
First, I have intez+ded inte~ded this effort tc be suggestive of e,
8.,
point of view'and I'hope rhope thai; thart I·oanage, r'oanage, ~togive ••••ideaS' ideas; even
wheIT when" (you, the reader." reader.,- doesn't) ••really know what ( I an) •••
saying' (Leach':1967:xvii). •.'Second, and with nest n'ostparticular
reference to the unsupported correlations of British native,
or 'practical" (Leach:1968:1) schenl3s schen~s ,of, ..,synbolicclass­
ification o'f 'etperienccl ,as ..it' . .i relate-st·o relate-st'o saoial structure, I
wciU1.d w6u.1.d hope that t?at
.
:th.EFf'ollow±ng :th.EFf'ollo:w±ng point .woul?

. - 1,6 -
by the Y0unG. younG. They cone between the Kshatriyp_ and the Brahnin
shared use of priv8.te vehicles, the forner being 'pp.xked' 'ppxked' rttld
the latter being 'unpp.rked.'
tunpp.rked.'
The Kshl:'.triya, in spite of his
beinG able to afford to purchase aprivatevehiclo of Great
Grent
power and prestiGe is thwexted in the full expression of this
mmership o\filership by havinG to park his nachine, a'n0st a'Dnst frustratinG'
frustratin~
exporience and one which the Kshatriya is willinG willing to spend
large SU"1S of noney.on to facilitate even to the point of
. ~estroyinGbeautiful ~estroyinGbee..utifUl urban features which obstruct his buildinG
plMS pl~sfbr for p?xkini~ prxkinG lots and ntilti-storey nUlti~storey car pRrks. pp.rks. The BrahrJn,
BrahrJ.n,
on the other hand, owns a private vehicle~
but it is chauffeurdriven
-
that is, .it requires no parking space about which the
Brclll:ri.n Dust be concerned. He is tree to take· his private
vehicle (or·to be taken it it) to where he wishes without beine
conc("rned where the nachine will rest while he is not in it.
When the Bra.hr.'lin Brahr.'lin is ready to clepp..rt, his vehicle is brought to
hin at his will. llS liS was shown befC're; ,the .the Brahnin and the
Vf1..iysha V0.iysha share a nunber of·· af.:f'inities ana the letter's latter's taxis
are entire.ly c.onpatible conpatible with this as their appropriate foro
of transport. The notorcycle, is a non-chauffeur driven vehicle,
but, on the o,the±' o,ther hand, requires reqUires no or Qr nininal parking spacel
space!
It is, in short, outside of the, classification systen and is,
thus, polluting. (see DOUGlas)'. Doublas)~
It is an. abonination for nost
of the society as such and only those siL1ilexly 'Iinpure llinpure ll for
other reasons and thus outside of the systen will find it
appropriate approprlatefor their us,e. use. Perhaps re.cent attenpts of the ,
Kshatriya to nark cycle parking spaces in large cities .i8 .is an
attenpt to ,bring .bring inpure ilJpure cycle owners into the systen or, at
least, to detract fron their affinity with the Brahr.1ins. It is
probably no accident, in this line, th!:'.tdeviant thl:'.tdeviant cyc~ist
clubs
ofton take on nar:.10S nar.lOS associated with royalty (i.e. The KniGhts,
The Kings).or, in anotherv'ein, vein, use nanes nar.1CS to synbolize their
ou~-of-plaoe
and paradoxical eonf~ieting eonf~~eting low/high status within
the cl?ssification schene (i. e. The Hell's t s l...ngels).
l..ngels).
Bibliography
COHEN, Y. 1969., Social Socie~ Boundary Systens. Current l.;nthropolotV[
j.;nthropolotV[
10:103-126.' 10:103-126.· .
DOUGL1..~,M.1966. Purity and Danr,er. Londo~: Rout~odGe & KeGan Kecan Paul.
DUMONT,. L. 1962. The Conception of Kingship in liD.cientlndia.
iiD.cientlndia.
Contributions to Indian Sociolo(9'6 :3-77, :3-77. .
.
. GHURYE,G.S. 1950. Caste' Cast~' "and' ·'and· Class in India.BonOay:Popular Book
. '... Depot.'. Depot.', .' .. .,,'..,',' ."'..,,,. ,.
"
LEl~CH,E.
11 11
. . I·
1967. Introdilct1qn. Introduct1qn. InE.L(il.ttch IilE.Lfil.ttch (ed.), The,. StI'lictural
Structural
Study of Myth and Toter.'lisri.AStI,MonoG-raph,No.5. Toter.'lisri.AS/I,MonoG"raph,No.5. London:
Ta'vistock Publications, .pp.! PD., ;.vii-xix.
" 1968, Introduction. In B.R. Leacn Leaon (ed.), Dialectic in
PractictU Practical ReliGion.' CnJJbric1ge CnrJbridgePapers in Social.
i..nthropoloGY, l.nthropoloGY, No,. 5,' Cnnbridce, Co.nbridce, At the University Press,
pp;1-6.. . , .
11' 1970. TelstaI' Tolstar and the tho Q,boriGines Q.boriGines or Lapensee Le.:pensee sauvage.
In D. Ermet Er1Det and ll. Ii. MacIntyre (ed~),
Sociolo/;ical Theory,
and·Philosophicali~alysis.
and·Philosophicali~alYsis.London: London:. Ma.cnillan Macnillan & Co.Ltd.,
183-203.
LEVI-STRAUSf:;,C. LEVI-ST~US~,C. 196~.
L'Orir;iile Ori/sine des Mp.nieres Mpnieres de Table. Paris:Plon.
Plon.
SIMMEL,G. 1955. Conflict,The Web of Group :~filiations.Glencoe,
111.: III.: J.rhe Free Press.
SRINIVLS,M.N. SRINIVl~S,M.N.
1962. Caste in Modern India. Bonbay:Lsi~
Booimy:.i~sia
Publish:tilgiHouso.
Publieh:tIig1Houso.

- 13'7: -
Lfrican Medic~?Taxonony:
with special. rofcrcnde,tO' rOfcrcne .. to oental illness;
It has been said that prinitive cl~ssification of
illness, illness. is ccnplotoly unrelntedto Westorn cc'toc;orios, cc-toc;ories, and
that th2.t in ·pe.rticular 'particular 0.11 fcrrls of illness o.ro o.re snicl to be cc..usod
cc..used
by witchcraft or supernatural agencies aGencies in prirutive prinitive societies.
Field Fielcl discussed tho the problen briefly:
'Thefi:rst first probleo problen of clnss;ification clnss;iiic2.tion -whether to
adopt rm etBnolociccl. etBnolocicru. or a psychiatric b8.~is,-
b8.~is·-
was easily
, _ disposed of. Had I chosen tho the fomer, forner, each category would
hnve reoained hopelessly heterogeneous. '(Fielcl:l960:149)
·Since ,Since she felt thnt "witchcraft cases" would have
covered ~loSt
of their ,diac;nosis,. -dia[;nosis,. ,'she .' used \'lestcrn dia@lostic
dia6Ilostic
labels such as depression and schizophrenia.
•
.,Over the,last the·last few years Dore nore interest,has interest.has been taken
in prirlitiveclassification. prinitiveclassification. Kinship has alwayS nlwo.ys beon been a central
area of investigation of such sY,stens by, by. 2nthropolocists, but
in the lc.at decp.de other folk tnxononies have boen been stUdied, the
field now beinc ce.llecl cl:'.llecl " ethnoscience, ethnoscienco, "bysone.Before ever
discussing diSCUSSing 'the -the classification of illnesses in (lifferent different
cultures oneMata onehaata nsk if there is the cctegory "illness" ['.s
ns
such. There seens to be no report of a society that does not
usee useQ. category closely reseobling resenbling what whnt we wc call illness. (It can
thus be called an, rot· "etie" cateGory since it is universal)
(Roone1 and D'1~drade:1964).
In the case of spirit possession,
there l1ay nay be nreaawhere nroaawhere certain'states cortc.in-states are defined as illness
in onei~ty
and not in QUother, c.nother, but even in our mm O\n1 culture there
are arc thos~
who are difficult to classify as "ill" or "not .il1". ,ill".
There flay rlay be doubts, for exanple,as to whether' a 0. person shoule?%led
eccentric or Dentally nentaJ.J.y ill.
Th~
early papers on the subject of prinitive prioitive concepts
of illness illnesS 'ended to concentrate on, on. concepts 01' causntion, 2nd
c~thouGhthese c~thouGhtheso
could be classified, they thcy were not the only
systen systeo used and Ilnd in fact seldon relate to the actual acturu. nn01nC no.i:.Unc of
,illnesses. -illnesses. Clencnt'a CleDent'a i,)aper i?aper on "P.rinitive Concepts of Disease"
was the first najor work in EnGiiahand deals entirely with
theories of diseaso caUsation, discussing,the discussing-the ideas found
t1;l.ro~hout
the worlcl and postulating various patterns of
diffusion to aocount for the presGnce presence ofthesc·ideas.He
theseidoas.He
actue.lly defines his sUbj subj ect as: .'
Prioi1ive Prini1ive conce~ts
of disease are those idees held
by prloitive prinitive peopie as 1;0 ~o the thc cause or {!emesis tenesis of
sicknase. (Cleoents: (C1enents: 1932:1Q6).
His classification of causes has beennodified slightly but
is still the' -nnsic bnsic '~,ext
-~.ext
on this subj ect. He firstly' extracted
three basic cateGories, cateGories_ of cause: .; ,;'
.
. Cll tlj Natural causes'~ .'
..
., ( 2 Hunan. aeency. .'
. (3 ( 3 .' Supernatural aeency. .
.
He p;r~ferred,
however,' to calltho ca1.lthe last -u.WQ- t-wo- Unne.turn.l Unne.turru. Causes of
Dis,ense Dis.e-ase and divide theso those into: .' ., ., ".',
""-
(1) Sorc"lry. Sorc~ry. This Tliis is the action of, of· hUI:k.'Ul hur.k~ beings usuclly
usuc~y
usin,r; contar;ious,or contar;ious. or initative tn.tive [,18.6io. r.l8.6io. He includes
the evil eyo. oye, in this. -' ..' '.' .,
.,( (2) Breach- Breach' of Taboo. 'This nay' be unintentional.
Confession is the usual forn of traatnent.
traatnont.
(3) Disoase - Object' Intrusion; This is a tangible forn
., of sono disease producinG prodUCinG acency n.cency and is' thus l:l.
i:I •
., ·nater:lal -nater:lal forn of the next.
(4) Spirit Intrusion. This is tho the presence presoncein the body
9fspirits. These Thesc nay cooe'by'theosclvos, cone'by'thensclves, they.nay
be sent scnt by a sorcerer, or' or- tney they nrx:!' nrx:r CODe as lJunl.shoenpent
for· breach of taboo. Spirit intrusion and .,
spirit posscssi6nt~.y possessi6nt~.y
be sinilar s1nilar and can be confused
by ethnographers. .'
(5) Soul Loss. This nay occur by accident or the soul

..... · '.," .............- -.... .
nay boo abstracted n.bstracted by spiritscr spirl. ,er sorcorers.
sorcor-ors.
Clenents mmtions nentions three cures for spirit intrusion:
intrusion.:
(a).. CODrmnds.:to' CODrmnds,:to' depart or exorc::\.,sn., Gxorc::\.,sn., ~
(b) .Mccn~i,caJ. ,Mccn~i,cal
LlCal1S nCalls suchas c}lppinC; bleedinG or
purg~nG· ';, " : ' "'.
Cc), Brush1I1t; BrushiI1t; into an i:miI1?,l or object by transference.
Clenents however docs cloes not nention ncntion the nathed nethocl of tn..-::1ine t~~inG the
spirit so that intrusion intru.sion ch~nccs
to c9ntrolled c9ntrollcd possession, which
is tho the funo.p.nentaJ. funo,.Q.DentaJ. step in nost instances of healinG; by
initiation into a n forn€'.l forn~~,
'possessed' relationship with the spirit
that is causinc the illness.
'
. , Hoilbwell Hoilciwell in his discussi:::,n of, Clenents',· work points
out that sorcery cap. oakc Duke use of several of tho the other ca,usntive
tochniques neIl:t~oned.
Sorcery invfJlves inv'Jlves (1) the hunnn GiJ'ent
(2) the technique onployed {3)'the specific proxinate proxulate c~use of
the [.mladY [,mladY which :?ctuaJ.ly actually produces the syrJ]?tO[ls. syrJ~tons.
This includes
objector objGctor Sl)irit spirit intrusion and soul loss. (Hallowell:19j5)
(Hallowoll:1935)
1Y'lUrPhy.uses l'iTurphy.uses C:ihsncnts!mitegat'i-oslin C:it.sncnts!oategati-oslm her ,~co6unt
of the beliefs
in disease causation anoncst tho the Eskinos.(Murphy in Kiev (cd)
196'4: 61-69 ) io, ,.' ," .' " '
Thero,has There beon sone discussion as to whether there is
a belief in naturtl.1 naturtl.l causes onuses at8J.i in prin1tive prinitive !]ec1icine. l'Jec1icine. This
point ,is 'is well 'reviewed by ..\ckcrknecht inh:1s paper "Uatu';:':J..l
"Uatu';:-:J l
Disease and Rational Trcatnont in: PriD.1tivo Medici:',e. Medici'.e." II Most
authors report that IJiner Diner 'illnesses arc' 'the ones uS,le.llY
uS.lE'.llY
considered )'ne.tural".
)'ne.turaJ.".
At the bCG1.nninG bc[,1.nninG of a diseasv no super­
supornn.turc.l
cla,ricer da,ric;cr nay be felt (;'..nd hone reJ:1eclies renoclies o.r':1 n.r':1 (;i'Ven. Gi'Van. There
Day not be sufficient concer,n to, oonsult a diviner. ~oDe
authors clain that thnt nl.l. all diseases 'nre 'arc believed to have 'l ~
supornatural,
oriGin, but in nilcl cases 'the patient will be content
nn.turaJ. with \d palliation pn.lliation 8lldnot and spend the no~ey on adi a diviner. Only when
sinple rcncdies fail. is the conplicated cODplicated supornaturp.~
naehinery
put into notion. These Those diseases ,considered netural ne.tural by
~riDitives are: (1) The very sliGht. (2) The very co~on ~nes.
(3) Diseases inported iDl)Orted by Whites. v/hites. (i: (~ckerknccht:1946:272). .. ckerknecht:1946:272). The
Tile
reason for this latter is net not obvious.'It oay Day be that it is an
artifo.ct n.rtif~ct
due to infornants being polite to \fuite \ihite investiGators,
investica-tors,
or it oay Day be that the explanatory systen is so riGid riCid that it
cannot accoIll::l.oclate new diseases. Ackerlmecht hioself hiriself clooti! cloctil not
believe in the notion of rationality in prinitiye nedicin~
and
says that !"1ild ~ild illnesses are just not explained, it is n01 that
their explanation expla.ne.tion 1s~aturalistic. ,naturalistic. ,(ibid: 478).
Prince, i~::h1sstudy
bfYo~b~ 'beliefs about nenttlJ.
nenttQ
illness found that 20% of casaS'whoo'he cases'whon'he saw in'an indicenous
treatnont centre contre were said saicl to be causcdnnturally. The factors
facto~s
involved were wore faulty fnul diet, sn."..ll' sn.."'..1l' insects, worns, woms, black blood
or watqry wat9ry blood, hen~
sr;10kiny- s~okiny, an~other ,other texiceffects toxic, effec.ts and
hereditary factors. (Pr~nce~n K~ev'(ed):
1964:96). Pre~unably
sone of those could be thouGht thOUGht to be clue to oaGical naGical processes
MSO.' Th" Thq . Ganda bolieve believe ,that epilepsy can be due to a lizard
in the brain which nay be there at birth and Cr'Jw CrfJw QI Q.I be
introduced by oao"'"ical. nau~al Dedns. nenns. (Orley: ,1970).
The distinction'betwQcn, distinction'betwQen, sorcery and wd witchcraft has
been enphasised by Micld.l.etC'll MicldJ.etC'll and Vlinter.
The tern sGrcery
should bG be used. to describe instangos inste..ngcs where cbjects or Dedicines. nedicines.
arc are used f:':.cainst f:':.Gainst vlctins. victins. SUch acts can be perfornecl perforned by &1Y­
&1yone,
_ Md are arc only call~d, eall~d, [1agi~nl1 [1agi~nll _because _ there arc no c;rounds in
Western science for ,believing in theD.
then.
vii Witchoro.ft, tchoro..ft, howevor
describes a nystice~
nystic(;'~
power" resi¢l.i.nG resi~G in particular Deople. It
nay be enouGh,for enOUGh, a Witch witch just to wish evi~ ovi~
acainst a victin.

- 1.39 ­-
Witches are usually thought to have ether pcwerssuoh [>.s
travellinr; at superhuoanspeed, turninG into D.!!inals, a!!inals, or
dissociatine their spirit frc.hthe body· and thus !30in,g nbc:ut
;l?ing :?ing evil w~.ile
a:p,parently avparontly ,asleep. in bod. bed. (Middleton (Mic1cllcton and
\fJ.nter (eels). 1963). . ,.
"
The Ge.nda Ge..nda believe that illnesses can .bo ,bo brought by
spirits er or w;Ltchcraft w~tchcraft substances. The spirits are of ef two types
that can work in tWG dif~erent
ways:
L·Thcso Theso that cb, cl) net kill people but nerely retu,ire retu.ire to
enter into S(irlO S(ino forn of relationship with people, anel ancl be
placated.
'.
2. These spirits which ?.re exceedingly dangerous and
whoso'ain whoso'aiI:'! is ti) kill people. These latter are sent aGainst
people by other"hui..18l'l.s. other"huilans. .
i:..J"1cnp:stthe, l:..ncnp:stthe, nearby North Kavirondo Bantu a visitation fron a
spirit is usually a slew illness., net a sudden Violent violent outbreak.
This lE'.tter would be attributed tn hunan' hurlan' 8,gents.
agents.
(We.:511er: (Wa:511er: 1959:164). . ­
.
The Gencln Genc"l.n do net he.voa he.vaa strc.ng belief in witches j
but
rather in· insorderers~ s~)rderers ~ SSf1e S~,ne witches ~o
do exist who. prepare
subste.nces subs1;e..nces ·which 'whioh nay be·· placed in such a; way that the victin
passes u'ear· near them then. •. These nay Cause Oause a sudden unpleasant. or even
fatal illness buti! if net i!Jj.1ec1iat~ly i!Jj,lOc1iatE;lly effective, they n~y C'l
CC)
on to produce a 71(lre 71(1re r~radua1 and persistent perSistent illness. I fl".Vf fl"'.V{ two
cases which, I was t-:li, t'ili, were certainly due tc witchcraft
SUbstance. One Wf':.S wr:.s a'pr0Gressivc a'pr0cressivc wasting disease which lasted
two years and ended in rleath, and arid the,:·ther the·:,ther was a c1e.'iontia.
c1e,"'1entia.
When these" those'· substances are walked ovor ovcr in. the path, they
produce a painful swellinG cf ef a parte·f the borly, typically
a feot, feat, spreading tc' tc, the rest cf ef the bGc1y. It nay produce
snall snaIl sores,over over the lees. There.is a' separate Ganda Gancla w~rd
wl'~rc1
for
poison. Poison is chD.racterised c~~racterised by having to tc be taken by :'1outh
~outh
and it, it_pr....'c'l.uces·' ,duces·' severe. severo. nbdcrline~,pain,v(',riitin[;)
nbdcnine~. pain,vcriiti.n[;) and ultir..1ately
ulti!".1ately
death if not treated. It is sonetinas c?~led the witchcraft
substance ef cf the Europeans. There is. nc ne difference in kind
between witchcrFct't substance and poison, pOison, and there is considered
to be no esseI),tial esseI).tial difference in their ncc1e af action, even
,. though the one· is swallowed nnd' tho the ether· ether, 'can work frc)f1. frc)f..1. a
distance.· Sinilariy there, .is c():D.sidered to be no d.ifference in
kind botw.oenth9se betw.eenthGse nedicines nec1icines which .are- ,are' Given by flouth, those
that are rubbed. over the body and thc.;se. that are wrJrn wrjrn wrapped
in a piece ef cf cl(~th
Fl.round the am '-'r waist. (Orley:1970:19-20).
Beattie. has nade a sioilar point about.,. the neir;hbcuring Nyoro:
.... '" t Sb for N~rorop0isoningis Nyoro poisoning p: l,{ihd' l,dhd' cf ef sc)rcery~indeed
the· the- flOSt floSt typical kinC'..: : .as· . as' 1.vesterners we distinGuish,
.in terns of what we know knew of· of'the operation of chenical
and physiol()Gical physioloGical laws, the act ':Jf of putti~; puttin{; noxious
nedici)'Lo in a :J,lerscn's :Jierscn's f('(,(I.,. f('(,O.,. fran fron tho the procedure
involved in buyinG another kind of ncdicine nedicine in·a
in'a
,.. . path whore an enet.lY will pass: Nyoro nake no such
.distinction. nistinction. Even to burn a parson's person's hcuse secretly
at niijht with the intention of killing cr er injuring
hin 8..n.d his.fanily is a kind 'of burogo (sorcery).' I
(Beattie in MIC1cUetone.nd MiCldletone..nd Winter (ods): (eds): 1963:29).
. There aro are difficulties encughf0r t~ose who wish to
relate Western disease cate~ories
to prirrl.tive cateGcr~es.
catoGcr~es.
For those who wish tr: to relate Westorn Western cateGorios cateGories to prinitive.
prinitive,
categories.ofcausation of causation the position isaven even nore Dore difficult
as is illustrated by Le Vine's study'of the Gusii of Kenya.
(Le Vino Vine in ibid). He. states that in anyone MY instance, death
or an illness r1?...y be' ascribed to different causes by the
different people invclved.
For the uninvolved obsorvers observers it
is nost convenient to ascribe nisf0rtuneto nisf0rtuno· to natural causes or
c,r

- ~40 -­
no"loct. An 111 ill nan hinse1f is likely to Sf::.y tha-c ho he >.[~E;
I. ::"J
::::"J
b&,ritchec1 bE;,fit chad and blru::1c a :~';)l.:l.tive
:~·;)1[1.tive or neir5hbour rE~' '\2:;:' '),2:;:' ·~r,[~....'l t,.i
ti)
think the.t he is be-in:; be-in.:; punished. The relatives in their turn,
either use the occasion t·(). t-(). express their hostilit.yagainst t.yagainst 2.
third partywhC'!:l they clain is bewi bawitchinr; tchin~:;
the ill nan or, if
. they wish to ,av'::::i-:'t ,av-::::i':'\. disruption, will clain that it is caused. by
the ancestors. Wonen tend to be ncre nere :prone ~rcne te t(= nake witchcraft
accusations, perhaps because they are outsiders who care less
about their disruptive effect. effect•.' " Lineage elclers on the ether
hand, who wish to preserve unity,' try where possible, pOSSible, to turn
blarle blane of others into self-blaoe.· self-blane.
-, The Ganda Gonda rocoGnise ,the way in which different people
attribute rlifferent cn~ses
ca~ses to' an,il,lness'. an,iJ.,lness-. They have a proverb;
a Lubaale, Here Spirit, punishes with reason, prnvided that it
has not killed ,)ne of your own relatives. Bennett found
difficulties when asking Qanda parents about their Childrons'
cfrJ.ilclrons'
diarrhoea.
:.J. :~though relatives adnitteda . a possible cause of
the c".iarrheea ~iarrheea was 0 obusobe,a be, a ritu8~ tUE'.l nistake nist8~e nade in: preGnancy
or infancy, none adnitted ttec1 thc.'\t this ·was -was the reason fer their
own child's c1iarrhcea diarrhoea (Bennett' -ct Elt al: 31:1964). 1964). 1:.1 1~th0uGh thOUGh there
are said tc be sC'ne sene diseases that result freD frcn the breakinG of
certain tab~~.r,s , it (bos rl:::.cs net se,en se,cn to be an. :;.I1portant :;.!'1portant r,eason (~iven
in these days. Mac1noss Madnoss im a nother followinG following child-birth is
thOUGht to be brnught br0ught by her dODDitting conoitting adultory during
durinG
precnancy. Southw61d investiGated the beliefs associated with
nrash a which nay be seen in infants because the [mther nother ate
salt t dUring dJuring the preGnancy.
preGIlancy.
He, He· states thllt although he had
read about.this b~lief, .
'I never heard ofa,specif:!.ccase ofa,specifj,ccase of anyone w:i.th the
disease, anc1,when and,when I apprnached 0 ached it froo the other
en~., en~,
by ~skint1 ~sk~1 what ,,!,()ulr woul~ l happen if anyone did clid break
;the taboo, people were pretty sceptical whether anythinG
,wculd. '(Southwold:1959: Southwold:1959; 45).
.
'
'Pecple'will teJ.,l you that buko is an illness that
people get thrOUGh connittinG conoittins incest, but when you
ask what happens to a oanwho connits cormits incest and
'
is not prosecuted they will say "nothing".'(ibid:p 46).
Thore There aPl"ears tc be no literature' ('n c'n the classification
cla.ssification
,. of "natural" causes in prinitive vc riedicine, but these are not
necessarily clearlydistin~1Uishe1fron supernatural causes.
What we nay call "natural" are those explanations exvlanations which are
nost rlost sensible in Western teros. In nany nnny cases those causes are
thoU{;ht thow;ht to be seconcle.ry to supernatural fr:.ctors. The "natural"
C?auses 9auses that, tha~ aPVear appear in the literature tJay bay be classified:
(1)
Invaaion of the body by external aGents; ,
(a) ~ivinG
aGents, ,wnrns, lizarrls lizar~s or insects.
(b) "N'on-living.ar;cnts "Non-living.agcnts such as peisons. pcisons. Poisoning
ls is only an ins~8.nce
ins~ance of disease-object intrusion
intrusicn
which' which· happenstc fit' in with' Western notions
ef of causation.
(2)
Thenal-function nal-f'llnction or noveI1ent novenent of certain organs
or the blood. blnoQ.
'
(3)
Dietary factors which· includes eating foods fe'ods which
are proscribed for ritual reasons.
(4)
Hereditary factors which nay be expressed in
. terns of 6'ooe sooe fanily spirit.·
(5)
Environnental factors such as the noon's phases
or cold winds.
(6)
,ContaGion, the'nechaniso of which is seldoo if
ever specified.
'
Thus HoernlG says of the Bantu of South J~rica
that:
'Worns they have seen in their stoels, and often
think that the pains in their bodies nay be caused
by such w(;1,nc1erinr; w8,nc1erinr; about' al''10ng 8..l"'1ong the differont oreans,
orGans,
or even by the crcansr.;etting crcansgettinGdisplaced within the

- ~4~ ­
-
body. I
t (Hoernlt: .}.-. .) .-. Schapera (ed) n937: 2?'7) •
Anongst the Ganda, stono..ch ston~ch aches of all kinds are usunlly
usuclly
referred to as enjoka., Whilst in general this wo~d h~s the
connot~tion
of "worns", not a11forns al1,forns arc thouGht to be due
clue
to w-;rns. 1m lm early European trn;veller' in UGp:.nda UGP:.nda reported an
encounter with woros anongst the Ganda~
'~~other
difficulty is that natives· often cone for
treatnent, for inaginary coop1aints.One conp1aints.One ~f
the ljreat
(jreat
Waganda Chiefs, the Kaee>, Kaeo, used tJ t'J cooe" cone" to ne
reeular1y reGUlarly with his storr story a:f' the,"worn". One day the
"worn"was in his heart., another, day in the snl?.ll snl?.11 of
his baok, [".nother ~~other tine it had travelled trave11ec1to to his am,
,and so on.
I Gave hin the benefit of the doubt, f and
t,reated hin for rheunatisri, oppression,' or anYthing
rational bearing on hiasynptonsi In, spite of all,
his ai10ents grew daily oore nore stout stcut and stronG. One
day I gave hin a strong purgative. He did not reappear
fora week; when,hep-ane, when,hep-a.ue, he. hc.waS acconpanied by one
of 'his nen 1ee.diilg 1eadihg a fat' sheep. He hadneve~
nevel' Given
ei oetha ne the slightest, acknow1edgcent for the scores and
scc,res scores of tines he had cone tone for the treatnent
which he was rec9iving rec~ivinG
gratis. This day he solermly
nade ne a ~resent
of a tat sheep. He reassured oe
that oy last nedicine was splendid. The effect was
such, he said, that he reallythoueht really.thoueht ho was ,about
to die, and that it had utte~ly
prostrated hin for
days. He felt, however', that he 'was 'waS cured and he
cane to thank ne ,Ilub1ic1Y4 It ~as
nany npnths before
he was ,troubled again by his, old elleny the "wern". "wc.m". '. I
was interested wHen when one day the Mission c\octor; Dri
1... Cook" incidente.11ynentioned incic1ente.l1ynentioned tone that sone
natives·cane natives·cnne to hin with ibaginary tllaginary diseases. They
cause a serious loss of tine to hiD hin whon I know to
be one of the nest ab1e and hard-working nen I have
had the privilege of neeting eithor thar in professionc'11.
professionc'1.l
consultation or in private life. '(,Ansonge:1.899:191-2).
'(.Ansonge:1.899:191-2).
The, 'Ganda alao nJ.ao classify sone diseases as, "those at ot f_ornication".
f.ornication".
These inc1uc1e include the venerGal venereal diseases but also ino1ude include the
nadness that occurs after ch,i1d-birth. Althouch they have the
nr:tion n0tion of conto.eion contaeion they cannot describe the neohanisn nechanisn by
which they think it, '}ccurs. c:ccurs. TheY They believe that epilepsy,
leprosy and consunption are contagious and they isolate
people sufferinG fron fran these diseases. (Or1ey::1970:35).
The relation between ideas of natural causation and
witchcraft aoongst anongst the Azande have been clearly laid out by
Evans-Pritqharcl.
tqhard.
'"
tIn lIn speaking to Azande aboutwitchoraft witchcraft and in
observing their reactions to'situations of, mis- ,
fortune it was obvious that th~ydidnot attempt
to account for the existence o.f- phenomena, or
even the action aotionof of phenomena, by mystioal mystical oausation
causation
alone. Who. What t they explained by witchcraft were the
,particular conditions in a chain ofoausation causation which
related anindividua.1·to anindividual·to natural happenings in..such
,a way that he sustained injury.' I (Evans';"Pritchard:
(Evans';"'Pritchard:
1937:67)'~'
1937:67)·~'
'
Thus a victime'of some accident, ;3.1though seeing clearly some
of the natural events leading up to it, wants to know why it
should have bappened happened to him rather than someone else and at
that time rather than at another.
Misfortune requires a
fuller explanation in addition to that which Can b~
given by
crude observation.

The naming of riseases, r'Useases, however, is seldom related to
causation in primitive medicine. Naming tends to depend on the
part of the body affected. and the symptoms of the disease.
Sometimes the response to. treatment J.s. J.s, uS'ed uS'ad ,to . define the ill­
illness
in broad terms. Junoq, Junoq. says tha1;: .' ,
.
'Thonga call the complaint from which they suffer by
the name of the organ ·affect.ed: 'affect.ed: .for. ,for. instance III have
a foot, I have a hand " I have a 'neck" , means; III have
a pain in my' foot., .my ,my hand o~
my neckll, •
.' "
"Hehas a head lt ll means ItHe IlHe is·mad".
lt , For "I ItI have a headache",
It , the expression ItI III feel. my head ll lt ,
w·ould
generally be used.;i(Junod:19l3:430).
The Tallensiname illnesses by reference to the part
:of the body' most affected, but there is a vague notion that
all forms of illriess illness are manifestations of disorder either of
the head or of the :belly or' of both. ,(Fortes and Mayer:1969:
41), 41). The Azande know disease,S\ diseas~~ by their major sYIDl'toms.
sym~toms.
Diseases are named (1) After the part affected. (2) After the
sensations they produce or the±r themr effects on the organism.
(3) After something in nature. natura tow-hioh which they bear a resemblance.
(4) After'their their cause. (5,) After their cures.· (Evans-Pritchard:
1937:482). . ., ., .. .. ' ,'.'
. .
The Ganda also:have a . tendency to think of their illnesses
in terms of·that ·t·hat part ofthe·bodyaffocted. 'body affected. Thus a
cough may be referred:to as ekifuba (chest), provided that the
context indicates· that illiJ.ess is being talked about. By
changing the prefix prefiX ot the word, one can indicate different
diseases of the chest. Thus there is akafuba (consumption or
tuberculosis) and olufuba (asthma).
Because of this already
established way of thought, the. Ganda seem to have readily
taken to the idea of a group of illnesses within the category
, diseases of the brain'.. (Orley,.1970: p4 L
The Subanum also use the part of the body affected in
their namin~
of disease, but they use other ,criteria as well.
(Frake:1962). Some causes are important criteria in classification
such as a wound, a bite,a a burn or a worm, whereas
others are not·important as criteria in naID1ng'since naming' they
appear to cover a very disparate collection of phenomena.
Such are the sorts of causes .listed _listed by elements Clements such as objectintrusion
or soul loss. It is' 'only the exceptional case that
is re-named as a resUlt of a seance or divination. Frake's
already classic desceiption of Subanum naming of disease
emphasises the way that symptomatology is used. Symptoms may
be,localised~int~rnally bo,localised~int~rnally or externally i~ der1;ain p~rts of the
body, body. Deformity in a particular area or pain, itch or
irritation in particular areas may help tQ refine the
diagnostic name .• ·
Mental illness appe~rs
to be recognised in all
areas ,of the world. and is defined by its symptomatology as
reflected in the patient's behaViour, behaviour, as also is epilepsy.
Jilek and Aall..-Jilok Aall-Jilok report from Tanzania,. however, that:
'The Wapogoro do not .possess a concept of mental
disease. ~hey
have, however, howevcr,u a fairly clear notion
of what constitutes a deviation from culturally
accepted patterns.' r
(Jilek and Aall-Jilcik:1967:208).
It is uncertain what they mean by this. Edgerton reported a
study of four East African tribes.: (Edgorton:1966). All had
terms corresponding fairly closely to Kichaa in Swahili which
is the word usually used forniadnbss. No great variety of terms
were found in anyone language,and where whore there are several
terms they do not seam seom to imply different symptomatology.
.

-143 ­
-
Questions about aetiolrg;~
produced no consistent. repli.es replies and
certainly witchcraft was not seen as the sole cause. Some
attributed it to a worm in the brain, not usually introduced
by witchcraft, others said it came for no reason. All tribes
recognise rocognise the possibility of multiple causation.· Further
enquiry in each of the four tribes for a description of what
was meant by that tribe's word for madness brought very
similar answers but with some differences in enphasis. The
Sebei Sobei (Uganda)-most ,most oftqn mention nudity, shouting, talking
"nonSense ',nonSense and violence. The Kamba (Kenya) mentioned viol~nce
and nudity most frequently as the features of madness. madnoss. The
Hehe' mentioned nudity frequent-ly, frequen~ly, but most often mentioned a
timorous retreat from people to a solitary life in the bush.
They did, however, talk of two types of madness, the violent
and the passively fearful. The Pokot most often referred to
tal~ing
nonsense, but murder and arson wore also mentioned.
They also distinguished between "wild" and "mild" mad people,
but these were not regarded as mutually exclusive exclUsive types. A
notable emphasis emphaSis in all the tribes was upon nudity.
nUdity.
Even the
Pokot whose men are typically nuda, nudo, are horrified by nudity
among w0I:lren~
wo~en~
Violence soems very 'frequently montioned,as has
been noted over much of Africa.
Hallucinations were very
seldom mentioned, but all mentioned that psychotic acts occur
without good reason.
None of the behaviour regarded as road in
these tribes would not also have been so regarded in tke vlost.
Two of the tribes reco~endtroatment reco~endtreatment more than the other tvlO,
and this may be related to their belief that it is caused by
witchcrn.ft and n.t least temporarily curable, whereas tl,\)se tl;\)se
who regard it as incurable tend to recommend harsh treatment
moro than medicine.
'
There nave have been very few, studies of the indigenous
classifiCation of mantal montal illnoss. Those attemptod attempted have usually
dono done nothing Doro,than list the names given tovnrious tOV"nrious conditions
that would bo·calied mental illnoss illness in the 'West. Exaoples of
this type of study from Africa have been reported from amongst
the Bemba, the Snona and the Yoruba. It is very difficult from
these accounts to distinguish what are the indigenous systems
systel!ls
of classification and arid what has been beon imposed upon the terms to
make them fit Westorn Western diagnostic groups.
Thus Brelsford
discusses various classes ·of the insane, in many of which there
are various sub~classes
given Bemba names. He lists the classes
as (1) Idiots· Idiots' and imbeciles. (2) Madness.' (3) Temporary
violence or fits. (4) Hysterics. (5) Melancholics. (6) Bhang
intoxication psychosis. (7) Eccentricity, EccentriCity, (not madness), madness). (8) An
aimless wanderer~
There are several,terms given for varieties
of sub-normals. Cdses,' which show violence, evon eVGn though subnormal;'
are calle,d "mad"'.
One infoITlant described· described, the typical.
madman:
'
,'This person,does not, mind anything. He stabs
another'without fear. He jeers when he is most
painfully tied up. He swears and curses without
, fear and reason, and he ho walks naked without shame.
'He'docs 'He'does great violence' and is the proper Legion
spoken .of in the Bible.' (Brelsford:1950). .
,
Gelfand gives the names of many disorders inShona,
but there seems soems 'no' system in his description. This may be
due to the tho fact that there thero is no system behind these na.r.les. n~es. vIe We
see, however~
the name ebenzi included in three disease nanes,
and we can assume that, they should be classed together togethor in some
way, but we are not told what meaning this word has. This
sabe applies applios to the word kupenga which also isincludod isincludad in
three disease names. namas. (Gelfand (Gelfa.nd in Kicv(ed):1964:l65-l70).
Aniong. Am:ong, the Yoruba tho'term the'term were is used forall'forns
,of insanity, particUlarly particularly chronic forms. (Leighton & Lambo:
Laobo:
1963:106-8), 1963:106-8). The symptoms covered by this torm term are; talking

-144 -J'
,to 'to onescl_', onoscl_', obvious h,:,'...L

- 145 -
­
convulsion, the eyes':;l;:.:n up n.s if to see the tho bi ru flying
above then. If such a0ird, is soen, the WODen wonen with the
children Day nay shout up 3.1:, a~
it that the child is really quite qUite an
old one, hoping to deceive tho the bird into thinking that the
child is too old to be attacked. There arc various other
preventive Deasures, such as the tying of a s@Bll bell onto
the left loft l'Trist,' wrist, the noise' of which will frighten the bird, or
attract the tho nother's attention iftho child Doves to fend it
off. (ibid: 9-10).
The association of birds with cpileptiforn fits and
convulsions seems to be comJon CODrl0n to nany parts of Africa. Anongst
the Benba the tern used for fits in children is the SaDe as
that used for a sparrowhawk that is found unconscious on the
ground, presU17lably presUl7lably afternissing a swoop. (Brelsford:1950). In
another part of ,northern Zarlbia the word used for epilepsy
means "tho,nadness "tho,nadnoss of a hawk".' (Haworth:1969:6). Turner has
reported that the treatncnt for epilepsy anongst the Lunda
consists' of the'beak,of the'beak-of a bird which "flies,up and down
spasnodically spasDodically like an epileptic; [laking oaking a 0. whirring sound."
(Turner:1963:29). The Wapogoro believe certain birds should not
be killed, especially the fish eagle, because it circles and
then drops to the earth like an epileptic in an attack (Aall­
Jilok:1965:71). Jilek:1965:71). (It is of interest to note that the word used
for fits by the thc ~,~ohave
~"~ohave
of North lu:wrica il.l:wrica oeans Doans il1u>.wks
i1h£>.wks
copulnte". copuln.te". (Devereux:1961:73) ). Y.
",
There Thore arc are few ethnographic accounts of priDitivQ prinitive concepts
of body _
function. ~ /~
few investigators give SODe sone infornation
as to thewc.ys in which Dental disorder is rela.ted to the
body. On the whole they are associated with the thc head or tho
the
heart, but occasionally abdooinal abdoninal structures are ioplicated.
inplicated.
Thus, as we wc have already nontiened, ncntioned, the tho, Thonga associntc associo.tc
nadnesswith th0 head. h0ad.(Junod:1913:430). The Tallensi have havc a
vague notien that all foros forns of illness are due to disorders
in either the head or the belly, or both. (Fortes and rJIayer:
rlI3.yer:
"1969:41). '1969:41). In much of the African literature thore thoro is probably
a greater enphasis cnphasis on'the associp.tion associp,tion between oadness and
anger as expressed in the" tho' .runorican ~orican colloquialiso colloquialisn "to get Dad"
nenning"to nCruling"to get angry". The Nyakusa Nyalrusa say that a rnada'l.n rnada"l.n Day
nay
recover but:'
'When 'he is angry his heart soemsto,befull of
oadness' nadness' a.gain.,' ngain.,' "
,
They say a'nad ECnad person talks to hiosolf like sane­
sone­
, one onc in a passion of grief,or anger, or fear, and
, ooilJ.ds noulds tho tht; earth. '(Wilson:1957:80,83).
The Benba des'cribe the oelancholic nclancholic o;s ns one who "has a. heart",
or is sick in'the,heart.' 'tho· heart.' (;Brelsford:1950:47). The Lozi considers
that' epilepsy epilopsy is·cause

-'1.46' ~.
The Ganda beliove that ~ the hoc.rt and br3.in brain chink, but
this probably ropresents an,incursion of wGstorn wostern thought, for
it is stillpossiblo to find older ·people who say.that only
tho. heart thinks. The hea+t is thought not only to be the
contre of onotions o[1otions such as fear, ange:r:, ange~,
joy and jealousy, but
in the past. . it was. e.lsoconsid,erod 2.lsoconsiderod the place where wisdon and
~:md
.. , . oenory nenory resido. Whereas older people believe in tho prinacy of
the heart, the young nornally norr.1O.lly say that the brain and the h08.rt
ho~rt
work vlOrk together, the heart deciding things and sending a Dcssage
r::tossage
to tho the brain which in turn passes it. it, on·to on.·to tho the body. (Orley:
197°:1) 1970: l ) .•
Thero are two conditions' of the heart which in sooe
sone
cC'..sesnay' cC'..sesnay· represent neurotic illness. Intho first.the heart
is referred to as being o.gitated. o.gito.tcd. er or fearful and o.nd in the second
it. is said, that the heo.rt h~sfo.llen
or fniled. The first
condition refors to a pounding of tho the 'heo.rt with fright and
nnd
nay n['o.y bo used nerely to. refer to feoling feeling startled. It is flost
corrrlonly CODrl0nly thought of as an illness in which the person
exporiences experiences an intense fear causing hiD to run away awo.y and o.nd hido
hide
in the bush. (Orley:l970jp8). (Orley:1970jp8). This running away into tho the bush
has been connented cormented on by authors r>.uthorsworking in Lfrica j~frica
ns an
.aspect of the "oad" "nad" syndrone. Field describes it in Ghnna as
a typical typicc.l feature of nostacuto nost'acute psychotic ep:i,sodes, op~sodes, and ~nd Fortes
and Mayor Mo.yor note it anongst 2.nongst th0 thE) Tallensi( Gfu.'1na). (Field:1968: :l968: 32).
(Fortes and Mayert1969:66).
~Iayer:l969:66).
The word used for the tho heart intheso eonditi.ons is
oLmene or.mone and refers rofors not only to ·the ,the heart but to the soall bone
at the base bo.se of the stornun(xi~histernUI:lrand (xiJ;>histernuo). to the snaIl
srmll
bono at the base of the spine (coccyx) and the assQciatcd
asso,ciatod
rogion region of. the anus. Tho The condition in which it is sa~d to
fnll or fail fo.il nay affect either or both of these. It nanifests
itself in a general genero.l weakening of the body and failuro failure to eat. oat.
Sir l~bert
Cook referred toile the condition in the usual tern
taken by Dsny D£mY physicians phySicians and surgeons to such disorders. He
,vrote ,,,rote of "the "tho stalwart nan with :;l. :;L'" fraoe of Hercules, Horcules, who
wastes ton oinutes ninutes trying to persuade you that his heart has
fallon fallen fron froG its right placo." (Cook:l954:l24).
(Cook:1954:124).
The inportance ioportance of the heart in Lfrican l~frican
thought has
been oophnsiscd onphnsised by Muwazo, Huwazo, a doctor working in KaLlpala•
Kanpala.
. , 'hfricans 'L.fricans of the pr~sent present day roscnblo rosonblo Europeans of
preVious previous centuries' in regarding rogarding the heart as tho
cop.tre co~tro of lifa; life; the tho soul is .elso ,also thought to reside
in or near the heart. Africans consider that the
he~rt
is nornally- nornally. ootionJ.Qss notionl,css ,.. ,.,;thoyhn,ve no Imcwledgo
of th~..ci~~tj,on th~, .ci~~tj,on of·tho 1Dloo.d~ ~heexact position
of the hen.rt he~rt
is not· not' understood clearly, but, but" the whole
of the front of the chest 8,nd ·theuppor ,the. upper ab

- 147­
147-
The final oethodof nethodof classification of illnebJos is
by "nationality". This 'lsually depends on treatnents nnd
cones into proninence prooinence wh,:-n wh,:.n there are conpeting coopeting systens of
treatnent. Illnesses '£'lay be said to have ccne fron neigh'o(;uring
tribes and this nay be due to 0.
sinilar nental procoss
process
that attributes illness to witchcraft frOD a neighbouring
hODestead~ Where Western treatMent treat~ent is offered, it seens that
so~e diseases'are seen to be very w~enable ru~enable to this treatnent
. and are perhaps Western diseases. Those illnesses not
a:lcnable a:lenable to Weste.rnnedicine (particu.larly (particu.la.rly psychogenic "ilJ.­
nesses are said to be indigenous.
The Zulu recognise disease
as being susceptible to Western nedical treatnents, usually
obviously organic illnesses, whilst psychogenic illnesses are
distinguishod distinguished froI!l then. theD.
'These things are "kwaZulu" (of the Zulu Race), and
cannot'be put right by a,White 0. , ru'\.ll.with ruUl, an
injection.' ('Loe:1950;10).
("Lee:1950;10).
Loudon also discusses accnversion hysteria called ufufunyana:
ufufun,yrum:
'The Zulu class ufufunyana as a Bantu disease, a
torn they usc use to cover all conditions which they
believe to occur only a~cng a~ong
their own people and
to besusceptiblo be'susceptiblo only to, indigenous Zulu r:.ethods
~ethods
of treatnent., •. (Loudon in Opler (ed) :1959:361).
Thesc These diseases arc thought to be due to spirits or witchcraft
. ,and are acconpanied by stereotyped dreams and are usually
assooiated with rather ill-defined or generalised pain. It
nay be diagnosed as such by a diviner.
11. sinilar approach seens to be taken by the Eskimos.
Murphy r1urphy describes' a shrewd shaoan:
, ,
~ He was one of t:q.e shc.-mans shc.'\OallS who changed, not by
giving giVing Up shnanisn, but by adjusting shananisn
to' fit now new cirCU1!lstances - recognising, for
eXal'1ple, that \-lestern i:lodicine works for white­
. , . ',can.' ,rum' s;." 61;." aiseases like' tuberculosis, while
shananistic nedicine works for different i1l­
i1l-
"'. nesses.' nesaes. I (Murphyin Kiev( ed)t 1964: 77). •
.In ,In South Iran it is not the lack of response to
Western oedicino nedicine that is the principle criterion but a
a
positive response to rituals ained atthe'Zar spirit. The
patient attends aZar cerenonY'and cereJ:lonY'and if he 'oecooes pecones un­
conscious during the cerenony, "it ..i t is an indication that he
:l,.s afflicted by' Zar..
Otherwise. Otherwise, tho".,patient oust nust go 'to..a
'to, ,B
'Western style doctor. I' .. ,. . , ,
It is la interesting iilterosting to note that the patient·who
,who
is ia diagnosed as being possessed by Zar will
.not ,not respond to any treatnent treatoent adninistered adninistercd by a' a
Western doctor.No~ 'Not only do they fail to respond
to Iledical nedical troatoent. troatt1ent, but in nanycases nanycascs they
becone becooe worse. If a doctor givos an injection to
these patients, they the'y becooe. becoI:1e. cxtremelynanic extremely r.1anic or
withdrawn. In the native dialect, they say that
Zar and the needle are' 'not' nat' conpatible,.and conpatible"and that
tho the nore you give injections the worse the
paticnt'becones. (Modarressi in Prince (ed):
(cd):
1968: 151-2).
This type of classification into indigenous and
non-indigenous illnesses is used by the Ganda. Thus not only
do the Ganda ascribe diseases to certain parts of, the body,
but they also classify thefl according to three sets of

- ~48 -­
dichotonies.
1. Those that con:; by thenselves 'and those that tha.t arE;
ar6
Sent or caused by witchcraft.
2. The strong and the weak.
3.: Kiganda and non-Kiganda.
In goneral. general. tho Klganda'illilesses are those that the
G2"nda G2"rida believe to havpbeen already afflicting then before the
Lrcbs ~nd.Europeahs
ca.ae,to thoJr country, but the Ge.nda
inply certain other things·when they rofor to illnesses as
Kigandd.. The Ganda think of their'illnesses'as'''strong'' U ill­
nosses, 8l,ld ~d thoy they are, usually' thought to be sent by another
although 2'~lthough there are' nany cxceptions~ There: are tradition~l
traditionlJ.l
fOTI1s of therapy for then although in these days the
traditional art of healing is.thought to have been largely
lost. Western neclicine'is not considered to be particula.rly
effect'ive effective in treating such illnosses illnesseS.
•. The underlying feeling
is that Europeans know how to treat their own diseases disoases with
their own nedicines.
Those illnesses whioh are arc untreatable
byl,'lestorn byWestorn nedicino or are difficult tc' to'treat, treat, as in the case
ca.se
with ouch Dental illness, are thought therefore, to be Kiganda
diseases, and arc of course- strong sinco since traditional foros forns of
thornpy thernpy are not often very useful eitho·r.Therc eithc·r.Therc are other
roasons for strong Kiganda illndsses being thought to be
brought by witchcraft. Madness, epilepsy and other strong ill­
nesses bring 'an onornous anount of trouble to a patient and
their fanily faoily and usu~y tend to follow' E". a Chronic course GX­
extending
over r:l.any nany years, if not a lifetine. In order'to cope
with such a stressful situation an explanatory exPlanatory nodel (paranoid
in naturo) nature) is fornulatod fornulated by the' fanily, which apart fron
helping then to talk about tho the illness, also absolves then
fron blanc and opens up a course of action. No one bothers to
use such a nodol nodel whon when referring to a cold, COld, but the "strong"
diso~ses
dise~ses are alnost always said to be sent. Thus tho the typical
Ganda illnoss illn~ss
such as nadness nadnoss or epilepsy are said to be sent
by another, anotberKiganda and strong. (Orley:1970:pl5).
(Orley:l970:pl5).
'The classification into "cone by thensolves"'and thcnselves"'and "sent
by another", is confu~ecl by the notio~ of contagion. This is
a recognised rocognised Bechanisn Bochaniso even though sane sooe illnesses exe are rcgnrded
rognrded
as contagious which wo we would not so regard in the West,an
exanplo exanple of this being epilepsy.
It' would seon seen that there
always was an indigenous classification of illnesses into
contagious, and non-contagious, but that this was disrupted by
. the advent of Western Westorn fJodicino, rJodicine, which includes a very vory strong
notiqn of contagious diseases.
Those diseases thought·
contagious in the two systons systens prosunably varied Widely widely and
the result has' 'peen p oen to leavo leave a certain a:::lOunt a~ount of' disorder in
this field. Thoso IJGchanisns df'the'gcnosis of'the·gcmosis of ilhess are not
Dutually exclusive and although a '''natural cause" is postulated
there is ,still the dosire to oxplainwhy explain this natural cause
operatqd at a particular tine and in a particular way.
The e'vidence evidence presented shows· that while African
Jdrican
nedical taxonooy varies varios considerably ,in .in detail., detail, thero there are
sone connon cor]non features, whi'ch which are well illustrated by the Ganda
Ge.nda
case. The six: nost connon COJ::lIlon criteria critena us'cd for classifying diseasus
in Idrica Africa, are:'
.
..
.,1. The part ,affected
2. The kind of SypptOD sypptoo
3. Sane Sone convenient na~ural synbol. synboL
4.The cause
5. The cure
6. The national origin
vlestern Western Do'dical, oodical science uses categories basodon
based' on
different criteria. We have soon, for e,xanple, e~anple,
that contagion

- 149 l49 -­
,'is inpor.tnnt in: "lestern n(.;Lticine, nl;Lticine. as a cause. To the Ge.nda,
causa cause mw nA.y be differcmt2..y deiori.lined detO:ITlined ana the not'':'on of contagim,l
will then only oainpv:. oeinpv:. tantin dotern1ning dotermning social troatnont. troatnent.
For the tho othnographo'r othnographor it is' Dore norc Inportant inportant clearly'to describe
his-people's liis-people's t.axQnooy than to ~evote
futile effort to matching
\vestern Western scientific and folk analyses. ane~yses.
'..', .'
Jahh John Orley.
.; ...... .~" ....
Bibliography
1J..L-JIL~,
L L.. M. 1965. 'Epilepsyiii iii the, tho. Wapogoro Tribe Tribc in
Tnhganyika'. 4cta Psychiatricn Scandinavia XLl
e, .
LC~~CHT, E.H. 1946. 'Natural Disease and Rational Trontnent Trontnont
in Prinitivo Modfcino Modi'cino '. Bi.lJ..letin Billletin of the
History of Modicine. XIX. XlX •
LNSORGE, .l~SORGE,
W.J. 1899. l899. Under Undor the i ..frice.n .frice.n Sun.London.
BENNETT, F.J. et at al. 1964. 'Kiganda 'Kigand~
Concepts of Diarrhoeal
Disea~e.' ., " ~ast
l.frican Mod. Journal.. JournaL XLI. XLl.
BRELSFORD,W.V. IN • v. 1950. i ilnsanity,.i:"1"1ong Insanity ,i:..1"1ong the Beeba Boeba of Northern
, Rhodo~i,n' Rhodo~i,a I •. l~frica XX.
CLEMENTS,F.E. 1932. 'Prinitive Concepts ef Disease' •
. university of Ce.lif,~"rnia PubI. in ,i.1!l.erican
~rcheology and EthnOlOgy •
.,DEVEREUX~ G.1961. G.l96l. Mohavo' Mohave' Ethnopsychiatry and Suicide.
Snithsonian Institution, Bureau of'inorican
of" i.norican
. Ethnology. Bulletin C~. Washington D. C.
EDGERTON, R.B. 1966. 'Conceptions of Psycho~is
in Four East
i~frican
Societies'. l~erican l.ncrican Lnthropelogist.
L.nthropologist.
EVi...NS-PRITCIlLRD,E.'E. EVi..NS-PRITCIlLRD,E.'E. 1937. vlitchcraft. v/itchcraft. Oracles and Magic llnOng
the .Azande .0, ." OXford•.
Oxford. '
FIELD, M.J. 1960. Search'for Security. Evansten.:
Evanston.:
" " 1968. 'Chronic Psychesis Psychosis in Rural Ghana'. Brit. J.
of Psychiatry.
FORTES, III. M. & Ml..YER, Ml.YER, D.Y. 1969. 'Psychosis and Secial Social C~~ge
i~ong ..t:..nong the Tallensi of Northern Glk~at.
Ghc.'Ul8. t •
in Foulkes, S.H. 2.nd Prince,G.S. (ods).
(eds).
Psychiatry in a Changing Society. London.
FR1~,
C.C. 1962. 'Tho Diagnosis of Disease l~ong l:..nong the Subanun
of Mindanoa'. i:.n.orican i:.n.erican Lnthropologist. LXlll.
LnlI.
ID:.LLOWELL, ID~LOWELL, 1..• l ... I. 1935. 'Prinitiva 'Prinitive Concepts of Disease'.
Jill.orican J~thropologist
XXXVII.
J~orican J~thropologist XXXVll.
Hl.RRIS, G. 1957. 'Possession "hysteria" in a Kenya. Tribe'.
l:.n.erican i:.n.erican ;~thropologist.
,.:"..nthropologist. LlX.
EL~WORTH,
L. 1969. 'Epilepsy in Zanbia'. The Caudle. Journal of
the British Epilepsy Lssoc.
.i~ssoc.
Spring Nunber:4-8.
JILEK~W.G. JlLEK~W.G. & lU..LL-JILEK,L.M. ~U.LL-JILEK,L.M. in 'Contributions to Conparative
Psychiatry'. cd. od. N. Petrilowitsch. Tropic~~
Probl. Psychiat. Neurol. V. (Karger,Basel!
(Karger,Basel/
New York 1969).

- 150 ­
-
JUNOD,H.L. 1913. The Lile of a South L.frican ~frican Trt~o.London.
Tri..~o.London.
KIEV. i.. (ed) 1964. L_."i,9. Faith and Healin.,g. New York. .
" .
L1JJBSCHER,B.J.F. LJJJBSCHER,B.J.F. 1937. See,Custooand See,Custotland Psychopathology.London.
LEE,S.G, LEE,S.G. 1950. 'Sooe Zulu Concepts of Psychogenic Disorder',
J. for Soci0.1 Research. 1: 9-18.
LEIGHTON,h.H., LEIGHTON,.i~.H., L1JmO, LJ.MBO, T.l T.~ .... •. et al. ale 1963. 'Psychiatric Disorder
anong aIlong the Yoruba'. New York.
MIDDLETON, J. ['.nd 11/INTER, 1-'/INTER, IS.H.· E.H.· (cds).1963. l"itchcraft nnd
Sorcery in East Lfrica. London~
MUWLZO, E.M.K. and TROWELL,H~.C.1944.
'Neurological Disease
anong l..frican l~rican Natives of Ug2.nda'. Ugcmda'. East i~frica
~ted. Journal.XX1,
Journal.XX1.
OPLER,M.K. 1959. Culture and Mental Health. New York.
ORLEY,J .1970. Culture and Mental Illness .. EastL.frican Studies.
Nairobi.
PRINCE R. 1968. Trance o.nd nnd Possession States. MontreaL
Montreal.
RmJINEY RmllNEY ,1... K~
and d I LNDRl...DE; R. G.1964. r ' Transcultural: Studies Studios in
Cognition', iJ'Jerican iJ.lerican ~'..nthrop.o1ogist. ~'...nthropo1ogist.
LVl
Special Publication.
Publication,
I. 1937. Tho BantuSpcakingTribes of South ~frica.
SCHl..PER..::', SCH1~EEll,
I. 1937. The BantU' Speaking' Tribes of South i.frica.
London~
SOUTHt..lOLD~M.
SOUTm'lOLD~M. 1959,.in •. 'L.,tiiitudes 'J.;.t:t;itudos tq.!.1c;:-),:th.and !,icc,J:th. Diso8.se anong
sooo sono East l hfrican .. Tribes. ;The ; Baganda'. I. Syr..lposiun Syr~posiun at
. Eaisr, Makerero College, Kanpala.. .
TURNER,V. 1963. 'Lunda Medicine and thc.Treatoent of Disease'.
Rhodes-LiVingstone Rhodes-Livingstone Occasional Paper. No n.
rv.
Wl.GNER,G. .. G. 1949. The. Bantu on'the North K.:·wirondo~'Oxford.
K.:'1virondo~' vTILSON, M. 1957• • Rituals of Kinship • London.
. '
'.,.'
'.,.,
.......~ ~., ..
\