Reflections on Recognition: A Matter of Self-realization or a ... - IWM

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Preferred Citation: Eimear Wynne. <strong>Reflections</strong> on Recognition: A Matter of Selfrealization 

or a Matter of Justice? In: Thinking Fundamentals, IWM Junior Visiting 

Fellows Conferences, Vol. 9: Vienna 2000 

<strong>Reflections</strong> on Recognition: 

A Matter of Self-realization 

or a Matter of Justice ? 

Eimear Wynne 

Recognition involves both our relationship with ourselves and our relationship to 

others. It evokes both the notion of respect and a basic quest for understanding 

which should be at the forefront of our relations with others. In recognizing “the 

other” we are acknowledging the other and yet not claiming absolute knowledge of 

the other. As Richard Rorty argues, in recognizing others, we see human beings as 

generators of new descriptions, not as beings one hopes to be able to describe accurately. 

1 From another perspective, Charles Taylor argues that recognition, in certain 

respects, can be said to involve re-cognition, a ‘knowing again’, a sort of reacquaintance 

among ‘selves’. He implies this point when he asserts that recognition 

draws upon the concept of recollection; it involves remembering in the sense of 

1 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

1979), p. 378.

EIMEAR WYNNE: REFLECTIONS ON RECOGNITION 2 

calling again to mind the ‘being’ understood to be present in all human beings. 2 

Thus, in recognizing the other, we are calling to mind the ‘being-ness’ of the other, 

which we share with the other. This means that, recognition rests on the presumption 

of shared community in which identity is formed, projected, and understood. 

As a result, recognizing difference is at the same time recognizing sameness and 

commonness of our being in the world. 

Given the preceding account, we might ask: is recognition a matter of self-realization 

or a matter of justice or both? In trying to answer this question, I will begin 

with an analysis of Hegel’s Master/Slave dialectic, which I believe clearly indicates 

that recognition must be viewed first and foremost as a matter of self-realization. I 

will then turn to Axel Honneth’s account of what he refers to as the three stages of 

recognition, namely self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem. I will focus on 

what Honneth deems essential for people to have a healthy relationship with themselves 

and others. Finally, I shall examine Nancy Fraser’s argument that recognition 

should be seen as a matter of justice rather than as a matter of self-realization. I 

shall asses the possibility of ‘de-coupling’ recognition from its psychological roots or 

inter-personal nature, which Fraser advocates in order to strengthen its normative 

force. 

Recognition takes place between subjects within particular parameters: cultural, 

intellectual, geographical, even ethical. Taylor, for instance, claims that some of the 

behavior exhibited by the Aztec priests and rulers, which include things like ripping 

people’s hearts out, we would consider psychopathic behavior. He argues, that in 

order to avoid dismissing the whole society as pathological we may have to enlarge 

and alter our parameters of recognition so that understanding can take place. In 

short, this means we must articulate, and go beyond, what were formerly limits to 

our conception of intelligibility or recognizability, thereby constructing a new context 

for seeing the Aztecs. 3 Here, Taylor is drawing attention to the role our context 

or culture plays in providing a medium through which we apprehend ourselves and 

others. No understanding or recognition can take place without this medium, but 

it is a fluid medium that is constantly changing as we change. The context within 

which recognition takes place becomes vital in debates over group-rights and multiculturalism. 

2 Charles Taylor, “The Need for Recognition”, The Ethics of Authenticity, (Cambridge: 

Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 52. 

3 Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) p. 

149.


The Roots of the Concept of Recognition 

Let us turn to the concept of recognition as outlined in Hegel’s Master/Slave 

model. The concept of recognition delineated in this model suggests that it is 

through recognizing and being recognized by the other that we become aware of 

our own self. For Hegel, one becomes a subject by viewing oneself as an addressee 

or interlocutor of other subjects. The Master/Slave model suggests that self-consciousness 

depends on the other; indeed it requires recognition from the other. 

Further, there is not only the confirmation of one’s own self here, but also, and 

perhaps more importantly, confirmation of the self of the other. Moreover, recognition 

is seen as a requirement for understanding. The aim of recognition is not to 

transcend or negate one’s own point of view as a situated and contextualized being. 

Rather, recognition takes place within these limits. Through understanding and 

recognizing the other our self-understanding is changed and our horizons are 

broadened and expanded. 

Hegel’s Master/Slave model enables us to understand how we, as autonomous 

individuals, can be reconciled to the community of which we are a part. The first 

step towards the recognition of difference is self-consciousness, as we move from 

subjectivity to inter-subjectivity. One of the key aspects of Hegel’s theory of recognition 

is the transition from individual consciousness to inter-subjective-consciousness. 

For Hegel, although ‘self-consciousness’ exists in and for itself, it’s more 

important characteristic is that it exists only in being acknowledged. 4 In other 

words, subjectivity exists only through inter-subjectivity; we must find our subjectivity 

in the external “objective spirit” of culture. As Alexandre Kojeve points out, 

for the idea of oneself to be a truth, it must exist not only for oneself but also for 

beings other than oneself. 5 Thus, our identity is dependent on the recognition we 

receive from others. For Hegel, “real and true man” is the result of his interaction 

with others; his ‘I’ and the idea he has of himself are “mediated” by recognition 

obtained as a result of his action or interaction with others. Hegel emphasizes the 

inter-subjective duality of this action. “Action by one side only would be useless 

because what is to happen can only be brought about by both”[subjects]. 6 Thus, 

two subjects recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another. 

4 G. W. F. Hegel, “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and 

Bondage”, Phenomenology of the Spirit, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 111. 

5 Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of 

Spirit, (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 11. 

6 Hegel, op. cit., p. 112.


Hegel posits two opposed concrete forms of consciousness: one is autonomous 

consciousness, for which the essential reality is being for itself; the other is dependent 

consciousness, for which the essential reality is animal life, that is, given being 

for another entity. The former is the master and the latter the slave. The slave 

becomes a slave by accepting the life granted to him by another. The master, on the 

other hand, is consciousness existing for itself. His relation to himself is mediated by 

the slave, who recognizes the master as master. Hence, for Hegel, to be fully human 

is to be recognized or mediated. Yet, vital to the Hegelian notion of recognition is 

reciprocity. Self-consciousness does not lose itself in the other or to the other. If 

this were so, then one would no longer see the other as a self at all, but rather, 

merely see oneself in the other. As Hans-Georg Gadamer explains, although selfconsciousness 

must cancel “the other being standing on its own” in order to be 

certain of itself, it must also hold itself back out of respect for the other. It is essential 

for self-consciousness that the other continues to exist. Only if the other is not 

simply the other of the first self-consciousness, not simply his other, but rather free, 

can it provide confirmation of the first’s self-consciousness. 7 

The relationship between the master and slave is, however, not one of proper 

recognition. Although the master is recognized as a master by the slave, this recognition 

is one-sided, as he does not recognize the slave’s human reality and dignity. 

In order to be fully recognized one must be recognized by someone whom one recognizes 

in turn. As a result, the master does not achieve true recognition. The slave, 

on the other hand, although subordinated to the master, recognizes the reality of 

human freedom; not finding it in himself, he finds it in the other, the master. 

Whereas the master is fixed in his mastery, the slave must transcend his condition 

of slavery. 8 In essence the slave continues to become, which he achieves through 

work. 9 What is most significant is that the slave is dependent on the existence of the 

master, who provides the catalyst for his transformation. 

Despite its profundity, there are problems with this Hegelian model. For example, 

it seems to predetermine that some of us play the role of master, never achieving 

true recognition for ourselves, in order for the slave to transcend his condition. 

Even the roles of master and slave seem rather outdated for societal relations today. 

However, this model illustrates the inter-personal nature of recognition and the 

7 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Hegel’s Dialectic of Self-Consciousness”, Hegel’s Dialectic: Five 

Hermeneutical Studies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 64. 

8 Hegel, op. cit., p. 116. 

9 Ibid., p. 118. Also see Kojeve, op. cit. pp. 21-22.


inter-subjective constitution of identity. It demonstrates the role the other plays, 

not merely in mirroring our selves to our selves, but more importantly in transforming 

who we are. Finally, the unequal relationship of the master to the slave 

emphasizes the need for universal recognition, the fact that in order to be genuinely 

recognized I must recognize the other as my equal. 

II. Recognition and Psychology 

In his book, The Struggle for Recognition, Axel Honneth continues on a sort of neo- 

Hegelian path, following Hegel’s earlier Jena writings. He concurs that one’s relationship 

to oneself is not solitary but rather an intersubjective process, that one’s 

attitude towards oneself emerges in one’s encounter with an other’s attitude 

towards oneself. Agreeing that the establishment of relations of mutual recognition 

is a precondition for self-realization, he further argues that our struggle for recognition 

takes place within relations of love, law and ‘the ethical life’(Sittlichkeit), 

which he maintains constitute relations of recognition through which individuals 

reciprocally confirm each other as autonomous and individual persons. 10 Honneth 

propounds three vital components of identity formation: self-confidence, selfrespect 

and self-esteem. Self-confidence derives from relations of love and friendship. 

Self-respect is maintained and fostered by legally institutionalized relations of 

universal respect for people. Lastly, self-esteem comes from community relations 

and acknowledgment. These, he argues, are only attained through inter-subjective 

recognition, whereby we are recognized by others whom we recognize. Thus, we are 

dependent on the establishment of relations of mutual recognition for self-realization. 

For Honneth, our relationship to ourselves is not a solitary thing but an intersubjective 

process where one’s view of oneself becomes manifest with an other’s 

view of oneself. Self-confidence, the most fundamental form of recognition for 

Honneth, takes place in relations between children and their parents, friendships, 

and adult relationships of love, as they are at the heart of the relationship to the self. 

Honneth draws on George Herbert Mead’s psychological theory to establish that 

the relationships children have with their parents and others have a profound effect 

on their development. The role a parent plays in providing the needs of the infant 

and yet allowing for the infant to develop on its own, is a finely balanced one, 

10 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, 

(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), p. 69.


worked out inter-subjectively between the parent and the child and leads to ‘basic 

trust’. 11 This demonstrates how the self is transformed in the process of social 

development, as individuals learn to conceive of themselves from the perspective of 

what he calls ‘the generalized other’. Growing children recognize their interaction 

with others by internalizing their normative attitudes. They begin to know themselves 

to be members of their social context of cooperation, accordingly they become 

members of the community. 12 

The second aspect of recognition Honneth outlines is self-respect, the respect 

due all persons on the basis of being human. Legal rights provide the medium 

through which this form of self-respect is best captured. There is a strong Kantian 

element here with the definition of personhood incorporating the capacity of persons 

to outline the moral and political laws to which they are subject, and the 

importance of respecting and recognizing this capacity or right. I will return to this 

aspect of recognition in my discussion of Nancy Fraser’s theory of recognition as a 

matter of justice. 

The third stage of recognition Honneth outlines is self-esteem, which requires 

the recognition of what sets us apart from others, recognition of our differences and 

uniqueness. As such, it is the more problematic of the three. Self-esteem and one’s 

own identity are tied to one another. Honneth expounds Mead’s theory of individuation, 

which looks at the division of labor and how individuals’ functions 

afford them the space in which to define themselves according to how they contribute 

to society. This is reminiscent of the role work plays in the slave’s transformation 

in the Hegelian model. But again Honneth’s model is not without its difficulties, 

as social-esteem is based on what counts as a contribution to society. Thus, 

the work of homemakers, for example, may go unrecognized. As a result, Honneth 

proposes we situate esteem in the horizon of values of a particular culture, rather 

than in the division of labor. In fact Honneth uses the term ‘solidarity’ for the cultural 

climate where self-esteem is derived. By this Honneth means that some shared 

concern or value is present for esteem to be achieved and generated inter-subjectively. 

So, for Honneth, in order that individuals be given the opportunity for full 

self-realization, common values must be shared. Consequently, his account has a 

strong communitarian strain. His notion of esteem is based on a contribution to 

one’s community. But how large is this community? If esteem comes only from 

one’s peers it would seem that it must come first and foremost from those of the 

11 Ibid., pp. 76- 77. 

12 Ibid., p. 78.


group to which an individual belongs. In a multi-cultural or multi-ethnic society 

this becomes very complicated and may result in the fragmentation of the society 

into sub-communities or sub-groups, instead of according the recognition that 

engenders self-confidence and self-respect. 

Recognition as a Matter of Justice 

Nancy Fraser shifts her theory of recognition from the realm of self-realization to 

the sphere of justice. In some sense Fraser’s contribution to this debate can be seen 

as a return to a more universal theory of recognition, transferring it from the more 

subjective realm of self-realization. She privileges the conception of recognition as a 

matter of justice and sets forth a pragmatic strategy for avoiding mis-recognition by 

combining it with the issue of redistribution. 

Fraser must bring recognition into the realm of justice in order to put it on the 

same plane as her theory of redistribution, which comes in tandem with recognition 

issues, as she demonstrates with the cases of race and gender. But there are certain 

problems involved in removing recognition from its psychological or inter-personal 

birthplace. The notion of identity formation is not one that can be rationalized easily 

for the legal sphere. It is not fixed, rather, it is constantly evolving. The notion 

of reciprocity, which is tied to the Hegelian notion of recognition, requires a shared 

value structure between individuals in order for them to be able to recognize each 

other. The liberal notion of “subjective freedom” will not be able to account for our 

interaction with others, which we rely on for our identity formation and recognition. 

Instead, it emphasizes what separates and differentiates us from one another. 

Fraser proposes the norm of ‘participatory parity’ to replace what she sees as the 

teleological norms of self-realization and the good. She maintains that for purposes 

of political theory, these can be replaced with justice, which can justify claims for 

recognition as normatively binding on all who agree to abide by fair terms of interaction 

under conditions of value pluralism. 13 However, this requires the prior establishment 

of recognition, i.e., that we all recognize and accept the rule of law. Consider 

for example the case of the Kurds in Turkey or the Palestinians in Israel. The 

rule of law is perceived by these minority groups to be in favor of the majority 

group, to their disadvantage. In such a situation these people are unlikely to relinquish 

their need for recognition of what is required for their self-realization or their 

13 Nancy Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition and 

Participation”, (Unpublished manuscript, 1997), pp. 19-20.


notion of the good in favor of justice. Recognition is appealed to on these bases 

precisely because various groups feel that either justice is not enough, or too 

abstract and therefore unable to connect to their everyday lives. 

Of course there are advantages to treating recognition as a matter of justice, but 

mis-recognition and the humiliation it engenders is often not ‘felt’ in justice terms. 

It is rather ‘felt’ as a deep psychological harm. Fraser argues that to be mis-recognized 

(as a matter of justice) is to be denied the status of a full partner in social interaction 

and prevented from participating as a peer in social life as a consequence 

of ‘institutionalized’ patterns of interpretation and evaluation. So she is in effect 

tackling ‘institutionalized’ mis-recognition by means of an ‘institutionalized’ remedy: 

the institution of justice. 

Fraser asserts that by treating recognition as a matter of justice we keep misrecognition 

as an externally manifest and publicly verifiable affair, which prevents 

some people from participating as full members of society. Therefore, she points 

out that overcoming mis-recognition involves changing institutionalized interpretations 

and norms which hinder what she terms ‘participatory parity’. 14 One of the 

benefits Fraser cites in leaving aside the psychological or inter-personal aspect of 

mis-recognition is that it avoids laying the blame upon the victim, which, she argues, 

can result when we identify mis-recognition with internal distortions of the 

self-consciousness of the ‘oppressed’. However, as I have outlined above, the issue 

of mis-recognition is intimately connected to the psychological playing out of 

identity formation and association. The idea that it is in danger of ending up 

blaming the victim is a bit of a red herring as mis-recognition involves two distinct 

entities interacting, and mis-recognition occurs when this interaction fails to connect 

in the appropriate way. This point also bears upon Fraser’s other concern, 

whereby mis-recognition is equated with prejudice in the minds of the oppressors, 

which, she fears may lead to a ‘policing’ of their beliefs. This she also finds unacceptable. 

Again, there is a problem in reducing recognition to justice as opposed to 

just coupling it with justice or, as seems more appropriate, with redistribution 

theory. 

For Fraser, the justice account of recognition avoids the view that everyone has 

an equal right to social esteem which, she argues, Honneth’s theory requires for 

undistorted identity formation. She proposes instead the requirement that everyone 

has an equal right to pursue social esteem under fair conditions of equal opportu- 

14 Ibid., p. 21.


nity. This means that institutionalized patterns of interpretation which ‘downgrade’ 

such things as femininity or non-whiteness must be replaced. 15 

Fraser’s argument for ‘participatory parity’ is a persuasive one. This is a basic 

right which requires the establishment of social arrangements to ensure that all 

adults can interact with one another as peers. But Fraser’s argument runs into 

problems on the issue of recognition of distinctiveness, where she maintains that 

the recognition needs of subordinate groups differ from those of dominant 

groups. 16 I feel that some of the problems encountered here derive from her use of 

the term ‘distinctiveness’ whereby a minority group wishes to have their ‘distinctiveness’ 

recognized. Fraser claims that what is at stake is fundamentally an issue of 

power, and that once the obstacles perceived to exist are removed and the minority 

group can participate on a par with others, their claims for the recognition of their 

‘distinctiveness’ will melt away. Perhaps if we substitute the word ‘characteristic’ for 

‘distinctiveness’ we can better see that this facet of identity formation is unlikely to 

just melt away with participatory parity. Our characteristics are not just summoned 

up in an attempt to draw minority people together to fight for democratic rights. 

Rather, our characteristics represent who we are to ourselves as well as who we present 

ourselves to be to others. It is this vital element that Fraser has cast aside in her 

effort to be pragmatic. It explains why the reduction of recognition as simply a 

matter of justice or participatory parity will not suffice. 

The theory of recognition has its base in connections we make with ourselves 

and others. This moment of ‘connection’ is missing in Fraser’s theory since it involves 

our psychological or inter-personal bond with the social world of others and 

our bond with ourselves. Failure to make this connection is ultimately a failure to 

recognize. Consequently, we fail to participate as humans, connecting socially with 

others. True recognition is a rare and valuable thing. It takes a lifetime to recognize 

who we are because we are continually changing. The effort to truly recognize an 

other becomes even more difficult, as it requires action on both sides: recognition 

of both selves and both others. Yet for all its difficulty, it is necessary if understanding 

is to take place and connections are to be formed. 

The appeal to justice is a way to propose a theory of obligation which is not 

grounded in the more familiar ethical notion of duty. The fear is that, unless rights 

to certain goods and services can be established, the poor and under-privileged are 

left to the mercy of the inconsistent ‘goodwill’ of others. Certainly we need institu- 

15 Ibid., p. 22. 

16 Ibid., p. 28.


tions which allocate responsibilities and create positive rights that will prevent or 

limit systematic injury of the vulnerable. But, as Onora O’Neill argues, the fact that 

certain social virtues alone cannot effectively protect the vulnerable from injury, 

does not show that they are unrequired and that justice is enough. 17 

IV. Conclusion 

Principles of justice alone are not enough to supply what is ethically required for 

recognition to take place. O’Neill points out that when we take account of the 

repeated patterns of vulnerability (or mis-recognition) that institutions can mitigate, 

and of the varied and specific ways in which particular agents and subjects are 

and become vulnerable to others, it seems unlikely that justice can be enough. 

Therefore, while principles of justice take due account of the plurality of lives, they 

take minimal and formal account of their connectedness. Connection is always of a 

specific sort, involving specific others, and specific power relations and expectations. 

18 As a result, recognition requires the inter-personal dimension which is 

stressed by Hegel, Gadamer and Honneth. Recognition is undoubtedly a matter of 

justice also, but it cannot be reduced to that alone, since it operates within a more 

personal psychological domain, and requires the unique bonding of two subjects, 

which will necessarily be different every time. 

Recognition must be seen in many respects as a social virtue, which must be cultivated 

and maintained in order for us to develop relations not only with ourselves 

but, more importantly, with others. The formation of our identity is dependent on 

this. A central context for attitudes and action that express certain social virtues is 

often provided in the daily, ordered and constraining lives of family and household, 

school and work, friendship and locality. As Honneth has pointed out, at their best 

they provide organizing structures for sustained love, care and solidarity. Duties of 

justice arise where contractual or other institutional structures establish enforceable 

rights and obligations between specified parties. However, when occasions and 

recipients of action are not fully defined, principles have to be embedded in more 

flexible ways. This is the basic reason why certain social virtues are better embodied 

in the characters of agents as ethical attitudes and characteristics rather than in 

structures that define precise claims between agents and recipients. 

17 Onora O’Neill, “Why Justice is not enough” in Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive 

account of practical reasoning, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 190. 

18 Ibid. p. 193.


In conclusion, then, the appeal for recognition fundamentally relates to the interpersonal 

connections we make with ourselves and others, where recognition is necessarily 

contextualized and grounded in the cultural roots of the subjects. Recognition 

from an institution, such as the legal system for example, is a further extension 

of this relationship, but it remains dependent on it and cannot be separated from it. 

References: 

Fraser, Nancy. 1997. “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, 

Recognition and Participation”. Unpublished manuscript. 

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1976. “Hegel’s Dialectic of Self-Consciousness”, Hegel’s 

Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, New Haven: Yale University Press. 

Hegel, G.W.F. 1977. “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: 

Lordship and Bondage”, in Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford: Oxford University 

Press. 

Honneth, Axel. 1996. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of 

Social Conflicts, Cambridge: MIT Press. 

Kojeve, Alexandre. 1969. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the 

Phenomenology of Spirit, New York: Basic Books. 

O’Neill, Onora. 1996. “Why Justice is not enough” in Towards Justice and Virtue: 

A Constructive account of practical reasoning, Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press. 

Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton 

University Press. 

Taylor, Charles. 1992. “The Need for Recognition” in The Ethics of Authenticity, 

Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 

——. 1995. Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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