Kansas Supreme Court - 99961 - State v. Hollingsworth

6.
Determining whether evidence was properly admitted pursuant to K.S.A. 60-455
requires several steps. The appellate court must determine that the fact to be proven is
material, e.g., concerning intent, motive, knowledge, or identity. In other words, the
court must determine whether the fact has a legitimate and effective bearing on the
decision in the case. The appellate court standard of review for materiality is de novo.
The appellate court must also determine whether the material fact is disputed, i.e., the
element or elements being considered must be substantially at issue in the case. The
appellate court must also determine whether the evidence presented is relevant to prove
the disputed material fact, i.e., whether it has any tendency in reason to prove that fact.
The appellate court reviews relevance—in particular, the probative element—of K.S.A.
60-455 evidence for abuse of discretion. The burden of proof is on the party alleging the
discretion is abused. The court must also determine whether the probative value of the
evidence outweighs the potential for producing undue prejudice. The appellate standard
for reviewing this determination is abuse of discretion.
7.
If the evidence presented under K.S.A. 60-455 meets all these requirements—that
the fact is material; that the material fact is disputed; that the evidence is relevant, i.e.,
probative to prove the disputed material fact; and that the evidence's probative value
outweighs its potential undue prejudice—then the trial court must give a limiting
instruction informing the jury of the specific purpose for the evidence's admission.
8.
Under the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that the probative value of the warrants evidence outweighed the potential for producing
undue prejudice.
Appeal from Shawnee district court; NANCY E. PARRISH, judge. Opinion filed December 11, 2009.
Judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Nancy Ogle, of Ogle Law Office, L.L.C., of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.
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